1945 to 1975 (United States involved 1964 to 1973)
After 30 years of war, Vietnam was conquered by the communists. Who were the winners? The communist leaders of North Vietnam were the clear winners. And who were the losers? The people of South Vietnam were the clear losers. Why did the South lose? The people of South Vietnam failed to find the fortitude to resist the invaders. South Korea won with American help because they were determined to maintain their freedom. South Vietnam lost because such determination went missing. How about the people of North Vietnam, did they win? No, they too lost. Only the leadership won. The millions of North Vietnamese bones littering Southeast Asia’s landscape is proof enough the people of North Vietnam paid a horrible price for their leader’s vision.
Background
After World War II, France re-established its control over Vietnam, its pre-World War II colony in Indochina. During the war the Japanese controlled the area using it as a base for attacking China and dominating the nearby sea lanes. After the Japanese surrender the Allies left the Japanese troops there to maintain order because communist guerillas were operating in Indochina, and without Japanese help they may have taken over before the French returned.
The French came back as the Japanese left. Japan believed the Vietnamese were racially inferior to them and had treated them harshly. The return of the French to their old colony might seem like a reprieve from oppression, but the French put their old administration back in place which favored the Catholic minority and generally continued to treat the Vietnamese as inferior.[365] Meanwhile, Ho Chi Minh had been leading a war against the Japanese. Now he would lead his troops against the French.
In Southeast Asia, Ho Chi Minh (Ho) would use Mao’s guerilla war tactics to defeat the French in Vietnam and expand communist domination to the rest of Indochina. These plans were laid out in Moscow prior to the death of Stalin[366] and only came to light after the fall of the Soviet Union. Some Western scholars and politicians maintained the wars in Korea and Vietnam were civil wars having nothing to do with forces outside the divided nations.[367] Other academics had maintained the wars were part of a unified communist effort to push the West out of Asia. It turns out the wars were part of a unified plan to oust the West and its democratic ideology.
The communist dictators, Mao and Stalin, thought the West (mainly the United States) would not fight for Korea or Vietnam. In the actual event, the United States and United Nations intervened in Korea and fought the communists to a stalemate, but in Vietnam the French received less help and the United States found itself involved in Vietnam shortly after the French departed. How is it that the United States fell short in helping the French hold Vietnam but later on committed hundreds of thousands of its troops to continue the same war? This surrealistic chain of events must be examined to understand the Vietnam War.
Originally, the French were effectively fighting Ho Chi Minh’s guerillas, although they were a growing threat. The 1949 fall of nationalist China to the communists changed the picture entirely. Now Ho received extensive aid that easily flowed from the USSR through communist China to Southeast Asia. The fall of China to the Reds (communists) was one of the most important events of the Cold War. The Korean War and the Vietnam War stemmed directly from that disaster caused by Truman’s miserly assistance[368]to the nationalists, and huge blunders by General Marshall who advised the president on the situation. In addition, there were the usual failures of US intelligence.
Once Ho was being well supplied he stepped up his campaign against the French. The strategy consisted of first gaining control of the countryside and its peasants by indoctrination of the villagers or by murdering the village leaders and replacing them with loyal communists. After the countryside was under control, larger attacks on the government would start with the goals of disrupting the economy and draining the resources and morale of the enemy. Meanwhile, additional emphasis would be placed on infiltration into the cities and establishing urban revolutionary cadres. In the final phase of the war, all-out assaults in World War II style would be launched against the French while communists revolutionaries in the cities would simultaneously rise up to overthrow the French supported government. After a series of major defeats the French would give up and leave.
The communists obtained help from the peasants through generous promises of more land and food. If cooperation from the peasants fell short, they would turn to indoctrination and then coercion. The communists counted on having excellent intelligence because they would infiltrate the government, both civilian and military, at every level. Even military secretaries were working for the Reds. The Reds would also take advantage of the corruption which riddled the society and the government in South Vietnam.
At first, the French won several bloody set piece battles[369] with the communists, but they were losing control of the countryside. After these losses Ho returned to guerrilla warfare forcing the French to spread their forces to protect many vital points of communication, command, and control. Communist ambushes of convoys became common. These ambushes cut French communications and causing numerous casualties. Because the French could not spread their units out and remain strong everywhere the insurgents struck where the French were weak causing French casualties and lowering morale. In the countryside the communists were stealing the crops from the villagers to feed their men, forcing young villagers to join their units, levying taxes on areas they controlled, and causing widespread discontent with the government.[370]
After years of conflict, the communist forces gained more control and built up their army to challenge the French to set piece battles once more. The war came to a strategic focal point at the battle for Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Dien Bien Phu was a large fortified French base with an airstrip in northern Vietnam near the Chinese border. The base was placed across a key enemy supply route to help stop infiltration of supplies and men into Vietnam from China. It was vital for the communists to remove this supply impediment. As the communists increased pressure on the base, the elite French Foreign Legion reinforced it. The engagement became one of prestige as much as military importance. Politically, it was a fight the French had to win.
