7
BEGINNING THE “GREAT SPRING OFFENSIVE”
As of late February, the bulk of Major General Pham Van Phu’s forces still protected Kontum and Pleiku. Kontum was defended by three Ranger groups, while a fourth group held Route 14 between the two cities. This force was led by Colonel Pham Duy Tat, the II Corps Ranger commander. Tat, a former Special Forces officer and protégé of Phu, was ecstatic that the Rangers had been given a specific mission under his command. He had come to II Corps in late 1972, and was well known in the Vietnamese military for his combat prowess and courage in battle. He had won several U.S. awards, including a Silver Star and several Bronze Stars. He had boldly pledged to Thieu at the early-February meeting at the 44th Regiment that he would hold Kontum at all costs. Hence he supported Phu’s decision to maintain strong forces around the city, and resisted any efforts to parcel out his Rangers.
Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong, commander of the 23rd Division, led the Pleiku front. Tuong had spent much of the previous eight years on the II Corps staff, first as chief of staff and then as assistant commander for operations. On 20 November 1973, he was given command of the 23rd Division. The 25th Ranger Group and two regiments of his division—the 44th and 45th—guarded the approaches to Pleiku. The division’s third regiment, the 53rd, had two battalions protecting Darlac province and one battalion in Quang Duc. Phu also had the 24th Ranger Group defending the vast province of Quang Duc. The 23rd’s organic armor squadron, the 8th Cavalry, had one troop of M-113 armored personnel carriers at Ban Me Thuot, while its armor troop, equipped with vintage M-41 tanks, supported an RF battalion holding Duc Lap.1 In reserve at Pleiku, Phu had the 4th Ranger Group and one tank squadron from the 2nd Armor Brigade, plus the other M-113 troop from the 8th Cavalry.
Despite Phu’s insistence that Pleiku was the target, his intelligence officer, Colonel Trinh Tieu, remained convinced that PAVN intended to attack Ban Me Thuot. At a meeting on 19 February with Phu and the assembled II Corps commanders and staff, Tieu recounted the previous intelligence from various ralliers and briefed Phu on some new information. Scouts at the remote outpost of Ban Don on the Cambodian border twenty-two miles northwest of Ban Me Thuot had reported finding tank tracks and seeing large fleets of North Vietnamese trucks moving south. Previously, all of PAVN’s armor in II Corps had been concentrated in the north. More recently, the Quang Duc province chief had informed Tieu that a large truck convoy had been spotted dropping off a PAVN regiment right across the Cambodian border from Duc Lap. Tieu believed both pieces of intelligence were clear signs that Ban Me Thuot was the objective.
Phu again insisted these were diversions. He stuck to his opinion that since Pleiku was the headquarters and nerve center of II Corps, it was the most likely target. Moreover, Phu had just returned from a meeting in Saigon on 18 February. Thieu, Vien, and the corps commanders had met to review the progress of the 1975 national-defense plan developed at the December 1974 NSC meeting. Regarding II Corps, Thieu had asserted that the main attacks would be directed at provincial capitals like Gia Nghia in Quang Duc and Pleiku.
Hanoi promptly learned of the Saigon meeting, as its spy in the JGS once again exposed the RVNAF’s strategic thinking. According to Hoang Van Thai, “We learned that Thieu had held an emergency meeting with his generals in Saigon on 18 February. Two remarks by the enemy drew particular attention from us. First, they thought we would launch a spring-summer offensive in the near future aimed at neutralizing their pacification strategy and regaining lost territory and population on all battlefields, mostly in [II Corps]. Second, Thieu had asked to take precautions against an attack by us on [Duc Lap], Pleiku, and Kontum, which would be the main targets. As for Ban Me Thuot, this would be only a support target, if ever we chose to attack.”2 This intelligence confirmed for the Politburo that its true plans remained secret.
The major military issue for Phu was how to deploy his limited units in the vast Highlands. Given the enormous territory, the security of II Corps was heavily dependent on accurate intelligence on enemy intentions, and then the capability to rapidly reinforce threatened positions by airlift. Phu had neither. His main concern was whether the North Vietnamese 968th Division would combine with the 320th to attack Pleiku, or instead replace the 320th, allowing it to move south and attack Ban Me Thuot. Without intelligence confirming that the 320th had moved into Darlac to strike Ban Me Thuot, Phu felt he could not strip units from Pleiku and take the risk that both enemy divisions might assault the city. Phu thought that if Hanoi did attack Ban Me Thuot, he could rapidly airlift troops to the city. However, he vastly overestimated his airlift capabilities, still thinking as if it were the old days of American-supplied mobility. He did not understand that now he had even less than when Toan was in charge of II Corps.
Another reason PAVN achieved tactical surprise was that Phu, after the discovery of the map in January, remained in a defense-oriented stance instead of launching pre-emptive strikes to destroy the PAVN forces in their lair. After Thieu made his annual Tet visit to the troops, General Cao Van Vien sent another directive to conserve resources. Vien noted that foreign assistance had been reduced because of “internal difficulties in the allied countries,” and that the world oil crisis had caused problems for the Vietnamese economy. The aid cuts had forced Vien to scale back his previous order of October 1974 limiting corps to only one ten-day operation per month. Now he requested the senior commanders to apply
the following operational concepts in a manner suitable to each locality: With regards to tactics, large-scale engagements with joint service coordination demanding massive and costly amounts of equipment and support are no longer appropriate, in part because of reductions in the level of assistance provided to us, and in part because of the restrictions imposed by the Cease-Fire Agreement. For that reason we must [not overly rely] on air and artillery support. . . . With regards to transportation, human labor will be the primary method, with transportation equipment like trucks, helicopters. . .serving only a secondary role, or only using these resources in situations when it is absolutely necessary and human labor, human legs, cannot carry out the mission.
As for unit operations from battalion size upward, we will only use such operations against large, confirmed, and evaluated targets. In this way we will be able to economize on our use of forces and will have a number of large reserve units on hand ready to send out to deal with the enemy when necessary. From the logistics standpoint, one of our greatest problems is that at present weapons, ammunition, and fuel are incredibly expensive, and continuing at our former rate of expenditure would be impossible for the national budget to sustain. The Joint General Staff has previously issued instructions to all units to economize on their expenditure of resources, but we have not yet reached the proper levels. In the future we will have even greater difficulties in this respect. For that reason, from this moment on we must conserve and economize on the use of each individual bullet, each drop of gasoline.3
This mid-February order restraining even battalion-size operations forced Phu into a defensive stance. Moreover, since the December 1974 NSC plan had ordered a nationwide pacification campaign for the first three months of 1975, Phu had concentrated on this campaign rather than large maneuvers. The aid cuts had done precisely what the anti-war groups sought: dramatically weakened the South Vietnamese military. And those cuts occurred precisely at the point when the Politburo was expanding the war. Hanoi then judged Saigon’s diminished power not as a condition for achieving a favorable peaceful settlement, but as an invitation to strike.
Despite Phu’s insistence that Pleiku was the main target, the new intelligence made him uneasy about Ban Me Thuot. To calm his own uncertainty, he dispatched the 45th Regiment, 23rd Division, from Pleiku to Thuan Man, a district seat about halfway between Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot. Its mission was to seek evidence that the 320th Division was hiding near Route 14. After the 45th Regiment had finished searching, Phu planned to send it to Ban Me Thuot. He also ordered a second battalion of the 53rd Regiment from Darlac to Quang Duc to bolster its defenses.
