6

“HOW CAN THE FREE WORLD ABANDON US?”

PREPARING FOR THE STRATEGIC BLOW

Claims that the South Vietnamese were not expecting Hanoi’s 1974–75 dry-season offensive are wrong. U.S. and ARVN intelligence had both predicted large-scale Communist attacks. Captured documents, prisoners, and defectors alerted them to the Politburo’s intentions. At the same time, signals intelligence (SIGINT) had detected the potential movement of three North Vietnamese strategic-reserve divisions toward South Vietnam, long considered the pre-eminent indicator of a new general offensive. As Major General John Murray, the departing defense attaché, told Admiral Noel Gayler during his end-of-tour debriefing in August 1974: “Watch those six enemy divisions in the North. Watch them like the flute player watches a cobra.”¹

Yet while Nguyen Van Thieu continued to loudly proclaim that Hanoi would soon launch a “general offensive,” many U.S. intelligence analysts and most outside observers dismissed the possibility of such a large-scale attack, declaring they did not see the indicators. For example, one scholar writing in the January 1975 issue of Foreign Affairs stated that Hanoi had, “for the next two or three years, opted for a period of reconstruction in the North and a moderately intense war of attrition in the South that stops short of a general offensive.”²

Hanoi had provided ample evidence for that conclusion, as the Politburo continued its stratagem of hiding its military preparations behind pronouncements that its priority was economic expansion. In mid-December Politburo members Le Thanh Nghi and Nguyen Duy Trinh addressed the DRV National Assembly. They again ranked building socialism above completing the revolution in the South. Following their presentations, in late December the North Vietnamese media broadcast new speeches honoring the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of the People’s Army. The commentators proclaimed that Hanoi was more concerned with creating a socialist economy than with launching an offensive. PAVN Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung also published an important article that month, postulating that the military must devote its energies to developing the economy and defending the North.

The South Vietnamese were not fooled. To prepare for the looming dry-season attacks, on 9–10 December 1974 Thieu chaired a two-day meeting of his National Security Council to develop the 1975 National Defense Plan. Unlike Thieu, the JGS estimated that there would not be a coordinated countrywide offensive similar to the one in 1972. Instead, it briefed the NSC that only regional offensives, similar to the ones in 1974, would occur. These would probably begin in late March. General Cao Van Vien stated that if the Communists did not bring in any reserve divisions, the RVNAF could defeat them with only limited loss of territory. Strategically, he predicted that Hanoi’s goal was to force out Thieu and create a coalition government. Tactically, he believed the North Vietnamese would strike II Corps first, “in an effort to drain our reserves,” before making their main attacks in I and III Corps.³ In I Corps, Vien believed, Hanoi would seek to occupy Quang Tri province and isolate Hue and Danang; if PAVN reinforced the northern front, Vien explained, Lieutenant General Truong would be forced into a defense concentrated around those two cities. In II Corps, the enemy would try to annex Kontum province, where ARVN forces controlled little more than the city and Route 14 into town, and would also attack northern Binh Dinh province. In III Corps, Tay Ninh province on the Cambodian border would be the main target, while IV Corps would be a diversionary theater.

Despite the meeting’s purpose, Vien later wrote that Thieu provided only limited military guidance to the JGS. Vien’s characterization of Thieu, however, is not totally accurate. In December 1974, Thieu had few answers to the country’s deepening problems. His reserves were pinned down, the army had taken heavy losses, and the aid cuts had left the military desperately short of supplies. The economy was in a depression, and Thieu faced enormous pressure to seek a political accommodation with the Communists. Yet he did not sit completely idle. During the NSC meeting he demanded an inventory of all ammunition and equipment by region. He also wanted more accurate hamlet security evaluations. These would form the basis for a new pacification drive to be launched in the first three months of 1975. Led by Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, the effort was designed to prepare for the looming offensive by improving provincial forces, stiffening outpost defenses, and perhaps even recapturing some lost territory.

More important, Thieu also ordered the formation of new reserve units. The Marine and Airborne commanders were ordered to form one new brigade each. Because of the desperate need for more reserves, two new Ranger groups, the 8th and the 9th, were cobbled together from demobilized military-police battalions and former deserters. With equipment scraped together from a few remaining stores, the units were assigned to the defense of Saigon and made a part of the JGS general reserve. Vien planned to eventually send the new units to I Corps to replace the Airborne Division. I Corps was also ordered to draft a plan to release the Red Berets within seventy-two hours if Saigon was attacked. An additional forty-five new RF groups were formed. The groups were designed to provide the province chiefs and corps commanders increased flexibility in shifting the RF to meet attacks.

In October 1974 both the DAO and the ARVN Central Logistics Command had begun planning for future fighting by adjusting the remaining aid funds to purchase more ammunition and fuel. American logisticians considered it essential to have in South Vietnam a stockpile of ammunition and fuel that could last through sixty-days of a high-intensity offensive. This provided a cushion until U.S. supplies could reach the country. Given the cutback in funds and high inflation, the DAO was only able to restore ARVN’s artillery ammunition stores to a forty-five-day level. With no money remaining, this left bandages, boots, radio batteries, grenades, tires, spare parts, and many other items in very short supply.

Since the JGS expected the enemy to interdict the main roads in the Highlands, in late January 1975 it shipped large amounts of ammunition and food to Pleiku and Kontum. According to the chief of staff for RVNAF logistics, “The amount of supplies placed in storage was sufficient for 20,000 men to defend Pleiku and Kontum for a period of sixty days without requiring additional supplies. That was a precaution against the dangerous eventuality that no supplies could be delivered. When Phuoc Long was lost, Lieutenant General Khuyen estimated that the Communists would attack . . . the Highlands earlier than the JGS estimated they would.”⁴ Logistically at least, the RVNAF had done its best to position itself for the coming offensive.

POLITICS AGAIN

The second anniversary of the Paris Accords brought an introspective review by President Thieu. Philip McCombs of the Washington Post, one of the few American reporters remaining in Saigon, was summoned to Independence Palace in late January for a one-on-one meeting, the first interview Thieu had given to a Western reporter since July 1973. In the discussion, Thieu sounded familiar themes. McCombs wrote that Thieu “wanted to impress on the American people and Congress that we badly need their support to resist Communist aggression . . . he wanted to see free democratic elections carried out under the terms of the Paris agreement . . . and he is unconditionally ready to return to the negotiating table.”⁵ However, there would be no “further concessions to the Communists other than those provided for in the agreement.” Politically, there would be no coalition government, unless one was achieved via free elections. Brushing aside the question of whether the U.S. was betraying him, Thieu instead responded that “the South Vietnamese people were beginning to feel the United States had let them down.” Regarding economic aid, what he had requested was not open-ended, as his critics charged, but only enough to achieve “economic takeoff”; however, it would be needed until at least 1980. Militarily, while the Communists were preparing a massive offensive, U.S. aid cutbacks had “reduced the combat effectiveness of his army by almost two-thirds,” and withholding the $300 million in new military aid would be “disastrous.” Still, he said, “We will fight to the end.” Finishing the interview, Thieu spoke from his heart: “We would like to be on the side of freedom. How can the free world abandon us?”

