Chapter Ten
Over the night of 25/26 May 1941 the New Zealand Division fell back from the Galatas Line to one that ran from the sea in the area of the 7 General Hospital to the northern flank of 19 Australian Brigade in Prison Valley. It was another exhausting night for the Kiwis.
Overnight, Brigadier Puttick sent General Freyberg a message ‘Am exceedingly doubtful on present reports, whether I can hold the enemy tomorrow’ and a liaison officer with the Greeks ‘made it clear that the Greeks were about to break’. The situation, despite the success at Galatas, was still near crisis point and during the 26th fundamental decisions would have to be made. Having delayed sending a signal to Wavell regarding the implication of the latest turn of events, finally at 0930 hours Freyberg signed the message pad and handed it to a clerk:
I regret to have to report that in my opinion the limit of endurance has been reached by the troops under my command here at Souda Bay. No matter what decision is taken by the Commanders-in-Chief from a military point of view our position here is hopeless. A small illequipped and immobile force such as ours cannot stand up against the concentrated bombing that we have been faced with during the last seven days. I feel that I should tell you that from an administrative point of view the difficulties of extricating this force in full are now insuperable. Provided a decision is reached at once a certain proportion of the force might be embarked…The troops we have with the exception of the Welch Regiment and the Commando are past any offensive action. If you decide in view of whole Middle East position that hours help we will carry on. I would have to consider how this would be best achieved. Souda Bay may be under fire within twenty-four hours…
View looking east towards 19 Australian Brigade’s positions south of the Hania – Aghia road.
There was to be no ‘immediate decision’ and Freyberg would have to wait a full twenty-four hours before he received an answer.
Meanwhile, as Brigadier Puttick’s men were enduring another night of marching and digging, Generalmajor Ringel was ordering a resumption of the attack of the previous day. Kampfgruppe Ramcke was to continue along the Coast Road and Gerbirgsjägerregiment 100 (GJR 100) to resume its advance eastwards through Galatas and Daratos. Starting from below Galatas, Heidrich’s FJR 3 would continue up Prison Valley, while in the foothills to the south, GJR 85, now with all three of its battalions and I/GJR 141 (from 6th Gerbirgsdivision) were to push east to cut off the Commonwealth troops. The advance of GJR 85 was cautious following an early morning Luftwaffe fratricide bombing incident in the hills south of Galatas.
By dawn the Commonwealth troops were more or less where they should have been and defensive schemes were being tied up. The fact that the Germans were feeling their way forward, assisted by recce aircraft, to locate the New Zealanders amongst the hills, gullies and trees, gave the defenders precious time. GJR 100 did not report Daratos clear until 1030 hours. However, behind the Commonwealth front line, communications that had always been poor were breaking down, as the various headquarters relocated to positions further back and the enemy aircraft continued to attack any movement they could identify, including dispatch riders. The effect of this was that by the time information had been gathered, decisions made and orders reached those who were supposed to implement them, the situations had changed to the point that the new orders were often irrelevant. The resulting confusion, amongst staff officers and their commanders did much to erode the in resilience of mind and confidence that had been so remarkable amongst the front line troops.
With command of the air the Germans could rove at will over the Allied positions.
Against this background and awaiting instructions from Wavell, General Freyberg insisted that the line be held despite the entreaties of his subordinate commanders that his men were reaching the end of their tether and that they would not hold the enemy for long. Men from the Composite Battalion, which had finally disintegrated after a highly creditable performance over the past days, were beginning, along with infantrymen who had lost their units during the withdrawal, to make their way to the rear. Men no longer required to operate the port had already been instructed to head across the mountains to Hora Safakion and in the atmosphere of rumour and uncertainty, word of this instruction spread like wildfire and the withdrawal to the south coast began way of its own volition.
Operations on 26 May 1941 – Overview
Closing up to the New Zealanders’ line, the Germans directed dive bombers and increasing quantities of mortar fire against the defensive positions, particularly those on forward slopes, where due to the lack of tools and the rocky ground soldiers had little in the way of adequate protective cover. Some, as indicated in the following typical ‘sitrep’ of the day, were forced to withdraw. Colonel Allen of 20 NZ Battalion wrote:
Right flank has caused me considerable anxiety all day. Have had to counter-attack once and regained lost ground. Since then have reinforced once; and am standing by to reinforce again. If I have to do so I shall have used all my reserves, but at present line is holding. Left flank position alright but a good deal of mortar fire coming over. 19th Battalion have withdrawn Coy from ridge in front of me.
