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An Examination of Hume’s Argument on the Subject of Miracles (Washington, 1845).
A.H. Lawrence
Alexander Hamilton Lawrence (1812–57) is at least as obscure today as he claimed he was in 1845. Lawrence offers a reasoned and original consideration of Hume’s “Of Miracles.” An Examination shows Lawrence to be knowledgeable of past answers to Hume by William Paley, George Campbell, William Ellery Channing Douglass, and Thomas Starkie; answers with which Lawrence was unsatisfied and upon which he built his own case against Hume. There is no modern scholarship on Lawrence. The only other publication on record for Lawrence appears to be the Speech of A.H. Lawrence, esq., at a meeting of Whigs in Washington city, May 31st, 1852 (Washington, Printed by J.T. Towers, 1852).
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The celebrated argument of Hume upon the subject of Miracles has long occupied the attention of theologians, and called forth various ingenious and learned arguments in reply; and it may be thought highly presumptuous in an unknown individual to thrust himself into a controversy which has been maintained by Paley, Campbell, Douglass, and others distinguished for intellect and learning; and still more presumptuous to dissent from those writers upon some of the grounds they have taken. Yet, if the positions here assumed shall be found to be correct, they will not lose their interest from the obscurity of their origin; and, on the other hand, if they shall prove to be erroneous, they will do the less injury from not being ushered before the world under the influence of a great name.
Although in all the replies to Hume’s essay which we have seen there is much sound philosophy, as well as praiseworthy zeal, yet many of the writers have examined the question from one position only; whilst others, who have set themselves in array against his whole doctrine, have, as we think, misconceived his argument, and consequently have fallen short of the anticipated effects of their own reasoning, from the fact of its being an answer to the supposed, rather than to the full and real meaning of Hume.
We shall not refer to what we take to be misconceptions of this sort from any captious spirit, far less from any purpose of injuring, were it possible, the just effects of what is really excellent and sound in the writings referred to; but because we have thought that an unfair answer in the cause of truth ought not to be sheltered from scrutiny by the advocates of truth, and because we have always felt that Hume had not been fully met in some of his positions, and there was always a secret conviction that what we wished to be true, and believed to be true, had not been fully made out; and a further secret conviction that a good and sufficient answer could be given, in the widest scope his argument could take.
With these remarks we shall proceed to state briefly the argument of Hume, and some of the answers which have been made, at the same time pointing out wherein we consider them defective, and then to examine the argument, and, as we hope, expose its unsoundness.
It may however be well to premise, that although the laws of nature cannot philosophically be considered as causes of action, but only as the established modes or rules of action, yet in order to give the utmost scope to the language of those who reason respecting those laws as if they were absolute and self-acting principles, we may in some cases assume the same language for the sake of argument; without however intending to recognise its correctness.
The following has been well stated to be the substance of Mr. Hume’s reasoning:
“A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. But we learn from experience that the laws of nature are never violated. Our only accounts of miracles depend upon testimony, and our belief in testimony itself depends upon experience. But experience shews that testimony is sometimes true and sometimes false; therefore, we have only a variable experience in favor of testimony. But we have an uniform experience in favor of the uninterrupted course of nature. Therefore, as on the side of miracles there is but a variable experience, and on the side of no miracles; a uniform experience, it is clear that the lower degree of evidence must yield to the higher degree, and therefore no testimony can prove a miracle to be true.”
In answer to this, reliance has been placed upon the following arguments, among others. Douglass, in his “Errors concerning Religion,” after stating Hume’s conclusion to be, that miracles can never be proved, because they are contrary to experience, says: “There is sophistry in the use of the word ‘contrary,’ inasmuch as a fact stated to have happened would not be contrary to one’s experience, unless that person was actually present at the time and place, and experienced the contrary of what is asserted.” “Miracles, philosophically speaking, are not violations of the laws of nature.”