In addition to his military dealings, on the eve of the Tet holiday (the Vietnamese New Year, usually falling in late January or early February), Thieu took four other actions. First, he tasked Tran Van Lam, a former foreign minister and the president of the GVN Senate, with assembling a congressional delegation to visit the U.S., Britain, and France to appeal for support. Lam’s group, visiting the U.S. at roughly the same time the U.S. congressional delegation was visiting South Vietnam, was politely received by congressional leaders, but it made little progress. Several senators, however, including Majority Leader Mansfield, Frank Church (D., Idaho), and Clifford Case (R., N.J.), refused to meet with them. To the congressional leaders who did meet with him, Lam says that he revealed Nixon’s promise, made at the time of the Paris Accords, to “react vigorously” to Communist violations. He also told his American hosts that for the GVN, the political significance of receiving new aid was more important than the amount. While Congress ignored Lam’s pleas for aid, several senators immediately jumped on Lam’s revelations concerning secret commitments to Saigon that Congress had never been briefed on.

Second, Thieu composed a letter to Ford. He again pleaded for more aid and for political support. He described the difficulties resulting from the continued North Vietnamese build-up in defiance of the Paris Accords, the disastrous U.S. aid reductions, and the effects of the fall of Phuoc Long. His growing sense of desperation was obvious: “Two years ago we signed the Paris Agreement with the hope that the elaborate structure for global peace would work. We also signed with the great conviction that should the Communists resort to the use of force again we will be provided with adequate means to defend ourselves. Today I wish to appeal to you to take all necessary action to preserve the Paris Agreement. I am aware of and thankful for the numerous personal efforts and intervention you have made in our behalf since you took over.”⁶

Third, Thieu again started to seriously consider pulling back his forces and population into more defensible positions. Retrenchment had been first raised in early 1974, but Thieu had rejected the idea as too difficult to implement. In late August 1974 Thieu reiterated that view to visiting Admiral Noel Gayler, commander of all U.S. forces in the Pacific, stating that “giving up any real estate creates psychological problems for the GVN.”⁷ Despite Thieu’s aversion to the plan, at the December 1974 NSC meeting, General Vien, supported by Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem, again raised the issue of ceding territory. When Thieu waffled, both generals turned to a former Australian officer, Brigadier Ted Serong, for help in convincing him. Serong had spent years in South Vietnam and had developed important connections among the senior GVN leadership. Serong sent Thieu a plan that advocated a withdrawal from I and II Corps to the more economically viable southern part of the country, especially since the potential oil deposits were located off the coast of this area.

Thieu considered Serong’s plan, but after mulling it over, in January 1975 he rejected it. The old fears remained: such an action would shatter the currently fragile South Vietnamese psyche, let alone the enormous upheaval caused by relocating several million people. Further, he worried that a withdrawal would only make the thorny aid effort tougher. Additionally, Ford’s request for supplemental aid had bolstered his resolve. For whatever reason—whether blind refusal to admit that the mood in Congress had hardened, or too many optimistic assurances—Thieu continued to believe the Americans would not betray him.

Still, Thieu wanted to prepare his people for the dangerous times ahead, and his fourth action was to speak bluntly to the nation. His Tet message to the South Vietnamese people was grim. The year ahead, he told them, would bring “even greater difficulties” than the previous year, yet he remained determined “not to let South Vietnam fall into the hands of the Communists.” The president further stated that his three main goals for 1975 were: “Maximum support for the front line, maximum stabilization of the rear, and increase of production. In the rear, we cannot afford to let the Communist underground agents . . . influence our nationalist ranks to . . . promote solutions of surrender to the Communists.”⁸ On the eve of the U.S. congressional visit, he intended his remarks as a warning to his people that the most pressing issue remained the physical survival of the Republic of Vietnam.

“NO MATTER WHICH WAY I VOTE”

Unfortunately for Ford, his 3 February request to form a congressional delegation to visit South Vietnam had been badly delayed. Congress was more focused on Ford’s proposal to solve the U.S. energy crisis, and then the members departed for their normal two-week break for Lincoln’s birthday. Behind the scenes, some congressional leaders were against the trip, and the delay by the House leadership in forming the delegation was seen as an implicit rejection of Ford’s request for a three-year aid package. It took over three weeks from the time Ford requested the delegation before the list of members was finalized. Since the trip’s purpose was to report back regarding the necessity for further aid, the effect was to delay congressional action on the $300 million supplemental-aid request into March.

Despite the long odds against gaining new aid, while waiting for the return of the delegation, several senators decided to offer a compromise. In early March Senators Frank Church and James Pearson (R., Kan.) sought a meeting with Ford and Kissinger to solve the impasse. Church told the president he hoped to “work out a scheme for phasing out both Cambodia and Vietnam. Now you are faced with ceilings and there is a strong chance that Congress won’t grant relief. I wanted to break the stalemate and see if there was some way out of this open-ended subsidy of an on-going war.”⁹ Ford was looking for $6 to $7 billion over three years, with two-thirds going to military aid. Church, a long-time critic of the war, wanted much less, only $2.5 billion. Pearson informed Ford that he doubted the aid bill would pass; but he added, “There is a gnawing conscience at work on the Hill—not really connected to current arguments or a ‘commitment.’”

Ford responded that he felt “an obligation. We must make a last massive effort to negotiate. . . . Our people say that with the supplemental there is a chance to get through the dry season.” Kissinger added that while he preferred to have the aid voted on each year, “this is an alternative. If the levels were adequate, this would be more bearable than for Congress to appear to be stabbing an ally in the back. If it is done over three years, our diplomacy and other countries could adjust to it.” Ford supported Kissinger’s view, adding: “If we can get a three-year program, adequately funded, it is the best way to save the American perception in the world, and the commitment to an ally.” Church and Pearson promised to work with the administration to find a solution, but the senators and Ford remained far apart on the amount.

