Chapter 18

In This Chapter

Seizing the last chance for victory: Lee’s bold decision

Making history: Grant and Lee

Failing at Gettysburg: Lee’s greatest loss

I n the summer of 1863, the Union and the Confederacy stood at a crossroads. For each side, victory would hinge on how well the two premier commanders, Ulysses S. Grant and Robert E. Lee, performed. If Grant could capture the Confederate fortress of Vicksburg, the Confederacy would lose control of the Mississippi River and be cut in half — a crippling strategic blow to the Confederacy and its hopes for independence. If Lee could win a decisive victory against the Army of the Potomac on Northern soil, Union morale might collapse and open the way for European recognition of an independent Confederate States of America. Whichever commander gained his objective would determine how the war would proceed to its conclusion.

The Gettysburg Campaign

The victory at Chancellorsville opened a strategic opportunity for the South. Lee proposed a bold offensive to invade the North and defeat the Union Army on its own ground aimed at altering the strategic balance once and for all. Such a plan was risky, to be sure, but it had a strategic defensive purpose. A battlefield victory at this point could end the war, and if anyone could pull such a risky maneuver, it was Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia.

The Confederate leadership faced a dilemma in the early summer of 1863. Lee in the Eastern Theater had held the invading Union Army of the Potomac at bay. In the Western Theater, Union forces had moved against the strategic strongpoint of Vicksburg. Could Lee’s army give support to Vicksburg’s defenders? Lee was cool to such an idea: He had a proposition of his own. In May, Lee met with President Jefferson Davis and his cabinet to propose a bold thrust. Two driving considerations led the leadership to buy Lee’s plan:

First, Lee argued that moving the army north would allow Virginia farmers to harvest badly needed food crops without the perils of armies maneuvering around them.

Second, invading the North might pull troops away from the Western Theater, or from the threatened coastline of the Confederacy.

Another possibility, of which all were aware, was that another victory, this time in Northern territory, might tip the scales for Great Britain or France to intervene on the side of the Confederacy. Besides, the fact that the Confederacy was running short on everything was no secret. The South would have trouble supplying an army sitting in a defensive position all summer. A move North would allow the army to live off of the bounty of the rich fields of northern Maryland and Pennsylvania, so far untouched by war. Confederate forces moving in the vicinity of Washington would throw Lincoln’s government into a panic, leading to all types of opportunities, just as had happened before in 1862 when Stonewall Jackson’s small force led Lincoln to pull combat forces from McClellan to protect the capital. But Stonewall was no longer with the army. The measure of Jackson’s abilities is seen in Lee’s decision to take Jackson’s corps and divide it in half, giving one new corps to A.P. Hill, and the other half to Richard Ewell (see Figure 18-1), both of whom had served under Jackson. They were good and capable leaders, but neither man on his best day was equal to the invincible Stonewall in his ability to understand Lee’s intentions and develop the pace of events on the battlefield.

Figure 18-1:Confederate General Richard Ewell.

” Medford Historical Society Collection/CORBIS

Moving the armies

Lee’s army, together with cavalry, had grown to about 79,000 men, the most he would ever command. Morale was high, everyone from the lowliest private to General Lee himself believed the army was capable of accomplishing anything. Lee began a slow sidling movement west, headed toward the Shenandoah Valley, the gateway to the North and a route that provided a mountain screen to limit enemy observation (see Figure 18-2). The vanguard of the army under Ewell swept into Winchester and cleared the last Yankee defenders away. The route for the invasion lay open.

Lee’s army took advantage of the agricultural riches of the land, accumulating food, clothing, horses, livestock, greenbacks, and forage. They paid for it in Confederate money or IOUs to be paid by the Confederate government. To procure needed supplies, the Confederate Army had spread itself in several columns, covering nearly 100 miles from Chambersburg to York and as far north as Carlisle. Meanwhile, Lee had sent Jeb Stuart (see Figure 18-3) instructions to ascertain the location of the Union Army. Stuart decided on his own that it was time for another grand ride around the Union Army as he had done in two previous campaigns. This time, he discovered that the Union Army was marching on a broad axis headed north. Stuart had to keep moving further and further away from Lee as he spent several very precious days trying to find his way back to the army. In the meantime, Lee’s troops were spread out deep in enemy territory with no information on where the enemy was or what he was doing. Without information, Lee sought to concentrate his scattered forces west of the town of Gettysburg. Here he could decide on his next move.

Figure 18-2:Map of the Gettysburg campaign.

Figure 18-3:Confederate General Jeb Stuart, cavalry.

” CORBIS

The Battle of Brandy Station, June 9, 1863

Hooker, uncertain of what Lee was doing, sent his cavalry corps along with infantry units to the town of Culpeper to attack what he thought were Confederate cavalry defending supplies. With 11,000 men, General Alfred Pleasanton crossed the Rappahannock River and arrived at Brandy Station near the suspected enemy location. Pleasanton did not know it, but he was riding into the place where the Army of Northern Virginia was concentrating in preparation for its move into Pennsylvania. Protecting this concentration (but not very well) was Jeb Stuart’s cavalry. The Union advance took Stuart by surprise, and all day the mounted forces charged back and forth, fighting at close range with sabers and pistols, each side trying to gain an advantage. It was the greatest cavalry battle in U.S. history, but largely indecisive in terms of the results. The Yankees retreated, but not before they had proven that they were a force to be reckoned with. From this point on, Union cavalry would be equal in every way to their Southern counterparts.

