6
The Jacobite campaign took a decisive turn when, on 8 November 1745, the Jacobite army finally marched into England and crossed the river Esk, far stronger than the one which marched through England 30 years earlier and buoyed up as a result of the most decisive military victory the cause had ever experienced. They chose the north-western route into England, thus avoiding a clash with Wade’s forces at Newcastle. Therefore, the border city and castle of Carlisle stood in their path. As has been discussed in the previous chapter, attempts had been made to strengthen its defences and to have a garrison of militia and armed townsmen to defend the city walls. They were now to be put to the ultimate test. Unlike the case in 1715 the far more confident Jacobite army was intent on its capture.
Yet there was doubt among loyalists that the Jacobites would march south. Colonel Pelham told John Collier on 12 November, before this news was known, ‘I can’t yet think they will venture to proceed in England and let Wade get behind them.’ He also stated that Ligonier’s forces would be marching into the Midlands.1
When the Jacobite army first came into view from Carlisle on 9 November, they could not be fired upon for it was market day and country people were leaving the city. It was only afterwards that the artillery could open fire and the advance party of Jacobites retreated.2 At 3 p.m. a message was received at Carlisle ordering the mayor to surrender the city. This was declined and the cannon opened fire again.3 Morale within the city was initially high. Durand wrote ‘the whole garrison appeared in the highest spirits and seem’d resolved to defend the city to the last’. He sent a message to Wade to request military relief.4
On 10 November, scouts were sent from the city and they ascertained that there were several bodies of the Jacobite army around the city. Cannon were fired at the Jacobites again and they moved out of range.5 At 2 p.m. another message was sent to the city. There was a meeting of Durand, the militia captains and the chief inhabitants who read it and discussed what to do next. Durand wrote ‘all treated it with the contempt it deserved’. As before, no answer was given except to detain the messenger and to fire the guns in defiance; this happened until nightfall.6 Probably on this day or the previous one a party of militia horsemen from the city captured a Jacobite spy, perhaps a quartermaster, and ten of them took the spy to Newcastle.7
An assault was feared that night as the fog rolled in. The city walls were lined with men and lights were lit everywhere. To increase the men’s morale, Pennington, Dacre and Waugh stood with them. The militia were drawn up in Castle Street in order to reinforce the men if needed.8
There was no attack; on the next day the Jacobite army seemed to withdraw from the vicinity of Carlisle. This was because they had heard word that Wade’s army was approaching them and they were in search of a suitable battlefield. Seeing a rearguard at Stanwix Bank, the city’s guns fired on them, killing a French officer and forcing the others to retreat and then a sortie was made which seized two supply wagons and a few stragglers.9 There were other minor victories for the garrison that day. A number of Lowlanders were also taken.10 On 12 November, a countryman entered the Jacobite camp with a map of England to show them but also ‘to try if I could penetrate their Designs’, though apparently with no success.11
Emboldened by these triumphs, Pattinson wrote to Lonsdale to let him know what was happening. The letter does not survive; on 13 November, however, Lonsdale wrote to Newcastle, telling him the news. Newcastle replied
and cannot omit the first opportunity of returning your Lordship my thanks for the good news therein contained. I have sent it to the King… I beg your Lordship would be so good as to acquaint the Mayor of Carlisle with the satisfaction that Everybody here, has in the Behaviour of the Town of Carlisle, which we hope, will be an Example to other Places, should the Rebels advance further into England.12
Mrs Palmer, writing from Broughton, thought that the Jacobite army would now ignore Carlisle and instead march straight for Penrith, and so
We are all in the utmost consternation here, especially at Whitehaven and Workington, where they have shifted all their best effects and put them to sea most places about here have removed their best effects I have sent our horse with two of Brother Fletchers to Mrs Church at Buttermere.13
This was to prove a little premature. The Jacobite army, finding that there was no foe to oppose them from the east, returned to the siege at Carlisle. That afternoon there was further bad news for the garrison there. An express from Wade reached them. Wade told them that since the Jacobite army did not possess heavy artillery they could not make a breach in the walls and therefore could not take the city. Implicit in this was that he would not therefore march to their relief.14 Wade did not appreciate that his presence, or rather the lack of it, was critical. William Fletcher recalled: ‘the militia proposed to keep the rebels out 8 or 10 days longer if any promise of Assistance in that time’ had been given.15
Wade’s message caused panic. The militia officers wanted to abandon the city that night and to leave the English Gate open so they could leave. It was with difficulty that they were persuaded to return to their posts.16 Meanwhile the pressure from the besiegers intensified. Some resistance was made. Grenades were thrown at the attackers and a besieger wrote: ‘the enemy redoubled their fire’. Yet the Jacobite entrenchments and their cannon had the desired psychological effect, as a contemporary historian wrote, ‘The Terror of the Highlanders storming the Town, sword in hand, in the Night Time, having raised in their Minds the dreadful Prospect of Blood, slaughter and Rapine.’ Some tried to flee by going over the walls.17 Men left their posts, ‘multitudes of them deserting every hour from the walls till the officers of many companies were at last left with three or four men’.18
Another reason for low morale among the militia was that relations between themselves and the townsmen had been poor. A letter from Kendal a few days later reported that the townsmen had only contributed two or three men from each of their 30-strong companies to patrol the walls. The bulk of this hard duty fell to the militia, therefore, ‘so that last week they were obliged to be continually upon duty and the week before one half relieved the other alternatively’. Additionally, the townsmen made the militia pay high prices for the food and bedding they needed. One Captain Wilson, an MP’s son, had to pay £1 10s for use of a cobbler’s stall on the walls. The litany of complaints concluded that ‘many of them were so sick with their great Fatigue’.19 If the militia were in such a condition they clearly lacked the ability, or even the will, to mount any effective defence.
On 14 November, Durand surveyed the Jacobite siege position and encountered ‘a great crowd of people who seemed to be alarmed at it’. He tried to explain that these were paltry and insignificant and that they could not possibly break down the city walls. He had the cannon and small arms open fire on them.20
There was another meeting of the militia officers. Despite Durand’s exhortations, the officers ‘still persisted in their resolution to capitulate and said it was to no purpose to argue any longer about it’. Of the 24 officers, 18 voted to surrender, 3 voted against and the other 3 abstained. The townsmen also tried to persuade the militia not to surrender.21 Whilst all this was going on, men were deserting their posts on the walls and flinging away their weapons. Their behaviour was infectious, with the townsmen now joining the militia in calling for surrender because there was no imminent relief.22
The city aldermen and councillors met, too. Fifteen, including Pattinson and Backhouse, wanted to fight on but they were out-voted by 24 who wanted to surrender.23 However, when Durand went to the castle, he found that 400 of the militia, as well as some gentlemen and clergy from the city, went there, too, and that ‘they all declared that they would join me in defending the castle to the last’.24
In the city the white flag was flown, and the mayor and aldermen told the Jacobite army that they were surrendering the city but not the castle. This was not accepted; it must be the city and the castle or neither. Despite the resolve of the militia in the castle on the previous day, at 1 a.m. on 15 November, no militia were to be found on the castle walls. Durand and Pennington ordered back those they could find, which numbered but 30. They only did this with great difficulty and had to promise them that they would be relieved within the hour. Once Pennington’s back was turned, these last defenders left, claiming ‘they would do no more duty nor would they stay and defend the castle on any account whatever’. Some went over the walls and some forced the gates open. By 8 a.m. there were no militia left at all.25
Later that day the mayor surrendered the keys to the city and the castle. This was the subject of a great deal of condemnation from those who were not present. Colonel Joseph Yorke (1724–1792) later wrote that it ‘shews how infamously it was surrendered on the Rebels’ approach, who certainly would never have been able to take it at all if the people have done their duty’.26 Civilians from afar also expressed similar views. Gertrude Savile wrote in her diary, ‘the braging loyal town with the militia of 2 Counteys in it, many Cannon and other Arms, surrender’d without a Gun shott against it’.27 According to Charles Robinson, ‘Everybody condemns the vanity of the Mayor in his letter to my Lord Duke of Newcastle’.28 Horace Walpole was even louder in his criticism, telling Mann that
We were put into great spirits by an heroic Letter from the mayor of Carlisle, who had fir’d on the Rebels and made them retire; he concluded by saying ‘so I think the Town of Carlisle has done His Majesty more Service than the great City of Edinburgh, or all of Scotland together’… But alack! The next day the Rebels returned… The great Mr Pattinson… instantly surrendered the Town and agreed to pay two thousand pounds to save it from pillage! Well! Then we were told that the Citadel would hold out seven or eight days, but did not so many hours.29
Another critic was John Collier of Hastings, who wrote that ‘The town in general has been very much disappointed with regard to the behaviour of the Carlisle men’ and wrote that the ‘militia basely deserted’. However, he believed ‘if it continued to advance into England, face ‘inevitable destruction will fall upon them [the Jacobite army] for they will be put between two fires without any possibility of escaping’.30
Waugh wrote ‘The surrender of Carlisle in the manner it was done and the Difficultys that were made in the Defence of it are subjects that were so much to my dissatisfaction that I know not how to look upon them.’ He put the blame on the militia, stating ‘the inhabitants would have held out as long as they could, if the militia officers would have stood by them’.31 Hoghton, closer to the scene, was more understanding, writing ‘I am afraid Carlisle will not hold out a great while, as there are such crowds of the rebels… and especially as the city expects no relief from Marshal Wade.’32
Carlisle fell because of a collapse in the defenders’ morale. Wade and Durand as soldiers knew that the low-calibre Jacobite artillery could not breach the city or castle walls; indeed, the Jacobites knew this too, which is why it was not fired. However, in making preparations as if they were to assault the city and bearing in mind the threat that they had made to the city about ‘fire and sword’, the morale of most of the defenders crumbled. It should also be borne in mind that the townsmen do not seem to have treated the countrymen who made up the militia at all well and thus, in addition to being burdened with the city’s defence by ungrateful hosts, their will to resist was sapped further. Wade’s refusal to aid the city was the final straw.