Mr. Starkie, in his practical treatise on the law of evidence, holds the following language: “but the question is, whether mere previous inexperience of an event testified is directly opposed to human testimony, so that the mere inexperience as strongly proves the thing is not, as previous experience of the credibility of human testimony proves that it is. Now a miracle, or violation of the laws of nature, can mean nothing more than an event or effect which has never been observed before; and, on the other hand, an event or effect in nature never observed before is a violation of the laws of nature: thus, to take Mr. Hume’s own example, ‘it is a miracle that a dead man should come to life, because that has never been observed in any age or country;’ precisely in the same sense the production of a new metal from potash, by means of a powerful and newly discovered agent in nature, and the first observed descent of meteoric stones, were violations of the laws of nature; they were events which had never before been observed, and to the production of which the known laws of nature are inadequate. But none of these events can, with the least propriety, be said to be against or contrary to the laws of nature, in any other sense than that they have never been before observed; and that the laws of nature, as far as they were previously known, were inadequate to their production. The proposition, then, of Mr. Hume ought to have been stated thus: Human testimony is founded on experience, and therefore is inadequate to prove that of which there has been no previous experience, &c.”
Others have reasoned in this manner, viz: “That Hume’s argument proves too much, as it would be just as strong against many things which we know to have happened as it is against miracles. Any extraordinary event is improbable from experience until it has actually been experienced. Thus it was improbable before hand that such men as Cæsar and Napoleon should ever live,” &c.
Now all this is founded on a misapprehension, either of the reasoning of Mr. Hume, or else of the legitimate consequences of the principles which he assumes. And, first, as to there being an inherent sophism in the use of the word “contrary” to experience. We think that an event which has never been observed before may, in some cases, be properly said to be contrary to experience even by those who were not present at the time or place at which that event is alleged to have happened. Our experience of the relation of cause and effect is a positive experience — an universal experience. And whether our belief in the necessity of a cause for the production of every effect be the result of this universal experience of such relation, or whether it be a simple intuition, an instinctive conclusion, it matters not; the fact is undeniably true that we feel just as sure that every effect that we witness had its cause, and its proper and adequate cause too, as that we witness the effect itself. It is a matter of positive and universal experience also, that like causes produce like effects, and the same cause the same effects. If, then, it is asserted in general terms that an effect has taken place without any cause, or by an inadequate cause, or that dissimilar effects have been produced by like causes, or opposite effects by the same cause, we properly reply that it is contrary to experience. Or if a particular fact is alleged which militates in any way against the relation of cause and effect, or the relation of any well known principle in nature and its hitherto invariable results, we say properly that is contrary to experience; not to our experience in person of the contrary of what is asserted, but contrary to universal experience of the results of uniform principles, and of the truth of a fundamental axiom in all philosophy.
It is perfectly true, as Mr. Starkie says, that “our inexperience of an event ought not to weigh against positive testimony,” when that event is a probable one, or even a possible one, under the ordinary laws of nature. But we do not think that this doctrine can extend to events which are not explicable according to our previous experience of the laws of nature. But in the latter case our disbelief is not based upon our not having experienced the particular fact at the particular time alleged; we do not discredit it simply because we did not see it, but our disbelief is grounded upon our positive experience of different results in similar circumstances under the ordinary laws of nature. If a man tells me that he can extract a metal from potash by some powerful chemical agency, I may well believe him although I may never have seen the thing done, and for this reason, I know that most substances are compounds, I know the power of chemical agents in decomposing these substances, and all this in perfect consistency with the laws of nature. An effect is produced by an adequate cause. The thing itself then being possible, nay highly probable, I may well believe the simple fact of an individual’s ability to do it upon his own assertion. But if the same man tells me that by his mere volition he can draw out a metal from potash, I certainly would not, under ordinary circumstances, believe him. And why? Because experience teaches us that no effect takes place without an adequate cause. We intuitively refuse our assent to testimony respecting events which are said to have taken place without the intervention of some cause sufficient to produce them. In extracting a metal from potash there is only a new effect brought to light by a known and competent cause; and although the precise fact had not been within our experience, yet it was not in its nature inconsistent with the experienced power of chemical agency. But in the other case there is an event asserted to have taken place without an adequate cause, without any physical agency — an effect which is both new and not the result of any known laws. Such an event is contrary to our experience of the laws of cause and effect in the general, and of the power of human volition in particular.
Again, as to the argument that “Hume’s reasoning proves too much, inasmuch as it is just as strong against many things which we know to have happened, as it is against miracles; that a thing (according to Hume,) is improbable until it has actually been experienced; thus it was improbable beforehand that such men as Cæsar, Napoleon, &c., ever should live.”
