CHAPTER 13

Challenges and Blessings of Technology

THOUGH THE IMPROVEMENTS WERE CONSIDERABLE, THERE were some problems associated with the new technologies. They were often a mixed blessing. The gadgets and the computers collect information. The Berlin Tunnel operation produced more data than could be processed by staff support elements. The CIA official responsible for the project joked about placing limits on how much information the Tunnel was allowed to send. When the eleven-month operation ended, the Tunnel data continued to be the subject of analysis for another two years. In short, the new technologies created a deluge of data meaning that analysts were tormented by having to determine which information was relevant and which was insignificant.

A basic objective of new indirect methods of communications often ran counter to the general impulses of agents who were risking their lives and felt that they deserved personal handling. Thus, their handlers needed to convince them that personal meetings might expose them to KGB surveillance. This was not always an easy task. With Adolf Tolkachev, a Soviet engineer who provided valuable intelligence about Soviet aircraft capabilities, the CIA made an exception. Tolkachev knew nothing of spy tradecraft and insisted on personal contact. This exception worked because, first, he was assigned a case officer who was a native Russian speaker and a master of disguise. He could look, smell, and act like a typical Russian. A second factor was the development of new technology that made it easier to detect Soviet surveillance. When Tolkachev was exposed in 1985, after almost six years of supplying sensitive information to the CIA, it was not the result of failed tradecraft but because the spy had been exposed by the CIA traitor Aldrich Ames.

The delivery of a sophisticated gadget and training the agent in its use emerged as another difficulty. Most Soviet citizens were products of an environment in which complicated devices were rare. Faced with such a novel instrument, they might become confused. Being unfamiliar with modern technology, it was likely that they might expose it to severe conditions or drop it. If that happened and the gadget stopped working, there was no convenient repair facility. Also, something that performed well in a sterile laboratory environment might not work well when exposed to moisture, dust, or mud. Even a tech savvy Westerner would have difficulty with these technologies. Finally, even though these new tools were fairly small, the agents would face challenges in finding a good hiding place. All of these creations were a sharp contrast with anything a Soviet citizen might possess.

The electronic short-range agent communication system (SRAC) was coming into its own during these years and was helping agents to communicate with each other. It measured three by six inches and worked as a “burst transmitter.” The receiver device could be placed in a window and when the agent came by, perhaps in a bus, he could depress a button that sent a burst of information to the receiver. This was somewhat like sending a text message with a modern cell phone and made it possible for the agent to appear to be doing nothing unusual. It was easier than having to service a dead drop while worried if a surveillance team was watching. CIA technical operations officers used covert signal path surveys to identify the most favorable transmission points. Keeping the device charged was a challenge so the CIA engineers decided to use rechargeable batteries. This innovation led to another problem: finding a hiding place for the recharger unit.

In 1981, after five years of operational planning, the CIA launched one of its most elaborate surveillance operations in the agency’s history. This operation linked ultra-sophisticated space age technology with traditional surveillance tradecraft. It demanded cooperation between a number of agencies including the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technology, as well as the NSA. Finally, the National Photographic Interpretation Center provided valuable support in planning for the operation known as CKTAW. The objective of the operation was to wiretap underground communications links between the USSR Ministry of Defense and a research institute in Troitsk, a closed city located twenty-three miles from the center of Moscow.

The first step in this operation was made possible by a new type of reconnaissance satellite, the KH-11 Kennan, launched by the National Reconnaissance Office in 1976. The KH-11 Kennan is a large vehicle that is sixty-five feet long and ten feet wide. Its most important component is a telescope that has a 2.4-meter-diameter mirror with sensors that enable detailed observation of almost anything on Earth. It can identify objects as small as ten centimeters wide. This satellite observed the Soviet military preparing a trench for communications cables between Moscow and Troitsk. Accomplishing what no on-the-ground surveillance team could have, the KH-11 noted that there were manholes along the length of the trench. The CIA aim was to gain access to the cable by using one of the manholes to enter the trench and attach a monitoring collar on the cable.

This act required a careful study of how the manholes were constructed and what was necessary to enter one without being exposed to KGB surveillance. Several surveillance trips were made to the area. Since visiting the location on a regular basis was dangerous the local CIA team was careful and took two years to complete their surveillance of the site.

