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“Antilon-First Citizen Letters,” in the Maryland Gazette for 11 March 1773; 8 April 1773; 6 May 1773; 3 June 1773; 1 July 1773; selections.
[Charles Carroll and Daniel Dulany, Jr.]
In 1773 the Maryland Gazette carried a debate between Charles Carroll of Carrollton (1737–1832), as “First Citizen,” and Daniel Dulany, Jr. (1722–97), as “Antilon.” In a series of eight letters (dating from 7 January 1773 to 1 July 1773), Carroll and Dulany argued about the constitutional right of Maryland Governor Robert Edens’s 1770 attempt to maintain, by proclamation, the level of officers’ fees. The debate aroused a good deal of contemporary attention precisely because it circumscribed the constitutional options available to the colonists in their debate with the British parliament. As shown by the selections reprinted below, Hume’s History played a central role in that debate. Both Carroll and Dulany turned to Hume’s text for the narrative of their historically based arguments. But for Carroll, as for Hume, the English constitution was a fragile product which could not (even once established) be safely put aside; rather it needed to be continually monitored and carefully guarded. On Carroll, Dulany, and the “Anitlon-First Citizen Letters,” see Ronald Hoffman, “Charles Carroll of Carrollton,” ANB, vol. 4, pp. 467–9; Peter S. Onuf, ed., Maryland and the Empire, 1773: The Antilon-First Citizen Letters (Baltimore and London, 1974); George A. Stiverson, “Dulany, Daniel, Jr.,” ANB, vol. 5, pp. 522–3.
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First Citizen to the Maryland Gazette, 11 March 1773
I shall now examine Antilon’s reasons in justification of the Proclamation, and after his example, I shall first compare the two transactions, the Proclamation, and the assessment of ship-money. —— That the latter was a more open, and daring violation of a free constitution(B) will be readily granted; the former, I contend, to be a more disguised, and concealed attack, but equally subversive, in its consequences, of liberty. —— Antilon’s account of the levy of ship-money, though not quite so impartial as he insinuates, I admit in the main to be true. — “The amount of the whole tax was very moderate, little exceeding £.200,000; it was levied upon the people with justice and equality, and this money was entirely expended upon the navy, to the great honour and advantage of the kingdom.” —— At that period the boundaries between liberty and prerogative were far from being ascertained; the constitution had long been fluctuating between those opposite, and contending interests, and had not then arrived to that degree of consistency and perfection, it has since acquired, by subsequent contests, and by the improvements made in later days; when civil liberty was much better defined, and better understood. The assessment of ship-money received the sanction of the judges — “After the laying on of ship-money, Charles, in order to discourage all opposition, had proposed the question to the judges, “whether in a case of necessity, for the defence of the kingdom, he might not impose this taxation; and whether he was not sole judge of the necessity.” —— These guardians of law and liberty, replied with great complaisance (reflect on this, good reader) that in a case of necessity, he might impose that taxation, and that he was sole judge of the necessity.” The same historian speaking of that transaction concludes thus: “These observations alone may be established on both sides, That, the appearances were sufficiently strong in favour of the King, to apologize for his following such maxims; and that, publick liberty must be so precarious, under this exorbitant prerogative, as to render an opposition, not only excusable, but laudable in the people.” —— But I mean not to excuse the assessment of ship-money, nor to exculpate Charles, his conduct will admit of no good apology.
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Antilon to the Maryland Gazette, 8 April 1773
In my former letter I laid before the reader for his examination, and comparison, the two transactions of the ship-money tax, and the proclamation, and shewed that the former imposed a direct tax on the people, and enforced the payment of it by the rigorous means of execution affecting the property, and personal liberty of the subject, and that the latter contained the sanction only of the Governor’s threats of displeasure to officers dependant, and removeable without any enforcement extended to the people beyond that, which the ordinary courts might confer on the very ground of its legality. I also proved that without some settled rate, or standard no exaction of an officer could be punishable as extortion, and that judges and others not vested with a legislative authority, had settled, and ascertained the fees of officers for the very purpose of preventing the oppression of the subject, and concluded, the two transactions, were not only not equally arbitrary infractions of the constitution, but were entirely dissimilar. The Citizen professes his design to consider my reasons in defence of the proclamation, and after having “granted that the assessment of ship-money was a more open, and daring violation of the constitution, still contends that the proclamation, though more disguised, is equally subversive in its consequence of liberty.” The reader will remember that the Citizen to support the character he has attributed to the proclamation, must prove it to be an arbitrary tax.