Despite Ford’s best intentions, the U.S. congressional visit to South Vietnam from 25 February until 3 March was, for the most part, an abject failure. So much has been written about the disastrous congressional trip that the author will not cover it here. The level of buffoonery exhibited by Representative Bella Abzug surely was a new low in American diplomacy. The Ford administration had gone to considerable lengths to placate the members of the delegation, including sending along White House staff, pressing the embassy and the GVN to provide them access to any location or person, and having Ford personally phone and meet with them when they returned. On 5 March, they met with the president at the White House. True to form, Abzug was late to the meeting.

Representative John Flynt (D., Ga.)—the delegation chairman and a supporter of continued aid—opened by stating, “We were manifestly shaken and impressed by what we saw. Our task is to convince the public and the Congress . . . not to abruptly terminate sufficient military and economic aid which could become the most tragic mistake of a series of tragic mistakes. All of us have a difficult job of convincing the Congress and the people that we cannot drop the ball.”¹⁰ Others opined that Thieu should broaden his base of support to help his cause and score points with Congress. Representative Paul McCloskey (R., Calif.), a major critic of the war, was “surprised by the success [and] capability of the [South] Vietnamese army. Vietnamization has succeeded from a military standpoint. It is a superb fighting force.” Regardless, McCloskey believed “the will to fight and the terrain favors the North,” and that “the North Vietnamese are going to win.”

Another major anti-war activist, Representative Donald Fraser (D., Minn.), thought the best option was a phase-out of the aid program, and then only if Saigon began moving toward “traditional” American values regarding political openness. He also advocated the immediate removal of Ambassador Martin, labeling him a “first-rate disaster. He is inflexible and a total spokesman for the Thieu regime,” a position that Flynt and others agreed with.

Kissinger again provided commentary regarding a political solution. “It was my misfortune to negotiate with the North Vietnamese for four years. I wish I could agree to get a political solution along with a military solution. It was not possible to negotiate a political solution with them in a strong military situation. They are the most devoted, single-minded abrasive Communists I have ever seen. . . . As far as the three-year program is concerned . . . it must be done right. We have to give enough to succeed rather than produce a lingering death. The domino theory is unpopular, but . . . when other countries see the U.S. providing . . . no help for Vietnam the impact will be strong.”

Writing later, Kissinger again elucidated that Hanoi was most truculent when it felt the battlefield situation was advantageous to its forces. He was disdainful of those who thought otherwise. “The favorite theme of those who opposed the supplemental was the administration should seek political rather than military solutions. But the aging revolutionaries in Hanoi had nothing but contempt for the proposition that diplomacy was somehow separable from strategy . . . . If America could not influence the situation on the ground, it stood no chance of making any impact on Hanoi via diplomacy.”¹¹

The discussion went on for another hour, ending with Ford again appealing for his three-year program. Flynt tried to mollify the president by stating, “Most of us want to support you as much as we can.” The anguish of many members, torn over the aid question, was reflected in the last statement by Representative Millicent Fenwick (R., N.J.). In response to Ford’s question as to how she would vote, she said, “I’ll regret my vote no matter which way I vote.”

THE FINAL DECISION

While Congress dithered, the Politburo was completing its military plans for 1975–76. In October 1974, Le Duan had convened the Politburo to decide its strategy for the next two years. While a general outline was agreed upon, the Politburo had postponed a final decision. The purpose of the second meeting, starting on 18 December, was to review the political and diplomatic changes since then, and to finalize its designs. Le Duc Tho, confirming Kissinger’s beliefs regarding mediation, commented on the potential for a negotiated settlement: “In 1975 diplomacy will not pose any major problems for us. If there was a resumption of negotiations right now, I am certain that the only purpose would be to prolong the talks and to try to expand them. If our posture is not strong, diplomacy will not be able to resolve anything.”¹²

At the 18 December meeting, the Central Cell provided an overview of the eighth and newest draft plan to conquer South Vietnam. The plan was the subject of much discussion, but the southern Central Highlands remained the main focus. PAVN forces in the vast middle portion of South Vietnam were divided into two fronts. The B-3 Front in the Central Highlands ran north to south from Kontum province to Quang Duc province in the under-populated forest and mountain region that the Vietnamese call the Tay Nguyen (Western Highlands). Assigned to the front were two main-force units, the 10th and 320th Divisions, along with the recently formed 198th Sapper Regiment; two independent infantry regiments, the 95A operating near Kontum and the 25th in Darlac; and an assortment of armor, artillery, anti-aircraft, engineer, and signal units. The second command was called the B-1 Front (more commonly known as MR-5), which stretched from the seaside resort of Nha Trang north along the coast to Danang, ending at the southern end of the Hai Van Pass. The B-1 Front had the 3rd Division in Binh Dinh province, the 52nd Brigade in Quang Ngai province, and the 2nd Division in Quang Nam province, along with two artillery regiments and under-strength armor and anti-aircraft regiments.

As the Politburo began its deliberations, the North Vietnamese pulled off another major intelligence coup. One of Hanoi’s top spies had sent the Politburo the JGS estimate of PAVN intentions from the National Security Council meeting in early December, plus the complete ARVN disposition of forces, including the precise count by military region of artillery, armor, and aircraft that Thieu had requested. Hanoi learned that the JGS expected an attack in the northern section of II Corps, and that ARVN troops were positioned accordingly. With the southern section thinly defended, the Politburo was now even more eager to attack that area.

Who was this agent providing the Politburo such critical material? CIA analyst Frank Snepp states that “Among those responsible for the ultimate North Vietnamese victory, the spy in Thieu’s entourage clearly must rank high on the credit list.”¹³ Snepp is correct, for the Politburo was able to craft its 1975 plan with complete insight into Thieu’s military deployments. Back in September 1974, PAVN Deputy Chief of Staff Hoang Van Thai had received a copy of Major General Murray’s June 1974 briefing charts describing the deleterious effects of aid cutbacks. While Hanoi has never revealed the spy’s identity, in 2005 an account was published detailing the exploits of “Warrior H3.” This man is the most likely candidate. Surprisingly, he was not a member of Thieu’s inner circle, nor was he a senior ARVN officer; in fact, he was a low-ranking sergeant in General Cao Van Vien’s office.¹⁴ His name was Nguyen Van Minh, and his job was to store and handle classified documents and official correspondence between Vien and the “various staff agencies of the Ministry of Defense, the Joint General Staff, and the various military regions . . . and units of the puppet armed forces. He even handled correspondence with the Office of the President and the U.S. Military Headquarters.”¹⁵