Van Tien Dung’s headquarters soon learned of Phu’s orders to transfer the 45th Regiment south. The worried PAVN commander realized that if Phu shifted troops to Ban Me Thuot, capturing the city would become very complicated. Although contingency plans had been drafted to strike Ban Me Thuot even if the city was reinforced and expecting an attack, Dung fervently hoped to assault an unsuspecting town. Otherwise the cost in blood and equipment would be high. For Dung, Phu’s move was a dangerous new element that had the potential to upset Hanoi’s grand strategic plan. If ARVN soldiers stumbled upon the 320th’s hiding place, that would provide compelling proof of North Vietnamese intentions and eliminate the element of surprise Dung and his generals had so arduously worked for.
Dang Vu Hiep, the B-3 Front’s political officer, later explained that to prevent Phu from discovering their plans, PAVN undertook “active deception measures in the Kontum and Pleiku sectors to lure 45th Regiment back to Pleiku. To implement this decision, the . . . staff ordered a false radio message to be transmitted to trick the enemy. The text of the message read, ‘The enemy has fallen for our deception and believes we will attack Ban Me Thuot. That is why he has sent 45th Regiment south.’”4
Phu fell for the ploy. After reading the intercepted message, he canceled the 45th Regiment’s onward movement to Ban Me Thuot. However, he left it at Thuan Man to continue searching. Concurrently, Hoang Minh Thao told the 320th to avoid any contact with ARVN troops and to pull its combat formations back from Route 14.
Much to Thao’s chagrin, however, more mistakes occurred. On 28 February, Phu was handed another piece of the intelligence puzzle when a prisoner was captured six miles northwest of Ban Me Thuot. He was from the B-3 Front’s artillery unit, and he informed his captors that he had left the Duc Co area in western Pleiku, the 320th’s traditional base area, in early January and had arrived in Darlac on 26 January. He was scouting firing positions in preparation for an upcoming “joint campaign.” This seemed to corroborate the earlier rallier’s information that the 320th had moved south, but the prisoner had been severely wounded, and interrogators were unable to glean any further information from him. Thus the presence of his artillery unit confirmed nothing; one could not deduce whether it was preparing to engage in a major attack against the town, or a routine bombardment.
Still, given the 45th’s movement and the newly captured soldier, Dung was taking no chances. On 1 March the 968th Division launched Phase Two of its deception plan (Phase One had been the fake radio messages), a series of attacks near Pleiku. The primary assault was against a battalion of the 25th Ranger Group holding positions west of the village of Thanh An. The village sat on the Route 19 extension southwest of Pleiku at the edge of ARVN-controlled territory. Under cover of an artillery barrage, 968th Division infantry—using 320th Division radio call signs—overran several Ranger positions and directly threatened Thanh An. Just as Dung hoped, when PAVN attacked the Rangers, Phu immediately shifted the 45th Regiment back to help defend Thanh An.
Seeing Phu’s continued sensitivity to Pleiku, Dung ordered the 968th Division to create even greater turmoil in the area. He implored his forces to make “one man seem like ten!” The division promptly dispatched small teams to rocket targets near Pleiku, including the II Corps headquarters and the Cu Hanh airfield, home of the VNAF 6th Air Division. It worked: the shelling kept Phu fixated on Pleiku.
The 968th action’s left the other PAVN units relatively free to continue their preparations, albeit still dodging South Vietnamese patrols. The 316th and 10th Divisions were preparing for the attacks on Ban Me Thuot and Duc Lap, while the 320th was organizing to cut Route 14 at Thuan Man. It also had a follow-on mission: seizing Cheo Reo, the capital of Phu Bon province. The division had sent a reconnaissance team in February to scout Cheo Reo. Afterwards, the division ordered its engineers “to secretly prepare a road toward Cheo Reo to ensure that troops and technical equipment could be moved to that area when necessary . . . the division sent one battalion (9th Battalion, 64th Regiment) to a base position four miles west of Cheo Reo city. The division’s communications personnel overcame many difficulties to string a direct line of communications to 9th Battalion. This telephone line would later provide outstanding service enabling the division to provide directions directly to the battalion after the situation began to develop.”5That was an understatement. The line, which ran thirteen miles to the 9th Battalion, would later pay a pivotal role in the defeat of II Corps.
On 1 March, Hoang Minh Thao took direct control of all troop movements from the B-3 Front headquarters. After the capture of the artilleryman, Thao’s first order was for each unit to take extra precautions to prevent discovery. Despite his admonitions, small encounters were unavoidable. Between 28 February and 3 March, RF troops in Darlac province had six separate engagements with North Vietnamese units. Also, on 3 March an ARVN spy posing as a woodcutter spotted a PAVN battalion west of Ban Me Thuot in an area where no enemy troops had been seen for some time. Then the Communists suffered another potentially serious blunder—although, luckily for Thao, it happened in the midst of major attacks in other areas. While crossing Route 14 south of Ban Me Thuot on the night of 4 March, a young lieutenant with the 316th’s southeastern assault column dropped his diary. A Darlac sector patrol discovered it the next day and gave it to the province intelligence section. The diary’s owner had noted his departure from North Vietnam on 24 January and his arrival in Darlac on 4 February. An entry for 3 March said that his unit was to proceed to Ban Me Thuot and participate in an attack. The last entry read: “4 March: crossing Route 14 on the way to Ban Me Thuot.”6 However, fortune again smiled on Giap’s army. The lieutenant did not identify his unit, leaving ARVN unsure who planned to attack the town, and when.
Given the growing human intelligence that Ban Me Thuot was the main target, Vien’s top intelligence officer, Colonel Hoang Ngoc Lung, had come to the same conclusion as Colonel Tieu. Under prodding from Tieu, Lung flew to Nha Trang in early March in an attempt to convince Phu of his analysis. Phu declined to meet with him.
With all these signs, plus the pleadings of Tieu, Lung, and others regarding an attack against the southern Highlands, why did Phu remain obsessed with Pleiku? Many have speculated as to the factors that shaped his thinking. They include fear of capture and loss of prestige if he was defeated.
In his defense, the Central Highlands is a vast domain of trackless forests and steep mountains, and the draconian aid cuts had severely hampered intelligence efforts. Most ARVN observers believe that Phu’s unfamiliarity with the area also greatly contributed to his decision. Phu had never served much time in II Corps. These observers contend that if Thieu had retained Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan as II Corps commander, Toan would have deciphered the Communists’ intentions. In fact, Toan had planned to attack Duc Co in November 1974 to disrupt Hanoi’s dry-season preparations, but he was relieved before he could implement his plan. A successful spoiling attack against the 320th might have forced Hanoi to alter its design. Toan’s removal left only one person who could have overruled Phu: President Thieu. But although he had ordered Phu at the early February meeting to send a regiment from the 23rd Division to Ban Me Thuot, he also later seemed to discount Ban Me Thuot as a target.
U.S. intelligence also provided contradictory information. Frank Snepp writes that the CIA’s base in Ban Me Thuot had recently closed, leaving the CIA dependent upon GVN intelligence sources, which were scarce in the thinly populated region. Snepp’s boss, Thomas Polgar, the CIA Station Chief in Saigon, disagrees with that statement.7 He claimed in numerous interviews that the CIA had human information that Ban Me Thuot was the target. Polgar indicates that this information came from captured documents and prisoners, which means he is probably referring to the same South Vietnamese intelligence reviewed above.
