CHAPTER 12
SPECULATION ABOUT THE RISE OF THE surveillance state tends to focus on modern technology and assumes this development took place in the United States. Without a doubt, creation of the surveillance state has been driven by technology, but it may have taken place earlier than most observers think and in a far more remote region than assumed. Some would suggest that surveillance began in the Philippines in 1898.
The United States experienced a technological renaissance in the 1870s when Thomas Edison introduced the quadruplex telegraph and Philo Remington began marketing the typewriter. The invention of the electrical tabulating machine and the Dewey Decimal System gave us the ability to catalog and retrieve data efficiently. Add to this the growing availability of modern photography, and it is possible to see how we could not manage and transmit information in a systematic manner.
By themselves, these inventions did not immediately translate into essential components of a governmental apparatus. However, when the United States occupied the Philippines in 1898, the stage was set for creation of a system that could be used to accomplish important political goals. The goal in the Philippines was the suppression of a Filipino resistance movement that had become a thorn in the side of US authorities. In order to advance this objective, under the direction of Captain Ralph Van Deman, the United States created an amazing apparatus that could provide detailed information on Filipino leaders suspected of working with the resistance. With modern photography, the physical appearance of each person was recorded. Something as basic as the typewriter meant recorded information could be easily read. Other devices made it possible to have a comprehensive record of personal finances, family connections, and political associations. Eventually, this system had records on about 70 percent of the population of Manila.
The legal framework supporting the use of this system was created by the Sedition Act, which spelled out severe penalties for anyone engaging in subversive activities. The Philippine system was so effective that it was eventually imposed on the United States when the Wilson Administration faced domestic opposition to involvement in World War I. The necessary legislation in the United States was provided by the 1917 Espionage Act and the 1918 Sedition Act.
The military intelligence division created by Captain Van Deman cooperated with the American Protective League. Together, they compiled a million-page catalogue of reports on German Americans as well as other people who opposed Wilson’s policies. Over ten thousand people were arrested in nationwide raids led by Attorney General A. Mitchell Palmer and J. Edgar Hoover. In 1919 Herbert O. Yardley founded the Cipher Bureau, better known as the Black Chamber. Its primary mission was to spy on foreign communications, including those of American allies. When the American public learned that most of the targets of this system were US citizens, there were demands to limit domestic surveillance, the State Department’s Cipher Bureau was abolished, and use of the Espionage and Sedition Acts was curtailed.
Today as in the past, new technologies are dramatically altering prospects for the ability of government or private sector actors to monitor activities of citizens and other governments. Generally, surveillance was conducted by an individual or a small group of operatives. With the passage of time, spyglasses were replaced by telescopes and eventually radio technology augmented the work of surveillance teams. More recently, CCTV, RFID, and GPS technologies have revolutionized surveillance.
Surveillance technologies make it possible for a variety of actors—both governmental and private—to violate not only the law but also social norms about the expectation of privacy. Employees of various security services have used their access to sophisticated devices to spy on wives or girlfriends. Several years ago, council employees in Liverpool, England used CCTV cameras to spy on a woman in her apartment. In Pennsylvania, parents of students took legal action against high school officials who accessed the webcams on students’ laptops to observe their at-home behavior.
So many commonplace items now have cameras that it is difficult to determine who is being watched by whom and for what purposes. As civil libertarians have grown concerned about the loss of privacy, there has been a debate about whether the use of surveillance devices enhances public safety or creates an Orwellian society in which “big brother” is always watching. With the rise of social media and the apparent willingness of the tech giants to share information with governmental agencies, the expectation of privacy that existed in the past is increasingly diminished. When Facebook and Apple agreed to give government officials access to the personal information of their users, it became obvious that the division between governmental and private authority had been eroded.
Cell phones have become major targets of technological innovations that provide access to their data. Normally, law enforcement agencies need to secure a search warrant to gather such information. However, in an increasing number of cases, those agencies have found a way to avoid the search warrant requirement. They do this through their use of a simulated cell phone tower—known as a Stingray—that secretly gathers information from all the cell phones in its area of operation.
As we live in an era of technological innovations, it is possible for the range of surveillance to reach far beyond what was possible at the time of World War II. Studies of the accomplishments of the Central Intelligence Agency demonstrate the agency’s embrace of technology. Allen Dulles and Richard Helms, both of whom headed the CIA, were responsible for an effort to use modern technology to advance intelligence work. This led to the creation of the Technical Services Staff in 1951. TSS was greatly expanded and renamed the Technical Services Division in 1960. In many cases the resulting innovations supported general intelligence work, including new weapons. In other cases, the innovations made a remarkable difference in what could be accomplished through surveillance.
