Chapter Eleven
After the action on 42nd Street, the remnants of 5 NZ and 19 Australian Brigades remained in position but according to 21 NZ Battalion ‘… parties of enemy troops could be seen moving across the ridges in the south. The main road across Crete passed through a defile near Stilos, and the enemy’s object undoubtedly was to block the only practical way out’. A further withdrawal was planned for that night to extract as many of the defenders of 42nd Street as possible. They just succeeded in making the point where the road headed south to Hora Safakion before the Gerbirgsjäger in the hills cut them off.
A typical comment on the mood of the front line soldiers, as the inevitability of defeat confronted them is that:
It was a tough 15-mile night march back but, in spite of eight days’ fighting with little sleep or food, the spontaneous bayonet charge at 42nd Street had raised the troops’ morale. It was generally felt that if the movement had been allowed to continue the enemy would have been pushed right off Crete into the sea.
Withdrawal Orders
Wavell’s answer to General Freyberg’s request for authority to evacuate eventually arrived at 1550 hours on the afternoon of 27 May, long after the withdrawal to the south coast had started and orders had been issued!
To set the scene for the final and torturous withdrawal to the south coast it is worth examining parts of the orders given by Generals Freyberg and Weston to CREFORCE. First Freyberg’s directive:
|
To: Major General Weston |
SECRET |
1. ORGANISATION AND COMD
All the tps formerly in the Souda Bay and Maleme Sectors are placed under your command for operational purposes. Force HQ will make all arrangements for the evacuation of tps.
2. The operations henceforth must be based on the evacuation programme which is:
Night 28/29 May ……………1000
Night 29/30 May ……………6000
Night 30/31 May ……………3000
Night 31 May/1 Jun ……….3000
3. As far as can be foreseen 5 NZ and 19 Aust Inf Bde and Layforce
[commandos – see below] will withdraw through the line of the [Mountain]
Pass immediately N of the ‘SAUCER’ [Kares/Askyfou] which is to be occupied this evening by 4 Inf Bde.
The 5 NZ and 19 Australian Bde will almost certainly be very tired and should, subject to the tactical situation, be withdrawn S of the SAUCER into assembly areas.
It is suggested that Layforce or at least a part of it, on reaching the line held by 4 NZ Inf Bde should be placed under command of that formation.
4. The C-in-C directs that you should put the R.M. Bn into a defensive posn immediately S of the SAUCER forthwith.
5. FUTURE OPERATIONS
It is anticipated that the enemy will make contact with 4 NZ Inf Bde in the afternoon of 29 May. In order to keep the enemy at a distance from the beaches it would appear that the 4 NZ Inf Bde will have to hold its posn until dark night 29/30 May when it is hoped to withdraw it direct to the beaches for embarkation…
7. POLICY OF EMBARKATION
The C-in-C has laid it down definitely and irrevocably that fighting troops embark first and that those who have fought the longest have priority. Wounded are included in the first priority. Only after fighting troops have embarked will noncombatants be provided for.
The key portion of General Weston’s orders are:
1. All troops whether Aust, NZ or British will withdraw to Sphakia (S coast) for embarkation (name of port not to be mentioned).
2. The withdrawal will be carried out under cover of a rearguard, which will consist of ‘Layforce’.
3. The intention is, in view of the enemy’s air superiority, troops will march by night and lie up under cover by day.
The march will be carried out in stages. At each stage rations, water and POL [fuel] will be available.
4. OC. L and M Unit (Royal Marines) will provide guides at each staging camp, the general intention being that Aust, NZ and British troops shall be routed to a separate camp where some degree of reorganisation of units can be carried out by day. …
It should be appreciated that in contrast to individuals’ reminiscences, unit War Diaries stressed that, on the whole, these and further detailed orders issued by General Weston’s HQ worked well.
German Orders
In contrast to the Commonwealth commanders, Generalmajor Ringel and his HQ were in a state of euphoria. They had on the 27th made significant gains, including FJR 3 securing Hania and the enemy were finally moving back apace. Either poorly served by his intelligence staff or through a premature loss of attention Ringel failed to realise that the Commonwealth forces were not falling back on their other garrisons in the east but heading south for evacuation. According to the New Zealand official history:
… the pursuit was now on and Ringel determined at once to exploit the day’s successes and hasten to the relief of Rethymno and Iraklio. He does not yet seem to have realised that these two objects were not identical. For his orders for 28 May were: ‘Ringel Gp will pursue the enemy eastwards through Rethymno to Iraklio without a pause. First objective Rethymno and the relief of the paratroops fighting there.’
Enter Layforce
The Middle East Commandos were in mid-1941 working under the codename of LAYFORCE, after its commander Brigadier Bob Laycock. Two of the commandos units, also for security, referred to as ‘battalions’, were sent to reinforce Crete, under its brigadier. These were A Battalion (formerly No. 7 Commando) and D Battalion (formerly an amalgamation of 50 and 52 Middle East Commandos), each with five companies of two troops. Layforce in Crete totalled around 900 lightly armed men, with few of the heavy weapons commandos had to support them later in the war. They were in short, organised as a light raiding force, not as line infantry but included nationals from various Mediterranean countries, including Spain.
