The Drift to War
In March of 1939 the Czechs were incorporated into the Reich in the name of a Protectorate. This led to a serious aggravation of the international situation. Hitler was exclusively responsible for the taking of this step.
On the morning of the occupation, the Commander-in-Chief of the Army sent for me; he informed me of the accomplished fact and ordered me to go at once to Prague, where I was to collect data concerning the advance made in wintry weather by our panzer units and to examine the Czech armoured equipment.
In Prague I found my successor as commanding general of XVI Army Corps, General Hoeppner, who informed me of his experiences during the advance. I also visited various units in order to collect firsthand impressions. In Brno I examined the Czech armoured equipment and found it serviceable. It was to prove useful to us during the Polish and French campaigns. During the Russian campaign it was finally replaced by heavier German equipment.
After Czechoslovakia, Memel was incorporated into the Reich without a blow being struck.
On April 20th Hitler celebrated his fiftieth birthday with a huge parade. All the colours of the armed forces were assembled into one colours battalion and the massed flags were dipped before him. He was now at the pinnacle of his success. Would he have the necessary selfcontrol to consolidate it, or would he overreach himself? The situation was highly inflammable.
On the 28th of April he repudiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement and announced the signature of a Non-aggression Pact with Poland.
On the 28th of May the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, visited Berlin. The German Foreign Minister gave a great reception in his honour. In order to make more room, two huge tents were set up which almost filled his garden. But that was a cold May, and so the tents had to be heated, a difficult undertaking. Hitler was present at this reception. The guests were entertained by cabaret turns, including dances by the Hopfner Sisters; this took place inside one of the tents in which a stage had been erected.
There was a wait before the performance could begin, since Hitler wanted to sit next to Olga Chekova and this lady had first to be found. Hitler was partial to artistes and ogoyed their company. The political motive of Ciano's visit was clearly to warn Hitler against the danger of war. I am not capable of judging whether he possessed sufficient continuity of purpose and tact to carry to Mussolini's instructions up to the end of his visit.
June brought the visit to Berlin of the Prince Regent Paul of Yugo-davia and his beautiful bride. Again there was a great parade, mostly of motorised troops; so many units took part in this march past that tte effect was more exhausting than impressive. It was significant that the Prince Regent went on to London from Berlin. So far as 1 know Hitler did not achieve the results that he had hoped for from this visit. There was no lack of political warnings.
But Hitler and his Foreign Minister, Ribbentrop, had persuaded themselves that the Western Powers would never risk war with Germany, and that they therefore had a free hand in Eastern Europe. During the summer months of 1939 I was engaged in preparing for the large-scale manoeuvres of motorised troops that were to be held in the autumn. They were to take place in the Erz Mountains and the Sudetenland. The considerable work involved was to be in vain.
The Polish Campaign
On the 22nd of August, 1939, I was ordered to the military train-area Gross-Born to take command of the newly created XIX iy Corps staff which was to be re-christened 'Fortification Staff Pomerania.' This staff was to be responsible for the construction of field fortifications along the German border as protection against any possible Polish attack. The XIX Army Corps had under command the 3rd Panzer Division and the 2nd and 20th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions, together with corps troops. The 3rd Panzer Division was breed by the Panzer Demonstration Battalion, which was equipped with our newest tanks, the Panzer III and the Panzer IV. Among the corps troops was included the Reconnaissance Demonstration Bat-Ion from DoberitzKrampnitz. These demonstration units from our ining schools were attached at my request, so that they might learn by practical experience. This was to stand them in good stead when they later returned to their primary functions. It was only after a conference between the army commanders and Hitler at Obersalzburg, at which I was not present, that the commander of the Fourth Army, Colonel General von Kluge, told me what my mission really was. 1 then learned that my XIX Army Corps formed part of the Fourth Army.
On my right, that is to the south, was General Strauss's II Corps and on my left were frontier defence units under General Kaupisch: in the event of hostilities breaking out these latter were to be strengthened by the 10th Panzer Division which since March had been engaged on occupation duties in Prague and its neighbourhood. Behind my corps was stationed the army reserve, the 23rd Infantry Division from Potsdam. (See Appendix II.) 1
My task was to cross the River Brahe, with my right boundary the Zempolno and my left boundary running through Konitz, and to advance with all speed to the Vistula, thus cutting off and destroying the Polish forces in the so-called Polish Corridor. Strauss's Corps on my right was similarly to advance to the Vistula, while General Kaupisch, on my left, was to move on Danzig. Polish forces in the Corridor were estimated at three infantry divisions and the Pomorska Cavalry Brigade. They were reckoned to possess a limited number of Fiat-Ansaldo tanks. The Polish side of the border was fortified. We had good observation of their field works. A secondary line of defensive positions was to be anticipated along the River Brahe.