The city’s officials, for all their earlier verbal hostility to the Jacobites, were forced to acquiesce in their being masters of the city. Corporation accounts record money spent on wine for the advance guard under the Jacobite James Drummond (1713–1746), Duke of Perth.33 Backhouse, the mayor, and Joseph Pearson, the town clerk, were then ordered to make a public proclamation of Charles as Prince Regent. Backhouse refused and Pearson claimed he did not know how to proclaim a King, but was told to repeat words that he was told, so he did so, ‘on the pain of military execution’.34 Waugh left the city, believing he could no longer do anything to serve the loyalist cause.35 There was also passive hostility to the occupiers; the Jacobite David Wemyss (1721–1778), Lord Elcho, recording ‘All the People of that Town and county shew’d a great dislike to the Prince’s cause’.36 Likewise, Elcho’s fellow officer, James Maxwell (1708–1762), wrote ‘The people of Carlisle seemed generally disaffected’.37
The Jacobite army then marched southwards from Carlisle on 20 November, taking the same route through Cumberland and Westmorland as their predecessors had in 1715: Penrith, Appleby, Kendal, Kirby Lonsdale. Sullen hostility awaited them at Penrith according to Elcho: ‘At Penrith they did not like the cause more than at Carlisle’.38
Meanwhile, one effect of the fall of Carlisle had been that the resolve of those in Whitehaven collapsed. The town had erected batteries and had formed a garrison to defend the place against the Jacobites. They had also intended to send men and military stores to assist with the defence of Carlisle. However, on hearing of Carlisle’s fate they dismantled their defences and placed the cannon and military stores on board ships so that at least it would not fall into Jacobite hands in case they marched to this important port.39
Many were concerned about the fate of their property in the advent of the Jacobite advance. In Whitehaven, some residents put their goods on ships bound for Dublin and the Isle of Man. Lower down the social scale an elderly woman carried away a large number of empty bottles ‘rather than trust them to Highland Civility’.40 Churchmen were also worried for their moveable property. At Greystoke, plate was hidden on several occasions ‘when the Rebels came out of Scotland’.41 Similarly, the churchwardens’ accounts for the parish of Heversham in Westmorland record spending a shilling ‘when the church plate was hid’.42 The Rev. Thomas Symonds, Vicar of Kendal, fled ahead of the Jacobites’ approach.43
The pattern now becomes clear: where opposition to the Jacobites was possible it did occur; if was not, it did not. For instance, on 29 November, a party of Jacobites left Carlisle to go, via Penrith, to Lowther Hall, seat of the absentee Lonsdale. Lonsdale’s steward, Mr Armitage, heard of this and led a group of 30 men with makeshift weapons to attack the Jacobites at Penrith. There was a firefight and one man was wounded, to three wounded and one dead Jacobite. Eleven Jacobites were captured and the remainder fled. Nineteen horses and a portmanteau containing £300 was also taken. Although fearful of reprisals, Armitage hoped that this little incident might encourage others to do likewise.44 Another minor victory happened when two Jacobites were found requisitioning horses; the animals were recovered.45
Not all loyalists had such achievements. At Penrith, 120 men from all ranks of society had banded together ‘with a resolution to do everything in our power to oppose the attempts of His Majesty’s Enemies’. Despite their being armed and having trained to use such, when the news of the Jacobite army’s approach was heard they disbanded.46 When there was a plan to retake Carlisle castle after the main Jacobite army had left, so as to end ‘the tyranny of a Highland government’, the Jacobites learnt of it and had the mayor and aldermen seized and not released until the plotters promised to cease their scheming.47
Loyalist responses in Lancashire were similar to those in Cumberland and Westmorland. The two main civilian forces which had been raised in the county in the previous month were the Liverpool Blues and the county militia and their actions and fates were rather different. The Blues were, on 10 November, commanded by Colonel William Graham and Lieutenant Colonel Alexander Gordon, ‘two pretty gentlemen & very good soldiers’. Lieutenant Walter Shairp of the regiment observed that this was ‘to Our great happiness & Joy at being no longer under the Direction of a parcel of ignorant Aldermen’. During the next three days, the men received their unforms of blue coats, hats, shoes and stockings and their muskets. They received training and drill. They were reorganised from six companies into seven companies of 70 men each, presumably so Graham could make his nephew a captain of one of them.48
The purpose of the regiment was now under discussion, presumably following receipt of news that the Jacobite army had marched into England. Liverpool corporation envisaged the force as defending the town against the invaders, but the regiment’s officers were opposed to this. Shairp wrote that this was ‘so Ridiculous a Scheme’ and mocked the ‘wise corporation’ in his memoir. More importantly, Graham disagreed. He resented being given a command and then being told what to do. His officers threatened to lay down their commissions en masse if they were not allowed to obey their commanding officer. The corporation had to accede to this and left Graham with sole authority over the regiment’s fate. On 15 November, he marched the men from the town and they arrived at Warrington where they remained for four days, perhaps continuing their training.49
Graham then had the regiment set about destroying bridges which the Jacobite army would have to cross in order to march southwards from Lancashire. Cholmondeley wrote to him on 24 November to have the bridge at Warrington wrecked so as to stop an advance against Cheshire as he believed that was their intention, before going on to Wales. The middle arches of the bridge were removed by the end of that day.50 Charles Lennox (1701–1750) second Duke of Richmond, was pleased with this work and hoped to hear of more of the same: ‘I am glad to hear they have broke down the bridge at Warrington and hope they will do the same at Stockport.’51
Crossford bridge and Barton bridge were also destroyed, but it was not possible to do the like at Stockport because on arrival the Jacobite army was too close. There was also opposition from the gentlemen of the town itself who were opposed to such demolition on the grounds that it would inconvenience locals and not hold up the Jacobite army, but their wishes were ignored. The Blues then marched to Chester to form part of the garrison there.52
It is useful to note the views of how the regiment could be best used. Shairp was of the opinion that they ‘could be of no service in opposing the whole army when there were no forces near us to support us’. This was militarily sensible; the Jacobite army vastly outnumbered the Blues. Yet the men’s morale for potential combat was not negligible. On the occasion of a false alarm, Shairp wrote,
However, this was of some service to us as it gave us an opportunity of trying the men’s Courage which was very extraordinary as not a man of them shewed the least sign of fear but went all on with the greatest show of alacrity, altho’ I believe every one of them expected to be attacked that moment.53
Meanwhile, in Liverpool, having lost their regiment, they raised a new force. Some were sent out from the town to learn what they could of the Jacobite army’s movements. When these scouts returned they found that the avenues to the town were guarded, with houses lit and the first floor of each guarded by armed men, ready to fire on any approaching Jacobites. Yet it was with a sense of relief that the news arrived that the Jacobite army took the road to Manchester not Liverpool.54 As Derby wrote, ‘Liverpool is certainly not tenable’.55
Elsewhere, despite talk of raising volunteer companies funded by subscription money, the county militia were raised on 12 November and issued with two weeks’ pay. They consisted of about seven companies of about 500 men in total. They were stationed in several towns: Blackburn, Burnley, Colne, Clitheroe, Whalley and Preston. Hoghton was in favour of such, for though he did not think they could stop the advance of the Jacobite army he did think they could prevent any internal disturbances. However, he did not think that suggestions made by Newcastle about sniping at the invaders, obstructing their passage or denying them supplies, were feasible. Derby’s son had a low opinion of their worth, writing on 19 November that it had been ‘so ill concerted a scheme from the beginning’.56
Hoghton’s attitude to the militia’s capabilities was echoed by his counterparts in Yorkshire. Malton had written on 23 September that ‘we cannot repel a great force, we may protect the quiet of the country’.57 He expanded on this theme on 11 November: ‘perhaps we of ourselves are unable to make a real stand I daresay we shall be able to prevent their being joined by any in this county had they an inclination for it’.58
Matters came to a head once the Jacobite army was marching towards the county. Derby wrote to Newcastle on 22 November, ‘In these circumstances, we are of opinion the best thing we can do is to secure as well as we can our arms from falling into the hands of our enemies.’ Derby’s gloom was added to by his state of health ‘a Body jaded almost to Death and an aching heart’.59 The weapons were taken to a ship at Liverpool. Derby was convinced that it was nonsense to believe that ‘a raw undisciplined Militia consisting of Foot without anyone that knows how to command should be able to prevent the advance of an army 7 or 8 times their number’. He went on to state that had the regular troops been in the county the militia might have been of some use, but as it was, they were no nearer than Staffordshire.60 Again this was echoed in Yorkshire, with D’Arcy informing Newcastle on 19 November, this his men were only ‘just cloathed and armed, consequently… very ignorant in military discipline and exercise’ and added in the same letter ‘… any opposition we can give them must be ineffectual and end in nothing but the loss of our men with their arms’.61 Similarly, Irwin wrote to Newcastle on 20 November:
I fear it will be very difficult to give any material obstruction to ye rebels march should they think it proper to take ye east riding in yr way… [there are] various roads and an open country almost to Beverley and but one river as I know of that a good strong bridge over it & wt your Grace mentions with regard to stopping ym in procuring subsistence and forage, will, I am apprehensive be equally impracticable from ye abundance of corn and cattle which the season of year affords.62
The difference between bark and bite was demonstrated by an examination of responses in York in late November. There was concern about York being at risk. D’Arcy wrote, envisaging that his nine companies of north riding volunteers be marched into the city and there was discussion as to how they could be accommodated there. Yet after discussion with Malton, the officers unanimously agreed the town was not tenable ‘with our Force an hour, above three miles of wall quite ruinous and not one cannon in place, so this scheme must be laid aside’.63 Herring agreed: ‘the attempts of a militia or new raised forces to preserve these towns as are arrant folly’.64
Returning to Lancashire, in any case the 14 days’ pay provided for the men would soon expire and it would be difficult, given the imminent arrival in Lancashire of the Jacobite army, for more to be collected. The deputy lieutenants came to a unanimous decision that the force be disbanded, with men being sent home. Despite Hoghton wanting to march the militia with him to his Yorkshire estate where they might be of some future use, this was denied him.65 Derby also left the county, explaining to Richmond, ‘not seeing it is in anyway in my power or any of the friends of the Government to be longer serviceable to the country, in which my fortune lys, or to the nation in general’.66 Cholmondeley thought this was a reasonable action: ‘it would be impossible for such a Body to make a Defence’.67 Locally, though, it was unpopular, with Derby being burnt in effigy ‘for deserting them on this occasion’.68
There was also some dissension among loyalists in Yorkshire. Irwin was unhappy to find that the town of Hull was outside his jurisdiction as Lord Lieutenant of the east riding, as regards the volunteer forces: ‘they intend to apply to me for commissions as being custos rotulorum. Should they do I presume my power extends so far.’69 Newcastle told him on 13 November, ‘your lordship was in the least, dissatisfied with the power granted to the mayor of Hull for raising men and granting commissions’.70 Irwin was not mollified by this:
ye power given to ye mayor of Hull of granting commissions for associated companies, which I find is looked upon as a superseding of my commission as His Majesty’s Lieutenant and Custos Rotulorum of that town and county… I have some reason to complain.71
This was nothing compared to the dissension in Durham. The deputy lieutenants there did not support Bowes, who complained ‘we have so frequently applied for ye assistance of ye deputy lieutenants without being favoured by their company… His Majesty’s service must suffer by a no attendance.’72
However, there was discussion about the volunteer forces being used against small groups of Jacobites. The men of the ‘Leeds Parliament’ applied to D’Arcy for his companies to march to their town to deter any raising parties.73 To facilitate operations of this type, it was decided to spread the 25 companies of the west riding forces throughout the riding. Higham’s would be stationed at Pontefract, Winn’s at Leeds and Ramsden’s at Wakefield. They would be able to unite at Leeds in one day or at Pontefract or Wakefield in two.74
There were also some volunteer forces raised in Leeds itself at this time. The Newcastle Journal refers to there being two.75 It seems that one Mr Wilson had formed one of these companies, of gentlemen volunteers, and there is a reference to four brothers being enrolled and being remarkably zealous ‘delighted much in fiddling with firelocks and bayonets’.76
The people of Scarborough became concerned in this month that they might be in danger; whether from French coastal attacks or from the Jacobite army is unclear. They subscribed £320 and on 20 November a committee of 12 men decided that it should be spent in fortifying the place. They ‘immediately set about with so much Alacrity, and without Distinction, under the direction of Mr Vincent’. It took three weeks, with 1,000 people erecting breast works and batteries in front of the avenues leading to the town. Artillery from ships in the harbour were placed there.77
Despite the initial difficulties over the raising of volunteer forces in Hull, it seems that by November, men were being raised. On 25 November, Robert Pease was given a captain’s commission to raise a company. He had four NCOs, a surgeon, a musician and 61 privates.78 There was another company raised, too, though presumably the total number fell short of the 500 envisioned by William Cookson, the mayor. He also said that arms were needed and applied to Newcastle for these.79 The town was eventually declared defensible on 27 November when cannon were mounted on the walls.80 Beyond the walls, the constables were busy in being stationed at the turnpike gates to watch for any approaching spies.81 General Pulteney was eventually impressed, writing ‘Hull has exerted in a very laudable manner… for ye works yr have been carried on and which are a great security to ye town… have not been without great expense and trouble to ye Corporation’.82
Loyalists continued to send information about the Jacobite army to the army and government. The Preston postmaster sent on reports from Kendal, and later from Lancashire, even when the Jacobite army was in Lancashire.83 Dr Henry Bracken of Lancaster forwarded to London a cache of letters written by the Jacobites. He also sent information about the Jacobite army to Wade.84 Corporations despatched men out to inform them of the Jacobite march; John Richardson, postmaster of Penrith, was later paid a guinea for ‘his trouble in sending intelligence to the Lord Mayor [of York] during the late rebellion’, which was then passed on to Lieutenant General Ligonier, who was at that time in command of regular forces mustering in the Midlands.85
Several clergymen did so as well. The Rev. John Griffiths, vicar of Whiston, sent information to Newcastle about the location of the vanguard of the Jacobite army. He wrote that it was the least he could do, as ‘I think our all is at stake’ and that he would ‘do my utmost in any other shape’.86 One unknown clergyman rode to Preston, then disguised himself as a farmer’s servant and observed the Jacobite army before reporting back.87
Malton sent messengers out for information during this period, as he had done previously. Swift Johnson was employed on at least two occasions, sending information to Wade and Malton who employed a ‘very trustworthy man’ to watch the Jacobite army on 25 November, to inform him about their advance. He also opened a correspondence with Cumberland, when he had replaced Ligonier as commander of the army in the Midlands.88
Other information was gathered. The Royal Hunters went from Barnard castle in November to Penrith to note the Jacobite army’s movements before returning to report such to Wade at Newcastle. According to Oglethorpe, ‘the Royal Hunters and the Rangers bring me the best intelligence and I have them send the last to Sir John Ligonier by express’.89 A member of the Leeds Independent Company of gentlemen volunteers travelled to Kendal to spy on the Jacobite army and then returned to Leeds to report his findings.90
The Royal Hunters also acted as intelligence gatherers for Wade. On 24 November Oglethorpe wrote that they had brought him ‘the best intelligence and I have made them send their last to Sir John Ligonier by express’.91 Stephen Thompson was less impressed, believing that ‘They make more noise than the deserve, their numbers being much magnified’.92 They seem to have been sent towards the Jacobite army and then reported back to Wade, but Ralph Brandling thought that they could have done more by continuing to watch the rear of that army.93
However, the morale-boosting value of the troop was admired by some, with Herring claiming that it was ‘not the power, but the spirit of that little body wch was the desirable thing’.94 The newspapers thought likewise, with one claiming ‘they made a fine appearance and do an Honour to their King and Country’ and another that ‘in short, their appearance was very grand, consistent with their own honour, the defence of a Protestant Sovereign, the spirit of true and steadfast Britons, the loyalty of worthy Yorkshiremen’. There was also a ballad written in their honour, ‘The Royal Hunters’ March’, which was published. It was written in the idiom of a hunt, with the loyalist volunteers, part of which read ‘Then we will rise/And rend the skies/With sound of cheerful horn/And beat the ground/The country round/And every traitor shall scorn’.95
A number of Jacobites were rounded up as prisoners by loyalists. Dr Bracken, for example, had nine stragglers arrested. The Manchester constables sent two or three prisoners to the house of correction.96 A Lancaster constable likewise dealt with a prisoner, but when James Ray presented two to the JPs at Preston they refused on the grounds that they feared Jacobite reprisals.97 More seriously, there was a Catholic rising at Ormskirk on 29 November, but this was put down by armed locals who captured some 10 or 12 of the Jacobites.98 Nottingham corporation had several Jacobite prisoners who they kept for a few days before sending them off, under escort, to Loughborough.99
There was also a rumour in the press at the end of November, of a proposal to retake Carlisle. It was written that at Halifax, ‘We hear… a subscription will immediately be enter’d into by the Gentleman, Merchants, Tradesmen and c. of this town for raising a body of men to march to Carlisle.’100 There is, however, no evidence that the project ever materialised.