Hooker waits (again) and is finished

The Army of the Potomac had about 100,000 men available, but about 20 percent of this total represented new recruits, replacements for those whose enlistments had expired at the end of May. The veteran regiments in the army were superb combat units, but they were under strength and scattered throughout the army. Instead of filling old regiments with new soldiers, veteran units were left to dwindle away, while replacements were brought into the army as entirely new regiments. When he got wind of Lee’s movement, Hooker pulled the army back toward Washington and waited nearly two weeks before moving his army into Maryland to pursue Lee’s army, which was now spreading out into Pennsylvania.

Hooker again seemed to lose his nerve after a prudent initial movement to protect the capital. When Hooker began to use McClellan’s old excuse that he didn’t have enough men to fight, Lincoln had had enough. Hooker was promptly replaced with George G. Meade (see Figure 18-4), who commanded a corps in the army. When messengers from Washington roused him from his tent, Meade’s first question was: “Am I under arrest?” He quickly discovered to his surprise and dismay that he was the newest commander of the Army of the Potomac. Meade was a solid officer who had been with the army through all of its major battles. He was an apolitical soldier with a fierce temper who cared not a bit whether he was popular or not. Although he was junior in rank to other corps commanders in the army, he had their confidence in his abilities. Meade started to make things happen quickly. He ordered the army to move northward into Pennsylvania — initially toward Harrisburg, then to find suitable defensive terrain to place his army. He also sent a cavalry unit to Gettysburg, a town that on the map looked like the hub of a wheel — ten roads from every direction intersected at this little town. Military logic dictated that this key road junction had to be secured before moving the main body of troops forward and to determine if Lee’s army was there.

Figure 18-4:Union General George G. Meade.

” CORBIS

Calling out the militia

As Lee’s army advanced, panic ensued in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York. The governors of those states called out the militia. Trenches were dug to protect Harrisburg. In Pennsylvania, the militia was more of a danger to itself than to the Confederate Army. Wrightsville, a town on the Susquehanna River, was almost burned down when the militia set the bridge on fire to prevent the rebels from using it. Confederate troops arrived and put the fires out. The destruction of the bridge did, however, prevent an attack on Harrisburg that could have been devastating to the Union cause.

The Battle of Gettysburg: Day One

On June 30, a Confederate brigade in search of shoes, legend has it, moved toward Gettysburg. To the infantrymen’s surprise, there was a unit of Union cavalry in the town. The Confederates pulled back and waited for additional troops to arrive. No one believed Union infantry was anywhere near Gettysburg. The decision was made to move into Gettysburg the next day. Early the following morning, in a light mist on July 1, the advance units of Lee’s army of A.P. Hill’s Corps moved down the road toward the town, initiating what would become the greatest battle ever fought in the United States.

The Confederates soon found nearly 3,000 Union cavalrymen barring the way into the town. These soldiers were armed with breech-loading carbines and could fire much faster than the Confederate infantry with their muzzleloading rifled muskets. The volume of fire forced the infantry to deploy and take time to maneuver. The cavalry’s job was to report what they found and buy time for the Union infantry to arrive and take over the battle. In this case, the Union I Corps was fewer than 10 miles away. After word reached them that Confed-erate infantry was outside Gettysburg, General John F. Reynolds brought his 10,000 men into battle. This corps had some of the finest quality units the Union Army had. If there was to be a fight, these were the men to depend on. The unlucky XI Corps (see Chapter 17) soon reinforced the I Corps. The two corps held their own, defending the ridge northwest of the town (see Figure 18-5). By the afternoon, however, more Confederate units under command of General Ewell began to arrive on the battlefield from several unexpected directions, primarily the northwest and the northeast. This was too much for the XI Corps. Outnumbered and outflanked, many units broke and ran for the safety of the hills behind the town, followed by the I Corps, which had fought the enemy to a standstill and had lost its commander, General Reynolds, to a rifle bullet. The I Corps took nearly 60 percent casualties. It had virtually ceased to exist as a military organization. Confederate troops chased the fleeing Yankees through the streets of Gettysburg.

Gettysburg favors the defender

Despite the defeat, the terrain of the Gettysburg battlefield gave the defender (the Union) the advantage. The town was in the middle of a shallow valley made up of two roughly parallel wooded ridges stretching southwest to northeast that had potential as strong defensive positions. The ridge in front of the town was called Seminary Ridge, after the Lutheran seminary that sat on it. This was the ridge the Union cavalry and infantry defended. The other ridge behind the town curved at bit, making it look like a fishhook. This ridge was called Cemetery Ridge, because the town cemetery sat on part of it. There were also a few rocky hills at the bottom and top of the fishhook-shaped ridge that were ideal for the defensive. As the Confederate pressure grew, the Union soldiers naturally sought safety and shelter on higher ground at Cemetery Ridge. There they found General Hancock waiting for them.