The first indication that Layforce would be needed in the battle was received about midnight on the 22/23 May when Brigadier Laycock was told that his command would be ‘carrying out raids on German air bases on Crete’ in order to help attack the enemy’s air superiority. The original plan was to a cross to the south coast of Crete by troop ship but these were too lightly armed and any ship in that area was in great danger. Consequently, Layforce was to be shipped to Souda Bay. On the morning of 24 May 200 men of ABattalion were landed from a mine sweeper. The remainder of the force left Egypt that day but the state of the sea and the destruction of the ships’ boats meant that they could not be landed. The commandos were eventually landed:
… at approximately midnight the ship crept up to the mole at the western end of the bay. All was quiet and only distant gunfire and occasional flashes of light from the direction of Hania marred the peacefulness of the night. Just as the Brigade Commander, myself and other officers were bidding farewell to the Captain of the minelayer, the door of the latter’s cabin was flung open and a bedraggled and apparently slightly hysterical Naval officer burst in. In a voice trembling with emotion he said, ‘The Army is in full retreat, everything is chaos. I’ve just had my best friend killed beside me. Crete is being evacuated!’ Cheerful to say the least and something of a shock to the little party of Commando officers, armed to the teeth and loaded up like Christmas trees, who stared open-mouthed at this bringer of bad news. ‘But we are just going ashore,’ I faltered. ‘My God,’ he cried, ‘I didn’t know that: perhaps I shouldn’t have said anything.’ ‘Too late now old boy,’ I said. ‘You can at least tell us what the password is.’ But he had forgotten it.
We had no time to stay and check upon his story which in any event was likely to be unreliable in view of his state of mind. Disembarkation started at once …
Brigadier Bob Laycock.
The situation a.m. 28 May 1941.
During unloading via lighters the commandos lost most of their heavier equipment into the bay through careless handling, as the ships crews were desperate to get out to sea and south of Crete by dawn.
Once ashore, the confusion was apparent and as Tom Caselli recalled:
We assembled by companies on the quay, by forcing other military personnel milling about out of the way… In the darkness we formed up in column of threes, company orders, and set off out of the dockyard and Souda. When we got onto the actual road it was clogged up by disorganised soldiery – only two words to describe them – a rabble!
Layforce marched east to join the advance party of A Battalion who were in position south-east of Souda. D Battalion passed through A Battalion to take up a position six miles in depth at Megala Khoratia, on a ridge, at the point where the road south to Hora Safakion left the coast road. This was in effect to be the first of the pre-prepared blocking positions ordered by General Weston.
Megala Khoratia (formerly Beritiana Junction)
Before dawn D Battalion arrived at Megala Khoratia, where Lieutenant Colonel Young deployed three companies to construct defences covering the road and the remaining two up on the heights covering the flanks. Throughout the day the Luftwaffe bombed and strafed them but their rock built sangars on the steep slopes provided plenty of cover and they suffered no casualties.
In the afternoon Colonel Young was instructed to recce a another blocking position to further delay the enemy. Once he had found one, he was to withdraw all but one company from Megala Khoratia. With a single company remaining down in the valley, this position was unsatisfactory, as it was overlooked by surrounding hills and could be easily outflanked by a larger force. Despite D Battalion’s protestations, General Weston’s headquarters ordered ‘that it had to be done’ and after dark, leaving E Company, including a troop of Spanish volunteers. Lieutenant Russo commented to his company commander Maj McGibbon ‘Christ Bob, we will never get out of this mess’. His commander ‘…silently agreed’, as Colonel Young ‘had explained there was only a slim chance of us ever getting out, but he was very fair about it’.
Lieutenant Russo recalled how the single company of commandos received a welcome reinforcement.
Shortly afterwards a platoon of New Zealand Maoris came through us — commanded by a 2nd Lieutenant. All were carrying not only their own weapons but also German weapons. They asked if they could join us — for a chance to fight the Germans! They stayed and later I sent them in on a bayonet attack.
The block at Megala Khorafia looking across the deep valley to the positions of the Cammandos and Maoris, as seen from the position of GJR 100.
Around midnight, two companies, numbering 130 Maoris, occupied rock built sangars on the high ground earlier constructed by the remainder of D Battalion, thus providing some depth, which greatly strengthened the position. The commandos and Maoris were to hold the junction until 0900 hours, in order to allow time for further positions to be established to the south. The four surviving Maori officers, according to the battalion history ‘… made a quick reconnaissance in the darkness while the troops who had found some rations had a meal’. There was, however, a problem.
