Chapter 4
János Incze
Introduction
Then, it is known to all what great and frequent dangers attended and arose in the affairs of the royal majesty and the whole country by the pledging and temporary alienation of the real and just revenues of the Holy Crown of the kingdom to diverse persons, as was done hitherto.
(Decreta regni, pp. 177–9)
With these words, the first article of the royal decree promulgated at the diet of 1514 begins. Its prominent place assigned in the decree shows clearly how pressing the issue of pledged and alienated royal revenues and possession became for the crown of Hungary in the early 16th century. In accordance with this as well, the measures prescribed by the decree reflect the severity of the problem. It was decided at the diet that half of pledged and alienated royal possessions and revenues had to be returned to the king after his remaining debts had been cleared away. Four years later, even more drastic measures were taken at another diet, as a new decree ordered that not only half of pledged and leased royal rights and revenues had to be returned to the king, as had been formerly decided, but all of it (CIH, p. 756).
While similar regulations concerning the recovery of pledged royal possessions emerged in other parts of Central Europe in this period, the problem gained special importance in Hungary because of the looming Ottoman threat and because of how great a financial challenge this posed to the kingdom (Ludwig 1984, pp. 113–17, 121; Matuszewski 1997, pp. 52–3; Isenmann 1999, pp. 253, 265). On the one hand, the royal revenues had dwindled during the Jagiellonians’ rule in comparison to the earlier period. This was partly because the number of taxable tenants dropped in the southern regions of the kingdom, but also because not all royal revenues were collected for the treasury owing to various military and fiscal reforms of the late 15th century. Finally, the continuous putting in pledge and alienation of the royal domains and revenues had also greatly contributed to the emergence of this situation (Neumann et al. 2019, pp. 57–9; Fógel 1913, pp. 14–15. Pálosfalvi 2018, p. 455). On the other hand, not only were the revenues lower, but expenses became so high that it was not always possible to meet them, sometimes not even the treasury’s basic expenditures. For fending off the Ottoman danger, a chain of castles and forts were erected alongside the southern border already in the first part of the 15th century and later extended with new ones. This defence system could fulfil its purpose entirely only if armed troops were stationed in the castles. To this end, a permanent army was established in the kingdom which was, at that time, one of the earliest on the continent, but its costs represented an enormous financial burden for the kingdom. The most severe financial troubles came forward when, besides paying the castles’ garrisons, troops were raised for planned military campaigns and their wages had to be covered as well. The case of the year 1522 is known from closer research and it shows a gloomy picture. That year, the royal revenues most likely remained short of the expenditures by a small margin despite the extraordinary tax levied for recruiting mercenaries (C. Tóth 2016, pp. 124, 126–7, Pálosfalvi 2018, pp. 4, 455). Considering all this, it is understandable that the recovery of pledges became such a cardinal issue for a treasury that was striving to complement its revenues by almost all possible means. Despite the ordinances of the diets their stipulations were not completely fulfilled, partly because some of the royal possessions were pledged exactly for military service (Kubinyi 2006, p. 306; Pálosfalvi 2018, p. 460).
This is how crucial the issue of the pledged royal lands became in late medieval Hungary before the Ottoman conquest. The aim of the present study is to trace back the roots of this process and to present the emergence of pledging in the royal finances, and to highlight under what circumstances it could become an important element of these finances.