Figure 18-5:Map of the Battle of Gettysburg, day one.

On the Union side, things were serious. General Reynolds, the highest-ranking Union officer on the battlefield at the time, had been killed, and General Abner Doubleday (who had ordered the first Union shot of the war at Sumter) had taken his place. General O.O. Howard, commander of the XI Corps was the senior officer on the field, but was soon himself replaced by II Corps commander General Winfield Scott Hancock, who had been sent by Meade to assess the situation. What Hancock saw was not promising, but he made the decision to defend the ground he was on at Cemetery Ridge and the big hill to the southeast, known as Culp’s Hill. He began organizing the men into units and getting them into position to defend against an attack. Meanwhile, Hancock must have been relieved to see the arrival of two additional Union Corps, giving him 20,000 troops to defend the ridge that evening.

Ewell says no

Lee had arrived in the afternoon and surveyed the scene of Union troops streaming away from the battlefield. He had not anticipated nor wanted a battle here; but Hill had brought it on, and some action had to be taken to seal the victory. Immediately he recognized the importance of the hills and the low ridge behind the town. He ordered Ewell to occupy the ridge “if pos-sible.” Ewell, seeing Union troops massing on the ridge and unable to collect his disorganized units, decided that there would be no attack.

The Battle of Gettysburg: Day Two

Throughout the night, the Confederates heard the sounds of axes and shovels, and the low, rhythmic, tread of large numbers of men on the move. July 2 would be a hard day for the Confederate infantry spread around the Union line, now squatting from Culp’s Hill, along the bulge of the fishhook at Cemetery Ridge and down the straight shank, stopping short of the two hills called the Round Tops. Meade had arrived after midnight and was satisfied with the disposition of the forces. Although four corps had arrived over night, he had only about 75 percent of his army on the field. Lee’s army, with the exception of one division (George Pickett’s) had arrived during the night. Lee knew that if the Yankees were driven off the ridge or the hills at either end of the ridge, they would have to retreat.

Early on the morning of July 2, Lee met with his corps commanders and outlined a plan. Longstreet’s corps was to attack the Union left, suspected to be near the Round Tops, while Ewell’s corps attacked Culp’s Hill. He hoped to cave in both flanks and force a retreat. But the problem was this: Lee didn’t know for sure where the enemy line ended, or what the enemy’s strength was. Without reliable information from his cavalry, such as he had at Chancellorsville, Lee had to guess. Essentially, Lee was ordering a reconnaissance with infantry to probe the enemy’s lines. By the time he had given his orders, it was already noon; it was now time for his subordinates to execute them.

Longstreet opens the battle

Longstreet was a stubborn fighter and a man of determination. Lee called him his “war horse.” But he was no Stonewall Jackson when it came to taking action and moving troops. Jackson was well known for having his men ready to move at first light and setting a killing pace to do Lee’s bidding. Longstreet did not have his troops prepared to execute Lee’s orders until he received them. Traveling over unfamiliar ground, he got turned around one or twice and had to sort out the traffic jams. When his corps reached its attack position, it took time to array the units properly. But when he did get organized, and when he was ready to attack, Longstreet’s prowess was rarely matched.

While Longstreet was on the march, the Union Army waited. Time weighs heavily on the hands of commanders sometimes, and as a result, they do dumb things. This is true of the commander of III Corps, Major General Daniel Sickles. Sickles, a former Democratic Congressman from New York, had a reputation as a hardheaded, aggressive commander. He had received a commission because he was a Democrat who supported the Republican administration’s policies. Sickles was not above taking independent action or ignoring good advice. At Chancellorsville, he had moved his corps forward out of the defensive line to investigate reports of Confederate troops moving to his front. In making this maneuver, he was out of position to assist Howard’s XI Corps when it was overrun. Now Sickles wanted to do the same thing. He thought the ground in front of him was better than the low ground his corps occupied. Without orders and with colors flying and bands playing, he moved his 11,000 men forward to a rise that had a peach orchard on it. Sickles now had an entire corps sticking out from the Union line like the proverbial sore thumb, with no support, and his units facing in opposite directions. There was no other Union unit of any size past his corps — the Union flank was open and exposed. He had just given Longstreet a golden opportunity to do just what Lee had ordered. On top of that, Sickles had just finished making his move by 4 p.m., the time Longstreet launched his attack. See Figure 18-6.

Longstreet attacks

It was not until 4 p.m. or so before Longstreet launched his attack, and a part of Longstreet’s attack fell upon the III Corps flank. In a short time, artillery and massed rifle fire had demolished Sickles’s corps. The remainder of Longstreet’s corps headed for the Round Tops. Taking the smaller of the two hills, Little Round Top, would give the Confederates a decisive advantage. From this hill, the entire Union line was open and exposed. Whoever controlled Little Round Top controlled the battlefield. Amazingly enough, Little Round Top was unoccupied except for a signaling station. Both sides seemed to recognize this fact at the same time; getting to Little Round Top now became a race.

