Chapter 14

In This Chapter

Taking the strategic initiative away from the North

Attempting to gain European recognition

Shaping the future of the war: Two critical battles

Expanding the wartime goals: Lincoln’s fateful decision

T he summer of 1862 found the Confederacy in the role of aggressor. In the Eastern Theater, Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia had driven the Union armies away from the Confederate capital, Richmond and was preparing to invade Maryland. In the Western Theater, the Confederate armies were also on the move, pushing into Kentucky. At the same time, indications from Europe pointed to the success of King Cotton diplomacy. France and Britain were beginning to feel the pinch as the supply of Southern cotton trickled away. Perhaps Southern battlefield victories in Maryland and Kentucky would convince Europe that the North could not win, leading to an open alliance with the Confederacy (and a steady supply of cotton). President Jefferson Davis became willing to take a bold step that could lead to victory.

President Lincoln was also thinking of taking a bold step to ensure victory. He began to see clearly that the war needed to take a different direction. His strategic goal to restore the Union was not sufficient to sustain the will of the Northern states for continuing the war. He had decided to give the North a new reason to fight and the Europeans a good reason to stay out of the matter but needed a victory to use as a backdrop for this change in strategy. The problem was how to announce this new direction before the Confederate armies broke the back of Northern morale with victories on the battlefield.

Winning the War Now: The Southern Strategic Situation

Early on, President Davis had adopted the strategic defensive. Essentially, this meant keeping the Confederate armies in the South to defend against Union attacks, shifting forces and resources to meet the threat with the hope of wearing out the opponent by making it too expensive in terms of blood and treasure to conquer the South. But Davis recognized an opportunity to win the war by taking the offensive.

While Lee and Jackson were battling the hapless Pope at Manassas, Confederate General Kirby Smith and 12,000 men had defeated a patchwork Union force at Richmond, Kentucky. By the end of August, Smith’s army arrived at the state capitol at Frankfort, Kentucky and having chased away the pro-Union legislature, raised the Confederate national flag. Could the same thing be done in the east? Nearly two months of constant marching and fighting had battered Lee’s army. Nevertheless, Lee was strongly in favor of abandoning the purely defensive strategy and taking the war to the enemy.

Some military factors favored an invasion of the North. Virginia had borne the brunt of fighting since 1861 and, therefore, could not easily supply the Confederate army. If Lee’s army operated outside of the state, both the army and Virginia could benefit. The upcoming fall harvest in Virginia could be collected without interference. Additionally, the rich farmland of Maryland could easily sustain Lee’s army. Clothing and shoes were available in Maryland as well. This may sound like a minor issue, but the Confederate soldiers were literally wearing rags, and most were without shoes. Everything had worn out long ago; remember that while the cotton was grown in the South, the mills to turn it into cloth were in the North. Finally, Lee hoped that Maryland men would volunteer for the army and that the state as a whole would eagerly throw off the yoke of Union control once a Confederate army entered the state.

Beyond the practical matter of sustaining an army in the field and neutralizing Union influence in a pro-Southern state, Davis also was watching the situation in Europe carefully. Great Britain was heavily dependent on Southern cotton (very similar to the West’s dependence on foreign oil today). Eighty percent of Britain’s cotton for its mills came from the Confederate states. With the blockade, exports of cotton to England shrank from 816 million pounds to 6 million pounds in the first two years of the war. British cotton mills were closing down, putting tens of thousands out of work. British Foreign Minister John Russell seemed ready to recommend recognition of the South to the prime minister, who held out for another convincing Southern victory to take such a major diplomatic step.

The French, while not as drastically affected by the loss of Southern cotton, nevertheless sought a joint effort with Britain to mediate a settlement and end the war. An independent Confederate States of America would restore the flow of cotton and improve French ambitions to reestablish a toehold in North America via Mexico. With the South taking the strategic offensive in Maryland and Kentucky, the British took a wait-and-see attitude. Not willing to act unilaterally, the French took the British lead and waited as well.

