Part IV

War to the Hilt, 1863–1865

In this part . . .

Part IV shows you how the Confederacy made its second bid for recognition and independence — and how close they came to success. In this part you observe commanders at their best and others at their worst. The most famous battles of the Civil War occur in this climactic period. With the emergence of U. S. Grant, you see how the Union finally shapes a truly coordinated campaign plan to support the national strategy. You also see how politics plays a role in the ultimate triumph of the Union, and how the war develops into total war: a remorseless, grinding, bitter fight to the end. Finally, you see how the last act of the drama of the war lent itself to a rapid restoration of peace and eventual reconciliation.

Chapter 17

In This Chapter

Making a good plan to foil Lee

Accomplishing a military miracle

Enduring a tremendous loss

A fter two years of bloodshed and hardship, the war was no nearer won for either side. The Union had not accomplished any of its strategic goals. True, the blockade was growing in effectiveness, but it was a time- consuming process that by itself did not assure victory. Confederate armies in the Eastern and Western Theaters were still in the field and still dangerous. To win, the Union would have to cut the Confederacy in two, and it would have to take the Confederate capital of Richmond, Virginia. The Confederate defenses at Vicksburg on the Mississippi River stood in the way of the first objective, while Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia stood like an iron gate before the second objective.

The Confederacy simply had to hold on, keep armies in the field, and wait for either one or both of two earnestly desired events to occur. The first event was the long-hoped-for recognition from Great Britain or France. The second event was that the Yankees give up the fight. The second was not a far-fetched notion. Politically, the war had made both Lincoln and Davis very unpopular; both presidents faced strong and increasingly influential opponents who sought to end the war. Each leader faced a dilemma: how to keep the nation together until a clear winner emerged on the battlefield.

The Strategic Situation East and West

For both the North and South, the strategic situation had not changed all that much since the onset of the war in 1861. The problem for the North remained the same — it had to conquer large sections of the South and hold on to them, while also defeating the Southern armies in the field. Kentucky and western Tennessee were lost to confederate control, and the Union controlled Louisiana up to Baton Rouge, and the Mississippi down to Vicksburg. But for all the effort, the ground gained by the North wasn’t much. Morale in the North was low, and prospects for any improvements were bleak. For the South, the basic defensive strategy had been successful, even if the offensive operations into Maryland and Kentucky had failed. Most of the South was untouched by the war, industrial production was ramping up to meet the needs of the armies, Richmond was secure, and the morale of the population was still high.

The Eastern Theater

In the Eastern Theater, the Union’s Army of the Potomac stood at the Rappahannock River, not much further from Washington than where it had begun the war in 1861. Morale was low, troops were deserting left and right, and Burnside was finished as a commander. Lincoln now had to search for a new General to take charge and find the way to defeat Lee and his army. As for Lee, his army stood behind the Rappahannock at Fredericksburg, Virginia, guarding the main approach to Richmond. His army was in good spirits and had competent, battle-tested leaders. The road to Richmond would not be an easy one to travel, whoever the new commander of the Union Army was.

The Western Theater

In the Western Theater, Vicksburg loomed as the focal point for all operations. The Confederacy had to hold Vicksburg to ensure continued control with the states in the Trans-Mississippi Theater. The Union had to take Vicksburg to split the Confederacy in half and control the Mississippi River. From Vicksburg, Union forces could strike at will into the largely undefended rear areas of the Confederacy. The all-important rail junction of Chattanooga was also key to the Confederacy’s survival. Chattanooga was the gateway into the Deep South, the vital agricultural and industrial base that was essential to the Southern war effort. Opposing the Union Army were Confederate forces under General John C. Pemberton, which occupied a strong defensive position at Vicksburg. Bragg’s army stood guard south of Murfreesboro, protecting Chattanooga from Northern invasion. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston was nominally the overall commander in this Theater, but Confederate President Jefferson Davis and Johnston did not get along. This unpleasantness would have fatal consequences for the Confederacy in 1863.

The Battle of Chancellorsville

The armies stood essentially where they were since Fredericksburg. Besting Lee and Jackson would take clever planning and skillful maneuvering. It seemed that Lincoln had found a General with the right combination of energy and toughness. Things appeared to be looking up for the North as the troops waited for the rains to end and the roads to dry. The Confederates on the other side of the Rappahannock River watched and waited as well (see Figure 17-1). Lee was waiting for the enemy to show his intent; at that point, he intended to strike an offensive blow that would cripple the Union Army.