Figure 18-6:Map of the Battle of Gettysburg, day two.

Meade’s Chief Engineer, Governor K. Warren, arrived on Little Round Top and discovered two things: the Confederate Army was headed his way, and somebody better defend this hill. Fortunately, two additional Union corps had come up in the morning. Warren diverted units from one of these corps headed to support Sickles to Little Round Top. They arrived just in time to stop the Confederate assault in a very bitter fight that lasted most of the afternoon. But they held on and saved the Union Army from defeat. The additional manpower from the two corps was just enough to hold the Confederates and limit their advance. Meanwhile, Ewell began his attack at Culp’s Hill at 6 p.m., but Union troops behind prepared positions of logs and rock held firm. At the end of the day, the Union position was as strong as ever.

Dan Sickles’s leg

When his corps was attacked in the Peach Orchard, Sickles took command at the center of the fight. His exposed position was an artilleryman’s dream: With the troops packed together as they were, crossfire would inflict maximum casualties. The Confederate gunners did this quite effectively. In the cannonade, an artillery shell smashed Sickles’s leg. He was carried from the battlefield on a stretcher, a cigar clamped between his teeth, giving encouragement to his men. His leg was amputated, and he kept it, eventually donating the bones to the Army Medical Museum. After the war, it was put on display, and Sickles would come by to visit his leg. Dan Sickles’s leg is still on display today, at the U.S. Army Medical Museum in Washington, D.C.

The Battle of Gettysburg: Day Three

The results of the second day did not faze Lee. Although Longstreet’s and Ewell’s divisions had been fought to a standstill, Lee believed he had struck a severe blow to the Union Army and that one more attack would finally push them off Cemetery Ridge. He made preparations for a final assault, using Ewell and Hill’s men plus the recently arrived division of General Pickett from Longstreet’s Corps.

Lee still didn’t know how strong his enemy was. Stuart and his cavalry had arrived that day, having been found in Carlisle by couriers that Lee had sent out to find Stuart. When Stuart arrived, Lee’s only comment was, “Well, General Stuart, you are here at last.” Lee and Stuart had known each other since Stuart was a cadet at West Point and Lee was the academy’s superintendent. But Lee’s comment, though gentlemanly and understated, clearly indicated his disappointment. Lee now ordered the chastened General to prepare to attack the Union rear in support of the next day’s attacks.

Meade calls a meeting

In the gloomy darkness of a room in a shabby farmhouse on the battlefield, George Meade met with his commanders to decide what to do next. The consensus was to stay and fight, but remain on the defensive to see what Lee would do. Included in the group was General Sedgwick, who had just arrived that evening with his VI Corps. The Army of the Potomac was all together. Meade told his commanders what to expect the next day — Lee had tried the flanks; tomorrow he would try the center.

Initially, Lee desired a full-scale attack all along the Union line, but he gave up on that plan when he found out that Longstreet had not made preparations for an attack. He spent the morning changing his scheme of attack, deciding upon a massive assault aimed at a small copse of trees that marked the middle of the Union line on Cemetery Ridge. Pickett’s division, with support from A.P. Hill’s corps, would attack across the open area stretching nearly a mile to the enemy position. Simultaneously, Ewell would launch an attack on Culp’s Hill. Stuart’s cavalry would threaten the Union rear, and attack the Yankees when their lines finally broke. The main attack would be preceded by a massive artillery bombardment that would disrupt the defenders and their artillery while blasting a hole in the line for the attackers to move through. Longstreet opposed Lee’s plan, saying that such an attack could not possibly succeed. But Lee believed his men capable of anything. Most of all, however, he believed that victory was in his grasp.

The Confederate attacks

The battle at Culp’s Hill began, ironically, with a Union attack that was launched just as Ewell’s men were beginning their own attack at 4:30 a.m. Intense fighting swirled around the hill — attack was followed by counterattack, which was followed by yet another attack. The fighting stopped just after noon, both sides with heavy casualties and very little to show for it. There was a lull on the field.

Longstreet assembled about 160 cannons, all pointed at the Union line on Cemetery Ridge (see Figure 18-7). During the morning, a collection of different brigades from Hill and Longstreet, all total about 15,000 men assembled in the woods behind the cannons. The artillery barrage began shortly after 1 p.m. and went on for two solid hours. No one in the United States up to that time had ever witnessed such a display of firepower. For all its ferocity, noise, and smoke, however, it accomplished very little. The gunners shot high, and most of their shells rained down on empty ground. The Union artillery was untouched, and the troops lying behind a low stone wall on the ridge near the copse of trees were unharmed. Some Union soldiers even reported falling asleep during the bombardment, after they realized that they were not in danger. It was the greatest artillery bombardment ever conducted on the North American continent, and the loudest noise ever heard up to that time.