Unfortunately, the French chose the battle site poorly. Their base was in a valley overlooked by rugged jungle-covered mountains which were perfect for concealment. In these mountains the communists dug in long-range artillery and antiaircraft guns. The French did not know the communists had these long range weapons. The French counted on their air force to resupply the base in case the roads were cut. The problem was the airstrip was under artillery fire from the moment the big guns were in place. The well sighted antiaircraft guns, concealed by the jungle, were able to ravage the French Air Force as their fighter-bombers descended to attack the hills crawling with hidden communist troops and long-range artillery.
The roads supplying the base were cut, trapping the French forces in Dien Bien Phu. Airdrops achieved some reinforcement and resupply to the trapped men, but the situation for the well-shelled troops inside the fragmenting underground citadel was anything but happy. As massive artillery barrages collapsed French positions, heavy infantry attacks engulfed their outlying strong points one by one. As always, the Foreign Legion fought bravely and savaged the Reds as they rushed forward. The communist casualties will never be known, but thousands upon thousands died in the assaults. Incredible Legion bravery and large enemy casualties made no difference as the fanatic Reds swarmed over shattered French bunkers.
Eisenhower Stays Out
The French had been asking for more American help all along, but now they increased their pleas. The French foreign minister flew to Washington to meet with President Eisenhower. The problem was that the French wanted massive American intervention, far more than an increase in the aid already being given. They needed American troops, materials, and anything and everything the United States could send in mass. To Eisenhower this sounded like another Korea, and he had just managed to end the fighting in that place. Plus, the French were asking the Americans to fight so France could keep a colony. Eisenhower thought Americans would balk at this idea.[371] Finally, the French asked the Americans to use the atomic bomb or give it to them so they could use it. Eisenhower once more demurred, and the French went home empty-handed. I think this decision hurt American relations with the French for decades to come. America had helped Korea why not help France, our old ally?
The real reason behind Eisenhower’s refusal was his good sense for foreign affairs. Eisenhower did not want to commit America unless there was a vital national interest. This concept is critically important to understanding how a nation decides when and where to use its resources. A nation needs to closely define its VITAL national interests. Such vital interests may be military, economic, or whatever; but it must be agreed by the leadership and the people that these interests are so critical they are worth going to war over. Nations should commit their blood and treasure only on interests where national survival is at stake. At this point, we should note that totalitarian regimes do not have to consult the people on anything, so these kinds of definitions only apply to democracies (although dictatorships would be well served by following this rule).
Nations often fail to analyze their vital national interests properly. Note the problem with the Japanese analysis of their vital national interest prior to World War II. Japan decided China must be conquered as a vital national interest; therefore, the military must be supplied and oil and other resources must be obtained for military conquest. The US was standing in the way of Japan obtaining oil and other military supplies, and telling Japan to back off China; thus, America must be attacked as they were thwarting Japan’s achieving a vital national interest. Do you see the flaw? The conquest of China, or not, would not affect the survival of Japan. Japan had decided the conquest of China was a vital national interest, but why? In fact, they just wanted to conquer China. Japan could have chosen to stop at taking Manchuria and Korea and they would have survived just fine. One might decide to attack a nation that threatened them, but China was no threat to Japan in the 1930s. As such, war with the West was not justified in terms of Japan’s vital national interest. The Japanese leadership determined Japan was a “have not” nation and must acquire territory to become a “have” nation. They further concluded Japan would always be under the thumb of America and Britain without the conquest of China. Oddly, after WWII, Japan was totally under control of the United State and it prospered as never before. It should have been clear in 1930 that Japan’s move on China was unwise, and no challenge to America or the United Kingdom was necessary to remain a viable, prosperous country. Thus, the analysis of vital national interests must be competent if a nation is to expend its blood and treasure wisely.
Eisenhower clearly discerned that Vietnam was not a vital national interest of the United States. Protecting France from humiliation was not in that category either. Giving France the atomic bomb, or using it himself, could lead to worldwide complications—something Eisenhower wanted to avoid. The result was that France was getting no additional assistance from the United States.