This part of the CKTAW operation called for traditional surveillance tradecraft. The very small Tessina camera, which could be strapped to the surveillant’s wrist, was used for casing photography. A specific manhole was chosen because there was a tree line that would provide cover for an agent approaching the manhole cover. Before the approach, agents had to determine how difficult it was to remove the cover. Next, they needed to know several things: (1) the precise measurements of the underground chamber; (2) the amount of ground water in the chamber; and (3) the accessibility of the cables. Not surprisingly, the cables were shielded in lead and protected by sensors and alarms. Once agents approached the cables, they needed to have the skills required for tapping into them. That task called for an expensive program to give agents those skills and required instruments. The most important of these was a collar that would surround the cable and record the signals.

And, of course, a preliminary examination of the cables had to be conducted in order to determine which cable carried the sort of information that would justify this expensive operation. This examination had to be conducted by a CIA officer disguised to look like an ordinary Russian out for a day in the sun. The OTS officer responsible for this aspect of the operation had been in Moscow long enough to establish a pattern of behavior that had been observed by KGB surveillance. It involved lots of family trips to parks and other nature settings. His behavior was not exceptional but rather boring. He simply did not look interesting.

The cover for his entry into the manhole was a typical family picnic. He and his wife wore radio monitors set to pick up possible KGB surveillance activity in their area. Once certain that there was no surveillance, he pulled his car into the spot they had selected. He avoided any locations typically used by Americans because he did not want to stumble into someone else’s surveillance. He left the family picnic wearing a back pack. At each stage of this journey, he was always the last person to leave the bus or street car. After going through a long surveillance detection run, he changed into the Russian clothing that had been selected for him by CIA personnel foraging through Polish flea markets. At his final stop, he left the bus two miles from the manhole that was his target. Prior to this, he had never visited the site but had only seen photographs. He carefully checked for surveillance as he approached it. He used his OTS designed pry bar to lift the cover and when in the chamber he placed the sensor on the cable. In returning to his family picnic, he took a more direct route because surveillance was less important once his mission was completed.

CKTAW worked until 1985 when the officer who was supposed to recover the recordings received a “tamper indicated” signal and aborted his recovery mission. When another trip was made to the site, the tapes were recovered but the system had stopped working. Initially, there was speculation this might have been a technical problem. However, in August, 1985 a KGB defector informed the CIA that the CKTAW operation had been exposed by CIA employ who, after being fired, sold this information to the KGB.

Operations like CKTAW employ what is known as “large technology” as opposed to the useful gadgets used by operatives on the ground. Large technology is extremely expensive and requires a major effort in production. The KH-11 Kennan is an example of large technology. When the CIA needed equipment to be used for on-the-ground surveillance and counter surveillance it relied on its engineers in TSS and subsequent versions of TSS. There were two categories to be considered. The first was equipment used for offensive purposes such as getting information about recruitment targets. The second was for defensive purposes when counter surveillance was used to protect operatives involved in covert activities. If a case officer was going to meet an asset in a hostile region, counter surveillance was required to determine if the case officer was being watched as he went to the meeting. If long-term observations are being made from a building or some other fixed site, the operatives could use still cameras and video cameras to monitor the site. As a result of technological advances, it became possible to establish unmanned observation posts, so fewer personnel were required. Stationary surveillance required imaginative concealments such as the cuckoo clock used for hiding a camera to keep a room under observation. Mobile surveillance operatives have employed a camera hidden in a briefcase that would be positioned facing the target. A camera such as this did not have a viewfinder because the user simply held the briefcase under his arm. The East German Stasi developed a surveillance briefcase that could take infrared photographs in complete darkness. It used a camera with a silent electronic shutter. The case was covered by a special fabric so infrared light could reach inside the case. The cover shielded the infrared flashes so they could not be seen.

By the 1990s, surveillance photography had been greatly improved by miniaturization and greater camera storage capacity. Video cameras became more useful because they were much smaller and could operate in lower lighting conditions. As a result, covert collection of information was easier and more effective.

If a surveillant was fortunate enough to be close to the target, concealment of a traditional camera was possible simply by hiding it under clothing. Such devices as large belt buckles were useful and many cameras were designed so the lens could be hidden behind coat buttons. When pictures had to be taken at night, ultra-high-speed film made it possible to get a good picture with no more than the light from one candle. If you could change the developing time or temperature, the film would be even more effective. By 2001, digital imaging was increasingly common and effective. The Nikon DOX high resolution camera emerged as one of the most popular devices for photographic surveillance.

When a surveillance team did not enjoy the advantage of proximity to its target, there were cameras such as the Questar Seven 2,800mm. The effective range of this long lens innovation allowed it to read license plate numbers from two miles away.

