CHAPTER 19
Mark A. Runco
Abstract
Creativity is related to effective problem-solving, adaptability, diverse indicators of success, and various indicators of health, learning, development, and growth. This chapter examines how creativity is related to human flourishing. It ties creative problem-solving to flourishing, the idea being that it is easy to flourish when the individual can creatively solve problems. Much the same logic is used in the discussion of adaptability and creative thinking. Self-actualization is recognized because it has been associated with both creativity and the highest form of psychological health. Divergent thinking, one kind of creative thinking, is brought into the discussion because it describes how ideas may be generated, some of which are original and creative. Divergent thinking is very clearly tied to flourishing, for it allows an individual to identify the fullest range of options and possibilities. Divergent thinking is not linear and does not lead in only one direction, but instead branches out so the individual has more freedom, more latitude, and a very full set of choices which add richness to life. This chapter touches on several different ways that creativity may be associated with human flourishing.
Key Words: divergent thinking, originality, adaptation, learning, problem-solving, self-actualization, criterion problem, invention, innovation
Introduction
There are various indications that creativity is strongly related to human flourishing. Before exploring the evidence, it is necessary to focus and operationalize. The terms “creativity” and “human flourishing” must both be operationally defined. The latter is defined throughout this volume, its richness quite apparent. Several different kinds of human flourishing are discussed in this chapter. Several relationships between creativity and human flourishing are suggested by research on the arts and with artists. This research shows, for example, that the self-expression that is often a part of artwork leads to improvements in immune functioning (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1997). On a more general level there is research showing that artists often express concerns about culture well before scientists realize that these same concerns are of any importance.
What of the term, “creativity”? It is much too ambiguous to be useful, which is why one suggestion has been to avoid the noun form of the word (i.e., creativity) and only use the adjective “creative.” That helps because it requires useful specificity. It is possible to discuss not only the creative personality, for example, but also creative products, the creative process, creative potential, creative achievement, and so on. This chapter focuses on one specific facet of creativity, namely creative thinking. Most of what is covered involves one particular approach to creative thinking, namely divergent thinking.
The key question here is therefore, how is creative thinking related to human flourishing? One way of answering this is to consider all of the benefits of creative thinking that have been acknowledged in the research, most of which with empirical support. Creative thinking is, for instance, related to effective problem-solving, adaptability, diverse indicators of success, and various indicators of health, learning, development, and growth. These are easy to associate with human flourishing, and each is tied to creative thinking.
Before diving into the specific benefits of creative thinking for human flourishing, one more thing should be said about wording. There is a clear benefit to avoiding the general noun of creativity and a benefit to focusing on creative thinking, but there is also a trade-off which must be acknowledged. This is the trade-off involving certainty and generalizability. It is analogous to the trade-offs discussed when comparing (a) laboratory research, where there is experimental control and where causes and effects can be isolated, but where generalizations to the natural environment are lacking; versus (b) naturalistic research, where there can be no control but, largely for that reason, results do generalize to life outside of the laboratory. In the present case, clear observations and associations with human flourishing are possible by focusing on creative thinking, but in the natural environment, thinking does not work in isolation. Creative thinking depends on mood, affect, attitude, and various meta-cognitive conditions. These will be identified, when possible, throughout this chapter.
Flourishing through Creative Problem-Solving, Health, and Adaptability
If we assume that effective problem-solving contributes to human flourishing, and effective problem-solving is associated with creative thinking, it follows that creative thinking is associated with human flourishing. As a matter of fact, this may be the easiest relationship to support of all of the associations mentioned earlier. Creativity has been related to effective problem-solving for decades (Guilford, 1968; Parnes, 1999; Osborne, 1953; Torrance, 1995). This is not to say that problem-solving is synonymous with creative thinking. Sometimes creative thinking is expressed in problem finding, which by definition occurs before there is any problem to solve (Getzels & Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; Runco, 1994). Creative thinking may occur as a kind of playfulness, where there is no obstacle or goal (as there always is when problem-solving), or as a kind of self-expression which can be proactive rather than reactive. Problem-solving is always reactive. From the other angle, sometimes problem-solving is not creative. A solution that has been used before might be recalled, for example, so a problem is solved without originality, and originality is a requirement for creativity (Runco & Jaeger, 2012).