He was the perfect spy in a perfect position. Low-ranking, trusted, and rarely scrutinized, this nondescript man worked clandestinely at night copying and then passing along Saigon’s most closely guarded military secrets. According to this same post-war Vietnamese article, “In April 1974 he provided an update on the activities of the general reserve force units—the airborne, the Marines, the rangers, and the air force—and provided a summary report on the military plan for all of South Vietnam. The intelligence information he gathered helped the [Central] Military [Affairs] Committee resolve a series of important strategic issues at a key point in time [during the April meeting to implement Resolution 21]. . . . The information he provided helped our senior leaders maintain the initiative and make correct decisions so that we could organize combat forces to secure victories on the battlefield. . . . Minh’s information when combined with information from other sources strengthened our resolve to attack to liberate all of South Vietnam.”¹⁶

Even with this vital intelligence, the Politburo kept a suspicious eye trained on U.S. military moves. The debate was fierce at the December 1974 meeting on whether the U.S. would resume bombing if PAVN launched large-scale attacks. Ultimately the Politburo concluded the U.S. probably would not respond, but it remained worried. As one senior participant recalled, “That was a very difficult question on which there were many differing opinions. The discussion was animated, and the opinions were often heated, and people whispered their own private thoughts. The vast majority of opinions . . . held that the U.S. would not send in ground forces, and that in any case, even such an action could not save the puppets from collapse. This was . . . the majority opinion . . . held by those of us from the battlefields . . . . However, there were still a small number of people who, speaking during the intermissions in the conference, worried that the U.S. would re-intervene in South Vietnam.”¹⁷ Even Ford’s later statement of 21 January 1975 that the U.S. would not re-enter the war did not eliminate the Politburo’s unease.

After several weeks of on-and-off deliberations, on 6 January, Le Duan closed the meeting with a blustery speech. His conclusion left no doubt as to his aims: “In the [October] meeting, the Politburo reached consensus on the strategic orientation aimed at taking . . . complete victory. All of us have reached full agreement . . . to achieve the . . . revolution in 1975–76. In 1974, while we were gaining in both strength and position, the enemy was declining in all fields. Our immediate task is to seize the historic opportunity [by] launching coordinated campaigns of our main forces.”¹⁸

Le Duan then went on to describe the main goals for each front in South Vietnam. “The 1975 plan of action sets the tasks for each battlefield . . . namely advancing by the shortest way towards the decisive battle in the enemy’s last stronghold [Saigon].” Both Le Duan and Giap wanted to first strike a major blow in the Highlands, and if the “strategic opportunity” arose, move immediately against Saigon. Tran Van Tra’s troops would disrupt pacification in the Mekong Delta, encircle the main cities, and widen the liberated zone. Instead of attacking Duc Lap, as the Central Cell had proposed back in August, the B-3 Front would instead capture Ban Me Thuot, the capital of Darlac province and the main town in the southern Central Highlands. PAVN forces would also seize the stretch of Route 14 from Ban Me Thuot south to Phuoc Long, thus allowing PAVN main-force units easy access to staging areas near Saigon. If the strategic opportunity appeared, PAVN would send two corps to Tra’s area to make a thrust at Saigon. In the northern portion of I Corps, just as General Vien had predicted, PAVN “should occupy the plain, control the area south of Hue, and cut off Hue from Danang.” Finishing with a thunderous exhortation to the leadership, he proclaimed: “This strategic battle . . . will lead our people’s struggle . . . to complete victory, thus contributing to changing the situation in Indochina . . . and will give rise to a new development in the revolutionary movement of the world’s people.” Le Duan’s heart was Vietnamese, but his soul was that of a pure Leninist revolutionary.

CHOOSING BAN ME THUOT

Two days after the Politburo meeting, the Central Military Affairs Committee met to finalize the operational details. While the Politburo chose the strategy, the committee decided on the tactics. Shortly after the meeting began, Le Duc Tho unexpectedly joined it. His purpose was to emphasize that the Politburo wanted to attack Ban Me Thuot instead of Duc Lap. As Van Tien Dung wrote, “It was only in the course of this meeting that the idea of striking Ban Me Thuot really began to take shape. Everyone saw the significance of an attack on this town, but it would take practical investigations . . . before we could decide how to [achieve] a quick victory.”¹⁹

Oddly, none of the available memoirs are clear as to precisely how and when the decision was made to change the objective from Duc Lap to Ban Me Thuot. It appears that as Tra’s forces were on the verge of victory in Phuoc Long in late December, the Politburo realized that its initial objective of Duc Lap was too conservative and swapped targets. One startling admission concerning the debate was provided years later. In a speech at a military-history conference, Le Duc Tho described the decision to assault Ban Me Thuot. “When we got down to detailed discussions about where the key attack to open the campaign would be launched, the discussion became very tense and heated. . . . A number of our comrades did not yet agree with the plan to select Ban Me Thuot for the opening attack of the campaign. . . . In fact, however, after we had obtained unanimous agreement in the discussion, but before Van Tien Dung was sent down to the battlefront, there was a comrade who still did not agree with the decision to attack Ban Me Thuot. That was why, during a meeting of the Central Military Party Committee and the General Staff, we had to discuss this decision once again, and we again made a final and clear-cut decision to attack Ban Me Thuot. Because there was a comrade who still was uncertain and wavering about this decision, the Politburo decided to send Van Tien Dung down to the battlefield. This was because we believed that such a vital, key attack required a commander who had full authority and who was fully determined and committed to carrying out the strategic intentions of higher authorities.”²⁰

Who was the “comrade” who was “uncertain and wavering” about Ban Me Thuot? While Le Duc Tho is silent on his identity, one possible candidate is Truong Chinh. Another candidate is General Vo Nguyen Giap. After the death of General Nguyen Chi Thanh in June 1967, Dung succeeded Thanh as Le Duan’s favorite general. Dung had never been part of Giap’s clique. He took advantage of the Le Duan–Giap rivalry, which had begun in the late 1950s, to advance his own career by supporting Le Duan within the military against Giap. He took Le Duan’s side in a heated dispute between Le Duan and Giap over the plan for the 1968 Tet Offensive, an offensive that Giap was against.²¹ Post Tet, Dung assumed increasing responsibility for the conduct of the war in the South, while Giap maintained responsibility for the North as well as for training, organization, and logistics support for the armed forces. After 1968, Dung was dispatched several times from the General Staff headquarters to directly supervise PAVN forces in major campaigns, notably the PAVN counteroffensive against the South Vietnamese incursion into Laos in February 1971 (Lam Son 719) and the Easter Offensive in Quang Tri and Thua Thien in April–May 1972. In return for his loyalty, Le Duan rewarded Dung with elevation to full membership in the Politburo in March 1972. While Giap never publicly disputed Le Duan’s decisions to launch the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the Easter Offensive in 1972, he was against such high-risk assaults. After those decisions had been made, he had left the country for “medical leave.” Thus he may have also quarreled over this assault, but his writings are mute regarding any such internal disagreements.

