2
Having addressed the problem with which this book is to be concerned, that modernity has decreased freedom and led to a loss of meaning, the aim of this chapter will be to present the solution which will be espoused. The idea which we intend to espouse is ‘authenticity’. As an idea, authenticity is superficially simple yet definitively elusive. Although ‘authenticity’ has been defined in terms of ‘originality’ and ‘self-realization’, and expressed through the imperative ‘be true to oneself’, what is actually inferred by these terms is obscure and often left unsaid. Fostered within an individualistic culture, it seems intuitive that one has one’s own particular mode of being; however, one confronts difficulty in attempting to articulate exactly what it means to be authentic. One is confronted with various strands of thought, which take one on alternative tangents and far from the process of simply being oneself. The issues with which one must engage include whether there can be such a thing as a ‘true self’, whether one creates or discovers oneself and what precisely provides the means to be authentic. How then to best approach the task of explicating the concept of authenticity?
In order to achieve our aim, we will begin by setting forth a general overview of the concept of authenticity, which will permit us to further develop our own concept within the course of our enquiry (Section 2.1). Here we will explain authenticity as a distinctly modern concept and discuss the various aspects of this complex ideal. We will then proceed to further define authenticity in relation to alternative ethical ideals (Section 2.2). Authenticity will be compared and contrasted with the ethics of sincerity, integrity and autonomy. In the third section we will consider the social turn of authenticity (Section 2.3). What this entails is that modern advocates of authenticity have turned away from existentialism and towards social thought for inspiration. In order to understand why existential authenticity fell out of favour, we will turn to discuss the existentialist approach (Section 2.4). Here we will focus on Jean-Paul Sartre and attempt to elucidate the flaws in his account. In the fifth and final section we will then turn to an ethic of authenticity (Section 2.5). Focusing on Charles Taylor, it will be argued that rather than providing an alternative to the existential approach, Taylor can instead be understood to develop this tradition.
2.1 Articulating authenticity
In general terms, the phenomenon of authenticity implies individuality, originality and being true to oneself. However, as discussed in the introduction, the concept of authenticity initially appears relatively intuitive, but quickly descends into obscurity. There are various approaches, and multiple interpretations of the aspects of authenticity. We will discuss the intricacies in the following sections, expanding it in contrast to alternative ideals. Here, however, we will begin by discussing the fundamental features of authenticity. Within this section it will be claimed that on a basic level, the concept of authenticity emphasizes individuality, is understood in relation to inauthenticity, and is a distinctly modern concept.
The first aspect of authenticity which will be discussed is its emphasis on individuality. That is, to be authentic is to be truly oneself, to choose for oneself, as opposed to accepting what one has become unreflectively. Søren Kierkegaard epitomizes this particular feature in his notebooks, where he claims that the purpose of his enquiries is ‘to find a truth which is true for me, to find the idea for which I can live and die’ (2015: §A75). His reason for this individualistic approach is because he realized that many people who are born into specific cultural practices accept them unquestionably. This belief is inherent in his attitude towards the Christian church, within which he believed that many so-called practitioners had not themselves chosen to be Christian. In order to explain this, he employed a travel metaphor depicting two men who had arrived at the same location, however, whilst one had mounted a horse and consciously travelled there, the other had fallen asleep on the back of a hay cart and arrived through no will of his own (2009: 261). For Kierkegaard, one’s faith had to be freely and consciously chosen. To freely choose it is necessary to reflect upon oneself, induce an element of doubt and embrace that which one determines to be self-evident. It is therefore the examined and self-chosen life which could be said to be authentic for Kierkegaard. This, however, raises the question, from where does one derive one’s sense of individuality?
This leads us to a second feature that authenticity is a relative concept insofar as it is defined in relation to inauthenticity. To be inauthentic is to adhere to the herd and to derive one’s beliefs, opinions and values from externally imposed norms. Authenticity, on the other hand, suggests the contrary of determining one’s own values for oneself. One does not need to live according to social goals, of learning to drive by eighteen, of going to university, or pursuing a conventional career, working 9 to 5 within an office. This is made explicit by Martin Heidegger, who claims that our existence is inauthentic for the most part. In the mode of existence which he terms ‘everydayness’ one does not choose oneself, but rather one’s values, beliefs and desires are determined by das Man, or ‘the One’. Heidegger defines this mode of everydayness by stating, ‘we take pleasure and enjoy ourselves as das Man take pleasure, we read, see, and judge about literature and art as das Man see and judge’ (2010: §127). The particular mode of existence which is dominated by das Man thus suggests social conformity. Authenticity is thus characterized by its attitude towards uncritical acceptance. As Jacob Golomb succinctly puts it, ‘one knows what one is only after realising what one is not’ (1995: 201). Although there are approaches that are almost anarchistic to the extent that they call for a radical rejection of conformity to social norms, there are also subtler theorists who simply suggest that we do not accept values uncritically.1 Nevertheless, authenticity is determined in relation to inauthentic existence which is not chosen by ourselves.
Can this concept also be retrospectively applied to the likes of Socrates who quite clearly meets the condition of having not acted in accordance with social convention? Not quite. The reason is becaus e the concept of authenticity is a modern ideal and one which is inextricably linked to individuality. Although Socrates may have gone against the social norms, and that which was expected of him as an Athenian citizen, he nevertheless acted in terms of the social norms definitive of the polis and expected of all citizens. Thus, whilst he may have been charged with corrupting the youth, he believed that his philosophical midwifery, of helping those pregnant with possibility to conceive of truth, was beneficial for the polis, as he so boldly claims at his trial (2003). Even Diogenes’s revolutionary claim to be cosmopolitan does not exempt him from the social recognition his fellow Greeks adhered to, for to understand oneself as a ‘citizen of the world’ is still to understand oneself as part of a larger social collective (1948: VI.II.§63). As Charles Guignon makes explicit, ‘certainly Socrates and St. Augustine, among other pre-modern thinkers, had a vivid sense of the importance of self-knowledge and a commitment to being true to oneself in what one says and does. But they lacked the experience of the self as a bounded centre of experience and action with no defining connections to anything distinct from itself’ (2008: 279).
