23
Evidences of the Authenticity, Inspiration and Canonical Authority of the Holy Scriptures (Philadelphia, 1836); selection from “Chapter VI. Miracles are Capable of Proof from Testimony,” pp. 65–88.
Archibald Alexander
Archibald Alexander (1772–1851) was born near Lexington, Virginia, and educated at Liberty College. In the early 1790s Alexander ministered as an itinerant Presbyterian in Virginia and North Carolina before accepting the presidency of Hampton-Sydney College in 1797. In 1812 Alexander was elected the first professor of the newly created Princeton Theological Seminary. There, Alexander introduced his students to Scottish common sense philosophy. Alexander published A Brief Outline of the Evidences of the Christian Religion in 1825. An enlarged edition with a new title, whence the selection reprinted below has been taken, contained twenty-three chapters. The aim of that book, as its title suggests, was to show that the Bible was a source of true knowledge. On Archibald Alexander see Lefferts A. Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment and Pietism: Archibald Alexander and the Founding of Princeton Theological Seminary (Westport and London, 1983); James H. Moorhead, “Archibald Alexander,” ANB, vol. 1, pp. 260–62; Mark A. Noll, Princeton and the Republic, 1768–1822 (Princeton, 1989).
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CHAPTER VI. MIRACLES ARE CAPABLE OF PROOF FROM TESTIMONY.
I DO not know that any one has denied that a miracle would be credible if exhibited to our senses. A man might, indeed, be deceived by an illusion arising from some disorder in his senses; but if he were conscious of being in a sound state of body and mind, and should witness not only one, but a variety of miracles; not only a few times, but for years in succession; and if he should find that all around him had the same perceptions of these facts as himself, I need not say that it would be reasonable to credit his senses, for the constitution of his nature would leave him no choice: he would be under the necessity of believing what he saw with his eyes, heard with his ears, and handled with his hands. But are there facts which a man would credit on the evidence of his senses, which cannot possibly be rendered credible by the testimony of any number of witnesses. Then there might be facts, the knowledge of which could never be so communicated as to be worthy of credit. According to this hypothesis, the constitution of our nature would require us to withhold our assent from what was true, and from what others knew to be true. If a thousand persons of the strictest veracity should testify that they had repeatedly witnessed a miracle, and if all circumstances should concur to corroborate their testimony, yet upon this principle it would be unreasonable to credit them, even if they should consent to die in confirmation of what they declared to be the fact. This is the ground taken by Mr. Hume, in his boasted argument against miracles. But it appears to me that every man, even before examination, must be convinced that it is false; for it is contrary to common sense and universal experience of the effect of testimony. The true principle on this subject is, that any fact which would be believed on the evidence of the senses, may be reasonably believed on sufficient testimony. There may be testimony of such a nature as to produce conviction as strong as any other conceivable evidence; and such testimony in favour of a miracle would establish it as firmly as if we had witnessed it ourselves. But though this is the conclusion of common sense and experience, the metaphysical argument of Mr. Hume has had the effect of perplexing and unsettling the minds of many: and as he boasts that “it will be useful to overthrow miracles as long as the world endures,” it seems necessary to enter into an examination of his argument, that we may be able to expose its fallacy. This has already been done in a convincing manner, by several men,* eminent for their learning and discrimination; and if their works were read by all who peruse Hume, I should think it unnecessary to add a single word on the subject. But it may not be without its use to present a refutation in a condensed form, for the sake of those who will not take the trouble to go through a minute and extended demonstration.
The argument of Mr. Hume will be best exhibited in his own words. “A miracle,” says he, “supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision, than of argument. No testimony for any kind of miracle can ever possibly amount to a probability.” — “We establish it as a maxim, that no human testimony can have such force as to prove a miracle, and make a just foundation for any system of religion.” — “Our belief or assurance of any fact from the report of eye witnesses, is derived from no other principle than experience; that is, our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity of facts to the reports of witnesses. Now, if the fact attested partakes of the marvellous, if it is such as has seldom fallen under our own observation; here is a contest of two opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other as far as its force goes. Further, if the fact affirmed by the witness, instead of being only marvellous is really miraculous; if, besides, the testimony considered apart, and in itself, amounts to an entire proof; in that case there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail. A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined. And if so, it is an undeniable consequence, that it cannot be surmounted by any proof whatever from testimony. A miracle, therefore, however attested, can never be rendered credible, even in the lowest degree.”
Here we have the substance of Mr. Hume’s argument, on which I propose to make some remarks, intended to show that its whole plausibility depends on the assumption of false principles, and the artful use of equivocal terms.