Eisenhower had applied the correct formula for intervention abroad. The presidents that followed him would not be so wise because the philosophy changed when the men holding the top office changed. Eisenhower wanted to stay with the vital national interest analysis because it kept the United States out of foreign entanglements unless they had supreme importance. Nixon, Eisenhower’s vice president who lost the race for the presidency in 1960, felt the same way. Presidents after Eisenhower decided when to send troops based on other concepts, and the results have been less than ideal as shown by public disenchantment with their policies.
The Fall of Dien Bien Phu
1954
With their backs to the wall, the French Foreign Legion at Dien Bien Phu fought on. Waves of artillery and enemy troops broke over the beleaguered fort and its exhausted defenders as French resistance bled away. Dien Bien Phu fell in 1954, and the communists captured about 16,500 tattered Frenchmen. The Reds paid a high price for the base (their casualties are unknown but thought to be thirty to fifty thousand), but they had it. They also had the French public. The people of France wanted out of the endless war in Southeast Asia.
At the peace talks the French gave the North to the communists while the South was to have elections to decide who would rule there. But the South did not hold elections, and a quasi-dictator, Diem, took the reins of power setting up the Republic of South Vietnam. The war was on again, but the nation of South Vietnam was weak and would fall quickly fighting against the experienced communist troops flooding down from the North.
America Steps In (it)
1964
1962—Military Advisors
John F. Kennedy became president of the United States in 1960. Kennedy ran against Richard M. Nixon, the vice president under Eisenhower. As history weirdly turned out, Kennedy would start the American involvement in Vietnam and Nixon would end it many years later. In between these two men a series of incompetent decision makers created national angst over the involvement.
During the presidential race between Kennedy and Nixon they held, for the first time, a series of televised debates. These debates were critical in determining the winner of a very close contest between the two men. One significant issue was whether or not the United States should defend two small islands off the coast of Red China, Quemoy and Matsu, controlled by the Nationalist Chinese. These islands had been shelled by the communists, but no invasion had been attempted. If such an attempt did come, should the United States commit troops to defend these two small islands? Nixon, taking the approach of a seasoned diplomat’s evaluation of vital national interest, said no. They were not a vital national interest because the survival of the US did not depend upon them, so no blood and treasure should be spent for the islands. Kennedy took the position that not one foot of free soil should be surrendered to the communists. Polls showed Kennedy had won on that issue. Somehow, the larger implications of this “fight for every foot of free soil” doctrine were not appreciated. This was an open commitment to fight communism anywhere and everywhere at any time. It constituted a total rejection of the vital national interest analysis. No one discerned that this idea could lead the United States into wearisome and unnecessary conflicts.
John F. Kennedy won a close election. After taking office, he began a new and far reaching foreign policy change which required a more active role for the United States in foreign affairs. The Cold War with the communists was running full blast, and Kennedy decided (along with his entire administration—including his brother Bobby Kennedy who was appointed the US Attorney General) that the United States would enact regime change if necessary to achieve victories over communism. An active role in the internal operations of foreign governments had rarely been tried before by American presidents,[372] but Kennedy wanted to do even more. It was a radical departure with the past, and it set an unfortunate precedent for the future.[373]
It was Kennedy who decided that the current president of South Vietnam (Diem) must go, and he helped coordinate a military coup that deposed and murdered Diem on November 1, 1963. It was also Kennedy who decided to commit American combat troops to Vietnam, although at the time they were called advisors and not many were sent. But the United States was in the war, and its involvement would intensify significantly.
In the United States another election was drawing near in 1964, and the debate over Vietnam had deepened. There were those in the US government who wanted a large commitment of US troops to Vietnam with the goal of achieving victory over the communists. Others were advising no increase in troops and perhaps a withdrawal of those who were there. Even the Joint Chiefs of Staffs for the US military were saying the war was unwinnable without a massive intervention, which no one wanted. According to some advisors close to President Kennedy at the time (1963), the president was planning a drawdown of troops to start right after the election in November of 1964 and a complete withdrawal was planned within a year or so thereafter. Was this true? It is very difficult to tell. The men close to Kennedy were loyalists and wanted to present him in a favorable light. The idea of an early withdrawal by Kennedy would add to his legend. The truth will never be known because the two men who knew what was next on the Kennedy agenda for Vietnam were both assassinated. The president was murdered on November 22, 1963, in Dallas, Texas, and his brother Bobby died by assassination on June 5, 1968, in Los Angeles, California. Robert F. Kennedy (Bobby) had campaigned on withdrawal from Vietnam, so there is no doubt what he was going to do if elected; however, this campaign was taking place for the election of 1968, and what changed in those intervening years was the mood of the American public. Support for the Vietnam War had badly waned, and the democrats were running on a platform of ending the war. What President Kennedy would have done after 1964, assuming he won the election, is unknown.