King Louis I’s finances
The name that initially pops up concerning royal pledging in the Kingdom of Hungary is Sigismund of Luxembourg (1387–1437) and this is not by coincidence. During his half-century-long reign in the country, he had managed to conclude several hundreds of transactions of pledge, in which a high number of royal castles were involved. Even one of medieval Hungary’s most infamous transactions of pledge is related to him. In 1412, he put in pledge a region to the king of Poland in such way that it could be recovered only 360 years later (Incze 2016, p. 266). Nonetheless, despite pledging becoming somewhat inseparable from his name, it was certainly not Sigismund who established this form of raising extraordinary revenues in the country. This is proven by one of his many transactions by which he contracted a loan based on his predecessor King Louis I’ (1342–1382) pledging of Steničnjak (Sztenicsnyák) castle (DL 34052, Frangepán I, pp. 131–2). Characteristic of Sigismund, he demanded a loan greater than the original sum for which the castle was given in pledge by Louis. His demand for credit was backed up by threatening the widow of the original pledge holder that he would grant the castle to someone else if his request was not met (Frangepán I, p. 140; Engel 1977, p. 158). The most interesting aspect emerging from this case perhaps was not how Sigismund dealt with the whole situation, but the fact that it reveals that his predecessor had to tackle financial problems and that he similarly tried to overcome them by pledging. The initial transaction concluded in 1380 leaves no doubt that Louis pledged the castle for a loan – a sum as high as 10,000 Hungarian golden florins. This might be somewhat unexpected in light of the literature’s frequent statements according to which Louis treasury seemed inexhaustible, or the prevailing notion that due to his prosperous financial situation he never had to resort to melting down or pawning his treasures (Engel 2003b, p. 315; Engel 2001, p. 157; Csukovits 2019, p. 108). The renowned Hungarian medievalist, Pál Engel, also noted this discrepancy and suggested that it was characteristic only of Louis’ last years of his reign when probably the outputs of gold production had dropped off, causing such financial difficulties for the treasury that they could never be overcome (Engel 2001, p. 187). Though admittedly, the transaction from 1380 belonged to Louis’ later ones, he had been pledging from much earlier in his reign – at least from the first part of the 1360s. Furthermore, specialists date the beginning of the gold production decline to somewhat later that his reign, the beginning of the 15th century (Batizi 2018, p. 176; Paulinyi 2005, p. 185). This entire discussion reflects precisely how much uncertainty surrounds the topic of royal finances during King Louis’ rule. It is telling in regard to the whole situation that the source material is so scarce that it only allows estimates for the revenues Sigismund had, whereas in the case of Louis not even such estimations are possible (Engel 2003a, p. 426; Kubinyi 2006, p. 23).
What seems unequivocally accepted is that the salt and the precious metal monopoly, the tax of the royal towns and of the hospes settlements, the extraordinary levy, and the revenues related to the royal estates were among Louis’ most important sources of income. Out of these, he could expect the highest yields from the precious metal mining, particularly from gold production (Engel 2003b, p. 315; Bertényi 1987, p. 219). The Kingdom of Hungary possessed vast mineral and metal wealth and, already in the second part of the 13th century, a boom was registered in the silver mining industry, while gold appeared only as a by-product of it. This first ‘golden age’ of the country’s precious metal mining was stopped by the fights for the throne that broke out after the extinction of the Árpád dynasty’s male line in 1301. After Louis’s father, Charles I (1301–1342), had risen to power and managed to stabilize his rule around 1320, new mines with large resources have been discovered and a new prosperous era began in the precious metal mining activity. At this time, especially the gold mining started to flourish, and despite the fluctuation in the output caused by the discovery of new mines and the closing of older, inundated ones, a highly significant amount of gold in the continent was produced by Hungary in the 14th century. On the top of that, silver mining was also thriving to such extent that only Bohemia produced more of it during this period. Calculations in scholarship estimate the yearly output of gold to 2–2.5 tons, and around 10 tons of silver (Batizi 2018, pp. 172–6; Štefánik 2012, pp. 224–5; Paulinyi 2005, pp. 184–5).
The journey of the queen mother, Elisabeth, to Italy in 1343 is commonly seen by the historiography as proof of this substantial wealth. That year, Robert of Anjou (1309–1343), the king of Naples died, and his testament named Joana, his granddaughter, to be his successor. King Louis’ brother and Joana’s husband, Andrew, lived in Naples since 1333 and was also a candidate to the throne. After Robert’s death, Queen Elisabeth set out on a journey to Italy to facilitate her son Andrew’s rise to power in Naples. If we can accept the information of a contemporary chronicler, Elisabeth carried with her more than six tons of silver and more than five tons of gold on the diplomatic journey. Nonetheless, even this great fortune proved not to be enough for her expenses so Louis sent another large amount of gold to her (Csukovits 2019, pp. 30–2; Engel 2001, pp. 156, 159–60). In line with this as well, one of Louis’ letters from 1366 is often mentioned, in which he wrote to one of his barons that if the money sent for paying soldiers is not enough, then he should send word of how much was needed, and it would be sent. Finally, Louis and his mother visited a number of pilgrimage sites abroad and lavished them with sumptuous gifts which shows precisely what financial possibilities the dynasty possessed at the time (Csukovits 2019, pp. 107–13; Engel 2001, p. 186).
A new element of the royal extraordinary revenues
It is not entirely clear when Louis resorted to the fundraising method of pledging for the first time. What can be stated with greater certainty is that putting royal possessions in pledge was more characteristic of the last two decades of his rule than the early phases. Presumably, Altenburg (Óvár) Castle of Moson County was one of the earlier examples of his pledging. The only piece of evidence attesting that Altenburg was given in pledge is in fact about its redemption. In 1364, Eglolf Wolfurt informed the king about the redemption of the castle from his brother Conrad. The text does not provide any further details on when and under what conditions the deal between Conrad and Louis was struck. Moreover, the situation is further complicated by the fact that Altenburg was in the Wolfurt family’s possession as part of their office already from 1350. Even Conrad himself is mentioned in 1357 as comes of Altenburg, supposedly around that time he became the pledge holder for it (DL 5313; Sopron vm., p. 354).