Another unanswered question is: Whose idea was it to attack Ban Me Thuot? The Communists have not singled out one individual, instead stating it was an idea that developed collectively. While several have claimed ownership of the Ban Me Thuot attack concept, Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao, who had served as commander of the B-3 Front from November 1966 until July 1974, is the most likely originator. In early December 1973 he had recommended attacking the city to both Van Tien Dung and Le Trong Tan. As Tran Van Tra would do with regard to Phuoc Long in 1974, he requested three strategic-reserve divisions to accomplish the task. Hanoi also denied Thao’s request. In September 1974 Giap brought Thao to Hanoi to discuss the southern Central Highlands campaign. During the meeting, Thao reminded Giap that of the seven Highlands campaigns conducted since the beginning of the war, six had been aimed at the northern sector because of difficulties in supplying the southern sector. Yet Thao still recommended attacking Ban Me Thuot: “I had raised the idea that if we selected the Central Highlands as our strategic offensive sector, the first thing we should do is attack Ban Me Thuot, because it was a large city [in] a vital, sensitive area, because it was the place where the enemy’s defenses were the most exposed and weakest, and because it would be easier for our forces to develop the attack down into the coastal lowlands from Ban Me Thuot than it would be from Kontum. I said that the difficulties that we would have to overcome . . . to launch an attack in this sector were the lack of roads for our troops to approach the target and the lack of water. . . . We would [also] liberate Duc Lap, hold the area firmly, and immediately connect [the Ho Chi Minh Trail] with Route 14 . . . thereby forming an uninterrupted North-South supply corridor that was entirely located on Vietnamese soil.”²² Given his passion for attacking the Montagnard capital, Dung’s committee chose Thao to serve as “campaign commander” for the Ban Me Thuot operation. He reported directly to Dung.

To summarize Hanoi’s military analysis of the reasons for choosing Ban Me Thuot, the two main east-to-west roads from the coast to the Central Highlands are Routes 19 and 21. Only one road, Route 14, runs north to south through the Central Highlands. (Route 1 runs along the coast.) Ban Me Thuot straddles the vital road junction of Route 14 and Route 21, just as Pleiku does for Routes 14 and 19. The Politburo chose Ban Me Thuot because it was surrounded by coffee plantations that provided good cover for attacking forces; it was lightly defended; and Route 21 to Nha Trang was wide open. Pleiku, on the other hand, was heavily defended, and its avenues of approach offered little concealment. If PAVN forces had taken Pleiku, they would then have had to fight the ARVN 22nd Division down Route 19 to the sea. Moreover, grabbing the Ban Me Thuot section of Route 14 and the section near Duc Lap, combined with the section recently captured in Phuoc Long, would provide Hanoi’s reserve forces a motorized artery straight to Saigon. Plus, Ban Me Thuot held the major but lightly guarded ammunition dump, the Mai Hac De supply depot, an enticing target for the Communist logisticians. In hindsight, it appears the logical choice, but as Thao notes, Hanoi had chosen the northern section of the Central Highlands (Kontum and Pleiku) six out of seven times. The main reason was logistics: Kontum and Pleiku were hundreds of miles closer to the main PAVN supply coffers. Only during Tet ’68 had PAVN attacked Ban Me Thuot, and then only for a few days before retreating.

During two weeks in January, the Central Military Affairs Committee completed the 1975 campaign plans, including how the other theaters would coordinate their actions. The design was to pin down RVNAF forces countrywide—Thieu’s long-predicted “general offensive”—to ensure that Saigon could not dispatch reinforcements to the Central Highlands. For the surprise attack against Ban Me Thuot to succeed, deception was critical. According to Giap: “With regard both to our combat strategy and [to] our deployment of forces, we must employ audacity [and] secrecy . . . to divert the South’s attention to the northern [Central Highlands] and Quang Tri–Thua Thien sectors.”²³ To ensure secrecy, the new target of Ban Me Thuot was so tightly held that only a select few in the General Staff knew of the change. The B-3 Front commander was not informed until late January, and the division commanders and their staffs who would carry out the operation were not told until early February.

Preparations for the offensive began immediately after the end of the Central Military Affairs Committee meeting. The Politburo sent some of PAVN’s most experienced officers to oversee the attack, including Major General Le Ngoc Hien, the General Staff’s chief of operations, and Lieutenant General Dinh Duc Thien, head of the General Logistics Department.²⁴ This command group was given the code-name A-75. The attack was called Campaign 2-75.

On 21 January, Hien arrived at the B-3 Front headquarters, just across the Laotian border from Pleiku, to distribute the new instructions and begin drafting battle plans. The B-3 Front staff, which was preparing to attack Duc Lap, now had to scramble to adapt to Ban Me Thuot as the main target. According to Senior Colonel Dang Vu Hiep, the B-3 Front’s political officer, the new orders were to “liberate all or most of the territory of Darlac, Phu Bon, and Quang Duc provinces, open a strategic corridor linking the Central Highlands and [the B-2 Front] and a corridor linking the Central Highlands with the provinces [along the coast]. . . . The focal point will be Darlac, and the primary target will be Ban Me Thuot. In the Pleiku and Kontum sector you will pin down, divert, and deceive the enemy. With regard to your use of forces, the General Staff grants you authority to use all the heavy, technical weapons [tanks and heavy artillery] at your disposal, without restriction.”²⁵ It is an indication of the attack’s strategic importance that, while Tra (and PAVN commanders in I Corps) were denied the employment of heavy artillery and armor, Giap had authorized their use for the assault against Ban Me Thuot.

Even before the Politburo’s plans were final, Giap had begun pouring reinforcements into the Central Highlands. In late December, he shifted the 968th Division, based in Laos, across the border into South Vietnam. The 968th was a light division, with only two regiments. Later that month, Giap also ordered the 316th Division to depart for South Vietnam. In anticipation of renewed fighting in South Vietnam, the division had returned to North Vietnam from Laos a year earlier for refitting. Since the 316th had fought exclusively in Laos for many years, its appearance in South Vietnam was one of the great surprises of the Central Highlands campaign, if not the entire 1975 campaign. The 316th departed North Vietnam on 15 January 1975, leaving its radio transmitters behind to continue broadcasting reports in order to fool signals intelligence. Transported south in a convoy of eight hundred vehicles, the 316th Division arrived at an assembly area southwest of Ban Me Thuot on 3 February.