As the intensity of the bombardment trailed off, Longstreet reluctantly gave the order to advance. The units, composed of men from Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee; from Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia, stepped out from the trees, aligned themselves as if on parade on a mile long front and began their march toward the Union line. Waiting for them were veteran infantry of the II Corps and the remainder of the battered I Corps, somehow sent to this part of the line because it was quiet. Union artillery began to engage the Confederates, not only from the wall and Cemetery Ridge, but from Little Round Top as well. The cannon fire was effective, forcing the attackers to halt and realign their ranks again before advancing at a run, flags flying, screaming the Rebel Yell. Gaining the wall, the attackers seemed to have won — but only for a moment. The Union defenders were far too numerous and far too determined to give up. Reinforcements were already moving forward, piling into the thinned Confederate ranks. Many were taken prisoner; those who could, fell back. Lee met the survivors as they returned, trying to rally them. “All this has been my fault,” he repeated over and over. The magnitude of the failed attack became apparent quickly — nearly half of those who crossed the open field did not make it back.

Figure 18-7:Map of the Battle of Gettysburg, day three.

Pickett’s Charge

George Pickett, up to this point, had never commanded troops in battle. He was something of a dandy, and known for his good humor and engaging personality. Because his division was the only unit that had not been assembled ad hoc for the attack, he was given command of the advance. But Pickett did not lead the charge, nor was he seen during the fighting. One of the greatest charges in all military history has Pickett’s name attached to it, mostly because he had arrived on the battlefield too late to do anything else. Pickett’s Charge is often described as an attack only by Virginians. While it is true that Pickett’s division was composed of all Virginia units, many other Southern units, a large number from North Carolina, participated and performed as formidably as the Virginians. Pickett himself never forgave Lee for his decision on the third day at Gettysburg.

Battle Captain’s Report: The Battle of Gettysburg, July 1–3, 1863 Union Victory

Commanders: Union: Major General George G. Meade, Army of the Potomac, 90,000 men. Confederate: General Robert E. Lee, 75,000 men.

Phase I: Lee’s army is spread in an arc from Carlisle to Harrisburg to York, gathering supplies. Lee, without Stuart’s cavalry to tell him where the enemy is, decides to concentrate his forces to the east of Gettysburg and plan his next move. The Union Army, under a new commander, moves northward from Maryland to the Pennsylvania border, looking for a good defensive position to protect Washington. Meade sends his cavalry out to the crossroads town of Gettysburg to collect information about the enemy. Meanwhile, Confederate troops arrive in Gettysburg looking for shoes and run into the cavalry. A sharp fight ensues, attracting other units to the town.

Phase II: By early afternoon of July 1, two Union Corps have arrived on the field with more units coming. Confederate forces arrive from the north and east, outflanking the defenders and driving them off Seminary Ridge and out of the town of Gettysburg. Union forces under Winfield Scott Hancock organize a defense on Cemetery Ridge and Culp’s Hill. As darkness arrives, Lee orders Ewell to take the critical terrain, if possible. Ewell his regiments scattered after chasing the 11th Corps through town decides not to, giving the beaten Union Army a breather. Lee collects his forces and plans for the next day.

Phase III: On July 2, Lee makes a decision to attack the flanks of the Union Army. Ewell’s Corps is to seize Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Ridge, while Longstreet’s Corps attacks the Union left near the Round Tops. Longstreet takes most of the day to get his men into place — he is not exactly sure where the Union flank is. Meanwhile, Union General Dan Sickles decides to move his corps out to a better defensible spot nearly half a mile out of place, just as Longstreet begins his attack. Sickles’s corps is mangled, and the Union left is in danger. The previously undefended Little Round Top is occupied just prior to the arrival of Confederate forces. The Union left and right are both under heavy attack, but terrain favors the defending Union Army, which also has the advantage of interior lines, quickly shifting forces to match the Confederate thrusts. The day ends with no advantage to the Confederates. Stuart arrives that evening, contributing nothing more to the campaign for General Lee than some captured wagons and stale information. George Pickett’s Division of Longstreet’s Corps arrives.

Phase IV: Lee decides to attack the center, which he believes has been weakened to supply troops to the threatened flanks. Lee decides to use Pickett’s Division as the core unit for a nearly 15,000-man assault on the Union center. Most of the additional troops would come from A.P. Hill’s Corps, which had not seen action since the first day. Ewell would again attempt to take Culp’s Hill. The attack would be preceded with a heavy artillery bombardment of the Union line. Longstreet disagrees with the plan, seeing no utility in it, but Lee is determined to win on this field. The greatest artillery attack in North America begins; almost every shot fired for the next two hours misses its intended mark — the Union defensive lines are undamaged. With Confederate guns running out of ammunition, Longstreet silently motions Pickett forward. Pickett’s Charge, one of the most famous events in military history, is as magnificent as it is hopeless. After small initial gains, Union reinforcements drive off the survivors. Ewell’s attack, begun early in the morning, is hard fought, but futile. Lee waits a day before retreating and crosses the Potomac on July 13, cautiously followed by Meade, who is glad to see the enemy go.