Rather, to be authentic requires that one understand oneself as an individual and determine one’s values for oneself, rather than derive these from one’s society. Insofar as it is premised upon the concept of individuality, authenticity is a distinctly modern theory. As noted in our historical survey of modernity, individuality as an idea emerged alongside the breakdown of traditional social hierarchies. Thus, pre-modern subjects cannot be characterized in terms of authenticity because prior to modernity this phenomenon did not exist conceptually. Having offered a preliminary account of authenticity – that it is an individual, relative and distinctly modern concept – it will now be compared with the alternative ethical ideals of sincerity, integrity and autonomy. The reason for doing so will be, firstly, to differentiate authenticity from other modern ideals to which it bears a resemblance, and, secondly, to further define authenticity in relation to these.
2.2 Alternative ethical ideals
The first ethical ideal with which authenticity will be contrasted is that of sincerity. In our everyday understanding, to be sincere is to express one’s heartfelt convictions, or at the very least, to not attempt to deceive others with regard to one’s true intentions. In Sincerity and Authenticity, Lionel Trilling demarcates the decline of sincerity as an ethical ideal and the emergence of authenticity as a more prevalent ideal. Trilling offers a genealogy of sincerity, though he determines that ‘the word as we now use it refers primarily to a congruence between avowal and actual feeling’ (1972 [2009]: 2). What this means is that sincerity carries connotations of frankness and expression of one’s innermost beliefs. In his explication of sincerity, Trilling cites Polonius famous lines from Shakespeare’s Hamlet: ‘to thine own self be true / And it doth follow, as the night the day / Thou canst not then be false to any man’ (1972 [2009]: 3). For Trilling these three lines epitomize what it is to be sincere – namely, the avoidance of being false to others by being true to oneself.
Although one must first discover one’s true self, on a sociological level, one is then required to portray this to others, as opposed to presenting a false image of oneself. This concept is also intricately linked with one’s social status, or role within society. That is, to be sincere is to understand one’s place within society and to act in accordance with this. As Trilling claims, ‘society requires of us that we present ourselves as being sincere, and the most efficacious way of satisfying this demand is to see to it that we really are sincere, that we actually are what we want our community to know we are’ (1972 [2009]: 10–11). However, the breakdown of traditional structures has problematized this, since if there is no role with which to identify then there is nothing to act sincerely in accordance with.
Although the idea of being true to oneself seems congruous with authenticity, there are two distinct differences. First, sincerity requires that one be oneself for the benefit of others, whilst to be authentic is solely for one’s own sake. Thus, as Trilling notes, ‘[sincerity] does not propose being true to oneself as an end, but only as a means’ (1972 [2009]: 9). Secondly, from a negative standpoint, one is understood to be insincere if one does not act in accordance with one’s social status, or the expectations of society. ‘In short, we play the role of being ourselves, we sincerely act the part of the sincere person, with the result that a judgement may be passed upon our sincerity that it is not authentic’ (1972 [2009]: 11). Under the criteria of authenticity, however, to present oneself as none other than one’s social role would be to live an inauthentic existence.
A similar criticism is made by Jean-Paul Sartre who equates sincerity with bad faith, which, as we will see in Section 2.4., is equivocal to inauthenticity. As Sartre explains, ‘the essential structure of sincerity does not differ from that of bad faith since the sincere man constitutes himself as what he is in order not to be it’ (2013: 65). Thus, for Sartre, sincerity is ironically an attempt to avoid bad faith by being what one is. Namely, for Sartre, any attempt to portray one’s true self can only end in failure because there is no essential self. However, as already established, authenticity rejects the idea of upholding externally imposed values. To equate oneself with one’s social role is thus to be inauthentic, or as Sartre claims, to live in bad faith. Authenticity thus goes beyond sincerity in that it emphasizes that one should instead determine one’s own values.
A second ethical ideal which bears a resemblance to the concept of authenticity is integrity. On a general understanding, to be a person of integrity is to possess certain commitments and to identify oneself with these. To maintain these commitments is then to remain true to oneself. According to Lynne McFall there are two forms of integrity: moral and personal (1987). The difference between these two approaches is that personal integrity is characterized by partiality and subjectivity, whereas moral integrity is impartial and universal. In order to distinguish these, McFall offers the example of a captain on a ship whose husband and two other passengers have fallen overboard and are drowning. Her thought experiment places one’s husband starboard and the two other passengers portside – as such, one cannot save both parties. Personal integrity suggests, as a wife, to save one’s husband; moral integrity, as the captain, expects one to save the two passengers. Moral integrity thus requires that one place external moral constraints before one’s own personal convictions; in this sense it is easily distinguishable from authenticity, insofar as the authentic person would side with their own personal conviction. This idea is also exemplified by Thomas Kasulis, who explains that ‘to preserve integrity, I should treat other people as autonomous agents having the privilege of being able to determine their own actions freely, including choosing the relationships into which they enter’ (2002: 117).
The second approach, personal integrity, however, is not so easily distinguished. As McFall explains, ‘personal integrity requires that an agent subscribe to some consistent set of principles or commitments and, in the face of temptation or challenge, uphold these principles or commitments for what the agent takes to be the right reasons’ (1987: 9). This ethical idea is espoused by Bernard Williams, who claims that ‘to act with integrity is to act in a way that accurately reflects your sense of who you are, to act from motives, interests, and commitments that are most deeply your own’ (1981: 49). A lack of personal integrity is thus attributed to someone who, either through cowardice or ignorance, fails to maintain their commitments. A further facet of integrity is that the various parts of our personality are integrated into a unified whole. This idea is well portrayed by Harry Frankfurt who advocates the organization of our beliefs and desires into a hierarchy of importance (1971: 5–20).