Waiting for a Victory: The Northern Strategic Situation

President Lincoln faced a tough situation in 1862. Politically, his coalition with Northern Democrats was fraying badly. The Republicans in Congress and in the administration increasingly insisted that the war should be the instrument to destroy slavery and crush the rebellion of the Southern traitors. This kind of talk alarmed Northern Democrats, who desired that the Union be restored to its pre-war form, with slavery untouched. The surprising number of casualties had lowered Northern morale. The great enthusiasm that had filled the ranks in 1861 had petered out after Shiloh and the Seven Days. The government’s new levy for 300,000 more volunteers was filled only with great difficulty. Backroom deals with state governors, monetary incentives, and the implied threat of conscription were necessary to fill the quota. These problems, occurring just before Lee’s advance into Maryland, placed the Democrats in a good position to win the upcoming congressional elections and make Lincoln a helpless wartime president.

Even as McClellan’s Army of the Potomac huddled against the banks of the James River, Lincoln had realized that the broken vessel of the Union could not be put back together as it had previously existed. The status of slaves had been an awkward problem. The government, fighting to restore the Union, treated slaves not as refugees or human beings, but property. Slaves who had fled to Union lines or had been abandoned by their masters were called “contraband,” occupying the same category as a horse or other confiscated property. At times, slaves were returned to confederate lines, a case of old habits dying hard. The Republican Congress had passed a confiscation law that allowed the government to seize all property belonging to anyone who had joined the Confederacy. This, of course, included slaves.

By late summer of 1862, Lincoln had had enough of fighting the war with one hand tied behind his back, due to the slavery issue. He came to a brutally simple conclusion: To destroy the South’s ability to make war, slavery must also be destroyed. Slavery sustained the Southern wartime economy, freeing thousands of men to serve in the Confederate army. Freeing the slaves — emancipation in the high-sounding talk of politics — had become in Lincoln’s mind a wartime necessity. However, Lincoln, the master politician, needed good timing for his announcement to be effective. Publishing such a noble proclamation in the midst of panicked Union troops running again for the safety of Washington’s defenses would be suicidal. Thus, Lincoln’s draft lay quietly in his desk drawer as he waited for McClellan, or any of his Generals, to bring him a victory and the public morale boost necessary to issue the proclamation safely.

The Antietam Campaign

Lee’s army crossed the Potomac River into Maryland on September 4 (see Figure 14-1). His objective was Harrisburg, the capital of Pennsylvania. On the way, he sought to spread his army around western Maryland, displaying his troops, gathering supplies (purchased with Confederate money, which, of course, was not legal tender outside of the Confederacy) and volunteers, and threatening Washington, Baltimore, and even Philadelphia in the process. Eventually McClellan would come out of Washington to fight him, but Lee would have plenty of time to choose the ground on which to fight the decisive battle that would destroy the Union army and ensure Southern independence.

Lee chose to use the Shenandoah Valley as his line of supply. There was one problem: The Union controlled Harpers Ferry at the northern opening of the valley. Like a foot on a garden hose, this force could cut off Lee’s wagon trains of ammunition, the one item that could not be obtained from the local populace in Maryland or Pennsylvania. Therefore, controlling Harpers Ferry became a key point in Lee’s campaign. As the Confederate army marched into Frederick, Maryland, Lee began to issue orders. Lee’s army would march west from Frederick, going through the mountain passes at South Mountain to shield his movements from enemy eyes. The army then would split into several parts. Jackson would lead three columns south to capture Harpers Ferry; Longstreet would move north to Hagerstown. Once Harpers Ferry was secured, Jackson would join the rest of the army for its move north into Pennsylvania.

These plans were detailed in Lee’s Special Order 191, copied, and sent to all commanders. Jackson sent an additional copy of the order to General D.H. Hill, one of his division commanders who had been detached from his command and assigned to Longstreet. The orders, wrapped around three cigars, were dropped at a campsite near Frederick.