The attack was to take place early on the 26th of August. By means of a secret agreement with the Russians during these days Hitler had ensured the protection of his rear in the event of war. Owing to Ribbentrop's disastrous influence, illusions were still being cherished concerning the probable reactions of the Western Powers; it was considered unlikely that they would declare war.
In any case it is not with the knowledge of hindsight that I can declare that the attitude of the army was very grave indeed and that, had it not been for the Russian pact, there is no telling what the Army's reactions might not have been. We did not go light-heartedly to war and there was not one general who would not have advocated peace. The older officers, and many thousands of men, had been through the First World War. They knew what war would mean if it were not simply confined to a campaign against the Poles. There was every reason to fear that this would not be the case, since after the creation of the Bohemian Protectorate the British had guaranteed Poland's integrity. Each of us thought of the mothers and wives of our German soldiers and of the heavy sacrifices that they must be called upon to bear even if the outcome of the war were a successful one. Our own sons were on active service. My elder boy, Heinz Giinter, was regimental adjutant of Panzer Regiment 35: my younger son, Kurt, had been commissioned Second Lieutenant in the 3rd Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion of the 3rd Panzer Division and so was in my Army Corps.
My last billet before the outbreak of war was at Dobrin near Preussisch-Friedland, where we were thoroughly spoiled by our dear hosts, the von Wilkens.
During the night of 25th-26th August the attack was cancelled. Certain troops had already begun to move forward and had to be recalled. It was plain that diplomatic manoeuvres were in progress. There was a last flicker of hope that peace might yet be preserved. But nothing positive reached the troops at the front. On the 31st of August there was a new alert. This time it was serious. The divisions moved up to the forward positions from which they would attack across the frontier.
Map The Battle of Tuchel Heath
The order of battle of my XIX Army Corps was as follows: On the right, 3rd Panzer Division under General Freiherr Geyr von Schweppenburg, with the task of advancing between two streams - the Zempolno and the Kamionka - to the Brahe, of crossing the Brahe east of Pruszcz in the neighbourhood of Hammermuhle, and of pushing on to the Vistula in the direction of Schwetz.
In the centre, the 2nd (Motorised) Infantry Division under General Bader, located north of the Kamionka between Grunau and Firchau, with the task of breaking through the Polish frontier defences and of advancing on Tuchel.
On the left, the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division under General Wiktorin, located west of Konitz, with the task of occupying that town and then of advancing across the Tuchel Heath towards Osche and Graudenz.
The main effort was to be carried out by the 3rd Panzer Division reinforced by corps troops, with the Army reserve (23rd Infantry Division) following behind.
On the 1st of September at 04.45 hrs. the whole corps moved simultaneously over the frontier. There was a thick ground mist at first which prevented the air force from giving us any support. I accompanied the 3rd Panzer Brigade, in the first wave, as far as the area north of Zempelburg where the preliminary fighting took place. Unfortunately the heavy artillery of the 3rd Panzer Division felt itself compelled to fire into the mist, despite having received precise orders not to do so. The first shell landed 50 yards ahead of my command vehicle, the second 50 yards behind it. I reckoned that the next one was bound to be a direct hit and ordered my driver to turn about and drive off. The unaccustomed noise had made him nervous, however, and he drove straight into a ditch at full speed. The front axle of the half-tracked vehicle was bent so that the steering mechanism was put out of action. This marked the end of my drive. I made my way to my corps command post, procured myself a fresh vehicle and had a word with the over-eager artillerymen. Incidentally it may be noted that I was the first corps commander ever to use armoured command vehicles in order to accompany tanks on to the battlefield. They were equipped with radio, so that I was able to keep in constant touch with my corps headquarters and with the divisions under my command. The first serious fighting took place north of Zempelburg in and around Gross-Klonia, where the mist suddenly lifted and the leading tanks found themselves face to face with Polish defensive positions. The Polish anti-tank gunners scored many direct hits. One officer, one officer cadet and eight other ranks were killed.
Map The Advance into Poland 9.9.1939
Gross-Klonia had once belonged to my great-grandfather, Freiherr Hiller von Gartringen. Here, too, was buried my grandfather Guderian. My father had been born in this place. This was the first time 1 had ever set eyes on the estate, once so beloved by my family.