There is real overlap between the ethic of authenticity and integrity, in terms of commitment, as will become evident in the succeeding chapter, and the desire for a unified self. However, the main difference between authenticity and personal integrity is that integrity is an attribute which one possesses, whereas authenticity is a state which one attains through rejection of externally imposed values which one does not consciously endorse. That is, by acting in accordance with the desires or volitions which other desires are subordinated to, and which one is committed to, one can be said to be a person of integrity. To be authentic, on the other hand, thus far construed, is to realize one’s values for oneself, rather than simply acting out of desires which one may not have consciously chosen. Understood negatively, one who lacks integrity does so because they fail to uphold their commitments, whereas one is inauthentic when one is not conscious of oneself as an individual.
Autonomy, as we have already determined, was the ethical idea heralded and upheld by advocates of the Enlightenment. Kant, for example, developed the categorical imperative, that agents ought to ‘act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it becomes a universal law’ (1993: 30). This is built upon the ‘golden rule’, that one ought to treat others how one wishes to be treated oneself, though it emphasizes that we have a moral duty not to negatively impinge upon the freedom of others. Autonomy does not derive ethical validity from external values upheld within society, but from an abstract principle of the agent’s own rendering. The concept of autonomy is more problematic than sincerity and integrity in that it co-exists alongside authenticity and shares a number of similarities. First, both ideas are opposed to tradition-based notions of what constitutes ‘right’. That is, both ideas reject that moral principles should be determined by social or cultural influences but instead grounded in the self-governing individual. Secondly, in both approaches, that which is to be considered right is determined by acting consistently and in accordance with a self-imposed principle.
Where the two ethical ideas differ is in terms of how rigidly one adheres to that which one considers right. On an autonomous ethical approach, one advocates a formal principle, such as the categorical imperative, and considers deviance from this to be opposed to right conduct. Authenticity, however, takes a broader ethical view. The crucial difference, according to Alessandro Ferrara, is that the ethic of authenticity introduces the idea that there are motives, desires and commitments that sometimes should outweigh the restrictions of rational reflection (1993: 88). That is, part of being human is experiencing a variety of moods and emotions, and although these may cause one to diverge from one’s principles, what is important is that one recognizes this and reconciles these with oneself. As Ferrara elsewhere elucidates, ‘all ethics of authenticity start from the assumption that in order to be a worthy moral being, we must not deny or try to suppress, but rather acknowledge the urges which deflect us from our principles, while at the same time continuing to orient our conduct to the moral point of view’ (1998: 7).
Ferrara here suggests that we need to be aware of and celebrate our particularity rather than suppress it. According to Ferrara, this emphasis upon particularity is a fundamental feature of ethics of authenticity, and which ethics of autonomy do not account for. Thus, whilst autonomy emphasizes freedom to choose, it does not insist upon this choice as particular to the individual. Although authenticity is distinct from autonomy, it is nevertheless dependent upon a conception of autonomy. Namely, in order to live authentically one must be able to freely reflect upon and enact one’s desires and values. Authenticity thus requires one to be free from manipulation and self-distorting influences, in order to be able to reflect and choose, and act from desires that are in some sense one’s own.
The preliminary articulation of authenticity, as a distinctly modern ideal, which emphasizes the rejection of externally imposed ethical standards and the actualization of one’s own ethical values, can now be expanded upon. In engagement with sincerity it was discovered that authenticity is an end in itself. That is, whilst sincerity suggests actualizing one’s true self for the benefit of others, authenticity is pursued for its own sake. In contrast with integrity, it was determined that to be authentic one must be conscious of oneself as an individual. Whilst personal integrity focuses upon the maintenance of one’s commitments, being authentic concerns being true to oneself. And contrary to autonomy, it was revealed that whilst authenticity involves a self-imposed principle, deviation from this does not detract from one’s authenticity, but can in fact highlight it. That is, the ethic of autonomy demands strict adherence to moral values, whilst authenticity recognizes that humans are fallible and incapable of consistently acting in accordance with moral absolutes. Having expanded our preliminary definition of authenticity – in relation to the rival ethical ideals of sincerity, integrity and autonomy – we will now proceed to further develop our definition by considering the alternative views upheld by its advocates. In the following section, we will consider the sources from which contemporary advocates of authenticity derive their understanding.
2.3 The socio-ethical turn
Authenticity is perhaps most commonly associated with existentialism. As a cultural and philosophical movement, ‘existentialism’ has been obscured by commentators’ desire to incorporate anyone who concerns themselves with modern existence.2 Even with regard to philosophical advocates, this term has been used as a catchall to incorporate thinkers who existed prior to the establishment of the phrase, such as Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and those who later came to reject this label, including Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel and Albert Camus. However, in this chapter we will seek to avoid the difficulties which arise through employing ‘existentialism’ as an umbrella term, by focusing on the primary proponent of this philosophical movement: Jean-Paul Sartre. Ironically, when the term ‘existentialist’ was initially applied to Sartre he resisted acceptance.3 As Simone de Beauvoir explains in her autobiography, ‘Sartre had refused to allow Gabriel Marcel to apply this adjective to him: “My philosophy is a philosophy of existence; I don’t even know what ‘Existentialism’ is”. I shared his irritation. [. . .] But our protests were in vain. In the end, we took the epithet that everyone used for us and used it for our own purposes’ (1965: 45–6).4
However, within contemporary socio-ethical literature, existential authenticity has largely been ignored. Associated with self-creation, many theorists believe that this leads to a form of aestheticism and egoistic self-indulgence. As Alessandro Ferrara attests, ‘the notion of authenticity is no longer used mainly in an existentialist sense or as a shorthand term for capturing the cipher of a moral climate characterised by a one-sided emphasis on self-realisation, intimacy, privatism and scepticism concerning all values that transcend the self’ (1998: ix). A further consequence is that by focusing on the subject, it is believed the existentialists are incapable of offering a satisfactory account of moral norms. As Charles Taylor suggests, ‘moral dilemmas become inconceivable on the [Sartrean] theory of radical choice’ (1985: 30). That is, if one determines one’s own values in solitude then there is no moral standard to validate the content of one’s choices and actions. It is precisely this attitude towards existentialism that has led modern advocates of authenticity to disregard the existential account as a valid approach. Instead, they suggest looking for an alternative source of inspiration for their concept and have found such a source within the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.