Another new commander for the army

Lincoln culled through his possible candidates for command of the Army of the Potomac in January of 1863. Burnside had been sent off to the Department of the Ohio, a large rear area where it was hoped he would do no more harm. Lincoln tried to find a general who could not only fight, but who would also please the Republican politicos. One of McClellan’s great drawbacks was that he was a Democrat. Unfortunately, Lincoln had trouble meeting his first criteria. It seemed nobody in the army had a consistent record of competent leadership in battle. All except one — the corps commander known as “Fighting Joe” Hooker. Hooker had a reputation as a hard-drinking, hard-living man, with an eye for the ladies. Nevertheless, he had displayed some ability at higher-level command. He was also a braggart who had both good friends and bad enemies. Politically he was harmless, but he was well liked by the radical Republicans, including Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase. Lincoln therefore decided to give Hooker command of the Army of the Potomac, hoping that his brash and aggressive nature would be turned to good use against Lee.

Hooker took charge and whipped the army back into shape, adding reinforcements and building morale with better food and furloughs. He gave soldiers the unit badges on their caps that they would wear for the rest of the war. He eliminated Burnside’s unwieldy Grand Divisions and returned to a corps structure. He also organized the Union cavalry into one corps instead of having small units parceled throughout the army. With drill and discipline, the army returned to fighting trim, now numbering 134,000 men. Justly proud of this instrument of war he had shaped, Hooker now turned to boasting, beginning his sentences with “When I get to Richmond . . .” and “May God have mercy on General Lee, for I will have none.” He said he had “the finest army on the planet.”

Hooker’s plans

Hooker followed up his boasting with an imaginative and innovative campaign plan. Hooker planned to make Lee fight in several directions at once. First he would send his cavalry out on a deep raid toward Richmond to cut Lee’s lines of communication and supply. This raid was intended to draw Confederate forces away from the Rappahannock.

Next, he divided his army into three parts. Hooker would take three corps of his army and move about 25 miles away from Fredericksburg, crossing the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers and button hooking, (which is a sharp, curved turn) around Lee’s left flank. The second part, two corps commanded by Union Major General John Sedgwick, would press the Confederate defenses in front of Fredericksburg. The rest of the army, two corps, were the reserve, to move to reinforce either flank as needed. Hooker believed that faced with these multiple threats, Lee would have to abandon his defensive line along the Rappahannock River or be trapped along its banks. If Lee’s army had to move, there was the chance that it could be trapped by Hooker’s superior forces and destroyed. At the very least, the attack would force the vaunted Army of Northern Virginia to retreat, something it had not done in a long time.

Hooker’s planned cavalry raid came to naught due to bad weather. The rest of the Army of the Potomac, however, performed superbly that late April of 1863. As Union forces moved into Fredericksburg, Hooker and his three corps successfully crossed the river and made their way back towards Fredericksburg. On the way, the Yankees passed through an area of thick undergrowth and dense, second-growth trees cut by numerous ravines and small streams called the Wilderness. At a road junction in the Wilderness stood a large brick house owned by the Chancellor family. The spot was called Chancellorsville, even though the house was the only building at the crossroads. Just past Chancellorsville, the terrain opened up, and the Union force would be sitting directly on Lee’s flank and rear, forming one jaw of a vise that would trap the Confederates in and around Fredericksburg, while the other jaw closed in on the enemy from behind the city. Hooker felt so good about his prospects for the next day that he halted his troops in the dense woods for the night.

Lee’s situation

Lee had about 60,000 men in the area. He was without two divisions and General Longstreet, all dispatched to Newport News to watch for a possible Union attack from the coast. Lee had not taken the bait intended to draw his attention from the Rappahannock. He and his army stayed put, deciding to await developments. The appearance of Union troops on his left flank and the deployment of Union troops in Fredericksburg was not altogether unexpected; Lee had anticipated some kind of movement to force him out of his position. Because the Union forces in Fredericksburg showed no inclination to attack, he reasoned that this was another feint to distract him for the real attack. Jeb Stuart’s cavalry confirmed that Union troops were now in the Wilderness. Hooker’s plan was now clear. The question now was what was Lee going to do?