However, the battle was not entirely one-sided, as this entry in 5th Gerbirgsdivision’s War Diary indicated:
The enemy is offering fierce resistance everywhere. He makes very skilful use of the country and every method of warfare. Mainly snipers, MG nests and positions partly wired and mined. Shellfire has so far only come from the western outskirts of Hania for the most part. Armed bands are fighting fiercely in the mountains, using great cunning and are cruelly mutilating dead and wounded. This inhumane method of making war is making our advance infinitely more difficult.
The continuous pressure by the Germans was held but in most places at a considerable cost to both sides.
The Attack on 19 Australian Brigade
Hitherto, Brigadier Vasey’s two battalions had not seen much action, despite being brought forward by 1,000 yards the day before, but had endured the Luftwaffe’s bombing and strafing by day and Fallschirmjäger patrols by night. Vasey was, however, confident that his line centred on the village of Galaria would hold that day and the next; but at 1700 hours, ‘he was convinced that the situation on his left was critical’. During the day the far south of the line, held by 2 Greek Regiment, finally started to crumble. While organised defence may have ended, groups of Greeks fought on as guerrillas to the discomfort of the Gerbirgsjäger as indicated in their War Diary. The Australian official historian wrote:
2/7th and 2/8th Battalions, in reality just a battalion and a half strong in terms of manpower, had been brought over land from their original positions at Georgioupoli and with few tools and virtually no defence store they dug hasty defensive positions. These shell scrape defences only afforded the minimum protection from enemy fire and short of ammunition the Australians could not realistically be expected to hold for long.
From 1030 hours, the Fallschirmjäger, well supported by air and mortar bombardment, attacked. The threat to two Australian platoons on the left was such that they were withdrawn some distance towards Perivolia, and there held on.
Hauptmann von der Hydte’s I/FJR 3 was not in action until late afternoon:
I had ordered that two strong detachments of Fallschirmjäger should be formed, the first, from No. 1 Company, to take Perivolia, and the second, from No. 2 Company, to attack Pyrgos. Both detachments fell in at 5 p.m., the first advancing down a densely overgrown trough-shaped valley, the second along the Cladiso. [ in Prison Valley] I followed in the wake of the latter.
The two detachments met initially with trifling resistance, and it appeared that the British [sic] had left only a weak rearguard. At the first contact with the enemy, however, an M.O. accompanying the second detachment was seriously wounded in the stomach. I came across him during the advance…He was fully conscious, and his voice, though weak, was quite clear. ‘Go on, Herr Hauptmann,’ he said. ‘I am a doctor…My wound is fatal…I know…Let me die…I don’t need anyone any more… .’
On the fringes of Pyrgos the shock-troops encountered barbed wire entanglements. Assuming that British positions could not be far away, they took cover and scanned the ground before them. But they could see nothing, and an absolute calm prevailed. Where could the British be? The leader of the detachment raised his steel helmet on a stick in the hope of drawing enemy fire. But still nothing happened.
Eventually our men crawled cautiously forward, expecting at any moment to come under fire. Wary of mines, they cut a path through the entanglements. Beyond the wire they found a deep trench, but it was empty, abandoned. Where could the British have gone?
Even in the village of Pyrgos itself they encountered no more than token resistance from a weak rearguard which retreated after a brief exchange of shots.
Hauptmann von der Hydte’s battalion had pushed into a gap between 2/7 Battalion and the Greeks who were by now no longer in place and following pressure from the attacks earlier in the day, at almost exactly the time I/FJR 3 were advancing, 2/8th Battalion was ordered to withdraw to its original positions outside Mournies. The 2/7th received similar orders. The Australian official history records that ‘They withdrew about 5 p.m. and fitted in among the Marines [of the Souda Brigade] around Mournies’. That night they and most of the rest of the force were to join in another withdrawal.
Despite Freyberg’s insistence that no mention be made of a withdrawal from Crete, by the end of the day, the retreat was becoming general. The official report commented:
… the units which had withdrawn from the front line had done so in some order, maintaining military formations which enabled them to fight further actions. But the rear units began to move without orders and without organisation. Units got inexorably mixed up, and it was never possible to sort them out again.