In short, creative thinking is sometimes used for problem-solving, but not always, and some problem-solving is creative, but some is not. Creative thinking and problem-solving overlap but are not one and the same thing. When creative thinking is associated with problem-solving, it tends to make it more effective. This is not to say that it makes it faster or even more efficient. Consider, for example, the problem-solving technique known as satisficing. This technique involves accepting the first marginally adequate solution. No other solutions or options are considered. This is a fast method for problem-solving, and efficient if the only consideration is time, but it is nearly the opposite of creative problem-solving, which tends to take time (Gruber, 1981; Runco & Cayirdag, 1999). Frequently, time is required for incubation (i.e., time away from the problem), though sometimes it is involved with the collection of information or, very probably, for the exploration of alternative solutions. Only by considering a large number of options can original and superior options be found. One line of research supporting this involves remote associates (Mednick, 1962). This confirms that the best solutions are found only after the common (and unoriginal) ones are depleted. It takes time to find a remote associate.
When creative thinking is used to solve problems, the individual or group may flourish—or at least take a step in that direction. That is in part because problems can deplete resources and distract an individual such that mindfulness and other manifestations of the quality of life are unlikely. Maslow (1973) and Rogers (1959) seemed to hold this view when they reported that creative individuals tend to be self-actualized. The explanation is that self-actualization is not possible if more basic needs are unmet. You might say that self-actualization is difficult if there are problems meeting basic needs. True, self-actualization and creativity also share things like spontaneity and self-acceptance (honesty). They may in fact be inextricable—at least that was Maslow’s final conclusion about self-actualization and creativity.
Note that the discussion here made a transition from the association of creative thinking with problem-solving to creative thinking and health, or at least self-actualization, which is often viewed as the epitome of psychological health. There is also evidence that creative thinking is associated with not just psychological health, but also physical health (Runco & Richards, 1997). The interesting thing here is that it may be the process of creative thinking, and in particular the self-expressive nature of certain creative acts, that contributes to physical health (Pennebaker, Kiecolt-Glaser, & Glaser, 1997). Impressively, the measurement of physical health in this line or research involves T-cells, objectively counted from bloodwork. Individuals who have regular opportunities to express themselves, even in something as simple as a journal, show improved immune functioning.
Before making another transition, it should be noted that research also relates creativity (but not necessarily creative thinking) to societal health (Simonton, 1997). It is not much of jump from there to demonstrations of how creative thinking (i.e., the generation of original ideas) is related to creative economies, and in both cases (i.e., societal health and creative economies) it is easy to see the connection to human flourishing. Creative economies involve professional expressions of creativity, and surely it is a good thing if individuals within a particular society have regular opportunities to generate ideas and express their creativity. If avocational creativity is good for people, which it seems to be (Richards & Runco, 1997), very likely having opportunities for creativity at work would be just as good—and maybe better. If creativity is a part of work, there is some assurance that the beneficial opportunities will be regular and predictable. Creative economies are defined in terms of the industries and professions involved (Florida, 2004; Runco et al., 2016). More will be said about societal flourishing and creativity in the following.
Creative thinking was connected to adaptability early in this chapter, and not just to effective problem-solving and health. The assumption about adaptability and human flourishing is as intuitively obvious and as easy to defend as the assumption about problem-solving and human flourishing. Both problem-solving and adaptability allow individuals and groups to avoid challenges and disturbances. There is a clear difference between problem-solving and adaptability. Simplifying some, in the former there is a goal and an obstacle, and the obstacle is removed or circumvented by the solution(s). In the latter, on the other hand, the individual or group changes—that is, adapts—so the problem or obstacle may not be eliminated but is no longer a disturbance or distraction. This distinction between problem-solving, where a solution is found and an obstacle outside of the individual is removed, versus adaptation, where the person him- or herself changes—is simplistic in that there are situations that do not fall neatly into one or the other category. Consider in this regard the case described by Wittgenstein (1921/1974). He referred to the “disappearance of the problem.” This describes a situation where there is a problem “out there,” but the individual eventually internalizes it because it is so enticing, and then the problem becomes something that is not something to be solved but instead is an intrigue and a part of one’s being. This logic fits nicely with research on the role of intrinsic motivation and creativity (Amabile, Goldfarb, & Brackfield, 1990; Runco, 1993, 2019) and is an example of what was promised earlier in this chapter, namely situations were creative thinking involves extra-cognitive processes, including motivation.