He allows that the tax of ship-money was an “open and avowed attack on liberty” and seems to apply to the proclamation the epithets, “modest, mild, and conciliating.” He acknowledges that the methods pursued in levying the ship-money were the “arbitrary seizure of property and deprivation of personal liberty” and that there “is no attempt in the proclamation to subject the people to any execution;” but, notwithstanding his admission of so great difference, he endeavours to maintain his position, that the proclamation is as subversive, in its consequence, of liberty, as the levy of ship-money was. “The most daring attacks on liberty, he says, are not perhaps the most dangerous,” because extreme violence excites general indignation, and opposition; but the “modest, mild, conciliating manner, in which the latent designs of a crafty minister come sometimes recommended, ought to render them the more suspected, and should always inspire caution, and diffidence,” let the operation, and effect of the proclamation determine its character; but, because the manner is modest &c. — let not suspicion at once infer, that the design of it is to violate the peoples rights; for if one measure is to be opposed, because expressed in an imperative stile, and attended with the most rigorous enforcements, and another measure is also to be opposed, because it is “modest, mild, &c.” in the manner, and unattended by any enforcement, except what it derives from the law, it would be difficult, indeed, for the best intentions to escape censure. In speaking of the ship money exaction, the Citizen admits my account of it to be, “in the main true,” but intimates that “it is not impartial,” “it is in the main true.” In what was it then not impartial? The exility of the insinuation shall not protect the principle of it, nor shall contempt so entirely extinguish indignation, as to hinder me from exposing the subdolous attempt. The appellation, “Tyrant” has, I suspect, rubbed the fore. “The tax (says he) was very moderate little exceeding, £.200,000 sterling — it was levied with justice and equity, &c.” “moderate?” When the people were plundered of every farthing of it? “levied with justice and equity;” when extorted by the rigours of distress, and imprisonment, in the most direct violation of every principle of liberty? The moderation, justice, and equity of a robber, who should suffer the plundered passenger to retain half a crown for his dinner, might be celebrated with equal grace and propriety. Again he whines — “the boundaries between liberty, and prerogative were far from being ascertained.” What, had not Magna Charta so often (at least thirty-two times) confirmed; the statute (he has referred to on another occasion) de Pallagio non concedendo, the petition and act of rights (to mention no other) most clearly established the principle, that “the people could not be taxed without their consent?” The boundary could not have been more clearly marked out by the utmost precaution of jealous prudence or more outrageously transgressed by the most determined, and lawless tyranny, and yet the Citizen, the generous friend of liberty, though he has adopted the pretences of a notorious apologist, has advanced them without any view to “excuse the assessment of ship-money, or exculpate King Charles” — he means not to apologize, though he has adopted the very principles of the tyrants apologist — again “James the IId by endeavouring to introduce arbitrary power, and subvert the ESTABLISHED church deserved to be deposed, and banished, and the revolution rather” says the Citizen, “brought about, than followed King James’s abdication of the crown.”
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First Citizen to the Maryland Gazette, 6 May 1773
Antilon has vented part of his spleen on Mr. Hume; the censured passage is taken from that author, acknowledge by a sensible writer,(B) and thorough whig, to be an instructing, and entertaining historian. To exculpate the notorious apologist, and myself, it is necessary to observe that the words “levied with justice, and equality” (not equity as cited by Antilon) mean, the tax was equally divided among, or assessed upon the subjects without favour and affection to particular persons, that the imposition, though applied to a good and publick use, was contrary to law, the historian has acknowledged in the most forcible and express words.
