Chapter 2
Zdeněk Žalud
Introduction
The loans of medieval rulers are extraordinary incomes which, at some points of reign, supplemented insufficient regular incomes. From the historical sources, we are often worse informed about the credit terms than about consequence of a loan, that is about debt and conditions of its payment, often in the form of a pledge. Medieval rulers of Bohemia and Moravia from the Přemyslid dynasty, who became the last bearers of the kingship in Central Europe at the beginning of the 13th century, used their revenues not only for the purpose of government, but also for prestige promotion and propaganda. In Italy, Ottokar II Přemysl, called the ‘king of iron and gold’, was rumoured to have 200,000 golden marks and 800,000 silver marks in his four castles in four towers, not to mention golden and silver dishes, jewels, and countless decorations (Kuthan 1993, p. 39). According to the Description of Germany (Descriptio Theutoniae) from about 1290, the Bohemian king had a revenue of 100,000 silver marks annually and an unknown author, describing Eastern Europe in 1308, argues that Bohemian kings are mighty not thanks to number of inhabitants, but because of monetary resources flowing from silver mines used for the hiring of mercenaries (Žemlička 2011, 246; Jan 2015, p. 13).
The key concept for the better understanding of medieval royal economy in Bohemia is the royal chamber (camera regis), which denotes not only the place, where the royal revenues were directed, but also the summary of king’s property and incomes flowing from it (Žemlička 2011, pp. 246–7). The Bohemian exile Pavel Stránský, only in 17th century, tried to aptly express what the revenues of Bohemian kings are based on. His words are, however, applicable for the High and Late Middle Ages as well: ‘Regular royal incomes in Bohemia flow partly from annual pay of monasteries and free towns, partly from golden and silver mines, partly from duties and partly from real estates, called chamber or alimental or land registry estates’ (Žemlička 2011, pp. 232–3). One part of the regular royal revenues originated not only from taxation of various economic activities of subordinated institutions, but also from real estates, which were managed by kings via their loyal administrators. During the high-medieval colonisation in Central Europe, the structure of pays, levies, and burdens transformed from natural taxes into pecuniary taxes. Kings monopolised some rights connected with revenues – since then the so-called royal rights (iura regalia) – they could also lease or pledge them. Royal incomes and expenses fluctuated depending on wars, paying of wealthy dowries, recompenses, occupation of new territories, etc. Extant records of these fluctuations are so unsatisfactory that it is usually difficult to associate these tendencies with particular amounts of money.
Accounts of the Bohemian king and his court do not survive before the second half of the 14th century and the later situation for Czech lands is, unfortunately, not satisfactory either. Therefore, it is not surprising that studies on the finances of earlier periods are based on documents, forms, letters and narrative sources rather than accounting books.
(Žalud 2016, p. 59)
In spite of dismal state of historical records, we often ascertain loans and debts of Bohemian kings of high and late middle ages. We should remember that ‘ordinary revenues of the majority of the medieval rulers often barely sufficed for their everyday needs and did not allow them to accumulate substantial reserves. Therefore, it would be mistaken to attribute to medieval rulers some budgetary irresponsibility’ (Postan 1979, p. 431). It is rather appropriate to speak about the chaotic complexity of royal financial transactions. A large part of regular incomes did not come to the royal chamber in order to be distributed but was sent by the kings directly from its source to recipients or creditors. The contemporary researcher is neither able to find out how the repayments of debts were supervised nor to discover the financial value of property of pledge in relation to amounts which were paid from it as payment of debts. That is why the following study presents the first and only rough outline (or chronological survey) of the finance-flow between Bohemian kings as debtors, on the one hand, and their creditors, on the other.
Loans and debts of the last Přemyslids
The expansion of silver production in the Bohemian-Moravian highlands from the late 1230s and the expanding power of Ottokar II Přemysl, king of Bohemia (1253–1278) to the Alpine lands and the Venetian region in the 1260s and 1270s started trade connections between Italy, especially Venice and Bohemia. The Bohemian king set three currency reforms in 1253, 1260–1261, and 1268–1270 in order to make trade contacts with Venice easier (Zaoral 2019, pp. 213–14). The first loans of the king Ottokar II Přemysl from abroad are documented in 1262 in Italy. The king’s creditors were financiers of Florence (the papal banker Dulcis de Burgo and his business partners) and it cannot be ruled out that king’s debts were covered by the Bohemian export of precious metals to Venice (Žemlička 2011, p. 349). Before introducing Prague groschen in 1300, the kings of Bohemia were able to multiply their incomes by regular re-coinage or coin renewal (renovatio monetae), pursued twice a year. In the Czech lands, there were about 12 mints that produced royal coins, mostly leased to burghers (Jan 2015, pp. 496, 501). The leading royal officers of these mints – the so-called urburéři – were certainly the main regular creditors of Bohemian kings.