Destruction of Force Reserve
During the day with the New Zealand Division having been forced to withdraw again, this time onto the Mobile Naval Base Defence Organization (MNBDO), Major General Weston took command of what was to become the rearguard for the withdrawal. However, in an attempt to hold General Weston’s new line, General Freyberg instructed Brigadier Inglis to take command of the Force Reserve, consisting of 1 Welch, The Rangers and the Northumberland Hussars. He was to take them forward to relieve the 5 NZ Brigade during the night 26/27 May. Colonel Kippenberger would replace him in command of 4 NZ Brigade.
Brigadier Hargest described the withdrawal of 5 NZ Brigade to between Hania and Souda:
All arrangements had been made and at about 10:30 we moved each [battalion] on its route with the Australians on our flanks to the south. The going was terribly hard, the roads had been torn up, vehicles burned across them, huge holes everywhere — walking was a nightmare. Our guide lost us with [the] result that we went through Hania itself, transformed from a pleasant little town to a smouldering dust heap with fires burning but otherwise dead.
While the remainder of the force were withdrawing to what was reffered to as the 42nd Street position, through one of the increasing number of communication failures, at General Weston’s insistence, Force Reserve were carrying out orders that were no longer relevant. They were moving forward, in the opposite direction to Weston’s/Puttick’s troops, and preparing positions covering the western outskirts of Hania. The Rangers and the Northumberland Hussars were under command of Lieutenant Colonel Duncan of 1 Welch.
The 1,300 strong Force Reserve had spent most of the previous week after clearance of the two LLSR companies from around Hania, awaiting the amphibious landing but even after that threat was disposed of they were given only low-level tasking. General Freyberg appears to have maintained them as a reserve for a reserve’s sake, in the manner of the Great War. Their deployment on 21, 22 or even 25 May would have, arguably, had a significant impact on the situation.
Force Reserve and the 42nd Street Positions 27 May 1941
The positions that the Force Reserve were to occupy were those the Welch had prepared four weeks earlier. Therefore, battle procedure was considerably shortened and they were, consequently, more effective in the very limited time available than if they had had to start from scratch. Even so, on a moonless night, it was a difficult procedure, with troops having to pick their way through bomb craters, wreckage and bodies of the dead, before reaching their position at 0230 hours.
Well before dawn on 27 May, patrols of Gerbirgsjägerregiment 100 (GJR 100) started to filter into the southern outskirts of Hania through the void left by the withdrawing Souda Brigade. A small detachment of Welch guarding the battalion’s transport was amongst those who had sharp encounters among the trees at dawn. Sergeant Creighton wrote:
One of the drivers asked me if he could go for a short walk to stretch his legs. He went, but did not return. Presently two little Greek boys came out of the wood, one of whom had been shot in the back by a German. We grabbed our rifles and moved stealthily into the wood. I hadn’t got far when I saw a German officer about fifty yards from me. He was immaculately dressed, with beautifully polished helmet and boots. He wore no equipment but was holding an automatic pistol in his left hand. He waved the pistol and shouted in English, ‘Come on boys’. I saw no other movement and I think he was bluffing. I shot him in the chest and he fell dead.
By dawn Colonel Duncan had heard nothing from General Weston since his deployment the evening before and ‘Right from the start we had been trying to make contact with Weston’s HQ by wireless but our operators never got them and consequently, no message of any sort reached us. Runners could not find their way through the infiltrating Gerbirgsjäger and the Battalion’s Bren-carriers that could have got through had been redeployed days earlier’. With a lack of information, at dawn, Colonel Duncan sent patrols to probe up the Kladiso stream and who almost immediately encountered the enemy but they found no sign of friendly forces that they assumed to be on their left flank. Worse was to follow, sounds of battle could clearly be heard behind their position; ‘soon proclaiming beyond all doubt that the enemy had penetrated far to the rear’. Meanwhile, General Weston’s HQ MNBDO had already departed for Neo Horio, eighteen miles down the road to Sphakia, having left no instructions for Force Reserve. Accusations are consistently traded that ‘he had long since written off Colonel Duncan and his men’ and that two dispatch riders were sent to recall Force Reserve but these could not get through. Weston himself remained in the Souda area trying to restore some order but with a breakdown of the command and control system he had a limited effect on this stage of the battle.
A member of Kampfgruppe Ramcke observes the withdrawal of Force Reserve.