The Piagetian view is also relevant and in some ways fits very well with theories of creativity and adaptability. For Piaget, an individual might be challenged by some misunderstanding. This occurs when the individual’s current cognitive status cannot process new information. There is disequilibrium. When this occurs, the individual is intrinsically motivated to adapt, which for Piaget means that information is altered such that it can be brought into one’s cognitive system (i.e., information is “assimilated”) and then the cognitive system can change (“accommodate”) to account for the new information. Importantly, for Piaget, “to understand is to invent,” the idea being that understandings are invented by individuals. They are not simply learned or found via experience. Instead, the individual must him- or herself go through the assimilation-accommodation process, the end result being an adaptation, a change in cognitive structures, and a new personally meaningful understanding of the world. A person must be intrinsically motivated to do this, and each of us must do it for ourselves. Otherwise, understanding is superficial and will not generalize; it depends solely on memory but does not represent authentic understanding. All of this applies to the current discussion because “create” can be substituted for “invent,” in which case “to understand is to create (new understandings)” (Runco, 2007). This brief discussion is relevant to adaptation but also provides one description for how creative thinking (the creation of new understandings) is related to human flourishing. Here creative thinking is necessary for understanding our experience. It underlies all authentic learning and growth, and surely learning and growth are a part of flourishing.
There are other explanations for how creativity is related to adaptation. Campbell (1960) and Simonton (2007) both used a Darwinian model to explain creativity, and Darwin’s theory hinges on adaptation, though he was concerned with the adaptation of species, while Campbell and Simonton were instead interested in how individuals rather than species adapt. They described the blind variation and selection retention of mental elements as underlying the creative thinking of individuals. In this view, the mind generates mental elements, which are much like ideas and options, but it does so blindly. It is not teleological. Only after new mental elements are generated, much like mutations produce variations, can selection occur. Such selection leads to “survival of the fittest,” which for Campbell and Simonton translated to good creative ideas and options.
There are other models describing the mechanisms underlying creative thinking (Roberts, Sternberg, Runco, Acar, Ward, Kolomyts, & Kaufman, 2021), but before turning to those other models, something more should be said about the association between creative thinking and cultural and technological advances, for these also are easy to relate to human flourishing. A few comments were offered earlier about the creative economy, but there is more to societal advance.
Societal advance often entails innovation and invention. The first of these is defined in various ways. One uses the standard definition of creativity, which recognizes both originality and effectiveness. Both are necessary for creativity. Innovation may also involve both originality and effectiveness, but it may be that the ratio is different, with originality being primary for creativity but effectiveness being primary for innovation. This view is consistent with a second definition. Here is where innovation involves implementation. This conception of innovation draws on a well-known stage model of the creative process (Amabile, 2019; Wallas, 1926), which has creative thinking beginning with preparation, and then moving to incubation, illumination, and verification. This four-stage process may be adequate for creative thinking, but innovation requires a fifth stage, namely implementation. A third alternative has creativity leading to things which are entirely new, while innovation instead improves on things which already existed. The electric car, for example, improved dramatically on the internal combustion automobile, but cars did exist before the electric models. Thus the process was innovation, not creativity per se.
Invention involves bringing something new into existence, and usually it is a tangible thing, not just an idea. True, Piaget was quoted earlier as believing that “to understand is to invent,” but he was not writing in English, so the translation may account for the wording. It may not seem easy to distinguish invention, innovation, and creativity, but then again there is a system in place that seems to work quite well. I am referring to the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). They have methods in place that allow good decisions about the newness of inventions. Interestingly, Simonton (2012) has used the same USPTO criteria in his suggestions for a broad definition of creativity, which he believes applies even outside of the invention process. This definition includes “non-obvious” as a criterion, to go along with newness (originality) and utility. There are other suggestions for criteria, but what is most pertinent is that both invention and innovation depend on creativity. They are not synonymous with creativity, but all patentable inventions and all useful innovations are creative. Some improve the human condition and can thus be viewed as one part of human flourishing.
Divergent Thinking
Various definitions have been offered in this chapter. It started with definitions, as well as the caveat that the focus in this chapter could be on creative thinking rather than creativity more broadly defined. So far the blind variation and selective retention model of creative thinking has been reviewed, as was the Piagetian view (with assimilation and accommodation) that allowed him to conclude that “to understand is to invent.” At this point, it is useful to look at another particular model of creative cognition, namely that involving divergent thinking (DT). There is probably more research on divergent thinking than any other description of creative thinking, and the processes described by this corpus of research point to fairly specific mechanisms which take us a step closer to understanding how creative thinking can lead to human flourishing.