The claim that an ethic of authenticity is inherent within the thought of Rousseau was first posited by Lionel Trilling, according to whom, ‘from Rousseau we have learned that what destroys our authenticity is society – our sentiment of being depends upon the opinion of other people. The ideal of authentic personal being stands at the very centre of Rousseau’s thought’ (1972 [2009]: 93). Alessandro Ferrara further explicates this claim in his monograph Modernity and Authenticity, where he argues that an ethic of authenticity is inherent within Rousseau’s novel Emile. According to Ferrara, ‘the significance of the novel has to do, in my opinion, with its touching on the all-modern conflict between an ethic of autonomy and an ethic of authenticity’ (1993: 103). Charles Taylor also derives his understanding of authenticity from Rousseau, whom he takes to be an early modern articulator of this ideal. Taylor’s reason for supposing Rousseau to be an advocate of authenticity is because his moral outlook entails ‘following a voice of nature within us’ (1992: 27). Somogy Varga also mirrors this perspective, arguing that ‘Rousseau considered this individual difference as the key to finding out how one should live’ (2012: 21).
However, it was not only Rousseau who upheld authenticity as an ideal but rather, this notion also permeated the thought of several theorists during the romantic movement. According to Charles Taylor, Gottfried von Herder also contributed to the development of an ethic of authenticity. As Taylor elucidates, ‘it was Herder [. . .] which added the epoch-making demand that my realization of the human essence be my own, and hence launched the idea that each individual has its own way of being human’ (1975: 15). More importantly, though, Herder places a strong emphasis on social context. In his Outlines of a Philosophy of the History of Man, Herder advocates a collectivist theory. That is, he believed that the individual derived value in belonging to a group. As Isaiah Berlin states, ‘he conceived and cast light upon the crucially important social function of “belonging” – on what it is to belong to a group, a culture, a movement, a form of life [and that] the notion of belonging is at the heart of all Herder’s ideas’ (1976: 194–5). Moreover, ‘the individual, for him, is inescapably a member of some group; consequently all that he does must express, consciously or unconsciously, the aspirations of his group’ (1975: 201). Thus, whilst he advocates a Protagorean maxim, that each individual has their own way of being, it is not subjectively conceived, but gains validity from one’s social grounding.
A further theorist whom contemporary advocates of authenticity draw upon is Friedrich Hölderlin. Within his novel, Hyperion, Hölderlin creates an atmosphere of nostalgia for a lost sense of wholeness. That which the protagonist longs for is ‘to be one with all that lives, to return in blessed self-forgetfulness into the All of Nature’ (2010: 23). According to Charles Guignon, an air of authenticity is invoked because ‘reunification with nature is achieved not by knowing, but by being fully immersed in the life-process in such a way that the “inmost of our inmost selves” resonates with all that is’ (2004: 55). Here we can detect a rejection of the scientific rationalization of the Enlightenment, which places a premium on knowledge acquired through empirical means. Hölderlin’s approach, on the other hand, is to find unity with nature and derive knowledge about the world through an understanding of oneself.
The claim that it is this desire which motivates the romantic turn inwards is also maintained by Somogy Varga, who claims ‘Hölderlin’s work displays another feature, which is added to the idea of authenticity during the Romantic period. . . . This is the attempt to recover a sense of wholeness by turning inward – a wholeness that is assumed to be lost with the emerging modern world’ (2012: 22). The recognition that a sense of unity has been lost is well expressed by Novalis’s ‘blue flower’, which became a motif for modern discontent and the futile quest to recover meaning. Within the novel Henrich von Oftendingen, Novalis’s protagonist dreams that he is venturing through a forest when he glances upon the most beautiful blue flower he has ever perceived. However, as he reaches down to pluck the flower he is aroused from his sleep, left alone with his longing and the realization that it is unobtainable.
In what way, then, can we understand an ethic of authenticity to be inherent within romantic literature? Through Rousseau we can see the rejection of autonomy, as a too rigidly conceived ethical ideal. Herder determined that human essence was not universal, but individual, and informed by one’s own social context. Hölderlin attempted to acquire unity through discovering oneself in relation to nature. What we thus find with Rousseau, Herder and Hölderlin is the attempt to discover an essential self through the process of looking inwards. The romantic approach to authenticity thus insinuates that each of us possesses an inner essence which is to be discovered through introspection. It is from this particular approach that Taylor and various other contemporary advocates of authenticity orientate their trajectory. Thus, what we find is that contemporary advocates of authenticity tend to by-pass existentialism and instead appeal to the ethical ideal inherent within the thought of Rousseau and the romantics.