The sources of Bohemian royal economy – the royal chamber – were considerably exhausted by Ottokar’s war with the King of the Romans Rudolph I of Habsburg and with rebellious nobility between 1276 and 1278 (Žemlička 2011, pp. 246, 450). In the early 1280s, the Czech lands seemed to have to pay 15,000 silver marks from the taxation to Otto V the Long, Margrave of Brandenburg, for the returning of the Přemyslid prince and the heir of the Bohemian throne, Wenceslaus II (Jan 2015, pp. 46, 61). His successful politics and territorial expansion of the kingdom from the 1290s was conditioned by increasing of silver production in Bohemia after the discovery of silver ore in Kutná Hora (Zaoral 2019, p. 216). Florentine merchants Rinieri, Apardo, and Cyno called the Lombardian anticipated fabulous gains from conducting business in the lands of the ‘silver’ king. That is why they ‘acted as a bank and rented the office of mint master and a mine from the king, including royal income from smelted precious metals (so-called urbura) with the aim of carrying out a complete monetary reform’ (Zaoral 2019, p. 216). The introduction of the Prague groschen in 1300, that should maintain permanent value, finished the period of inflationary regular recoinage.
The Florentines carried on business in real estate and lent the king as well as his nobility huge amounts of money. Apardo became an administrator of the royal economy in the office of chamberlain (subcamerarius). It seems that loans from the Florentine consortium were never repaid during the reign of the last Přemyslids – one of the merchants’ claims the amount of 28,000 silver marks from their successor King John the Blind (of Luxembourg) in 1311. The burdensome financial situation of the royal economy after 1305 was result of expensive foreign policy and the war with the Roman King Albert I of Habsburg. The terminally sick Wenceslaus II ordered his heir as well as his most important courtiers to settle royal debts. After the premature death of Wenceslaus III in 1306, his royal treasure carried to the expedition to Poland was stolen and his successor, the Bohemian king Rudolph I of Habsburg, started to pay the old debts by instalments of 1000 silver marks per week from the royal income from smelted precious metals and from the royal chamber (de urbura et fisco regio) (Jan 2015, p. 499).
During the anarchy in Bohemia after Rudolph’s death in 1307, the amounts from precious metals in Kutná Hora as well as other royal incomes and real estates became the means of haggle over the political benefits of aristocracy, namely Raimund of Lichtenburg, Henry of Lipa, and John of Wartenberg. The Bohemian nobility began to look for a more capable successor than Henry of Carinthia and the young king John the Blind (of Luxembourg) had to take over the indebted kingdom (Žalud 2016, p. 61).
Kings of Bohemia from the House of Luxembourg and their extraordinary incomes
John the Blind exploited his regular financial resources – especially taxes, king´s mining revenue (urbura), and coinage – but made use of incomes from mercenary service, alliance agreements, from booty, and ransom. He also extended the Bohemian kingdom to Lusatia and Silesia, imposing taxes on his new subjects. During his reign, King John amassed a disorganized and vast tangle of debts and their repayment by John’s successors – Emperor and King Charles IV and Wenceslaus, Duke of Luxembourg – was in some cases prolonged until 1370s. John’s last will from 1340 shows that the blind king was aware of the problem and appealed to his successors to continue repaying his debts. Among the executors of his last will, we can find royal financiers from the upper social classes – his uncle Baldwin, Archbishop of Trier, Rudolph, Duke of Saxony, noble Peter of Rosenberg and Vaněk of Wartenberg – as well as Abbots of Cistercian monasteries in Bohemia, etc. Some important financiers, however, are not named in that document: Frenzlin (Franz) Jacobi from the patrician family of Prague, Gisco (Gisilbert) of Reste from Silesia, and Arnold of Arlon from the County of Luxembourg (Žalud 2016, pp. 66–72). Many of the royal real estates and revenues were pledged, the burden of older royal debts was growing and so John’s heir of throne, Prince Charles, observed the almost complete pledging of real estates and castles in 1330s. Prince Charles tried to improve unfavourable situation of royal economy and established the annual taxation of monasteries in Moravia and later in Bohemia (Borovský 2005, p. 123), yet he could not avoid taking out loans from the nobility as well as from wealthy patricians (Šusta 1946, pp. 216–19). Charles’ complicated cooperation with his father by ruling in Bohemia and Moravia was finished by an agreement at the beginning of 1342. King John should stay beyond the kingdom two years in exchange of revenue of 5000 silver marks (Šusta 1946, pp. 370–2). It seems that indebtedness of the kingdom did not decreased considerably during this period and so Charles forced his father to promise not to alienate other royal real estates, especially towns and castles, in the presence of pope Clement VI in Avignon in 1344 (Šusta 1946, p. 415). The commitment was not fulfilled: increased expenses on the Charles’ election the King of the Romans in 1346 caused cancellation of such a restriction. Charles had to buy votes of the electors – except for his father – and that is why several capable financiers, especially Arnold of Arlon and Rainhard of Schönau, were employed. Their loans were assured mostly by deeds of pledge. The vote of Charles great-uncle, Baldwin, Archbishop of Trier, was secured by pledging almost the whole County of Luxemburg (Knake 2010, p. 396).
