Chapter 11

In This Chapter

Exploring the setting for the campaign

Outlining Lee’s strategic vision

Examining Jackson’s battles and their results

J ackson’s series of battles from March to June 1862 are considered a masterpiece of military campaigning. Thomas J. Jackson, known as Stonewall Jackson throughout the South, emerged as the Confederate nation’s greatest hero. There was no great battle fought in the Valley Campaign on the scale of Bull Run or Shiloh; actually, the number of soldiers involved was rather small. But the overall effects for Southern morale were immeasurable.

Collectively, these battles formed the components of a campaign supporting a strategic design developed by Robert E. Lee. Jackson’s Valley Campaign served to keep the mesmerized Army of the Potomac commander General George B. McClellan from receiving any reinforcements. McClellan, convinced he was outnumbered, would not move against Richmond without additional troops. Jackson’s efforts enabled Lee to take the initiative outside of Richmond and open his first offensive against the Union army.

Creating a Hero: Stonewall Jackson

Jackson (see Figure 11-1), born in what is today West Virginia in 1824 became an orphan as a boy and was raised by his uncle. Although his education was scanty, he obtained an appointment to West Point, but because of his rudimentary education, found that he had to apply himself mightily to pass his courses. Here he gained a reputation as a quiet, almost withdrawn, young man who had within him a deep resolve to make something of himself.

” CORBIS

Jackson was commissioned as an officer in the artillery and soon found himself in a war. The United States was involved in a war with Mexico, and many prominent Civil War officers learned about fighting firsthand. Jackson certainly did. In several important engagements around and in Mexico City, the young officer distinguished himself while expertly and courageously employing his cannon against the enemy. General Winfield Scott, the commanding general himself, made note of Jackson’s accomplishments.

Jackson stayed in Mexico for a while and served in various Army posts, including Florida, where his exacting sense of duty and strict adherence to regulations and orders brought down the wrath of his lackadaisical post commander. This experience soured Jackson on the peacetime army, and he accepted an appointment as a college professor of natural philosophy (physics) and artillery tactics at the Virginia Military Institute in Lexington. Lexington was a small, tidy town at the end of the Shenandoah Valley.

As an instructor, Jackson earned the cadets’ respect over time, but his methods and personality were hard to get used to. Each night after supper, Jackson would laboriously memorize his lesson for the next day. In class, he would repeat the lesson verbatim. If interrupted by a cadet’s question, he would simply repeat word for word the last section he had just spoken. Needless to say, he became a legend. Cadets called him “Tom Fool” Jackson.

He was also a hypochondriac, always imagining some imbalance in his body. As a result, he ate only milk and corn or whole wheat bread to assist his digestion, and sat bolt upright in his chair, like a sculpture of an Egyptian pharaoh, to ensure his internal organs were properly aligned. He was also deeply religious, following the rules of the Bible as if they were a set of military regulations. He established a Sunday school for slave children in town.

He married twice, his first wife dying in childbirth — not an uncommon occurrence in nineteenth century America. He remarried and bought a house in Lexington and was very happy with his situation. Jackson and the VMI corps provided a military presence for the execution of John Brown. John Brown was not the end, but only the beginning of sectional strife that would lead to war. When the war came, Jackson, like so many others living quiet, contented lives, joined the colors when his home was threatened. Taking a detachment of cadets to Richmond to assist with drilling new recruits, Jackson was dispatched to Harpers Ferry to train new soldiers there.

Jackson had no time for the relaxed atmosphere of sunshine soldiers. He drilled the men hard and established firm discipline. Jackson had a full beard and piercing blue eyes. He was awkward in his manner, careless in his dress, wearing the military coat he wore in Mexico, and he wore a battered cap pulled low over his eyes. He had no interest in the pomp and circumstance of the parade ground or the privileges of rank that some officers sought. Quiet, serious, seemingly preoccupied, Jackson always put his duty as a soldier first above everything else and was uncomprehending when others did not do the same. Although thoroughly disliked by his new trainees, Jackson cared not a whit. War was serious business and called for stern measures. He would follow his orders and do his duty. Jackson did his job well. This same unit he trained at Harpers Ferry he led on the Manassas battlefield in the first major action of the war. The brigade stood out as calm and ordered amid the confusion and terror of battle — a direct result of Jackson’s stern and demanding discipline. As a reward for his exceptional performance at the Battle of Manassas, Jackson was given command of a small army of 4,200 men with the mission of defending the Shenandoah Valley.