Now this argument seems to suppose Mr. Hume to mean nothing more than that there may be chances against the happening of an event, which event in itself would be nothing marvellous if it were to happen. This we conceive to be neither a fair understanding of Mr. Hume’s meaning, nor a proper, philosophical, distinction between different states of improbability, or rather the different sources from which improbability may arise. An event may be improbable in itself, or it may be improbable from some circumstances which may control it. It is improbable that yonder blind, lame, and penniless beggar will visit Europe this season, and it is improbable that he will walk across the neighboring river on the surface of the water. Yet no one will contend that the improbability in these cases is of the same character. Blind, lame, penniless though he be, and without the least ray of expectation of visiting Europe, it is nevertheless possible that he may do it. It is improbable, but not from any thing marvellous in the thing itself, but because in his case circumstances (if I may so speak) have heaped up in his way chances against it. But to walk over the river on the surface of the water, the known laws of nature have shown to be improbable, because UNDER THEIR ORDINARY operation it is impossible.
Enough we think has been said to show that what Mr. Hume really meant by “being contrary to experience” was, not that the very identical fact had never been before experienced, and therefore could never be believed, but that such fact was inconsistent with the known operation of principles which had been deduced from a long course of observation and experience. We have been thus careful in giving what we believe to be his true meaning, because we wish to approach the subject with perfect fairness, and because we believe that an argument founded upon a false or uncandid statement of his reasoning not only fails to convince us of its fallacy, but reacts on the cause it was intended to support, and in the end does much harm. And besides, we believe that his argument may be successfully combatted, at least to the minds of all who believe in the existence of a “Great First Cause.”
In the discussion of this question we do not hold ourselves obliged to yield to all the postulates of atheism, nor to admit the doubts of those who deny those maxims on which we instinctively act, because they cannot be proved by absolute demonstration. We intend our remarks for those, who believe in a Great First Cause, but who reject both Christianity and the miracles, which were the accrediting evidences of it. We shall assume the existence of a God for the following reasons:
1st. Because upon the principles of absolute atheism or skepticism, although neither miracles nor any thing else could be certainly proved, yet neither could their impossibility or improbability. Nothing could be proved either to exist or not to exist, without assuming IN the reasoning, some of those very maxims which the object of the reasoning is to disprove.
2nd. Because Mr. Hume himself says, that “though the Being to whom the miracle in this case” (any new system of religion) “is ascribed, be almighty, it does not upon this account become a whit more probable; since it is impossible for us to know the attributes of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of his productions in the usual course of nature.”
3d. Because the greatest number of those who have sheltered themselves under the reasoning of Hume, have not been Atheists but Theists, and have made his arguments their boast and reliance, in rejecting Christianity, and fortifying modern infidelity.
Hume does not deny the possibility of miracles. His argument is not a metaphysical one, founded on the nature or essence of the thing considered, but is entirely a practical one, touching only the reasonableness of our belief in miracles. He no where attempts to prove that miracles cannot be, but that upon principles of reason we cannot believe them to be. Nor would it comport with his philosophical opinions to assert that miraculous events, or any events, could not occur, inasmuch, as he referred all our knowledge to experience; consequently, he could only infer from the past what would probably, not what would certainly, take place in the future. The most that Mr. Hume could say, respecting the possibility of miracles, would be, that as they never had happened, so they never could reasonably be expected to happen.
It is the want of a proper observance of this distinction between that which may reasonably be expected to be, and that which must of necessity be, which has led to considerable irrelevant reasoning in answer to a misconceived notion of Mr. Hume’s meaning. His argument (as we have said,) we understand to be entirely a practical one, touching only the reasonableness of our belief in miracles. It does not consist of, nor is it: dependent on, the peculiar philosophical notions of its author, as developed in other works. If it did, we should have but little fear of it in its practical effects; for however plausible and ingenious asspeculations, the ideal theories of Berkley [sic] and Hume, and the destruction of all connection between cause and effect, so strenuously maintained by the latter, when applied to our every day affairs, and our temporal or eternal interests, they can have but little influence. We do not much fear the theories of those who, to sustain themselves, must deprive us of those instinctive impressions, and those spontaneous operations of the mind, and those self-evident axioms, which are the foundation not only of all reasoning, but of all action.