Although contemporary advocates of authenticity side with a social perspective, contrary to the existential approach to authenticity, it will be argued that the difference lies in that which these two approaches problematize. Although we can certainly find early modern articulations of the ideal of authenticity, this search for an alternative source of authenticity than the existentialists leads to a historical rupture in the tradition of authenticity. This dislocation of approaches, however, can be resolved if we consider these two seemingly opposed accounts in terms of the problems they address. That is, in what follows, we will argue that existential authenticity, as developed by Sartre, was intended to engage with the problem of nothingness; moreover, social-ethical authenticity, as advocated by Taylor, was designed in reaction to the problematization of authenticity itself. Thus, although it has been demonstrated that contemporary literature on authenticity draws upon the romantic tradition for an ethical ideal, it will be argued that by engaging with the concept of authenticity that they are the existentialist’s successors, whether they acknowledge it or not.
2.4 Sartre’s existential authenticity
Sartre begins Being and Nothingness, his magnum opus, by attempting to elucidate the ontological structure of being; however, the problem which propels his enquiry is that of nothingness. Beginning with the attempt to articulate being, like Hegel before him, Sartre determines that being includes its antithesis, non-being.5 As he recognizes and articulates, ‘the permanent possibility of non-being, outside us and within, conditions our questions about being’ (2007: 29). This claim is elucidated through Sartre’s well-known example of waiting for Pierre within a café. Glancing around, one focuses one’s attention on the appearance of Pierre, whom one does not perceive to be present. And although the café is full of people and objects, one does not focus on these, but only Pierre’s absence. As Sartre puts it, ‘nevertheless if I should finally discover Pierre, my intuition would be filled by a solid element, I should be suddenly arrested by his face and the whole café would organize itself around him as a discrete presence’ (2007: 10). In this way, then, Sartre suggests that we experience a non-being through our perception of the absence of being.
However, it is not only in one’s experiences of the external world that we encounter nothingness. According to Sartre, the concept of nothingness is also fundamental to our ontological structure. Unlike inanimate objects, whose being is predetermined, a significant dimension of human existence is that we are not any thing in particular. That is, to use a concrete example, unlike a chair, which will always be a chair even if it is broken or disassembled, human beings do not possess a fixed essence which defines them. Whilst the chair cannot but be a chair, that which defines each individual not only changes but is also determined by that individual. Sartre explains this through the distinction between being-in-itself (en-soi) and being-for-itself (pour-soi). The chair possesses being-in-itself, insofar as it is none other than a chair, whilst each human being, on the other hand, must determine its being-for-itself. That is, it is up to each individual to choose their fundamental projects, that which defines them and the telos of their life for themselves.
This ontological fact, that our being is itself without foundation, however, causes the individual to experience anxiety.6 Sartre derives this concept from Heidegger, who in turn borrows it from Kierkegaard, and each differentiate anxiety from fear.7 Fear is always induced by an object, one is afraid of a spider, for example, but with anxiety there is no-thing which gives rise to the feeling of angst. It is precisely this nothingness, in Sartre’s account, that an individual does not possess being-in-itself, and the subsequent realization that each individual is required to determine being-for-itself, which causes anxiety. As Sartre explains,
anguish is characterized by a constantly renewed obligation to remake the Self which designates the free being. As a matter of fact when we showed earlier that my possibilities were filled with anguish because it depended on me alone to sustain them in their existence, that did not mean that they derived from a Me which to itself at least, would first be given and would then pass in the temporal flux from one consciousness to another consciousness. (2007: 35)
Acceptance of this ontological fact, made manifest by anxiety, leads us to realize that we possess ontological freedom. As Sartre explains, ‘it is in anguish that man gets the consciousness of his freedom, or if you prefer, anguish is the mode of being of freedom as consciousness of being; it is in anguish that freedom is, in its being, in question for itself’ (2007: 29). Through anxiety then, individuals arrive at the realization that they do not possess being-in-itself and are faced with the understanding that it is their role to determine being-for-itself. A further implication of this realization is that since all of our choices are self-determined, they lack any firm foundation. It is then for this reason Sartre exclaims ‘my freedom is anguished at being the foundation of values while itself without foundation’ (2007: 38). We therefore experience anxiety at the realization that our choice of project is itself foundationless. As a consequence, Sartre claims, ‘I emerge alone and in anguish confronting the unique and original project which constitutes my being; all the barriers, all the guard rails collapse, nihilated by the consciousness of my freedom’ (2007: 39).
As a consequence of anguish, induced by the realization that an individual does not possess being-it-itself, Sartre claims many people live in bad faith (mauvaise foi).8 That is, rather than accepting that each individual is free to determine being-for-itself, a large percentage of people convince themselves they already possess an essence. As Sartre puts it, ‘this nihilating power nihilates anguish in so far as I flee it and nihilates itself in so far as I am anguish in order to flee it. This attitude is what we call bad faith’ (2007: 44). In order to elucidate, Sartre offers the well-known example of the Parisian waiter who wholly identifies himself with his social role. The waiter’s movements are a little too robotic, too well rehearsed. His actions suggest that he is none other than a waiter, and in doing so, denies his freedom and possibility to be otherwise. However, as Sartre explains, ‘a waiter cannot be a waiter in the same way as an inkwell is an inkwell’ (2007: 59–60). It is precisely this concern which leads to the development of his thoughts on authenticity.9
Sartre’s proposed resolution, to the realization that our lives are fundamentally meaningless, is to overcome our contingency, to become the foundation of our own being – to become in-itself-for-itself. As Sartre explains, ‘the ideal of a consciousness which would be the foundation of its own being-it-itself by the pure consciousness which it would have of itself. It is this idea which can be called God’ (2007: 587). This project, however, is doomed to failure, for the reason that we cannot establish our own foundation. That is ‘while the meaning of the desire is ultimately the project of being God, the desire is never constituted by this meaning’ (2007: 587). As Jonathan Webber notes, ‘it is only those people who are in bad faith who have the fundamental project to be God’ (2009: 109). For this reason, Thomas Anderson has suggested that Sartre only discusses self-deception within Being and Nothingness and that the positive phase is not enacted until his later work Notebook for Ethics.10 Nevertheless, by engaging with the problem of nothingness, and explaining negative modes of existence which lead to self-deception, Sartre can be seen to point towards the alternative as a means to live authentically.