Loyalist addresses continued to be sent to the court. Colonel Pelham told Collier on 12 November, ‘we all think there should be an address to his majesty from our corporation’. He added that there was ‘no reason to fear our loyalty and zeal for the government’. As soon as one was ready he was happy to ‘present it in the usual form as soon as it comes to my hands’.101
Flight or preparation for it, and concern about property and possessions, were common attitudes among some in the north of England. Charles Yorke wrote on 23 November, generally, that in ‘all the Countries where the Rebels advance the people fly before them with their Families. In a word, the present confusion and terror everywhere are what we feel in England’.102 From far-off Hertfordshire, Edward Young wrote on 26 November, ‘The common calamity makes more than a common impression here. God Almighty send us good news’.103 Another man known to have invoked the deity at this point was the Rev. Richard Hurd, Fellow of Emmanuel College, Cambridge, ‘God grant it may end as happily as that did’, after comparing the current situation to one in Roman history.104
Meanwhile the Jacobite army marched southwards, unopposed, through Lancashire. The mayor of Lancaster fled on hearing of the Jacobites’ imminent arrival.105 Clergy departed too, no one above the rank of curate would remain lest they be forced to conduct divine service and offer up prayers for the Stuarts.106 The rector and parson of Wigan certainly left the town, as did the Rev. Thomas Lewthwaite, after preaching a sermon hostile to the Jacobites on the text, ‘He that has no sword, let him sell his garment and buy one’.107 Mrs Mary Holland of Mobberley wrote on 27 November: ‘Every day brings fresh alarms, our rebel enemies drawing near, and besides our own family came for shelter.’108
There were other examples. Mr Whitworth, proprietor of The Manchester Magazine, which had printed a great deal of anti-Jacobite material in previous editions, fled the town and so no editions of the newspaper were published between 26 November and 17 December.109 Richard Kay recorded on 28 November, ‘How persons are removing their Families and Effects out of Manchester. We have here [at Bury] a numerous Family’. People would stay with friends at other towns.110 Families were sent over the Mersey to the Wirral, and some fled as far afield as Chapel en le Frith in Derbyshire.111
Fear was commonplace. At Preston it was noted, ‘We are under the utmost apprehension here… it is not easy to express how much all ranks and degrees of people are frightened.’112 Those who could not flee, hid or sent away their moveable possessions. Kay recorded, of his own family, ‘All Things are in a Hurry, Business is confus’d. We have conceal’d our valuables mostly, the Press has been so strong for horses that for fear lest ours shou’d be seized we have sent them away.’113
In Staffordshire, Anne Congreve expressed her concerns whilst her brother wondered if he should stay with his bedridden mother or flee. Eld wrote ‘fear is the Jacobites are like locusts taking everything they can carry’. Residents removed their valuables. Mr Hawes loaded his treasures on a cart and sent it, with his wife and armed labourers, to be concealed in the barn belonging to an innkeeper, Mr Ire. Farmers hid their cattle in a ravine on the moorland. Another response in the county was to attack Catholic chapels, as occurred in Stourbridge, and to assault priests.114
This was not just among those who lay in the route of the Jacobite army, but because that route was unknown, there were concerns by those who might have been in its proximity. After the fall of Carlisle, it was feared by some that the Jacobite army might march in a south-easterly direction, through the Pennines and then through Yorkshire and this resulted in several scares. This was certainly the case in York. Christopher Oldfield, treasurer of the York subscription monies, wanted, on 16 November, to relinquish them because he feared that if the Jacobites arrived there, they would be sure to accost him.115 Herring remarked in the next week ‘not a soul will stay in York that can move from it… Every sensible gentleman… sees this matter now in a light most alarming.’116 One Mr Graves planned how he would secure his family and moveable property, ‘I had borrowed of a friend a small vessel of 30 or 40 tons well docked and fitted… lay at anchor at St. Mary’s Gate Tower and ready to sail at a moment’s notice… to have sailed for… south east of the Trent.’117 Henry Pelham (1694–1754) wrote to Irwin: ‘I find your neighbours are alarm’d att the approach of the rebels, I don’t wonder att it’.118
Such fears were but momentary once accurate news of the Jacobite march was known, as Herring could write on learning that the Jacobites did not have York on their itinerary: ‘Our apprehensions are gone, and for ought I know, York may for the ensuing month be one of the quietest towns in England, which after a few sleepless nights, will be a great consolation.’119
Others elsewhere were fearful. Tucker wrote on 17 November, ‘People affect to see of these Highland fellows as irresistible in their first attack… I have better hopes myself but abundance of people do not seem to have any great confidence in the administration.’120 On 29 November, Malton sent his wife to London, evidently not realising that was the Jacobites’ ultimate destination.121 On 2 December, Malton confided to Fitzwilliam: ‘My Grand concern is being cut off from yourselfs and all my family by such cursed scoundrels.’122
There were also concerns in various towns in the west riding, especially as the Jacobite army marched through the adjacent county of Lancashire. Richard Burden of Leeds wrote on 3 December of the ‘refugees’ from Sheffield who were arriving in Leeds ‘with carriages and loaded horses with the valuable effects’.123 Arthur Jessop noted the effect of such fears, writing that the residents of Wakefield and Leeds were ‘in a terrible fright’, adding
the great men are busy talking together and were sending their best effects away and abundance of people are for leaving the town and want to be boarded at a distance from the Town to escape the danger. Robert Middleton was back here and says that madame Kaye is gone to Heath but will come back soon to Butterly unless there comes better news & because she dare not stay there. He is going to Holmfirth to see if he can get a woman boarded.
He added
The clothiers are gone to fetch their cloth from Leeds and Halifax. They have sent them word to fetch it. Madam Kaye has been at George Tinkers of Scholes and at John Battys to bespeak for beds for people who are coming out of Wakefield to Butterly.124
The panic subsided temporarily as it became known on 26 November that the Jacobites were marching through Lancashire and not into Yorkshire and merchants moved their goods back. Yet this relief was short-lived, for on 30 November, hearing that there was a great deal of plundering,
they sent from Huddersfield in the night to the clothiers to fetch away their Pieces and they are gone for them soon this Morning. They are in a terrible Consternation in Huddersfield, Holmfirth, Wooldale, Scholes and all places hereabouts and are securing their best Effects.125
Because of the panic in York about a possible Jacobite march there, fear of the city’s few Catholics grew and Herring reported ‘it has been proposed to ’em that the principal of them should be apprehended’. Yet he resisted the urge to do so, ‘I opposed that for many reasons’.126 He claimed that if there had been a plan to defend the city he would have remained, but if not he would have left and would have tried to persuade the Lord Mayor to do likewise’.127
There was like behaviour in the Midland counties as noted by Charles Yorke near the month’s end:
You say the terror which the Rebels carry with them spreads over all the Country as it prevails here. The roads in Nottinghamshire within these three of our days we are told, were crowded with gentlemen and ladies and all the considerable families of the country flying from it so that the inns could not contain them, and many were obliged to sit by the fireside all night for want of beds. The Duke and Duchess of Norfolk left Worksop manor and went for Bath.128
This was not the only response in this part of Yorkshire. On 29 November, bullets were brought over, recorded Jessop. Next day ‘And in Holmfirth they are getting their Guns ready and iron forks &c and they are coming into Holmfirth from every side with what weapons they can get’. Mr Buck preached next day: ‘He shall not be afraid of evil tidings. His heart is fixed trusting in the Lord.’129
Some implored God’s help in this situation and Kay was one such. His diary in late November is littered with references to his prayers, writing on 21 November, ‘Lord, let the Fears and the Troublesome Affairs of the Nation have a comfortable Issue’. Six days later, he wrote, ‘We all hope and Pray that God will not suffer such an unnatural Rebellion to reign long on the Nation. Lord, suppress the Pride of the Rebells, these rebellious Wretches, in due Times’. On 29 November, he wrote ‘Lord, discover their Plots, discomfit them and shake their Babel down’. More positively on 1 December, he wrote ‘Lord, bless our Protestant King. May his Crown sit firm upon his Head.’130
In and around Manchester was great distress as the Jacobites approached it on 28 November. ‘Manchester and all our country were in the utmost confusion for a fortnight past in removing their effects and families’. Bromfield sent a servant there to find news of the Jacobite army for his benefit and for that of his neighbours. A neighbour advised Bromfield and others to remove their horses to a place of safety. Several of Bromfield’s horses were taken to Ashbourne, but when he heard that the Jacobite army was marching there he sent another to go there to remove them.131
Those who remained were forced to assist the Jacobite army in both practical and legalistic ways. At Manchester, the town’s bellman was obliged to give notice to all innkeepers and others who had tax money in their hands to give it up to the representatives of their ‘rightful’ monarch ‘upon pain of military execution’.132 The town’s two constables, Thomas Walley and William Fowden, were ordered to assist the army with numerous tasks, including billeting troops, providing the army with supplies of arms and ammunition, horses and carts and hay, and finding labour to repair Crossford bridge. Fowden also had to proclaim Charles as Prince Regent. Both were reluctant to do so. Fowden refused at first, but then a party of armed men came to his house and so he had to go with them. A Jacobite officer, after drawing his sword, told him in no uncertain terms what a refusal would mean: ‘Sir, I charge you in Prince Charles’ name to obey all our commands; if you refuse any of them you are a dead man and we’ll lay your house in ashes and take your family prisoners.’133
It was observed of Fowden that though he acquiesced, ‘he did very unwillingly and in great fear’. He did his best to resist where possible, for example in advising a plumber not to make musket balls.134 Edward Chetham, a JP, had previously given the constables advice on what to do, ‘that if the rebels forced them to do anything, they were to submit, but that he advised them to do nothing for them but what they were forced to, which direction they determined to follow’.135
The Jacobites reached Manchester on 28 November and left on 1 December. As in the more northerly counties, in Chester there had been both preparations for defence and fears. On 12 November, the corporation of Chester decided to have its city gates blocked up; including Castlegate, and for the city walls to be repaired.136 Buildings near to the city walls which might provide cover for any attacker, were pulled down. In the following week, householders were ordered to lay in a fortnight’s food supplies.137 Cholmondeley had the walls and gateways of the city patrolled at night. The county JPs were told to enquire about stocks of wheat, oats and hay for the garrison’s use.138 Cholmondeley thought that bridge breaking might be a more effectual method of defence: ‘The only remedy left in such an Exigency’. Yet despite what had been done by the Liverpool Blues, it was also thought that this course of action ‘might be attended with great inconveniencies.’139
As had occurred elsewhere, there was panic and flight among some of the inhabitants. At Chester,
almost all the principal inhabitants having sent away their goods and most valuable movables, retired to several parts of the county, the shops were all shut up and all trades, and business ceased for some weeks and things appeared with a melancholy aspect.140
Cholmondeley added, on 2 December
such is the panick of the common people, which they catch from others of higher Rank… those who have called themselves the King’s Friends have been the first to fly, and have, by that means, spread Terrors, and Apprehensions, to all Parts.141
Apparently ‘the Ladies are fled from Chester’.142
One who left was the bishop, Samuel Peploe. On 10 November, he had written, ‘that God would be pleased to put a happy end to this wicked Rebellion’.143 He was not alone in his flight. George Booth (1675–1758), second Earl of Warrington, fled Dunham Massey on hearing of the Jacobite advance.144 Those who could not depart hid their valuables, as in the case of the parish of St. Mary’s, Chester, which spent 3s on ‘securing church plate and books at ye time of the Rebellion’.145
Among the defenders of Chester was Gower’s newly raised battalion of infantry, one of whose captains was Sir Edward Littleton. Hurd was greatly appreciative of his actions and wrote to him thus on 23 November:
At this important time, when ev’ry thing valuable is at stake, it is greatly becoming your Rank & Fortune to be employ’d as you are; in bearing a part in the defence of the best of governments, & in contributing all you can to the service of your King. It shews a fine spirit, glorious in a young gentleman to sacrifice, not your Ease and Diversion, only but your Studies in so good a cause, and to hazard e’en your person should there be occasion for it, rather than desert it.146
A few days later, when it was possible that the Jacobite army might march towards Chester, Hurd told his friend, ‘I am glad to hear you are so strong in ye City, and that you are preparing to make a good Resistance to the Rebels if they think proper to shape their course that way’.147
James Ray claimed that he was active against the Jacobite army, according to his own published account. He had been about to march out with the men of Whitehaven to relieve Carlisle when news of the town’s fall came to them. Undeterred, he was still determined to do what he could. After the Jacobites marched south from Carlisle he followed them, disguised as a trader with letters, parcels and the relevant paperwork. He took up two stragglers at pistol point in Garstang on 28 November. They were taken to the constable, who had them conveyed to Lancaster castle. Beyond Garstang he took another straggler and claimed he took a mail bag of post from the Jacobite army, which the magistrates were fearful of dealing with in case the Jacobites learnt of it and damaged the town.148 However, Dr Bracken also claimed this small victory.149
Ray then went to Ribchester, expecting to be pursued by Jacobite cavalry, but the Preston gentlemen had posted men on the bridge to stop anyone travelling south to warn the Jacobite army about Ray. Later he met a countryman and asked him if he saw any Jacobites searching for him if he could misdirect them. He eventually reached Clitheroe and passed his letters to a JP there. They contained little useful, but ‘if they had gone to Scotland, would have been of bad Consequence, in spiriting up the People to Rebellion’. On 30 November, he reached Rochdale and thereafter shadowed the Jacobite army, making notes of its strength.150
Meanwhile, in York, when Dr John Burton (1710–1771), a city physician, returned on 26 November after having been briefly with the Jacobite army in Hornby, Lancashire, loyalists acted against him. Principally, these were his longstanding political enemies, Dr Jacques Sterne and failed parliamentary candidate Sir Rowland Winn. William Birkbeck, a Settle Quaker, had sent information about Burton’s activities and furthermore had Nicholas Fenwick to seek further information.151
Winn did not feel that he had the power to imprison Burton, so on 29 November he wrote to Newcastle ‘that you may find me such powers as you shall think convenient or yt out take measures as you may think best for the public good’. He felt that the lord mayor and aldermen of York would not do their duty, so he sent Newcastle the written testimonies he had obtained against Burton to date.152 Thomas Place and Dr Sterne, a JP, had Burton committed to the castle on 30 November, where he was examined by the JPs.153 Apparently, his arrest went down well in the city: ‘There was the greatest satisfaction expressed at his commitment, from the highest to the lowest.’154
It is possible that fears of the Jacobite army led civilians to be receptive to soldiery in their midst, as was rarely so in more settled times. On 19 November, on their arrival in Chester, the men were met half-way by a torchlit procession and an ‘Extraordinary Reception and entertainment thro’ every town they pass’d especially at my town of Namptwich’.155 At Chester itself it was noted that householders took soldiers voluntarily into their homes and provided for them.156 A similar attitude prevailed when Wade’s army returned to Newcastle on 18 November after an abortive march to Carlisle, it ‘moved the compassion of the magistrates and gentlemen of this town to admit the whole Body of Foot to march into it and to take shelter in the publick halls, glasshouses, malt houses and other empty buildings as also in many of the private houses of the town’.157
John Nock of Knutsford claimed that loyalist zeal was not wanting but the means of defence were. He claimed ‘ye Protestants of Lancashire and Cheshire being strong and zealous on His Majesty’s Interest’, but were unarmed so could do nothing, adding ‘I doubt but 20,000 would be ready to take up the same in the Defence of his Royal Person’.158 Yet if physical resistance was impossible, towns set out messengers to garner information about the Jacobite army, as occurred at Congleton and Knutsford. Samuel Cooper, mayor of Macclesfield, sent information about the Jacobite army to an advance party of soldiers.159
As in Manchester and Carlisle, so too at Macclesfield and Congleton in Cheshire, the Jacobites forced civic officials to proclaim the Stuarts and to assist with the army’s passage. This was despite Cooper’s actions hitherto. He had to tell local bakers to provide bread and also to hand over the tax monies. Cooper said that this was ‘greatly against his inclination’. Yet as with other earlier officials he was ‘threatened with military execution’.160
Tucker was disappointed in hearing of what he thought was the response in the northern counties, writing on 3 December,
The people of England, if one may judge of them from the northern counties, have not virtue or spirit enough to defend themselves against the bold marauder. So effectually has the late grand corruption fitted us for slavery and arbitrary power.161
Yet he did not suggest what the civilians there should or could have done in the face of a hostile army in their midst.
This did not represent the entirety of the civilian response. Elcho later wrote ‘at Macclesfield, the people seemed mightily against the Prince and vast numbers of people had run away from their houses’.162 William Baxter, a tax collector, fled, presumably with his money and records. David Browne, the town clerk, who had been forced to assist in the proclamation of Charles, later wrote
it was then too hazardous to remove my family, so determined to stand my ground, especially as my wife seemed to be in good spirits, and in no way afraid. Indeed, I must own that she had more courage than all the family besides.163
With the Jacobite army in Staffordshire and Derbyshire, adjacent counties took note. At Nottingham, men were reimbursed for going forth and reporting back; John Elliott was given 5s for watching Jacobite movements; Nathaniel Owen received 11s for two journeys to find this information. Meanwhile, constables stood watch on the nights the Jacobites were expected.164 Likewise, the corporation of Leicester on 28 November paid ‘to send out what messengers he shall think proper to wait for and send accounts of the motions of the rebels at the charge of the corporation’.165
A more detailed account of espionage, and its attendant dangers, came from the pen of Eliezer Birch. On 3 December, having travelled from London in the knowledge that the Jacobite army was in Manchester, he sent a message to Devonshire via one of his associated captains, about Kingston’s Light Horse being at Loughborough and Leicester. Birch remained in Derby to ‘take as particular account of the rebels as I was able’ and Devonshire’s agent ‘seem’d pleased, thank’d me, and said it wou’d be of service’. Before the postmaster left the town he told Birch that he could entrust his information to his servant who would see he received it. He also was given some peas by the postmaster’s wife, presumably to assist in counting. Meeting a friend, the latter conducted him to a house in Derby where he could watch the arriving army. Four hours later, the advance guard arrived, so Birch made notes, passed the message to the postmaster’s servant and then left town for Uttoxeter.166
Birch was at his destination that evening and rode, with a guide, to see Cumberland at Stafford on 5 December. There he told his secretary the numbers of men, horses and wagons belonging to the Jacobite army. Cumberland was told this and was pleased, the news was then sent to Nottingham. Later that day he rode back to Uttoxeter, where the postmaster supplied him with horses for another trip to Derby. However, he was arrested by the Jacobites and kept as a prisoner. On the next morning he escaped and eventually found refuge at Willian Rigley’s house at Alverton. Rigley provided Birch with clothes, he having lost most of them in his escape and flight, but Birch was obliged to go on the run again and eventually arrived safely in Nottingham that night.167
The next port of call for the Jacobite army was Derby, where they arrived on 4 December. During preceding weeks, the Derbyshire Blues had been in arms. On 29 November, Devonshire sent ‘a Proper Person’ to the north of the county to ascertain news of the Jacobite advance. On the next day a servant reported from Weighhigh bridge to let him know that ‘not above 100 joined at Manchester’ but otherwise had no news of the feared advance.168
Meanwhile, Devonshire had written for ‘all the captains to bring their companies to Derby as soon as they possibly can’. Hayne wrote ‘His Grace in His military habit in uniform with his captains, and intends to command the Corps de Garde’.169 Once the men were assembled, Devonshire gave a sixpence to each man in the Chatsworth contingent of the Blues. It may have gone to buy food and drink. The companies were eventually all reviewed as a regiment on the Holmes, open land by the river Derwent.170
On 3 December, with news of the Jacobites being at Leek on their way to Derby, Devonshire reported to Cumberland, ‘I am here with 700 new raised men and should be glad to know what orders you are under’. Again, he sent spies out. Devonshire clearly wanted to know if the army was about to arrive in order that his force could join them.171 Later that day, he realised that there was only one sensible option. He told this to Cumberland on the next day, by which time the Blues were at Nottingham, that they had left Derby because 3,000 Jacobites were at Ashbourne, but 10 miles from Derby. He noted that ‘many well affected persons are in the neighbourhood’ and offered to supply the army with necessaries.172 There was some discussion that a delaying action might have been possible, with Hartington informing Newcome, ‘we had some consultations there about maintaining a Pass over a small Brook between the town & Derby, but upon examination it did not prove tenable’.173 Hartington wrote ‘as it was impossible for us to think of resisting their whole force, we retired to Nottingham’.174
Yet this was not to be the end of the Blues’ flight. On 6 December, Devonshire concluded that he ‘did not think we could stand against the Army of the Rebels’ so he marched to Mansfield and was planning to deliver all their arms to boats on the Trent if necessary.175 Hartington later gave a more extensive description:
We had flying reports most part of the Day that the Rebels were advancing our way, which we had given no credit to, but on the contrary had sent a Captain with one Company to take Quarters in the Road towards Derby, in order to return there as soon as the Highlanders had left it, imaging that they would have gone, directly for London just as it was growing dark our Captain returned & assured us that he had seen the Rebels to the number of three or four Thousand within two miles of the Town, & this being also confirmed by other advices, we thought it was prudent to get out of their way & we went to Retford, which brought us very near the Van Guard of Mr Wade’s army.176
On 21 November, there was a plan to raise the militia in Durham, given the lack of support for Bowes’ troop of horse. The deputy lieutenants there wrote to Chandler, as lord lieutenant and resident in London, asking him for his authority for them to do this. He agreed and then sought the authorisation of Newcastle and the Lord President. An Order in Council was expected.177 On 29 November, the deputy lieutenants wrote to Chandler again, reminding him that raising the militia would result ‘in expenses which are to be repaid by a pound rate assessed on all people in General… according to their several proportions’. Given that the volunteer force was to be disbanded, there was an urgency about raising the militia.178
The York Journal was a newspaper which first went to print on 26 November 1745, and supplemented the city’s existing newspaper, The York Courant. John Gilfillian, its publisher, did so with an explicit intent: ‘being entirely circulated for the service of the King and Church he hoped it would meet with the encouragement of all who wished well to the happy establishment in church and state’.179 Herring wrote that the printer was ‘a mere honest creature, just set up to keep the Whig interest’.180
As in previous months, the press produced anti-Jacobite propaganda, much of which was widely circulated in other newspapers and so reached a wide audience, even among the Jacobites. One such work, full of insulting allusions that contemporaries would immediately grasp, was as follows:
Advertisement with a REWARD
Run away from their Master at Rome, in the Dog-Days of last August, and since secreted in France, two young Lurchers, of the right Italian Breed, and being of a Black Dun colour, with Shar Noses, long Claws, and hanging Ears, have been taken Abroad for King Charles the Second’s Breed, but a Bitch from Italy unfortunately broke the strain in 88, by admitting into the Kennel a base Mongrel of another Litter. They are supposed to be upon the Hunt for Prey in the North. They go a full Dog Trot by Night, for fear of being catch’d. They answer to the Names of Hector and Plunder, and will jump and dance at the sound of a French Horn, being used to that Note by an old Dogmaster at Paris; they prick up their Ears also at the Musick of a Lancashire Hornpipe.