Map Advance of XXI Army Corps to Brest-Litovsk
After successfully changing vehicles, I rejoined the 3rd Panzer Division whose most forward troops had now reached the Brahe. The bulk of the division was between Pruszcz and Klein-Klonia and was about to settle down for a rest. The divisional commander had been sent for by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, ColonelGeneral von Bock, and was therefore absent. I asked the officers of the 6th Panzer Regiment who were there to tell me about the situation on the Brahe. The regimental commander did not believe that a passage of the river could be forced on that day, and he was eager to carry out the welcome orders for a rest. The corps order - that the Brahe should be crossed during the first day of the attack - had been forgotten. I walked angrily away and tried to decide what measures I should take to improve this unhappy state of affairs. A young Lieutenant Felix came over to where I was standing. He had taken off his tunic, his shirt sleeves were rolled up, and his arms were black with powder. 'Herr General,' he said, 'I've just come from the Brahe. The enemy forces on the far bank are weak.
The Poles set fire to the bridge at Hammermuhle, but I put the fire out from my tank. The bridge is crossable. The advance has only stopped because there's no one to lead it. You must go there yourself, sir.' I looked at the young man in amazement. He made a very good impression and his eyes inspired confidence. Why should not this young lieutenant have done the trick of Columbus and the egg? I followed his advice and drove through a confusion of German and Polish vehicles along the narrow sandy track that led through the woods to Hammermuhle, where I arrived between 16.00 and 17.00 hrs. A group of staff officers were standing behind a stout oak tree about 100 yards from the water's edge. They greeted me with the cry: 'Herr General, they're shooting here!'
They were indeed, both the tank guns of the 6th Panzer Regiment and the rifles of the 3rd Rifle Regiment blazing away. The enemy on the far bank sat in his trenches and was invisible. First of all I put a stop to the idiotic firing, in which I was ably assisted by the newly arrived commander of the 3rd Rifle Brigade, Colonel Angern. Then I ordered that the extent of the enemy's defensive positions be established. Motorcycle Battalion 3, which had not yet been in action, was sent across the river in rubber boats at a point that was not under enemy fire. When they had crossed successfully, I ordered the tanks over the bridge. They took the Polish bicycle company, which was defending this sector of the stream, prisoner. Casualties were negligible. All available troops were immediately employed on building up a bridgehead. Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion 3 was ordered to push forward straight across the Tuchel Heath until it reached the River Vistula near Schwetz, wth the mission of locating the main Polish forces and their reserves, if any. At about 18.00 hrs. the crossing of the Brahe was completed. During the night the 3rd Panzer Division reached its objective, Sviekatovo.
I returned to my corps headquarters at Zahn, which I reached at dusk.
The long road was deserted. Not a shot was to be heard. I was therefore all the more amazed to be stopped on the outskirts of Zahn by men of my own staff, whom I found busily engaged in setting up an anti-tank gun, steel helmets on their heads. When I enquired what the purpose of this was, I was informed that Polish cavalry was advancing towards us and would be upon us at any minute. I calmed them down and proceeded to get on with my work at headquarters. Messages from the 2nd (Motorised) Infantry Division stated that their attack on the Polish wire entanglements had bogged down. All three infantry regiments had made a frontal attack. The division was now without reserves. I ordered that the regiment on the left be withdrawn during the night and moved to the right wing, from where it was to advance next day behind the 3rd Panzer Division and make an encircling movement in the direction of Tuchel.
The 20th (Motorised) Division had taken Konitz with some difficulty, but had not advanced any appreciable distance beyond that town. It was ordered to continue its attack on the next day.
During the night the nervousness of the first day of battle made itself felt more than once. Shortly after midnight the 2nd (Motorised) Division informed me that they were being compelled to withdraw by Polish cavalry. I was speechless for a moment; when I regained the use of my voice I asked the divisional commander if he had ever heard of Pomeranian grenadiers being broken by hostile cavalry. He replied that he had not and now assured me that he could hold his positions. I decided all the same that I must visit this division the next morning. At about five o'clock I found the divisional staff still all at sea I placed myself at the head of the regiment which had been withdrawn during the night and led it personally as far as the crossing of the Kamionka to the north of Gross-Klonia, where I sent it off in the direction of Tuchel. The 2nd (Motorised) Division's attack now began to make rapid progress. The panic of the first day's fighting was past.
Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion 3 had reached the Vistula during the night. At the farm of Poledno, near Schwetz, it had unfortunately through carelessness sustained considerable officer casualties. The main body of the 3rd Panzer Division was split into two by the Brahe and during the morning the Poles attacked the units on the eastern bank. It was noon before a counter-attack could be launched and the division could continue its fighting advance through the woods. The 23rd Infantry Division followed behind the 3rd Panzer Division by means of forced marches. Both the motorised infantry divisions were making good progress across the Tuchel Heath. On the 3rd of September the 23rd Infantry Division, under General Graf Brockdorff, was committed between the 3rd Panzer Division, which had pushed on to the Vistula, and the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division: by this manoeuvre, after many critical moments and some heavy fighting, we succeeded in totally encircling the enemy on our front in the wooded country north of Schwetz and west of Graudenz. The Polish Pomorska Cavalry Brigade, in ignorance of the nature of our tanks, had charged them with swords and lances and had suffered tremendous losses. A Polish artillery regiment on the march towards the Vistula was overrun by our tanks and destroyed; only two of its guns managed to fire at all. The Polish infantry had had heavy casualties too. A portion of their supply and bridging columns was caught while withdrawing and annihilated.
On the 4th of September the noose was tightened about the encircled enemy. The battle for the Corridor was approaching its end. For a short time the 23rd Infantry Division was in trouble, but a regiment detached from the 32nd Infantry Division of General Strauss's Corps soon cleared up the situation here.
The troops had fought brilliantly and were in good spirits. The casualties among our other ranks were small, but our losses of officers had been disproportionately heavy, for they had thrown themselves into battle with the greatest devotion to duty. General Adam, State Secretary von Weizsacker and Colonel Freiherr von Funk had each lost a son.
On the 3rd of September I had visited the 23rd Infantry and 3rd Panzer Divisions and had thus had the opportunity of seeing my son Kurt and also the towers of Kulm, my birthplace, glittering in the suns! on the far bank of the Vistula. On the 4th I watched the 2nd and 20th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions fight their way forwards through :he woods; towards the end of the day I arrived at the former German Hilary training area of Gruppe, west of Graudenz. That night I was with the 3rd Panzer Division which, with its back to the Vistula, was advancing westward for the final elimination of the enemy's remnants in the pocket.
The Corridor was pierced. We were available for fresh employment. While we had been fighting hard, the political situation had taken a serious turn for the worse. England and, under pressure from England, France had declared war on the Reich; this destroyed our hope of an early peace. We found ourselves engaged in a second World War. It was plain that it must last a long time and that we would need all the fortitude of which we were capable.
On the 5th of September our corps had a surprise visit from Adolf Hitler. I met him near Plevno on the Tuchel-Schwetz road, got into his car and drove with him along the line of our previous advance. We passed the destroyed Polish artillery, went through Schwetz, and then, following closely behind our encircling troops, drove to Graudenz where he stopped and gazed for some time at the blown bridges over the Vistula. At the sight of the smashed artillery regiment, Hitler had asked me: 'Our dive bombers did that?' When I replied, 'No, our panzers!' he was plainly astonished. Between Schwetz and Graudenz those elements of the 3rd Panzer Division not needed for the encirclement of the Poles were drawn up these included the 6th Panzer Regiment and the 3rd Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion with my son Kurt. We drove back through parts of the 23rd and 2nd (Motorised) Infantry Divisions.
During the drive we discussed at first the course of events in my corps area. Hitler asked about casualties. I gave him latest figures that I had received, some 150 dead and 700 wounded for all the four divisions under my command during the Battle of the Corridor. He was amazed at the smallness of these figures and contrasted them with the casualties of his own old regiment, the List Regiment, during the First World War on the first day of battle that one regiment alone had lost more than 2,000 dead and wounded. I was able to show him that the smallness of our casualties in this battle against a tough and courageous enemy was primarily due to the effectiveness of our tanks. Tanks are a life-saving weapon. The men's belief in the superiority of their armoured equipment had been greatly strengthened by their successes in the Corridor. The enemy had suffered the total destruction of between two and three infantry divisions and one cavalry brigade. Thousands of prisoners and hundreds of guns had fallen into our hands.
As we neared the Vistula we could see the silhouette of a town against the sky across the river. Hitler asked if that was Kulm. I replied: 'Yes, that is Kulm. In March of last year I had the privilege of greeting you in your birthplace; today you are with me in mine. 1 was born in Kulm.' Many years later Hitler was to recall this scene.
Our conversation turned on technical matters. Hitler wanted to know what had proved particularly satisfactory about our tanks and what was still in need of improvement. I told him that the most important thing now was to hasten the delivery of Panzers III and IV to the fighting troops and to increase the production of these tanks. For their further development their present speed was sufficient, but they needed to be more heavily armoured, particularly in front; the range and power of penetration of their guns also needed to be increased, which would mean longer barrels and a shell with a heavier charge. This applied equally to our anti-tank guns.
With a word of recognition for the troops' achievements Hitler left us as dusk was falling and returned to his headquarters.