McClellan had begun his army’s typically cautious advance toward Frederick. Just as before, McClellan was convinced that his army of 90,000 was outnumbered. Lee, he believed, had at least 120,000 men. But then came the stroke of luck that, even to this day, is astonishing. One of his soldiers had found the lost Order 191. An even greater miracle was that the order actually got into the hands of the commanding General within hours. The fog of war had lifted for McClellan. He now knew exactly where Lee’s forces were, where they were going, and, best of all, that Lee’s army was scattered and weak. “Now I know what to do!” he was quoted as saying when he read the order. If he moved now, he could win the war in 24 hours.

McClellan allowed 16 of those precious 24 hours to drift by. Time is the dominant factor in warfare — always has been and always will be. How a General uses his available time to make decisions, to move forces, and to sequence actions on the battlefield will tell you whether he is a good General. How Lee and McClellan used time in this campaign illustrates better than anything the qualitative difference between these two commanders. Within hours of McClellan reading Lee’s orders, Jeb Stuart had passed the critical information about the lost orders to Lee. While McClellan telegraphed the good news to the president and Halleck, the General in Chief, and issued orders for his army to move promptly the following day, Lee began to shift the meager forces he had immediately available to defend the two mountain passes his army had recently used. McClellan’s army would have to fight to get through South Mountain. Lee recalled Longstreet from Hagerstown, ordered him to support the defense of the passes, and ordered the rest of the army to concentrate at a little crossroads near the Potomac River — Sharpsburg, on Antietam Creek.

The following day, McClellan found the passes at South Mountain guarded. Although heavily outnumbered, the Confederates fought skillfully and tied up several Union army corps. At the end of the day McClellan had the passes, but not much else for his trouble. It was clear that Lee knew that McClellan was aware of his strategy. The captured plans were increasingly less useful as Lee improvised. Still, all was not lost. Time was of extreme importance if McClellan and the Union army were to destroy Lee and his invading army. But now McClellan was no longer sure where Lee’s army was. Nevertheless, he claimed victory, declaring Lee’s army all but finished. President Lincoln, who understood the difference between words and actions, responded to McClellan’s crowing succinctly: “God bless you and all with you. Destroy the rebel army if possible.”

Jackson’s Coup at Harpers Ferry

While McClellan claimed victory, Jackson was claiming his own victory, notifying Lee of his capture of Harpers Ferry. By a brilliant use of maneuver and deception, Jackson rapidly convinced the demoralized Union defenders that they had no chance. Jackson’s reputation alone seemed enough to clinch the victory. Over 11,000 men surrendered, and the Confederates took possession of 3,000 rifles, 73 cannons, and 200 wagons. While Jackson’s nearly bloodless victory was a sterling accomplishment and a brilliant employment of his forces, the capture of Harpers Ferry is largely forgotten because of the events that would overshadow it in the next few days. Lee’s reply to Jackson’s victory message stressed that he must bring his men to Sharpsburg as quickly as possible. Jackson promptly responded to Lee’s orders, as he always did. He left General A. P. Hill’s division in charge of handling the prisoners while he took the remainder of his men to join Lee. Hill’s men, as ragged and dirty as any in the Confederate army, took advantage of the more than adequate Union supplies at Harpers Ferry, equipping themselves with new rifled muskets, canteens, and shoes. Many put on brand new blue uniform pants and jackets.

When he received news of Harpers Ferry’s surrender on September 15, Lee had about 19,000 men from Longstreet’s division on the banks of Antietam Creek. The day before, he had decided to retreat across the Potomac. Jackson’s message changed his plans, because now, Lee could count on having about 41,000 men on the field. He was outnumbered, and the defensive position he had staked out was that good. One advantage that Lee’s position did present was that his troops occupied a 4-mile line on a low ridge with woods and small hills overlooking Antietam Creek. This meant that attacking Union troops would have to cross a water obstacle and attack uphill, for the most part. But Lee’s position left his flanks open, and, worst of all, his back was to the Potomac River, a major obstacle. If worst came to worst, Lee’s retreating army could be trapped against its banks and easily destroyed. But Lee seemed totally unperturbed by the odds he faced. Lee took the risk for two reasons: First, he knew his opponent. McClellan had never risked a major attack against any enemy force. Second, he understood the stakes involved in the campaign. A victory would most likely lead the Confederacy to foreign recognition and independence.