1. Some prejudice is created in the mind of the unsuspecting reader, by the definition of a miracle here given. It is called “a violation of the laws of nature,” which carries with it an unfavourable idea, as though some obligation were violated and some injury done. But the simple truth is, that the laws of nature are nothing else than the common operations of divine power in the government of the world, which depend entirely for their existence and continuance of the divine will; and a miracle is nothing else than the exertion of the same power in a way different from that which is common; or it may be a mere suspension of that power which is commonly observed to operate in the world.
2. Mr. Hume’s argument will apply to the evidence of the senses as well as to that derived from testimony, and will prove (if it prove any thing) that it would be impossible to believe in a miracle, if we should witness it ever so often. “The very same principle of experience,” says he, “which gives us a certain degree of assurance in the testimony of witnesses, gives us also, in this case, another degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavour to establish, from which contradiction there arises necessarily a counterpoise, and mutual destruction of belief and authority.” The very same counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief must also occur between the assurance derived from the senses and that derived from experience. The reason why testimony cannot be believed in favour of a miracle, is not, according to Mr. Hume, because it has no force, for taken by itself it may be sufficient to produce assurance; but let this assurance be as strong as it may, it cannot be stronger than that derived from universal experience. “In that case,” says he, “there is proof against proof.” It is evident that, upon these principles, the same equilibrium from contradictory evidence must take place between experience and the senses. If one evidence be stronger than another, “the stronger must prevail, but with a diminution of force in proportion to that of its antagonist.” But in the case of the senses and a firm and unalterable experience, the evidence is perfect on both sides, so that the “counterpoise and mutual destruction of belief” must occur. According to this metaphysical balance of Mr. Hume, a miracle could not be believed if we witnessed it ever so often; for though there is a great weight of evidence on each side, yet as there is an equilibrium, nether can have any influence on our assent. Whether Mr. Hume would have objected to this conclusion does not appear; but it is manifest, that it logically follows from his argument, as much as in the case to which he has applied it. And here we see to what a pitch of skepticism his reasoning leads.
3. Mr. Hume makes an unnecessary distinction between that which is marvellous and that which is miraculous; for though there is a real difference, there is none as to his argument. The force of his reasoning does not relate to events as being miraculous, but as being opposite to universal experience. If the conclusion therefore be correct, it will equally prove, that no testimony is sufficient to establish a natural event which has not before been experienced. If ever so many witnesses should aver that they had seen meteoric stones fall from the clouds, or the galvanic fluid melt metals, yet if we have never experienced these things ourselves we must not believe them.
4. The opposite or contrary experience of Mr. Hume in regard to miracles, can mean nothing more than that such things have not been experienced. There is no other opposite experience conceivable in this case, unless a number of persons present at the same time should experience opposite impressions. The distinction which he artfully makes in relation to “the king of Siam, who refused to believe the first reports concerning the effects of frost,” between that which is contrary to experience and that which is not conformable to experience, is without foundation. For a fact cannot be contrary to experience in any other way than by being not conformable to it. There neither is nor can be any experience against miracles, except this, that they have not occurred in our own experience or that of others. When the proposition of our author is expressed in language free from ambiguity, it will amount to this, that what has never been experienced can never be believed on any testimony; than which nothing can easily be conceived more false. In what a situation must man have been at the beginning of the world, if he had adopted the principles of this skeptic!
5. Mr. Hume uses the word experience in a two-fold sense, changing from one to the other as best suits his purpose. Sometimes it means personal experience, and at other times, and more commonly, the experience of the whole world. Now if it be taken to mean our own individual experience, the argument will be that no fact which we ourselves have not witnessed can be established by testimony, which, if correct, would cut off at a stroke the greater part of human knowledge. Much the most numerous class of facts are those which we receive upon testimony of others, and many of these are entirely different from any thing that we have personally experienced. Many learned men never take the trouble to witness the most curious experiments in philosophy and chemistry; yet they are as well satisfied of their truth as if they had personal experience of it.