DT is a mode of thought in which numerous and diverse ideas are generated. It is best understood in contrast to the convergent thinking that is required by most academic tests and the IQ test. These almost entirely ask examinees to identify the one best or more conventional answer (e.g., “On which continent is Mexico?”). Convergent thinking draws mostly on memory and partly on experience. Nothing new is produced when thinking convergently. There is a question or problem, and the individual’s thinking must draw from what is known and then converge on the best answer. But when thinking divergently, remote associates can be found and original ideas discovered. This is why DT is viewed as an indication of creative potential. It allows originality, and originality is a prerequisite for creativity. Divergent thinking is not synonymous with creativity, but often plays a significant role in creative cognition.
DT can be measured with open-ended tasks that allow examinees to produce pools of ideas (Runco & Mraz, 1994; Acar & Runco, 2012). That pool of ideas can then be scored for fluency (the number of ideas produced by any one individual), originality (the number of unique or statistically uncommon ideas), and flexibility (the number of conceptual categories used by the individual). Some DT tests are quite simple (e.g., “List as many uses for a brick as you can”) and others are domain specific or resemble problems that might be encountered in the natural environment. The last of these are viewed as “realistic tests of divergent thinking” and may ask a student what can be done if there is a distracting or trouble-making peer in the next desk, or what do to when homework is forgotten. Both of those are open-ended tasks, which is vital for the testing of divergent thinking. The individual must be able to generate a number of alternative ideas. Work with entrepreneurs used fairly realistic tasks based on the SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) model, so they were asked four things: first about the strengths of their business, and then about the weaknesses, opportunities, and finally threats to their business.
DT is sensitive to the setting and immediate context. When testing DT, for example, it is important to avoid test-like expectations, because if examinees think the DT tasks are just like other tests (e.g., academic exams), they tend to focus on conventional ideas, as if they are going to be graded and need to produce answers that the examiner or teacher wants. If DT tasks are administered under game-like conditions, however, with plenty of time and encouragement to think playfully, examinees tend to be much more original. The same sort of thing is apparent when using DT tasks in an organization, to actually find good options or perhaps as a kind of exercise. There, too, the conditions are important, and it is best, if the objective is original thinking, to create a relaxed setting, free of evaluation, while avoiding constraint or psychological pressure.
DT tests are reasonable validity, when they are given under the right conditions. In fact, when given under the right conditions, DT tests predict real-world successes much more accurately than IQ or academic tests! Much, of course, depends on the criteria used in this kind of research. Indeed, there is a long-standing criterion problem in the creativity research (Paek & Runco, 2017) because it can be so difficult to measure authentic creativity, which usually involves things like spontaneity and intrinsic motivation—things which are precluded by typical tests. Recall here the idea mentioned earlier that creativity is only partly cognitive and also has motivational, attitudinal, and affective components.
One relevant investigation of the predictive validity of DT tests showed that they had quite surprising accuracy over a fifty-year period (Runco et al., 2011). Predictive coefficients were only slightly above .30, but given the time span involved, and the fact that DT only measures the cognitive contribution to creative behavior, this is quite impressive. Notably, the criterion that showed the strongest correlation with DT over the fifty-year period involved personal creativity, rather than socially recognized creative achievements. Certainly socially recognized achievements are important for society and probably are indicative of invention, innovation, and some of the advance and progress that was mentioned earlier when listing indicators of human flourishing, but so too are personal expressions of creativity quite important for the human flourishing of individuals. Think, for example, about the self-actualization related to creativity by Maslow (1973) and Rogers (1959).
The DT approach focuses specifically on ideation and the production of numerous, original, and varied ideas. Thus this chapter has narrowed the discussion, from creativity most broadly to creative cognition, to divergent thinking, and finally to ideation. This helps explain exactly how the indicators of human flourishing are related to human creativity. Consider how clearly ideation can be related to problem-solving, for example, for it is surely almost always beneficial to consider a wide range of options before choosing the solution in which to invest. As a matter of fact, DT can be viewed as the antithesis of the satisficing that was defined earlier. Admittedly there may be times when satisficing is sufficient, and it may even occasionally be the best option (e.g., when a problem is unimportant, and there are no contingencies, so any solution is adequate if it allows the individual to move on to more important things). Still, very likely just about all problem-solving will benefit from the consideration of options, which means that DT is nearly always helpful for problem-solving and any benefits that result from it.
