CHAPTER 17
Piercarlo Valdesolo
Abstract
Experiences of states like awe, wonder, inspiration and curiosity have been empirically linked with both human flourishing as well as with engagement in the arts and humanities. Recent research in affective science investigating the structure of these emotions has begun to shed light on exactly why. This chapter argues for two ways in which these disciplines may promote human flourishing via their capacity to trigger such states in observers. It begins by laying out a conceptual framework for awe and its relation to other similar states. It will then survey existing research on awe’s relationship to two domains of well-being: the self-transcendent and the epistemic.
Key Words: awe, well-being, epistemic, self-transcendent, arts, humanities
The enemy of art is the absence of limitations.
—Orson Welles
By articulating the importance of limitations in art, Welles has widely been understood to be communicating the importance of practical limitations in the process of artistic production (e.g., budgeting, marketing, the medium in which an artist is working). He believed that constraints trigger creativity. In one sense this seems obvious. Given the constraint that Anthony Perkins could not actually stab Janet Leigh in the film Psycho, Hitchcock needed to find a way to create the illusion of the act. Operating within limits necessitates artistic innovation. But Welles can also be understood as revealing something about how the consumption of art, or any discipline which seeks to depict the human experience, operates: transcendent art entails psychological limitations. If there are no limits to what kinds of events we have previously experienced, what kinds of ideas we have previously conceived, or what kinds of perspectives we have previously considered, then what boundaries remain for music, art, literature, philosophy, history, theatre, film, or religion to transcend? Our experiences are bound by the cognitive structures through which we filter the world, and it is only through poking up against these boundaries, violating the expectations that these structures create, that the arts and the humanities can elicit the kinds of emotional states psychologists believe are intertwined with human flourishing: awe, wonder, inspiration, curiosity.
Experiences of these states have long been linked with engagement in the arts and humanities, and recent research in affective science investigating the structure of these emotions has begun to shed light on exactly why. This chapter argues for two ways in which these disciplines may promote human flourishing via their capacity to trigger such states in observers. It begins by laying out a conceptual framework for awe and its relation to other similar states. It will then survey existing research on awe’s relationship to two domains of well-being: the self-transcendent and the epistemic.
A Conceptual Framework for Awe
Awe has been defined in a variety of ways. For example, Ekman (1992) speculated that awe would likely be found to satisfy all commonly accepted criteria for inclusion as a basic emotion, but he offered no framework for understanding its causes or consequences. In 2003, Keltner and Haidt published Approaching Awe, a Moral, Spiritual and Aesthetic Emotion, a seminal conceptual framework for the empirical study of awe which has shaped the course of research over the past two decades. Their theory identifies two core components of this affective experience: a perception of vastness and a need for accommodation. On this view, awe is triggered when in the presence of something that cannot be understood in terms of one’s current theories of the world (i.e., it is perceptually vast) and that involves a strong motivation to adjust those theories in order to make sense of the novel stimulus (i.e., a need for accommodation). In other words, awe is experienced when an event transcends the limits of our ordinary experience.
Importantly, vastness can be perceived in a variety of ways: the incomprehensible depths of outer space; the power and strength of a nuclear explosion; the authority of an individual; the complexity of an idea; the beauty of a piece of music; the elegance of a scientific theory. Vastness simply requires that a stimulus cannot be easily understood through the existing cognitive architecture of the perceiver. It exceeds the capacity of our explanatory power. Because such stimuli are not easily explained, or assimilated into existing mental structures, they require “cognitive accommodation”. This conceptualization of awe is grounded directly in Piagetian theories of cognition (Piaget, 1971), on which we process new information either by assimilating that information into preexisting schemas or by changing our preexisting schemas to accommodate the new information. Awe is thought to be evoked when we confront information that cannot be assimilated into preexisting schemas and, consequently, triggers accommodation instead.
Several lines of research support this framework. For example, Shiota, Keltner, and Mossman (2007) found that when asked to recall an experience of awe, most participants described the kinds of perceptually vast stimuli that Keltner and Haidt’s model suggests: panoramic views, works of art, others’ astonishing performances. This work also supported the link between a need for accommodation and awe, showing a correlation between dispositional awe proneness and the need for cognitive closure (an index of an individual’s discomfort with uncertainty and desire for consistency; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Awe-prone participants demonstrated less of this need, suggesting that individuals who chronically experience awe are more comfortable revising existing mental structures to assimilate novel information.
Separate lines of research further support the model by revealing awe’s relationship to feelings of uncertainty. Uncertainty, which is generally considered to be a negative psychological state, results from failures of assimilation (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), and research suggests that the desire to reduce this uncertainty constitutes the main motivation behind cognitive accommodation. In short, feelings of uncertainty motivate a drive for increased understanding as a means of accommodating novel information. Awe is triggered when information transcends the limits of our knowledge, and it motivates us to wrap our minds around the eliciting event. Taken together, this work shows how awe motivates explanation-seeking as a function of its relation to uncertainty, and supports the need for accommodation as a fundamental component of the awe experience.