But though an argument founded on an opposition between testimony and experience, in order to be of any validity, must relate to personal experience; yet Mr. Hume commonly uses the term to signify the experience of all men in all ages. This extensive meaning of the term must be the one which he affixes to it in most places of his essay; because it is experience by which we know that the laws of nature are uniform and unalterable; and he has given an example which clearly determines the sense of the word. “That a dead man should come to life,” says he, “has never been witnessed in any age or country.” Now, according to this use of the word, what he calls an argument is a mere assumption of the point in dispute, what logicians call a petitio principii, a begging of the question. For, what is the question in debate? Is it not whether miracles have ever been experienced? And how does Mr. Hume undertake to prove that they never did exist? By an argument intended to demonstrate that no testimony can establish them; the main principle of which argument is that all experience is against them. If miracles have ever occurred, they are not contrary to universal experience; for whatever has been witnessed at any time, by any person, makes part of universal experience. What sort of reasoning is it then to form an argument against the truth of miracles, founded on the assumption, that they never existed? If it be true, as he says, that it has never been witnessed in any age or country, that a dead man should come to life, then indeed it is useless to adduce testimony to prove that the dead have on some occasions been brought to life. If he had a right to take this for granted, where was the use of such a parade of reasoning on the subject of testimony? The very conclusion to which he wished to come is here assumed as the main principle in the argument. It is however as easy to deny as to affirm; and we do utterly deny the truth of this position; so that after all we are at issue precisely on the point where we commenced. Nothing is proved by the argument which promised so much, except the skill of the writer in sophistical reasoning.
6. Our author falls into another mistake in his reasoning. The object is to prove that testimony in favour of miracles can never produce conviction, because it is opposed by uniform and unalterable experience. But how do we know what this universal experience is? Is it not by testimony, except within the narrow circle of our own personal experience? Then it turns out that the testimony in favour of miracles is neutralized or overbalanced by other testimony. That is, to destroy the force of testimony he assumes a principle founded on testimony. It is admitted that when testimony is adduced to establish any facts, if other and stronger testimony can be brought against them, their credibility is destroyed. But if I bring testimony for a fact, and some one alleges that he can show that this testimony is unworthy of credit because he can bring witnesses to prove that many persons in different countries and ages never saw any such thing; to such a person I would reply, that even if these witnesses declared the truth, it could not overthrow the positive testimony which I had adduced, as they did not contradict the facts asserted; and besides, it must be determined which witnesses are the most credible, yours or mine. Just so it is in the case of Mr. Hume’s argument. He sets up uniform experience against testimony, and gives a preponderance to the former, on the ground that witnesses are known sometimes to lie; but all that he knows of what has happened in other ages and countries, is by testimony; and they who give this testimony are as fallible as others; therefore, there existed no ground for preferring the evidence of experience to testimony. Besides, he is not in possession of testimony to establish a thousandth part of what has been experienced; and as far as it goes, it amounts to no more than non-experience, a mere negative thing which can never have any weight to overthrow the testimony of positive witnesses. In a court of justice, such a method of rebutting testimony would be rejected as totally inadmissible. If we had sufficient evidence of a fact of any kind, that testimony would not be invalidated, if it could be proved that no person in the world had ever witnessed the like before. This want of previous experience naturally creates a presumption against the fact, which requires some force of evidence to overcome: but in all cases, a sufficient number of witnesses, of undoubted intelligence and veracity, will be able to remove the presumption and produce conviction.
7. Mr. Hume lays it down as a principle, that our belief in testimony arises from “experience, that is, observation of the veracity of human testimony.” But this is not correct. Our belief in testimony is as natural and constitutional as our belief in our senses. Children at first believe implicitly all that is told them, and it is from experience that they learn to distrust testimony. If our faith in testimony arose from experience, it would be impossible to acquire any knowledge from instruction. If children were to believe nothing that was told them until they had made observations on the veracity of human testimony, nothing would be believed; for they would never arrive at the maturity and judgment necessary to make observations on a subject so complicated.
But although Mr. Hume’s object in wishing to establish this false principle was, to exalt the evidence of what he calls experience above testimony; yet, if we should concede it to him, it could answer him no purpose, since we have shown that this experience itself depends on testimony. Whatever use he can make of this principle therefore against testimony, can be turned against himself, since his knowledge of what the experience of the world is, can only be obtained by the report of witnesses, who, in different ages, have observed the course of nature.
8. Mr. Hume, on reflection, seems to have been convinced that his argument was unsound; for in a note appended to his Essay on Miracles, he makes a concession which entirely overthrows the whole. But mark the disingenuity (or shall I not rather call it the malignity?) which is manifested in this only evidence of his candour. He concedes that there may be miracles of such a kind as to admit of proof from human testimony, in direct contradiction to his reiterated maxim, and in complete repugnance to all his reasoning; but he makes the concession with the express reservation that it shall not be applied to the support of religion. He however not only makes this concession, but gives an example of such miracles, and of the testimony which he admits to be sufficient to establish it. “Suppose,” says he, “all authors in all languages agree, that from the first of January, 1600, there was a total darkness all over the earth for eight days; suppose that the tradition of this event is still strong and lively among the people; that all travellers bring us accounts of the same tradition, &c. — IT IS EVIDENT THAT OUR PHILOSOPHERS OUGHT TO RECEIVE IT FOR CERTAIN.” And this is a part of the same Essay, in which it is said that “a miracle supported by any human testimony, is more properly a subject of derision than of argument.” “No kind of testimony for any kind of miracle can possibly amount to a probability, much less to a proof!”