While the rest of 5 NZ Brigade was passing through an all-round position was organised and the troops put on the ground, but the dispositions had to be altered somewhat unexpectedly. A Canadian captain in charge of the Commandos who were guarding high ground to the west and… Sixty of his men, Spanish [commandos] volunteers under a Spanish sergeant had marched away with the last of 5 Brigade.
These were foreign troops pitched into the chaos of a retreat, and while the Spanish Troop’s unauthorised withdrawal was thoroughly reprehensible, it is perhaps understandable. Lieutenant Russo commented, ‘It was hard to explain to Spaniards why British troops didn’t stand and fight’.
With the withdrawal of 5 NZ and 19 Australian Brigades around midnight on 27 May, the commandos of A Battalion, positioned to the south-east of Souda became the rearguard and fought their way back, passing through B Battalion before dawn. At 0800 hours, the engagement at Megala Khoratia began.
Following the charge at 42nd Street, Kampfgruppe Whittman echeloned through GJR 141 to continue the advance along the sharply narrowing coastal plain. Kampfgruppe Whittman consisted of the Gerbirgsdivision’s 95 Recce Battalion, the Motor Cycle Battalion and two troops of self propelled anti-tank guns, plus motorised artillery and engineers. Their task was to be ready to move off before dawn and drive through to Rethymno and then on to Iraklio. From his position on the high ground, Captain Royal of the Maoris could see that the road from Souda Bay was ‘lined with enemy transport and troops, light armoured vehicles and field guns’. This was the advance guard of Kampfgruppe Wittmann, probably 95 Recce Regiment, which had been ordered to clear the Megala Khoratia Junction.
The attack opened with the defenders being engaged by a mortar bombardment and then attacked by the Gerbirgsjäger from the coastal road to the north and from the high ground to the south-west. The battle took place on the more open high ground and in the close confines of the valley, with fighting taking place at ranges of 100 yards or less, because of the hillside scrub. With only Bren guns, Tommy guns and rifles plus the Maoris’ captured weapons the Commonwealth troops were not only outgunned but heavily outnumbered. It was only a matter of time before the Germans identified the extent of the position and attempted to envelope them, threatening to cut them off from the route to the south.
See map page 232
Down in the valley Major McGibbon had been badly wounded and told Lieutenants Russo and Sandbach to leave him and ordered them to withdraw at 0900 hours. Major McGibbon recalled that:
After I was finally picked up by the Germans, one of their officers expressed surprise that so few commandos (although he did not know that we were commandos) had held up the German attack for so long. The German said that their losses were very high – especially the number killed.
Informed of the commandos’ withdrawal and with what was almost certainly a company from the Recce Battalion approaching Megala Khorafia to cut the road south to Stilos, Captain Royal led the Maoris into the hills to the south-east, where weak [enemy] patrols did not have the stomach to tackle the determined Maoris.
Having reorganised after their attack and the withdrawal of the Commonwealth troops, half of Kampfgruppe Whitmann continued its advance east along the coastal road, while the remainder advanced south down the Megala Khoratia–Stylos Road, which had already been cut by GJR 85. GJR 141 was similarly tasked with objectives in the east and only GJR 100 had any orders regarding the south and they were only to provide flank protection. As the official history comments, ‘The importance of Ringel’s failure to appreciate the direction of the withdrawal needs no underlining… he could easily have brought strong forces to bear…’
Stilos
While the commandos and Maoris were fighting at the Megala Khoratia Junction, in the hills to the south of Kampfgruppe Whittman, GJR 85 was advancing with all three battalions forward, due east across country, a task eminently suited to the Gerbirgsjäger. Their aim was to cut off the tail of the Commonwealth withdrawal and reach Georgioupoli, thus opening the way to relieve the Fallschirmjäger at Rethymno. A company of I/GJR 85 narrowly missed encountering the withdrawing commandos and Maoris, as it made its way east, while II Battalion closed with the Commonwealth position (5 NZ Brigade) that had been identified at Stylos. Further south into the mountain foothills III/GJR 85 was unknowingly heading south to an encounter with the main body of Layforce at Agh Pandes.
See map page 232
After a gruelling night march, the remnants of five New Zealand battalions and an Australian battalion arrived at Stilos. 23 NZ Battalion’s historian commented:
All were feeling the lack of sleep and of regular meals, to say nothing of the strain imposed by frequent attacks from the air. The road grew steeper and rougher the farther south it went. At daybreak the battalion reached Stylos. Major Thomason established his headquarters in a cave and ordered A and D Companies to occupy a ridge to the west of the road, covering the northern approaches to Stylos.
Most of the withdrawal was on foot, with little water or shelter from the sun.
23 NZ Battalion were to cover the area of the bridge north of Stilos. The two company commanders were carrying out a recce of a piece of high ground just to the south-west before settling down.