Johnson Commits US Troops—1964
Lyndon B. Johnson took over as president after President Kennedy’s death, and won the presidency in his own right in 1964.[374] Immediately after assuming the presidency Johnson began to increase the troop levels in Vietnam. After the so-called Gulf of Tonkin incident, Johnson gained plenary power to commit troops to the war, and he did so in spades. Before Johnson left office he had placed 500,000 Americans into Vietnam. It is widely thought that Johnson lied about the attack in the Gulf of Tonkin to gain congressional authorization to widen the war.[375] By 1967, the war was not going well for the United States of America. Although American units were consistently defeating both North Vietnamese regular army units and the local Vietcong, nothing was resolved. In the few all-out battles against US troops, such as in the Ia Drang Valley in 1965, the communists learned US firepower was potent, and the US won total victories. With control of the air over South Vietnam, and lots of artillery, the US forces decimated the communists in anything like a set peace engagement. But the infiltration from North Vietnam, the ambushes, and the limited assaults went on; thus, control of the countryside and the road system was constantly in flux. Like the French, the United States and the South Vietnam military tried to protect all vital points and thereby spread their combat power. Without the support of the peasants the government of South Vietnam, even with massive American help, was not winning.
Figure 80 Vietnam & Ho Chi Minh Trail
General Westmoreland, commander of US forces in South Vietnam, was aggressive in his pursuit of the Red forces. He ordered “search and destroy” missions to sweep rural areas and keep the pressure on the communists. He rejected the strategy of establishing a line from DMZ across South Vietnam and Laos to stop enemy troops and supplies from moving south. Such aggressive search and destroy tactics put US troops at high risk because the communists knew, through spies ensconced in every corner of the South Vietnamese government, when the US patrols were going out and by what routes. The communist units could avoid the search and destroy operations whenever they wanted, but in many instances US troops were ambushed and had to fight against long odds to escape without being destroyed. US firepower, plus close air and artillery support, saved the day many times. The American problem was that no matter how many communists they managed to kill more would come down from the North. Casualties were meaningless to Ho (or his backers, China and the USSR). He had murdered hundreds of thousands after he came into power in the North, hence added deaths had no meaning to the communist leadership.
The real need was for a new kind of US strategy that would cut North Vietnam’s ability to move troops and supplies south, thereby isolating the battlefield in South Vietnam. Cambodia and Laos were not neutral countries, and the US allowing this fiction to exist doomed all other efforts. South Vietnam was being invaded from North Vietnam, and the US needed to deploy its troops from the coast of South Vietnam along the DMZ through Laos to Thailand in order to cut the Ho Chie Minh trail. This would allow the ARVIN (South Vietnam’s army) to pacify its own nation as the US had done in South Korea. During the Korean War, North Korea had tried to start problems in the south with guerrilla units, but the US let the South Korean Army handle that problem and concentrated on stopping the invasion from the North. At the outset of the conflict in Vietnam, President Kennedy had determined this was a new kind of war and must be fought on new terms; however, Clausewitz was not out of date and his precepts clearly told military commanders how to win this type of war (see: American Strategy in Vietnam, by H. G. Summers, Dover Publications, 2007). By isolating the battlefield in the south winning was at least possible. Without it the war would never end because North Vietnam would never stop sending troops south.
Robert McNamara, US Secretary of Defense during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, played a key role in confusing US military goals. He implemented a complex budgeting and progress measurement system that completely disregarded the strategy and basic military principles of war (Clausewitz again) needed to focus US strategy and tactics on striking at the enemy’s center of gravity, its movement of forces south.
Figure 81 US Helicopters lift off
Another problem for the Americans was corruption in the South Vietnamese government.[376] The peasants did not want to fight for such a government making recruitment of good soldiers hard. In addition, the government was rife with communist spies. Every American operation had to be cleared through the South Vietnamese; thus, every operation was known to the Reds. In spite of these numerous disadvantages, the Americans were still “winning” in the traditional sense. More and more areas in South Vietnam were free of communist domination. The Americans also protected the harvest from communist theft and taxation, and this had impacts on the ability of the Reds to maintain control of the countryside. Nonetheless, the murders, ambushes, and coercion went on so the countryside was never secure.
