Appendix B
[Introduction]
1. When he [al-Ghazālī] finished with these questions, he began to claim that the philosophers deny the resurrection of bodies.1 This is something for which no statement is found among any one of those who have gone before, although a statement about the resurrection of bodies has been widespread in Laws for at least a thousand years. Yet those from whom philosophy has come to us do not go back that many years. That is because the first to speak about the resurrection of bodies were the prophets of the children of Israel who came after Moses (peace upon him), and that is evident from the Psalms and from many of the writings attributed to the children of Israel. It is also established in the New Testament, and the statement has a tradition going back to Jesus (peace upon him). It is [also] a statement of the Sabaeans, and Abū Muḥammad ibn Ḥazm [581] says that theirs is the oldest of the Laws.2
[The Philosophers’ Opinions about Laws]
2. But it appears that the group [of philosophers] is the people who make the most of them and have the most faith in them.3 The reason for that is their being of the opinion that they [the Laws] direct to the governance of people by means of which a human being exists insofar as he is human and obtains the happiness particularly characteristic of one [sc. a human being]. That is because they [the Laws] are necessary for the existence of the human moral virtues, theoretical virtues, and practical arts. And that is because they [the philosophers] are of the opinion that a human being has no life in this abode but by means of the practical arts and no life in this abode or in the final abode but by means of the theoretical virtues; that neither one of these two is completed or obtained for him but by means of the moral virtues; and that the moral virtues are firmly established only through cognizance of God (may He be exalted) and magnifying Him by means of the devotions set down in the Law for them in each and every religion—such as offerings, prayers, invocations, and similar speeches spoken in praise of God (may He be exalted), the angels, and the prophets. In sum, they [the philosophers] are of the opinion that the Laws are the necessary political arts whose principles are taken from the intellect and Legislation, especially those that are common to all the Laws—even if they [the Laws] do differ about the lesser and the greater with respect to that.
3. They [the philosophers] are of the opinion, moreover, that one ought not to object to their common principles by means of a statement that establishes or rejects—such as whether it is obligatory to worship God [582] or not and, more than that, whether He exists or not. And they are of the same opinion with respect to the rest of the principles—such as the statement about the existence of final happiness and what it is like—because all Laws agree about another existence after death, even if they differ about the description of that existence; just as they agree about His existence, attributes, and actions being cognizable, even if they differ more or less4 with respect to what they say about the essence of the Principle and His actions. Similarly, they agree about the actions that lead to the happiness of the final abode, even if they differ in the evaluation of these actions.
4. In sum, since they [the Laws] had directed to wisdom by means of a path shared by all, they [the philosophers] held them [the Laws] to be obligatory. For philosophy directs to making only a few intelligent people cognizant of happiness; and it is up to them to learn wisdom, whereas the Laws are intent on teaching the multitude in general. In spite of that, we do not find any one of the Laws that has not been attentive to what particularly characterizes the wise, even though it is concerned with what the multitude share in.
5. Since the select sort of people completes its existence and attains its happiness only through association with the common sort, common education is necessary for the existence of the select sort and for its life both in the moment of its youth and its growing up—and no one doubts that—and as it passes on [583] to what particularly characterizes it. A necessity of the virtue of such a one5 is not to make light of what he has grown up with; to interpret it in the fairest way; and to know that the intent of that education is what is common, not what is particular. And if he explicitly declares a doubt about the Law-based principles in which he has grown up or an interpretation contradicting the prophets (God's prayers upon them) and turning away from their path, then he is the person who most deserves to have the name of unbelief applied to him and to be judged with the penalty of unbelief in the religion in which he has grown up.
6. In addition, it is obligatory on him to choose the most virtuous one [religion] in his time, even when all of them are true according to him. He is to believe that the most virtuous will be abrogated by one more virtuous. Therefore, the wise men who were teaching the people of Alexandria became Muslim when the Law of Islam reached them. And the wise men who were in the cities of Byzantium became Christian when the Law of Jesus (peace upon him) reached them. And no one doubts that among the children of Israel there were many wise men. This is apparent from the books that are found among the children of Israel attributed to Solomon (peace upon him). Nor has wisdom ever ceased to exist among those with revelation—namely, the prophets (peace upon them). Therefore the truest of all propositions is that every prophet is a wise man, but not every wise man a prophet. Rather, they are the learned [584] of whom it is said that they are the heirs of the prophets.
7. If the principles of the demonstrative arts are postulates and fundamentals that are posited, how much more appropriate must that be with respect to the Laws taken from revelation and intellect. Every Law comes about from revelation and has intellect mixed with it. For anyone who holds that it is possible for a Law to come about from intellect alone, it necessarily follows that it is more deficient than the Laws inferred from intellect and revelation. And everyone agrees that the principles of practice must be taken on authority, for there is no way to demonstrate what practice makes obligatory except through the existence of virtues acquired through practical, moral actions.
[The Superiority of the Religion of Islam]
8. Now it has become evident from this statement that wise men in their entirety are of this opinion with respect to the Laws—I mean that the principles of action and the Traditions posited in each religion are to be taken on authority from the prophets. According to them, what is praiseworthy among these necessary principles is what most incites the multitude to virtuous actions, so that those brought up on these are more completely virtuous than those brought up on others—like it is with prayers among us. For there is no doubt that “prayer6 puts an end to iniquity and transgression,” as God (may He be exalted) has said (29:45) and that in the prayer posited in this Law this action [585] is to be found more completely than in the rest of the prayers posited in the rest of the Laws, that is, with respect to what is stipulated as to their number, their times, their calling to mind, and the rest of what is stipulated with respect to them concerning purification and renouncing—I mean, renouncing actions and statements that corrupt them.