An important consideration in the conceptual work on awe has been how to distinguish it from related emotional states. This work has proceeded along two distinct lines, both of which ultimately link awe with outcomes associated with well-being. The first identifies awe as belonging to a family of self-transcendent emotions – emotions that reduce attention to the self and its goals – along with admiration, elevation, gratitude, inspiration, appreciation and compassion (cf. Stellar et al., 2017). Much of this work has focused on distinguishing awe from elevation and admiration, since all three can be evoked in response to witnessing the excellence (in virtue or ability) of others (Shiota, Thrash, Danvers, & Dombrowski, 2017; Onu, Kessler, & Smith, 2016; Van Cappellen, Saroglou, Iweins, Piovesana, & Fredrickson, 2013; Immordino-Yang, McCall, Damasio, & Damasio 2009). According to this work, awe is unique in its ability to foster group cohesion and connectedness, at least in part through its effects on feelings of subordination to authority and a diminished sense of self.
The second line identifies awe as belonging to a family of emotions that can be labeled “epistemic.” These affective states are all defined by their relation to knowledge and understanding -surprise, wonder, curiosity, interest. The relationship between these states has thus far been ambiguous, with researchers either using the terms interchangeably or defining certain states as blends or variants of others. For example, awe has been defined as a kind of interest (Izard, 1977), possibly leading to curiosity, as well as related to feelings of surprise (Frijda, 1986). The terms awe and wonder have not been distinguished empirically, with wonder often being included in composite measures of awe (e.g., Shiota et al 2007). According to this work, awe may be unique in both its elicitors (i.e. stimuli individuals fail to assimilate into existing mental structures) and its consequences on subsequent understanding (i.e., motivating conceptual change).
Awe as a Self-transcendent Emotion
Social connection is a primary psychological need (Baumeister & Leary, 1995) and a key to well-being (Seppala, Rossomando, & Doty, 2013; Berkman & Syme 1979; Cacioppo et al., 2002). Not only do individuals with satisfying social lives report above-average levels of happiness (Diener & Seligman 2004; Putnam 2001) and lower levels of depression and anxiety (Lee, Draber, & Sujin, 2001), but those who report social isolation, loneliness or exclusion suffer from a variety of psychological and physical maladies (Baumeister & Tice, 1990; Baumeister, Twenge, & Nuss, 2002; Cacioppo, Hughes, Waite, Hawkley, & Thisted, 2006; Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007).
Functionalist theories posit that emotions have in part evolved to help motivate adaptive responses to social challenges. Given the primary import of forming and maintaining social bonds, a functionalist perspective predicts that certain emotions ought to serve these ends. Indeed, affective scientists have created a category of positive emotions, known as the self-transcendent emotions, defined by their shared effects on promoting coordination and cooperation within a group. These emotions reduce attention to the self and its goals, and focus attention on enhancing others’ welfare and motivating prosocial behavior (Stellar et al., 2017). Following from the tight link between social connection and well-being, these emotions are also expected to directly relate to well-being. As mentioned earlier, awe is considered to be in this category of emotion, along with states such as gratitude, compassion, and admiration. Though this classification emerged after Keltner and Haidt’s original theoretical work on awe, that work predicted that awe would be associated with the kinds of cognitive and behavioral tendencies that motivate commitments to social collectives. Evidence over the past decade has begun to support this hypothesis.
For example, awe increases feelings of interconnectedness and common humanity with others (Shiota et al., 2007) and decreases self-interested goals such as the desire for money (Jiang, Yin, Mei, & Zhu, 2018). Awe motivates prosocial behavior (Piff, Dietze, Feinberg, Stancato, & Keltner, 2015), increases the amount of time participants are willing to devote to others (Rudd, Vohs, & Aaker, 2012), and increases willingness to help a person in need (Prade & Saroglou, 2016). Individuals higher in dispositional awe-proneness show greater generosity to others in an economic game, and experimentally induced awe increases ethical decision-making and reported prosocial values (Piff et al., 2015). Piff et al. (2015) shed light on a potential mechanism through which awe’s effects on prosociality operate: a diminished sense of self. In their research, feelings of smallness in relation to the world mediated awe’s prosocial effects. Experiencing awe made the self and its goals seem less significant, and increased the salience of, and commitment to, the needs of others.