It was noteworthy that the civilian population, which was re-emerging from its hiding-places now that the fighting was over, cheered as Hitler drove past and brought him flowers. The town of Schwetz was decorated with our national colours. The impression made by his visit on the troops was a very good one. Unfortunately as the war went on Hitler visited the front less and less frequently, and in the final stages not at all. By so doing he lost contact with the feelings of the troops and was no longer able to understand their achievements and their sufferings.
On the 6th of September the corps staff and the advance guards of the divisions crossed the Vistula. Corps headquarters was set up in Finkenstein, in the very beautiful castle that belonged to Count Dohna-Finckenstein and which Frederick the Great had given to his minister, Count von Finckenstein. Napoleon had twice used this castle as his headquarters. The Emperor first came there in 1807, when he took the war against Prussia and Russia over the Vistula and into East Prussia. After crossing the poor and monotonous Tuchel Heath, Napoleon exclaimed at the sight of the castle: 'Enfin un chateau!' His feelings are understandable. It was there that he had planted his advance towards Preussisch-Eylau. A mark of his presence was still to be seen in the scratches left by his spurs on the wooden floor. He was there for the second tune before the Russian campaign of 1812; he spent a few weeks in the castle in the company of the beautiful Countess Walewska.
I slept in the room that had been Napoleon's.
Unfortunately our host, Count Dohna, was sick in a Berlin clinic, so that I had not the honour of meeting him or his countess. He was kind enough to write telling me to make free of bis deer. Since we had not yet received orders concerning our future employment, and only knew that we were to be detached from Fourth Army and placed immediately under the command of Army Group von Bock, I thought that I could accept his kind offer without detriment to the performance of my military duties. While my divisions were crossing the river during the night of the 7th and early morning of the 8th, I therefore went kunting and had the good fortune to bag a large twelve-pointer. The conscientious bailiff responsible for the administration of the Count's forest lands insisted on personally acting as my guide. On the 8th of September all my divisions were across the river at Mewe and Kasemark, and events began to develop more rapidly. In the evening 1 was told to go to the Army Group headquarters at Allenstein to receive my orders. I left Finkenstein at about 19.30 hrs. and between 21.30 and 22.30 hrs. I was given my new instructions. The Army Group's original intention was to attach my corps to General von Kiichler's Third Army: it was to operate in close coordination with his left flank and to advance from the Arys area, through Lomsha, towards the eastern side of Warsaw. It seemed to me that such close co-operation with an infantry army was not in accordance with the full potentialities of my troops. I pointed out that the proposed operation would not enable me to make use of the speed of my motorised divisions, and that a slow advance on our part would give the Poles in the Warsaw area the chance of withdrawing eastwards and of establishing a new defensive line along the River Bug.
I therefore suggested to the Chief of Staff of the Army Group, General ton Salmuth, that my Panzer Corps remain under direct Army Group control and be pushed forward on the left of Kiichler's army, through Vizna, along the east bank of the Bug, with Brest-Litovsk as its objective. This would frustrate any attempt on the part of the Poles now in and around Warsaw to establish new defensive positions. Salmuth and Colonel-General von Bock agreed to my suggestion; I received the necessary orders and went at once to the military training area Arys, where I told the corps order group to assemble (to receive fresh orders for the advance on the Narev River).
Of my old divisions, I was to retain the 3rd Panzer Division and the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division. The 2nd (Motorised) Infantry Division was for the time being withdrawn from my command into Army Group reserve. The 10th Panzer Division, which up to then had formed part of Kiichler's army, together with the Fortress Infantry Brigade Lotzen, a newly formed unit of men from the older agegroups, were now subordinated to my XIX Corps: both these units were at present in action along the Narev in the neighbourhood of Vizna.
Orders were issued to the two divisions which had previously formed part of the corps. This took place at Arys between 02.00 and 04.30 hrs. on September 9th. I then drove to Korzeniste, 11 miles north of Lomsha, to visit General von Falkenhorst, the commander of XXI Army Corps which was now on my right; I wished to find out what his situation was and to hear what he might have to say about the units which I was now to command. I arrived there between 05.00 and 06.00 hrs., woke the officers and let them describe to me the previous battles on their front. I now learned that an attempt to capture Lomsha by means of a coup de main had failed, partly owing to the stubborn defence offered by the Poles, but partly also due to the inexperience of our own troops. XXI Army Corps was immobilised on the northern bank of the Narev.