Casualties: Union 23,000, Confederate 28,000.

The Final Moves

The following day, as he had done at Antietam, Lee remained on the battlefield with his bloodied army. Meade did nothing that day, preferring to rest and re-equip his army; he certainly felt that a victory in the hand was far better than taking a risk at losing it. Lee knew what he had to do — he gathered up his wounded (those he could get to — he was forced to leave over 6,000 wounded), assembling a wagon train 17 miles long to take them on the long, hard road back to Virginia. A heavy rain accompanied the army, and Lee was halted at the flooded Potomac for several days, exposed to the threat of an attack from Meade’s army. Meade finally did pursue, but slowly and cautiously, despite President Lincoln’s entreaties to go after Lee and finish him off. When he found Lee’s men protecting their Potomac escape route with heavy entrenchments, Meade waited. While he waited, Lee crossed over the river to safety during the night.

The Battle’s Significance

Gettysburg was the largest battle fought on the North American continent. Nearly 160,000 men fought on the field, and 51,000 were killed or wounded. Meade had handled the army well, and his troops had fought with courage and determination on their home territory. Lee had not fought well. Gettysburg was his greatest failure. He made bad decisions, crippled by a lack of information. In the end, he asked too much from the men he commanded. His men responded the best they could, and came so close several times to clinching the victory, but even they had limits. Cemetery Ridge became known as “the high water mark of the Confederacy.” Perhaps the event that had the greatest significance at Gettysburg didn’t happen during the battle; instead, it occurred in November when Abraham Lincoln came to speak at the dedication of the Union soldier’s cemetery on the battlefield. His short speech, known as the “Gettysburg Address,” is one of the masterpieces of the English language. In it, he captured the essence of the cause the men had died for, laying the foundation for a new nation in the process.

Heroes and Goats

Gettysburg has entered into American myth — it has come to symbolize the Civil War and it is the representative battle that everyone knows something about. There are so many elements of heroism here that they must be selected carefully.

Heroes

Meade and Warren are at the right time and the right place making critical decisions that save the battle or the Union. But in the end, this battle gives us the best sense of the heroic quality of the American soldier that transcends time. Valor and sacrifice are the watchwords here.

The Army of the Potomac: Finally, after years of disappointment, dismal performances, and poor leadership in combat, the army gains a tremendously important victory when it counted the most. With a core of tough, battle-tested veterans, the army is equal to Lee’s best. After this battle the Army of the Potomac becomes a dangerous foe.

The 20th Maine and the 1st Minnesota: On the second day at Gettysburg, these two units played a decisive role in the battle’s outcome. The 20th Maine, with about 300 men, was the last Union unit on the far left of the Union line at Little Round Top. If the attacking Confederate troops got through them, the battle was lost or at least in great danger of being so. The 20th Maine not only held for over two hours (taking over 100 casualties), but it made a bayonet charge after running out of ammunition to stabilize the line and save the Union Army. Likewise, the 1st Minnesota was sent in to stop a Confederate breakthrough. If the Minnesotans couldn’t stop them, the Union line would be shattered. Of the 262 men who made the charge against the enemy, only 38 survived. But the Confederate assault was halted and the Union line held.

George G. Meade: Dragged out of his bed and made commander of the army just days before the most critical battle in U.S. history, George Meade came through. He led by consensus, meeting with his corps commanders to gain their approval, but he made all the right decisions and gave the Union the victory that would decide the war in the Eastern Theater.

Governor K. Warren: Meade’s chief engineer, Warren just happens to be standing at the right place at the right time and makes the decision that saves the battle of Gettysburg. Observing the opening Confederate assault on the Union left from Little Round Top, Warren immediately orders reserves and artillery to defend the critical terrain. They arrive just in time to hold off the attack. Without Warren’s quick thinking, Longstreet would have rolled up the Union flank as effectively as Jackson had done at Chancellorsville.

The Army of Northern Virginia: The Virginians of Pickett’s Division, the North Carolinians of Pettigrew’s Division, the Mississippians of Barksdale’s Brigade, the Alabamians of Wilcox’s Brigade, the Texans of Law’s Brigade, and the Stonewall Brigade all won immortality, even if the battle was lost.

Goats

Here the Confederates join the ranks of the goats — an unaccustomed situation for the leaders of the Army of Northern Virginia. Debating who was the real goat of Gettysburg has been going on since the battle ended. It still goes on. Saying that one or all of the following are to be blamed as the one who lost this battle for the South will certainly land you in a fight, verbal or otherwise.

Jeb Stuart; James Longstreet; Richard Ewell: Pick one, a combination of two, or all three. For years the South sought a scapegoat for the loss of Gettysburg. Lee was held blameless, despite his poor decisions. Stuart was blamed, perhaps with more justification than others, for leaving the army in the lurch when his troops were most needed to collect information about the enemy. Longstreet was blamed because he disagreed with Lee’s plan of attack on days two and three, and was accused of being slow and sullen in carrying out his orders. “If only Longstreet had been faster . . .” goes the criticism, Lee would have won the battle. Ewell’s decision not to take Culp’s Hill and Cemetery Hill on the first day appeared to be a fatal blunder. Because Ewell didn’t take them when it was relatively easy, he was unable to take them when the Yankees made it tougher.