It might appear that after so complete a renunciation of the principle which at first he so strenuously asserted, we might have spared ourselves the pains of a formal refutation But not so. The author is resolved that his concession shall be of no service whatever to religion. Hear his own words: “But should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of religion; men in all ages have been so imposed upon by ridiculous stories of that kind, that, this very circumstance would be full proof of a cheat and sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but even reject it, without further examination.” I have heard of a maxim which I believe the Jesuits introduced, that what is false in theology may be true in philosophy; but I never could have expected that a philosopher, a logician, and a metaphysician too, would utter any thing so unreasonable and so marked with prejudice as the declaration just quoted. The fact is admitted to have such evidence, that even philosophers ought to receive it as certain; but not if it is ascribed to a new religion. On this subject no evidence is sufficient. It is perfectly unexceptionable in philosophy; but in religion a sensible man will reject it, whatever it may be, even without further examination. The circumstance of its being a miracle connected with religion is sufficient, in his opinion, to prove it a cheat, however complete the testimony. The world, it seems, has been so imposed on by ridiculous stories of this kind, that we must not even listen to any testimony in favour of religious miracles. This author would indeed reduce the advocates of religion to an awkward dilemma. They are called upon to produce evidence for their religion, but if they adduce it sensible men will not notice it; even if it is good every where else, it must go for nothing in religion. Upon these principles, we might indeed give up the contest; but we are not willing to admit that this is sound logic, or good sense. The reason assigned for proscribing, in this summary way, all the testimony in favour of religion, will apply to other subjects. Men have been imposed on by ridiculous stories in philosophy, as well as in religion; but when evidence is proposed, shall we not even examine it, because there have been impositions? This is the very reason why we should examine with care, that we may distinguish between the true and the false.
If it were true, that miracles had often been ascribed to new religions, it would not prove that there never were any true miracles, but rather the contrary; just as the abounding of counterfeit money is evidence that there is some genuine; for that which has no existence is not counterfeited. But the clamour that has been raised by infidels about new religions being commonly founded on miracles, or the pretence of miracles, has very little foundation in fact. Beside the Jewish and Christian religions, (which are indeed parts of the same,) it would, I believe, be difficult to designate any other, which claims such an origin.
After all that has been said of the false maxims of the Jesuits, I doubt whether any one could be selected so perfectly at war with reason, as this of the philosopher; nay, I think I may challenge all the enemies of revelation, to call from any Christian writer a sentence so surcharged with prejudice.
But, to do justice to Mr. Hume — though he seems to have closed the door against all discussion on our part — yet, in one of his general maxims, he leaves us one alternative. The maxim is that, “That no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless it be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous than the fact.” An ingenious writer* has undertaken to meet Mr. Hume on his own ground, and has endeavoured to prove, that the testimony of the apostles and early Christians, if the facts reported by them were not true, is a greater miracle than any which they have recorded. But the maxim, as stated by Mr. Hume, is not correct. With the change of a single word, perhaps it may be adopted, and will place the question on its proper ground. The change which I propose, is to substitute the word improbable for miraculous. And it will then read: No testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more improbable, than the fact which it endeavours to establish. The ground of objection to the word miraculous, is, that it involves a false principle, which is, that facts are incredible in proportion as they are miraculous; which principle he in several places avows, and which is indeed a cardinal point in his system of evidence. But it is not true. There are many cases which might be proposed, in which, of two events, one of which must be true, that which is miraculous is more probable than the one which is merely natural. I will mention only one at present. Man was either immediately created by God, or he proceeded from some natural cause. Need I ask, which of these is more probable? and yet the first is miraculous; the second is not. The plain truth is, that in all cases, the fact which has most evidence is most probable, whether it be miraculous or natural. And when all evidence relating to a proposition is before the mind, THAT IS TRUE WHICH IS EASIEST TO BE BELIEVED, because it is easier to believe with evidence than against it. We are willing, therefore, that this maxim, as now stated, should be the ground of our decision, and we pledge ourselves to prove that the falsehood of the miracles of the gospel would be more improbable, and consequently more incredible, than the truth of the facts recorded in them. But this discussion will be reserved for another place.
