Chapter 15

In This Chapter

Invading the North a second time

Struggling to find the enemy

Creating a new government in Kentucky

Stumbling into battle

C onfederate General Braxton Bragg’s advance into Kentucky was well conceived and strategically sound. His execution was flawless. As long as he had no significant enemy to face, Bragg, as a General, was one of the best. Unfortunately for Bragg, the enemy plays a role in any campaign plan. To be successful, the commander must know where the enemy’s forces are. The commander also must have a feel for what the enemy will possibly do to thwart his plans, so that he will not be taken by surprise. Bragg’s actions leading up to the Battle of Perryville reinforce these basic lessons of generalship.

Confederate Cavalry Dominates Tennessee

Prior to his departure to Washington, D.C., General Halleck divided the massive army that he had assembled during his snail-like capture of Corinth. Most of the troops took on occupational and railroad repair duties. Tied to the railroads as their primary lines of supply and communication and deep within enemy territory, the Union forces were constantly harassed by Confederate cavalry. Generals Nathan Bedford Forrest and John Hunt Morgan were superb raiders. Attacking isolated outposts and destroying or seizing supplies, they wrecked bridges, tunnels, and rail lines with impunity. The Confederate cavalry was such a problem that tens of thousands of troops from Grant’s 65,000-man army were dispersed to guard their supply lines. Union General Don Carlos Buell’s 40,000-man Army of the Ohio was ordered east to capture the main rail center at Chattanooga. Even though he relied on the rail line from Corinth to Chattanooga, he averaged about 4 miles a day. Nearly every day, Buell (see Figure 15-1) had to deal with Confederate raiders who tore up tracks ahead and behind the army. Buell was forced to move only as fast as his repair crews could work.

” Medford Historical Society Collection/ CORBIS

Bragg Takes Command

At the end of May 1862, President Davis appointed General Braxton Bragg (see Figure 15-2) as the commander of Confederate Army of Mississippi, replacing General Beauregard. As a young officer in the Mexican War, Bragg had won a reputation as a fighter, and he was a close associate of President Jefferson Davis. But Bragg was a difficult man to deal with. He was a no-nonsense type who could get things done, but he was quarrelsome and stubborn. He also had a very high opinion of his own abilities. These traits would do little to further the Southern cause in the Western Theater.

” Bettmann/CORBIS

With no enemy pressure against his forces, Bragg used the time to drill and discipline the army of nearly 70,000 men into an effective fighting force. With Buell moving his Union army to Chattanooga, Bragg took advantage of his interior lines and used rail and water movement to move about half of his army from northern Mississippi to Chattanooga ahead of Buell. At this point in the war, the Confederates had no fear of Union cavalry replicating Forrest and Morgan’s cavalry attacks on the Yankees. Confederate forces could move rapidly by rail through the interior of the South, which gave Bragg an enormous advantage in maneuver (this is what interior lines accomplish for a commander). Bragg left the other half of his army in northern Mississippi to protect Vicksburg and keep an eye on Grant.

Bragg’s invasion plan

By August, Bragg was ready to take the initiative. General Kirby Smith, in Knoxville with 20,000 Confederate troops, was not under Bragg’s command, but they had made an agreement to cooperate. Smith drove north into Kentucky, smashing a patchwork of largely untrained defenders at Richmond, Kentucky in early August, just about the same time Lee had beaten Pope at Manassas. Smith then moved to the capital of Kentucky, Frankfort. Bragg planned to support Smith’s advance by driving his army north toward Kentucky, while threatening Nashville as well. This would draw Buell northward to protect Nashville with its newly installed pro-Union Governor Andrew Johnson. If Grant moved to assist Buell in the east, Bragg’s forces in northern Mississippi could strike and move into western Tennessee, or even into Kentucky, wiping out all the Union gains in the spring of 1862. Bragg’s plan was sound and his strategy impeccable, but could he pull it off?