Polgar further states that the Defense Department would not accept the CIA’s analysis without confirmation from signals intelligence, which he says the U.S. did not possess.8 NSA historian Robert Hanyok’s study of the U.S. National Security Agency in Vietnam agrees with Polgar on this point, stating that allied SIGINT before the Ban Me Thuot battle “did not do well in discovering what the communist troops were up to.”9 Since U.S. aerial photography and VNAF reconnaissance were severely crimped by the budget cuts, the North Vietnamese specifically targeted the allies’ best remaining source of tactical intelligence, signals intercepts. That is why the main component of PAVN’s deception plan was using the fake radio transmissions, while imposing strict radio silence upon its troops on the march. All accounts to date accept that Hanoi fooled allied SIGINT into believing that its soldiers remained in their usual operating areas.
Those accounts are incorrect. On 7 March the head of South Vietnamese signals intelligence, Brigadier General Pham Huu Nhon, and the American head of the National Security Agency in Vietnam, Tom Glenn, flew to see Phu. The purpose of their trip was to warn Phu that ARVN SIGINT analysts had concluded that PAVN intended to attack Ban Me Thuot. According to Glenn, “We had previously warned the JGS that the PAVN were about to attack Phuoc Long. Nhon had now concluded that Ban Me Thuot was the next target. He based his conclusion on a combination of radio direction finding, message traffic analysis, and a few readable messages. We met Phu in Pleiku. Nhon treated Phu with great respect, but Phu did not believe Nhon’s analysis or the SIGINT reports. Colonel Tieu was with us, but he was also unsuccessful.”10
While hindsight is always 20/20, it appears there was a breakdown in intelligence coordination between South Vietnam and the U.S., or between American agencies. Unfortunately, there is no answer to the question why Nhon’s analysts, who shared all the information they received with the U.S., had determined that Ban Me Thuot was the primary target while most of the Americans failed to reach the same conclusion.
Hanoi’s deception plan was a significant element of the successful assault on Ban Me Thuot, but it was not the only reason victory was achieved. Overwhelming force and the use of armor in an urban environment were also noteworthy. Both rested upon avoiding discovery of PAVN’s growing presence around the town, or the placement of the 320th and 10th Divisions in their respective hiding spots.
Yet how did the PAVN soldiers in the Central Highlands successfully evade the ARVN patrols? As mentioned, fuel cuts had limited the mobility of the reconnaissance teams and the amount of aerial reconnaissance. Most important, just as Hanoi’s spy at JGS had provided crucial intelligence, the B-3 Front also had a critical agent in the South Vietnamese ranks. A warrant officer working at the communication center for the II Corps logistics agency stole the codebooks for ARVN forces in the Central Highlands.11 His theft enabled the Communists to both monitor South Vietnamese radio frequencies and crack ARVN codes. This gave them advance knowledge of ARVN patrol routes, a point hinted at in the histories but never fully acknowledged. For example, Van Tien Dung notes that “By following enemy radio transmissions we knew that [ARVN] had ordered their reconnaissance units to find out where our 10th Division was located.”12
Ultimately, the North Vietnamese deception and concealment efforts were extraordinarily successful. Some of it was luck, but much of it was thorough planning and execution. The outcome was a remarkable transfer of men and equipment that enabled the North Vietnamese to concentrate substantial combat power, which produced victory in one of the defining battles of the war. From North Vietnam came the 316th Division and Dung’s campaign headquarters. From I Corps came the 95B Regiment, 325th Division. The two divisions that had been based in the northern part of the Central Highlands—the 10th and the 320th, along with artillery, sappers, and air-defense guns—marched over one hundred miles out of their normal operating areas near Kontum and Pleiku south to new locations. PAVN logisticians and engineers supported the effort by stockpiling large stores and building rough roads. Only the 968th Division was discovered, but its intentions remained unclear. This enormous strategic thrust was completed virtually undetected, and what little was discovered was not believed by the people who had final decision-making power.
THE CAMPAIGN BEGINS
ARVN Lieutenant Colonel Le Cau, commander of the 47th Regiment, 22nd Division, fell wearily onto his cot in his makeshift headquarters just east of the An Khe Pass on Route 19 in Binh Dinh province. It was late at night on 3 March. For ten hours he had climbed steep, rocky hills and walked among his troops, reviewing their defensive positions.13 Since the capture in January of the prisoner with the map, his regiment had been defending the pass. After six weeks of constant patrolling and twenty-four-hour guard duty, Cau and his troops were exhausted.
Cau had been given this mission because of his familiarity with the terrain; he had fought there during the difficult days of the 1972 offensive. He knew that the 3rd Division would attempt to capture the pass, but he did not know the exact date or time. Despite the intelligence that the entire 3rd Division would attack the pass, both Cau and his division commander, Brigadier General Phan Dinh Niem, believed that the 3rd would follow its typical pattern: one regiment would seize the pass while the rest of the division would attack the coastal region in northern Binh Dinh. Given that the two sides had been locked in a bitter struggle in that area since December 1974, and because Phu was afraid of an attempt by the PAVN 52nd Brigade to capture the port of Sa Huynh, Niem had kept two of his regiments there, leaving one in reserve. The only unit he had available to reinforce Cau was a newly formed RF group.
This time, however, the 3rd had altered its traditional approach. The division had been regenerating in its base camps in northern Binh Dinh when new instructions arrived. As part of the Central Highlands Campaign, its mission was critical. It was, as the division history later put it, to destroy “a significant portion of the enemy’s troop strength and . . . cut Route 19 for an extended period of time to create favorable conditions to allow the primary offensive in the Central Highlands to annihilate enemy forces and to create a vacuum in the east to support our local movement in Binh Dinh. The difference was that this time the scale of the battle, the length of time the road had to be cut, and the objectives of the campaign were all much greater than they had been during the 1972 offensive. In 1972 the division only cut the road . . .to help other units win a victory. . . . This time the division was ordered to annihilate enemy forces so that we could keep the road cut for an extended period of time.”14
Blocking the road indefinitely would strangle Kontum and Pleiku, and prevent ARVN forces from retreating to the coast. Route 19, almost 125 miles long, is the chief lifeline of the Central Highlands. Supplies for Kontum and Pleiku travel by truck from the port at Qui Nhon, Binh Dinh’s provincial capital and the fourth-largest city in South Vietnam. The road begins on Route 1 near Qui Nhon. It cuts through rice fields and foothills to the treacherous An Khe Pass and then continues to the famous Mang Giang Pass, where in 1954 French Mobile Group 100 had been ambushed and almost destroyed. The road then enters Pleiku province and continues west on the Route 19 extension, ending at Duc Co near Cambodia.
To keep Niem guessing, the 3rd Division also conducted a deception campaign. The 3rd’s troops “spread the word that they were going to liberate northern Binh Dinh. At night many units sent forces up to the enemy’s perimeter fences, and when they pulled back they intentionally left blatant signs of their presence behind. Tractors and bulldozers belonging to the province agriculture committee were ordered to drive north with their headlights burning and their engines revving loudly, leaving behind track-marks which resembled tank tracks. Right up until the final days the enemy was certain we would launch our attack in the north, even though the entire division and all its troops had quickly but quietly moved south.”15
On 2 March, Phu flew in to review Cau’s efforts. Phu emphasized to Cau that Route 19 between Pleiku and Qui Nhon must be kept open at all costs. Cau replied that holding every piece of this long road against an initial attack was impossible. There were too many bridges, the terrain was too difficult, and his troops were spread too thin. Aerial reconnaissance provided little help. The 22nd Division was limited to one plane for three hours a day. Still, Cau personally vowed to Phu that he would reopen the road if the Communists cut it.