Not knowing what your enemy may be planning is what we think of as an intelligence failure. For years, memories of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drove intelligence organizations to seek better ways to observe the enemy. Shortly after the end of World War II the sensitivity of American intelligence services was heightened by their failure to detect Soviet intentions to impose a blockade on all land routes to Berlin. Later the outbreak of the Korean War was another reminder of the inadequacies of Western intelligence organizations to anticipate the moves of their adversaries.
The CIA was smarting from its obvious failures and the British security services were feeling the embarrassment of the defections to the USSR of senior British MI-6 officials Burgess and Maclean when they informed the CIA of a major technological breakthrough in 1953. At this time, the CIA leadership believed that covert operations would be the key to success in efforts to manage effective surveillance of the Soviet Union. The British technological breakthrough raised the possibility of a massive wiretapping operation that would undermine Soviet operations. This technology would open a wide range of Soviet communications without endangering Western operatives.
William King Harvey, who was chief of the Berlin Operations Base, became the American leader in organizing what became known as the Berlin tunnel operation. Although he had reservations about working with the British, the project became a British-American collaborative effort. To their credit, the British had managed to dig a tunnel in Vienna that enabled them to tap into the phone lines that ran to the Soviet headquarters located in the Imperial Hotel. For several years they acquired sensitive information about Soviet operations. The CIA later did the same thing in Vienna and concluded that if they could tap into Soviet communications in Vienna, they could do the same in Berlin which was even more important as an intelligence target.
The formal starting date for the Berlin tunnel operation was December 1953. It became one of the most spectacular signals intelligence operations of the Cold War. The closest the Soviet communication lines came to the west was in Rudow, a remote suburb in the American sector of Berlin. The tunnel in Vienna was seventy feet long while the one in Berlin ran for 1,476 feet. The tunnel began in a warehouse built to look like a typical US logistical facility. Displaced dirt was stored in the warehouse. All of the work was conducted within sight of guard towers along the sector boundary. The tunnel went through sandy ground and a cemetery. Flooding as well as a nearby sewer line made construction of the tunnel more difficult. The digging was completed in February 1955 and it took another month to complete the tap chamber.
As soon as the cables were connected, collection began immediately. A small group of linguists worked at the site. Voice recordings were sent to London for translation and all telegraphic material went to Washington. The system worked for over eleven months until East German soldiers began digging at the site of the Soviet cables and an alarm sounded in the tunnel. Harvey realized what was happening and removed the most sensitive electronic equipment the day before the tunnel was penetrated on the Soviet side. The tunnel operation, which has always been regarded as a great success, was exposed by George Blake, a senior British intelligence official who was a Soviet spy.
Throughout much of the Cold War, the Soviets were well ahead of the United States in their surveillance techniques, so the Berlin tunnel operation came at a time when the West needed an intelligence victory. The Soviets had expected their exposure of the tunnel to be a major embarrassment to the United States but global opinion indicated that most people were impressed by the skill and audacity of the US-UK team.
The case of Oleg Penkovsky, an officer in Soviet military intelligence (GRU) who was spying for the West, represented another Western intelligence success. When the KGB became suspicious of Penkovsky, they mounted a very effective surveillance operation. As Penkovsky communicated with his handlers, the KGB had three observation points from which they could monitor the spy. Audio surveillance was managed from the apartment directly above his while visual surveillance was conducted from the balcony outside his window. Finally, their third observation point was set up in an apartment in a building across the river from Penkovsky’s residence. From these three locations, the KGB was able to compile a complete record of Penkovsky’s activities.
Before any operation could take place, the CIA needed to detect and counter the KGB’s surveillance of CIA personnel and assets. The KGB’s advantage was based, in part, on their assumption that any Westerner in the USSR was a likely spy. For each individual, the KGB prepared expected activity charts and responded immediately to any deviation from that pattern. Any attempt to evade KGB surveillance would bring retaliation that was often brutal. Their surveillance extended to the US Embassy and in 1963 embassy security personnel discovered wires running through the mortar outside the building and going into the basement. Because of the proficiency of KGB surveillance operations, the CIA stopped most of its agent operation in the USSR.