The Germans, however, did not immediately realise that there had been another Commonwealth withdrawal and probing attacks only began after the end of the Luftwaffe’s morning attacks. To the south of Force Reserve, the enemy advance went well facing only sporadic resistance from Commonwealth troops who had become separated from their units. The Fallschirmjäger of Kampfgruppe Ramcke found that there had been no reduction of the opposition along the coast at axis. At 1000 hours, Oberst Ramcke informed Generalmajor Ringel that the enemy had ‘reoccupied the positions … which he had evacuated yesterday’ and requested close air support, while urging his men to renew their attacks.
Advancing at the same time up the Cladiso stream, GJB 100 found that they had struck Force Reserve’s scattered companies who were quickly bypassed and the Germans poured heavy fire in on them from all sides. From his command post, under a bank two hundred yards west of the bridge, Colonel Duncan could hear what was happening and decided to bring back B and D Companies from the left flank.
With great difficulty, orders were got through to them. At last, a few men began to come running in groups out of the trees, splashing through the shallow water of the river and dropping for a moment behind the stone walls to fire at their pursuers before stumbling on.
The Gerbirgsjäger were hot on their heels making their way through the olive groves to the east of the Kladiso. Colonel Duncan realised that he was all but surrounded and ordered his 2IC, Major Gibson, to take a total of about four hundred men including those men of the Rangers and the Northumberland Hussars that could be found, through Hania in small parties, and to reorganise on the Souda Road. They made their way in cover as best they could across the battlefield littered with enemy dead, while one group used the surviving vehicles to burst through a German cordon. Others using a ditch as cover passed the body of their Quartermaster, a Welch Regiment Great War veteran.
Colonel Duncan remained at his post with a few men but early in the afternoon, with the Germans all around, he was joined at the Kladiso Bridge by survivors of A and B Companies who had been driven off the ridges to the right. With thrusts from Kampfgruppe Ramcke and GJR 100converging, the battle would not last long. Oberleutnant Kurt Meyer was with II Battalion GJR 100 moving north along the bed of the stream and witnessed the Welch withdrawing from the bridge:
We bring to bear all the machine-gun fire that we have in order to cover the last seconds of our comrades’ advance. A croaky hurrah breaks out from half-dried throats. Hand grenades fly. The defenders tear their machineguns round … and set them in the face of the attackers, but the German machine-pistols are quicker. With hand grenades and bayonets the yellow shadows spring out of their holes and defend themselves. They won’t surrender. Nearly fifty … cover with their bodies this last bulwark before Hania. Only four men, pale and shattered, are taken as prisoners.
About two hundred Welch, thirty or so Rangers and Northumberland Hussars, escaped into Hania. With Colonel Duncan carrying a Bren gun, they fought their way back through the ruins of the town but their bitter resistance ended late in the afternoon on the rocky slopes of the Akrotiri Peninsula. Brigadier Hargest was a distant witness to their last stand and wrote in his personal diary:
Up on Souda Hill enemy bombers and fighters were blasting at a village to our surprise until we found that the Welch Regt and Rangers, who had gone out to beyond Hania with the mistaken idea that they could hold the line Vasey and I had left, had been smashed to bits in a few minutes and had been driven up to the hill village where they were annihilated. Whoever sent them should be shot.
A distant view of another example of 1 Welch’s heroism was had by wounded New Zealander prisoners, who watched in admiration the remains of a platoon that had been left behind, fighting on in their trenches on a small knoll near the site of 7 General Hospital. An officer saw a Bren gun team:
…fire bursts all day … Then must have run short of ammo. One man got out and in full view of the Germans walked 100 yards round the hillside — walked with no intention of hurrying though bullets were hitting the bare hillside. We could see every strike at his feet and above him on the slope. He got into a gun-pit, emerged with two Bren mag carriers and walked back at the same pace despite bullets and mortars. The gun went into action again … Patients cheered the inspiring sight.
The Charge at 42nd Street
‘Big battle at Souda. Gave Huns a good dishing.’
WO2 Bill Foxwell, 2/7th Battalion - personal diary.
As already recorded, at first the Germans did not understand that the New Zealanders had withdrawn and it was not until 0645 hours on the 27th that Oberst Jais (GJR 141) received word from Generalmajor Ringel that II/GJR 100 had lost contact with the enemy south of Platanos, on the Prison Valley Road. Jais was ordered to strike across country, around Hania, to the head of Souda Bay and cut off the enemy’s retreat. After the departure of the bombers, at 0730 hours, I Battalion began its advance, with its Gerbirgsjäger companies widely spread among the olives.