Starting the Battle: McClellan Creeps In

While Lee scanned the horizon for Jackson’s troops, he watched as the Union army slowly made its approach to the battlefield. A vast sea of blue appeared on the hills opposite Antietam Creek on the 16th of September. Yet there were no indications of an attack or any aggressive action. In fact, nothing at all happened that day. McClellan had given Lee another precious 24 hours to assemble his army. Jackson’s men (minus A. P. Hill’s troops still at Harpers Ferry) arrived and took up positions on the vulnerable left flank of the army. What happened?

At this time, there was nothing keeping McClellan and his 71,000 men from advancing and crushing Lee’s inadequate force. The only thing stopping the Young Napoleon was his own fears. McClellan believed that Lee had 120,000 men facing him. To McClellan, an attack that day would be foolhardy — best to bring up the entire army, its artillery, and all its supplies, and spend a day in preparation and planning. Oddly enough, McClellan never provided a battle plan to his Generals, either orally or in writing. Lee indeed had a good understanding of his enemy.

On the morning of the 17th, McClellan ordered the bulk of his army — three corps — to attack Lee’s left flank. He ordered another corps to attack the Confederate right flank by crossing Antietam Creek. But without a plan, the Union Corps commanders could only wait for orders from McClellan’s headquarters or take action as they felt necessary. Joseph Hooker’s Corps, numbering 8,700 men, went in first on Lee’s right flank. All McClellan had told him was to start the battle. As the men crossed a cornfield, they ran directly into Jackson’s troop (see Figure 14-2). For over an hour, thousands of men fought in the terrible cornfield, charging and countercharging. John B. Hood’s division of Texans battled the enemy to a standstill. Hooker’s Corps was shattered — one-third of his men dead, wounded, or missing. But Jackson was only barely holding on — his losses had also been severe. Another Union corps, composed mostly of new recruits, followed behind Hooker. Lee had shifted troops from the right and center to reinforce Jackson. Another hour and a half of brutal fighting passed with another Union corps broken and no ground gained.

The sunken road

Shortly after this attack ended, yet another Union Corps started its attack. The divisions became spread out, one division headed for the enemy’s right flank, where the men became bogged down in a concentration of Confederate artillery and rifle fire that wrecked the division. The other two divisions headed toward the strongest point of the Confederate defensive line — a sunken road that provided the defenders with a natural trench to fight from. These Union divisions also were shattered in viscous fighting, but not before gaining the sunken road, thereafter called Bloody Lane. Lee’s center was wide open — only a few remnants of the Confederate defenders stood to resist. Things were so desperate in the center that General Longstreet’s staff manned an artillery battery, with Longstreet directing its fire. McClellan had thousands of fresh troops to mount a concerted attack that would have carried the Union army to Sharpsburg and the Potomac. But nothing happened.

McClellan was struck with uncertainty. The battle had been going on for seven hours; he had thrown three corps against Lee’s lines without success. All the news he had received from his commanders had been bad. McClellan was convinced that Lee’s 120,000-man army was poised for a counterattack. He ordered his commanders to hold their ground where they were and defend. At the point of decisive victory, McClellan was thinking of how to save his army from defeat.

Battle Captain’s Report: The Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), September 17, 1862

Draw

Commanders: Union: Major General George B. McClellan, Army of the Potomac, 75,000 men. Confederate: General Robert E. Lee, Army of Northern Virginia, 38,000 men. (Some authorities believe this number may have been as high as 50,000.)