More recent work is consistent with the diminished self-hypothesis, showing that this relationship exists across cultures (Bai et al., 2017) and that awe relates to feelings of humility (Stellar et al., 2018). Bai et al. (2017) found that experimentally induced awe lead to greater feelings of self-diminishment across both individualistic and collectivist cultures and that this relationship explained awe’s effect on prosocial engagement. Stellar et al. (2018) found not only that awe-prone individuals are viewed as more humble by their peers, and report more instances of humility in a diary over the course of two weeks, but also that experimental inductions of awe increased self-reported humility. Taken together, this work reveals how awe functions to fold individuals into a larger collective. One study supports the possibility that awe also increases devotion and commitment to powerful others within a group (cf. Bai et al., 2017). Participants in this study felt lower status compared to awe-inspiring others, and reported increased loyalty to, willingness to sacrifice for, and positive views of ingroup members. These results are consistent with portrayals of awe as eliciting feelings of low power and submission (e.g., in religious epiphanic experiences).
Though awe, and other self-transcendent emotions, are typically considered to be a subset of positive emotions, awe is unique in that it can be colored by feelings of fear (Keltner & Haidt, 2003). Though negative awe experiences are relatively rare compared to positive variants (cf. Shiota et al., 2007) it may be that they are particularly conducive to eliciting feelings of a diminished self. Being in the presence of something larger and more powerful than the self might be an effective means of triggering the kinds of self-transcendence that motivates prosocial behavior. Only a few studies have focused on threat-based variants of awe (Gordon et al., 2017), but what they have found is consistent with this possibility. Specifically, threat-based awe evokes feelings of powerlessness. This will be an active area of future research into the emotion.
Awe as an Epistemic Emotion
Epistemic emotions are defined by their relation to knowledge, and have been studied in a variety of ways with respect to processes associated with understanding (e.g., attention, exploration, and explanation-seeking). But the relationship between these states has thus far been ambiguous, with researchers either using the terms interchangeably or defining certain states as blends or variants of others. Though researchers seem to agree that all these emotions are triggered when gaps in our existing knowledge are made salient through violations of our expectations (Kashdan, Sherman, Yarbro, & Funder, 2013; Loewenstein, 1994; Silvia & Kashdan, 2009), and that they influence processes related to acquiring or revising that knowledge, there are important distinctions between them. Valdesolo, Shtulman, and Baron (2017) proposed a conceptual framework that identifies the need for accommodation as the feature distinguishing awe from the related states of surprise, curiosity and wonder (see Valdesolo et al., 2017, figure 1).
Surprise can be elicited when any there is a discrepancy between an existing schema and a current input (Reisenzein, Meyer, & Niepel, 2012; Schützwohl, 1998). The intensity of the experience maps directly onto the degree of unexpectedness of the eliciting event (Stiensmeier, Pelster, Martini, & Reisenzein, 1995). But importantly, an unexpected event can be surprising even if it can be explained easily. For example, one might be surprised by family members jumping out from behind a couch at a birthday party. Experimental manipulations of surprise are consistent with this conceptualization, using simple techniques such as unannounced changes of computer stimuli to evoke the emotion (Reisenzein & Studtmann, 2007). These kinds of events do not require effortful assimilation or explanation to understand, and it is this feature that distinguishes surprise from other states like curiosity, wonder, and awe. Though some research has linked complexity of explanation for an event with intensity of surprise (Foster & Keane, 2015), this research did not measure other similar states, and work that has done so has found important distinctions in the kinds of events that elicit surprise and other epistemic emotions (e.g., Shiota et al., 2007).
If an explanation for an unexpected event is not obvious, and an effortful causal search is required in order to assimilate information, then the emotional state generated by the event is best described as curiosity or wonder. Curiosity and wonder are conceptually similar emotional states, characterized by not only the presence of an unexpected event but also the salience of a gap in current knowledge and a desire and need to acquire more information in order to explain that event. Experimental inductions of curiosity map onto this definition, the most common of which is presenting trivia questions that participants cannot answer but may desire to know the answer (Gruber, Gelman, & Ranganath, 2014; Kang et al., 2009). No empirical work has studied wonder per se, though the term has been used in composite scales of awe (Saroglou, Buxant, & Tilquin, 2008), and it is often used interchangeably with curiosity in language to refer to a positively valenced approach state geared toward acquiring knowledge (e.g., “I am curious about,” “I wonder about”).
Curiosity and wonder do not require the accommodation (or restructuring) of existing mental structures in order to make sense of an event. They are thought to be evoked only by relatively minor violations of expectations, while violations that represent major threats to understanding either evoke fear-like aversive reactions (Hebb & Hebb, 1949; Loewenstein, 1994) or are simply ignored because of an inability to assimilate the new information into existing mental structures (Chinn & Brewer, 2001).