Stonewall’s Valley: The Shenandoah Valley

For centuries, the Shenandoah Valley had been a heavily traveled natural thoroughfare. It is a broad open valley about 30 miles wide between the Blue Ridge Mountains and the Allegheny Mountains, stretching 160 miles from Harpers Ferry to Lexington. The American Indians used the valley as a trading route for goods throughout the southeast. Later settlers followed the American Indian paths in wagons to settle in the valley or move on to lands further south and west. By the nineteenth century, the valley had a packed, hard-surface, all-weather road that made travel easy and relatively quick. The Shenandoah Valley became one of the most important producers of grain, fruit, and cattle in the state. These products could easily be moved northward, via the railroad at Harpers Ferry, or through the mountain gaps down to Richmond.

The valley’s strategic importance

Militarily speaking, the Shenandoah Valley was of vital importance to Virginia and the Confederacy. It was a natural invasion route for Union armies moving into Virginia or for Confederate armies moving northward into Maryland or eastward to Washington. Its all-weather road enabled troops to move rapidly from one location to another. Its mountain passes gave armies access to the center of Virginia, or they could be controlled by a small number of defenders to prevent an army from entering or leaving the valley. Near Harpers Ferry was the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, a strategic line of communications and supply for the Union. Finally, its agricultural wealth sustained Confederate armies in the field. Such an important source of supply had to be protected; from the Union perspective, control of the valley crippled the Confederacy’s armies by cutting off a major food supply source. Jackson knew very well the importance of this strategic territory. If the Shenandoah Valley was lost, he said, then Virginia was lost.

Looking for Jackson: Banks enters the valley

In February 1862, Union General Nathaniel Banks entered the valley with an army of 38,000 men, cautiously looking for Jackson’s troops in Winchester, a major town at the northern end of the valley. See Figure 11-2. Banks was a career politician, former governor of Massachusetts, a prominent Republican vote getter, and former Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. When the war came, Banks collected some political favors along with the two stars of a Major General. He also was given an army and a department in which to operate. That department included the Shenandoah Valley. Banks certainly looked like a General, but that was as far as his military ability went. His orders were to push Confederate forces out of the Shenandoah Valley and then prepare to join McClellan as reinforcements near Richmond. Banks dutifully chased Stonewall Jackson’s Confederate troops off, pursuing them until he was satisfied that they must have left the valley. Banks detached a division under Brigadier General Shields with about 11,000 men to occupy Winchester while the rest of Banks’s force left to join McClellan’s army, which at this time was making a laborious approach up the peninsula to Richmond.

Jackson disappears and reappears

By no means had Jackson left the valley. Although he couldn’t fight all of Banks’s army, he certainly could fight a portion of it. When he learned that Shields was on his way back to Winchester, Jackson moved his little army rapidly in pursuit, moving 50 miles in two days. On March 22, he pounced on Shield’s division just outside Winchester at the village of Kernstown. Even though outnumbered, Jackson pressed the attack. By the end of the day his army had been outfought and had left the battlefield in disorder, having lost nearly 700 men — killed, wounded, or missing. The Union force moved to Winchester, having lost about 500 men.

Jackson was furious that contrary to his orders, a brigade retreated from the field because it was short of ammunition and in danger of being overwhelmed by a Union attack. The retreat led to a disordered flight by the rest of the army from the battlefield. When the Brigade Commander, Richard Garnett, told Jackson why he disobeyed his order to stay in place, Jackson relieved him of his command. In retrospect, Garnett had made the right decision based on his assessment of the situation he found himself in. Jackson was unaware of Garnett’s desperate situation; nevertheless he had given an order and expected it to be absolutely obeyed. The position should have been held with the bayonet, Jackson told the astonished officer.

Using the defeat: Lee’s strategic vision

Kernstown was a clear Confederate defeat; yet, this little battle had very big consequences in the overall operations of the Union and Confederate armies in the Eastern Theater. An interesting element of warfare is that battlefield victories or defeats are not as important as how the battles themselves affect the strategic and operational picture. Even though a Confederate defeat, Kernstown surprised everyone. Jackson’s force was supposed to have been inconsequential and chased out of the Shenandoah Valley, yet there it was, fighting toe to toe with an army nearly three times its size. No one in his right mind would have attacked with such fury unless it had been reinforced. This mistaken assumption changed the course of activities in the Eastern Theater for the Union forces. On the Confederate side, Jackson’s defeat actually created more options for maneuver against the multiple Union threats.

Banks’s army was going nowhere — it would stay in the valley. McClellan would have to wait for any further reinforcements from the valley. President Lincoln also stepped in and ordered that McDowell’s corps, initially bound for McClellan’s army near Richmond, hold in place to protect Washington. Lincoln also ordered Banks’s army reinforced. Thus, the little battle of Kernstown suddenly reshaped McClellan’s entire campaign plan. Banks was ordered to pursue Jackson, but Banks now saw Confederates behind every tree. His advance slowed to a crawl.