American air power was having a negative impact on the communists. [377]From carriers offshore and airbases in Vietnam and Thailand, the United States could apply air power quickly and effectively at any point in the South. In addition, the United States used air power to try and cut the communist supply lines from North Vietnam to the South. The Ho Chi Minh Trail traversed the area of Laos and Cambodia[378] all the way to the southern tip of South Vietnam. The United States tried to interdict this supply route with air power all through the war; however, even though tons of supplies were destroyed, the trail was never cut. In spite of the bombing attacks on the Ho Chi Minh Trail, and the other efforts to cut supply lines from North Vietnam, the communists in the South remained well supplied throughout the war. This again demonstrates the critical nature of the loss of China to the Reds. If the United States could have cut the supply lines to the battlefields in South Vietnam the communists may have lost. It was the endless movement of supplies from Russia through Red China to North Vietnam and then, after the addition of numerous men, to South Vietnam that determined the outcome of the war as much as any other factor.
President Johnson wanted the war to end, and after being rebuffed by the North in his call for negotiations he began bombing North Vietnam with the goal of forcing them to the negotiation table. Unfortunately for the United States, Johnson insisted on a list of politically correct targets that hamstrung the ability of the US Air Force and US Navy to successfully destroy the North’s war-making ability. Their main harbor, Haiphong, was allowed to operate without any interference during the Johnson years. Russia, China, and other nations brought supplies openly to North Vietnam through this harbor, which made US Airmen furious. Because of US Bombing restrictions the communists soon developed, again without interference (American airmen could see the facilities being constructed), a sophisticated air-defense system in the North. The US attacks on ground targets became predictable (because of White House interference), so the communists had a simple time arranging their air defenses. Surface to air missiles (SAMs) and triple canopy flack brought down many US pilots. In addition, the North was flying excellent MIGs with good pilots against US airmen. The resulting air war over North Vietnam was intense. The United States was losing aircraft, and the results of the bombing were less than satisfactory. The Johnson White House restrictions allowed prime military targets to go untouched. Oil storage, hydroelectric power plants, harbor equipment (cranes, piers, etc.), and other vital installations were not bombed.
Not only was the United States not using the atomic bomb, it was not using its conventional war-making ability to its full potential. Somehow, using all the military power available was unpopular in the Johnson administration. Even though the war was costing American lives at the rate of five hundred per month (at the peak), President Johnson seemed to believe world opinion would turn against him if he bombed the “off target” areas. In fact, all he did was drag out a brutal war. The air force wanted an early all-out bombing effort with no restraint, and they wanted the effort continued unabated until the North stopped sending troops and supplies south. Johnson’s restrictions were a grave error, and it set another dreadful precedent for the future. When America later decided how to use its war-making potential the idea of a limited conventional response was adopted over and over again. It seems American military lives were less important than looking good to the international community.
The communists were ruthless in their suppression of villagers, and this was a key element in their maintaining control of the countryside. Murder, kidnapping, and theft were major components of communists’ efforts to control the peasants of Vietnam. In 1961, before the US intervention, the communists killed four thousand village officials in that year alone. There was also the constant indoctrination of the young people and new recruits who were told they had to expel foreign invaders and tyrants from their land. Communist propaganda stressed how the kindly “Uncle Ho” would look after them as a grandfather might after the capitalist devils were driven off. All lies of course. After the communist takeover there was murder and imprisonment on a grand scale. Even though Ho Chi Minh died before South Vietnam fell, it is clear his followers did exactly what he would have done.
Tet Offensive
1968
In 1968, communist leaders Ho Chi Minh and General Giap[379] decided to launch a massive offensive with the goal of capturing the cities of South Vietnam and causing a popular uprising against the unpopular South Vietnamese government. The communists assembled their forces and managed to move them south without being detected by American intelligence. On January 30, 1968, Giap launched the Tet Offensive which managed to capture some cities in South Vietnam (most notably Hue), but no popular uprising resulted. In the end, Ho’s offensive was a decisive and multiphase defeat. The local Vietcong organizations were wiped out, effectively ceasing to exist, while the regular divisions sent from North Vietnam were extensively damaged. As a military operation the Tet Offensive was an unmitigated disaster for the communists.
But something else was in play during the Tet Offensive. The American press corps had decided the Vietnam War was wrongheaded, and their reporting became nothing more than communist propaganda. The TV networks (ABC, CBS, NBC), the major newspapers (New York Times, LATimes, Washington Post, Chicago Tribune, etc.), and liberal weekly news magazines (Time, Newsweek) all reported the Tet Offensive was a comprehensive American defeat. To do this, the reporters had to lie about what they saw all around them, and they had to disregard US Army reports about the extent of the enemy defeat. In essence, they denounced the reports from the US Army and State Department while publishing communist propaganda from North Vietnam as true.