The tie to adaptability is even clearer. There ideation plays a role in the sense that when the person is faced with a challenge and must adapt, if there are no alternatives, changes are impossible or close to it. As a matter of fact, adaptation might be defined in terms of making changes, and the alternative changes can be found via DT. To bring this point home, consider the processes underlying ideational flexibility, which was also defined earlier. When thinking flexibly, the person considers various categories and different kinds of ideas. Flexibility thus provides breadth to the alternatives that can be considered. The opposite, which can be called inflexibility but is also rigidity, implies that there is no breadth and that only one or very few different kinds of ideas are considered. It is easy to see how the options needed for adaptation would be limited when there is little or no breadth and variety to the alternatives available.
Literal Divergent Thinking and the Full Range of Possibility
Some of the more recent research on DT suggests a somewhat different take and actually offers a more qualified view of creative thinking. Interestingly, this new perspective on DT implies that creative cognition can lead to human flourishing, whether in effective problem-solving, self-actualization, adaptation, learning, or improved health—but it does not always do so.
The new approach to DT was designed to test ideas about literal DT. That concept was proposed because it became apparent that most tests of DT did not really always require an actual divergence of thought. The same is true of situations in the natural environment which are open-ended and which thus benefit from DT. In both cases, a person can find multiple and varied ideas by simply following one associative pathway, in a straight line, so to speak. Following one associative pathway will provide numerous ideas, and the more remote ones are likely to be more original. Yet all of them may be connected in some semantic or conceptual fashion, in which case the thinking is more linear than divergent. With this in mind, Acar and Runco (2014, 2015) set out to design a method to determine if some people do in fact think divergently—literally divergently, where the thinking is nonlinear and truly diverges in the sense of moving in different directions. In one investigation in this series, individuals completed DT tasks and the ideas were coded using a range of dichotomies. Dichotomies were used because they were useful for checking nonlinear processes, the epitome of which was when a person thought about, say, highly moral options, but then jumped to highly immoral options. Other dichotomies used for scoring the ideas included natural versus artificial ideas, original versus conventional, malevolent versus benevolent, primary (process) versus secondary, feasible versus impractical, close versus remote, and synthetic versus nonsynthetic. Analyses of ideational output indicated that some people were in fact capable of using literal DT. Put differently, they tapped cognitive hyperspace: they followed one line of thought and then jumped to a very divergent line of thought, only to jump again and again. And this kind of literal DT was correlated with originality as measured by an independent criterion measure. Cognitive hyperspace is not necessarily a metaphor. There is no reason why people can’t follow one line of thought, then take a perpendicular turn and follow an orthogonal line of thought, only to do so again and again and again. There are only three dimensions in physical space, but mathematics and astrophysics often describe the possibility of hyperspace in other realms, and cognition is very likely capable of it.
There are practical implications of the idea of literal DT and cognitive hyperspace. Some of those are in the area of testing, where these new ideas simply lead to more accurate assessment, and perhaps more accurate predictions of actual creative performances. Of relevance to the present discussion is the implication that creative thinking can go in any direction. Creative thinking does not always lead to practical, useful, moral, legal, and beneficial ideas. Indeed, creative thinking can be malevolent; the last few years have seen a surge in research on the dark side of creativity (Cropley et al., 2010; McLaren, 1993; Runco, 1993, 2010). This does suggest that conclusions about creativity and human flourishing are qualified. Creative thinking may lead to health and effective problem-solving and those other indicators that someone or some group is flourishing, but it does not always do so.
This in turn is a reminder that creative thinking is only one aspect of creativity, or what is often called the creativity syndrome or creativity complex. Mood, affect, attitude, and motivation were mentioned earlier as other facets of the same complex, and it is quite possible that someone with a capacity for DT or some other kind of creative cognition may be motivated to, say, commit suicide rather that live a long productive life. In that case, the motivation directs the creative capacity away from those things associated with flourishing. Certain values could do the same thing, as could a dark mood or a bad attitude.