Around 6:20 A.M. on 4 March, a thick cloud of fog and mist covered the ground, shrouding the mountain peaks from view. Suddenly a shattering explosion rocked Cau’s headquarters. Bridge #13, a nearby culvert that was poorly guarded by a Popular Force platoon, had been destroyed by sappers. Phu’s lifeline had been cut. At 6:35 A.M., as the morning fog lifted, two flares shot into the sky. Artillery shells immediately began bombarding RF and Cau’s troops. The “Great Spring Offensive” had begun.
CLOSING THE TRAP
Concurrent with the 3rd’s attack at An Khe, the 95A Regiment struck RF/PF positions on Route 19 on the western side of the Mang Giang Pass in Pleiku province. By late afternoon, it had captured a large stretch of the road. With most ARVN troops tied down protecting Kontum and Pleiku, Phu could only dispatch a battalion from his reserve, the 4th Rangers, along with limited armor support, to dislodge the 95A. He had to keep the rest of the 4th to await the next threat. Phu also ordered the 42nd Regiment, 22nd Division, to move from northern Binh Dinh to the small town of Binh Khe on Route 19 near the pass to defend it against an expected PAVN attack.
Although the diary found on 5 March was the clearest indicator yet that enemy forces were encircling Ban Me Thuot, apparently it was overlooked when the PAVN 25th Regiment attacked and cut Route 21 on the same day. Phu now had four brush fires going simultaneously: two on Route 19, a third one at Thanh An, and a fourth on Route 21. Phu organized a large task force to pry open Route 21 where it was blocked east of Ban Me Thuot near the Darlac–Khanh Hoa province border. Made up of “virtually every RF unit that could be spared from the coastal provinces,” it was assigned the mission of reopening the road.16 Commanded by the Khanh Hoa province chief, the counterattacks began on 7 March. Despite support from air, artillery, and armor, the RF failed to dislodge PAVN forces holding the high ground astride Route 21.
As for Phu, when the attacks came, he basically took up residence at corps headquarters, even eating and sleeping there. Ever the brave soldier, he raced to the scene of the fighting, managing each battle personally. It was the esprit de corps expected of a South Vietnamese Airborne officer. Yet while such action was required of a brigade or division commander, corps command was different. Courage alone was not enough. Phu’s style might have worked in the past, but in 1975, the war was vastly different. PAVN had committed larger, more mobile forces, with superior firepower and logistics, all synchronized by superb planning and enhanced control by commanders who had war-gamed in advance Phu’s every move. This situation required a leader who could simultaneously react and plan ahead.
Phu was good at reacting, but not at planning ahead. He countered the closure of Route 21 by ordering the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, to immediately leave Duc Lap and return to Ban Me Thuot. He also sent some artillery and the deputy commander of the 23rd Division, Colonel Vu The Quang, in a convoy to Ban Me Thuot to coordinate ARVN defenses in Quang Duc and Darlac. Colonel Quang was given complete authority over all forces in those two southern provinces. However, despite the injunction against revealing its presence, the 320th Division ambushed Quang’s south-bound convoy, destroying ten vehicles. Although Quang escaped, a captured major from the convoy revealed that the 45th Regiment, 23rd Division, was returning a battalion to Thuan Man to search for the 320th. The PAVN division commander immediately asked permission to cut the road in order to prevent the 45th from traveling south.
With Routes 19 and 21 blocked, Van Tien Dung next intended to interdict Route 14 between Pleiku and Ban Me Thuot, but the timing was critical. He wanted to capture Thuan Man and cut Route 14 at that location, but if he did it too soon, Phu might recognize that Ban Me Thuot was the main objective and reinforce the town. If Dung did not cut the road, and the 45th Regiment went to Ban Me Thuot, the town would be considerably harder to capture. It was a tough decision, and the 320th’s commander pressed him to make a choice. After reviewing Phu’s moves, Dung concluded that Phu seemed focused on Route 19 and had not changed his troop concentrations. Consequently, Dung made a critical judgment: he told the 320th to “remain silent, avoid exchanging fire with spy patrols, [and] not fight on Route 14 without orders.”17 It was a tremendous risk, but it paid off when the 45th Regiment remained near Pleiku.
After two nervous days, Dung decided the opportunity had finally arrived to cut Route 14. On 7 March he sent a unit of the 320th Division to seize an RF base south of Thuan Man. His intention was to draw the newly arrived 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, away from its patrols north of Ban Me Thuot. The ploy failed when the 48th Regiment, 320th Division, over-ran the RF position in forty minutes. However, even though the attack did not succeed in luring in the 3rd Battalion, the next day the 48th Regiment struck Thuan Man and a section of Route 14, and seized both in less than two hours. All three of the main roads in the Central Highlands had now been severed.
Meanwhile, the regiments that would assault Ban Me Thuot slid into position. Five separate columns would attack the town. Each was a combined-arms operation that would penetrate into the city to capture the command centers and major installations. In this way South Vietnamese control would be destroyed, and the outlying outposts would easily fall.
The initial assault into Ban Me Thuot would be led by the 198th Sapper Regiment. Its strike force comprised three sapper battalions. Two of the regiment’s other battalions would harass Pleiku, while the last one would support the 10th Division at Duc Lap. The 198th made three reconnaissance forays into Ban Me Thuot to determine infiltration routes and observe the defenses of its objectives. The sappers would attack in conjunction with a two-hour artillery barrage to paralyze four main targets: the city airfield, the 53rd and 44th Regiment base camps, the Mai Hac De ammunition storage facility, and the larger Phung Duc airfield east of town. The airfields were chosen so as to prevent escape or reinforcements, and Mai Hac De to foil any resupply efforts.
After the 198th hit its targets, the five attack columns would advance on the town. Their objectives were to seize the main six-way intersection in the town center, the 23rd Division headquarters, the Darlac province headquarters, and the 8th Cavalry’s base camp. The 316th Division would control three columns. One would hit from the northwest, another from the southeast, and a third from the southwest.18 Each column was supported by an anti-aircraft battalion. The northwestern and southwestern columns had a powerful additional punch—eight tanks and eight armored personnel carriers each.
The 10th Division formed a light headquarters to command the fourth and fifth columns, and to coordinate the return of the division from Quang Duc. The fourth prong was the 95B Regiment, the crack unit that had held the Quang Tri citadel for many days in 1972 in some of the toughest fighting of the war. The fifth spearhead was a lone infantry battalion from the 24th Regiment, 10th Division. Both of these columns were also strengthened with anti-aircraft battalions and armor. The 95B would smash from the northeast to secure the main six-way intersection, the city airfield, and the province headquarters. The 10th’s strike force would seize the 23rd Division headquarters in combination with the southwestern column. Two artillery brigades would fire in support of the attackers.
Dung and Thao staked everything on the initial assault. In essence, the plan was to commit virtually their entire force to a mad dash into the city, gambling that they could overwhelm Ban Me Thuot in one massive wave. Only one battalion from the 10th Division remained in reserve. If ARVN survived the first onslaught, and Phu was able to reinforce the defenders, Dung’s troops would be trapped in the open, cut off from any easy retreat.