This was not the only transaction that Louis concluded with the Wolfurts. Kittsee (Köpcsény), another castle in Moson County, was similarly pledged to the family. We know about the transaction because, in 1363, Stephen, the bishop of Zagreb and vicar of Slavonia, promised in his and in some of his relatives’ names that by February 1364, they would manage to issue a charter with the royal grand seal. The document would contain that Eglolf Wolfurt and his brother Rudolph took in pledge the castle Kittsee from the king at a value of 6,000 florins. Also, in the case that the charter could not be issued by the deadline, Bishop Stephen and his relatives themselves would have to pay back the 6,000 florins to the Wolfurts. Finally, if the bishop and his relatives would not prove able to get the charter issued nor pay the money back then they would have to provide a recompense from their own domains (DL 5256; HO, 410). It was uncommon that certain persons stood as guarantors behind the pledgings of kings, but it was not completely unparalleled either. From the many transactions of King Sigismund, there is one with a resemblance to this. In that case, a royal familiaris guaranteed similarly with his own possessions that before a given deadline the creditors of the king would receive royal domains for the money they lent (CD X/6, p. 842; ZsO XIII, 1429). Furthermore, it was he to whom the credit was handed over. It remains unclear whether Bishop Stephen was similarly more deeply involved in the deal concluded between the Wolfurts and the king, or if his role was restricted simply to the issuing of the charter. The reason behind Louis not being able to use the great seal when the charter of the pledging was issued is that he simply did not have it. That year (1363), he personally led a military expedition to Bosnia and during the siege of a castle, the great seal was allegedly stolen (or lost) from the archbishop of Esztergom’s tent. In order to prevent the stolen seal being used for falsification and forgeries, a new grand seal was produced, and all documents on which the stolen seal was hanging had to be resealed with the new (Csukovits 2019, p. 78. AOklt XLVII. 659).
The Wolfurts, the pledge holders of the two royal castles, were a knightly kindred from the Vorarlberg region that King Louis came to know from his Italian military expeditions. Ulrich Wolfurt, the brother of Eglolf, Rudolph and Conrad, had a prominent role in Louis’ campaigns to Naples, as he was the Hungarian king’s most highly favored mercenary captain. It shows how much trust Louis placed in him that after the first campaign to Naples, the king left the city with Ulrich in charge acting as a governor (Veszprémy 2008, p. 166). After the Neapolitan Wars were over, the brothers moved to Hungary where they received offices from the king (Engel 1996, pp. 155–6, 179, 226). It was suggested that even Altenburg Castle was pledged to them as a recompense for Ulrich’s military accomplishments (Csukovits 2019, p. 43). Most probably, the pledging was concluded several years after the Neapolitan campaigns finished; there is information preserved only on Conrad being the castle’s pledge holder, no such information existing for Ulrich. Still, since Louis donated royal domains years after his troops left the Italian Peninsula – for the grantees’ ‘Apulian merits’ – the possibility cannot be completely ruled out (Csukovits 2019, p. 50).
It was more than mere coincidence that the Wolfurts – who provided military service to Louis – became pledge holders of royal property. Waging war was a central element of Louis’ four-decade reign in the Kingdom of Hungary. The bellicose ruler organized military campaigns almost in every direction (to Naples, Venice, Lithuania, Serbia, etc.), and he himself took part in a minimum of sixteen of these. Only from the second part of the 1370s, his appetite for war began to diminish and in 1377, he led a military campaign abroad for last time (Csukovits 2019, p. 106; Kubinyi 1982, p. 31). The almost regular wars must have caused difficult periods for the treasury; especially the Italian Wars could be proven very costly as mercenaries like the Wolfurts were hired in large numbers for these campaigns (Veszprémy 2008, p. 171). Due to the mounting expenditures, Louis had no choice but to raise loans, sometimes in the middle of a military expedition (for example, see the study of Boglárka Weisz in the present volume). By that time, it was already a common practice for members of the royal court, and members of the high clergy, to secure the loans they contracted by pledges of lands (DL 3924, AOklt XXXI, 929; DL 94077; DL 37556; DL 87228; Lederer 1932, 44). It was only a matter of time until the king himself would also resort to this fundraising method. War-related expenses burdening the treasury’s resources most heavily, it is presumable that Louis’ pledges aimed to cover these directly or indirectly. However, it must be emphasized that the field of military expenditures was not the only one with which the money of the pledges was associated.