This is to give Notice, that whoever can secure this Couple of Curs, and bring them back to the Pope’s Head at Rome, near St. Peter’s church, or to the Cardinal’s Cap at Versailles, or to the King’s Arms at Newcastle, or to the Thistle at Edinburgh, or the Three Kings at Brentford, or rather to the Sign of the Axe on Tower Hill, shall have the Reward of Thirteen Pence Halfpenny, or any Sum below a Crown, and the Thanks of all the Powers of Europe, except France, Spain and the Pope.
N.B. They have each a French Collar on, stampt with the Father’s Arms, a warming Pan, and the Flower-de-Luce, with this Inscription, ‘We are but Young Puppies of Tencin’s Pack. Beware of them, for they have got a Smack of the Scotch Mange, and those that are bit by them, run mad, and are call’d Jaco-BITES’.181
Verses continued to be published in these weeks on the same themes as previously, with ‘An Ode to Liberty’ linking George II with liberty, compared to the otherwise nature of Catholicism and France. ‘Against Transubstantiation’ was another anti-Catholic verse. ‘Cards and Politics’ denigrated the Jacobites as ‘desperate rebels’ and ‘nasty highland things’, concluding with the resolution ‘To live with freedom or to die with the same’.182 Xenophobism was also employed, ‘It is hoped that the Nobility and Gentry will turn off all the Popish French servants as cooks &c. and drink no French wine.’183
There was a great deal of misinformation and rumours in this period in the lack of accurate news. So much so that at Barnsley on 22 November, church bells rang to celebrate ‘for the joy of the victory’ – the, as it turned out, fictious, defeat of the Jacobite army.184
Far away from any immediate danger were loyalists in the southern counties of England. Yet the Middlesex and Westminster Association was collecting more money. There was also a meeting on 20 November where it was decided to meet every day except Sundays, and from 4–6 p.m. would accept money. It was also decided to enlist men ‘at this critical junction’. Each recruit was also to supply ‘“a Responsible Person” to vouch for his good character’.185 Walpole recorded on 22 November ‘I had this morning a subscription book brought me for our parish.186 Other ‘several citizens of London, of good Fortune, animated by a proper and commendable zeal at this critical Juncture, offered to enlist in the First Regiment of Foot Guards, to serve where His Majesty should require, and were readily accepted’.187
Although most loyal associations were established in the previous months, another was formed in Cambridgeshire in November. However, it was marked by division and desire for self-advancement. Initially, the Chancellor was in favour of an association, ‘but yt as for a subscription he knew not, if it would be expected. As the parliament was then sitting, he concluded such Supplies would be granted, as might supersede the necessity of Private Contributions.’ The matter might have stood there, but the vice chancellor, George Rooke, and the heads of some of the colleges thought that more was needed ‘to shew the forwardness of their zeal & from an ardent passion doubtless for their Country’s Service’. They approached Newcastle and asked how they might show their loyalty. Hurd, in retrospect denounced such ‘frequent meetings and cabals’ which drew up a document allotting quotas from each college.188
When such planning was known it ‘gave general offence’. Hurd wrote ‘It was evident, their design was to make a Job of this Affair, & had a Mind to assume the whole Merit to themselves’. He added that ‘The University has been censured as opposing a subscription itself, which I assure you was very far from being the case’.189
It was advertised in the press on 16 November and the county meeting was held at Cambridge Town Hall six days later. As with earlier associations elsewhere in the country, it was not headed by the county’s lord lieutenant, Lord Lincoln, as his wife was expecting, but by Lord Montfort. Nobles, gentlemen, clergymen, freeholders and the heads of the colleges attended. They unanimously agreed to enter into an association to raise 1,000 men to defend England’s laws, liberties and religion. Men would be paid a bounty of £4 to enlist in the army for six months on condition they would not serve overseas. Recruits were to be aged between 18 and 40 and be at least five feet five inches tall. Seventeen men were enlisted very quickly but it is not known how many more were raised.190
As with other associations, a similar method of financing and payment was employed. In order to raise funds to pay such a bounty, subscriptions were needed. One-tenth of the sum promised had to be paid immediately. William Finch, a Cambridge merchant, was the association’s treasurer. Eventually, £5,819 8s was raised. The most substantial subscribers were the noblemen; the earls of Lincoln, Montfort, Godolphin and Hardwicke with £500 each. The university promised £400 and the corporation £200. ‘The noble act of our Chancellor’ was to subscribe £600 and that this be added to the university’s contribution: ‘a sum, he said, more suitable to the Honour and Dignity of such a Body’. The only female subscriber was a Mary Hutton, with £25.191
Another association formed at this time occurred in Salisbury. John Cooper, a deputy lieutenant and JP, organised this. He formed an association of clothiers and tradesmen of Trowbridge, Bradford and Melksham, of 210 men. Some of the men had been armed with muskets, carbines and basket hilted broadswords, but another 80 arms were needed and he requested that Newcastle send these to them, as well as commissions for the officers. Cooper wrote: ‘We will keep the Jacobites and Papists in awe, for there is a noble spirit in these parts and tis pity it should be discouraged.’ He added that ‘’Tis with great concern that I see the country gentlemen about us will not enter this association’.192
Yorke referred to displays of loyalty in London on 22 November, ‘This day the whole body of the Law in 250 coaches waited on the King with an address’.193 Even in Oxford, there were signs of loyalty as noted when troops marched through the city:
It is impossible to express with what demonstrations of joy they were received, which was visible in everybody’s countenance: the innkeepers with great Alacrity furnishing them and their horses with all necessaries for which they refus’d to be paid a farthing: and the great number of scholars of the University employ’d themselves in giving the soldiers liquor.194
In Staffordshire, troops were welcomed. Richmond wrote of the joy he saw in the inhabitants on seeing the British troops arrive nearby. A soldier at Lichfield wrote of the hospitality of locals and how they saw the soldiers as saviours. A resident of Stone prepared bedding and boiled beef for the ‘poor soldiers’. Cumberland was greeted with shouts of joy when arriving in that town on 27 November. Swynfen Jervis, a barrister of Meaford Hall near Stone, offered to billet Cumberland and up to 30 soldiers at his house; his brother offered to accommodate 300 more at his home.195 At Lichfield on 1 December Cumberland attended a service at the cathedral and alter at a church, ‘He has gained a vast character here, by his great Affability, and admitting all to his Presence. 196
Sir Everard Fawkener (1694–1758), Cumberland’s secretary, wrote to the gentlemen and inhabitants of Birmingham on 30 November to express his master’s thanks at their support:
His Royal Highness has commanded me to acquaint you that he saw with great satisfaction the very strong marks of affection to His Majesty’s person and Government and of a true love to your country and the excellent constitution we so happily enjoy expressed on the occasion of the demand of the horses for the more expeditiously bringing forward the troops on their March to supress this wicked and unnatural rebellion.197
Likewise, Cumberland informed the magistrates of Liverpool, of ‘The proofs of fidelity and zeal which you have given and give upon this important occasion, & of which Colonel Grimes has made a very exact report are as they ought to be extremely agreeable to me’. 198
Responses on seeing the Jacobite army were hostile. Richard Lluellyn, on seeing them leave Manchester, wrote, ‘I thank God we have at last got rid of them for they went on Tuesday for Leek’.199 A Mr Mountfield at Leek saw them thus, ‘They at first seemed fine on good horses, but then the greater part looked shabby, lousy, diminutive creatures, some without breeches, some without saddles.’200 Another negative description of the Jacobite army was ‘they don’t appear such terrible fellows as they were represented… the men are of but small size: I think our dragoons could trample them underfoot… a great many of the Foot are poor Dimmunitive Creatures’.201
Verbal hostility towards the Jacobites was still to be found in these weeks. The county of Somerset and the corporations of Bedwin, Beverley, Great Yarmouth and many others, sent their loyalist addresses to the court, as others had in previous months. There were still anti-Jacobite writings in evidence in print. In London, John Collier wrote, on 12 November,
At the Union coffee house in Cornhill I saw the ceremony of burning the pretender’s declaration, etc. There was the greatest concourse of people I ever saw on any occasion, and when the papers were put into the fire three universal huzzas given.