Another valuable innovation for surveillance operations has been the development of sophisticated tracking devices or beacons. These may be as small as a credit card or, like the “parent beacon,” as large as a WiFi router. The smallest beacons can be used for the tracking of assets that are being moved. If an adversary is traveling over great distances and is carrying, for example, a case full of money, the case can be tracked by a tiny beacon placed in its outer shell. There have been numerous cases in which terrorist equipment has been tracked while passing through several countries. Rather that have a surveillance team attempt to follow crates full of sensitive equipment, a well-placed beacon enables surveillance via a computer that traces a small chip. For especially complex operations in which surveillance is required on several targets, a “parent beacon” can be used to monitor multiple beacons. Again, this is done without endangering surveillance teams and no action needs to be taken until the shipments arrive at their destination in preparation to be used in an attack.

There are various types of beacons based on the purposes for which they are employed. For operations that are close to the target, a tactical beacon is used. One of the best-known tactical beacons is the PowerFlare PF-200. It is lightweight and uses a rugged infrared signal that produces a 360-degree infrared light. It can use several signal and flash patterns. It is currently being employed by security services, military, and law enforcement. Strategic surveillance uses beacons to monitor a broader range of activities that might constitute a threat. Its monitoring is based on selected information sources that draw from different disciplines. Satellites or aircraft are generally used to monitor strategic beacons. Most of these beacons—whether tactical or strategic—will employ a tiny radio frequency transmitter that serves as a navigational signal.

Because of their miniscule proportions, concealment is easy and the devices can be placed inside shipping containers when there is a need to track their movements. For people who are vulnerable to kidnapping, beacons can be placed inside shoes, belts, or some other article of clothing. Once that person is taken by kidnappers, he can activate the beacon which will transmit a signal. Another device that serves a similar function is a taggant, much like the security tag used by commercial establishments, which keeps track of the movements of the person being protected. The KGB was known for using a compound known as “spy dust.” This mildly radioactive substance could be placed on clothing worn by a suspect or placed on the furniture in a room holding materials being sought by the suspect. If the “spy dust” could be detected on a suspected spy, it was proof he had entered the room.

In the decades after World War II, success in technical collections was dependent on audio operations and satellite photography. Audio operations assumed a high priority for the CIA engineers. The enemy communications system was the objective for audio operations. The effort put into the Berlin Tunnel operation was a tribute to the importance attached to our ability to listen in on the adversary’s discussions. In that period, conventional landline telephones were especially vulnerable. When the British technicians penetrated the cable of the Soviet headquarters, there was a flood of information that immediately became available to British and American intelligence services. A very simple innovation was created by the CIA’s TSS when it devised a system that by-passed the telephone hook switch so the phone served as a microphone for listening to conversations in the room where it was connected.

Contemporary cell phones are even more vulnerable to audio surveillance. The information passing through a cell phone can effectively be plucked out of the ether. No physical connection is required. In fact, with simple technical adjustments, the cell phone is transformed into a spy that can transmit conversations, data, and the physical location of the user.

The most basic component of an audio operation is the contact microphone that is fixed to the wall of the target location. Sound causes vibrations on most hard surfaces and the contact microphone will pick up sound even through a concrete wall. Pinhole microphones will work with a tiny airway of less than half a millimeter in width and are more difficult to detect than the contact microphone. Even more sophisticated is the fiber optic microphone that uses cable that is smaller than a human hair. It uses light waves that can be transmitted on its miniscule cable placed under a door or through a hole in the wall. This remarkable device began as something used for medical procedures.

One difficulty with audio operations is that background noise often makes it hard to understand what your target is saying. The creation of the directional microphone—sometimes called acoustic radar—focuses on specific individuals rather than picking up a sea of incomprehensible noise and will focus on sound that is in front of the listener. It is intended for use in collecting human voice audio information. The directional microphone will pick up sound from a certain direction rather than from an entire location. These microphones may be omnidirectional (meaning a circular pickup pattern), unidirectional, or bidirectional. The basic part of the microphone is a waveguide pipe that has a diameter of 10mm to 30mm and individual cells that amplify sound. If listening to targets that are outside, there is a type of directional microphone known as a rifle or shotgun microphone that is effective outside. When a news crew attempts to interview a subject outside the building, it will use the rifle microphone. It will pick up sound from the direction of the target but filter out any noise from the side. This microphone is useful if your target happens to be a smoker forced to go outside for his smoking break.