To conclude; since it has been shown that there is no antecedent presumption against miracles from the nature of God, or from the laws by which he governs the universe; since a miraculous fact is not more difficult to be accomplished by omnipotence than any other; since miracles are no further improbable than as they are unusual; since they are the most suitable and decisive evidences which can be given of a revelation; since even by the concession of Mr. Hume himself, there may be sufficient testimony fully to establish them; and since the many false pretences to miracles, and the general disposition to credit them, are rather proofs that they have existed than the contrary; we may safely conclude, that Mr. Hume’s argument on this subject is sophistical and delusive; and that so far from being incredible, whatever may be their evidence, when brought to support religion, this is, of all others, the very case in which they are most reasonable and credible.
In a recent popular, but anonymous publication, entitled, “ESSAYS ON THE PURSUITS OF TRUTH, ON THE PROGRESS OF KNOWLEDGE, AND THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ALL EVIDENCE AND EXPRECTATION, BY THE AUTHOR OF ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION AND PUBLICATION OF OPINIONS,” the doctrine of Hume, on the subject of testimony, has been exhibited in a form somewhat new and imposing. And as this writer has acquired considerable celebrity in England, and his Essays have been published in Philadelphia, and recommended strongly to the public upon the authority of the Westminster Review it seems necessary to guard the public against the insidious design of the writer. The ingenious author, indeed, never brings the subject of divine revelation directly into view, in all that he has written; and I believe, the word “miracles” does not occur in either of the volumes which he has published. It is a fact, however, that in the last of his Essays he has revived, in substance, the famous argument of Hume on miracles; and has, with even more concealed sophistry than the celebrated infidel employed, endeavoured to prove that no testimony, however strong, is sufficient to establish any fact which involves a deviation from the regular course of the laws of nature. That I may not be suspected of misrepresenting the sentiments of this discriminating and popular writer I will here insert an extract from the essay before mentioned, which contains the substance of the whole argument.
“Testimony must be either oral or written. As far as the mere physical circumstances are concerned, we evidently commence our use of it by reasoning from effects to causes. We infer, for example, that the writing before us has been the work of some human being, in doing which we of course assume the uniformity of causation. If from the circumstances attending the testimony we infer that it is entitled to be received as veracious; if, for instance, we find that it has proceeded from a man of tried integrity, and who acted under the influence of motives which render it unlikely that he should deceive, our inference still proceeds on the assumption of the same principle. I may have, in other cases, found these circumstances to have been the precursors or causes of true testimony; but how can I or any one tell that they have operated in the same way in the instance before me? The reply must evidently be, that it is impossible to avoid assuming that the same causes have invariably the same effects.
“In fact, if we examine any of the rules which have been laid down for the reception of the testimony, or any of those marks which have been pointed out as enabling us to judge of its credibility, we shall find them all involving the uniformity of causation. It is allowed on all hands, that the concurrence of a number of witnesses in the same assertion, their reputation for veracity, the fact of the testimony being against their own interest, the probability of detection in any false statements, are all circumstances enhancing the credibility of what they affirm. These are considered as general principles on the subject gathered from experience, and we apply them instinctively to any new case which may be presented to us, either in the course of our own observation, or as having taken place at some former period. But it is obvious from what has just been said, that unless we assume a uniformity in the succession of causes and effects, we cannot transfer our experience from any one case to another. That certain circumstances have produced true testimony in one or a hundred instances, can be no reason why they should produce it in a different instance, unless we assume that the same causes have necessarily the same effects.
“It is clearly shown by this reasoning, that in the reception of testimony and the use of physical evidence we proceed on the same principle. But in the case of testimony there is a peculiarity not belonging to physical evidence. In the former we not only have certain effects from which it is our task to infer the causes, or certain causes from which to infer the effects; as when we judge the writing before us to have been the work of some human being, or the testimony to be true on account of the circumstances under which it was given; but the testimony itself consists of the assertion of facts, and the nature of the facts asserted often forms part of the grounds on which the veracity of the testimony is determined; it frequently happens, that while external circumstances tend to confirm the testimony, the nature and circumstances of the facts attested render it highly improbable that any such facts should have taken place, and these two sets of circumstances may be so exactly equivalent as to leave the mind in irremediable doubt. In the consideration of both, however, the same assumption is involved. We think the facts improbable, because we have found them rarely occurring under the circumstances stated; we think the testimony likely to be true, because we have generally found true testimony to proceed from witnesses acting under the influence of similar motives, and what we have found to happen in other cases we are irresistibly led to conclude must also happen in the case before us.