Many of the criticisms levelled against existential authenticity are a consequence of Sartre’s disavowal of traditional moral theory. As Mary Warnock makes apparent, ‘[it is] doubtful whether it can be claimed that there is any direct contribution to philosophy which should be described as Existentialist ethics’ (1970: 57). This problem is perpetuated by Sartre himself, who, in the closing comments of Being and Nothingness rejects the idea that which he has de vised is capable of establishing an ethical basis. As Sartre himself suggests, ‘ontology itself can not formulate ethical precepts. It is concerned solely with what is, and we can not possibly derive imperatives from ontology’s indicatives’ (2007: 645). These closing lines suggest that Sartrean authenticity is incapable of supporting an ethical ideal, and a promise is made to readdress this concern. This, however, is something which he unsuccessfully attempts to develop within Existentialism Is a Humanism.
In this famous lecture, Sartre attempts to determine the ethical precepts of his existential approach; however, his argument ultimately infers that since our choices and actions are freely determined, our values cannot be objective (2007). This claim has quite rightly been met with heavy criticism, and it is this short-sighted suggestion which Taylor picks up on. Focusing on Sartre’s example of the student, seeking help to resolve his moral predicament of joining the resistance or staying with his mother, Taylor claims that ‘it is a dilemma only because the claims themselves are not created by radical choice. If they were the grievous nature of the predicament would dissolve, for that would mean that the young man could do away with the dilemma at any moment by simply declaring one of the rival claims as dead and inoperative’ (1985: 30). Taylor’s point is that if we adhered to Sartre’s concept of radical choice, and only endorsed that which we deem to be agreeable, then the student’s dilemma would not exist for it rests upon objective criteria such as his mother’s happiness, or the overall good of the French nation, but if that which is of value is subjectively determined, then he has no grounds to acknowledge his mother’s desire to be happy or France’s need for liberation.
This characterization of Sartre, as a one-sided thinker, may seem unfair, and restricted to his early thought. One may interject that a more developed theory of recognition can be seen to take place within What Is Literature, Anti-Semite and the Jew, and Notebook for Ethics and that a sound ethical ideal can be constructed from his corpus, as T. Storm Heter has done.11 However, our intention is not to portray the development of Sartrean authenticity. Rather, the purpose is to explain the neglect of the existential approach by contemporary advocates of authenticity, and attempt to demonstrate that the social approach, championed by Charles Taylor, does not deviate from the existential approach, as one may be led to believe. On the contrary, it will be argued that by understanding both approaches to be concerned with a particular problem that we can see the social approach as a continuation of the same tradition of authenticity as that perpetuated by the existentialists.
In the preceding analysis, an overview of Sartre’s early reflections on nothingness was offered and how this problem led him to develop existential authenticity as a response. Sartre’s account, that each person does not possess being-in-itself, but rather we must construct our values for ourselves, is therefore contrary to the socio-ethical approach upheld by Rousseau, Herder and Hölderlin. Whilst the romantic theorists claimed that we possess an individual essence which we discover through introspection, Sartre goes one step further in rejecting any notion of essence whatsoever. Furthermore, instead of suggesting that we discover who we truly are, for Sartre one must create one’s authentic self. It was also illustrated that Taylor rejects Sartre’s approach for its emphasis on radical choice, which undermines any attempt to seriously address moral problems. In the following section, it will be demonstrated that Taylor characterizes the phenomenon of authenticity in accordance with this criticism of Sartre and that he attempts to circumvent this problem by appealing to an ethical ideal inherent within romantic thought. Having demonstrated Sartre’s existential authenticity is a response to nothingness, we will now turn to elucidating Taylor’s ethic of authenticity and to demonstrating that he problematizes the phenomenon of authenticity itself.
2.5 Taylor’s ethic of authenticity
Charles Taylor begins his seminal work on authenticity, The Ethics of Authenticity, by noting that, although authenticity has been criticized as leading to ethical relativism and egoistic self-indulgence, it offers a valuable ideal. Taylor divides the philosophical responses into the broad categories of ‘knockers and boosters’ (1992: 11). The knockers are critical of any form of individualism and refer to their contemporary social setting as a ‘culture of narcissism’ (1992: 11). The boosters, on the other hand, are advocates of self-creation and claim that since there is no ethical framework from which to orient oneself, subjective ethics are the only option. Although Taylor does not specifically name those whom he deems to be ‘boosters’, from the criticism given earlier, we can safely assume that he has the existentialists, specifically Sartre, in mind. Taylor, however, does not side with one approach against the other, but agrees with both to a certain extent. Agreeing with the ‘knockers’, Taylor acknowledges that a subjective approach to authenticity, which leads to relativism, is an ethically undesirable one. However, he views authenticity as not only valuable but the means to also live a meaningful life within the modern age. As he himself claims, ‘I do not believe that everything is as it should be in this culture. Here I tend to agree with the knockers. But unlike them, I think that authenticity should be taken seriously as a moral ideal’ (1992: 22).
As a consequence of the breakdown of social hierarchies, we no longer possess a shared conception, or singular subjective notion of the good. This has led to what Taylor refers to as ‘liberalism of neutrality’. As he elucidates, ‘one of its basic tenets is that a liberal society must be neutral on questions of what constitutes a good life. The good life is what each individual seeks, in his or her own way’ (1992: 17–18). In this respect, Taylor recognizes that authenticity offers a powerful and useful ideal. That is, insofar as a communal conception of the good cannot be re-established, it falls upon each individual to determine the good for ourselv es. Thus, according to Taylor, ‘not only should I not fit my life to the demands of external conformity; I can’t even find the model to live by outside myself. I can find it only within.’ Furthermore, as Taylor continues, ‘being true to myself means being true to my own originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it, I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my own’ (1992: 29). It is precisely this role which authenticity fulfils and the reason why it has become so prevalent within modern occidental societies.