Has the Citizen any where insinuated, that the assessment of ship-money was legal? Has he not expressly declared, that he does not mean to excuse that assessment? That the conduct of Charles will admit of no good apology? Yet that there were some appearances in his favour, the passages already quoted, candid men, I think, will admit, if not as a proof to convince, at least as an inducement to incline them to that opinion; mine, I confess, it is, and I make the acknowledgment, without fear of incurring the odious imputation of abetting arbitrary measures, or of being a friend to the Stuarts.
What means the insinuation, Antilon, conveyed in this sentence, “The appellation “tyrant” has I suspect rubbed the sore.” Your endeavours to defame, excite only pity, and contempt; your heaviest accusations, thank God, have no better foundation than your own suspicions. But to return. I again assert, that notwithstanding all the acts ascertaining the subjects rights, cited in your last admirable, and polite performance, that the boundaries between liberty and prerogative were far from being ascertained in Charles’s reign, with that precision, and accuracy, which the subsequent revolutions, and the improvements o[u]r constitution in later times have introduced.(C) I must trouble my readers with a few more quotations from the obnoxious historian abovementioned, submitting the justice of his observations, and the inference drawn from them to their decision, and better judgment.
“Those lofty ideas of monarchical power which were very commonly adopted during that age and to which the ambiguous nature of the English constitution gave so plausible an appearance, were firmly riveted in Charles.” Again, speaking of illegal imprisonment, “But the Kings of England (says he) who had not been able to prevent the enacting these laws, (in favour of personal liberty) had sufficient authority, when the tide of liberty was spent, to hinder their regular execution, and they deemed it superfluous to attempt the formal repeal of statutes, which they found so many expedients, and pretences to elude.”
“The imposition of ship-money (the same historian remarks) is apparently one of the most dangerous invasions of national privileges, not only which Charles was ever guilty of, but which the most arbitrary princes in England, since any liberty had been ascertained to the people, had ever ventured upon.” He subjoins in a note, “It must however be allowed, that Queen Elizabeth ordered the sea-ports to fit out ships, at their own expence, during the time of the Spanish invasion.” Elizabeth treated her parliaments with haughtiness, and assumed a tone of authority in addressing those assemblies, which even the tyrant Charles did not exceed, — her father governed with despotic sway. To these opinions, and unsettled notions of the kingly power, and to the prejudices of the age, candour perhaps will partly ascribe the determination of the judges in favour of ship-money, and not solely to corruption.
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Antilon to the Maryland Gazette, 3 June 1773
. . . I have no spleen against Mr. Hume (as you have foolishly supposed) by whom I have often been entertained, and whose ingenuity, and literary talents I admire; but that his history is a studied apology for the Stuarts, and particularly Charles the first, all men, conversant with the English history, and constitution, and not blinded by prejudice must acknowledge. Without having recourse to the “letters written upon his history,” I could point out very many instances to fix this character, if suitable to the design, and limits of this reply. The bill of rights, which Charles the first endeavoured to evade by mean prevarication, shews that the constitution was most clearly settled in the very point infringed by the ship money levy. That the abdication “rather followed, than preceded the revolution,” is the assertion of ignorance, or prejudice — the very defence of jacobitism. The principle of it was stated in my former letter, from the reasoning of Hampden, Sommers, Holt, Maynard, and Treby.
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First Citizen to the Maryland Gazette, 1 July 1773
. . . The liberties which the English enjoyed under their Saxon kings, were wrested from them by the Norman conqueror; that invader intirely changed the ancient constitution by introducing a new system of government, new laws, a new language and new manners. The contest, which sometime after ensued between monarchy, and aristocracy, not between liberty, and prerogative; the common people remained in a state of the most abject slavery, a prey to both parties, more oppressed by a number of petty tyrants, than they probably would have been by the uncontrouled power of one . . .
Equally unfortunate, and equally unfit for improving the constitution, was the reign of Richard the 2d. Hume teaches us what idea we ought to form of the English government under Edward the 3d —— “Yet, on the whole it appears that the government at best was only a barbarous monarchy, not regulated by any fixed maxims, nor bounded by any certain undisputed rights, which were in practice regularly observed. The king conducted himself by one set of principles, the barons by another, the commons by a third, the clergy by a fourth; all these systems of government were contrary and incompatible; each of them prevailed according as incidents were favourable to it.”
