14
The Nature, and Danger, of Infidel Philosophy, exhibited in Two Discourses, addressed to the Candidates for the Baccalaureate, in Yale College (New Haven, 1798); selection from pp. 29–32.
Timothy Dwight
Timothy Dwight (1752–1817), a grandson of Jonathan Edwards, wrote The Nature, and Danger, of Infidel Philosophy soon after assuming the presidency of Yale College, upon the death of Ezra Stiles, in 1795. Dwight’s aim was to raise Yale from the depravity into which he felt the school had sunk. His Nature, and Danger, of Infidel Philosophy was designed to help revive the college. That Hume was the subject of such directed comments suggests that Dwight considered Yale students to be all too well familiar with the arguments of Hume’s philosophy. The content, style, and tone of Dwight’s critique of Hume are clearly borrowed from George Horne’s famous publication, A Letter to Dr. Adam Smith LL.D. on the Life, Death, and Philosophy of his friend David Hume Esq. By one of the People called Christians (London, 1777). Dwight also quotes extensively from Horne in a footnote included below. In earlier writings such as The Triumph of Infidelity: A Poem Printed in the World (1788) and Greenfield Hill: A Poem, in Seven Parts (1794), Dwight had singled out Hume for comment. On Timothy Dwight see Sydney E. Ahlstrom, “The Scottish Philosophy and American Theology,” Church History, vol. 24 (1955), p. 263; Chandos Michael Brown, Benjamin Silliman: A Life in the Young Republic (Princeton, 1989); Charles E. Cunningham, Timothy Dwight (New York, 1942); William C. Dowling, “Timothy Dwight,” ANB, vol. 7, pp. 192–4; I. Woodbridge Riley, American Philosophy: The Early Schools (New York, 1907).
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Mr. HUME declares,
That there is no perceptible connection between cause and effect;
That the belief of such connection is merely a matter of custom;
That experience can shew us no such connection;
That we cannot with any reason conclude, that, because an effect has taken place once, it will take place again;
That it is uncertain and useless to argue from the course of nature, and infer an Intelligent Cause;
That we cannot, from any analogy of nature, argue the existence of an Intelligent Cause of all things;
That there is no reason to believe that the Universe proceeded from a Cause;
That there are no solid arguments to prove the existence of a God;
That experience can furnish no argument concerning matters of fact, is in this case useless, and can give rise to no inference; and
That there is no relation between cause and effect; and yet,
That Experience is our only guide in matters of fact and the existence of objects;
That it is universally allowed, that nothing exists without a cause;
That every effect is so precisely determined, that no other effect could, in such circumstances, have possibly resulted from the operation of its cause;
That the relation of cause is absolutely necessary to the propagation of our species, and the regulation of our conduct;
That voluntary actions are necessary, and determined by a fixed connection between cause and effect;
That motives are causes, operating necessarily on the will;
That Man is a mere machine (i.e. an object operated on necessarily by external causes;)
That there is no contingency (i.e. nothing happening without a settled cause) in the universe; and
That Matter and Motion may be regarded as the cause of thought (i.e. The Soul is a Material Cause, and thought its effect:)
That God discovers to us only faint traces of his character, and that it would be flattery, or presumption to ascribe to him any perfection, which is not discovered to the full in his works (and of course, that it would be flattery or presumption to ascribe any perfection to God:)
That it is unreasonable to believe God to be wise and good;
That what we believe to be a perfection in God may be a defect. (i.e. Holiness, Justice, Wisdom, Goodness, Mercy, and Truth, may be defects in God;) Of consequence, Injustice, Folly, Malice, and Falshood, may be excellencies in his character;
That no reward, or punishment, can be rationally expected, beyond what is already known by experience and observation:
That self-denial, self mortification, and humility, are not virtues, but are useless and mischievous; that they stupify the understanding, sour the temper, and harden the heart (and of course are gross crimes:)
That pride and self-valuation, ingenuity, eloquence, quickness of thought, easiness of expression, delicacy of taste, strength of body, health, cleanliness, taper legs, and broad shoulders, are virtues:
That Suicide, or self-murder, is lawful and commendable (and of course virtuous:)
That Adultery must be practised, if we would obtain the advantages of life:
That Female Infidelity (or Adultery) when known, is a small thing; when unknown, nothing: and That Scepticism is the true and only wisdom of man.*
*The following summary of Mr. Hume’s doctrines, published some years before his death, Bishop Horne says, was never, so far as he could find, questioned, as to its fidelity or accuracy, either by Mr. Hume, or his friends.
A Summary of Mr. Hume’s Doctrines, Metaphysical and Moral.
Of the Soul.
That the soul of man is not the same this moment, that it was the last: that we know not what it is; that it is not one, but many things, and that it is nothing at all.
That in this soul is the agency of all the causes that operate throughout the sensible creation; and yet that in this soul there is neither power nor agency, nor any idea of either.
That matter and motion may often be regarded as the cause of thought.
Of the Universe.
That the external world does not exist, or at least, that it’s existence may reasonably be doubted.
That the universe exists in the mind, and that the mind does not exist.
That the universe is nothing but a heap of perceptions, without a substance.
That though a man could bring himself to believe, yea, and have reason to believe, that every thing in the universe proceeds from some cause; yet it would be unreasonable for him to believe, that the universe itself proceeds from a cause.
Of Human Knowledge.
That the perfection of human knowledge is to doubt.
That we ought to doubt of every thing, yea, of our doubts themselves, and therefore, the utmost that Philosophy can do, is to give us a doubtful solution of doubtful doubts.
That the human understanding, acting alone, does entirely subvert itself, and prove by argument that by argument, nothing can be proved.
That man, in all his perceptions, actions and volitions, is a mere passive machine, and has no separate existence of his own, being entirely made up of other things, of the existence of which he is by no means certain; and yet, that the nature of all things depends so much upon man, that two and two could not be equal to four, nor fire produce heat, nor the sun light without an act of the human understanding.
Of God.
That it is unreasonable to believe God to be infinitely wise and good, while there is nay evil or disorder in the universe.
That we have no good reason to think the universe proceeds from a cause.
That as the existence of the external world is questionable, we are at a loss to find arguments by which we may prove the existence of the Supreme Being, or any of his attributes.
That when we speak of Power, as an attribute of any being, God himself not excepted, we use words without meaning.
That we can form no idea of power, nor of any being endued with power, much less of one endued with infinite power; and that we can never have reason to believe, that any object or quality of any object exists, of which we cannot form an idea.
Of the Morality of Human Actions.
That every human action is necessary, and could not have been different from what it is.
That moral, intellectual, and corporeal virtues are nearly of the same kind — In other words, that to want honesty, and to want understanding, and to want a leg, are equally the objects of moral disapprobation.
That adultory must be practised, if men would obtain all the advantages of life; that, if generally practised, it would in time cease to be scandalous; and, that, if practised secretly and frequently, it would by degrees come to be thought no crime at all.
Lastly, as the soul of man, according to Mr. Hume, becomes every moment a different being, the consequence must be, that the crimes committed by him at one time cannot be imputable to him at another.