In articulating the sources of an ethic of authenticity, Taylor suggests that such an ideal found articulation within the thought of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. However, in his account, ‘[authenticity] becomes crucially important because of a development that occurs after Rousseau and that [he] associates with Herder [whom] put forward the idea that each of us has an original way of being human. Each person has his or her own “measure” is his way of putting it’ (1992: 28). It is precisely this which Taylor takes to be the ethical ideal inherent within the concept of authenticity. As he continues to elucidate,
there is a certain way of being human that is my way. I am called upon to live my life in this way, and not in imitation of anyone else’s. But this gives a new importance to being true to myself. If I am not, I miss the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me. (1992: 29; 1994: 30)
Although we find this ideal at work within existential philosophy, it could be argued, in line with Taylor’s earlier criticism against Sartre, that he equates existential authenticity with subjective ethics, which reduces to a form of relativism. The ethic of authenticity inherent within romantic thought, on the other hand, provides an intersubjective account insofar as it recognizes that society shapes who we are whilst simultaneously emphasizing that each individual determine this for themselves.12
In order to defend authenticity against the ‘knocker’s’ criticisms, Taylor addresses the main flaw in the ‘boosters’ account, that of self-indulgence, and states that it is not possible to be an individual in the sense which they advocate. That is, we cannot simply abstract ourselves from our social context and engage in a form of radical choice because the conditions which provide us with our choices exist independently of us. More specifically, Taylor first explains that this is impossible because communities share a language with fixed values. That is, ‘selfhood and the choice of moral goals can operate only within a shared framework of significance and meaning, without which they lapse into incoherence’ (1994: 30). Secondly, it is this shared meaning which enables one to choose that which one understands to be meaningful. As Taylor explains, ‘things take on importance against a background of intelligibility’, which he elsewhere refers to as a ‘horizon of significance’ (1994: 37).
Taylor claims that we are still free to choose our identity, but from within a horizon of intelligibility. That is, we choose what is important from within a horizon of pre-established beliefs and values. Far from diminishing our possibilities, it is this horizon which makes our choices significant and enables us to define ourselves as individuals.13 That is, one cannot be authentic unless one is distinguished from others and by choosing in accordance with this. As Taylor explains, ‘defining myself means finding what is significant in my difference from others’ (1992: 35–6). In order to be authentic, in Taylor’s account then, we must define ourselves through properties with human significance. Thus, disagreeing with those who equate authenticity with narcissism, Taylor argues that not only does it provide a desirable, modern mode of existence but it also should be understood as an ethical ideal. As Taylor himself explains, ‘by “morality” I mean a picture of what a better or higher mode of life would be, where “better” and “higher” are defined not in terms of what we happen to desire or need, but offer a standard of what we ought to desire’ (1992: 16).
A crucial feature of human life, according to Taylor is that it is fundamentally ‘dialogical’.14 In his own words, ‘people do not acquire the language needed for self-definition on their own. The genesis of the human mind is in this sense not monological, not something each person develops on his or her own, but dialogical’ (1994: 230). What this means is that individuals develop their understanding of themselves in dialogue with others, as opposed to in monologue with themselves. Thus, that which permits the possibility of articulating one’s inner and outer ideas is enabled through language. Therefore, in order to conceive of oneself as an individual, one is dependent upon one’s community with which one shares this language. Furthermore, although one may believe that it is possible to isolate oneself and reject the cultural practices which previously defined us, one would still be employing the same learned language, or mode of thinking which has been socially imposed. For these reasons, Taylor claims that ‘the making and sustaining of our identity remains dialogical throughout our lives’ (1992: 35). Thus, according to Taylor, unlike the claim made by Sartre in Being and Nothingness, our identity is not chosen in isolation, but rather he sides with Rousseau and Herder in claiming that this is informed by our society as a whole.
A further dimension of Taylor’s account is that to form successful relationships, in which individuals define themselves in dialogue, it is necessary to recognize that we have an obligation towards our interlocutors. His concept of dialogical self is thus underpinned by a theory of recognitio n.15 Although this was previously built-in to social hierarchies, their collapse led to the emergence of recognition, alongside authenticity, as a modern social condition. In his own words, ‘democracy has ushered in a politics of equal recognition, which has taken various forms over the years, and which now has returned in the form of demands for the equal status of cultures and genders’ (1992: 47; 1994: 27). However, in order for us to recognize others as equal, there has to be some external standard which we can appeal to. As Taylor emphasizes, ‘to come together on a mutual recognition of difference [ . . . ] we have to share also some standards of value on which the identities concerned check out as equal’ (1992: 52). Where do we derive this value from? In Taylor’s account it is the same cultural framework which gives meaning to our choices which provides us with a standard for recognition. As he explains, ‘recognizing difference, like self-choosing, requires a horizon of significance, in this case a shared one’ (1992: 52).
Through emphasizing that our values are not determined through radical choice, but are in part informed by our cultural context, and that authenticity can offer a valuable ethic through drawing upon the validation of our horizon, Taylor is able to overcome the problems he perceived within Sartre’s early approach. However, despite the fact that Taylor overcomes Sartre’s account and salvages authenticity as an ethical ideal worth preserving, his own account is not without its flaws. The primary pitfall of his approach is that he does not provide a formal account of what this ideal looks like. As Eric Hall makes explicit, ‘Taylor’s own work on this particular issue lacks some explicatory content . . . these lacunae include a lack of explicit and developed definition and an intellectual cultivation of the means by which authenticity, as an ethical ideal is pursed in the first place’ (2015: 43). That is, although Taylor develops an ethic of authenticity, he does not offer an account of what an authentic existence would look like or how one engages in the cultivation of one’s authentic self.