Awe is triggered by an unexpected event, like surprise, and involves the salience of a gap in knowledge and a desire to acquire more information, like curiosity and wonder, but it also entails an inability to assimilate information into existing mental structures and a resulting need for accommodation. Distinct from curiosity and wonder, awe seems to be evoked by major violations of expectations that, while they can evoke feelings of uncertainty and confusion, also motivate explanation-seeking via a need for cognitive accommodation. Consistent with this conceptualization, awe can be both positively or negatively valenced and can be characterized by either approach or avoidance motivations (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), likely depending on individual differences in constructs, such as the need for cognitive closure and openness to experience (Shiota et al., 2007) or perceptions of threat or great power in the awe-evoking stimulus. A growing body of empirical literature supports this conceptual definition of awe, and it is the accommodative component of the awe experience that distinguishes it from other epistemic emotions.
Of central importance to understanding awe as an epistemic emotion is its relationship to feelings of uncertainty. Uncertainty, which is generally a negative psychological state, results from failures of assimilation (Keltner & Haidt, 2003), and research suggests that the desire to reduce this uncertainty constitutes the main motivation behind cognitive accommodation. For instance, Shiota et al. (2007) found a correlation between dispositional awe-proneness (example item: “I often feel awe”) and the need for cognitive closure. Specifically, awe-prone individuals were less likely to demonstrate such a need, suggesting that individuals who chronically experience awe are more comfortable with uncertainty. Griskevicius, Shiota, and Neufeld (2010) found a complementary effect showing that experimentally manipulated awe leads to increased feelings of uncertainty.
These studies also showed that awe leads to more systematic cognitive processing and that this relationship is mediated by feelings of uncertainty—a result interpreted as demonstrating that feelings of uncertainty motivate a drive for increased understanding. Indeed, while other positive emotions tend to increase reliance on heuristics and stereotypes when processing novel information (Griskevicius et al., 2010), awe is unique in that it does the opposite: it motivates systematic processing of information geared toward understanding and explaining the awe-inducing event. In short, feelings of uncertainty motivate a drive for increased understanding as a means of accommodating novel information.
Building from this work, Valdesolo and Graham (2014) and Valdesolo, Park, and Gottlieb (2016) directly tested whether awe would increase explanation-seeking and whether feelings of uncertainty might represent the motivational force behind this effect. They did so in the distinct domains of scientific and supernatural thought. On their surface, scientific and supernatural thought offer competing explanations for natural events (Preston & Epley, 2009), but research in anthropology (Frazer, 1922) and psychology (Rutjens, van der Pligt, & van Harreveld, 2010) suggests that they stem from the same underlying motivation: the need to explain, predict, and control the natural world (Preston, 2011; Shtulman & Lombrozo, 2016). A large body of literature has shown that explaining events via either religious frameworks (Kay, Whitson, Gaucher, & Galinsky, 2009) or scientific frameworks (Rutjens, van Harreveld, van der Pligt, Kreemers, & Noordewier, 2013) can buffer against the aversive state of uncertainty, and, consistent with that literature, Valdesolo and Graham (2014) found that awe increased affinity for supernatural explanations as a function of how strongly it raised feelings of uncertainty. Similarly, Valdesolo et al. (2016) found that the effect of awe on attraction to either religious explanations or scientific explanations depends on preexisting explanatory commitments. Individual differences in theism moderated the effect of awe on the kind of explanations to which participants were attracted. Other empirical work is consistent with this finding, showing that manipulations of awe can increase reported spirituality (Van Cappellen & Saroglou, 2012), and that its effects on spirituality can in turn influence self-transcendence (Yang, Hu, Jing, & Nguyen, 2018).
Taken together, this work shows how awe motivates explanation-seeking as a function of its relation to uncertainty, and points to the possibility that the need for accommodation that accompanies awe experiences may influence explanation-seeking and meaning-making in ways that are unique from other epistemic emotions. Specifically, awe might be particularly conducive in promoting the kind of deeply engaged learning that education researchers consider to be most transformative. Researchers distinguish between easy, run-of-the-mill learning (“knowledge enrichment”) and learning that is more effortful and protracted (“knowledge restructuring” or “conceptual change”). While other epistemic emotions might be equally effective in promoting the former, awe’s relationship to the need for cognitive accommodation suggests a unique pathway to deep learning and, consequently, flourishing.
Conclusion
You can’t always be in awe of someone’s talent, living with them.
—Yoko Ono
The enemy of awe is the absence of limitations. If information can be easily assimilated into existing mental structures, then the experience of the emotion is extinguished. We must be faced with something we are not equipped to understand and explain. When the magician reveals her trick, the audience’s uncertainty fades, along with their experience of awe. When the process of creation is revealed, genius can seem ordinary, as appears to have been the case with Yoko Ono and John Lennon. The content and form of the arts, and the ideas embedded in the humanities, are uniquely capable of triggering awe. These domains play with the limits of our understanding and expectations. They transport us to previously unimaginable places and confront us with ideas that challenge the very basis of our knowledge about the world. Awe propels inquiries in these domains forward by motivating exploration and understanding, and contributes to well-being and flourishing via both its self-transcendent and epistemic effects.
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