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“AN EXAMINATION OF HUME’S ARGUMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF MIRACLES. BY ALEXANDER H. LAWRENCE,” Christian Register, vol. 25, no. 40 (3 October 1846), p. 157.
Anonymous
The Christian Register was published weekly in Boston from 1821. It was the leading voice of the American Unitarian Association. Among its contributors were several of the Republic’s most prominent writers, including — listed in order of their dates of birth — William Ellery Channing (1780–1842), Jared Sparks (1789–1866), Edward Everett (1794–1865), and George Bancroft (1800–91). For a reprinting of Lawrence’s entire pamphlet, see selection #26. For another review of it (in the North American Review), see selection #27.
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AN EXAMINATION OF HUME’S ARGUMENT ON THE SUBJECT OF MIRACLES.
By Alexander H. Lawrence,
A very modest pamphlet of twenty pages, bearing this title, was published in Washington about eighteen months ago; and to our mind it is, we know not but we may say, the most complete and strictly philosophical confutation of Hume that we have seen. There is not a word said for effect, — no rhetoric, no display of logic, but a simple, direct, lawyer-like statement of the argument and its fallacies. We take pleasure in quoting a portion of it, for, we believe that Hume’s argument in one form or another is the real secret of nearly all the skepticism, which does not come from a bad heart. If any one who doubts the possibility of proving a miracle should cast his eye here, we beg him not to throw this article aside after a hasty perusal, but to study it till he has made himself master of the subject. Let him throw aside his prejudices, and ask only “what is reasonable, what is true!” After having thus mastered the article let him continue to think of it, till his mind is familiar with it from this new point of view. We may have it demonstrated to us that our idea of the Geographical position of places is wrong; but till we have learned not only to find them on the map, but to call them before us rightly, our old error is not fairly removed. So old doubts on religious subjects are not cast out entirely when the reason is convinced; but we must habituate ourselves to the correct view, till it has become the easy and natural position of subjects with respect to us.
The following has been well state to be the substance of Mr. Hume’s reasoning:
“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. But we learn from experience that the laws of nature are never violated. Our only accounts of miracles depend upon testimony, and our belief in testimony itself depends upon experience. But experience shows that testimony is sometimes true and sometimes false; therefore, we have only a variable experience in favor of testimony. But we have an uniform experience in favor of the uninterrupted course of nature. Therefore, as on the side of miracles there is but a variable experience, and on the side of no miracles a uniform experience, it is clear that the lower degree of evidence must yield to the higher degree, and therefore no testimony can prove a miracle to be true.”
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“Hume does not deny the possibility of miracles. His argument is not a metaphysical one, founded on the nature or essence of the thing considered, but is entirely a practical one, touching only the reasonableness of our belief in miracles. He no where attempts to prove that miracles cannot be, but that upon principles of reason we cannot believe them to be. Nor would it comport with his philosophical opinions to assert that miraculous events, or any events, could not occur, inasmuch, as he referred all our knowledge to experience; consequently, he could only infer from the past what would probably, not what would certainly, take place in the future. The most that Mr. Hume could say, respecting the possibility of miracles, would be, that as they never had happened, so they never could reasonably be expected to happen.
It is the want of a proper observance of this distinction between that which may reasonably be expected to be, and that which must of necessity be, which has led to considerable irrelevant reasoning in answer to a misconceived notion of Mr. Hume’s meaning. His argument we understand to be entirely a practical one, touching only the reasonableness of our belief in miracles. It does not consist of, nor is it dependent on, the peculiar philosophical notions of its author as developed in other works. If it did, we should have but little fear of it in its practical effects; for however plausible and ingenious as speculations, the ideal theories of Berkley [sic] and Hume, and the destruction of all connection between cause and effect, so strenuously maintained by the latter, when applied to our every day affairs, and our temporal or eternal interests, they can have but little influence. We do not much fear the theories of those who, to sustain themselves, must deprive us of those instinctive impressions, and those spontaneous operations of the mind, and those self-evident axioms, which are the foundation not only of all reasoning, but of all action.
But the great error in most of the reasoning in relation to miracles — both in that of Hume and of those who have replied to him — is, in over-looking the true nature of miracles, and attempting to reason on them in the same manner as on ordinary circumstances. They have been treated as facts which must have taken place through the agency of, or in accordance with, the laws of nature; or, in other words, the arguments seem to suppose NATURE to be the cause of their happening. And it is this erroneous view of miracles that Mr. Hume’s reasoning overthrows, and none other. But it should be remembered, that miracles are opposed to the ordinary laws of nature, because if they were explicable upon any known laws, they would cease to be miracles. And to speak of the raising of the dead, the turning of water into wine, &C., as of the same kind of improbabilities as the exploits of Caesar or Napoleon, is certainly a loose mode of reasoning.