Figure 82 Marines in Vietnam
These press reports discouraged the American public. In any war, if the press tells of defeat the general population becomes demoralized. At the start of WWII the press reports were repeats of American propaganda, but as the war went on, with the cooperation of the US Military, the press reports became more realistic. The turning point was Guadalcanal where the navy decided to report just how things were really going there, and the possibility that the Americans might lose to the Japanese. The American public responded well to the truth, and it became common to report what was actually going on.
The activities and reporting of the mainstream news outlets about Vietnam unnerved the American military. Being negative was bad enough, but outright lying and repeating communist propaganda was outrageous. Mistrust began to grow between the military and the mainstream press organizations. The gap grew wider as the war went on, and at war’s end the military abhorred the press and began systematically excluding the mainstream press from obtaining operational information. This mistrust continues to this day as US military leadership thinks the mainstream media is uniformly liberal, anti-military, and opposed to ideals the military reveres. History tells us that a lack belief in the nation results in defeat for the armed forces (Austria-Hungarian empire, Rome, France 1940). The media consistently leak secret or classified information to the world endangering military lives. The media also downplay military accomplishments. This current lack of trust between the military and the media started with how the War in Vietnam was reported.
President Johnson was toppled because his Vietnam War strategy failed. As major voices in the Democratic Party came forward and objected to the war, challengers appeared in 1968 to run against President Johnson for the nomination of the Democratic Party. Because of the pressure to step aside Johnson announced he would not seek another term as president. It is perhaps fitting that the man who committed the United States to the Vietnam War for foggy reasons at best, and fought the war demanding restraints impossible to understand, had to step aside. Johnson’s unfathomable total political commitment to the war, his irresponsible constraints on the military, and the expansive social welfare programs enacted during the fighting, displayed incompetence in war, economics, and international affairs unparalleled in modern American history.
Nixon Gets the United States Out
1973
The winner in 1968 for president of the United States was Republican Richard Nixon, an old name in politics and Kennedy’s rival for the presidency in 1960. Nixon was back, and he was going to show the United States and the world his excellence in foreign affairs.
President Nixon clearly understood the American public wanted out of Vietnam, but a lot of them did not want to leave with a “loss.” Through the process of “Vietnamization” he would turn the war over to the South Vietnamese, and while doing so he would reduce the number of American units in Vietnam.[380] This was an obvious concept and should have been the policy from the inception. In fact, that was the role of the original US Advisors: show the South Vietnamese how to fight while the United States improved their equipment and training. The war should never have been a mainly US enterprise where the United States bore the brunt of the fighting. Clearly, if a nation cannot defend itself the United States cannot commit itself to eternal conflict on its behalf. Nixon simply implemented the simple solution, but he was restrained by time and a discontented democratic Congress. Somehow, he had to make progress immediately or he would fail in his endeavors to extract the United States while preserving South Vietnam’s freedom (such as it was). Nixon wanted what he termed “Peace with honor.” To this end, he wanted a peace treaty with the communist North which would guarantee the South’s sovereignty.
To achieve these goals, Nixon allowed the military more latitude in prosecuting the war. Hanoi’s Haiphong Harbor was mined which cut off supplies flowing to the communist capital by sea. He authorized bombing formerly off-limits military targets, and he authorized the carpet bombing of Hanoi by B-52 bombers. Diplomatically, he sent Henry Kissinger to Paris to talk with the North Vietnamese, and he began to open doors to normalization of relations with China. Nixon knew that between China and North Vietnam hostility was historically common, so his plans were to drive a wedge between them. Nixon realized China was not going to abandon the North in its war against America and the South; however, the mere threat of China reducing its aid would cause the North pause. Neither communist China nor the USSR had thriving economies, and the massive aid being sent to North Vietnam was a drag on their own economic positions; thus, a way out of the war would benefit them as well.
Nixon’s moves were exceptional. By releasing the military to do their job he was able to inflict significant economic and military harm on North Vietnam. He allowed military raids into Cambodia to destroy communist supply dumps, and his bombing of Hanoi inflicted significant and costly damage on its infrastructure. By allowing a quick increase in military pressure, while at the same time opening negotiations with China, he managed to get the North Vietnamese to sign a peace treaty agreeing to leave the South alone.
As the United States began its withdrawal from Vietnam Nixon got himself into the political tar pit of Watergate which ended his presidency. Nixon decided to resign from office in December of 1973, and the unelected vice president Gerald Ford took his place. At the same time, Congress, being controlled by huge democratic majorities that despised President Nixon, banned all US help to South Vietnam.