But the great error in most of the reasoning in relation to miracles — both in that of Hume and of those who have replied to him — is, in overlooking the true nature of miracles, and attempting to reason on them in the same manner as on ordinary circumstances. They have been treated as facts which must have taken place through the agency of, or in accordance with, the laws of nature; or, in other words, the arguments seem to suppose NATURE to be the cause of their happening. And it is this erroneous view of miracles that Mr. Hume’s reasoning overthrows, and none other. But it should be remembered, that miracles are opposed to the ordinary laws of nature, because if they were explicable upon any known laws, they would cease to be miracles. And to speak of the raising of the dead, the turning of water into wine, &c., as of the same kind of improbabilities as the exploits of Cæsar or Napoleon, is certainly a loose mode of reasoning.
But, as we have said, Mr. Hume argues that a miracle cannot be proved, because it is against those laws which experience has shewn to be immutable — which means, that an event cannot be proved to have happened by the operations of nature, which is against all our experience of the operations of nature. Or, in other words, he does not take into view any other agent (as causing an event,) than nature, or any other “modus operandi” than the ordinary course of nature. But if we suppose an independent and higher power brought into exercise, which can even set aside the laws of nature, then all such reasoning falls to the ground, because we cannot circumscribe within any laws either the acts, or the manner of acting, of a being who is superior to, and independent of, all laws. For instance, if we were told that a rock had separated itself from the earth, and by the force of gravitation had raised itself in the air, we should disbelieve it, because it is against our uniform experience of the effects of gravitation, which draws heavy bodies to the earth. But if we had been told that the rock had been hurled into the air, by some extraordinary force, which for the time had counteracted the power of gravitation, we might readily believe it. And in this latter case we should not think of reasoning about the uniformity of the law of gravitation, and our want of any experience of a violation of the order of nature, &c., but we should at once perceive that a force had acted independently of the law, and had done something which the law itself would never have done. Just so with miracles. When we are told by Mr. Hume that we ought not to believe them because they are contrary to the laws of nature — we are told truly, if it is meant that they are caused simply by the operations of nature — but we are not told truly, if they are considered as the acts of a power superior to the laws of nature, and entirely independent of them.
In this view of the case, let us examine a little more particularly the argument of Mr. Hume. He says, a miracle is a violation of the laws of nature. But we learn from experience that the laws of nature are never violated, &c. Upon the truth of this proposition the whole of his argument depends, and the conclusion derived from it depends entirely on the truth of each part of the proposition. He asserts experience to prove that the laws of nature are never violated, and that experience proves human testimony to be often fallacious; so that we have an uniform experience opposed to a variable experience, and of course the latter should always give way to the former. The truth of this argument then, and the soundness of its conclusion, depend upon the fact that the laws of nature are never violated. If this proposition be not true, the conclusion is good for nothing. We assert then without fear of contradiction, and as a fact established by experience, that the laws of nature are often violated; nay more, that they are daily and hourly violated in the same manner, though not to the same extent, as they are violated in the case of miracles. When a stone is thrown into the air, the law of gravitation is violated. When a bird takes wing, the law of gravitation is violated. When two bodies in certain states of electricity, are brought near each other, they mutually repel, and the law of attraction is violated. And so in thousands of instances. Nor will it suffice to say, that these are not violations of the laws of nature because they are of frequent occurrence, and may be explained in a natural way; that the law does not cease, but is only overcome for a time. The law is violated for the time as much as a law can be violated. A different effect is produced, from what the law would produce. And it matters not whether the law is overcome by another law, or by an extraneous force, the result is the same, and the law is violated. The “vis inertiæ” may be called a law of matter; that is, it is a law of matter that it shall remain at rest unless put in motion by some superior force. A superior force may overcome that law. Now we would ask, wherein does this differ in principle from raising the dead. It is a law of our nature that when we are dead we remain at rest, have no power of motion, nothing of sensation, or of life. Yet may not this law be overcome by sovereign power, in the same way that the “vis inertiæ” of matter is overcome by human force? If the question were, whether the dead were ever raised into life by the ordinary operations of the laws of nature, uniform experience of the operation of those laws would lead us to a denial of the fact. But such an inference is not contended for. What we contend for is this, that it is unphilosophical and wrong to adduce the acknowledged uniformity of the operations of nature, when uncontrolled, in opposition to positive testimony in favor of different results where nature is not uncontrolled. We know that effects are every day produced, different from what would have been produced, by the uninterrupted course of nature.