Apparently this ruse was not completely successful. ARVN SIGINT uncovered the 968th’s move across the border, and also detected the potential movement south of the 316th. Since shifting the 316th from Laos to South Vietnam was a key indicator of a major future attack, CIA analysts, according to Frank Snepp, remarked on this new intelligence in the President’s Daily Intelligence Briefing for 25 January. However, no further information on the 316th’s movement was discovered, leaving allied intelligence uncertain of the division’s intentions. Its presence was not confirmed until a prisoner was captured during the Ban Me Thuot attack.

Given the great significance of reserve divisions moving into South Vietnam, what intelligence was uncovered? What little is known is contained in Colonel Le Gro’s diary. He notes that the 316th Division stopped internal communications on 18 January, and halted communications with PAVN Military Region 4 headquarters on 20 January. More important, South Vietnam was added to the 316th’s postal codes. According to Le Gro, these signs indicated movement of the unit south. A further warning occurred when SIGINT intercepted a conversation in which one speaker remarked that “the division has gone far away.”²⁶ Another intercepted message stated the speaker was “enroute to South Vietnam.” After that, nothing concrete was received.

Besides these two divisions, in February, Giap sent the 341st Division to the B-2 Front. At the same time, Giap also directed the 27th Sapper Battalion to move from North Vietnam to the Highlands to reinforce the 198th Sapper Regiment, making the regiment, now with six battalions, the most powerful sapper unit in South Vietnam. Giap also sent the crack 95B Regiment, 325th Division, from PAVN forces in Quang Tri in I Corps to augment the forces attacking Ban Me Thuot. Lastly, he dispatched another anti-aircraft and engineer regiment to the Highlands, along with eight thousand new recruits to replace future combat losses. Logistically, the B-3 Front was also well provisioned: “By the end of February, Group 559 [the element commanding the Ho Chi Minh Trail complex] and its supporting elements had fulfilled 110 percent of the transportation plan for the campaign, ensuring . . . sufficient supplies to operate through the end of 1975.”²⁷

Thus, while retaining the powerful 1st Corps in North Vietnam to exploit any opportunity, Giap had dispatched half of his six-division strategic reserve—the 316th, 341st, and 968th—to strongly reinforce the Southern battlefield, particularly for the Central Highlands attack. This critical action is one that U.S. analysts should have been closely watching—as Major General Murray had reminded Admiral Gayler—since it was one of the main predictors of Hanoi’s intentions. But now, in an era of congressionally mandated U.S. intelligence cutbacks in South Vietnam, our analysts could barely discern it.

Hoang Minh Thao arrived at the campaign headquarters in early February. His first mission was to get the right mix of units into the right position. He wanted to put ARVN in a situation such that its only choices would be “flee, surrender, or die.” As Giap had said, “feints to deceive the enemy” were another key element of Thao’s plan. His units “carried out a whole diversionary campaign [, and] during the final period . . . by which time the enemy had obtained some real evidence about our intentions [at] Ban Me Thuot, we even sought ways to neutralize that evidence to cause the enemy to believe that those moves were the feints. The Campaign Command was very concerned with, and directly commanded the diversionary tactical moves. We regarded them as ensuring the element of surprise, and surprise would ensure victory.”²⁸

In early February, Major General Vu Lang, the B-3 Front commander, gave each unit its mission orders. The 968th Division would conduct diversionary measures and pin down ARVN forces around Kontum and Pleiku. Afterwards, the first blow of the campaign would commence with the 320th Division cutting Route 14 near Thuan Man district, halfway between Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot. After blocking Route 14, the independent 95A Regiment and the B-1 Front’s 3rd Division would strike Route 19 west and east of the An Khe Pass respectively. Simultaneously, the independent 25th Regiment would block Route 21 east of Ban Me Thuot. Once all these missions were accomplished, the 10th Division would overrun Duc Lap. At that point, the 316th Division, the 198th Sapper Regiment, the 24th Regiment, 10th Division, and the recently assigned 95B Regiment, 325th Division—along with artillery, anti-aircraft, armor, engineer, and signal units—would attack Ban Me Thuot. After capturing Duc Lap the 10th Division would move to Ban Me Thuot and join the battle if the initial assault was unsuccessful.

The 316th Division would carry the brunt of the attack against Ban Me Thuot. The division commander, Senior Colonel Dam Van Nguy, was ordered by the B-3 Front to first “peel away the outer defenses,” then make a follow-up attack into the city against the ARVN 23rd Division headquarters and the Darlac province chief’s headquarters. Nguy, an ethnic T’ai from North Vietnam, had previously fought in the Central Highlands against U.S. forces at the bloody battle of Dak To in 1967. Upon examining Ban Me Thuot’s defenses, Nguy began to question the wisdom of attacking the town in this manner. He later wrote: “If we tried to peel away the outer defenses first, the battle would naturally take a considerable length of time . . . . After each round of fighting we would have to stop to regroup and regain our combat strength, while at the same time responding to enemy counterattacks. If this kept up, the balance of forces would gradually turn against us, the division’s attack power would gradually deteriorate, and we might have to halt or perhaps even fail to meet the goals of the campaign. The enemy would strengthen the defenses of his key installations, and powerful enemy counterattack forces, including tanks, artillery, and air support, would push us back away from Ban Me Thuot city.”²⁹

Moreover, Nguy believed that “If we fought in this manner under the existing conditions in 1975, when the enemy was armed to the teeth with the best weapons and technology, we would have to expend a great deal of time, strength, equipment, and blood. As for myself . . . during the entire course of my military career I had never fought a battle to ‘peel away the outer defenses.’” Instead, Nguy proposed a different tactic: “use a powerful force to make a surprise attack penetrating deep into the enemy’s headquarters, his nerve center, to throw enemy troops into confusion and make them thrash around wildly like a snake whose skull has been crushed.” After reviewing Nguy’s plan, Major General Vu Lang turned him down.