But, as we have said, Mr. Hume argues that a miracle cannot be proved, because it is against those laws which experience has shown to be immutable — which means, that an event cannot be prove to have happened by the operations of nature, which is against all our experience of the operations of nature. Or, in other words, he does not take into view any other agent (as causing an event,) than nature, or any other “modus operandi” than the ordinary course of nature. But if we suppose an independent and higher power brought into exercise, which can even set aside the laws of nature, then all such reasoning falls to the ground, because we cannot circumscribe within any laws either the acts, or the manner of acting, of a being who is superior to, and independent of, all laws. For instance, if we were told that a rock had separated itself from the earth, and by the force of gravitation had raised itself in the air, we should disbelieve it, because it is against our uniform experience of the effects of gravitation, which draws heavy bodies to the earth. But if we had been told that the rock had been hurled into the air, by some extraordinary force, which for the time had counteracted the power of gravitation, we might readily believe it. And in this latter case we should not think of reasoning about the uniformity of the law of gravitation, and our want of any experience of a violation of the order of nature, &c., but we should at once perceive that a force had acted independently of the law, and had done something which the law itself would never have done. Just so with miracles. When we are told by Mr. Hume that we ought not to believe them because they are contrary to the laws of nature — we are told truly, if it is meant that they are caused simply by the operations of nature — but we are not told truly, if they are considered as the acts of a power superior to the laws of nature, and entirely independent of them.
In this view of the case, let us examine a little more particularly the argument of Mr. Hume. He says, a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. But we learn from experience that the laws of nature are never violated, &c. Upon the truth of this position the whole of his argument depends, and the conclusion derived from it depends entirely on the truth of each part of the proposition. He asserts experience to prove that the laws of nature are never violated, and that experience proves human testimony to be often fallacious; so that we have an uniform experience opposed to a variable experience, and of course the latter should always give way to the former. The truth of this argument then, and the soundness of its conclusion, depend upon the fact that the laws of nature are never violated. If this proposition be not true, the conclusion is good for nothing. We assert then without fear of contradiction, and as a fact established by experience, that the laws of nature are often violated; nay more, that they are daily and hourly violated in the same manner, though not to the same extent, as they are violated in the case of miracles. When a stone is thrown into the air, the law of gravitation is violated. When a bird takes wing, the law of gravitation is violated. When two bodies in certain states of electricity, are brought near each other, they mutually repel, and the law of attraction is violated. And so in thousands of instances. Nor will it suffice to say, that these are not violations of the laws of nature because they are of frequent occurrence, and may be explained in a natural way; that the law does not cease, but is only overcome for a time. The law is violated for the time as much as a law can be violated. A different effect is produced, from what the law would produce. And it matters not whether the law is overcome by another law, or by an extraneous force, the result is the same, and the law is violated. The “vis inertiae” of matter is overcome by human force! If the question were, whether the dead were ever raised into life by the ordinary operations of the laws of nature, uniform experience of the operation of those laws would lead us to a denial of the fact. But such an inference is not contended for. What we contend for is this, that it is unphilosophical and wrong to adduce the acknowledged uniformity of the operations of nature, when uncontrolled, in opposition to positive testimony in favor of different results where nature is not uncontrolled. We know that effects are every day produced, different from what would have been produced, by the uninterrupted course of nature.
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There is another of Mr. Hume’s propositions essential to the establishment of his doctrines which we also think incorrect, viz: “That our belief in human testimony depends upon experience.” * * * Mr. Hume treats the “laws of nature” as a whole, and in this case very properly, because his proposition is as true of each and every, as of any or all the laws of nature. He also treats human testimony as a whole, in the aggregate, without reference to its parts or qualifications. He says, “our experience is against the infallibility of testimony” meaning testimony as a whole. Now we say that experience is not against all testimony, because our experience is in favor of much, perhaps most testimony. All that can be said is, that human testimony is not always found to be true. Hume would have the exceptionable vitiate the unexceptionable. Taking the character of all testimony from the character of one class or species, and stamping testimony as a whole as therefore doubtful, he concludes that all the testimony in the world would not be sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. Now we would observe, that testimony derives its character mainly from the character of the individuals from whom it comes, and the circumstances under which it is given. Our experience is in favor of the testimony of some men and against that of others. There are some men whom we have never known to tell a lie, and others whom we have scarcely ever known to speak the truth. We almost instinctively trust the one and distrust the other. But to bring into one mass all human testimony and brand it as unreliable, because a part is uniformly bad, and only a part uniformly good, is very much like saying that this world is in physical darkness because it is not uniformly clothed in light.