In 1972, before the last of the American units were removed from Vietnam, the North gathered together a large invasion force and attacked South Vietnam from Cambodia and Laos in a fierce Spring Offensive. This force included large numbers of tanks and armored vehicles. Some American troops and advisors were still in the country, along with helicopters and other aircraft. With help from these few Americans and their air power, the South Vietnamese drove the invading units back to their start points and inflicted heavy losses (over 100,000 dead) on the communists. At this point, many in the US military took heart. The partially trained South Vietnamese had done well. Maybe they could hold on after all.
The South Falls
1975
In 1975, after Nixon was out of office and Congress had cut off all aid, military and financial, to South Vietnam the communists invaded again. This time, they came from the north across the DMZ and from the west across the central highlands with an enormous force of more than 22 divisions. They began to attack down toward Saigon, the capital of South Vietnam. The invasion began in April of 1975, two years after the last US Units had been removed.[381] During those few years the South Vietnamese had not received military aid from America because of congressional legislation halting such aid. Now the aircraft and tanks the United States left in South Vietnam needed parts. When the South Vietnamese government approached the World Bank for a loan they had to deal with Robert McNamara[382] who was by then the head of the World Bank. They never had a chance with the ex-defense secretary. McNamara quickly refused their request. Another powerful American, in a new and important international role, turned his back on South Vietnam.
In spite of the odds against them in 1975, the South Vietnamese army initially fought well and held up the communist invasion. Then the president of South Vietnam issued a fateful order. He told some of the troops engaging the communists in the north to fall back to a predetermined line above the capital where a stronger defense could be mounted. Once the troops began to fall back the retreat turned into a rout, and the communists were in Saigon without delay (looks as if he should have issued a Hitler “no retreat” order). Pleas for help to American fell on deaf ears. The South fell to the Reds.
The United States had “lost” the Vietnam War, a war in which the it never lost a significant battle, and a war in which the Americans had inflicted untold casualties on its opponent.[383] About 48,000 Americans had died fighting the communists. (The New YorkTimes Almanac, 2008, reports US Vietnam War deaths at 47,355 from all causes, and including all services. Some of the differing figures result from different dates for the start and stop of US involvement) In my opinion, at least 1 million communists were killed by the US military during the period of US involvement. Additional losses were inflicted on the North by ARVIN units. The United States had lost in the sense that its former ally was destroyed. However, South Vietnam was not a US colony and US troops were sent there to preserve South Vietnam’s freedom. The South Vietnamese were the losers, and the Americans were interested, if bloodied, participants. The major impact on the United States would be economic, psychological, and political.
The North Vietnamese had broken the treaty signed in 1973 and the United States did nothing. President Ford doubtless felt confined by the congressional acts preventing any kind of interference with events in Vietnam; however, Ford was still president and still in control of the military. He could have cited the breached treaty and easily justified bombing the long columns of communist tanks and men moving south. At least it may have given the South Vietnamese a chance to hold on. As it was, the resignation of Nixon led directly to the fall of South Vietnam.
What is doubly strange about the events in Vietnam is that most people do not remember that Kennedy got the US into Vietnam, Johnson dramatically upped the commitment, and Nixon got America out of Vietnam. What the American media, and most people, want to remember is Kennedy was a hero and Nixon was a jerk. When discussing the presidents, Kennedy is normally credited with the desire to get us out while Nixon is smeared with the idea that he expanded the war. Love them or hate them, Kennedy got the United States in, and Nixon got the United States out. The old rivals of the 1960 debates bookended the war.[384] In the event, Nixon was right when he said the United States must closely evaluate its vital national interests, and Kennedy was wrong when he said we could not give up one foot of free ground. Vietnam was the test of the two theories—and Nixon was correct.
After the Fall
1975 to 1978
It was over. All of Vietnam came under communist rule at an extreme cost to the people of South and North Vietnam. The communists murdered thousands of people who had helped the Americans. Many boatloads of starving, half-dead South Vietnamese people, risking all to flee Vietnam, were picked up at sea. Some refugees made it all the way to Australia by boat. Horrifying stories of oppression and murder were recounted. The numbers who died trying to flee the “workers’ paradise” of communist Vietnam are unknown, but it was clearly many thousands.
Worse was to come.