Robert E. Lee: Upon hearing that Hooker had been replaced with General Meade as commander of the Army of the Potomac, Lee said, “General Meade will commit no blunder in my front, and if I make one he will make haste to take advantage of it.” Lee’s blunders cost him his army in a place deep in enemy territory, on a field not of his choosing, under circumstances unfavorable to him. Lee wrote Confederate President Jefferson Davis and offered his resignation, holding his subordinates completely blameless. In his account of the battle, he told Davis he never doubted that he could win a victory; otherwise he would not have given the orders he did. Davis took no action on Lee’s resignation, leaving Lee as the commander of the army.

The Vicksburg Campaign

In 1863, Vicksburg, a town sitting on a bluff overlooking the Mississippi River, was the key to victory in the Western Theater (see Figure 18-8). It was the last outpost preventing Union control of the River; without Vicksburg, the Confed-eracy was cut in half, isolating Texas, Arkansas, and Missouri, and preventing them from providing any support to Richmond. Vicksburg, however, was easier taken in strategy meetings than in actuality. Grant had tried once before (between November and December 1862) and had failed to take the city, suffering heavy casualties. In 1863, he was determined to capture this strategic city.

Figure 18-8:Map of the Vicksburg Campaign.

The advantages of geography

Anyone who has read Mark Twain knows that the Mississippi River was a treacherous and powerful foe, swallowing up the pilot who paid no heed to her peculiarities. The river was swift and deep in some places, shallow and sluggish in others. The water washed huge trees and other debris into the river, creating underwater barriers and obstacles. The river twisted and turned in hairpin curves. One such hairpin curve whipped right underneath the bluff where Vicksburg stood. On the bluff were powerful cannons that would splinter any navy ship coming into range. Also flowing into the Mississippi north of Vicksburg was the Yazoo River, which formed a large swampy delta that would impede any advance from the north. The only way to get at the city of Vicksburg was to attack from the south or go around the Yazoo to the east and come around the city from behind. To get south, of course, troops in ships would have to pass Vicksburg. To cross the Yazoo, troops would have to move eastward for a significant distance, and then cut back through enemy held territory with a long and vulnerable supply line to protect. Confederate commander John C. Pemberton had about 20,000 men who had to do nothing except occupy the city. The navy, which up to this point had been General Grant’s ace in the hole, would be less helpful as the army made its approach to Vicksburg. Whatever way Grant tried would be very difficult and time-consuming. This was not good because political pressure was mounting to do something quick.

Grant’s troops would be supplied by ship from the river; his staging area for the attack on Vicksburg was only 20 miles from the city, but he couldn’t get there from here. The swamps, bayous, and water made the task of moving his army impossible. Grant looked at the map and reasoned that he could get south of Vicksburg if the base of the hairpin curve in front of the city was cut by a canal. That way, the Union ships and troops could sail past the city at their leisure. So a canal was dug (by hand — lucky soldiers working in muck up to their waists) for two months before the whole project collapsed, literally and figuratively, when the levee fell in, flooding the entire neck of land. The next project planned was a 200-mile canal to bypass Vicksburg completely and join at the Red River, which would allow Grant’s men to attack from the south. The project, however, was far too ambitious and time- consuming to be practical. A river advance down Yazoo Pass in an attempt to reach dry land failed at Greenwood, Mississippi, where the Confederates built a fort of cotton bales and drove the gunboats off. A similar attempt at Steele’s Bayou, a more direct approach to Vicksburg via the Yazoo, met with failure as the flotilla was caught by Confederate troops who felled trees in front and behind the ships, then began to shoot anyone who exposed himself on deck. Sherman’s troops were dispatched to provide protection for the navy and get them out of the tangled mess they were in. The troops actually saved the fleet from direct capture.

Grant’s gamble

Grant had tried to take the engineer’s path to victory and had failed; he was now ready to take a chance that would either make him a hero or get him relieved from command. Grant proposed to move the army south on the left bank of the Mississippi River below Vicksburg. Meanwhile, Admiral David Dixon Porter would sail his fleet right past Vicksburg’s defenses and link up with Grant’s troops. The ships would ferry his men across the river, and he would be able to move on dry land and approach the city from the rear. There were two problems involved in this plan. The first was that Grant would move his army south and operate against the enemy without a supply line. The second problem was if Porter failed, or if a large number of his ships were damaged or destroyed, the campaign was effectively ended (and with it, Grant’s career). As the calls for Grant’s dismissal rose with each passing day of no news from Vicksburg, Grant knew he only had one chance to make good. Lincoln could only watch and wait, displaying his full confidence in his General’s judgment.