At 08.00 hrs. I arrived at Vizna where I found the staff, of the 10th Panzer Division. Its commander, General Schaal, had had an accident and the division was now under General Stumpff. The latter informed me that his infantry was over the river and had reported the capture of the Polish fortified positions dominating this sector. The battle was continuing. Reassured by this news I next visited the Lotzen Brigade; originally this unit had been intended to garrison these fortifications, but nqw had to cross the Narev in open battle. The brigade and its commander, Colonel Gall, made an excellent impression on me. They crossed the river and went into the attack. Quite satisfied with the measures that the brigade commander was taking, I returned to the 10th Panzer Division.
When I arrived back in Vizna I found to my disappointment that the morning's report on the successes of the division's infantry was based on a misapprehension. They were across the river but they had not reached the concrete defence emplacements on the far bank. For the time being nothing was happening. I therefore crossed the river myself to see the regimental commander. I did not succeed in discovering his command post. The battalion's headquarters were very well hidden, too. I found myself in the front line. There was no sign of the division's tanks, which were in fact all still on tile north bank of the Narev.
I therefore sent back my adjutant to order them across. In the front line an extraordinary performance was going on; when I asked what was happening I was told that the foremost companies were being relieved. It looked like nothing so much as a guard-mounting parade. The troops knew nothing about any order to attack. An artillery observer from the heavy artillery was located in the middle of the infantry and had no idea what he was supposed to be doing there. No one knew where the enemy was; there was no sort of reconnaissance being carried out. I first put a stop to the remarkable manoeuvre of company reliefs, and then ordered that the regimental and battalion commanders be brought to me. 1 next gave the artillery observer orders to lay down fire on the Polish positions.
When the regimental commander at last turned up I immediately set out to find the enemy's front line and he and 1 went forward until we came under fire. We were by this time immediately in front of the concrete emplacements, where we stumbled on a German anti-tank gun, whose brave commander had advanced this far on his own. It was from here that we mounted the attack. 1 cannot pretend that I was anything but very disappointed by what had so far happened. When I returned to the Narev, I found the tank regiment still on the northern bank. The regimental commander was ordered to cross the river with all speed. Since the bridges were not yet ready the tanks had to be ferried across. It was 18.00 hrs. before the attack could at last be launched. It was immediately successful and our casualties were very light. An energetic and determined leadership could easily have secured these results in the morning.
Before going to my corps headquarters, which was now established in Vizna, I gave both verbal and written orders to the engineer officer responsible for bridge-building; bridges over the Narev were to be built with all possible speed since they were urgently needed for transporting the 10th and ultimately the 3rd Panzer Divisions to the far side. When I arrived at my headquarters I drew up orders for the following day: the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division was to cross the Narev on the right of the 10th Panzer Division, while the 3rd Panzer Division was to follow behind the 10th. We slept in the newly built vicarage of Vizna, an uncompleted and almost uninhabitable building, but all the others were worse.
It was not until 05.00 hrs. on the 10th of September that I discovered that the bridges over the Narev, which were to have been ready by midnight, had been dismantled on the orders of the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division's commander and moved downstream where they were to be put up anew for his division to cross. The two panzer divisions were therefore compelled to go on using ferries and nothing but ferries. It was desperate. The engineer officer had not informed the divisional commander of my order. The latter had acted hi all good faith. Now we had to wait till evening before a new bridge was built for the tanks.
On this day General Wiktorin's 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division became involved in heavy fighting near Zambrov. Strong elements of the division were marching towards the Bug in the direction of Nur. I had sent the Reconnaissance Demonstration Battalion ahead of the division to this crossing-place over the Bug, and the battalion had arrived there without encountering any resistance. The 10th Panzer Division pushed on to Bransk, fighting a number of engagements on the way. I followed this division towards evening and spent the night in the burning village of Vysokie-Masovieski. My corps staff, which had crossed the Narev that evening and was following behind me, could not get through a small village that was on fire north of Vysokie-Masovieski, and so we were compelled to spend the night in separate villages, a bad state of affairs from the command point of view. I had ordered the move of the headquarters prematurely; we would have done better to have spent another night in Vizna.
I passed the morning of September 11th impatiently awaiting the arrival of my staff. Polish forces, trying to withdraw south-east from Lomsha, had cut across the route of advance of the 20th (Motorised) Division at a point south of Zambrov and were causing that division considerable trouble. The divisional commander decided to order the portion of his command which was beyond the Poles, advancing on the Bug, to turn round in order that he might encircle the enemy and destroy him. I moved a part of the 10th Panzer Division across to help in this manoeuvre. Meanwhile a rumour had spread through the 3rd Panzer Division, which was moving up on the left of the 10th, that I was myself in danger of being surrounded by Poles in Vysokie-Masovieski. Motorcycle Rifle Battalion 3 therefore turned off towards Vysokie to get me out. The men were very pleased when they found me standing safe and sound in the middle of the village street. This often-shown feeling of comradeship which the motor-cyclists displayed was good to see.