9. The matter is the same with respect to the hereafter, for what is said in it urges more to virtuous actions that what is said in the others. Therefore, making an image of the hereafter for them [sc. the people of the religion] by corporeal things is better than making an image of it by spiritual things, as He (may He be glorified) said: “The likeness of Paradise promised to the pious, from beneath which rivers flow” (13:35).7 And the Prophet (peace upon him) said: “What is in it, no eye has seen, nor has ear heard, nor has it occurred to the mind of man.” And Ibn ‘Abbās said: “There is nothing of this world in the world to come but names.”8 He signified that that existence is another growth higher than this existence and another phase better than this phase. That is not to be denied by anyone who believes that we perceive a single existing thing being transformed from one phase to another, like inorganic forms being transformed until they come to perceive their [own] essences—namely, the intelligible forms. Those who doubt these things, object to that, and give expression to it are surely those intent on rejecting the Laws and rejecting the virtues. They are the atheists who are of the opinion that a human being has no end other than the enjoyment of pleasures—this no one doubts. Any of these who is capable of this will undoubtedly be killed by the companions of the Laws [586] and by the wise in their entirety. For the one who is not capable of it, the most complete statements needed are the significations contained in the Precious Book.
10. What this man [al-Ghazālī] said in contending against them is good. And in contending against them, the soul should by all means be posited as immortal—as is signified by the intellectual and the Law-based indications. And it should be posited that what comes back [to life] are bodies like these that were in this abode—not these very ones, because what has perished does not come back as an individual entity. Existence comes back only to a likeness of what has perished, not to what has itself perished, as Abū Ḥāmid [al-Ghazālī] has explained. Therefore, the statement about coming back in the doctrine of the dialectical theologians, who believe that the soul is an accident and that the bodies that come back are those that have perished, is not correct. That is because what perishes, then exists, is one in kind—not one in number. Rather, it is two in number. And [it is not correct] in particular for those of them who say that accidents do not last during two periods of time. [587]
[Conclusion]
11. This man [sc. al-Ghazālī] accuses the philosophers of unbelief with respect to three questions. One of them is this one, and we have said enough about the opinion of the philosophers with respect to this question and that, according to them, it is one of the theoretical questions. The second question is their saying that He does not know particulars, and we have also said that this is not a statement of theirs. The third is their statement about the eternity of the world, and we have also said that what they mean by this name is not the meaning for which they are accused of unbelief by the dialectical theologians. In this book [sc. The Incoherence of the Philosophers], he said that not a single Muslim speaks about spiritual return. Yet in others, he says that the Sufis do speak about it and that, accordingly, there is no consensus for accusing of unbelief those who speak about spiritual but not about sense-perceptible return and that speaking about spiritual return is permitted. In yet another book, moreover, he repeats this accusation of unbelief based on consensus. So, as you see, all of this is confused. God is the one who conduces to what is correct and selects whom He wills for the truth. [588]
12. I came to the opinion I would stop speaking about these things here and would ask to be pardoned for discussing them. Were it not for the necessity of seeking the truth with the one capable of it—and he, as Galen says, is one in a thousand—and resisting discussing it with those not capable of it, I would not have discussed that. God knows every letter, and perhaps God will accept my asking for pardon about that and excuse my stumbling through His grace, nobility, goodness, and superiority. There is no Lord but He!
1. Text from Averroes, Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (Incoherence of the Incoherence), ed. Maurice Bouyges (Beirut: Imprimerie Catholique, 1930), 580:1–588:6. This translation, with minor alterations, is taken from Averroës, The Book of the Decisive Treatise: Determining the Connection Between the Law and Wisdom, and Epistle Dedicatory, trans., with intro. and notes, Charles E. Butterworth (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2001), 43–46.
2. Abū Muḥammad ‘Alī ibn Aḥmad ibn Sa‘īd ibn Ḥazm, a prolific theologian and jurist, was born in Cordoba in 994/384 and died in Manta Lisham, a town near Seville, in 1064/456. The reference is to Ibn Ḥazm’s claim about the Sabaeans in his multivolume Al-Faṣl fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwā’ wa al-Niḥal (Decisive Judgment about Religions, Sects, and Creeds), ed. Muḥammad Ibrāhīm Naṣr and ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ‘Umayra (Jidda: ‘Ukāẓ, 1982), vol. 1, 88:8–89:1.
3. The immediate antecedent of the feminine singular pronoun (hā), which may be used to refer to inanimate plural things, must be “Laws” (sharā’i‘). In the context, it must be understood as the Laws establishing the resurrection of bodies.
4. Literally, “less and more” (bi-al-aqall wa al-akthar).
5. That is, someone who is of the select sort.
6. Reading al-ṣalwa, with the Istanbul Yeni Jāmi‘ manuscript no. 734, to accord with the verse from the Quran, rather than al-ṣalawāt, with Bouyges on the basis of the other manuscripts. See Decisive Treatise, section 50.
7. The rest of the verse reads: “and partaking of it and of its shade is perpetual. That is the outcome of those who are pious, and the outcome of the unbelievers is the fire.”
8. ‘Abd Allāh ibn ‘Abbās ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib was a paternal uncle of the Prophet Muhammad and a recognized authority in the interpretation of the Quran as well as in the traditions about the Prophet’s sayings and deeds; he was born in about 535 and died in 32/653. See W. Montgomery Watt, “al-‘Abbās b. ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., ed. P. Bearman, T. Bianquis, C. E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, and W. P. Heinrichs, Brill Online, 2014, http://referenceworks.brillonline.com.proxy-um.researchport.umd.edu/entries/encyclopaedia-of-islam-2/al-abbas-b-abd-al-muttalib-SIM_0017.