“The opposition of the circumstances of the evidence and the nature of the facts may be carried still further. Assertions are frequently made which in themselves imply a breach of uniformity of causation. From such cases the conclusions already established remove all difficulty. To weigh probabilities, to determine what credit is due to two sets of conflicting circumstances, neither of which as far as our knowledge extends, is irreconcilable to the usual course of nature, is often a nice and arduous task; but if the principles of this essay are correct, it is easy to see what reception ought to be given to assertions professedly implying a deviation from the uniform succession of causes and effects.
“Suppose, for instance, any person to affirm that he had exposed a cubic inch of ice to a temperature of two hundred degrees of Fahrenheit, and that at the expiration of an hour it had retained its solidity. Here is a sequence of events asserted which is entirely at variance with the admitted course of nature; and the slightest reflection is sufficient to show, that to believe the assertion would involve a logical absurdity. The intrinsic discrepancy of the facts could never be overcome by any possible proofs of the truth of the testimony.
“For let us put the strongest case imaginable; let us suppose that the circumstance of the ice remaining unmelted, rests on the concurrent testimony of a great number of people, people too of reputation, science, and perspicacity, who had no motive for falsehood, who had discernment to perceive, and honesty to tell the real truth, and whose interests would essentially suffer from any departure from veracity. Under such circumstances false testimony it may be alleged is impossible.
“Now mark the principle on which this representation proceeds. Let us concede the positions, that what is attested by a great number of witnesses must inevitably be true, — that people of reputation and intelligence without any apparent motive for falsehood are invariably accurate in their testimony, and that they are above all, incapable of violating truth, when a want of veracity would be ruinous to their interests. Granting all this, I ask the objector, how he knows that these things are so; that men of this character and in these circumstances speak truth? He will reply that he has invariably found them to act in this manner: but why, because you found them to act in this manner in a few or even in many cases, within your own experience or in the experience of ages, do you conclude that they have acted so in all cases and in the case before us? The only answer is, that it is impossible not to take for granted, that in precisely similar circumstances similar results will ensue, or that like causes have always like effects.
“Thus on the ground of unifomrity [sic] of causation, he would be maintaining the competency of testimony to prove a fact which implies a deviation from that uniformity.”
It will abbreviate the answer to this specious argument, to acknowledge, that the general principle which this author takes so much pains to establish, and on which he builds his reasoning, is freely admitted to be not only correct, but self-evident. That the same causes uniformly produce the same effects, is a truth so obvious, and so generally admitted, that it was unnecessary for the ingenious author of this essay, to spend so much time in rendering it evident. And I am willing to admit its certainty to be as undoubted in moral, as in physical subjects. But while I freely admit, that the same causes will uniformly be followed by the same effects, I do by no means accede to the proposition, which our author seems to consider as of the same import; namely, that the course of nature, or the laws of nature, never have been interrupted, or suspended: and the whole appearance of force and plausibility which the argument of this writer possesses, arises from the artful confounding of these distinct propositions. I agree, that no testimony can be strong enough to induce a rational man to believe that the same causes will not be attended with the same effects; for this would be to assent to an evident absurdity. But it is an entirely different thing to believe that the laws of nature have sometimes been suspended; for in this case, we suppose that an extraordinary cause has intervened. To believe that a divine power has interposed to change the course of nature, is surely not the same thing, as to believe that the same cause which commonly produced one effect, is now attneded [sic] by another entirely different. The natural causes, it is true, remain the same, but the general proposition stated above, is not true, if confined only to these. If there exist supernatural causes, or a power superior to the laws of nature — and this our author does not profess to deny — then the laws of nature, or mere natural causes may remain the same; and yet, by the operation of these supernatural causes, effects entirely diverse from those that would be the sequence of natural causes, may take place. And the author himself seems in one place to have been aware of this distinction, and to admonish the reader of its existence; and yet, through the whole of the argument he proceeds, as if the two propositions were identical. He ought, however, to have recollected, that while no man in his senses disbelieves the first proposition, much the greater number of men have believed, that in some cases the laws of nature have been suspended; not, that they thought that the same causes did not, in these instances, produce the same effects, but that other causes of greater potency than natural causes, were put into operation.
When our author, therefore, infers from the uniformity of causation, that no testimony is sufficient to be the foundation of a rational belief, that there has been a deviation from the common course of nature, he applies a correct principle to a case to which it evidently does not belong. Because the same cause must produce the same effects, does it follow, that when another and superior cause operates, the same effects must be produced? This would be in direct repugnance to his own maxim. Then, before this principle of the uniformity of causes and effects can be applied, it must be demonstrated. That in the case under consideration, no other causes operate, but such as are usual and natural, and whenever he shall be able to establish this, there will be no further contest respecting the matter.