Let it always be kept in mind that we are not attempting to show that the laws of nature ever violate themselves, or that a law of nature in its free operation ever produces any effect contrary in its character to those effects which are the ordinary consequences of that law. When a heavy body is thrown into the air the law of gravitation is violated, but not by the law itself, but by an independent force. And all we contend for is, that the laws of nature are often opposed, overcome, and in this sense “violated” by some extraneous power, and in the same sense in which they are violated in the case of miracles, and that, therefore, Mr. Hume’s assertion is not true, and of course the proposition founded on it false. We do not pretend that the laws of nature produce miracles, but that an Almighty power suspends, overcomes those laws, and introduces other effects which are in no other sense miracles, than that they are not caused by the ordinary active powers of nature, but by an extraordinary and unusual exertion of omnipotent power. Nor let it be said that in this reasoning we are giving an improper meaning to the word “violated.” We defy the most zealous advocate of Hume’s infallibility, to point out any difference (except in the degree of power required, and the time of its continuance,) between a violation of a law by that power, which produces a miracle in the sense of Mr. Hume, and that power which causes a stone to ascend. What we call a miracle is no more in the hands of the Almighty, than the smallest exertion of power in the hands of man. There is no difference in principle between the act of the Almighty in exerting omnipotent power, and suspending or overcoming the laws of nature — and the act of a human being in overcoming them for a time by an exertion of limited power — save that the former exerts his control over laws which he himself has ordained, whilst the other opposes his feeble arm against laws which he can not long resist. The one can act upon the law itself, and suspend both the law its effects — the other can only for a moment suspend its effects.
There is another of Mr. Hume’s propositions essential to the establishment of his doctrine, which we also think incorrect, viz: “That our belief in human testimony depends upon experience.” This doctrine has been most successfully assailed by Mr. Campbell in his celebrated reply to Hume upon the supposition that Hume’s meaning is, that our belief originates in experience. Mr. Campbell has very clearly shown, that experience leads us to a distrust, rather than to a belief of human testimony; but in our opinion Mr. Campbell’s doctrine does not avert the ultimate conclusion of Mr. Hume, (his proposition standing as it does in general terms,) inasmuch as it makes no difference as to the result, whether our belief or our distrust of testimony is founded in experience, since our experience is in either case against the infallibility of human testimony. Mr. Hume has certainly shown great dexterity in the management of his argument. But though standing as it does in abstract terms, Mr. Campbell’s reasoning (which is undoubtedly correct,) may not reach it with much effect in this particular point; still we think that he has put us on the right track for a proper understanding of the subject. Mr. Hume treats the “laws of nature” as a whole, and in this case very properly, because his proposition is as true of each and every, as of any or all the laws of nature. He also treats human testimony as a whole, in the aggregate, without reference to its parts or qualifications. He says, “our experience is against the infallibility of testimony,” meaning testimony as a whole. Now we say that experience is not against all testimony, because our experience is in favor of much, perhaps most testimony. All that can be said is, that human testimony is not always found to be true. Hume would have the exceptionable vitiate the unexceptionable. Taking the character of all testimony from the character of one class or species, and stamping testimony as a whole as therefore doubtful, he concludes that all the testimony in the world would not be sufficient to establish the truth of a miracle. Now we would observe, that testimony derives its character mainly from the character of the individuals from whom it comes, and the circumstances under which it is given. Our experience is in favor of the testimony of some men and against that of others. There are some men whom we have never known to tell a lie, and others whom we have scarcely ever known to speak the truth. We almost instinctively trust the one and distrust the other. But to bring into one mass all human testimony and brand it as unreliable, because a part is uniformly bad, and only a part uniformly good, is very much like saying that this world is in physical darkness because it is not uniformly clothed in light.
Our senses sometimes deceive us; and the reasoning of Mr. Hume is just as strong, therefore, against the evidence of our senses as against human testimony, both taken as a whole; yet, there are some circumstances in which the evidence of our senses must be considered as absolutely certain.