Our senses sometimes deceive us; and the reasoning of Mr. Hume is just as strong, therefore, against the evidence of our senses as against human testimony, both taken as a whole, yet, there are some circumstances in which the evidences of our senses must be considered as absolutely certain.
But it may be said, admit the truth of all this, admit that experience is in favor of some testimony and against other, still may not those who have never yet deceived us possibly deceive us hereafter? Is there an absolute certainty that those who have never yet deceived us, never will deceive us? If a man of unimpeached veracity should tell you that he had lately seen a brook, which had from time immemorial run down a hill, without any known or perceptible cause run up the hill, would you be as certain from that man’s testimony that the brook did flow up the hill, as you would be from your experience of the laws of gravitation that it did not flow up hill? These questions we think present the doctrine in its fairest and strongest light, and we wish to answer them fairly, and at the same time to make known the ground on which we stand. We answer, then, that a man who has never yet deceived us, may nevertheless deceive us. The laws of human conduct are not as open to the view as the laws of physical nature; and in the case of the brook just mentioned, if required to believe the statement without any other circumstance than the bare word of the informant, we should hardly feel convinced of the fact. But our doubts in such case arise from what we suppose the possibility of variance in the one case, and the impossibility of variance in the other. Testimony depends entirely upon the will or choice of the witness, which circumstances may vary. But the laws of nature can only be changed by the will of Him who ordained them, “in whom there is no variableness neither shadow of turning.” The presumptions are strongly against any deviation from the ordinary operations of the laws of nature. Experience would lead us to expect the same results that had hitherto been witnessed to continue, but it could probably go no further. No one would be so bold as to say that the Almighty could not for a time change the laws of his own establishing, or that he might not by possibility see sufficient occasion for so doing. Experience, in this view of the case, is not a proper guide to the truth, for it only makes known what may be fairly anticipated, but not what must of necessity actually happen. But of this hereafter: we wish at present only to say, that evidence itself (as shown by Mr. Starkie) admits of various degrees; it is strengthened by concurrence of testimony; it is still further strengthened by concurrence of circumstances; and it is possible that there should be such a concurrence of testimony and circumstances as to render the falsity of the evidence as improbably, nay, as impossible, as the facts which it asserts. Nay further, there may be circumstances in which the violation of a law of nature shall be a more probable event (even judging by experience in its proper sense) than that the evidence and the circumstances brought to support it, should be untrue. For example, if on the 8th March I started for New York to take passage for Europe, and just before leaving W., a man whom I had never known to deviate from the truth, told me that at 12 o’clock in the night previous, in the midst of total darkness, the sun appeared in meridian brightness at the zenith for one hour, and had then suddenly disappeared, I should probably think that he had seen a meteor, or had been dreaming, or that he wished to frighten me, or that he was telling a lie; but I should hardly believe that the sun had been seen by him at the time and in the manner described. If the man seemed terrified, I should suppose that at least he believed what he was telling, but I should still attribute it to delusion. But if I heard others talking of the same event, and saying that they had seen it, I could not doubt that some remarkable luminary had thus appeared, but could not believe it to be the sun. If on arriving at New York, the same thing were talked of and believed, all agreeing that it was the sun, that the light and heat were those of the sun, I should be still more staggered. I set sail immediately for Europe, and ours is the first vessel that arrives after the 8th March from the United States. On our arrival, the first topic of inquiry is, whether the sun was seen at midnight on the American side of the Atlantic. Persons assert on all hands that at the precise hour it was seen in Europe. On looking at the newspapers of the 9th, I find full accounts of the phenomenon, and all agreeing that the object seen was the sun. Now I ask, could I doubt this concurrence of evidence? If so, on what principle could I doubt it? Mr. Hume tells us that it is against our experience of the uniformity of the laws of nature. But is it not equally against our experience to find such evidence as this false? But Mr. Hume would say, though the witnesses may not be false, it is still probable that they were deceived as to the reality of some remarkable phenomenon, but only as to the fact of its being actually the sun. Well now suppose, further, the evidence of the truth of the New Testament to be just as they now are, and suppose there were contained therein certain prophecies that the Messiah should again appear on the earth about this time; that there should be certain signs and wonders in the Heavens and on the earth, just preceding his appearance, among which prophecies should be contained one, that the sun should appear at midnight and shine with its usual splendor, and that other of the predicted signs and wonders had absolutely taken place, would not this place the evidence that we have before spoken of in a state of absolute unassailability?