Lee had two options: Retreat to a better defensive position and leave Hooker holding the bag, or attack one of the elements of Hooker’s army. Nine commanders out of ten would have chosen to take the most prudent course and retreated. But Lee was different. He did not see himself in danger — instead, he saw Hooker in danger with his army divided and exposed to a smashing counterattack. Lee decided to defend Fredericksburg with a very small force while he took the rest of the army, Jackson in the lead, to strike Hooker in the Wilderness.

Fighting Joe Hooker won’t fight

Hooker’s troops took their time getting ready to move the next morning, expecting to find the Confederates heading toward Richmond. Instead the Confederates were headed for him. Jackson wasted no time in slamming head on into Hooker’s left flank. This unanticipated action stunned Hooker into a near stupor. Even though the units engaged were fighting well, Hooker had had enough. To the surprise and consternation of his Generals, he recalled the army back to Chancellorsville and ordered everyone to dig in for the night. The army was stretched about five and a half miles along a narrow dirt road, in the middle of a forest so thick that visibility beyond 50 feet was impossible, with a river at its back. The troops threw up some logs and brush and waited for Fighting Joe to decide what to do next.

While the troops in both armies rested uneasily in the dark thickets, Lee and Jackson searched for an opportunity. Confederate General Jeb Stuart provided that opportunity with a report to Lee that the Union right flank lay open. It was simply dangling, not anchored on any defensible terrain. Fortified with Stuart’s info, Jackson proposed a plan that made even the bold Lee catch his breath. He proposed to take all but 17,000 men, whom Lee would command, to deal with Hooker’s entire force, while he took the rest, about 26,000, in a wide march to fall on the open Union flank. Jackson’s attack would roll up Hooker’s army like a rug, cutting off its line of retreat at the river fords, thus trapping it against the river and destroying what was left. Lee was dividing his army for a second time in the face of a far superior force. He would risk such a maneuver on the skill of Jackson and the inaction of his opponent. Lee agreed, and Jackson set off at dawn to organize his troops for the march.

While Jackson moved his nearly 10-mile column in a slow march in front of and around the Union Army, Hooker was awaiting Lee’s attack. Of course, he expected the Confederates to come from his left flank, as they had the day before, so his defenses there were particularly strong. He traveled the lines inspecting the preparations, and even thought his right flank to be adequately protected. About midafternoon, after repeated reports that Confederate troops were moving in large numbers across the front of the Union defensive lines, Hooker came to believe that Lee was retreating and that the troops everyone reported were the rear guard of Lee’s army. Therefore, he ordered one of his corps commanders, General Dan Sickles, to advance ever so slightly and carefully to find out what was happening. By this time, Jackson’s men had already passed and were getting set up for the flank attack.

Jackson disappears and reappears

Jackson and his 26,000 men made the march and reached the far right flank of the Union line, but it took two precious hours to put so many troops into formation amid the undergrowth of the Wilderness. That many men rustling around in the underbrush are bound to attract some attention. Messages from Union outposts were passed to the corps commander, who discounted all of them. They were now convinced, as Hooker was, that Lee’s army was in retreat. By 5:00 p.m., the men were up, but Jackson took extra time to spread the ranks out over a mile in length, poised directly on the unprotected Union flank. Time was running short; there were only about two hours of daylight left, and the tension and anticipation was growing with each passing minute. Finally, Jackson calmly told his division commander leading the attack, “You can go forward, sir.”

By early evening, the men of the Union XI Corps had settled down to cook their meals. Their weapons were stacked, card games were underway, and tents were set up for the night. This corps was made up primarily of German immigrants, led mostly by German officers who were staunch Republican supporters. Some of these units had fought in the valley in 1862 when Jackson had beaten them once before. Suddenly, there was a high-pitched yell from the throats of thousands of wildly excited men — the Rebel Yell the Yankees had heard before — then groups of startled animals ran out from cover into the camps. Next, the masses of Confederate troops burst in among the startled Yankees. All order was lost as units were overrun. As soon as a defensive line was formed, it was swept away by thousands of panicked men fleeing for their lives, headed for safety somewhere near Chancellorsville. But the Wilderness hampered the charging Confederates as much as it did the Union troops desperately trying to put together some defense. The heavy brush and looming darkness slowed the momentum of the attack; units got lost and small groups of men crashed around in the dark. Union artillery began hammering shells into the wood line and down the road to halt the attack. Jackson called up General A.P. Hill’s division and ordered him to press on to take the main ford on the Rappahannock River, which would cut off the Union Army’s primary line of retreat. It was to be Jackson’s last combat order.