Overnight, the Commonwealth troops had withdrawn to positions to the south-west of the head of Souda Bay. Brigadiers Puttick and Vasey, in the absence of General Weston, chose positions along a feature called 42nd Street. Properly known as Chickalarion Street, this was an obvious country lane, with earthen banks on either side, running south from the main Hania–Souda road towards the Malaxa Escarpment. It received its nickname from 42nd Field Company RE, who set up camp here in late 1940, as a part of the British garrison in Crete. The name was inspired by the 1930s’ musical, 42nd Street, winner of the 1933 Oscar for best movie. In due course, military maps marked the road as 42nd Street.
One of the few remaining olive groves on 42nd Street containing old trees that must have witnessed the charge.
The commanding officers tied up arcs of fire, with the battalions making the most of the earthen banks for defence and dug shallow trenches. ‘There was a 50-yard field of fire with patches of oats and olive trees beyond’ obscuring the view.
According to 21 NZ Battalion, during this routine liaison, word circulated that the Maoris were fed up with being pushed around and were going in with the bayonet when the enemy approached. Left largely to their own devices the commanding officers agreed that ‘if the enemy attacked they would let him come right up and then have a go at him …’ attack being the best form of defence, in this circumstance. This offensive spirit reveals that the infantry were not yet defeated and offers a tantalising glimpse at what might have been if the middle ranking officers had been in overall command in Crete. Putting aside the ‘what if’ questions, the result of this plan was without a doubt, wholly remarkable.
In the pause while the enemy closed up to their positions the soldiers who, as Lieutenant Cockerill recorded, ‘were thoroughly tired by now … were all hungry, thirsty, and desperately in need of sleep’. So having dug themselves trenches behind the banks and ‘eaten such hard rations as they had brought with them, they mostly prepared to bed down’. Their rest was not to be long.
I/141 GJR were advancing on the head of Souda Bay and, in doing so were crossing in front of the Commonwealth defensive line at an angle, unaware of the new position. Nor were they aware that their progress was being watched and reported on by patrols and observation posts provided by the Australians and New Zealanders.
Some of the Gerbirgsjäger halted in their advance to loot food from a Commonwealth engineer supply dump that was now abandoned in noman’s-land. Australian company commander, Major Miller of 2/7 Battalion, had sent forward a patrol to keep the enemy under observation, while he planned a counter-attack. Receiving agreement of Captain Nelson, commander of the left company to support the venture; ‘When the shooting started he signalled his company forward to the patrol and engaged the enemy. It took a few minutes to establish superiority of fire and after this was effected the enemy broke and ran’. Having won the fire fight both companies charged. Private Carter took part in the assault and his account forms a part of the 2/7th Battalion War Diary:
I was platoon runner of No. 13 Platoon under command of Lieutenant McGeoch. About 1000 hours on 27 May, we were told that we were to attack the enemy who were then about 250 yards ahead of us … Both C and D Companies attacked together. After covering about 200 yards we went to ground and opened fire at the enemy who were then very close. Major Miller called for the mortars who fired about six bombs, and the enemy started to run.
We immediately charged forward at them, on the order of Major Miller who went with us; during the charge some Maoris came up and joined us. We shot a considerable number of Germans.
I/GJR 141 had been advancing with its companies, probably well spread out, bumped the whole Commonwealth position more or less simultaneously and a fierce fire-fight broke out, spreading south down 42nd Street. 21 NZ Battalion reported that they could hear ‘… yells that could come only from Maori throats. It was a blood-stirring haka. The Australians produced a scream even more spine-chilling than the Maori effort’. The sight of the Maori Battalion charging ‘with vocal accompaniment’ sent the whole Commonwealth line surging forward.
The charge at 42nd Street.
Soldiers of FJR 3 were facing Greek soldiers and Cretan civilians to the South of Souda Bay.
The Maoris’ regimental history records:
A rumble followed by a series of explosions and a cloud of smoke from the direction of the engineers’ dump. A ragged rattle of small-arms fire, surprisingly close, and bullets mowing the leaves off the trees…. The Maori reaction was immediate – there was a glint of steel and a rattle as bayonets were fixed, then another rattle as magazines were filled and safety-catches released.
A, B, and C Companies jostled for starting positions in the confined area of 42nd Street, now immediately in front of the battalion; B Company, led by Captain Royal brandishing a bamboo walking pole like a taiaha in one hand and a revolver in the other, and C Company following Captain Scott got into 42nd Street first and deployed across the battalion front. By this time the Germans were within 200 yards of the sunken-road start line and advancing in sections dispersed in frontage and depth.