That I do not misrepresent the argument of the author will appear satisfactorily, by considering the cases which he had adduced. “Suppose, for instance,” says he, “any person to affirm, that he had exposed a cubic inch of ice to a temperature of two hundred degrees of Fahrenheit, and that at the expiration of an hour, it had retained its solidity. Here is a sequence of events asserted, which is entirely at variance with the admitted course of nature; and the slightest reflection is sufficient to show, that to believe the assertion, would involve a logical absurdity. The intrinsic discrepancy of the facts could never be overcome by any possible proofs of the truth of testimony.”
In another page, he says, “If a number of men were to swear, that they had seen the mercury of the barometer remain at the height of thirty inches, when placed in the exhausted receiver of an air-pump, their testimony would be instantly rejected. The universal conclusion would be, that such an event was impossible.” What is here confidently asserted, would only be true upon the supposition, that no causes but such as were natural operated in the cases adduced; but on the hypothesis of the operation of a supernatural cause, there would neither be absurdity nor impossibility in either of the facts. What! could not He, who established these laws and gave to heat and air, respectively, their peculiar power and qualities, suspend their usual operation? Could not He cause the ice to remain unmelted in any temperature; and the mercury to remain suspended, without the pressure of the atmosphere? But the sophistical nature of the argument used, is most evidence. The principle is, that similar causes must have similar effects. Very good — what then? Why, if ice remain unmelted at two hundred degrees of Fahrenheit, then this principle would be violated? I answer, not at all, provided another cause is in operation, of such potency as to counteract the usual effects of caloric; or to counteract the gravity of the quicksilver, in vacuo. And it: will not do to allege, that God, who established these laws, will not contravene them, on any occasion; for this would be an entire change of the ground of the argument, and a relinquishment of the principle on which the reasoning of our author is founded. Besides, it would be a mere begging of the question in dispute.
Now, in both the cases adduced by this writer, to illustrate and confirm his argument, on which he pronounces so confidently, that the judgment of men would universally reject any testimony, I beg leave to be of a different opinion, and will appeal to the common sense of all reflecting men, whether, on the supposition, that a dozen men, of perspicacity and undoubted integrity, should solemnly affirm that they had seen a cubic inch of ice remain an hour unmelted at two hundred degrees of Fahrenheit, whether they could refuse their assent, even if they knew of no good reason why the laws of nature should be suspended? But if they knew that an important purpose in the divine government could be answered by such a miracle, much less testimony would be sufficient to produce unwavering conviction of the truth of the extraordinary fact. And while they assent to such facts, on sufficient testimony, they are guilty of no absurdity, and violate no rule of common sense. It is true, that the credibility of the event reported, may be reduced to this question — whether it is more probable, that the laws of nature should, for a good end, be suspended, or that twelve men of tried veracity, should agree to assert a falsehood, without any motive to induce them to do so? And here our ingenious author revives the metaphysical balance of Mr. Hume; and after admitting that the evidence from testimony may be so strong that nothing is wanting to give it force, yet the maxim that the same causes may have the same effects, is also a truth so certain, that no evidence can countervail it. We have, therefore, according to this statement, the equipoise of evidence, which we have already considered, in Mr. Hume’s argument. The rational mind, in such circumstances, must remain neutral; it can neither believe nor disbelieve; for the evidence for the one exactly counterbalances that for the other. But after stating this hypothesis, our author finds that the evidence from testimony never can be so convincing, as that which we have for the uniformity of causation. His words are — “If the rejection and the admission of the testimony equally implied a deviation from the uniform terms of causes and effects, there could be no reason for rejecting or admitting it.” “But the rejection of the testimony is not in this predicament. The causes of testimony, or in other words, those considerations which operate on the minds of the witness, cannot always be ascertained; and as we are uncertain as to the causes in operation, we cannot be certain of the effect; we cannot be sure that the circumstances of the witness are such as have given rise to true testimony, and consequently we cannot be sure that the testimony is true.”
On this whole subject I have several remarks to make. First, this method of destroying the equipoise of evidence granted by Mr. Hume, and conceded by our author, is not altogether fair; because it does not admit what is obviously true, that in regard to some kinds of testimony, the evidence is so certain, that we might as soon doubt our own existence as the truth of the facts attested. Now, this being the case, there was no propriety in representing all testimony as being involved in some degree of uncertainty.