Technical innovations gave the CIA the ability to conduct overhead reconnaissance through development of the Corona satellite in 1959. Eventually, recognizing that the satellite was not inhibited by the KGB’s superior ground surveillance capabilities, there was a decision to rely more on technological collection of information. Imagery analysis gave the CIA near real-time images of not only Soviet territory but also the territory of almost any country in the world. Intelligence agencies appreciated that this could be accomplished without creating risks for agents like Penkovsky who was executed by his bosses within the KGB and the GRU. Moreover, “big technology” such as the Corona satellite operated in a predictable, relatively clean environment. This was an advantage not enjoyed by the small devices that would be used in an unpredictable environment affected by dampness, dust, and rain. Electronic gear suffered when used in normal outdoor conditions.
While technology helped the United States overcome deficiencies in its reconnaissance capabilities, it did not determine the intentions of the Soviet leadership. Looking at the position of troops on the ground does not reveal the actual intentions of your adversary. In the end, a reconnaissance satellite was no substitute for effective surveillance. Therefore, the CIA leadership was committed to the selective application of technology and the Technical Services Division was responsible for making this work. CIA recruitment then had to shift from prestigious liberal arts universities that had long supplied the ranks of America’s espionage services.
As the TSD developed modern tools that could be used in surveillance operations, there was a problem because such devices would stand out in the Soviet Union where citizens did not have access to modern technological innovations. An instrument that could be used in the USSR would have to be disguised to look like a more primitive gadget to which Soviet citizens might have access. Even a battery powered transistor radio was beyond the reach of a Soviet consumer. So the TSD set out to create special cameras, communications equipment, and counter surveillance devices. Without these, it would not be possible for CIA assets to operate in the Soviet Union. The CIA technicians also needed to develop sophisticated concealments to hide the tools to be used in operations.
One of the most prominent architects of the CIA’s technical services was Seymour Russell. Most people recognized that stealing information was a difficult challenge. However, many agents like Oleg Penkovsky were exposed when they tried to communicate that information to their handlers. Russell worked to develop covert communications because it was required for operations every aspect of intelligence activity in the Soviet Union.
Concealment was the first step in this process. In order to disguise film, documents, or anything of intelligence value, agents needed concealment devices. Those items might be picked up in the basement of the Kremlin, but unless they can be transported to a location controlled by the agency directing these efforts, they were of no intelligence value. An agent that is making that journey is a great risk from his enemy’s surveillance teams.
There are numerous devices created for the transport of items stolen by spies. The Soviet spy known as Rudolf Abel used a hollow nickel to hid microfilm. It worked well until he used that nickel to pay his paper boy. Fake batteries, hollow hair brushes, and cans of shaving cream have been shaped to hold small items of intelligence value. In the popular spy comedy show Get Smart, a shoe was used to hide a secret telephone in the days long before cell phones. In fact, transmitters were often hidden inside what were otherwise functional shoes. The German Steinbeck watch supported surveillance teams by doubling as a camera while still working to tell time. A thermos was also modified to hold a camera for use by surveillance personnel. When the microchip replaced the vacuum tube, it was possible to dramatically reduce the size of the instruments used for surveillance.
Miniaturization became the watchword for creation of technology used by surveillance personnel. The most important objective was the development of a short-range agent communications device (SRAC). In 1975, the only existing SRAC had a limited number of characters. If an agent had several pages of data to transmit, this would require the sort of risky moves that invited challenges by KGB surveillance operatives. For the transmission of a document of several pages, the CIA technicians needed to develop a “bubble memory” system. This was a system that could store and retrieve large amounts of digital information in a tiny sphere.
Success in this technology required another innovation: a “charge-coupled device” or CCD. It started as a memory storage device that relied on a chip consisting of light sensitive capacitors. The detail in each transmitted image was a function of the number of capacitors or pixels. The CCD eventually became a “filmless camera” or what is now known as a digital camera. Using this innovation made it possible for relatively high-resolution images to be immediately transmitted. Had he enjoyed the benefit of the digital camera, Oleg Penkovsky could have eluded KGB surveillance that had targeted him. By reducing the size of gear used by surveillance teams, it is easier to hide it from observations of surveillants. This reduced the power required for operation of the device and made it easier to carry.