Bragg in Kentucky

Once his army arrived in Kentucky, Bragg’s forces captured a Union garrison and blocked Buell’s easiest line of advance northward. Buell appeared to wait patiently for Bragg to do something. But Bragg seemed to lose his focus. Although he had not fought a battle yet, he wasn’t sure what to do next — link up with Smith and invade Ohio? Capture Louisville and move into Indiana? Fight a climactic battle in Kentucky? Smith, for all intents and purposes, was an independent commander, although pledging cooperation with Bragg, Smith could do as he pleased. The two armies were separated, with Smith near Lexington and Bragg near Bardstown, more than 60 miles away. This disjointed command structure (the brainchild of President Davis) frustrated Bragg. In addition, he was greatly disappointed at the response of the people of Kentucky, so he busied himself with politics, installing the new pro-Southern governor, Richard Hawes, in Frankfort, Kentucky. While the governor was giving his address, his words were cut short by the sound of artillery outside of town. The ceremony ended quickly. Buell’s army had made it to Kentucky. See Figure 15-3.

While Bragg wasted valuable time playing politician, Buell accomplished little, as well. Prodded into action by Halleck, Lincoln, and an aggravated Northern press, Buell gained reinforcements and made a slow and deliberate McClellan-like movement toward Louisville, arriving there on September 26.

Lincoln loses patience

Lincoln had actually decided to remove Buell and replace him with George H. Thomas. Thomas declined the command, arguing that the army was ready to move and that it would be improper to change commanders at such a critical time. Buell also had very powerful allies in Congress who made their displeasure known to the president. Lincoln backtracked, putting Thomas as second in command. Buell now began to feel the heat and put together a sound battle plan. With 60,000 men (most of them raw recruits), Buell sent a division to Frankfort to fool the Confederates into thinking that this was his main attack. It was this division that spoiled the inauguration. At the same time, Buell also launched an uncharacteristically aggressive three-pronged attack against the divided forces of Smith and Bragg.

Starting the Fight: The Battle of Perryville

Bragg took the bait; believing Buell’s main attack was headed for Frankfort, he shifted forces north in support of Smith. But Bragg never really knew where the enemy was, because Bragg’s orders to his subordinate commanders were confusing and had no connection to the actual situation. Bragg was planning to concentrate his army with Smith’s at a point 30 miles northeast of where Buell was actually concentrating his army — Perryville. Buell’s estimations of the enemy’s movements were not much better — he had no idea where Bragg’s main body of troops was located.A northward moving portion of Bragg’s army, 15,000 men under Bishop Polk, ran into a part of Buell’s army at Perryville. Polk took up a strong defensive position near the town and waited most of the day for an attack that never came. Buell had planned to attack in the morning, but his subordinates were slow in bringing up their troops. Bragg arrived in the afternoon, finally realizing that the enemy was not where he had originally thought. The Confederates launched an attack against the Union left flank, catching the Yankees off guard, as a division moved forward to look for water in a nearby creek bed. The Union forces were driven back nearly a mile after prolonged and very bitter fighting. Most of the new units composed of recruits broke and ran, but some units stood and fought stubbornly. (Some said the toughest close-in fighting of the war occurred at Perryville.) In the center, an aggressive Union division commander named Philip Sheridan advanced against the enemy, driving the Confederates into the town (see Figure 15-4). His success, however, was never followed up because of the Confederate pressure on the collapsing Union flank.

Amazingly, Buell did not know his forces were in a major battle until late in the afternoon. The temperature or the wind that day had created an effect called an acoustic shadow, in which sound travels upward, rather than along the ground where it can be heard. Just a few miles away from the fighting, Buell heard nothing. Likewise, Bragg was not aware that Polk had been engaged until he arrived on the scene. It was not until nightfall that both commanders finally had a clear idea of their respective situations. Buell ordered an, all-out attack against the vastly outnumbered Confederate defenders; Bragg, facing the entire Union army, ordered a retreat that night. The battle of Perryville was over.