Shortly after Van Tien Dung arrived at B-3 headquarters, he called for a meeting with Thao and the local commanders to receive a briefing on the attack preparations. Vu Lang was suddenly stricken with malaria and was unable to attend, and so Dang Vu Hiep led the briefing. As Dung listened to Hiep’s report on the campaign battle plan, he became perplexed. Why was the 10th Division being used to attack Duc Lap rather than Ban Me Thuot? Dung thought the plan was for the 316th to attack Duc Lap, while the 10th would assault Ban Me Thuot. Hiep tried to explain, but the answers did not satisfy an increasingly angry Dung. As Hiep notes:

During a recess in the meeting, I hurried off to see Vu Lang. When I saw him his face was ashen, his lips were purple, and his body was shaking like a leaf, but he was still anxiously awaiting word about our discussions with Dung. I was concerned about him and felt the deepest affection for him. However, I described the situation to him and joked, “If you’re going to die, you’ll just have to wait to do it tomorrow, because right now you have to come and ‘argue’ for us about the use of 10th Division to attack Duc Lap!” At my recommendation and in spite of the fact that his malarial fever had not yet broken, Vu Lang came to the meeting and gave a detailed briefing on our plans for 10th Division. Vu Lang clearly spelled out [our] intentions. . . . It was precisely because 10th Division had experience in attacking heavily fortified enemy positions that we had to use 10th Division (minus 24th Regiment) to attack Duc Lap, because the Campaign Headquarters had specified that we must be certain of victory when we launched our attack on Duc Lap, and that the battle must not last more than one or two days. . . . In addition 10th Division had already been deployed to an assembly position in the Duc Lap sector. If we decided to move the division again it would not only cause us to lose more time, it would also create a lot of problems for us, especially with regards to maintaining the secrecy of our planned attack.³⁰

Given that the 10th was already in position, Dung grudgingly approved the plan, but he was adamant that the division must capture Duc Lap and then quickly reinforce the Ban Me Thuot battlefield. This was the first time, but by no means the last, that the attack direction of the 10th Division would be controversial. During the rest of the 1975 offensive, the 10th Division would bounce like a pinball around South Vietnam, becoming one of the most heavily engaged divisions during the “Great Spring Offensive.”

On 25 February, Dung called a final meeting to discuss campaign tactics. Again Nguy presented his plan for bypassing the outer defenses and striking the headquarters. As he later wrote: “There was vigorous discussion of my plan as we stood over the sand table. There were several occasions when some of the generals got into heated, ferocious arguments over the plan, but in the end, everyone unanimously approved of my division’s battle tactics. After concluding the discussion on the plan of attack . . . General Dung . . . gave us some words of encouragement: ‘The tactic that Dam Van Nguy has just presented to us is called ‘a flower blossoming behind enemy lines.’ When I was commander of 320th Division, I organized a powerful, elite force to attack the center of Thai Binh City, leaving the enemy no time to react.’”³¹

While Dung has long been credited with using the “blooming lotus” technique for attacking Ban Me Thuot (penetrating the city first, and then moving from the inside to attack the outer defenses), it was the 316th Division commander who actually proposed it. While it is true that Dung had once used the tactic in a battle against the French in North Vietnam, it was Nguy who asked to fight in this manner at Ban Me Thuot. Why Dung omits this fact from his book is unknown.

Despite internal debate over tactics, PAVN’s daring plan was swiftly taking shape. However, Dung now had another problem: ARVN was growing suspicious about Ban Me Thuot.

THE ARVN RESPONSE

Responsibility for the vast swath of South Vietnam known as the Central Highlands rested on the thin frame of Major General Pham Van Phu. Born in October 1928 in North Vietnam, Phu had compiled a storied twenty-four-year career in the Army when he was chosen to be II Corps commander. He twice won the French Croix de Guerre, earned the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry seventeen times, and was wounded four times in combat. He began his career as an interpreter for the French army, and then was sent to Dalat to attend officer school. Graduating in July 1953, he was assigned to the 5th Airborne Battalion. The battalion fought at Dien Bien Phu, and there he gained a well-deserved reputation for bravery, as his unit fought practically until the last man. After the French surrender at the besieged outpost, he and seven thousand other POWs began a five-hundred-mile trek to a Communist prison camp, where he endured sixteen months of horrific captivity. There he contracted tuberculosis, and the terrible conditions induced in him a great fear of ever again suffering the draconian hospitality of the Communist prison system.

After returning to the South, he became one of the first Vietnamese Special Forces commanders. In 1969 he went to the Delta, where he earned his first star. He then went to I Corps. and was assigned as Truong’s deputy commander for the 1st Division. When Truong went to the Delta as deputy commander of IV Corps, Phu became 1st Division commander. This was a prestigious assignment, as the 1st Division had long been considered ARVN’s best regular infantry outfit. During Lam Son 719 in February 1971 the division suffered heavy losses, but he retained command and was promoted to major general. During the 1972 offensive, he worked himself so hard his health collapsed. He was relieved in October 1972 and sent to a hospital to recuperate. For the last two years he had been commandant of the Quang Trung Training Center located outside of Saigon, the main instructional facility for enlisted soldiers. On 5 November 1974, he assumed command of II Corps after Vice President Tran Van Huong had doggedly insisted that Thieu replace the corrupt but effective Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan.

Phu was generally non-political and not particularly corrupt himself. But, like most senior officers, he turned a blind eye to his wife’s extracurricular business activities. Because of Dien Bien Phu, the French had a particularly high regard for him, which caused Thieu to consider him one of his best generals. However, according to those who knew Phu, while he had a deserved reputation as a brave officer and a good division commander, he was not capable, for reasons of both health and education, of assuming the heavy demands of corps command.

Upon assuming command, Phu faced two simple but profoundly difficult questions: What locations in the vast expanse of II Corps would PAVN attack, and how should he deploy his troops to defend those locations? The vast majority of Phu’s actions were in response to those two questions. In December 1974, both the JGS and Phu believed PAVN would first cut the three main highways providing access to the Highlands, Routes 14, 19, and 21, and then attack Kontum and northern Binh Dinh. Phu thought that another objective of the Communists was to take advantage of the new road they had built paralleling the Ho Chi Minh Trail—the so-called Eastern Annamite Road—by tying it into Route 14. He recognized that the new road detoured into Cambodia near Duc Lap, thereby adding 125 miles for the supply convoys headed for the B-2 Front. After the attacks against Phuoc Long, Phu, Vien, and Thieu all believed PAVN would attempt to march north and seize Route 14 in Quang Duc, as it had tried to do in late 1973, to shorten that supply line. It was a logical breakdown of Politburo plans, and Phu quickly dispatched the 24th Ranger Group to protect Quang Duc.