As they reached a stone wall at the top of the ridge, they saw Germans coming out of a creek bed about 400 yards away. Machine-gun fire whizzed over the ridge. In great haste the men of the two companies, many of whom had already dropped off to sleep, were summoned to the ridge. Major Thomason ordered those near him to join A and D Companies, shouting, “Sergeant Hulme! Get men on top of that hill! Whoever gets men there first wins!”
Lieutenant Cockerill wrote:
There was a terrific scramble up to the ridge and in places the ascent was almost precipitous. On getting to the top of the ridge we came under fairly heavy mortar fire and there were, unfortunately, quite a few casualties. Some of the enemy had advanced to within 20 to 30 yards of the stone wall which ran right along the ridge like a backbone of a hog’s back and these, of course, were sitters if one cared to take the risk of looking over the wall which, of course, we had to do.
The redoubtable Sergeant Hulme was again at the forefront of the action, according to his battalion’s history:
Hulme was among the first to arrive and opened fire from behind the stone wall just when the enemy leaders were about 15 yards away. He was joined by Sergeant Bob Young and then by D Company.
These were the leading elements of II/GJR 85 and after they had been sent back down the hill in chaos, Sergeant Hulme was seen ‘sitting side-saddle on the hog’s back stone wall’, shooting at the enemy on the lower slopes. His VC citation stresses that:
His example did much to maintain the morale of men whose reserves of nervous and physical energy were nearly exhausted. At one stage, too, Hulme threw the grenades that were being hurriedly primed by others. Eventually, after shooting several Germans, he himself was wounded in the arm.
With his battalions’ way forward blocked, Oberst Krakau sent a detachment to the left who, using the cover of the wall, began to throw grenades across. In response, a section of 19 Battalion was sent to deal with the enemy and ‘arrived in time to dispatch an enemy officer and about six men who stood up at the wall with a machine gun’. The attack was finally beaten off by about 0930 hours. GJR 85 later described this engagement in their report: ‘The strong enemy force at Stylos: A terrific struggle developed, including bloody hand-to-hand fighting’.
Brigadier Hargest signalled General Weston first thing in the morning: ‘We will endeavour to hold small position here today and move back tonight but owing to exhausted state of troops this will be very difficult.’ However, while the battle described above was going on, he held a conference at his HQ and asked each of his COs if they could fight and hold all day and then withdraw under cover of night, marching eleven miles to Vryess. The answer was ‘No’. ‘Well, we’ll march at 10,’ said the brigadier. In doing so, in full daylight, the force would be risking the attentions of the Luftwaffe. However, aircraft were now, fortunately, only available in limited numbers thanks to the requirements of BARBAROSSA. The troops were ordered to make the best use of the cover available; a habit that was now well engrained!
As the most northerly battalions began their withdrawal, at the vital moment, 23 Battalion reported that ‘shouts, hakas and yells were heard from the rear of the Germans who suddenly ceased attacking and withdrew in some confusion’. It seems that the new arrivals were a detachment of Maoris that Captain Royal had sent back with the wounded. The official history comments:
Royal, however, says that he had told the escort and the wounded to throw away their weapons. We must assume either that they had acquired fresh weapons on the way or that they had been joined by parties from A Battalion or by men who had had to fall out on the march but who were now ready to make a further bid for freedom.
This unplanned intervention significantly assisted the break clear of 5 NZ Brigade which fell back through the rearguard of 2/7 Australian Battalion. It was fortunate that the Brigade was falling back in a southerly direction, for the Gerbirgsjäger were under orders to advance east, and this contributed to 2/7 Battalion escaping destruction.
Agh Pandes (formerly Babali Hani)
On the afternoon of 27 May, Colonel Laycock had been ordered to locate a defensive position further back on the road beyond Stylos and occupy it with his force less the company left at Megala Khoratia. He was to hold this last position, which was on a low ridge north of Agh Pandes Crossroads, before the climb into the White Mountains, until dark on 28 May.
D Battalion had four of its own companies to cover a long front. A and D Companies were deployed on the right of the road, with a combined frontage of about 500 yards. This flank against rising ground was reasonably secure. C and E Companies, however, were in better cover, also on a frontage of about 500 yards, to the left of the road but had ‘a more or less open left flank’ in the valley beyond the ridge. His reserve was a company of A Battalion that arrived during the course of the morning.
Tom Caselli recalls their battle preparations:
We all deployed roughly in our company areas and as dawn broke, occupied the positions in detail, arranging inter-company junction points, tidying up arcs of fire and getting ourselves fixed up with individual sangars — plenty of stone about and with the steel helmet rim (the back portion only) to scratch out a hollow. If we had used the front of the rim the sun could catch that part where we had scratched off the paint and give our position away. While this was going on, there was a continual procession of unattended retreating men, straggling through our lines and along the road south, very few carrying any weapons… Our battalion had been joined by the remnants of the 2nd/7th Australian Infantry Battalion, who were giving us invaluable back-up. Gen Weston had given us three of the Matilda Infantry tanks (7 RTR) as a reserve. There was a ravine on the left of our company running roughly east-west, capable of giving the enemy a covered approach and during the morning we had mounted several patrols there, so as not to be surprised, but Jerry was not encountered.