Charles ascension to the throne of the King of the Romans coincides with the crushing defeat of his cavalry and the death of his father at the battle of Crécy. Over three years, Charles had to assert his rank in Germany against the Wittelsbach party and abundant deeds of pledge helped him to recruit political followers (Bender 1967). He ‘contracted nearly a third of all the pledges in the Middle Ages’ (in total about 1100 pledge contracts) but ‘strictly avoided pledging his own hereditary territory’ (Isenmann 1999, p. 254). However, we must confess that pledging policy of Charles IV in his Central European domains remain unresearched. If we should mention only one important Charles’ financier from the first period of his rule (1346–1378), it would be Dietrich of Portitz, who rose from humble beginnings to the title of archbishop of Magdeburg (1361–1367) and was an important personality at the court of Charles IV. Never named to the office of chamberlain (subcamerarius), Dietrich as the king’s main creditor got an extraordinary privilege from him in 1357. Charles pledged him all royal revenues from the Bohemian kingdom till the repayment of his financial claims. Dietrich’s nephew was elevated to the Bohemian nobility and became the burgrave of Vyšehrad in 1360 (Fajt 2015, pp. 144–96). After Dietrich’s departure for Magdeburg, his position in the administration of the royal finances was taken by Bohemian noblemen, honoured with title ‘Master of the royal chamber’ (magister camerae regalis): Zbyněk Zajíc of Hasenburg, Bušek the Younger of Velhartice, Boreš V. of Riesenburg, Hašek of Zvířetice, and Těma of Colditz (Kavka 1991, pp. 23–36). An accommodating creditor of the often-indebted king and (from 1355) emperor was his younger brother John Henry, margrave of Moravia (1322–1375). Thanks to Adolf Nuglisch, we have Charles’ revenues from the Holy Roman Empire relatively well documented. The emperor’s two campaigns to Italy in 1355 and 1368 were especially lucrative: the first ‘Romzug’ brought him – according to Nuglisch – more than 565,000 golden florins, the second provided him with more than 311,000 golden florins (Nuglisch 1899, pp. 112, 115).
The most complicated military and diplomatic operation of Charles’ territorial politics was conquest of the Margraviate of Brandenburg in 1373. Although the land was conquered by armed forces, the circumspect emperor prepared for the defeated Wittelsbach Margrave Otto financial compensation of 500,000 guilders. The main creditors of this munificent amount were Bohemian towns, the margrave of Moravia along with his adult sons (64,000 florins), whereas Charles’ domain in the Upper Palatinate (in Bavaria) were given to the Wittelsbachs as a pledge (Kavka 1993, pp. 150–5). Charles IV paid for the election of his first son Wenceslaus IV as King of the Romans in 1376 with another huge amount of 120,000 florins, which was later collected from the free imperial cities in form of an extraordinary tax (Rapp 2007, p. 224; Kavka 1993, pp. 176–92). Such ambitious foreign politics was not conceivable without considerable credits. According to F. Kavka and F. Šmahel, Charles IV drew from his pledged family domains (Bohemia, Moravia, etc.) ca 50,000 threescore groschen, whereas his deeds of pledge in the Roman Empire brought him credits of 445,000 silver marks, 270,000 halers, and 698,000 golden florins. These enormous deeds of pledge weakened economic potential of the royal chamber until the reign of his successor, King Wenceslaus IV. The slow repayment of the pledges, which dragged on for years, brought financial losses to the royal chamber (Šmahel 1995, p. 208).
Between 1330 and 1350, the production of silver ore in Kutná Hora declined from 20–30,000 kg annually to ca 10,000. Moreover, the constant outflow of precious metals from the Bohemian kingdom abroad weakened the economic potential of the land. Both rulers, Charles as well as Wenceslaus, tried to compensate these losses by the debasement of the quality of the Prague groschen and of its small change, they both strived for restriction of metal export, but in vain. The value of Prague groschen in relation to Hungarian ducat was depreciated by 42 per cent during Charles’ reign and by 50 per cent during Wenceslaus’ reign, to 1419 (Šmahel 1995, pp. 210–11). However, the evaluation of this development is not unequivocal nowadays (Čechura 2012, p. 325).