The plan depended heavily on reaching the jump-off positions undetected. This was perhaps the most difficult aspect of the operation. The southeastern column marched for two days and nights, forded two rivers, and then crossed Route 14 undetected. The northern columns passed numerous settled areas and outposts. The armor units had a formidable task: depart from hiding spots some fifteen to twenty miles from the city without getting lost or stuck, cut through the thick forests, cross the wide and fast-flowing Srepok River on flotation devices, and then finally link up with their assigned attack columns. The artillery guns and the signal, engineer, and anti-aircraft units also had to maneuver into position undetected.
With Ban Me Thuot isolated, and Phu’s attention drawn to Pleiku and Route 19, the next phase of the Central Highlands campaign began in Quang Duc. On the afternoon of 7 March, the 10th Division command group met in the jungle west of Duc Lap to make the final decisions about the attack. Duc Lap was considered a formidable target. It was viewed as the southern flank of Ban Me Thuot. To protect it, ARVN had built five fortified strong-points around the town, with fighting positions, underground bunkers, and minefields. Defenders included an RF battalion, three artillery batteries, and the M-41 tanks.
Like Dung and Thao, the 10th Division commander, Senior Colonel Ho De, also decided to gamble everything on one great assault. Cognizant of his orders to win fast and return immediately to Darlac, Ho De made a plan similar to the one for Ban Me Thuot: bypass the strong-points on the outer perimeter and strike at three chief targets. They were the main military base, a 23rd Division tactical headquarters, and the district headquarters inside the town. Two battalions would strike each target. Division artillery would provide fire support. ARVN’s 24th Ranger Group in Quang Duc would be concurrently attacked by the B-2 Front’s recently formed 271B Regiment. After the 10th captured Duc Lap, the 271B would seize the rest of the province.
At 5:55 A.M. on 9 March, the 10th Division transmitted the attack order. For ninety minutes, the fifteen guns of the division’s artillery fired shells onto the three targets. As soon as the barrage lifted, the infantry was given the signal. At 9:30 A.M. the soldiers of the 10th Division overran the military base and the 23rd’s command post. The M-41 tank troop was also quickly eliminated. Only the assault against the district headquarters fared badly. The RF forces, supported by air strikes, fought back. Suddenly, however, the district commander broadcast an uncoded radio message that he was retreating. He requested air strikes to cover his withdrawal. Intercepting the message, the two PAVN battalions surged forward to catch the retreating RF.
It was a trap. As the North Vietnamese moved in, the RF troops ambushed them, inflicting heavy casualties on the advancing soldiers. By noon, the two battalions were forced to pull back and regroup for a strike the next day. The division engineers were ordered to build a road to the top of a nearby hill so that the PAVN troops could move two 85-mm guns to fire directly into the town. Working all night, the engineers successfully dragged the two guns to the hilltop. Attacking at first light, the 85-mm guns poured shells onto the RF defenses, crushing many bunkers. At 8:30 A.M. on 10 March, Duc Lap fell.19 Ban Me Thuot stood alone.
INTO THE STORM
On Route 19, the soldiers of Le Cau’s 47th Regiment withstood furious assaults by 3rd Division shock troops and artillery fire. Cau’s troops were strung out holding platoon- and company-sized positions along both sides of the road near the pass. Savage fighting occurred on many hilltops. PAVN artillery would blast away, followed by human-wave assaults. Once a position fell, Cau had to counterattack to regain it. Often, he personally led his troops to reclaim the lost positions. While his courageous efforts were inflicting heavy losses on the North Vietnamese, his casualties were also high. Outnumbered three to one, the attackers were slowly pushing him out of his positions. By late afternoon on 5 March, only one ARVN strong-point remained at the eastern entrance to the pass. If it fell, the pass would belong to the People’s Army. Cau now could only dig in and wait for reinforcements.
Using excellent close air support, the ARVN 42nd Regiment at Binh Khe had stymied the PAVN efforts to occupy the town. With the 47th Regiment unable to dislodge PAVN from the pass, Brigadier General Niem dispatched his 41st Regiment to replace the 42nd, sending that regiment to help Colonel Cau. That left Niem with only one regiment and RF/PF to cover hundreds of square miles along the heavily populated coast.
With the 41st Regiment occupying Binh Khe, on 7 March the 42nd Regiment moved to help Cau’s men wrest back control of the lost ground. The 42nd attacked to clear the area north of the eastern entrance, but was soon bogged down in the tough terrain. Fearful of the 22nd Division’s new efforts, on 8 March the 3rd Division attacked to destroy Cau’s remaining position. It changed hands several times, but after two days of ferocious fighting, Cau’s troops remained in control.
Despite heavy losses, the North Vietnamese would not relent. On 10 March, under orders from Dung to intensify the fighting and tie up the 22nd Division, PAVN threw an entire regiment at Cau’s forces. His 2nd Battalion was overrun and its commander killed. Brigadier General Niem had no choice; he pulled his 41st Regiment out of Binh Khe and raced it into the breach to replace the 47th Regiment. Cau’s troops had sustained 40 percent casualties while holding the pass area against the 3rd Division. Niem sent the 47th to defend northern Binh Dinh and recuperate. Before departing, he promoted Cau to colonel.
Meanwhile, on the morning of 9 March, Phu flew into Ban Me Thuot to see Colonel Vu The Quang, the deputy commander of the 23rd Division, and Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat, the Darlac province chief, to discuss the city’s defenses. Luat was a career armor officer, and one of Nguyen Van Toan’s fair-haired boys. Luat had commanded the 2nd Division’s armor unit when Toan was the division commander, and he led the 1st Armor Brigade’s spearhead into Laos in February 1971 during the abortive Lam Son 719 incursion. Toan made him Darlac province chief shortly before Toan was relieved of command.
Luat met Phu at the airport, and took him to the 23rd Division headquarters in Ban Me Thuot. They were joined by Colonel Quang, Brigadier General Le Trung Tuong, and the Quang Duc province chief. The chief informed Phu that during the battle for Duc Lap, a document was captured identifying the 10th Division as the unit assaulting the town. After discussing the situation, Phu decided against attempting to recapture Duc Lap. He reviewed the defense plan for Ban Me Thuot, and ordered the city to be placed on 100 percent alert. Phu also sent the 21st Ranger Group (minus one battalion, which was supporting Thanh An) to reinforce the village of Buon Ho in Darlac province, twenty-five miles north of Ban Me Thuot on Route 14. If Duc Lap was Ban Me Thuot’s southern flank, Buon Ho was its northern flank. Phu expected it to be the next Communist target.
The 21st Rangers were led by Lieutenant Colonel Le Qui Dau, who had commanded one of the Ranger battalions that fought at An Loc in 1972. By late afternoon of 9 March, the Rangers had completed the helicopter lift into Buon Ho. From there they could move to recapture Thuan Man, or they could support Ban Me Thuot if needed. Additionally, Luat ordered one of his RF battalions at Ban Don to pull back to defend Ban Me Thuot. Despite the reinforcements, ARVN forces around the Darlac capital were thin. Regular Army units consisted of the 23rd Division Reconnaissance Company, the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 53rd Regiment, and one M-113 troop from the 8th Cavalry. The rest were rear-echelon soldiers. Darlac sector forces included two RF battalions and local police. VNAF personnel were stationed at the two airfields.
At the same time Phu was discussing the city’s defenses, Dung was finalizing the last details of the attack. On the afternoon of 9 March, he sent a cable to Giap. In it he outlined the preparations for the Ban Me Thuot attack and reported the Duc Lap victory. In closing he noted that his troops and equipment were in good shape, and that the men’s morale was high.