At the end of the month when Jacobite prisoners from France were brought into London, ‘Not a bad circumstance of the inclination of the populace that they broke the glasses of the coaches yesterday in which the prisoners came to the tower, and but for the guards would have pulled em to pieces’.202
Henry Fielding’s True Patriot gave differing pictures. In one edition there was much in line that the clergy in their sermons of 5 November had written of; that a successful rebellion would mean Catholic-inspired massacres, burnings and torture. He stated that his purpose was ‘principally intended to inflame this nation against the Rebels’. Yet a week later he gave a more temperate address, about the positive benefits of government under George II. Indeed, there was so much liberty in recent years that ‘must be acknowledged by every man of the least candour’ that royalty and ministers could be mocked in print in public with impunity. As for the King, ‘he hath less deserved [it] than his predecessors to be the object of it, so he hath supported it with more dignity and contempt than they have done’.203
He also argued for the benefits of commerce, which he said were at risk by the rebellion. According to him:
Now tis trade, by which alone many thousands have got an honest livelihood for themselves and families, must be totally ruined; for, if this nation should be once enslaved, it would be impossible for an honest man to carry on this business any longer. A freeman (as hath been proved) may justly sell himself, but a slave cannot.
He added ‘when Rome and France are repaid their demands, when a vast army of hungry highlanders and a larger army of hungry priests are satisfied, how miserable a pittance will remain to your share?’204
It has been commonplace to describe the situation among civilians in London to have been critical, especially when the Jacobite army was still advancing. Philip Yorke wrote on 9 December of the situation a few days ago,
The motion of the Rebels to Derby threw us into no small panic here, lest they should give you the slip, as they had done Marshal Wade and get to London by hasty marches. Our alarm was increased by the news of a large embarkation at Dunkirk which was intended for the south.205
However, some took other views. Sir More Molyneux of Loseley, Surrey, wrote on 9 December:
I cant say yt I am so afraid at this critical time as a great many are, for I go upon ye reason if things, I cant see, morally speaking, how the rebels can get to London, as the King’s and the Duke’s Troops are situated. Without fighting & then we have great reason to think that they will be beat… tis plain they won’t stand a battle, till they are forc’d, wch I hope will be soon.206
Tucker felt likewise:
There are very strange notions prevail of them reaching even the capital without opposition. This is only the effect of panic and want of judgement for the knowing pretend today they must inevitably fall before our two armys that have in a manner hemmed them in between them. We expect hourly to hear of an action between them and the Duke if they stand, pray God they may be extirpated and tranquillity restored again, but I am afraid the happy day is far off.207
A few days earlier, Hurd had expressed like sentiments, ‘We are in great expectations of the whole Affair being over in a little time.’208
Walpole gave a mixed assessment, writing about a possible Jacobite advance on London,
The news of this threw the town into great consternation… But here in London the aversion to them is amazing: on some thought of the King’s going to an encampment at Finchley, the weaver not only offered him a thousand men, but the whole body of the law formed themselves into a little army under the command of Lord Chief Justice Willes, and were to have done duty at St. James’, to guard the royal family in the King’s absence.209
They were to exercise at Hyde Park and be inspected by General Folliott.210
Samuel Bromfield, writing on 4 December, was far from confident, and after writing about ‘the Rebels’ fury’, wrote,
I am afraid this adventure of our army has done them hurt and retarded them, so that the Rebels will get before them to London, and God only knows will be the end of it. It gives great uneasiness to this country. But we are not left without hope that they will be scourged, and the more so because I do not hear that anybody of consideration has joined them since they left Carlisle.211
William Cranston, in London, wrote a few days later ‘we were terribly alarmed here from the rumour and belief that the rebels were south of the duke and posting with all imaginable hast to usward’. He also wrote ‘Pray God send us out of these difficultys speedily’.212
There was another fear, first voiced by Tucker on 5 December: ‘there is an apprehension gone forth today of a French invasion, which I have heard from some few’. He was also concerned that there might not be a battle in England, ‘We are much concerned to find the Rebels will not stand the Duke, but hope he will be able to reach them soon, and give a good account of them’.213
In London, on 7 December, the City of London ordered that one regiment of trained bands was to patrol the streets in the daytime and two at night time. More watchmen were employed.214 Chief Justice Sir John Willes (1685–1761) told the King, on hearing that he and the Prince of Wales were to head the army gathering at Finchley, that he would raise a regiment of lawyers to defend the royal family and he would the colonel.215
It is unlikely that these volunteer formations would have proved very militarily useful, with unknown training, arms and equipment, but the fact of their being in existence shows that the regime commanded a degree of political support in the capital. Of more importance, practically speaking, were the troops posted to the north of London. Yet, as we shall see, none of these defenders were necessary.
Notes
1. Saville, ‘Letters’, p. 313.
2. Bell, ‘Memorials’, pp. 238–239; Douglas, History, p. 51.
3. Douglas, History, pp. 48–49.
4. Mounsey, Carlisle, p. 75.
5. Ibid.
6. Ibid., pp. 75–76; A. and H. Tayler, eds., 1745 and After (Edinburgh: T. Nelson and Sons, 1938), p. 92.
7. Dalton, ‘Cumberland’, p. 110.
8. Douglas, History, p. 52.
9. Ibid., pp. 49–50.
10. Mounsey, Carlisle, p. 76.
11. Boyse, Impartial History, p. 93n.
12. TNA, SP36/73, f361r.
13. Dalton, ‘Cumberland’, pp. 110–111.
14. Mounsey, Carlisle, p. 76.
15. CAS: Whitehaven, YD/Da8.
16. Mounsey, Carlisle, pp. 76–77.
17. Henderson, History, pp. 56–57.
18. TNA, SP36/74, f.106r; CAS Whitehaven, Y/Pen.Acc.2689/35.
19. Marchant, History, pp. 168–170.
20. Mounsey, Carlisle, p. 77.
21. Ibid., p. 77.
22. Ibid., pp. 78, 87.
23. CAS Whitehaven, Acc.2689/35.
24. Mounsey, Carlisle, pp. 78, 87.
25. Ibid., p. 79.
26. Yorke, Hardwicke, I, p. 488.
27. Saville, ‘Secret Comment’, p. 262.
28. Mounsey, Carlisle, p. 114.
29. Lewis, Correspondence, 19, p. 165.
30. Saville, ‘Letters’, pp. 315–316.
31. RA, CP MAIN/7/62 (M).
32. TNA, SP36/73, f.360r.
33. CAS: Carlisle, Ca4/42.
34. TNA SP36/81, ff.213r–218v.
35. Mounsey, Carlisle, pp. 56, 120.
36. Lord Elcho, Short Account of the affairs of Scotland 1744–1746 (Edinburgh: David Douglas, 1907), p. 324.
37. James Maxwell, Narrative of the Expedition of Prince Charles (Edinburgh, 1841), p. 64.
38. Elcho, Short Account, p. 325.
39. CAS: Whitehaven, DF4/12.
40. Ray, History, p. 98.
41. CAS: Carlisle, PR5/31.
42. Ibid.: Kendal, WPR8/W1.
43. J. Hodgkinson, The Greater Parish of Kendal, 1553–2002 (Kendal: Little Trinity Publishing, 2002), p. 20.
44. The London Evening Post, 2823, 7–9 December 1745; General Evening Post, 1902, 3–5 December 1745; Dalton, ‘Cumberland and the ‘45’, p. 111; CAS: Whitehaven, 2689/34.