Phase I: With his plans for the invasion of Maryland in McClellan’s hands, Lee orders his army to assemble at the town of Sharpsburg, near the Potomac River. Here, he and Longstreet select defensible terrain and await McClellan’s attack. Jackson, minus A. P. Hill’s division, arrives from Harpers Ferry, after capturing the Union garrison there. McClellan approaches slowly and with great caution, giving Lee an extra day to assemble his forces and prepare his defense.

Phase II: The battle opens at 6 a.m., with Hooker’s Corps attacking Jackson’s position on the Confederate left flank. A terrible struggle at the cornfield and near the Dunkard Church begins. Hooker is repulsed, but another Union corps under Mansfield follows Hooker’s effort at 9 a.m. This corps is also stopped after close and desperate fighting. Sumner’s Corps launches a third Union attack at 10:30 a.m. The three divisions of this corps are sent in piecemeal, one headed toward the Confederate left flank, the other two headed for the center of the line. Confederate reinforcements arriving on the battlefield crush the Union attack on the left. Thousands of Union troops fall in a matter of minutes. Fighting in this part of the battlefield ends.

Phase III: The two remaining Union divisions of Sumner’s Corps advance mistakenly toward the center of the Confederate line, where the defenders have occupied a sunken road — a natural trench. The attackers cannot see the defenders until they are almost upon them. The Confederates fire at point-blank range. As each division attacks, it suffers terrible casualties, but not before gaining a part of the road and overwhelming the defenders, who are killed in heaps along the stretch of road known thereafter as Bloody Lane. The Confederate center is broken, but the attack is stalled. McClellan orders no more reinforcements to go forward — he is thinking about saving his army when he is on the edge of total victory.

Phase IV: General Burnside’s Corps has spent all day attempting to cross a bridge over Antietam Creek. Every time Burnside attempts push forward, his men suffer heavy casualties. By 3:30, Burnside succeeds, partially because he changes tactics (a direct rush over the bridge rather than moving parallel to the bank to access the bridge) and partially because Lee has stripped men from the right flank all day to save his left and center. Once Burnside crosses, his divisions advance slowly against tough, but limited, resistance. He nears the outskirts of Sharpsburg and the main road that leads to the shallow part of the Potomac River, Lee’s only escape route. The Confederates have no reserves to stop his attack. Burnside has the second opportunity of the day to gain complete victory. At this time, troops appear on Burnside’s left flank. They are dressed in blue, but the flags they fly identify them as Confederate troops. It is A. P. Hill’s division from Harpers Ferry, arriving at precisely the right time and place. They attack Burnside’s tired and surprised men, driving them back to the bridge that still bears their General’s name — Burnside’s Bridge. The sun sets after 14 hours of battle — the bloodiest day in American history.

Casualties: Union 12,400, Confederate 10,300.

Burnside’s bridge

By late afternoon, General Ambrose E. Burnside’s Corps became the main (and only) attack. Burnside had been on the field since morning, but he had only made the most tentative attempts to cross the large stone bridge at Antietam Creek. McClellan uncharacteristically ordered Burnside to attack repeatedly and “at all hazards,” yet Burnside still had made no progress. Why he never just sent his 12,500 men wading across the 50-foot wide shallow stream is still a mystery. To the 550 Confederates sitting on the hills above the bridge, it was a sharpshooter’s paradise. As soon as the massed attackers tried to run along the bank to reach the bridge, the defenders shot them down in heaps. By afternoon, Burnside had finally succeeded in crossing the bridge and began a slow advance up the ridge toward Sharpsburg. The Confederate defenders were too weak to stop the advance; they could only delay it. Lee was in Sharpsburg rallying troops for a final stand, as his right flank and escape route to the Potomac were in great danger.

Just then, a large body of troops appeared on Burnside’s flank. No one could tell who they were. Through the dust, their uniforms appeared blue — Union reinforcements! But to the shock and dismay of the Union troops, they were A. P. Hill’s Confederates; many were wearing captured Union uniforms, arriving on the battlefield from Harpers Ferry at precisely the right time and place. Burnside’s attack collapsed, and the disordered divisions retreated to hold the bridge that they had fought so hard to win. After 14 hours of combat, the sun mercifully set on two shocked and devastated armies.