When preparing an operational plan that involves audio or video recording, there are three basic components. The first is a recording device that will capture the information so it can be transmitted to the surveillance team base. Therefore, the second component is an effective transmission link. Finally, there must be a listening post that is reasonably close by the transmission that can be done by a wire rather than a less secure radio link.

If a team intends to use wire for transmitting the information, it can use several tools created by the CIA’s Office of Technical Service (OTS). The best known is called the “fine wire kit” and includes tools that will help create separations for holding a wire. It offers a small crow bar for pulling back a baseboard so the tiny wire can be placed behind it. If there is no baseboard, the surveillance team can use the razor contained in the kit and create a small slit in the wall as a location for the wire.

It is important to be able to hide or disguise listening devices. Chinese companies routinely produce and sell a variety of tiny cameras that are designed to look like normal writing pens. These devices will also function as an actual writing implement. Many of these spy tools are voice activated and can be used for audio and video recording. The cheapest of them comes with a web camera and sells for around $40. The Chinese company even offers a pinhole camera, a motion detector, and advice on where to hide their cameras. During the Cold War, the Czechoslovakian security service developed a device known as the David pen. When the user removed the tip of this fully functional pen, it exposed a camera designed to take photographs of documents.

The OTS created a variety of gadgets that could be used by operatives who only had two or three minutes to plant their listening device. In an age when smoking was common, agents could carry what looked like a cigarette lighter but was actually a listening device. This might be casually left behind to pick up conversation in a room the agent had just left. A narcissistic person might use this to learn what people said about him after he left the room, but an intelligence operative could hear what plans might be developed by an enemy to counter their operations.

OTS also created an AC electrical adaptor that was actually a bugging device that could be placed between a lamp and the electrical outlet. It built furniture that hide concealment cavities for placement of listening devices or even blocks that might be placed inside existing furniture to hid a listening device. A Soviet musician named Leon Theremin created a passive cavity resonator that functioned like a drum. When targeted by an external transmitter using radio signals at the correct frequency in a building across the street, the resonator was activated to listen to conversations in a particular room. This is referred to as “illuminating” a passive device. The Soviets’ passive cavity resonator was hidden inside a carved wooden version of the US “eagle” emblem that was presented to the US ambassador to the Soviet Union. Its true purpose was not exposed until a decade later and Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge Jr. presented it to the United National General Assembly in an effort to embarrass the Soviet Union.

The CIA engineers created an assortment of concealment devices over the years. These included a lighter, a pen, and a key fob that contained the tiny Tropel cameras used in surveillance operations. One of these devices was used by Lieutenant Colonel Boris Yuzhin, who was a mole inside the KGB and was actually spying for the FBI. While visiting the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, he left his Tropel camera concealment behind, an action which prompted the KGB to begin an investigation that led to his eventual imprisonment.

The KGB designed and used a fixed surveillance camera that could be easily hidden inside common items. Their most successful employment was inside a decorative mask given as a gift to US officials. The tiny camera was set to take pictures at certain intervals.

Modern technology represented a threat to American interests not only with the placement of the Theremin device in the office of the US ambassador to the Soviet Union. Through the NSA GUNMAN project, the NSA uncovered evidence of another unique and sophisticated Soviet effort to penetrate the US Embassy in Moscow. In 1976, the KGB managed to install miniaturized electronic eavesdropping equipment and burst transmitters inside sixteen IBM Selectric typewriters used in American diplomatic facilities in Moscow and Leningrad. This equipment copied everything typed on those machines and then transmitted that information to nearby KGB listening posts. This system operated for eight years and was not discovered until President Reagan authorized the GUNMAN project in 1984. Within one hundred days, an NSA team replaced every piece of communications and encryption equipment and all of the computers, typewriters, and printers used in Moscow and Leningrad. Only then did they uncover a sophisticated and destructive Soviet operation.

More recently, thanks to the proliferation of cheap surveillance technology, almost any government or individual can become a surveillance power. A Virginia based satellite operator known as HawkEye 360 offers the services of its CubeSats which can be used with almost any type of equipment. The CubeSats are nanosatellites that are no bigger than a shoebox. Its standard size measures 10x10x10 centimeters, although there are larger ones that are the size of a school bus. They were developed in 1999 and designed to be a platform for education and space exploration. Over the past two decades, the CubeSats have become an important part of industrial and governmental markets. The first CubeSat used as a spacecraft was launched in 2006 by NASA Ames. Since then it has launched sixteen more CubeSats of varying sizes.