On the afternoon of 9 March, Dung’s armor began to move to the Srepok River. The 316th Division engineers constructed wooden boats and bamboo rafts to cross the 250-yard-wide, crocodile-infested river. Cables were strung across the river to pull the rafts to the eastern bank. The armor was forbidden to cross the river until the artillery began firing, making the timetable very tight. At the same time, the sappers moved in close to town.
As the minutes ticked down to H-hour, Dung picked up the field telephone and called Thao at his campaign headquarters five miles west of Ban Me Thuot. The PAVN signal troops had just finished stringing the wire across the Srepok River. Dung asked for a status report. Thao replied that all columns reported they were ready. Dung told Thao to maintain close communications with him so that they could make decisions quickly and decisively. Finishing the call, Dung exclaimed, “I wish you victory!”20
“WE HAVE WON A GREAT VICTORY”
At 2:45 A.M. on 10 March, the sappers were in position. Three companies were right next to the barbed-wire fence at the city airfield on the north-eastern side of Ban Me Thuot. Another company totaling thirty-eight men slipped close to the Mai Hac De supply depot located in the southwestern corner of the city.
At 3:00 A.M. all the months of planning and debate, and the sweat and labor of thousands of soldiers, were realized when an officer shouldered his AK-47 at the city airfield and shot out its main searchlight. Immediately, a wave of satchel charges, mortar rounds, and rocket-propelled grenades exploded onto various sections of the airfield. At a second signal, 122-mm rockets began to rain down on the province headquarters and the 23rd Division command post. Sappers then swarmed onto the airfield, firing at guard positions. The Air Force technicians and RF troops manning the base fought back, but by 6:00 A.M. the sappers had secured one part of the airfield from the outgunned South Vietnamese guards. Shortly thereafter, one sapper company set out for the adjacent city center to capture the important six-way intersection. Meeting little resistance, the sappers quickly surrounded the crossroads and hunkered down to wait for the arrival of the tanks and infantry of the 95B Regiment.
While the attack on the city airfield was going on, the small sapper company at the Mai Hac De supply depot opened fire on the depot’s command center. The depot sat on a piece of land 1,300 yards long and 750 yards wide. Over sixty-four warehouses and open-air dumps holding ARVN’s largest ammunition supply in the Highlands were contained within the barbed-wire fences. Local Route 429 ran from the city alongside the depot to the Srepok River. After a sharp firefight, by 6:00 A.M. the depot commander had been killed and the depot captured.
Colonel Luat sent an RF company to counterattack. When the sappers beat off the first assault, the RF regrouped for a second wave, this time from two separate directions. Thao ordered the sappers to blow up several open-air ammo dumps to block one of the RF assault prongs, enabling the sappers to concentrate their firepower against the second prong.
The tactic worked. After three hours of fighting, the Regional Forces had not succeeded in recapturing the depot. Fortunately for the exhausted sappers, a battalion from the 316th Division’s southwest deep-penetration column arrived at that very moment to assist them. After several more hours spent cleaning out the remaining guards, the entire complex was theirs. Only eighteen of the thirty-eight sappers who began the attack were still alive.
Meanwhile, the main sapper thrust was directed at the Phung Duc airfield about five miles east of town. This military area also included the base camps of the ARVN 53rd and 44th Regiments. The 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, was currently holding the regiment’s well-fortified base, while the 44th’s was manned only by support troops. Two PAVN sapper battalions, one of them the powerful 27th Battalion, which Giap had personally sent from North Vietnam, would attack this critical area. The 27th Sappers would attack the 44th Regiment camp and the airfield command center while a battalion from the 198th would strike the 53rd Regiment camp. Because of the importance of this assault, the 198th Regiment’s commander personally accompanied the attackers.
The two sapper battalions opened fire at 3:20 A.M. By 7:00 A.M. they had overwhelmed the 44th Regiment base camp and the airbase command center. At the 53rd Regiment’s camp, however, the sappers faced a sterner test. No longer fighting guards or rear-service troops, the sappers ran into trouble when the regulars of the 3rd Battalion reacted quickly to the initial attack. Steadied by the 53rd Regiment commander, Lieutenant Colonel Vo An, the ARVN troops retook the initial breach point. As dawn broke, ARVN artillery poured fire onto the advancing sappers. The sapper battalion’s assault soon collapsed. The 27th Sappers were ordered to join the assault in order to assist their pinned-down brothers. Although they threw themselves against the base defenses, they also bogged down under the withering fire. To rally his troops, the 27th’s commander personally moved up to the barbed-wire fence to direct the attack. He paid for his courage with his life. With the 27th’s chief killed, artillery fire battering his exposed troops, and wounded and dead sappers littering the ground, the 198th’s commander broke off the attack.
Despite the setback at the 53rd’s base camp, the 198th had achieved its main objectives, but at a high cost. During the opening attacks and the ensuing six days of the Ban Me Thuot campaign, the 198th lost almost 150 dead and wounded, close to one-third of its troops assigned to the initial assault. According to the regiment’s official history, “This was many times less than the enemy’s casualties, but for sapper troops these were very heavy losses.”21
For the defenders of the 53rd base camp, their victory was ephemeral. While well protected by their extensive fortifications, they were surrounded and unable to move beyond their own perimeter. In the days to come, however, and almost completely unknown to the outside world, the continuing stalwart defense by the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment, provided ARVN with one of its few moments of glory in II Corps.
At 6:30 A.M. the rocket attacks against Ban Me Thuot were halted, and the deep-penetration columns began moving. From the north, the 95B Regiment and armor raced into town along Route 14. One column advanced to the city airfield while another occupied the six-way intersection. After defeating RF counterattacks at both locations, the column at the intersection headed for the nearby province headquarters. Montagnard guards and troops of the 23rd Division Reconnaissance Company fought back fiercely. To defend against an armor assault, Colonel Luat had trained his troops in the use of the M-72 anti-tank rocket, and now it was paying dividends. Several T-54s were soon burning around the province headquarters, and after four hours of heavy fighting, the headquarters still held.
The PAVN forces, however, were too strong. In the Highlands, a cool mist often hangs near the ground in the morning, making visibility poor. Once the sun had burned off the haze, and the forward observers could see their targets and adjust fire, Thao directed an intense artillery barrage to support the 95B column. Darlac sector’s ability to coordinate the RF defenses crumbled when one round finally found its mark, hitting and destroying the province headquarters’ main radio transmitter. PAVN soldiers soon breached the compound. Although the South Vietnamese retreated into nearby buildings to fight back, it was useless. Badly outnumbered by the experienced troopers of the 95B Regiment, the last remaining pockets of resistance were cleaned out by nightfall.
In the west, the PAVN 4th Battalion, 24th Regiment, 10th Division, reinforced by eight T-54 tanks and eight K-63 armored personnel carriers, poured out of the jungle, crossed the Srepok River, and sped down Local Route 429. They motored past the Mai Hac De depot and penetrated through the housing compound for enlisted families and into an area near the 23rd Division headquarters. The 10th’s column quickly reported its success to Thao, stating that it had taken the 23rd’s headquarters. However, Thao’s military-intelligence staff disagreed, insisting it was still monitoring transmissions from the command post. Thao then recalled a comparable incident during the battle for Kontum in 1972. An attack column claimed to have captured an important position. His intelligence staff back then had also disagreed, and it was soon proven correct. The column in Kontum had confused a similar-looking building with the headquarters. Thao immediately ordered a senior officer to drive out to inspect the situation. Sure enough, the 10th had mistaken the medical and communications compound for the 23rd’s headquarters.