Abandoned Commonwealth transport on the climb up to the mountains.
‘Jerry’ was, however, not far behind the Australians, who withdrew through Layforce from Stilos. George Williams was forward of the main position in an observation post.
We could see quite a long way up the road along which any mechanised vehicles would have to travel. Eventually the first that came into view were Jerry motorbikes and sidecars. Our signallers passed this message with mirrors. There was a church tower some distance over the other side of the road from which a sniper later did some deadly work. But I think someone was there already and had spotted our signals, because just after this they started peppering us with mortars. They soon got the range and were becoming quite deadly. The corporal then gave the order to get back to HQ.
At 1330 hours, the enemy attacked, advancing on the axis of the road where C Company immediately to the left of the road bore the brunt of the attack for thirty minutes. Elements of Kampfgruppe Whittman, in the centre, with the flanking support of III/GJR 85had attempted a quick attack, with little recce, in the hope of bouncing the commandos out of their position.
So there we were in our little stone sangars, watching for Jerry to appear and with our forward scouts posted to spot men or vehicles making an appearance. About mid-day the first German patrol appeared on motorcycle combinations. They were allowed to get well within range before we opened up with concentrated machine gun and rifle fire and some grenades, which sent them hurtling off the road into a quarry. The follow-up troops got the same treatment. Sure enough, up went the blue flares and the mortars began to range in. Star-shells followed and the Stukas turned up and plastered our positions in their own noisy fashion. Curiously enough they caused few casualties and many bombs went wide of the mark. They did manage to set some of the scrub on fire, but their ground troops didn’t take advantage of it, but it was hectic whilst it lasted. Then they tried a change of tactics – turning our flanks, but were beaten off.
An hour and a half later an altogether more serious attack started, this time using the whole of Kampfgruppe Whittman, and the Gerbirgsjäger battalion. Again it focussed on the left flank but this time threatening to use the valley to envelope the commandos. Tom Caselli was with E Company on the left flank:
A Fieseler Storch appeared again, disappeared and the same tactic was repeated. However, the field grey uniforms were soon spotted as they came on and they were easily picked off. They must have had heavy casualties.
Commando Bren gunner Arthur Noble recalls the second attack:
We never had a moment’s respite. I had to keep my Bren gun in constant action. The need to estimate distance had by then gone. I dropped my sights down to zero. Boyle [his No.2] was carrying on valiantly, filling and charging magazines as they became empty and changing barrels as they became hot. The Jerries were pressing closer and closer and just as our first box of ammo ran out they appeared to have broken through on our left.
Tom Caselli wrote about the role that the commandos’ senior officer played in the defence:
Colonel Laycock must have had a guardian angel because he was here, there and everywhere, wearing his brigadier’s cap with its red band and gold peak, which must have been very obvious to the snipers as we were all in steel helmets… It wasn’t long before the Stukas turned up again and we got plastered, with the infantry following up … the pressure was increased on our left flank, so much so that the 2/8th Australians were moved up to our left on the edge of the ravine. Colonel Laycock, plus cap, also arrived to assess the situation.
Colonel Young used every man he could to extend his flank and asked Laycock for reinforcements. As mentioned above 2/8 Battalion were sent to assist with two companies. This deployment and a counter-attack by E Company, along with the Matildas, which ‘kept making sorties up the road’, enabled the line to be held but ‘It had been touch and go’. Certainly out-gunned and by now outnumbered as well, the commandos only had the troop from A Battalion in reserve. 2/7 Battalion had already been sent to the rear with HQ 5 NZ Brigade.
Vehicles: broken down, out of fuel or knocked out by air attack littered the mountain road.
In his situation report Oberst Whittman recorded:
The enemy’s actions pointed to his intending to hold his positions at all costs at least until the evening and then withdrawing under cover of darkness. He even made small counter-attacks from time to time, and often the fighting came to close-quarters. Observation was too poor for our artillery to be effective, and our tanks had not yet arrived, and so we had to desist from attacking, as it would have been too costly under the circumstances.
Further reinforced by GJR 85, with a company of GJR 141 approaching the flank and GJR 100 on their way, the enemy now planned an attack by two battalions of GJR 85 at dusk but they attacked too late. During the afternoon Brigadier Laycock received confirmatory orders to withdraw at dusk and at about 2115 hours, the commandos began to slip away. Their stubborn stand had made the withdrawal of 2/7 Battalion and 5 NZ Brigade a much less hazardous affair than it would otherwise have been.