Again, what is here said of testimony will apply just as fully to what we ourselves witness, and for the truth of which we have the testimony of our own senses. I mean, that if the argument of our author is at all valid, it will prove, that if we saw the ice remain unmelted in the heat, and beheld it ever so often, and found that thousands around us received the same impression, we must not credit our own senses, nor believe what we saw with our own eyes, because, however certain this kind of evidence may be, it cannot be more certain than the principle, that the same causes will uniformly produce the same effects. Therefore, although we should, under all manner of circumstances, see such events, they could not be believed; for to believe them would be a logical absurdity. And thus would these men, by their metaphysics, reason us out of the evidence of our very eye-sight. I know, indeed, that neither Hume, nor the author whose reasoning we are now considering, has pushed the argument to this its just consequence; but I would defy any man to show, that it is not as applicable to the evidence of the senses as to that derived from testimony. Now, as the kind of evidence which will invariably command assent, is not learned by metaphysical reasoning, but by experience, I would leave the matter to be decided by every man of impartial judgment, for himself. Every man knows whether or not he would believe his own eyes, if he should see ice remain unmelted in two hundred degrees of temperature, according to Fahrenheit: or whether he would say, “it seems to be so, but it cannot be true, because it contradicts a self-evident principle, that the same causes must always be followed by the same effects.” To which a man of plain, unsophisticated common sense would reply, “I must believe my own senses; if doing so contradicts a thousand abstract principles, I care not — ‘seeing is believing.’ “And the same may be said in regard to testimony. Suppose a thousand persons entirely disinterested to aver, that they had seen ice remain unmelted in a very high temperature, we could not but believe them, account for the fact as we might. But we have already proved, that believing in such an event violates no maxim, but only supposes that some extraordinary power or cause is in operation; and when it is understood, that this deviation from the laws of nature is intended to confirm the declarations of some person who claims to be a messenger of God, there is not only no absurdity in the thing, but all presumption against the probability of such supernatural interposition is removed, as has been shown in the argument on that subject.
It might also be demonstrated, that upon the principles of this author, it would be absurd, upon any evidence, to believe not only in a fact which involved a real deviation from the laws of nature, but in any one which was entirely different from all our own experience of the laws of nature. For if it would be absurd to believe, on the testimony of thousands of unconnected witnesses, that ice did not melt in a certain case when placed in the fire; then it was altogether rational for the king of Siam, and all others in similar circumstances, to disbelieve the fact that water had been known to become as hard as a stone, so that men and animals could walk upon it. Persons so situated never could know that such an effect existed, but by testimony; yet as this testimony contradicted all their own experience about the laws of nature, in relation to water, they ought rather to reject the testimony, however strong, than to credit a fact which seemed to involve a deviation from “the sequence of cause and effect,” to use the language of this author. And thus we should be reduced to the necessity of rejecting all facts not consonant to our own personal experience; for to receive them on the ground of testimony, would be to violate the principle that causation is uniform.
But the zeal of our author to establish his favourite point, has led him, not only to assert that a deviation from the regular succession of the laws of nature was incredible on the ground of testimony, but that it is, in the nature of things, impossible. In this assertion he certainly may lay claim to originality; for I believe no one before him, not even Hume, has gone so far in bold affirmation. His words are — “An event is impossible which contradicts our experience, or which implies that the same causes have produced different effects, or the same effects been preceded by different causes. Thus, when we pronounce that it was impossible for a piece of ice to remain in the midst of burning colas without being dissolved, our conclusion involves a complete knowledge of this particular effect of fire on ice.”
And he is so confident that this is the true import of the word impossible, that he says, “If I am not greatly deceived, the acutest reasoner, the closest thinker, the most subtle analyser of words, will find himself unable to produce any other meaning of the term impossible, than that which is here assigned to it.” But he seems to have felt that he had gone too far in this dogmatical, and I must say, irrational assertion; for in a note he himself gives another, and one of the true meanings of the word impossible. But as confident assertion, accompanied by no proof nor reason, is sufficiently answered by a confident denial, I would take the liberty of saying, therefore, that if I am not greatly mistaken, no accurate philologist will admit that this is the true meaning of the word impossible. And certainly, men of plain common sense never can be persuaded, that it is impossible for the succession of events according to the laws of nature, to be changed. It is true, when we confine our ideas to the mere powers and qualities of nature, we do assert that their effects will be uniform, and that it is impossible that the same causes should produce different effects; but when we extend our views to the Great First Cause, it is not only absurd, but impious, to assert that he cannot suspend or alter the laws of nature. Nothing is impossible to him which does not imply a contradiction, or is not repugnant to his attributes.
The conclusion which is rational on this subject, is, that all things are possible to God, and whatever is possible may be believed on sufficient testimony, which testimony, however, must be strong, in proportion to the improbability of the event to be confirmed.
*Dr. Campbell, Prof. Vince, Mr. Adam, Dr. Douglas.
*Dr. Gleig.