In the face of Banks’s minuscule advance, Jackson had time to reorganize his forces, procuring supplies and equipment. Jackson wisely sent out a group of engineers to map the valley in preparation for further action. He also received a series of communications from Confederate President Jefferson Davis’s military advisor, Robert E. Lee. Lee began to sense that McClellan was not in any hurry to get a battle going, which would give Confederate forces time to prepare for offensive action. But something had to be done to prevent McClellan from getting any stronger. Lee proposed a bold strategy and would use Jackson’s army as a diversion. Even though Johnston’s army was badly outnumbered and needed help holding a defensive line at Yorktown, Lee proposed reinforcing Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley. According to Lee, after he was reinforced, Jackson could maneuver and attack Banks and attract other Union forces to the valley. By forcing the president to look nervously out of the corner of his eye toward the valley, no additional Union forces would be sent to McClellan’s aid if the politicians believed Washington was exposed to even the slightest danger. This meant that Jackson with a small force could occupy much larger forces in a chase around the valley, leaving McClellan sitting before Richmond without any additional forces to count on.

Lee’s plan was all well and good on paper, of course, but it assumed Jackson could fight outnumbered over 3 to 1 and still survive. It was a tall order and a bold gamble. But something told Lee that Jackson was a fighter, and that given additional troops, he just might make a miracle happen. Thus, into the valley came 9,000 additional infantry and cavalry commanded by Richard S. Ewell (pronounced “Yule”). Ewell and Jackson made an interesting pair. Ewell was a hard-bitten American Indian fighter, swore a blue streak, and had mannerisms and an appearance that reminded many of a bird. Ewell’s arrival eased only slightly what was becoming a dangerous situation for Jackson.

Not only was Banks creeping toward him (under renewed pressure from Washington), but also another army in western Virginia was approaching on Jackson’s flank to link up with Banks. Former 1856 Republican presidential candidate and pre-war explorer-hero John C. Frémont, known everywhere in the United States as “The Pathfinder,” commanded this army. Frémont had no real soldier skills, but received a General’s commission anyway because of his connections to the party in power. A small Confederate army of 2,800 men observed Frémont’s activities. As part of Lee’s plan, this army also came under Jackson’s command. Jackson now had a force of 16,000 men. He was still outnumbered. This bothered him not a bit. Placing his faith in God and the marching prowess of his men, Jackson lined up on Frémont.

Jackson disappears and reappears — again

Ewell’s troops came through the Swift Run Gap to reinforce Jackson. To everyone’s surprise, Jackson left Ewell and a small body of troops to watch Banks. Jackson never told anyone his plans, not even his subordinate commanders. He loaded the rest of his army on trains heading out of the valley. Banks, receiving this information, telegraphed Washington that Jackson had left the valley and was heading toward Richmond to reinforce Johnston. Jackson had the trains make a loop back into the valley and detrained in Staunton. From there he conducted a rapid march to meet the advance units of Frémont’s army on the mountain road near McDowell. The fight was not an easy one, but Jackson’s men drove the Yankees off. Jackson had lost nearly 500 men; the Union forces had lost half of that. After blocking the road, Jackson moved to reunite his army, confident that Frémont would not pursue.

Banks, unaware of Frémont’s defeat and blithely confident that he no longer needed such a large army in the Shenandoah Valley, detached most of his army under Shields to aid McClellan as originally planned. Banks had only about 8,000 men with him and he headed back toward Winchester, stopping at a crossroads on the valley turnpike called Strasburg. By this time Jackson had reunited with Ewell, who hadn’t known where Jackson had gone or when he’d come back. Jackson then gave orders to follow Banks. Jackson soon crossed over the backside of a small mountain range that split the valley. Again Jackson had disappeared, and nobody knew where he was headed.

“Commissary” Banks

From Strasburg to Winchester, Banks had strewn the road with every conceivable item of military equipment (which the gleeful Confederates were happy to have), including nearly 10,000 new rifled muskets. Winchester served as Banks’s supply depot. It was crammed with supplies of all types, but most important to the Confederate army were the medical supplies, already growing scarce in the South. Because he had left such abundance behind for the resupply of Jackson’s army, General Banks became known among Confederate soldiers as “Commissary” Banks, after the military term for a source of supply.

Jackson strikes again

Jackson used the mountain range as a screen, hiding his army’s movement from Banks. It just so happened that Strasburg and Banks’s army sat at the end of this mountain range. Jackson was using the terrain to his advantage to get around and behind Banks’s army. At Front Royal, Jackson overwhelmed a Union detachment guarding the railroad line that led to Manassas (now under Union control) that served as a major line of communication and supply to Banks. Capturing more than 600 men and a wagon train of supplies, and inflicting 900 casualties with a loss of only 50 men, Jackson turned his hard marching army left and headed for Banks at Strasburg. Banks was better at retreat than any other military maneuver. Completely surprised by Jackson’s maneuver, Banks drove his army as fast as it could go, headed for Winchester. Jackson caught up with him there and made short work of his thoroughly demoralized troops, who ran for their lives across the Potomac. In three days, Banks had lost 3,300 men; Jackson had lost 400.