At 7:30 A.M. VNAF bombers appeared in the sky and began pummeling the exposed 10th Division formation. Supported by the air strikes, RF troops attempted to retake the compound. PAVN casualties began to mount, and several tanks were destroyed. According to the 10th Division’s history: “After one day of continuous combat, [the] combined-arms deep-penetration force had managed to capture a number of targets, but our forces had also suffered heavy losses. The battalion commander was killed and the deputy battalion commander was wounded. Eight platoon- and company-level cadre were killed or wounded, we were out of virtually all types of ammunition, and if a night assault was ordered . . . the attack would run into difficulties.”22
On the other side of town, the 316th Division’s deep-penetration columns faced their own problems. The northwestern infantry column was in position by 6:30 A.M., but the armor and anti-aircraft guns had gotten lost. As dawn broke, PAVN commanders attempted to hide the regiment in a cemetery near the 8th Cavalry compound, but lookouts spotted them. Artillery and machine-gun fire began killing exposed North Vietnamese soldiers. Several times the Communist troops pressed forward, but they could not advance. Miraculously for them, the missing tanks suddenly arrived. The tanks’ main guns began blasting away at ARVN bunkers and defensive positions. Despite continued heavy resistance, by noon the 316th had taken the 8th Cavalry’s compound. Moving into the city, it linked up with the 95B at the six-way intersection, and the two units combined to attack the province headquarters.
The armor and artillery assigned to the southwestern column also failed to arrive on time. The original plan had called for the tanks to cross the Srepok River first, followed by the anti-aircraft guns. The engineers at the river, however, reversed the order. Then the trucks towing the guns got stuck in the middle of the river. It took several hours before the traffic jam was finally cleared. Despite the lack of support, the infantry captured a ridge line near the Mai Hac De depot to ensure that the 10th Division’s armor had unimpeded access along Local Route 429. By mid-morning, the column’s assigned armor finally caught up. Pushing up Route 14 from the south, the rest of the regiment and the armor advanced into the city under a cloud of VNAF air strikes, eventually linking up with the 10th Division’s column at the medical compound. They remained there the rest of the day.
The 316th’s southeastern column was two miles from the city when its artillery opened fire. With no heavy weapons to impede them, by alternately running and walking, the troops reached the city’s outskirts at first light. The column fought its way into the city, sending one battalion up to the gate of the 23rd Division camp, but failed to break into the base.
By the end of 10 March, the Communist troops had captured the city center and overcome many strong-points inside the city. While Murphy’s Law often hampered the North Vietnamese effort, overall the first day had gone exceedingly well for them. Analyzing the triumph, the campaign command noted: “In the first day of the attack on the city we have gained a great victory. We captured two important targets, the city airfield and the province headquarters, and have paralyzed the Phung Duc airfield. All spear-heads fought well, although the southern spearhead had problems, and its successes are not commensurate with the number of casualties suffered by its troops. In spite of ferocious counterattacks by local enemy forces [the oft-maligned Montagnards had fought hard in many cases] supported by air strikes, the enemy has not been able to expel our forces from the city, and the puppet officers and soldiers are extremely frightened. However, the enemy leaders are still resisting stubbornly. Campaign Headquarters has decided to concentrate a powerful force to quickly destroy and overrun the headquarters of the 23rd Division and the other remaining targets.”23
The next day would bring no respite for the battered ARVN in Ban Me Thuot.
“GOODBYE FOR NOW, BAN ME THUOT”
Shortly after the shelling began on 10 March, Colonel Luat left for the 23rd Division headquarters to coordinate the city’s defenses with Colonel Vu The Quang. That morning, Quang radioed Brigadier General Tuong requesting relief forces, but Tuong denied the request. Tuong passed along a message from Phu asking Quang to try to hold the city for a few days. Phu thought the Communists would follow their 1968 pattern: attack Ban Me Thuot for three or four days, and then retreat. His belief was buttressed when Lieutenant Colonel Vo An at Phung Duc informed him of the defeat of the attack against the 53rd Regiment base camp. An reported his troops had killed over one hundred enemy soldiers. Convinced the assault against Ban Me Thuot was being conducted by the 320th Division and local forces, Phu stubbornly clung to his belief that the attack was a diversion for an assault against Gia Nghia in Quang Duc, followed by the main thrust against Pleiku. Moreover, given the incorrect identification of the PAVN units attacking Ban Me Thuot, along with Lieutenant Colonel An’s stellar defense of the 53rd base, Phu was convinced that the city could hold and that the enemy would soon retreat.
Sadly for the South Vietnamese, these were deadly misjudgments. One can only surmise that had Phu known from the start that the 316th Division and the 95B Regiment were on the battlefield, he would have reacted differently. Not only did the lack of reinforcements doom Ban Me Thuot, but it fed Dung’s and Thao’s perceptions that ARVN defenses were weak, spurring them to press even harder.
President Thieu called Phu at 9:00 A.M. on 10 March for an update on the situation.24 Phu stated that while VNAF bombers had flown over eighty sorties and had destroyed many tanks, intense anti-aircraft fire had prevented them from completely destroying the attackers. Phu had also ordered ARVN counter-battery artillery fire to refrain from shelling the city in order to prevent civilian casualties. Never having been subjected to artillery fire, the city’s residents had no bunker system.
Thieu told Phu to recapture Ban Me Thuot. Phu immediately ordered the 21st Ranger Group to depart Buon Ho and retake the lost positions in the city. The Rangers arrived by nightfall but were unable to break through enemy lines, and they retreated to the western outskirts of town. Phu ordered Lieutenant Colonel Dau to launch an attack the next morning to recapture the province headquarters and support the 23rd Division headquarters. Additionally, the 45th Regiment at Pleiku was restricted to base and ordered to prepare to fly by helicopter to Ban Me Thuot. Thieu also wanted Phu to identify precisely which PAVN divisions were engaged in the attack, a key element in determining Hanoi’s intentions.
Phu was about to discover the Politburo’s plans the hard way. Following their first-day analysis of the battle, and after all-night preparations, on 11 March the Communists launched a massive assault against the 23rd Division’s command post. Artillery began pounding the complex at 5:30 A.M. Hoang Minh Thao sent the 10th Division’s deep-penetration column plus four battalions from the 316th and a battalion from the 95B—essentially two infantry regiments supported by armor, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns—against a rear headquarters defended by ARVN support personnel and elements of the 1st Battalion, 53rd Regiment. It was no match.
As the artillery fire lifted at 7:00 A.M., the tank-led infantry attempted to break into the compound. Once again PAVN armor tipped the scales. As tanks reached the base, Colonel Luat lay in wait on an M-113 armored personnel carrier equipped with a 106-mm recoilless rifle. As the first tank closed in, Luat gave the order to fire—but the recoilless rifle malfunctioned (see Introduction, p. 2). Realizing the great danger, Luat radioed to the circling A-37 pilots to provide close air support. Diving in, the planes missed their target and instead hit the 23rd command post, destroying the transmitter and wounding and killing many soldiers. Despite the loss of communications, the ARVN troops fought on, but their valiant efforts went for naught. By 11:00 A.M. the entire complex had been captured.