Their withdrawal, however, wasn’t straightforward. Major Graham recalled that with most of the commandos, including many wounded, still on the road:
Imagine my horror, when … I found a huge crater which was being admired by the sapper party [42 Field Company] who had done the deed. In a fury I cross-examined the officer in charge, but all he could say was that a ‘senior officer’ who said he was commander of the rearguard had ordered him to blow. To this day no one knows who that ‘senior officer’ was. There was no time for recrimination – desperately we organised working parties to at least partially repair the damage. No vehicle, tracked or wheeled, would ever get through, but we might make it passable for marching troops. After some hours of backbreaking toil, we succeeded in getting the wounded across to the other side, where some ramshackle Cretan lorries were waiting to evacuate them… Two tanks had run out of petrol and been destroyed and the third was slewed across the narrow road on the enemy side of the crater and, after removing oil and water, we abandoned her with her engine running.
The Mountain Road
Beyond Agh Pandes the road, an earth and gravel track wide enough for a single vehicle, climbs from the hills into the mountains, zigzagging up the steep slopes to the Pass at an altitude of 900 metres. Beyond the Pass, the mountains open up to the small flat fertile Askyfou Plain, a former mountain lake bed, surrounded by bare rocky peaks. The road then makes its way between the deep gorges that run down steeply to the sea. Opportunities to slow the German advance abounded but the mountain troops were trained to operate in exactly this type of terrain. The road petered out into an exposed, steep, switchback track for the final few miles of descent down to the coastal plain. The marching troops, however, were able to take a covered route down via the five mile long Imbros Gorge, where they were all but immune from strafing attacks.
Motorcyclists from the Gerbirgsdivision examine the Matilda that blocked the road at the crater.
Heading up into the mountains at the best of times is demanding but for men who had fought with little sleep, hardly any food and hardly any water for the previous week, the barrier was an extreme challenge ‘and not to be able to cross it was to become a prisoner’. No one who took part in the withdrawal could forget the climb up to the Pass:
For two days and two nights men had been streaming over it, some crammed into the few vehicles that were still functioning, the rest marching, stumbling, and at times reduced to crawling on hands and knees. The natural savage grandeur of the mountain road was overprinted with the chaos of war. Every yard of the road carried its tale of disaster, personal and military. The verges were strewn with abandoned equipment, packs cast aside when the galling weight had proved too much for chafed skin and exhausted shoulders; empty water bottles; suitcases and officers’ valises gaping their glimpses of khaki linen and pullovers knitted by laborious love in homes that the owners might not live to see again; steel helmets half buried in the dust; all the grotesque and unpredictable bric-a-brac of withdrawal, the personal property treasured till it became an impediment and then discarded so that its owner could keep up with his desperate urge for life.
An overloaded carrier pauses under cover of a tree on the mountain road.
On the way up to the Pass, further blocking positions were established to cover CREFORCE’s withdrawal. Having been first away from Stilos, it was 23 NZ Battalion who were providing the blocking force on the morning of 29 May. They took up positions as best they could in the dark, ‘with D Company on the left of the road, Headquarters Company, A Company, and the detachment of gunners under the indefatigable Captain Snadden on the right’. One man commented that ‘We had never slept on such boulders but it might as well be a feather bed; it makes no difference’.
From their naturally strong, rocky but waterless positions astride the road up into the mountains, at 0715 hours, 23 NZ Battalion reported they could see a large number of the enemy below them and to the north. These were I/GJR 100, who following the loss of contact with Layforce the night before had been brought up from reserve to follow the enemy withdraw leaving the main force to resume its march east to relieve the Fallschirmjäger at Rethymno and Iraklio. Regaining contact would take time and General Ringel was heavily criticised by Student for allowing so many Commonwealth troops to be evacuated but this is to underestimate the effectiveness of the rearguards and to ignore Student’s own priority for the relief of his beleaguered regiments to the east.
The upper section of the marching troops route down through the Imbros Gorge or Ravine.
Slowed by the demolitions lower down on the mountain road, the Germans did not make contact with 23 NZ Battalion before they withdrew. They started to thin out after mid-day but not finally abandoning the position until late afternoon, to head south through 18 NZ Battalion who were providing the rearguard on the northern crest of the Askifou Plain.
The Saucer
18 NZ Battalion arrived out of the mountain after a dreadful trek, early on 28 May, onto the lip overlooking the green Askifou Plain:
It didn’t belie its looks. When those weary men stumbled down the mountain to the flat below they found wells — lovely wells, scores of them, scattered all over the fields. Water to drink, water to sluice over your face and head, water to bathe your feet. The men practically wallowed in it. German planes were miraculously absent, and for a while the antiparatroop role had to wait on the good pleasure of the water.
According to the Battalion’s historian ‘There was no work to do yet, and a day of inaction was doubly welcome after the fearful march of the night before’. 18 and 20 NZ Battalions were to hold the plain, with the help of four Light Tanks and three old Italian 75mm guns crewed by Australians.