Although a draw, the Battle of Antietam is considered one of the decisive battles of the Civil War. Politically, Lee’s failed invasion gave Lincoln the opportunity to issue the Emancipation Proclamation and change the direction of the war. Diplomatically, Lee’s withdrawal from Maryland ended the Confederacy’s best hopes for European intervention to end the war and guarantee Southern independence.

Aftermath of the Battle

As Lee, Longstreet, and Jackson met to survey the battlefield and assess the army’s condition, they quickly realized that the army had been grievously hurt and completely disorganized. “Half of Lee’s army was hunting the other half,” one staff officer recalled. A full third of his army had disappeared — killed, wounded, or missing. Lee had thrown every man available into the battle. There were no reserves, no fresh troops. On the Union side, four army corps suffered almost all of the 12,000 casualties suffered that day. Amazingly enough, one-third of McClellan’s army had not even fired a shot. On both sides, regiments ceased to exist. The fighting had been so fierce and so close that hundreds of men fell dead or wounded in just a matter of minutes. At the end of the day, only a handful of survivors of these brutal encounters were left to answer the roll.

Despite the heavy losses, Lee gave instructions to his subordinates to prepare for another battle. He refused to surrender the field to McClellan. For his part, McClellan expected another battle, but in his mind it was Lee’s 100,000 men who would attack. He ordered his army to defend the ground they occupied, even after receiving 13,000 reinforcements. A strange calm followed throughout the day, as soldiers from both sides collected casualties and cooked rations. That night, Lee withdrew silently across the Potomac, the hopes of victory that would lead to independence postponed. A Union attempt at pursuit was savagely beaten back at the Potomac by A. P. Hill’s men. The Antietam Campaign was over.

Assessing the Battle and Its Significance

The battle, itself, was a draw. Lee always considered it one of his finest battles, in which he displayed his mastery of the battlefield against enormous odds. McClellan, too, believed he had demonstrated his superior skills, claiming that it was “a masterpiece of art.” Although neither side gained any advantage on the battlefield, the Battle of Antietam had profound significance for America.

The day after Lee’s army crossed the Potomac, McClellan sent the president a triumphant telegram announcing his victory. “Maryland is entirely freed of the enemy,” he reported. True, Maryland was freed, but Lee’s army was not destroyed as Lincoln wished. Nevertheless, McClellan’s report was the first Union success in many long months. It gave the president the cover he needed to alter the nature of the war.

The Emancipation Proclamation

On September 22, Lincoln issued his Emancipation Proclamation. The Proclamation, a wartime expedient that Lincoln issued as Commander in Chief, declared that unless the Southern states returned to the union by January 1, 1863, all the slaves in those states “shall be then, thenceforward, and forever, free.” By issuing the Proclamation, Lincoln hoped to cripple the South, both psychologically and economically. The Proclamation was intended to break Southern morale and lead to an end to the war; it was also aimed at crippling the South’s ability to continue the war. By offering freedom to the slaves who sustained the South’s farms and factories, Lincoln was aiming at the Confederacy’s vulnerable heart. The Emancipation Proclamation also signaled a new direction in the war and a final effort to win the battle for the hearts and minds of the European powers. It was also meant to bolster his political support among Republicans, especially abolitionists. Expanding the original war aim, restoration of the Union, to also include a war for human freedom helped nullify Lincoln’s political opposition in the North. The Union armies were now armies of liberation.

Lincoln’s proclamation: The fine print

Lincoln’s noble words in 1862 were just that — words. A careful look at the document reveals some interesting legalistic language carefully crafted for political purposes. Let’s take a look at the main points:

The Proclamation made no mention of slaves held in neutral states or those loyal to the Union. Even after January 1, 1863, the people held in bondage in these states were still slaves. This exclusion helped ensure that these slave states would not join the Confederacy.