The appearance of two companies of bloodthirsty, howling Maoris, along with a ‘few stray Greek soldiers who adding their Hellenic yells to the blood-curdling din’, sent the enemy to ground and ‘they opened heavy defensive fire’.
Maoris practising their blood-chilling haka.
Captain Baker recalled:
B Company were subjected to deadly fire as soon as they commenced to move forward and by the time they had moved to 50–55 yards they were forced to the ground where from the cover of trees, roots, and holes in the ground they commenced to exchange fire with the enemy, who had likewise taken up firing positions as soon as the attack commenced. I therefore gave immediate orders for A Company to advance. We moved forward in extended formation through B Company and into the attack. At first the enemy held and could only be overcome by Tommy-gun, bayonet and rifle. His force was well dispersed and approximately 600 yards in depth and by the time we met them their troops were no more than 150 yards from 42nd Street. They continued to put up a fierce resistance until we had penetrated some 250–300 yards. They then commenced to panic and as the troops from units on either side of us had now entered the fray it was not long before considerable numbers of the enemy were beating a hasty retreat. As we penetrated further their disorder became more marked and as men ran they first threw away their arms but shortly afterwards commenced throwing away their equipment as well and disappearing very quickly from the scene of battle…
Commonwealth Commanding officers struggled to retain control of their men who were flushed with success.
Fallschirmjäger from Kampfgrupe Ramcke in the outskirts of Hania.
The pursuit of the enemy paused briefly at a wadi some 600-800 yards forward of 42nd Street, while its clearance took place. However, there was practically no German resistance, as ‘those still alive threw away much of their equipment and disappeared westwards’. They were chased for another 400–500 yards before fire from houses and a road where a second German battalion was deployed gave the harried I Battalion some relief. 21 NZ Battalion describe the hunt during this phase of the battle:
The forward elements of the enemy did not wait. They threw away their packs and ran. They were shot from the hip, and those who hid in the scrub were bayoneted. Some mortar teams that tried to get into action were overrun and dealt with. Patches of crop were trampled flat, drains were peered into and buildings ransacked. The chase went on for about half a mile without a prisoner being taken, before it was checked at a group of houses with rifles firing from every window.
I/GJR 141 had been virtually destroyed, with over 300 bodies being counted in the olive groves in front of 42nd Street. The New Zealanders’ and Australians’ total of dead and casualties from this remarkable action was around a hundred. The effect can be summed up in the words of the New Zealand history: ‘The ground troops gave no more trouble that day.’ Oberst Jais and his Gerbirgsjäger were shocked by the Commonwealth counterattack. I/GJR 141 fell back on the III Battalion who were dug in, having earlier lost contact with them and it was only later that Oberst Jais adopted a prudent course keeping clear of the 42nd Street position and took a literal interpretation of his orders to secure the head of Souda Bay. The result was that ‘By the middle of the afternoon the road was cut, but patrols sent towards Souda were soon forced back by fire from 19 Brigade’.
It can be argued that despite Jais’s later assertion that ‘The counterthrusts, in so far as they were not the imagination of his forward troops, were no doubt mere feints to cover withdrawal’, the later, much criticised, performance of his regiment was shaped by their experience at the hands of the Commonwealth infantry on 42nd Street.
In the aftermath of the campaign, accusations of brutality and violation of the laws of war at 42nd Street were made by the Germans. Controversially, British officer Alexander Clifford wrote ‘The Australians, of course, had not the faintest notion of the laws of war … They were a brutal lot of men, and they made up their rules as they went along’. Reg Saunders of 2/7th Battalion, refutes claims that Germans had been killed ‘unfairly’ and described the fight as ‘a short range very bloody action. Certainly skulls were broken and men stabbed … it was hand-to-hand combat, and that’s what happens’.
Accusations of breaches of the laws of Armed conflict were not only made by the Germans. Lieutenant Bennett reported:
The German machine-gunners had taken up positions on our flanks and an attacking party of infantry were moving up between them. The enemy had put out a screen of Cretan civilians and these poor people received the full blast of our weapons and several were killed. One of them was a policeman I knew well …
Despite the accusations, the charge at 42nd Street was a truely remarkable event and did much to enable the Commonwealth rearguard to break clean that night and begin the withdrawal to the south coast and evacuation.