It might be useful to consider the point of a chapter I wrote some years ago on adaptability. Looking at the research, it quickly became clear that an adaptable person is not necessarily creative. Sometimes adapting means fitting in and going with the crowd, in which case creativity is precluded, at least given the standard definition of creativity, which requires originality. Originality is impossible if the person is conventional and conforming. In addition, creativity may be maladaptive. Consider in this regard creators who have been jailed (Brower, 1999; Eisenman, 1992) or otherwise punished for their creativity (e.g., Galileo). What was most important was that this review of the research showed that various developmental disturbances (e.g., loss of a parent) sometimes actually contribute to a notable creative capacity. But such disturbances and trauma do not always do so. For that reason I paraphrased the Existential philosopher Fredrich Neitzsche, who had said, “that which does not kill me makes me stronger.” The wording varies some from translation to translation, but the paraphrasing fits with each of them. My conclusion about adaptability was a bit different. I wrote, “that which does not kill me can make me stronger.” Tension, discord, and challenges of all sorts do not necessarily make a person stronger. They can, but not always. Apparently the same may be said about creative thinking and human flourishing.
In fact, this is another way in which the research on the dark side of creativity is relevant. I was co-editor of a volume completely devoted to the dark side; but my contrarianism led me to explore the possibility that “creativity has no dark side” (which was the title of my chapter). Of course the creative capacity is sometimes used for malevolence (e.g., computer viruses, weapons, scams), and sometimes those are quite intentional. But it is not the creative capacity that is malevolent. The creative capacity merely provides a process that gives the individual original and effective options and choices. The person’s values, attitudes, and motivation direct the creative capacity in one direction (malevolence) or the other (benevolence).
Much the same may be said when considering the relationship of creative thinking and human flourishing. Indeed, the practical message offered here as a conclusion is that it is wise to invest in the creative capacity to ensure that individuals and groups have the potential to produce original and effective ideas, but to contribute to human flourishing involves other things (e.g., values, attitudes) as well. These are likely to take the creative process in one direction (beneficial) or another (destructive). If asked how to support human flourishing, I would certainly point to creativity. It plays a key role in human flourishing, even if it does not work alone and depends on other human qualities. I am for this reason pleased to have this chapter in a volume which no doubt explores many of the other contributions to human flourishing.
References
Acar, S., & Runco, M. A. (2014). Assessing associative distance among ideas elicited by tests of divergent thinking. Creativity Research Journal, 26, 229–238.
Acar, S., & Runco, M. A. (2015). Thinking in multiple directions: Hyperspace categories in divergent thinking. Psychology of Art, Creativity, and Aesthetics, 9, 41–53.
Acar, S., & Runco, M. A. (2016). Divergent thinking: New methods, recent research, and extended theory. Psychology of Aesthetics, Creativity, and the Arts, 13, 153–158. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/aca0000231
Amabile, T. M. (2019). The Art of (Creative) Thought: Graham Wallas on the Creative Process. In V. Glavaneau (Ed.), Classic readings in the creativity research (pp. 409–430). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Amabile, T. M., Goldfarb, P. and Brackfield, S. C. (1990). Social influences on creativity: Evaluation, coaction, surveillance. Creativity Research Journal, 3, 6–21.
Brower, R. (1999). Dangerous Minds: Eminently Creative People Who Spent Time in Jail. Creativity Research Journal, 12, 3–13.
Campbell, D. T. (1960). Blind variation and selective retention in creative thought as in other knowledge processes. Psychological Review, 67, 380–400.
Cropley, D. H., Cropley, A. J., Kaufman, J. C., & Runco, M. A. (Eds.). (2010). The dark side of creativity. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Eisenman, R. (1992). Creativity in prisoners: conduct disorders and psychotics. Creativity Research Journal, 5, 175–181.
Florida, R. (2004). The rise of the creative class: And how it’s transforming work, leisure, community and everyday life. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Getzels, J. W., & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1976). The creative vision: A longitudinal study of problem finding in art. New York, NY: Wiley.
Gruber, H. E. (1981). On the relation between “aha” experiences and the construction of ideas. History of Science, 19, 41–59.
Guilford, J. P. (1968). Intelligence, creativity, and their educational implications. San Diego, CA: EDITS/ Robert Knapp.
Maslow, A. H. (1973). Creativity in self-actualizing people. In A. Rothenberg and C. R. Hausman (Eds.), The creative question (pp. 86–92). Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
McLaren, R. B. (1993). The dark side of creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 6, 137–144.