Slave owners in states not in rebellion could be financially compensated for their slave property. Lincoln also proposed resettling people of African descent (presumably outside of the country).

Slaves in territory under Union control, as of the proclamation date, were still in bondage.

Lincoln declared freedom for slaves in an area where the Federal government no longer had any power. Thus, for the Proclamation to have any effect, the Confederacy would have to be occupied by Union troops.

Southern reaction

Southern reaction to the Proclamation varied from outright hysteria over fears that the Union was trying to foment a slave rebellion to a cocky response that said in effect: “Come and get us!” But thoughtful Southerners understood the power of Lincoln’s words. Already, the French and British were growing cool to the idea of Southern independence. The Union had gained the moral high ground in world opinion, or at least the part that counted. Also, the slaves themselves could not help but be aware of the promise offered to them. There was no way for slave owners to control their thoughts or emotions, or ensure their loyalty. The Proclamation would also change the course of the war. The Union would no longer be fighting for limited objectives. Southerners understood that the nature of the war had changed. The stakes were now raised to a war for human freedom. Any compromise on the issue of slavery was now out of the question. With this new Union war aim came the unstated understanding that the South would have to surrender unconditionally. Unconditional surrender meant only one thing — the South’s absolute destruction. It was a fearsome prospect that no one had contemplated in the heady days of 1860 and 1861.

Heroes and Goats

This campaign produced more goats than heroes. It is interesting to observe how such little things can turn out to be so important.

Heroes

Heroes come in all forms. Sometimes even a lowly private can turn the tide of battle. Check out the following:

Robert E. Lee: His bold plan to invade the North and threaten Pennsylvania and beyond just might have worked. Caught off guard, Lee improvised and fought a battle for the survival of his cause, never once doubting the capabilities of his soldiers or his able commanders to win a victory. But the cost was high — Antietam claimed too many of the best men he ever had.

Stonewall Jackson: His brilliant victory at Harpers Ferry was soured by events at Antietam. Still, Jackson arrived on the field in time to fight valiantly, even desperately, on Lee’s left flank against the better part of three Union corps. His cool leadership during the battle was worth a thousand men. Loved by his soldiers, feared by his enemies, Jackson’s value to Lee continued to grow.

A. P. Hill: He provided as close to a storybook ending as you will find in the history of warfare: Hill, wearing a bright red shirt, rode at the head of his hard-marching division from Harpers Ferry to smash into Burnside’s attack that, at the last minute, threatened to cut the Confederates off from the Potomac. He saved the day and became one of the most famous Generals in Lee’s army. He was clearly destined for bigger things.

Corporal Barton W. Mitchell, 27th Indiana: He was the soldier who discovered Lee’s Special Order Number 191 near Frederick and had the brains and initiative to pass this goldmine of information up the chain of command to General McClellan.

Abraham Lincoln: He was still far from the status of faultless icon that we know today, but he was on his way. The Emancipation Proclamation, although in many ways an exercise in political double-talk, ennobled both the cause and its author, over time. He became the Great Emancipator of legend and myth.

Goats

Goats, like heroes, can stand out or remain anonymous. McClellan is an example of amazing opportunities lost. The other goat is an example of why paying attention to little things in war is important. The goats are as follows:

George B. McClellan: He claimed, for the second time, to have saved the nation from outright destruction. (The first time was at the conclusion of the Peninsula Campaign.) Everyone was frustrated with his timidity and aversion to bloodshed. Given a chance of a lifetime, he gave Lee every possible chance to survive, and then, when all the cards are in his favor, he was overcome by fears of massed rebels that existed only in his imagination. Time was running out for the Young Napoleon.

Whoever Lost Special Order 191: For some strange reason, this careless Confederate officer, forever anonymous, decided that a commanding General’s critical movement orders for the entire army should be carried about, wrapped around three cigars. What was he thinking? On such errors, history is made (or unmade).