Early on the 29th, 18 Battalion was ordered to send its main body several miles south, to the south end of the Saucer, where it joined 20 Battalion. A Company, however, with fifty men under command of Major Lynch, went back up to the north edge of the Plain to block the entrance. With the company was one of the tanks, a few Vickers gunners who had happened to be tagging along, and ‘a 3-inch mortar manned by the 19 Battalion RSM (who had lost his own unit) and a crew of volunteers’.
A Company, jaded as it was, hauled its weary feet up to the top of the first peak north of the plain, and there spread out over a wide front, covering as much of the approach from the north as possible.
With the withdrawal of 23 NZ Battalion, it wasn’t long before A Company was in action, ‘putting up a skilful defence against the Germans at close range’. For three hours the enemy probed the company, trying ‘to smash this stubborn ring of men who disputed their passage’. Major Lynch, despite the exhaustion of his men fought a mobile battle, and used the rock ridges as cover to ‘move a section hastily to counter one of Jerry’s thrusts’.
Thwarted on the direct route into the Saucer, the Gerbirgsjäger were forced to feel their way around the flanks in a wide loop, taking a Spandau with them. Eventually they reached a position overlooking A Company’s rear and the road down to the plain, and opened fire.
This could have been the end of A Company, but it wasn’t. When the situation began to get ‘sticky up on the hilltop’, Brigadier Inglis sent the three ‘Aussie guns’ up in support. They were, without much ammunition, but nicely sited to tackle the ‘troublesome Jerry machine gun’. The German fondness for firing tracer gave away their exact location, and the Aussie gunners ‘gave it the works’. Under cover of their fire A Company began to retire downhill.
Safakion 29 May.
Lieutenant Colonel Gray ‘had been largely responsible for turning the Aussie guns on to their target’, and helped direct their fire. He wrote:
It was the first time I had ever spotted for artillery and Geoff Kirk and I sat on the rocks above the road directing the fire and calling out corrections to the guns. The range, by trial and error, was 3200 yards and they literally rocked it in, firing, I believe, all the 40 rounds which was all they possessed.
Colonel Gray also secured three trucks from somewhere, and had them waiting, with nervous drivers, at the foot of the hill, where a breathless A Company tumbled into them. Covered by the remaining Light Tanks, the trucks took the exhausted Kiwis to the south end of the plain, where the rest of the battalion was preparing to move on again.
The actions fought between Stilos and the Saucer enabled 6,500 men to be evacuated from Hora Safakion on the night of 29/30 May.
The Final Leg
With GJR 100 now up in the mountains, preventing the Gerbirgsjäger from advancing along the road from Imbros to Hora Safakion or the five miles through the mountains and gorges to the south coast was vital for the slowly proceeding evacuation. Brigadier Vasey was allocated the grim task of commanding the last rearguard. He had under command, his two Australian battalions and the Royal Marine battalion, the three 75mm guns, a platoon of 2/1 MG Battalion with two Vickers, the four tanks of 3 Hussars, and three Bren carriers. His plan was simple; the tanks and carriers, under Major Keith, were to delay the enemy in front of the defence line until 1700 hours and then fall back, the Sappers of 42 Field Company RE blowing the road behind them. Two miles further down the road, the defence line, prepared overnight 29/30 May, covered the road and the routes through the flanking mountains.
The pass through the mountains south of Imbros was easily blocked by a few determined men.
Safakion 30 May.
The Covering Force, Sergeant Trethowan’s platoon of 2/8 Infantry, mounted in carriers and supported by tanks, were deployed about a mile north of Imbros. At dawn, they spotted the enemy moving into the vacated Saucer, aboard trucks and motorcycles. GJR 100’s War Diary for the 30th includes a claim that they ‘captured’ the Plain!
Two companies of I Battalion GJR 100 with three light tanks, probably Panzer IIs, which had finally been landed on Crete on 26 May, advanced on the Covering Force at 0645 hours. The Australian carrier crews were dismounted and deployed in the rocks astride the road but it was the Light Tank commanded by Corporal Summers that opened the battle with his Vickers machine guns, engaging the infantry advancing on the road. He only managed to get off a couple of bursts before his guns jammed but ‘he had disposed of perhaps a dozen enemy’. Sergeant-Major Childs’ tank came into action, covering his corporal’s withdrawal. However, one of the panzers soon hit Childs’ tank, which though still a runner was damaged. Somewhat later, with enemy mortar fire growing in volume, the remaining tanks and carriers withdrew behind the Sappers’ first demolition, which they blew at 0855 hours. A delay of over two hours had been inflicted on the enemy, who were now also slow in following up.
Brigadier Vasey was allocated the grim task of commanding the last rearguard.
The second block was established a mile back, just north of Imbros. Two carrier crews again deployed astride the road. Major Keith’s tanks, now up against opposition from their own type, took up positions on the southern outskirts of the village, from where they provided covering fire. After an hour’s hasty preparation:
About ten o’clock the new position was attacked and the enemy moved in cautiously to within a hundred yards of the Bren crews, who held their fire, waiting to be sure of not firing on stragglers.