Just as his father, Wenceslaus IV was inventive in relation to the means of the enrichment of the royal chamber. It is documented by the loan of 20,000 guilders from his expectant brother-in-law King Richard II of England in 1381 (Bartlová & Bobková 2003, p. 304), yields of three papal tithes in 1380–1400 (in sum ca 4200 threescore Prague groschen) or by his one-time amortization of Christian debts towards Jews in the free imperial cities in Germany, which made him a profit of 40,000 golden florins (Šmahel 1995, p. 219; Hruza 2005, p. 125). On the one hand, Wenceslaus collected valuables (or treasure) and protected them at his royal castles, on the other hand, he callously exploited repeated taxation of royal towns and monasteries, often during a single year. The king was afflicted by several political disasters – prisoner of the Bohemian nobility in 1395, deposition from the kingship of the Romans and war with Ruprecht of Palatinate in 1400, prisoner of his brother Sigismund in 1402 – accompanied by economic disasters – the pillaging of Kutná Hora, the most important mining town in Bohemia, along with the loss of valuables in 1403, substantial debasement of the quality of the Prague groschen and of its small change in 1407 (Castelin 1953, pp. 142–3). According to F. Šmahel, repeated debasement together with lack of precious metals in Bohemia caused a profound decline of the royal finances as well as of the Bohemian coin system in 1417–18 (Šmahel 1995, pp. 214, 220).
Delineation of the economic situation of the royal chamber is more explicit at the end of the 14th century. Not only charters, forms, and narrative sources are preserved, but also extensive remains of royal registers of real estates, the arrangement of the collection of taxes from royal towns and monasteries, and a roll of expenditures of the royal chamber in 1418. This roll shows that about 55 per cent of royal incomes from towns and monasteries was sent by kings directly from their sources to creditors. We are able to gain precise data; however, such lists of revenues are not all-inclusive (Šmahel 1995, pp. 217–19). From the royal registers of real estates, we can gain a realistic idea about the amount and social status of the royal creditors under Wenceslaus IV. The dukes and margraves of Moravia held the highest position among them, then the Bohemian Lords – Jan Krušina of Lichenburg, Těma of Colditz, Boček of Poděbrad, Petr Zmrzlík of Svojšín or Jan Ťavák of Schwamberg – but the most numerous was lesser nobility and rich townspeople – Jan of Lestkov, Zikmund Huler, Mikuláš called the Poor of Lobkovic, Jan of Chotěmic, Jan Sádlo of Smilkov, Vlášek of Kladno, Filip Lout of Dědice, Petr of Netvořice or Konrád of Vechta. Many of them became holders of important royal castles and strongholds or court offices. The most important financial offices of the king remained the chamberlain (subcamerarius) and the Masters of the royal chamber (magistri camerae regalis) but we are not able to distinguish their official authority more clearly nowadays.
After the debasement of 1407, it seems the king took into account the descending value of coins when he issued some deeds. Real estates, that were pledged by Wenceslaus at that time, got two monetary values: the first, lower, in case of redeeming it by Wenceslaus himself, the second, higher, in case of redeeming it by his successors. These options are documented for the pledged estates Potštejn and Kostelec nad Orlicí (1409), Dvůr Králové nad Labem (1410), and for some properties in Moravia in 1413. In this troubled era associated with plundering companies, many people of noble birth, but impoverished, became robbers or mercenaries. That is why Wenceslaus often used his revenues as soldier’s pay or as recompense.
Conclusion
From the beginning of the 15th century, a social and religious ferment with trade unrest and armed robberies, ongoing debasement of the currency, inconsiderate royal taxation, debts paid over long terms, and increasing royal deeds of pledge – it all together caused and intensified the crises of the royal finances. After Wenceslaus death in 1419, the royal chamber of his legitimate successor Sigismund, king of Hungary, later also Emperor and King of Bohemia, was exhausted by the 14-year-long Hussite wars. Sigismund was forced not only to alienate royal real estates, but also to pledge church property at that time. The Hussite wars dramatically changed the ownership in the Bohemian kingdom: a considerable reduction of royal property and dissipation of the property of the Catholic Church.
This process, however, started already under the reign of Wenceslaus IV or even sooner, during the 14th century. According to Miloš Prokop, Wenceslaus had at his disposal ca 30 castles in 1418, but almost 2/3 of them were pledged; he had also about 35–40 fiefdom castles, but many of them were pledged too (Prokop 2004, pp. 147–9). The total sum of Sigismund’s pledges reached almost 490,000 threescore Prague groschen but its real value was much higher. During the Hussite wars, Bohemian church institutions lost more than 350,000 threescore groschen (Šmahel 1996, p. 64). It is perhaps obvious from the foregoing presentation that despite the long-lasting and destructive power of the Hussite wars, the revolutionary outcome of the Hussite period was conditioned also by the excessively ambitious or sometimes even reckless financial politics of Sigismund’s predecessors.
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