As long as Soviet surveillance capabilities exceeded the counter surveillance skills of CIA operatives, it was virtually impossible for American operatives to function inside the USSR. If a Soviet official was to be approached, the approach would have to happen overseas. So the CIA’s targets were Soviet personnel stationed outside the Soviet bloc. One of the CIA’s most valuable assets, GRU General Dmitri Polyakov, was recruited in 1961 while serving in the United States. Even working in a neutral or a Western nation, there were severe limits. KGB surveillance teams monitored the activities of Soviet citizens when they were overseas. Living in Soviet compounds, they had to deal with the informer networks that existed in Soviet institutions no matter where they were located. The ambition of CIA operatives was to meet and recruit Soviet officials who were stationed overseas but would eventually be transferred home to Moscow. Hopefully, their new postings would be in agencies conducting work of interest to the West.
The best-known case of such a recruitment this took place in Columbia and involved Aleksander Ogorodnik, an economist working in the Soviet Embassy. His recruitment and his training placed stringent requirements on CIA personnel responsible for surveillance regarding Ogorodnik. Unlike Dmitri Polyakov and others who spied for the United States, Ogorodnik had no training at all in intelligence work. The OTS sent qualified personnel to Columbia in order to train him during the few times he was available. Those sessions required Ogorodnik to learn surveillance and counter surveillance skills. He had to master use of an ultra-miniature camera known as a T-100 and later, to use an easier version of the camera known as a T-50. Both were designed to be hidden in what looked like a luxury pen. Communications were a challenge but as the OTS was utilizing new technologies, face to face meetings could be avoided. There were times when Ogorodnik would appear to be talking to a tree because CIA microphones were hidden in its branches.
After four years of successful operations in Moscow by Ogorodnik, his case officer found him to be non-responsive to requests for a meeting. After a four-hour surveillance detection run, his case officer, who was using an OTS-developed frequency scanner to detect Soviet surveillance, was confronted by a KGB team. Within a few hours, the case officer was expelled from the Soviet Union. The previous month, Ogorodnik had been confronted by KGB officers in his home and used his suicide pill to avoid interrogation. From the KGB perspective, this constituted a defeat while the CIA regarded the four-year operation as a success.
Nonetheless, there was an eventual increase in clandestine operations by the CIA in the Soviet Union. The key to this increased pace was the deployment of new “spy devices.” Agent communications and surveillance counter measures were two of the most significant technological improvements. Most spies had been tripped up when attempting to communicate the information they had stolen to their handlers, who could transfer the data back to the headquarters. A variety of short-range agent communications instruments helped reduce this danger. As noted elsewhere, surveillance counter measures are those actions to identify the presence of surveillance and to evade individuals involved in that effort. The key in this undertaking is to determine the objectives of the surveillants.
As impressed as we are with the emergence of new technological innovations, it is important to recognize that there are limits to the gift of technology. In the 1960s, the CIA ran a program that involved experiments on animals such as rats and ravens. The CIA’s engineers hoped to use a tactic called passive concealment. Rats and ravens were noted for their abilities to get into places where they were not wanted, but cats were identified as being more appropriate for this operation. A power pack was placed in the abdomen of the selected cat and a cord was fitted next to his spine and connected to a recording device hidden in the cochlea of the cat’s ear. The cat’s tail became an antenna. These measures were intended to transform the cat into an instrument that could casually position itself near a target and record the target’s conversation.
If successful, the project would have created an actual cyborg kitty. There were, however, some obvious design flaws. One of the first was the difficulty of ensuring the cat would follow directions. Cats, of course, are not known for their obedience. One of the targets of the acoustic cat was rumored to be an Indonesian politician who often met on the verandah of his residence located in a rural area. The area had a large population of stray cats so the official assumption was that another cat would not be noticed. He might not have been noticed by the people on the verandah, but other cats would have noticed this intruder. The ensuing confrontations would likely prevent the cat from assuming a position under the chair of the target. He probably would have been more attracted to possible sources of food in the area.
A second difficulty was the danger that the body of the cat could not indefinitely support the devices installed in his body. There were doubts that an altered cat could survive without constant attention from a veterinarian. Infections would always constitute a threat.
A final difficulty was the placement of a device to monitor conversations picked up by the cat. If used in a rural area near the home of a prominent politician, a van used for listening would have been observed and ordered to leave the area. The details of this failed project were finally released in 2001, when former executive assistant to the CIA Director, Jeffrey Richelson, published his book The Wizards of Langley. Even though the acoustic cat operation was an expensive failure, there have been similar efforts to transform insects into surveillance devices that could fly over the barriers protecting intelligence targets. Visitors to the CIA museum can see some of these innovations, such as a fish with a periscope, on display as tributes to the agency’s technological skills.