Both Luat and Quang escaped, but in different directions. Quang was quickly captured, but Luat eluded the North Vietnamese. Leading a group of about one hundred soldiers out a side gate, he headed for the dense brush of a nearby coffee plantation. He planned to hide there overnight and then head for Nha Trang. As he led the group toward the plantation, they began traversing a clearing. Machine-gun fire suddenly ripped through the men, killing and wounding many. In an open field, pinned down by heavy fire, with no hope of rescue, Luat ordered his assistant to wave a white flag of surrender. North Vietnamese troops soon appeared from their hidden positions. Luat was forced to identify himself. As he sat on the ground handcuffed, stripped to his underwear, his mood bitter and sad, he thought: “Goodbye for now, Ban Me Thuot; we promise to return somehow, someday.”25 The main battle for the city was over.
After capturing the 23rd Division headquarters, Thao followed the original “blooming lotus” plan. He ordered his units to eliminate the remaining bases on the outer perimeter: the Phung Duc airfield, the two remaining regimental base camps, the local training compound, and almost a dozen village strong-points surrounding the city. Much of the city was still untouched by the North Vietnamese, who were concentrated mainly in the city center and the southern portion. Over the course of the day, the 316th Division mopped up most of the local village positions surrounding the city. The division then sent its 149th Regiment to attack the ARVN 53rd Regiment base camp.
When the fighting began at the 23rd headquarters, Lieutenant Colonel Dau’s 21st Rangers launched their counterattack. After bypassing enemy positions, by 10:30 A.M. on 11 March he had reached the edge of the headquarters complex. Thao’s military-intelligence unit then intercepted a radio message from Dau reporting that the Darlac province headquarters and 23rd Division headquarters had both fallen, and that many enemy tanks were in the area. Dau said his two battalions, with limited fire support, could not rescue the besieged base. He was ordered to hold his position and assist any Darlac sector forces still fighting inside the town.
That night, Phu spoke with Thieu again. Phu indicated that while he now believed Ban Me Thuot was a major target, it was only one part of PAVN’s effort to capture the Highlands. However, Thieu had now changed his mind. Given the loss of the 23rd headquarters, he told Phu to recapture the city at all costs.
Phu quickly designed a counterattack to retake the city. He would send an M-113 troop along with the 40th Regiment, 22nd Division, to assist in opening Route 21. He would employ the 21st Ranger Group in coordination with the battalion of the 53rd Regiment at its base camp to form one counterattack group. The 23rd Division would then mass its other two regiments east of Ban Me Thuot to form a second attack group. These two groups would launch a direct assault on the city with maximum air support. Brigadier General Tuong would command the counterattack. Phu requested that the 7th Ranger Group be shifted from Saigon to replace the units of the 23rd Division that were still based at Pleiku, 115 miles away from Ban Me Thuot.
Thieu approved Phu’s plan, but Thao had no intention of allowing any counterattack. For Thao, defeating the ARVN response was the key to securing victory. He had carefully prepared for this response and calculated where Phu would land his reinforcements after Ban Me Thuot was attacked. He realized that with Route 14 blocked to the north and south, Phu could only land reinforcements east of the city. And the further away from the city Phu had to begin his attack, the more difficult it would be for him. More important, with the roads cut, Phu could not bring in armor or artillery to assist the counterattack, leaving the unsupported infantry easy prey for a tank-led assault. This preparation for Phu’s expected counterattack is the least appreciated aspect of Thao’s design, yet one with far-reaching consequences.
To prevent Phu from using footholds near the city, on the night of 11 March, Thao rapidly issued new orders. He told the 10th Division to attack and capture the remaining ARVN positions on the eastern side of the city, particularly the 45th Regiment base camp. The two regiments of the 10th Division still in Quang Duc were told to immediately depart, leaving the 271B Regiment to finish PAVN’s mission there. He also ordered the 316th Division to attack the 53rd Regiment base. Additionally, Thao ordered the capture of other towns defending the approaches to Ban Me Thuot—Buon Ho to the north, and Ban Don to the west.
After moving into position during the night, at 5:00 A.M. on 12 March one battalion from the 24th Regiment, 10th Division, accompanied by tanks and supported by division artillery, struck directly at the 45th Regiment base. By 9:30 A.M. the battalion had secured complete control of the position, capturing almost five hundred soldiers along with twelve howitzers, five thousand rounds of artillery ammunition, and thousands of liters of fuel. At the same time, the 9th Regiment, 320th Division, attacked and captured Buon Ho, securing the last section of Route 14 within Darlac province. PAVN now had unimpeded use of Route 14 from the Darlac–Pleiku border through Quang Duc to Phuoc Long. Within Ban Me Thuot, PAVN troops began a house-to-house search. Civilians soon began to stream out of the city onto Route 21, headed for Nha Trang. Others holed up in nearby villages.
That same morning, Phu ordered the 45th Regiment, 23rd Division, to board helicopters and fly from Pleiku to a landing zone near Ban Me Thuot. Just as Thao had predicted, the ARVN troops landed east of the city. They landed at Hill 581, the main high ground between Route 21 and the Phung Duc airfield. The hill, one mile east of their surrounded comrades at the 53rd base camp, provided a dominating position from which to launch a counterattack. According to journalist Pham Huan, the 45th Regiment “volunteered to the last man” to return to Ban Me Thuot; their morale was high, and “they were determined to get back into Ban Me Thuot at any price to rescue their families.”26
However, because of maintenance problems with the heavy-lift Chinook helicopters, the entire lift was not completed until late afternoon the next day, 13 March. It had taken almost two days for the 45th Regiment to fly from Pleiku and assemble east of Ban Me Thuot to link up with the 21st Rangers. Under orders from Brigadier General Tuong, the Rangers had pulled back on the afternoon of 12 March to secure the training center east of town. Tuong then sent in a helicopter to rescue his family hiding at the center. With the Rangers pulled out of the city, at 6:00 P.M. on 12 March Phu reported to Saigon that all organized resistance in the city had ceased.
Meanwhile, the 7th Rangers boarded planes in Saigon on the morning of 13 March and landed in Pleiku that afternoon. The helicopter lift from Pleiku resumed on the morning of 14 March, carrying one battalion of the 44th Regiment, regimental support elements, and the tactical headquarters of the 23rd Division to Phuoc An, a town farther to the east of Ban Me Thuot.
Phu’s plan, however, was already known. Using the broken codes, Thao’s signals-intelligence unit had intercepted a critical message. On 12 March, it picked up a conversation between Tuong and Lieutenant Colonel Vo An at the 53rd base camp. Tuong told An that reinforcements were arriving, and that “there would be a counterattack to recapture Ban Me Thuot. Under this plan . . . they would use the [53rd base camp] and Hill 581 as a springboard area, remnants from Ban Me Thuot would regroup there, and coordinate with the relief force in a two-prong counterattack to the east and southeast of Ban Me Thuot.”27 Once again, PAVN intelligence provided total insight into South Vietnamese operational plans.
Meanwhile, the Chinooks’ mechanical breakdowns had given Thao precious breathing room to prepare for the next round. Worse yet, as the 45th Regiment landed on Hill 581, the men saw a mass of refugees streaming from Ban Me Thuot. Despite having sworn to recapture the city, soldiers soon began sneaking away to find their loved ones in the wave of humanity moving along the road. This was the first manifestation of the “family syndrome,” wherein ARVN soldiers and officers deserted their posts to find their families. The world would famously see this syndrome reoccur on a grander scale during the disastrous collapse of Danang.
On 13 March, Phu received a telephone call from Thieu’s chief of staff. Phu was to meet Thieu at Cam Ranh Bay the next morning. It would be the most important meeting of the war.