Mednick, S. (1962). The associative basis of the creative process. Psychological Review, 69, 220–232.
Osborn, A. F. (1979). Applied imagination. New York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
Paek, S.-H., & Runco, M. A. (2017). Dealing with the criterion problem by measuring the quality and quantity of creative activity and accomplishment. Creativity Research Journal, 29, 167–173.
Parnes, S. J. (1999). Programs and course in creativity. In M. A. Runco & S. R. Prentky (Eds.), Encyclopedia of creativity (Vol. 2, pp. 465–477). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Pennebaker, J. W., Kiecolt-Glaser, J. K., & Glaser, R. (1997). Disclosure of trauma and immune functioning: Health implications for psychotherapy. In M. A. Runco & R. Richards (Eds.), Eminent creativity, everyday creativity, and health (pp. 287–302). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Piaget, J. (1976). To understand is to invent. New York: Penguin.
Richards, R., & Runco, M. A. (Eds.). (1997). Eminent creativity, everyday creativity, and health (pp. 359–377). Greenwich, CT: Ablex.
Roberts, A. M., Sternberg, R. J., Runco, M. A., Acar, S., Ward, T. B., Kolomyts, Y., & Kaufman, J. C. (2021. Creativity and Cognition, Divergent Thinking, and Intelligence. In R. J. Sternberg & J. C. Kaufman (Eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Creativity (3rd Ed), 102–127. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Rogers, C. R. (1959). Toward a theory of creativity. In H. H. Anderson (Ed.), Creativity and its cultivation (pp. 69–82). New York, NY: Harper & Row.
Runco, M. A. (1993a). Moral creativity: Intentional and unconventional. Creativity Research Journal, 6, 17–28.
Runco, M. A. (1993b). Operant theories of insight, originality, and creativity. American Behavioral Scientist, 37, 59–74.
Runco, M. A. (Ed.). (1994). Problem finding, problem solving, and creativity. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Runco, M. A. (2007). To understand is to create: An epistemological perspective on human nature and personal creativity. In R. Richards (Ed.), Everyday creativity and new views of human nature: Psychological, social, and spiritual perspectives (pp. 91–108). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Runco, M. A. (2010). Creativity has no dark side. In D. H. Cropley, A. J. Cropley, J. C. Kaufman, & M. A. Runco (Eds.), The dark side of creativity (pp. 15–32). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
Runco, M. A. (2019). B. F. Skinner on poetry, fiction, and design: An implicit science of creativity. In V. Glavaneau (Ed.), Classic readings in the creativity research (pp. 409–430). Oxford University Press.
Runco, M. A., Acar, S., Campbell, W. K., Jaeger, G., McCain, J., & Gentile, B. (2016). Comparisons of the creative class and regional creativity with perceptions of community support and community barriers. Business Creativity and the Creative Economy, 2, 83–92.
Runco, M. A., & Cayirdag, N. (1999). Time. In M. A. Runco & S. Pritzker (Eds.), Encyclopedia of creativity (2nd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 485–488). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
Runco, M. A., & Jaeger, G. (2012). The standard definition of creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 24, 92–96.
Runco, M. A., Millar, G., Acar, S., & Cramond, B. (2011). Torrance Tests of Creative Thinking as predictors of personal and public achievement: A 50 year follow-up. Creativity Research Journal, 22, 361–368.
Runco, M. A., & Mraz, W. (1994). Scoring divergent thinking tests using total ideational output and a creativity index. Educational and Psychological Measurement, 52, 213–221.
Simonton, D. K. (1990). Political pathology and societal creativity. Creativity Research Journal, 3:2, 85–99, https://doi.org/10.1080/10400419009534339
Simonton, D. K. (2007). The creative process in Picasso’s Guernica sketches: Monotonic improvements versus nonmonotonic variants. Creativity Research Journal, 19, 329–344.
Simonton, D. K. (2012). Taking the U.S. Patent Office Criteria Seriously: A Quantitative Three-Criterion Creativity Definition and Its Implications. Creativity Research Journal, 24, 96–107.
Torrance, E. P. (1995). Why fly? Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Wallas, G. (1926). The art of thought. New York, NY: Harcourt Brace & World.
Wittgenstein, L. (1921/1974). Tractatus: Logico-philosophicus. New York: Routledge. (trans. D. F. Pears & B. F. McGuinness. Originally published 1921.