In September 2002, one year after the September rr attacks, the Bush administration released a document called the National Security Strategy. Like NSC-68 of 1950 (discussed in Chapter 23), the National Security Strategy outlined a fundamental shift in American foreign policy. And like NSC-68, it began with a discussion not of weaponry or military strategy, but of freedom.
The document defined freedom as consisting of political democracy, freedom of expression, religious toleration, free trade, and free markets. These, it proclaimed, were universal ideals, “right and true for every person, in every society.” It went on to promise that the United States would “extend the benefits of freedom” by fighting not only “terrorists” but also “tyrants” around the world. Since nothing less than freedom was at stake, the document insisted that the United States must maintain an overwhelming preponderance of military power, not allowing any other country to challenge either its overall strength or its dominance in any region of the world. And to replace the Cold War doctrine of deterrence, which assumed that the certainty of retaliation would prevent attacks on the United States and its allies, the National Security Strategy announced a new foreign policy principle—“preemptive” war. If the United States believed that a nation posed a possible future threat to its security, it had the right to attack before such a threat materialized.