Only fragmentary evidence is left regarding Louis’ two financial deals struck with the Wolfurts. His first known pledging for which a charter has come down to us with full details of the transaction is from 1372 and concerns the castle of Sirok. The wording of the charter is not ordinary as it completely lacks the terms commonly used to denote pledging (obligare, impignorare). Based on its wording, it is no wonder that for a long time this transaction was regarded as the very first royal castle pledging in the Kingdom of Hungary (Fügedi 1986, p. 114). In this case the castellan of the very same castle (Sirok) became the pledge holder of it for 2000 florins lent to the king and which the ruler needed for the refurbishment of that castle (DL 6047, 6049). Another instance reveals a different field of outlays with which Louis’ pledging was associated. Just two months before he died, he gave in pledge a number of settlements in Pozsony County to Temlin Szentgyörgyi, for an earlier loan and for the expenses of diplomatic assignments. According to the document, Szentgyörgyi and another envoy travelled twice to Bavaria on Louis’ order and the journeys’ expenses were covered by Szentgyörgyi himself. With the pledging, Louis intended to clear away his debt from the loan and the diplomatic journeys (DL 6939).
The sample-pool of Louis’ pledges is not large enough to perform a painstaking comparison with his successor’s pledging practice but, nonetheless, certain patterns are vaguely traceable. It was King Louis who laid down the foundations of royal pledging in Hungary and it was he who chose the more advantageous form of pledging for the royal possession – a practice that later became widely used by the future kings of Hungary. This form lacked a deadline for redeeming the pledge; in this case the ruler did not risk losing the property due to not being able to meet the deadline. The elaboration or precise description of the need for pledging was often bypassed by some of the Hungarian king’s charters of pledging, in a way that the justification was phrased too vaguely in many cases (DL 7519, 33412, 13189). This practice also had its beginnings in King Louis’ reign. The already mentioned 10,000 florins loan raised from the pledging of Steničnjak was allegedly needed by Louis for his own advantage, without anything more specific being revealed about why it was necessary (Frangepán I, pp. 89–91).
Certain decisions of Louis regarding how and for what he used pledging (refurbishing royal castles, covering services of his adherents) proved to be a desirable model for the successors to his throne. Moreover, even his choice of pledge holder turned out to be influential since he began to undertake transactions of pledge (Steničnjak) with the prominent Croatian family, the Frankopan, which later became the most important pledge holder of his heir to the throne (Incze 2018, p. 168).
Finally, it is not known precisely how many transactions of pledge King Louis made. Nonetheless, it seems almost certain that he was among the Hungarian kings with the fewest pledgings. The number of pledged royal castles can serve as a good indicator of this. The four castles known at this point as being put in pledge by Louis seems like a negligible number compared to the more than 80 pledged castles of King Sigismund. Also, King Matthias I (1458–1490) and Wladislas II (1490–1516) had considerably more castle pledges than Louis (Incze 2018, p. 82; DL, 15508, 30860, 16156, 88716, 103835, 88828; Fógel 1913, 14–15). This can be explained by Louis father’s cautious alienation policy, one that which Louis would also follow. As a result, only 18 castles were transferred into private hands during his whole reign (Fügedi 1986, pp. 113–14).
Conclusion
Despite the golden age of precious metal mining in Hungary, the royal treasury of King Louis seems to have experienced shortages more often than merely in the last years of his rule. Most likely, the expenses of the countless wars in which the kingdom was involved could not always be met with the ordinary revenues. To fill this financial void, besides other methods of raising extraordinary funds, Louis chose one that was already well known by some members of the royal court: loans secured by pledges of land. Louis, as the ruler who introduced pledging into the royal finances of the Hungarian kings, shaped its form and had an influence on its later evolution. That is why certain elements of his pledging practice reappear in that of his successors. Moreover, even his choice of pledge holders proved to be influential since it was he who initiated this set of interactions with the family that later became his successor’s largest pledge holder.
Pledging as a tool of raising funds was mostly characteristic of the second part of his reign and the small amount of known transaction is not only the consequence of the loss of sources, but it is also an indication of the limited usage of pledging by King Louis. After his death, on the foundation laid down by him, a new era began in royal pledging when its importance and extensive usage reached heights unimagined before.
Funding
This chapter was supported by the Expro-Project: “Od performativity k institucionalizaci. Řešení konfliktů v pozdním středověku (strategie, aktéři, komunikace) (Konflikt)” (identification number: GX19-28415X), funded by the GAČR (Grantová agentura České Republiky).
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