Lincoln sets a trap for Jackson

Jackson had cleared the Shenandoah Valley of Union troops in a most spectacular fashion. After all the bad news of the terrible spring of 1862, Stonewall’s victories were welcomed in the South with near desperate joy. He became the hero of the nation overnight. In Washington, Jackson was anything but a hero; the capital was in turmoil with rumors that Jackson was on his way to capture the defenseless city. President Lincoln had other plans for the new hero. Lincoln ordered a triple attack on Jackson’s forces now enjoying Winchester’s bounty. Frémont was ordered to march toward Strasburg in Jackson’s rear. Lincoln stopped McDowell’s movement toward McClellan and detached 20,000 men under Shields and ordered him to march back into the Shenandoah Valley, move through Front Royal westward, and meet Frémont at Strasburg. Together, they would block Jackson’s escape route. Banks was ordered to push Jackson out of Winchester toward Strasburg where the three armies would destroy Stonewall once and for all. It was a bold plan that revealed the president as a fast learner in the art of war.

Lincoln’s plan almost worked. If Lincoln had any other Generals to execute the plan, Jackson’s army would have been in serious trouble. As it was, Lincoln had three incompetents who moved slowly, if at all. Banks never got started; he’d seen enough of Jackson. Shields and Frémont took their time, got lost, and made a complete mess of the plan. Jackson’s men got away, though just barely, due to fast marching (25 miles a day or more for the Confederates) and the iron will of their commander. The trap shut on empty air — Jackson had escaped and was moving to a defensible position at a strategic crossroads in the valley.

Jackson’s knowledge of the Shenandoah Valley’s terrain enabled him to stay one step ahead of his enemies. Nevertheless, he faced a serious problem; two Union armies, each equal to his, were moving against him. Heavy rains made movement slow, and Jackson’s cavalry had destroyed the bridges to slow down the pursuit. High water also impeded the march. Jackson chose the only road intersection Shields and Frémont could use to unite their armies. Jackson proposed to fight and defeat each one separately. He did just that.

Jackson’s simple rules of war

At Cross Keys, Jackson and Ewell watched as a bold Union officer on a white horse led an attack on the Confederate lines. Ewell, in a burst of admiration, ordered that no one kill such a brave man. Jackson immediately countermanded Ewell’s order. “The brave and gallant Federal officers are the very kind that must be killed,” Jackson explained. Then he added tersely, “Shoot the brave officers, and the cowards will run away and take the men with them.”

The campaign ends

On June 8, Ewell defeated a halfhearted Frémont attack at Cross Keys. Leaving a small force to watch Frémont, Jackson and Ewell joined together the following day with about 6,000 men to fight a portion of Shields’s army (4,000 men) at Port Republic. It was the biggest fight of the Valley Campaign. Union troops fought resolutely and inflicted heavy casualties on Jackson’s forces. By the end of the day, Jackson had outflanked and outfought them. His losses were 800, while the Union losses totaled about 1,000. The following day, both Shields and Frémont had retreated. Banks was still approaching, Winchester, having contributed nothing at all.

The Valley Campaign: An Appreciation

The Valley Campaign stands as part of one of the most brilliantly executed strategic plans in U.S. military history. Here you can see the importance of linking strategic goals with a campaign plan that then fulfills the strategic goals through a series of interconnected battles. The Valley Campaign served as a strategic diversion, preventing McClellan from receiving the reinforcements he thought he needed to win before Richmond. McDowell had been ordered three times to move his troops to reinforce McClellan; and three times McDowell received orders to stay put because of what was happening in the valley. The Confederates used interior lines, shuttling Ewell by railroad to the Shenandoah Valley to provide Jackson with sufficient combat power for him to employ the principles of war — maneuver, surprise, security, and the offensive — to defeat several enemy armies.

With never more than 16,000 men, Jackson held off 64,000 Union troops, fighting four large battles and six small engagements that resulted in 7,000 Union troops killed, wounded, or captured. Jackson’s casualties numbered about 2,500. In about 48 days, Jackson had marched his army an astounding 676 miles. Jackson marched his soldiers until they could hardly stand, and then threw them into battle with little regard for their condition and even less regard for the losses they suffered as long as a Union soldier stood on the field. Yet they won battles over and over again under his command. In his communications back to Richmond after a battle, he would credit God with the victory.

The string of victories made the soldiers believe they were something special, and the Confederate army began to gain a sense of pride and esprit that never left them. Jackson’s men began calling themselves “foot cavalry” because they seemed to move as fast on foot as men did on horseback. Jackson’s brilliance in this campaign has fascinated military professionals for generations. People still study the campaign as an appreciation of Jackson’s masterful translation of the principles of war into the art of war.