Corps headquarters spent the night at Vysokie-Masovieski. On the 12th of September the 20th (Motorised) Division, together with those elements of the 10th Panzer Division sent to its assistance, succeeded in surrounding the Poles near Andrzeievo. The 10th Panzer Division reached Vysokie-Litovsk, the 3rd Panzer Division Bielsk. I myself had driven to Bielsk with the foremost troops of the reconnaissance battalion, and was thus able to receive their signal by hand. In the afternoon I saw my son Kurt.
The corps headquarters was moved to Bielsk. The 2nd (Motorised) Infantry Division was freed from Army Group reserve and once again placed under my command. It was ordered to advance along the line Lomsha-Bielsk and thus rejoin the rest of the corps. The order contained the words 'the divisional commander to come on ahead.' When, in the morning of the 13th, General Bader, in accordance to this order, was advancing well in front of his division, accompanied only by a wireless signals truck, he ran into Polish troops between Bransk and Bielsk who had managed to escape from the Andrzeievo pocket; he had to spend a few uncomfortable hours under fire before his competent wireless operator managed to let us know what had happened so that we could get them out. This accident was a lesson to us.
On this date the Poles near Andrzeievo surrendered. The commander of the 18th Polish Division was among the prisoners. The 3rd Panzer Division reached Kaminiec-Litovsk. They had reconnoitred as far as Brest-Litovsk. Orders for the attack on that fortress were given. We spent the night in Bielsk.
We knfev that Polish forces had reached the famous forest of Bielovieza. I wanted to avoid a battle in the forest since this would have distracted us from our main objective - the capture of Brest-Litovsk and would have tied up a sizeable portion of our force. I therefore contented myself with leaving troops to observe the edge of the forest.
On the 14th of September elements of the 10th Panzer Division, consisting of the Reconnaissance Battalion and of Panzer Regiment 8, broke through the line of fortified positions outside Brest. I immediately ordered the whole corps to advance with all speed on Brest in order to exploit this surprise success.
We spent the night in Vysokie-Litovsk.
On the 15th of September the ring was closed around Brest on the east bank of the Bug. An attempt to capture the citadel by means of a surprise tank attack failed, owing to the Poles having blocked the entrance gate by parking an old Renault tank at an angle across it, so that our tanks could not force their way in.
Corps headquarters that night was at Kaminiec-Litovsk.
The 20th (Motorised) Division and the 10th Panzer Division were deployed for a concerted attack on the citadel to take place on the 16th. They stormed the encircling wall but there the attack faltered owing to the failure of the infantry regiment of the 10th Panzer Division to advance, as ordered, immediately behind the creeping barrage that the artillery was putting down. When the regiment, in whose front line I myself was, did at last attack too late and without orders, it suffered sadly heavy casualties without reaching its objective. My adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel Braubach, was severely wounded on this occasion, and died of his wounds a few days later. Fire from troops to the rear had been falling among our own advanced units; he had gone back in an attempt to stop this. A Polish sniper on the top of the rampart shot him at a range of 100 yards. His was a painful loss. The 3rd Panzer Division, skirting Brest on the east, headed south towards Vlodava; the 2nd (Motorised) Division, following behind, moved east in the direction of Kobryn.
Corps headquarters remained in Kaminiec-Litovsk.
Early on September 17th the citadel was captured by the 76th Infantry Regiment under Colonel Gollnik, which had crossed over to the west bank of the Bug during the night. They captured it at the exact moment when the Polish garrison was about to attempt to break out westwards across the undamaged bridge over the Bug. This marked in a way the end of the campaign. Corps headquarters was transferred to Brest and established itself in the Voivodschaft. We learned that the Russians were advancing from the east.
The Polish campaign was the baptism of fire for my armoured formations. I was convinced that they had fully proved their value and that the work which had gone into building them up had been well spent. We were standing along the Bug, facing west, ready to receive the rest of the Polish Army. The corps' rear was covered by the 2nd (Motorised) Division, which still had heavy fighting to do before Kobryn. We were expecting at any moment to establish contact with the armoured forces moving up from the south. Our most forward reconnaissance troops reached Luboml.