But it may be said, admit the truth of all this, admit that experience is in favor of some testimony and against other, still may not those who have never yet deceived us possibly deceive us hereafter? Is there an absolute certainty that those who have never yet deceived us, never will deceive us? If a man of unimpeached veracity should tell you that he had lately seen a brook, which had from time immemorial run down a hill, without any known or perceptible cause run up the hill, would you be as certain from that man’s testimony that the brook did flow up the hill, as you would be from your experience of the laws of gravitation that it did not flow up the hill? These questions we think present the doctrine in their fairest and strongest light, and we wish to answer them fairly, and at the same time to make known the ground on which we stand. We answer, then, that a man who has never yet deceived us, may nevertheless deceive us. The laws of human conduct are not as open to the view as the laws of physical nature; and in the case of the brook just mentioned, if required to believe the statement without any other circumstance than the bare word of the informant, we should hardly feel convinced of the fact. But our doubts in such case arise from what we suppose the possibility of variance in the one case, and the impossibility of variance in the other. Testimony depends entirely upon the will or choice of the witness, which circumstances may vary. But the laws of nature can only be changed by the will of Him who ordained them, “in whom there is no variableness neither shadow of turning.” The presumptions are strongly against any deviation from the ordinary operations of the laws of nature. Experience would lead us to expect the same results that had hitherto been witnessed to continue, but it could properly go no further. No one would be so bold as to say that the Almighty could not for a time change the laws of his own establishing, or that he might not by possibility see sufficient occasion for so doing. Experience, in this view of the case, is not a proper guide to the truth, for it only makes known what may be fairly anticipated, but not what must of necessity actually happen. But of this hereafter: we wish at present only to say, that evidence itself (as shewn by Mr. Starkie) admits of various degrees; it is strengthened by concurrence of testimony; it is still further strengthened by concurrence of circumstances; and it is possible that there should be such a concurrence of testimony and circumstances as to render the falsity of the evidence as improbable, nay, as impossible, as the facts which it asserts. Nay further, there may be circumstances in which the violation of a law of nature shall be a more probable event (even judging by experience in its proper sense) than that the evidence and the circumstances brought to support it, should be untrue. For example, if on the 8th March I started for New York to take passage for Europe, and just before leaving W., a man whom I had never known to deviate from the truth, told me that at 12 o’clock in the night previous, in the midst of total darkness, the sun appeared in meridian brightness at the zenith for one hour, and had then suddenly disappeared, I should probably think that he had seen a meteor, or had been dreaming, or that he wished to frighten me, or that he was telling a lie; but I should hardly believe that the sun had been seen by him at the time and in the manner described. If the man seemed terrified, I should suppose that at least he believed what he was telling, but I should still attribute it to delusion. But if I heard others talking of the same event, and saying that they had seen it, I could not doubt that some remarkable luminary had thus appeared, but could not believe it to be the sun. If on arriving at New York, the same thing were talked of and believed, all agreeing that it was the sun, that the light and heat were those of the sun, I should be still more staggered. I set sail immediately for Europe, and ours is the first vessel that arrives after the 8th March from the United States. On our arrival, the first topic of inquiry is, whether the sun was seen at midnight on the American side of the Atlantic. Persons assert on all hands that at the precise hour it was seen in Europe. On looking at the newspapers of the 9th, I find full accounts of the phenomenon, and all agreeing that the object seen was the sun. Now I ask, could I doubt this concurrence of evidence? If so, on what principle could I doubt it? Mr. Hume tells us that it is against our experience of the uniformity of the laws of nature. But is it not equally against our experience to find such evidence as this false? But Mr. Hume would say, though the witnesses may not be false, it is still probable that they were deceived. To this we reply, that they could not be deceived as to the reality of some remarkable phenomenon, but only as to the fact of its being actually the sun. Well now suppose, further, the evidences of the truth of the New Testament to be just as they now are, and suppose there were contained therein certain prophecies that the Messiah should again appear on earth about this time; that there should be certain signs and wonders in the Heavens and on the earth, just preceding his appearance, among which prophecies should be contained one, that the sun should appear at midnight and shine with its usual splendor, and that other of the predicted signs and wonders had absolutely taken place, would not this place the evidence that we have before spoken of in a state of absolute unassailability?