In the chaos of combat in unfamiliar woods, Jackson and his staff began scouting a route to reach the ford and determine the Union front lines. As they were returning, a forward unit of Jackson’s mistook the riders for Union cavalry and fired into the group, wounding Jackson in the arm. Shortly thereafter, his arm was amputated at a field hospital and Jackson was moved from the battlefield to Guiney’s Station, a supply depot for the Confederate army. He died of pneumonia, a complication unrelated to his wound, eight days later in the presence of his wife and infant daughter. A.P. Hill, who would have taken command, was also later wounded. Jeb Stuart took command and prepared to attack at dawn.

Hooker fails to act

The Union situation was serious, but not as desperate as it seemed. Union forces had reacted and had put up a stubborn defense. Hooker still outnumbered Lee, and the Confederate Army was split in half, with Hooker’s troops in the middle. All Hooker needed to do was take the initiative and launch a counterattack. But he did nothing. The new Confederate commander, Jeb Stuart, resumed his attack the next day, pushing hard to reunite the divided wings of the army. They successfully came together just below Chancellorsville, pushing the crumbling Union lines back toward the river. Sometime during the fighting, a Confederate artillery shell hit a pillar on the porch of the Chancellor house. Hooker had been leaning against the pillar when the shell struck it, throwing him violently to the ground and knocking him senseless for a time. Whether in possession of his senses or not, Hooker had no control over events — he had given up the fight.

With the army reunited, Lee now sought a decisive battle. General Sedgewick had received orders from Hooker the night before to take Fredericksburg and come to his support. This was a strange request by any stretch of the imagination. Sedgewick, whose force was supposed to be the second jaw of Hooker’s vise, could not mount a night attack against a fortified position and then march 12 to 14 miles to help Hooker on a road held in strength by the enemy. Besides, Sedgewick had about 24,000 men with him; Hooker had nearly 90,000 — in what way did Hooker think Sedgwick was going to help him? The day Lee reunited his army, Sedgwick rolled past the Confederate defenses above Fredericksburg and headed toward the Wilderness. Sedgwick did not know that Hooker was already ordering a withdrawal across the river, leaving his subordinate open to an attack from Lee. Lee split his army again, leaving Stuart with 25,000 men to watch Hooker, while he took 21,000 to deal with Sedgewick. Lee struck hard, but late in the day. By nightfall, Sedgewick had retreated toward Fredericksburg. The following day, Lee turned his men back toward Hooker to finish him off. But Hooker’s troops were already crossing over the ford to safety.

Battle Captain’s Report: The Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1–3, 1863 Confederate Victory

Commanders: Union: Major General Joseph Hooker, Army of the Potomac, 134,000 men. Confederate: General Robert E. Lee, 60,000 men.

Phase I: Hooker divides his army into three groups. With one group acting as a reserve, the first group will cross the Rappahannock River to threaten Fredericksburg. The third group (under Hooker with about 53,000 men) will cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers and swing around Lee’s left flank to come around behind, forcing him to retreat toward Richmond. Lee is without Longstreet and two of his divisions, and his army is spread from Fredericksburg southeast along the Rappahannock River. Lee gets wind of Hooker’s flanking movement and sends Jackson with troops to develop the situation.

Phase II: By May 1, Hooker has moved his army across the rivers and placed it in a dense undergrowth forest called the Wilderness around a crossroads called Chancellorsville. Jackson’s forces would then blunt the initial Union advance out of the Wilderness. Hooker is so confused by the attack that he orders a retreat. He orders the army into a defensive position around the crossroads of Chancellorsville, hoping that Lee will advance to attack him. Lee has left a small force to deal with the Union troops at Fredericksburg, taking the rest of the army to fight Hooker. That night, Lee confers with Jackson, looking for a vulnerable opening. Jeb Stuart reports that the Union right flank is open and undefended — all the troops are facing south; no one is looking west. Jackson proposes to take his corps and march to the open flank while Lee occupies Hooker’s front. At 5:15 p.m., on May 2, after an all all-day march, Jackson launches his assault. It catches the Union XI corps completely off guard and sends them fleeing toward the Chancellor house. Darkness falls before the full weight of Confederate attack can be employed, and the Union resistance stiffens. Jackson is wounded by his own men while searching in the darkness for a route that will cut off the Yankees from their only line of retreat — the ford.