The Aftermath of Battle: Results and Recriminations

Bragg later succeeded in combining his army with Smith’s army — about a week too late. Bragg had no interest in another battle. Apparently, Buell did not want another fight either, even though he outnumbered the Confederates. Bragg finally began a long retreat to Knoxville, leaving Kentucky and the prospect for a decisive turnaround in the Western Theater. He had accomplished one of his objectives: The army he brought back to Tennessee was vastly better clothed, shod, and equipped than the one that had left, and in possession of vast quantities of supplies, particularly the superb horses of Kentucky. Buell also let an opportunity for decisive action slip away. He followed Bragg too cautiously, to the point of abandoning the pursuit altogether; to make matters worse, he balked at the president’s directive to move into east Tennessee, arguing that Nashville should be protected. Lincoln lost all patience and sacked him, putting General William S. Rosecrans in charge of the army.

On the Confederate side, the finger pointing began in earnest as soon as the army was safely in Tennessee. The Southern press was furious and demanded an explanation from the President. What had gone wrong? Bragg traveled to Richmond to meet with President Davis personally and explain what happened. Bragg was quick to assess blame — it was all Polk’s fault. Davis then summoned Polk to Richmond. Polk said it was all Bragg’s fault. Davis made an executive decision. He promoted Polk to Lieutenant General and placed General Joseph E. Johnston in overall charge of a department that included Kirby Smith (now assigned to the Trans-Mississippi Theater), Bragg, and General John C. Pemberton in Mississippi. Like all executive decisions, this pleased no one. Bragg and Davis were friends, as were Davis and Polk; Davis could not bring himself to believe that Bragg was incapable of effective battlefield command. This reluctance would ultimately doom the Confederate defense of the Western Theater.

Significance of the Battle

Perryville, compared to other important Civil War battles, was rather small. But for the forces actually engaged, the casualties were very high — 4,200 Union and 3,400 Confederate. The number of casualties alone illustrates the intensity of the fighting. But for both sides, the battle decided little. However, it prevent the Confederate army from convincing Kentucky, or France and Great Britain for that matter, that the Southerners could sustain an offensive outside of their own territory. Kentucky had been up for grabs; a pro-Confederate legislature and governor were in place in Frankfort. Bragg and his army (along with the freelancing Kirby Smith) had the opportunity to change the balance of the war in the Western Theater. But Bragg seemed to lose track of his objective, and he lost track of Buell’s army. Buell, although only a bit more competent than Bragg in this campaign, was able to take advantage of Bragg’s listlessness. The result was an accidental battle that lost Kentucky for the Confederacy and returned the strategic initiative back to the Union, although it seemed that Buell was just as befuddled in victory as Bragg was in defeat.

Heroes and Goats

Heroes in this campaign are hard to find. A hero would have taken advantage of the numerous golden opportunities offered him by his enemy and brought about a decisive result. As it was, no true hero emerged at the army level.

Heroes

Some heroes stand out because of their individual acts. Some heroes stand out because of their collective acts. Here are two examples:

The Union and Confederate soldiers: The Battle of Perryville proved, beyond a doubt, that American volunteer soldiers possessed impressive fighting qualities. Marching for days without water, often poorly led, and even more poorly supplied, these men persevered. They displayed enormous courage and spirit in a battle fought not by Generals, but by Colonels, Majors, and Captains.

Philip Sheridan: Feisty, bold, and unafraid, Sheridan made his mark at Perryville. He and his men were always in the thick of the fight. Sheridan saw things his superiors on the battlefield did not. He was quick to take advantage wherever he could. He showed that he would be a great asset to the army.

Goats

Without a doubt, this is one of the sorriest examples of generalship in the American Civil War — a comedy (tragedy?) of errors, compounded by ignorance that is hard to believe at times. As always, the soldiers in the ranks pay the terrible costs of Generals’ blunders. A great deal was riding on the skills of these two Generals during this campaign. Neither displayed any skill. In fact, it is hard to say who performed worse

Don Carlos Buell: Buell’s caution and inaction drove Lincoln to distraction. Lincoln, perhaps realizing how close Buell came to losing Kentucky, wisely began to move him out of command after the battle.

Braxton Bragg: Bragg’s inability to get along with his officers led to the collapse of a well-conceived campaign plan. Davis, blind to Bragg’s costly mistakes, kept him in command.