Again, suppose that the inventor of the Magnetic Telegraph had concealed within his own bosom its principles and effects, but had at the same time constructed his fixtures from Quebec to New Orleans. Suppose that he had then announced to the world (without however making known any thing of the manner in which it was to be done,) that in the space of two minutes he would communicate a message from Quebec to New Orleans, and also the answer to it. Suppose, too, that he proposed to communicate what any friend in one of those places was doing, his looks, his dress, his actions, his conversation, &c., provided that friend would visit a particular room. Suppose the thing to be tried over and over again, by different persons, and at different times, and that the evidence of thousands could be brought to establish the fact. How would Mr. Hume act in regard to such testimony? He would be bound on his own principles to reject it. The facts would be as clearly against our experience as the fact of the child’s restoration to health by our Saviour, even before he had reached the dwelling. According to Mr. Hume, here would be an event asserted, which militates against all our ideas and experience of time and space. We hear that said to have been accomplished in a moment, which reason and experience tell us must have required weeks to accomplish. We are told of a conversation being carried on at the distance of some 2,000 miles with nearly as much facility and rapidity as it could be if the parties were face to face. To Hume this would be really as miraculous an event as could be conceived, and against our belief of which all his arguments would apply with just as much force as against the miracles recorded in the Scriptures. True, when the theory is unfolded, it is explicable on natural principles — that is, the effect is produced by the operation of a well known agent. But so is it in the case of miracles. Superior force is a well known agent, though sometimes (like the galvanic fluid in the case just cited) it produces unwonted and astonishing effects. So far as our belief is concerned, the two cases stand upon the same ground. Besides, even now, not one person in a thousand understands the rationale of the thing, or has ever actually seen the experiment made. It is taken entirely on trust. But at any rate, before the principle was unfolded, and whilst it appeared a supernatural affair, on Mr. Hume’s principles we were bound to disbelieve it, and yet it was nevertheless a fact susceptible of absolute certainty.
We believe, then, that those extraordinary acts called miracles are, in themselves, when considered with reference to the established laws of nature, in the highest degree improbable, though upon the supposition of an independent and superior power, perfectly possible. We say in themselves improbable, because we could in no way suppose a miracle possible without the intervention of such controlling force. They contain within themselves no explication of their causes, in unison with the uninterrupted operations of nature, but are referrible only to arbitrary, absolute, and unaccustomed power.
If then we were once to suppose an Almighty Sovereign and moral Governor of the universe, whose character and attributes were somewhat shadowed forth in the works of nature, but who was about to give a revelation for the proper conduct and final salvation of men, it would then become probable, or at least not incredible, that he would give evidence of the genuineness of this revelation, and of the source whence it emanated, by the performance of acts which should in themselves be extraordinary and improbable. That he would approve the revelation as coming from the omnipotent God, by the exhibition of omnipotent acts; because, in the same proportion as the acts were improbable or supernatural, so would the probability be of their divine origin; and in the same proportion as their improbability should be diminished, would the probability of their being in the usual course of things be increased. Circumstances then may render it probable that the Almighty would arbitrarily perform acts, which in themselves would not only not be probable, but violently improbable under the known course of nature. Whenever an occasion for miraculous power shall be seen, then we may reasonably expect a manifestation of that power; and we see no reason why the expectation thus raised, may not counterpoise the expectation induced by experience, that the manifestations in the natural world shall be as they have hitherto been. It is but an inference, not a certainty, in either case. Thus, that water should by the force of gravitation rise above the level of its fountain, is in itself an event as improbable as well could be. And yet, if the Almighty were to send an accredited messenger from Heaven, it is very probable that he would enable him to perform acts as unusual and unaccountable as that of raising water above its level by a word, for such acts would be the vouchers of his mission. Under such circumstances, miracles would be the very best, if not the only satisfactory evidence; and inasmuch as from their natural improbability (judging by the ordinary course of events,) they would be the best evidence of supernatural power, so they would be the most probable means that we can conceive of by which a divine revelation would be accompanied. The question would then become entirely a question of fact. The probability arising out of the occasion, the circumstances, the demand for them, would neutralize the improbability growing out of the nature of the miracles themselves; and as to their susceptibility of proof they would be on the same footing with other remarkable facts.
We have thus endeavored to set forth the true and legitimate meaning and effect of Mr. Hume’s argument, by pointing out some of the particulars in which he may have been misunderstood — to show that his argument in its utmost force can apply only to those events which are, or are alleged to be, natural or from natural causes — to show that our experience of the course of nature under prescribed laws cannot reasonably be set against the acts or manifestations of a Being who is superior to all laws — to show that the inference of Mr. Hume is not legitimate, because one of the essential propositions on which it stands is not true, viz: that the laws of nature are never violated — and lastly, to show that there may exist even a probability that a Being who is independent of all laws should act in direct opposition to the laws of nature, whenever he should wish to manifest himself to mankind, or to accredit any created being as a messenger from himself.