Grant slowly moved two corps, about 24,000 men, southward along the semi-solid riverbank, while Sherman (with 10,000 men) remained above Vicksburg with his corps to distract and confuse the Confederates. In addition, Grant sent Colonel Benjamin Grierson with 1,700 men to attack Confederate rail lines and supply depots in central Mississippi, which would further distract the enemy’s attention. Grierson did this very well, covering 600 miles in just over two weeks and ending up at Baton Rouge; it is considered one of the most successful cavalry operations of the war. Grant’s distractions worked — Pemberton was confused and sent troops and cavalry running everywhere to deal with the number of threats he thought were coming his way. He dealt with all but the most dangerous one.

With the Confederates distracted and Grant in position, it was now Porter’s turn. On April 16 Porter sent transports and selected ships downstream at night past the bluffs of Vicksburg. The Confederate batteries were waiting and lit up the night with bonfires and houses set on fire along the riverbank. The Confederate guns fired for nearly three hours and succeeded in sinking only one transport. Nearly a week later, the rest of the fleet passed successfully. Grant was now ready to move against the city.

Grant wasted no time after he was on dry ground. He marched rapidly to Jackson, Mississippi to cut off Pemberton’s supply line and block any Confederate reinforcements coming to his aid. Grant was using speed and deception to keep Pemberton guessing. He had abandoned his supply line, something Pemberton never expected. Troops carried three days rations; after that, they would live off the country. The only extra supplies carried for the army was ammunition. Grant also was outnumbered when he crossed the river. Even after Sherman joined him near Jackson, he had only 34,000 men. Pemberton had 40,000 under his command, but he had spread them all over trying to defend everything. Grant easily overcame these isolated groups, and Pemberton never really figured out what Grant was doing until it was too late. Pemberton’s confusion was compounded by the conflicting orders he was receiving. From General Joseph E. Johnston, the Theater commander, he was told not to allow himself to get caught in a siege, but to maintain his mobility. At the same time, Confederate President Jefferson Davis was telling him to stand and hold at Vicksburg. No wonder he hesitated!

Grant closes the vise

As the Union forces approached Jackson, Joseph E. Johnston arrived to take charge and prevent Pemberton from being trapped. The Yankees moved too fast; Johnston had only 5,000 men to hold off three times that many men. Grant’s forces were also moving west toward Vicksburg to cut off his retreat and block Pemberton from supporting Johnston. The following day, Johnston retreated and gave up the city and ordered Pemberton to move out of Vicksburg to attack Grant’s supply lines. It was a good idea, but had no grounding in reality. Grant had no vulnerable supply line. What he did have was a unified army sitting across Pemberton’s supply line and looking for a fight. Pemberton took up a good defensive position at Champion’s Hill, but was outnumbered as two Union Corps attacked and drove the Confederates back. Pemberton badly misdirected the battle and lost control of his forces. He found himself pursued into the defenses of Vicksburg with only 20,000 men. Grant now outnumbered him and would soon receive reinforcements to bring his strength to 75,000.

The Siege and Fall of Vicksburg

Grant, eager for a resolution, tried two all-out attacks against the defenses and was repelled both times. Grant had to worry about Johnston, who now had assembled a 30,000-man army and was attempting to break the siege. Grant sent Sherman’s corps of 50,000 to watch Johnston, while Grant and the rest of the army resigned themselves to a siege — a steady land and naval bombardment of the city. The Confederate forces returned fire, but each day, their food supplies grew smaller. The Confederate defenders also had to deal with a sizable civilian population as well. People lived in dugouts or caves to protect themselves from the incessant shelling. They began to starve, and sickness spread through the 10-square-mile area in the sweltering Mississippi summer heat. No Americans have ever suffered in war as much as the people of Vicksburg did during the siege. Johnston made an attempt to save the city on July 1, but retreated when blocked by Sherman’s superior forces. Just two days later, Pemberton asked for terms of surrender. Pemberton had known Grant during the Mexican War, and he hoped that friendship would give him some advantage. He was disappointed. Grant offered him his only terms: unconditional surrender. On the next day, July 4, the Vicksburg garrison surrendered and was paroled. Gettysburg had ended with Lee’s defeat the day before. “The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea,” Lincoln wrote after hearing news of the surrender. Grant’s brilliant generalship moved him to the first rank of Union Generals. The Union controlled the Mississippi and, with it, the strategic initiative. The Confederacy would now be fighting for survival (see Figure 18-9).

Figure 18-9:Map of Confederacy at end of 1863.

Grant’s Accomplishment

Grant had done what few U.S. generals had ever done. Nineteen days had passed from the time he crossed the Mississippi River with his two corps on April 30 to the time he had trapped Pemberton in Vicksburg. Grant had taken enormous risks by dividing his forces in the face of the enemy and cutting his army off from its supply base. He compensated for these risks, however, by deceiving Pemberton and by using speed of maneuver to force Pemberton to protect his own line of supply at Jackson. After he was out in the open, Grant could attack Pemberton and destroy him, or send him back into Vicksburg. Either way, Grant had the initiative. Pemberton had allowed Grant to take it, and, in a matter of days, Union forces were closed around the city.

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