45. Ray, History, p. 119.
46. CAS:Whitehaven, D/Pen.Acc.2689/18.
47. Gentleman’s Magazine, 16 (1746), p. 235.
48. MNMM, DX 594, ff.2r–3r.
49. TNA, SP36/69, f.234v; MNMM, DX594, ff.3r–5v.
50. BL. Add. Mss., 32705, f.375r; MNMM, DX594, f.7v–r.
51. BL. Add. Mss., 32705, f.367r.
52. MNMM, DX594, ff.9v–10r, 18v; RA, CP (M) 7/142.
53. MNMM, DX 594, ff.13r–15v.
54. Ray, History, p. 109.
55. RA, CP MAIN/7/112 (M).
56. LRO, DDHO475/56, 58, 63, 69, 74, 75, 80.
57. TNA, SP36/68, f.292r.
58. NRO, Malton to Fitzwilliam, 11 November 1745.
59. TNA, SP36/73, ff.186r–7v.
60. RA, CP MAIN/7/112 (M).
61. TNA, SP36/74, ff.82v, 83r.
62. Ibid., f.111r
63. Ibid., f.231r.
64. BL. Add. Mss., 35598, f.128v.
65. Ibid; ‘Hoghton Tower’, pp. 118–119; LRO, DDHO1475/86.
66. CAS: Whitehaven, D/Pen. Acc.2689/32.
67. RA, CP MAIN/7/113 (M).
68. LRO, DDSC 44/15.
69. TNA, SP36/71, f.197r.
70. Ibid., f.241r.
71. Manuscripts of the Hon. Frederick Lindley Wood, pp. 112, 114–115.
72. DCL Sharp 150, 26.
73. TNA, SP36/74, f.231r–231v.
74. WYAS: Leeds, Birkbeck Papers, 12; ibid., NP1514/3.
75. Newcastle Journal, 7 December 1745.
76. BL. Add. Mss. 51386, f.96r.
77. Ray, History, pp. 139–140.
78. KUHCA, DFP 472–473.
79. TNA, SP36/74, f.25r.
80. General Advertiser, 3460, 30 November 1745.
81. TNA, SP36/74, ff.161r–162v; 75, f.36r.
82. KUHCA, BRB7, f.82r.
83. TNA, SP36/76, f.282r.
84. Ibid., 76, ff.157r–158v.
85. YCA, B43/264.
86. TNA, SP36/76, f21r; CH, 324.0.
87. The General Advertiser, 3466, 27 November 1745.
88. NRO, Malton to Fitzwilliam, 11, 25, 27 November 1745.
89. The Caledonian Mercury, 3923, 3 December 1745; TNA, SP36/74, f.266r.
90. General Advertiser, 3463, 5 December 1745.
91. TNA, SP36/74, f.266r.
92. Report on the Manuscripts of Lady Du Cane (London: Johnson and Co., 1905), p. 77.
93. WYAS, Leeds, TN/PO3/3C, 115.
94. BL. Add. Mss. 35889, f.38r.
95. The Newcastle Courant, 2706, 26 October–2 November 1745; The General Advertiser, 3444, 31 October 1745, The Gentleman’s Magazine, 15 (1745), p. 664.
96. The Manuscripts of Lord Kenyon (London: Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1894), p. 482.
97. Ray, History, pp. 125–126.
98. Marchant, History, p. 193.
99. Records of the Borough of Nottingham, VI, pp. 202–203.
100. Newcastle Courant, 2711, 30 November–7 December 1745.
101. Saville, ‘Letters’, p. 313.
102. Yorke, Hardwicke, I, p. 467.
103. Henry Pettit, ed., The Correspondence of Edward Young, 1683–1765, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 216.
104. Sarah Brewer, ed., The Early Letters of Bishop Richard Hurd, 1739–1762 (Woodbridge: Boydell Press, 1995), p. 145.
105. The General Evening Post, 1901, 30 November–3 December 1745.
106. Bell, ‘Memorials’, p. 245.
107. LRO, DDSc44/15, Talon, Selections, p. 226.
108. Francis Stuart Banner, ‘The Going out of Prince Charles in 1745’, Lancashire and Cheshire History Society NS, 2, (1905), p. 62.
109. Manchester Magazine, 462, 24 December 1745.
110. Brocksbank and Kenworthy, ‘Diary’, p. 102.
111. True Patriot, 4, 26 November 1745; Doe, ed., ‘Diary’, II, p. 558.
112. The Penny London Post, 404, 27–29 November 1745.
113. Brocksbank and Kenworthy, ‘Diary’, p. 102.
114. Boulton, Staffordshire.
115. WYAS: Leeds, TN/PO3/3C/84.
116. BL. Add. Mss. 35598, f.129v.
117. WYAS: Leeds, NH2875/6.
118. Manuscripts of the Hon. Frederick Lindley Wood, p. 134.
119. BL. Add. Mss., 35598, f.133r.
120. Bod. Lib. Donc107/2, f.171r.
121. NRO, Malton to Fitzwilliam, 30 November 1745.
122. Ibid., 2 December 1745.
123. WYAS: Leeds, TN/PO3/3C/124.
124. Whiting, ‘Two Yorkshire Diaries’, pp. 108–109.
125. Ibid., p. 110.
126. BL. Add. Mss. 35598, f.129r.
127. Ibid., f.130r.
128. Yorke, Hardwicke, I, p. 469.
129. Whiting, ‘Two Yorkshire Diaries’, op. cit., pp. 110–111.
130. Brocksbank and Kenworthy ‘Diary’, p. 102.
131. Banner, ‘Going Out’, p. 81.
132. St. James’ Evening Post, 5597, 30 November–2 December 1745.
133. J.P. Earwaker, ed., The Constables’ accounts of the manor of Manchester, III (Manchester: H. Blakelock, 1892), pp. 21–23; Manuscripts of Lord Kenyon, pp. 479–480.
134. HMC Kenyon, p. 481.
135. Ibid., p. 480.
136. CA, ZAB4, f115v.
137. Ibid., Cowper MSS 1, p. 278.
138. Ibid, DCH/X/9A/9.
139. Ibid., 9, 10.
140. Ibid., Cowper, Mss, 1, p. 279.
141. Ibid., DCH/X9A/28.
142. Brewer, The Early Letters, p. 147.
143. TNA, SP36/73, f.227r.
144. Crawford, ‘Diary’, p. 71.
145. CA, P20/13/2.
146. Brewer, The Early Letters, p. 144.
147. Ibid., p. 147.
148. Ray, History, pp. 123–127.
149. TNA, SP36/80, f.120r.
150. Ray, History, pp. 128–131, 140–141.
151. John Burton, British Liberty Endangered (London, 1749), p. 30. WYAS, Leeds, NP/D3/4/11/4.
152. TNA, SP36/75, f152r.
153. Burton, British Liberty Endanger’d, p. 33 London Evening Post, 2822, 5–7 December 1745.
154. London Evening Post, 2822, 5–7 December 1745.
155. CA, DCH/X/9a/13.
156. Ibid., Cowper Mss 1, 279.
157. TNA, SP36/74, f.207v.
158. Ibid., 75, f.115v.
159. Ibid., ff.37r, 114v; TS20/93/3.
160. C.S. Davies, ed., A History of Macclesfield (Manchester, 1961), p. 111; TNA, TS20/93/3.
161. Bod. Lib Donc.107/2, f.179v.
162. Elcho, Short Account, p. 334.
163. F. Renaud, History of Prestbury (Manchester, 1876), pp. 178–179.
164. Anon., Records, VI, pp. 208, 206.
165. Chinnery, Records, V, p. 157.
166. G.R. Potter, ‘A government spy in Derbyshire during the “45”’, Derbyshire Archaeological Journal, 89 (1969), pp. 25–26.
167. Ibid., pp. 26–28.
168. RA, CP MAIN/7/174, 210 (M).
169. Robert Simpson, A Collection of Fragments illustrative of the History and Antiquities of Derby (Derby: G. Wilkins and Sons, 1826), vol. 1, pp. 249–250.
170. DCA, C/5//A/2; ‘Nathan Ben Shadai’, The Chronicle of the Derbyshire Regiment (London, 1760), p. 4.
171. RA, CP MAIN/7/274 (M).
172. Ibid., 278.
173. DCA, CS1/260.58.
174. Ibid.
175. RA, CP MAIN/7/303 (M).
176. DCA, CS1/60.58.
177. DCCL, Sharp Mss., 150, 26, 36.
178. TNA, SP36/75, f.115r.
179. R. Davies, Memoirs of the York Press (London, 1868), p. 209.
180. BL. Add. Mss., 35889, f.84r.
181. Marchant, History, pp. 203–204.
182. Gentleman’s Magazine, 15, pp. 604–607.
183. Reading Mercury, 9 December 1745.
184. Whiting, ‘Two Yorkshire Diaries’, p. 108.
185. RA, CP MAIN/7/56 (M).
186. Lewis, Correspondence, 19, p. 167.
187. Derby Mercury, 12 December 1745.
188. Brewer, Early Letters, p. 157.
189. Ibid., pp. 157–158.
190. C.H. Cooper, Annals of Cambridge, IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1862), pp. 252–254.
191. Ibid.; Brewer, Early Letters, p. 151.
192. TNA, SP36/74, f.203r.
193. Yorke, Hardwicke, I, p. 467.
194. Oxford Gazette and Reading Mercury, 2, 25 November 1745.
195. Boulton, Staffordshire.
196. Reading Mercury, 9 December 1745.
197. RA, CP MAIN/7/232 (M).
198. Ibid.
199. Loveday, John Loveday, pp. 361–362.
200. Boulton, Staffordshire.
201. Reading Mercury, 9 December 1745.
202. Saville, ‘Letters’, pp. 314, 318.
203. Cited in Jarvis, Collected Papers, II, pp. 196–198, 209.
204. Ibid., pp. 199–200.
205. Yorke, Hardwicke, I, p. 477.
206. Surrey History Centre, LM.COR.11.
207. Bod. Lib., Don.c.107/2, f.178r.
208. Brewer, Early Letters, p. 147.
209. Lewis, Correspondence, 19, p. 180.
210. Derby Mercury, 12 December 1745.
211. Banner, ‘The Going Out’, p. 79.
212. Saville, ‘Letters’, p. 318.
213. Bod. Lib., Donc.107/2, f. 180r.
214. Gentleman’s Magazine, 15, 1745, p. 665.
215. Saville, ‘Letters’, p. 318.