In January, however, Phu was forced to adjust his analysis of enemy intentions. In early January the ARVN 22nd Division captured a soldier in the western part of Binh Dinh province near the critical An Khe Pass. The An Khe Pass and Mang Giang Pass are the two main chokepoints on Route 19 between the coast and Pleiku. Interrogators gleaned from the prisoner that the An Khe Pass was a major North Vietnamese target. The POW had accompanied the PAVN 3rd Division commander on a reconnaissance of the pass, and he was caught with a map showing the locations of the Communists’ proposed blocking positions. Interdicting the road had been a Communist tactic since the days of the French war, and the secret plan called for the entire 3rd Division to assault the pass in conjunction with large-scale attacks against Pleiku.

This was a critical change in tactics. During the 1972 offensive the 3rd Division used only one regiment to cut the road at the An Khe Pass, and it had taken several months of hard fighting to remove them. If PAVN severed Route 19, Kontum and Pleiku would be isolated from their primary supply route. This new intelligence—combined with recent signal intercepts indicating that the PAVN 968th Division had slipped into South Vietnam from Laos—convinced Phu that Pleiku and not Kontum was now the Communists’ main objective. Thus, in late January his priority changed from guarding Kontum to securing Route 19 and Pleiku.

The ARVN 22nd Division quickly assigned its 47th Regiment to hold the pass, but Phu also remained concerned about northern Binh Dinh along the coast, the area in the province most often contested.³² He also possessed some spotty intelligence about an attack into Binh Dinh by the PAVN 52nd Brigade. Consequently, instead of assigning the entire 22nd Division to guard the pass area against the expected attack by the PAVN 3rd Division, he ordered the 22nd to hold two regiments in the north, leaving its fourth regiment in reserve.

In mid-February 1975, Phu was interviewed by Nguyen Tu, the highly influential chief correspondent for Chinh Luan, long regarded as the best newspaper in South Vietnam. Tu had graduated from the Son Tay Military Academy in North Vietnam. He was an institution among Vietnamese reporters, having worked for newspapers in Hanoi and Saigon. Instead of lounging in Saigon coffee shops trading or making up gossip, Tu spent his time in the field, talking to soldiers and reporting on their lives. He was the Vietnamese equivalent of Ernie Pyle, the famed American World War II war correspondent. In March, his series of articles on the withdrawal from Pleiku would devastate morale in Saigon.

Phu gave Tu his analysis of the coming campaign, and predicted that a “division-size force” would attempt to interdict Route 19.³³ Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, the J-2 (intelligence officer) for the Joint General Staff, was aghast at the amount of information Phu revealed during the interview. Lung later wrote: “In a press interview in February 1975 . . . the commander of II Corps withheld nothing from what he knew about the enemy’s goals and future actions in his MR and even outlined his operational plans in no uncertain terms.”³⁴

Phu’s staff, however, only partially agreed with their commander’s estimate. The II Corps intelligence officer, Colonel Trinh Tieu, judged that PAVN’s main objective was not Pleiku, but Ban Me Thuot. Tieu had served as an intelligence officer in the Central Highlands for many years, including as the 23rd Division intelligence officer (G-2) during the Easter Offensive. Tieu based his analysis of Communist plans on old-fashioned human intelligence. In early January, ARVN had lost track of the PAVN 10th Division, which normally operated around Kontum. Soon thereafter, a report was received that a 10th Division reconnaissance team had been spotted in Quang Duc, 150 miles to the south. Tieu also learned that both the PAVN 10th and 320th Divisions had celebrated Tet early, and had then moved southward. A POW reported in late January that the 25th Regiment, an independent B-3 Front unit, had been ordered to move east of Ban Me Thuot to cut Route 21.

More important, on 4 February, a communications sergeant from the PAVN 320th Division deserted to ARVN. He confirmed that his unit had moved south from its position around Duc Co, a village west of Pleiku, leaving its broadcasting gear in place to send out misleading radio messages. He also provided the secret location of the 320th in Thuan Man district on the border between Darlac and Pleiku provinces, along with detailed information on North Vietnamese plans. He claimed the 320th intended to cut Route 14, the 10th was planning to strike Duc Lap, and PAVN would assault Ban Me Thuot with two divisions, reinforced with tanks, artillery, and sappers. However, he did not know when the attack would happen.

This was another ominous development for Phu. If the 320th cut Route 14 between Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot, and the 3rd Division simultaneously interdicted Route 19 while Route 21 was also blocked, the Central Highlands would be cut into two isolated chunks of real estate. With most of Phu’s forces in the north, a major PAVN assault would easily capture Ban Me Thuot and the weakly defended southern section of the Highlands.

President Thieu was briefed on this new information during a stopover two days later at the defensive positions of the 44th Regiment, 23rd Division, about ten miles northwest of Pleiku. He made yearly visits to each corps right before the Tet holiday to bring gifts to the troops and receive a briefing about front-line conditions. During the meeting, he asked Phu his opinion of the rallier (the term commonly used for a defector) from the 320th Division. Phu responded that he felt the North Vietnamese were trying to deceive him into moving the 23rd Division to defend Ban Me Thuot, leaving Pleiku exposed. Thieu disagreed and ordered Phu to concentrate the 23rd Division around Ban Me Thuot, and to bolster it with a company of tanks. The 53rd Regiment, 23rd Division, was immediately dispatched from Pleiku, sending its headquarters and two battalions to Ban Me Thuot and one battalion to Quang Duc. A week later, however, Phu canceled moving the rest of the 23rd Division, apparently without Thieu’s knowledge.³⁵ Phu had received new signals intelligence that the 320th Division was once again transmitting radio messages from its usual location at Duc Co. Now convinced the rallier was a plant, Phu terminated the move of the 23rd Division.

It was a huge mistake. Just as the defector had revealed, the radio messages were a massive ruse. In early February the 968th Division initiated Phase One of Thao’s deception plan in the Highlands by establishing “a phony communications network to mislead the enemy.” Near Pleiku, “19th Regiment’s cryptographic team pretended to be the Central Highlands Campaign Headquarters, and the role of the 320th Division Headquarters was played by 4th Battalion, 19th Regiment. 29th Regiment organized a radio network playing the role of 10th Division.”³⁶ Not only were false messages transmitted, but open preparations such as reconnaissance teams that were “discovered” and road building made it seem that PAVN was preparing to attack Pleiku.

Despite the details from the defector and the conclusions drawn by Phu’s own staff, he disregarded their advice. He remained adamant that Pleiku was Hanoi’s focus. Phu was convinced by the resumed chatter from the 320th radios, the “harder” intelligence on the 968th Division’s entry into II Corps, and the captured map showing the 3rd Division’s plan to cut Route 19. A month before the opening battle of the final campaign, ARVN in II Corps remained badly divided over Hanoi’s military plans.