The communists took over the rest of Laos and Cambodia. Little is known about events in Laos, but in Cambodia the truth bled out. Literally. On April 17, 1975, the communists under Pol Pot captured Phnom Penh the capital of Cambodia. Immediately thereafter Pol Pot began systematically killing millions of Cambodians—because they were city dwellers.[385] The communist Khmer Rouge marched millions of innocents into the countryside to “teach” them how to be peasants. In fact, no re-education occurred. It was simply a plot to kill everyone that lived in the cities. There was no reason to execute these people. This debauchery was a direct result of the communist takeover of Vietnam.
Why? The Analysis of the War and its Aftermath
The strange circle of history was complete. The United States turned down the French when they asked for aid against the communists, then the United States, under President Kennedy, committed troops to Vietnam. Following Kennedy’s assassination, President Lyndon Johnson fully committed the United States to Vietnam and then refused to use the available power of the US Military to “win.” Then President Nixon, Kennedy’s rival in the 1960 election for president, took office and got America out of Vietnam with a treaty guaranteeing the North would respect the South’s sovereignty. Nixon resigned under threat of impeachment, Congress forbade aid to South Vietnam, the communists invaded with a large army, and South Vietnam fell. Then, as predicted, Indochina began to fall to the communists, and slaughters of vast proportions took place in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and probably Laos.
Did all of Southeast Asia fall to the communists? No. Burma and Thailand remained non-communist without massive intervention of US Troops. Both nations were threatened with communist guerilla insurgents for a while, but those problems were held in check. What was the difference? The key difference concerned the governments and people of these nations. Both nations possessed marginally decent governments in 1975, in that, corruption levels were less than Vietnam. In both of these nations, the population remained at least somewhat loyal to the government. The terrain was similar, but the people and the governments vastly different. The communists failed to make inroads when the population remained loyal to the government and rejected communist intimidation tactics.
In addition, the lessons of Cambodia and Vietnam became well known throughout Southeast Asia. People could see what it meant to lose to the communists. The population began to reject the murderers’ lies and realized what they faced under communist rule. Understandably, the people of Thailand, Malaya, Burma, and Indonesia wanted nothing to do with the bloodthirsty murderers.
Another reason might have been in play, but one seldom discussed. The North Vietnamese admitted losing 1 million men in its war with South Vietnam; however, communism and lying go together. Reasonable estimates put communist losses at 2 million, and North Vietnam’s infrastructure was badly damaged. After the United States departed Vietnam, China and the USSR ceased sending aid. Their goals were reached. The United States was humiliated, had lost a long and brutal war in Asia, and under President Carter became less involved with the world. The world became open to aggressive communist adventures designed to bring areas in the Middle East, Africa, and South America under communist control. Monetary debts owed by North Vietnam to China and the USSR for the massive amounts of arms, ammunition, rockets, cannons, and antiaircraft guns, must have been considerable, and that debt went unpaid—forever. Although default was probably expected, the communist giants had economic problems and the default no doubt caused tensions.
In my opinion, the rest of Indochina defeated communism because of losses the United States and its allies inflicted on North Vietnam, and because support from China and the Soviets ended. Looked at in this way, the Vietnam War probably prevented the subjugation of the rest of Indochina. Note that the economy of Vietnam is the worst in the region by far even thirty plus years after the end of the war.
Books and Resources:
This is a difficult subject to recommend books on because it is hard to get non-biased views of the war. Until everyone who fought and reported on the war is dead, emotions run too high for an unbiased view to emerge. I personally like books just recounting battles and their outcomes, while briefly listing political events in Washington DC. I recommend avoiding books listing only US casualties in the war, and any book by a journalist covering the war for major US news media outlets. Nothing they say can be trusted. TheVietnam War for Dummies is one of these books looking at the war from an antiwar perspective and is therefore useless for studying the events objectively. The vast majority of books on the war have an anti-war bias—especially books authored by journalists of the era.
Vietnam: the Necessary War: a Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict by Michael Lind, Free Press, 2002.
Unheralded Victory: the Defeat of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army, 1961-1973, by Mark Woodruff, Presidio Press, 2005.
Street Without Joy by Bernard B. Fall, 2005, Stackpole Books. Probably the best background book on the Vietnam War.
The Fifty Year Wound: How America’s Cold War Victory Has Shaped Our World, by Derek Leebaert, Back Bay Books, 2003.
American Strategy in Vietnam, A Critical Analysis, by Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., Dover Publications, 2007. At 121 pages and a price of $8.95 this is probably the best book on the War in Vietnam that a student of history can acquire.
The Vietnam War, Bernard C. Natty, Barnes and Noble, 1998. A very factual record of the main events of the war and its aftermath. Very little bias displayed by this author.