Although there are certain aspects which require further development in Taylor’s account, and which we will address in the following chapter, he can nevertheless be understood to resolve the problems which Sartre’s early approach encountered. That is, since Sartre’s account ultimately results in ethical relativism, as a consequence of his claim that individuals determine their values for themselves, Taylor appealed to an ethical ideal inherent within romantic thought to revive the concept of authenticity. Thus, although Taylor rejects Sartrean authenticity as ethically impaired, to the extent that he attempts to rescue the concept of authenticity from aestheticism by resolving this tension, he can be seen to continue the existential tradition of authenticity. That is, insofar as Taylor takes up the challenge left by Sartre, and endeavours to develop authenticity into a functioning ethical ideal, he can be seen to continue the trajectory set by Sartre. Thus, rather than considering the socio-ethical approach to authenticity as a rival to the existentialist approach, we can consider the former to be the continuation, or development, of the latter. Thus, by understanding each of these approaches in terms of that which they problematize, we can perceive of them as one unified tradition, as opposed to two distinct approaches.
2.5 Summary
This chapter began with a preliminary account of authenticity, where it was defined as a distinctly modern concept which emphasizes individuality and is understood in relation to inauthenticity. This account was then differentiated and further defined in relation to the alternative ethical ideals of sincerity, integrity and autonomy. What these comparisons revealed was that authenticity is an end in itself, insofar as it is pursued for its own sake; that authenticity requires being conscious of oneself as an individual and being true to oneself; and that deviation from one’s self-imposed principle does not detract from one’s authenticity, but in fact highlights it. Having expanded our definition, we then turned our attention to the various approaches to authenticity. Here it was suggested that existential authenticity has fallen out of philosophical fashion and modern advocates instead turn to sociopolitical thought for inspiration. However, rather than presenting the existential and social accounts of authenticity as two alternative approaches, it was suggested that we instead understand them as concerned with two different problems. Having considering the advantages and flaws of each approach, the task towards which we will now turn is to devise a formal account of authenticity which incorporates those aspects deemed desirable and which is capable of overcoming the problems which the preceding approaches encountered.
Notes
1 The spectrum of advocates ranges from Kierkegaard’s radical rejection of society to socially conceived approaches like that of Charles Taylor.
2 Walter Kaufmann, for example, in his well-regarded Existentialism: From Dostoyevsky to Sartre includes excerpts from Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Franz Kafka and Rainer Maria Rilke in order to express the central tenants of existential philosophy.
3 As Sartre and Beauvoir lived together for twenty years, it is difficult to determine the extent to which Beauvoir influenced Sartre – we will assume existentialism to be a consequence of their joint effort.
4 Soon after adopting this philosophical classification, Beauvoir and Sartre launched their ‘existential offensive’. Publishing plays, novels and philosophical treatises, they advocated living authentically as a remedy to the meaninglessness of contemporary European society. The ‘existential offensive’ included Sartre’s lecture, Existentialism Is a Humanism, and Beauvoir’s article Existentialism and Popular Wisdom, which was published in the journal Les Tempts Modernes which they jointly edited, alongside Maurice Merleau-Ponty.
5 In Hegel’s account, indeterminate being, as devoid of any content, also contains its negation – nothing. See ‘The Science of Logic’, in The Hegel Reader, trans. Stephen Houlgate (London: Blackwell, 2013).
6 Julian Young argues that Sartre employs the concept of anxiety in two opposing senses. In parts I and IV of Being and Nothingness Sartre claims we feel anguish because we must choose what we become, however, in parts II and III he suggests that the cause of anxiety i s because we cannot choose what we become. See The Death of God and the Meaning of Life (New York: Routledge, 2003), 144.
7 For an analysis of Kierkegaard’s influence on Heidegger, see Jean Wahl, Transcendence and the Concrete: A Selection of Essays, trans. Alan D Schrift and Ian Moore (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016).
8 Jonathan Webber offers an excellent analysis of the various ways in which mauvaise foi is employed by Sartre. He notes that it is used to express (i) self-deception, (ii) a particular epistemic attitude towards evidence, (iii) belief in fixed natures, (iv) belief that one’s own fixed nature does not include traits that one does possess. See The Existentialism of Jean-Paul Sartre (2009).
9 Catrin Gibson has recently determined that although Sartre’s attempt to develop authentic love fails in Being and Nothingness, this can be established, not through eros, as Sartre attempts to convey, but through the mother–child relationship. See ‘Authentic Love’, Sartre Studies International 23, no. 1 (2017): 60–79.
10 See Sartre’s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity (Chicago: Open Court, 1993).
11 Heter argues that Sartre’s corpus can be interpreted as an attempt to resolve this problem by developing an ethic of authenticity based upon Hegel’s concept of recognition. Heter recognizes that it is precisely this which was missing in Sartre’s early work, where he notes that the other effects how we view ourselves through ‘the look’ but rejects that the other is required for mutual recognition. Sartre equates objectification with alienation, see Jean-Paul Sartre’s Ethic of Engagement (New York: Continuum, 2006).
12 Although romantic approaches to authenticity were claimed to emphasize self-discovery through introspection, Taylor does not advocate that there is an essential self, but employs ‘self-discovery’ as a metaphor.
13 Taylor is here influenced by Hans Georg Gadamer’s ‘Fusion of Horizons’, Truth and Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004), 302.
14 This concept also exists in the thought of Martin Buber, for whom man developed in dialogue with God. Placing a secular spin on this term, Taylor employs it to explain the formation of human character. See I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh: T.&T. Smith, 1937), Pt.1 Aphorisms 19–22.
15 For an excellent analysis of the theory of recognition, see Cillian McBride, Recognition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013).