Meanwhile the Fourth Army under Colonel-General von Kluge had caught up with us, and we were once again placed under its command. The Fortress Brigade Lotzen, which had fought so bravely on the Narev, had continued for a few days to be our left wing before it was subordinated to Fourth Army. Fourth Army now ordered that XIX Army Corps move forward, one division to go south, one to go east towards Kobryn, and one to go north-east towards Bialystok. Such a move would have split the corps and would have made all attempts at command impossible. The appearance of the Russians rendered these orders obsolete before they could be carried out. As forerunner of the Russians there appeared a young officer in an armoured reconnaissance car, who informed us that a Russian Tank Brigade was on its way. Then we received information concerning the demarcation line which the Foreign Ministry had agreed; this surrendered Brest to the Russians, since the Bug was to be the boundary. We did not regard this as a very advantageous decision; and finally we were informed that we only had until the 22nd of September in which to evacuate the territory east of the line of demarcation. This was so little time that we could not even move all our wounded or recover our damaged tanks. It seems unlikely that any soldier was present when the agreement about the demarcation line and the cease fire was drawn up.
There is one more small incident that occurred in Brest-Litovsk and that seems to me worth recording. The Bishop of Danzig, O'Rourq, together with the Primate of Poland, Cardinal Hlond, had fled eastwards from Warsaw. When the two princes of the Church arrived at Brest they were much surprised to find the Germans akeady installed. The Cardinal slipped away to the south-east and managed to reach Rumania. The Bishop of Danzig decided to go north-east and thus fell straight into our hands. He asked for an interview with me, which I willingly gave him in Brest. Since he did not know where he could find safety, and since in no circumstances did he wish to be handed over to the Russians, I suggested that he travel back with one of my supply columns which brought our stuff down from Koenigsberg. Once there he coifld easily get in touch with the Bishop of Ermland and place himself under the latter's protection. The Bishop accepted my suggestion, and he and his entourage thus escaped without harm from the war zone. He wrote me a charming letter, in which he spoke of the chivalrous traditions of the German officer corps, to thank me for the assistance I had been able to give him.
On the day for handing over to the Russians a Brigadier-General Krivochin appeared, a tank man who had some knowledge of French, and with whom I could therefore converse. What the instructions of the Foreign Ministry had left undecided I now settled in a friendly fashion directly with the Russians. All our equipment could be carried away: only supplies captured from the Poles had to be left behind, since in the short time at our disposal we had not been able to organise the transport necessary for their removal. A farewell parade and salutes to the two flags in the presence of General Krivochin marked the end of our stay in Brest-Litovsk.
Before leaving the fortress whose capture had cost us so much blood, I accompanied my adjutant, Lieutenant-Colonel Braubach, to his last resting-place on September 21st. I deeply regretted the loss of this brave and capable colleague. The wound which he had received was not in itself mortal, but it had become septic, and this, working on an akeady weakened heart, had proved fatal.
On the evening of the 22nd of September we arrived at Zambrov. The 3rd Panzer Division had akeady set off for East Prussia, with the other divisions echeloned behind. The corps was now dissolved. On the 23rd of September we occupied quarters in Gallingen, tfie beautiful estate of Count Botho-Wend zu Eulenburg. The count himself was on active service. We were therefore entertained by the countess and her pretty daughter, and we enjoyed several peaceful days' rest, which did us all good after the excitements and exhaustion of the campaign.
My son Kurt had survived the battles in good condition. I had had no news of my elder son, Heinz; in fact during the whole campaign the troops never once received any field post from home. This was a considerable hardship. Now we all hoped for an early transfer to our home stations, so that we might get our units into good shape again as soon as possible.
We also hoped at that time that the speed of our Polish victory would bear political fruit, and that the Western Powers might now feel inclined to make a sensible peace. We imagined that if this were not the case, Hitler would quickly decide on a campaign in the West. Unfortunately both hopes were to prove groundless. We were entering the period which Churchill has described as the drole de guerre. I spent the leisure that was now granted me in visiting my East Prussian relatives, with whom I also found a nephew from West Prussia who had been compelled to join the Polish Army and who had now been released from captivity in order to serve his own nation. On the 9th of October my corps staff was transferred to Berlin. On the way I stopped to see my relations in West Prussia once again; they had been through hard times, including the notorious Bromberg'Bloody Sunday.' I also paid a short visit to my birthplace, Kulm, and found the houses in which my parents and my grandmother had lived. It was the last time I was ever to visit my first home. Back in Berlin I soon had the great joy of seeing my elder son once again, who had been decorated with the Iron Cross, both First and Second Class. He had fought in the fierce battles for Warsaw. I cannot end my story of the Polish campaign without mentioning my staff which, under its chief, Colonel Nehring, did such splendid work, and which by its intelligence and its first-class command technique contributed so immeasurably to the successes of my corps.