Phase III: On May 3, Lee realizes he is in danger. Unless he can reunite the two wings of his army, Hooker can counterattack and destroy his force. Jackson’s corps, now under Jeb Stuart’s command fights desperately to link up with Lee’s force. Hooker, dazed by a near miss from an artillery shell, plays no role in the battle. By mid-morning, the Confederates have captured Chancellorsville and the Union Army begins to withdraw toward the ford. Meanwhile, the Union force under General Sedgwick has captured Fredericks- burg and is moving westward toward Chancellorsville. Lee splits his forces, leaving Stuart to guard Hooker while he attacks Sedgwick. Sedgwick initially retreats, and is attacked again in strength the following day, May 4. Sedgwick then retreats across the Rappahannock River.

Phase IV: Lee turns again on Hooker, hoping to launch an attack with his united army. Hooker has had enough and orders a retreat. Under pressure, the Army of the Potomac skillfully crosses the Rappahan- nock to safety. The army is still full of fight; 40,000 men in the army had not fired a shot during the entire battle. Richmond celebrates what seems to be another miraculous victory. In Washington, Lincoln in deep anguish can only cry, “My God! What will the country say?”

Casualties: Union 17,000, Confederate 13,000 + 1 (Jackson’s death is a loss so serious that some say the war cannot be won without him).

Heroes and Goats

Certainly Lee and Jackson pass into the halls of immortal generals with this battle. Jackson’s wounding and later death take away the South’s greatest hero. Goats seem to become goats by having their excellent battle plans make contact with an enemy who does not want to cooperate. Without a sense of where you are or what your purpose is, once you meet the enemy, you are headed for goatship.

Heroes

The blending here of commander, key leader, and soldiers is what all military men hope and dream to have. Such a combination of skill, audacity, and courage becomes a nearly unbeatable combination, as the Army of the Potomac learned over and over again.

Robert E. Lee: Never has Lee’s genius as a commander shone more brilliantly than at Chancellorsville. Lee’s use of surprise, maneuver, and mass to offset the strength of a superior force is considered one the masterpieces of military art. He begins to believe he can do anything with his Army of Northern Virginia.

Stonewall Jackson: Jackson is the South’s greatest loss and martyr. He is wounded at the moment of his greatest battlefield triumph. Upon recovering from the anesthetic after his amputation, he dutifully informs Lee that he has been incapacitated and has lost his left arm. Lee replies: “I have lost my right arm.” Jackson is irreplaceable. He is one of the ablest commanders that the United States has ever produced. Never again will Lee be able to act as boldly or as confidently as he did with Jackson under his command.

The Army of Northern Virginia: This instrument of battle, so masterfully led and so dedicated to its leader, appears unstoppable. Under trying circumstances, hungry, ragged, and ill, and despite all odds, it continues to win battles. As long as it can fight, the Confederacy can stay alive.

Goats

Hooker had led soldiers in combat at Antietam and Fredericksburg and had been in some of the toughest fighting there, yet he lacked something to be an army commander. The goat here is obvious; bragging and posturing like a general doesn’t make you a general. Also when generals become goats, often the blame is passed (justifiably or unjustifiably) to subordinates. Here is a bad luck unit that experiences an unpleasant sensation of being at the bottom after everything has rolled downhill.

Joseph “Fighting Joe” Hooker: Hooker’s well-conceived plan is also well executed — for the first 36 hours. Hooker expected Lee to retreat; when he stood and fought, Hooker never got over his surprise. After the battle, he tries to keep the bad news from the President for nearly three days. He makes weak excuses to his corps commanders about protecting Washington and saving the army. Hooker alone lost the battle. His collapse of will, not the Army of the Potomac’s fighting ability, caused this defeat.

The Union XI Corps: The mostly German unit caught by surprise and overrun by Jackson’s flank attack is nicknamed “the flying Dutchmen” within the Army of the Potomac. Its shaky reputation as a combat unit is never repaired in the Eastern Theater.