This short historical deduction may seem foreign to my subject, but it really is not.
The frequent and bare faced violations of laws favourable to the people, the pardoning offences of the deepest dye, committed by men of the first distinction, or the inability to punish the offenders, the corruption and venality of the judges, all tend to discover that practices as subversive to liberty, as a discretionary power in the judges to impose fees, went unnoticed, or remained unredressed.
From the deposition of Richard the 2d to the battle of Bosworth, the English were continually involved in wars, foreign, or domestick. Silent inter arma leges.
We may presume, during that period, the courts of justice were but little frequented, and the business transacted in them inconsiderable; from whence we may infer, that the rules of practice, and orders established by the judges in their courts being slightly known to the nation at large, escaped the notice of parliament, in a time of general poverty; and confusion. Frequent insurrections disturbed the peace of Henry the 7th. The fist parliament of his reign was chiefly composed of his creatures, devoted to the house of Lancaster, and obsequious to their sovereign’s will. The 2d parliament was so little inclined to inquire into abuses of the courts of law, or into any other grievances, that the commons took no notice of an arbitrary taxation, which the king a little before their meeting, had imposed on his subjects. His whole reign was one continued scene of rapine and oppression on his part, and of servile submission on that of the parliament. “In vain (says Hume) did the people look for protection from the parliament; that assembly was so overawed, that at this very time, during the greatest rage of Henry’s oppression, the commons chose Dudley their speaker, the very man, who was the chief instrument of his oppressions.” Henry the 8th governed with absolute sway; parliaments in that prince’s time, were more disposed to establish tyranny than to check the exercise of unconstitutional powers.(E) During the reigns of Edward the 6th, Mary and Elizabeth, these assemblies were busily engaged in modelling the national religion to the court standard: their obsequiousness in conforming to the religion of the prince upon the throne, at a time, when the nation was most under religious influence, leaves us no room to expect a less compliant temper in matters of more indifference.
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“Hume’s history is a studied apology for the Stuarts, particularly of Charles the first.” Has the historian suppressed any material facts? If not; but has given an artificial colouring to some, softened others, and suggested plausible motives for the conduct of Charles, all this serves to confirm the observation, that an account may in the main be true, and not intirely impartial; the principal facts may be related, yet the suppression of some attendant circumstance will greatly alter their character and complexion. I asserted that the constitution was not so well improved, and so well settled in Charles’s time, as at present. In answer to this, Antilon remarks, that the constitution was clearly settled in the very point infringed, by the levy of ship money. To this I reply, that the petition of right was only a confirmation of former statutes against the same unconstitutional power, which had been assumed by most preceding kings in direct violation of those statutes.
(B)The most open and avowed attacks on liberty are not perhaps the most dangerous. When rigorous means — “the arbitrary seizure of property and the deprivation of personal liberty are employed to spread terror, and compel submission to a tyrant’s will” they rouse the national indignation, they excite a general patriotism, and communicate the generous ardor from breast to breast; fear and resentment, two powerful passions, unite a whole people, in opposition to the tyrant’s stern commands; the modest, mild, and conciliating manner, in which the latent designs of a crafty minister come sometimes recommended to the publick; ought to render them the more suspected “timeo Danaos, et dona ferentes”: The gifts, and smiles of a minister should always inspire caution, and diffidence. There is no attempt, it is true, in the Proclamation “to subject the people indebted to the officers for services performed to any execution of their effects or imprisonment of their persons — on any account” — If the judges however should determine costs to be paid, according to the rates of the Proclamation, execution of a person’s effects, or imprisonment would necessarily follow his refusal to pay those rates.
(B)Danes Barrigton — Observations on the statutes chiefly the more ancient.
(C)“The later years, says Blackstone, of Henry VIII. were the times of the greatest despostism, that have been known in this island, since the death of William the Norman: the prerogative, as it then stood by common law (and much more when extended by act of parliament) being too large to be endured in a land of liberty.”
(E)An Act was passed in his reign to give proclamations the force of laws.