The most successful marketer of the CubeSats is probably HawkEye 360. It is a Radio Frequency geospatial analytics company based in Herndon, Virginia. It operates a commercial satellite constellation that can identify and locate RF signals. Their services recently assisted Ecuadorian authorities faced with the problem of illegal fishing being conducted by Chinese vessels. This problem is not limited to just Ecuador. There is a multitude of gangs involved in smuggling, piracy, and human trafficking around the world. The countering of these threats requires effective monitoring of vessels that routinely deactivate the Automatic Identification Systems that are supposed to monitor their movements. When this happens, nations can only defend their interests by dispatching coast guard vessels or airplanes to search the sea. These are extremely expensive and beyond the financial reach of many nations. HawkEye 360, with its fleet of small commercial satellites, can expand the visibility of such nations so they can locate the “dark ships” that are involved in criminal behavior. HawkEye can pick up those ships’ radio frequency signals that are used for marine radar and satellite communications.

HawkEye360 uses trilateration or triangulation to locate ships that have turned off their Automatic Identification Systems. As an alternative, it can measure small shifts in the signal frequency of the ship’s transmitter as it moves. Given the commercial success of HawkEye360, it is not surprising that other companies are being set up to benefit from the need for more effective surveillance at sea. HawkEye’s data can effectively locate guerrilla camps and mobile missile-launchers used by terrorist organizations.

With its reliance on satellite clusters to collect data based on RF signals, there is speculation that the technology of HawkEye360 may soon fall behind the times. Engineers at the French-based Unseenlabs have determined that the clustering technique is no longer the best for use in monitoring ships at sea. The detection system used by Unseenlabs requires only a single satellite instead of the cluster presumably required for accurate triangulation. How their system works is a vital and well-protected secret that is guarded by French security services. If Unseenlabs enjoys a monopoly on the single-satellite-RF-intelligence market, it is unlikely they will enjoy this advantage for much longer. Its most significant emerging competition comes from Horizon Satellite, an Alaska-based company founded in 1990. According to Horizon engineers, a single satellite can determine the location of its target by using differences in the angles of a target’s signals as it travels across the sky. They maintain that this gives them the ability to pinpoint the target’s location within 3,000 meters while Unseenlabs can only guarantee a location within 5,000 meters. They claim their technology will also enable Horizon to create a library of radar-pulse “fingerprints” so any vessel can be easily identified no matter where it may be located.

Another blessing of the new technologies is that they have made it possible to spy on internet users who attempt to maintain anonymity. The Tor network is one of the most frequently used browsers by those hoping to hide their identities. Working together, the NSA and Britain’s GCHQ have sometimes been able to block access to the TOR network or to actually expose the identity of TOR users. By implanting malicious code into the computers operated by TOR network users, clandestine operations have disabled elements of the anonymous community. They have also targeted members of the internet group known as “Anonymous” which has been responsible for cyber-attacks against major corporations, governmental institutions and agencies.

The same technology enabled Britain’s GCHQ to set up an automated system to monitor reservation systems in certain luxury hotels. There were 350 hotels that were targeted by the GCHQ, all of them luxury hotels around the world. Known as the Royal Concierge surveillance program, it reflected their interest in monitoring the activities of numerous random individuals determined to be of possible natural security interest. They could also wiretap telephone calls made from the rooms in these hotels.

Working together, NSAand GCHQ even conducted surveillance on many online games. The specific targets were the massive multiplayer games that involved role-playing. The objectives of this virtual reality surveillance are not immediately apparent, but it may be a reflection of the desire to do something simply because it is possible. The value of this endeavor may be a function of the social interactions that occur both within and outside of such games.

Political espionage is an obvious aspect of surveillance operations. Intelligence organizations typically establish specific intelligence priorities. For the NSA, this means setting a scale of one to five with one representing the most important and five indicating the lowest level of interest. The NSA collaborates with thirty nations in its surveillance endeavors, although it also spies on many of these partners.

Throughout the global war on terror, the SCS was instrumental in establishing eavesdropping post in major cities in the Middle East. It was able to monitor al-Qaeda training camps and successfully target known associates of Osama bin Laden. When bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan was located, SCS operatives set up a base in an apartment one mile away and used lasers to target the compound windows. By analyzing vibrations, they determined how many people were in the facility and that one of those individuals never went outside. They correctly surmised that this was Osama bin Laden, thus making possible the special operations raid in which bin Laden was killed.