Once sure that they could see ‘field grey and coal scuttle helmets’ the infantry opened fire, ‘doing a good deal of damage before they withdrew under cover of the tanks’. The infantry and tanks fought from Imbros for a further 30 minutes, before enemy fire mounted and they came under pressure from enemy using the beginnings of the gorge to the left, to outflank them. The Covering Force again withdrew, blowing the second and third demolitions (north and south of the village) as they went. This time they fought their way back to a position a mile or so south of Imbros. Withdrawing at 1130 hours, the Covering Force had now delayed the enemy for almost five hours. The Germans had, however, advanced two miles but in doing so, suffered significant casualties.
The third position occupied had been established in depth by the Royal Marine Battalion but they had already moved back as the Covering Force fell back on the main line of defence. The force occupied the positions hidden on a rocky slope beyond a sharp bend. Sergeant Trethowan described the results of this ambush:
The enemy came into range with troops in trucks followed by walking personnel. They were an easy target, and the first column when fired upon scampered for cover while their trucks tore down the road and gained cover. The enemy began a searching fire with mortars and machine guns but failed to locate us. A column of marching troops came into range on the road soon after and we dealt with them in a similar manner.
The Covering Force at one point staged a feigned withdrawal and having lured the enemy into the open, ‘they were dealt with’ by the tanks and carriers that returned to occupy their positions after ten minutes. They estimated that they had killed or wounded around forty or fifty of the enemy. The July 41 Report, however, stated that:
The trick did not work a second time, and the Germans brought an A/T gun to bear from the high ground to the left. The last demolition was blown at about 1320 hrs and the tanks and carriers retired to the next bend.
The Gerbirgsjäger were now even more cautious and started to move around the precipitous slopes to outflank the Covering Force, who claim to have been ‘driven back, chiefly by mortar fire, from one bend to another, until they reached the main infantry position (2/7 Australian Battalion) at about 1700 hours’. The damaged Light Tanks finally broke down. The report continued:
By this time the last two tanks were finished; they had steering, brake, engine and clutch troubles, so they were wrecked and abandoned on the road blocks which had been erected and the crews proceeded to the beach, where they arrived at 1845 hours.
Gerbirgsjäger of 1/100 GJR attempt a flanking move around the blocking position.
The situation at Hora Safakion 31 May.
The carriers were able to press on until the rough dirt and stone road finally ran out where the mountains dropped down to the narrow coastal plain. Here they too were destroyed, having provided excellent service with the covering force, delaying the enemy for over seventeen hours. The enemy was however, just three miles from the sea. ‘The Germans came on and made contact with Brigadier Vasey’s main rearguard position but did not press their attack.’ Oberst Utz sent messengers (he had out-run his radio communications) with requests for close air support but it was too close to darkness for a response from the Luftwaffe and the artillery were too far down the mountain to help without time consuming moves. Consequently, he despatched companies to the flanks to find the extent of the Commonwealth rearguard’s positions.
Inside the Creforce HQ Cave.
During the evening of the 30th a patrol of eleven Gerbirgsjäger managed to slip around the rearguard, through the Safakio Gorge to the west of the road and had to be driven off from the vicinity of the HQ CREFORCE cave. A New Zealand Platoon killed all eleven men and took their weapons, including a Spandau, into use.
In another action in the Safakio Gorge, Colonel Kippenberger tangled with one of the companies dispatched to the flanks by Oberst Utz. He sent the remains of two companies of 20 NZ Battalion including Lieutenant Upham to block their progress down the gorge. Colonel Kippenberger recorded the destruction of a part of the enemy force:
… Upham’s platoon was slowly climbing up the steep 600-foot hill west of the ravine. The men were weak and very weary but they kept slowly going, and we could see that Upham was working round above the Germans still in the bottom of the ravine and pinned down by Washbourn’s company and by fire from the eastern bank. Two hours after they had started the climb there was another sharp outburst of firing. It lasted about a minute, there were then some single shots, and then silence. A little later Upham’s platoon started to come back and then a message came that all twenty-two of the enemy party had been killed, completely helpless under his plunging fire.
That night, 30/31 May, Naval Force D evacuated 1,500 men from the port just three miles behind the rearguard’s main position. Amongst those ordered out by Cairo that night were General Freyberg, Group Captain Beamish and Brigadier Stewart. Approaching 2300 hours, they were walking down to the Sunderland flying boats waiting just off the harbour. Encountering Brigadier Inglis en route, Freyberg ordered him to join the party. Inglis demurred and was in his turn ‘sharply overruled’. General Freyberg wrote of his departure:
My feelings can be imagined better than described. I was handing over a difficult situation with the enemy through in one place almost to the beaches from which we were to make our last attempt to get away the remnants of the fighting force that still held out, tired, hungry, and thirsty on the heights above.
Major General Weston was now in overall command.
The Evacuation
While the rearguard action was being fought at Megala Khoratia by the Commandos and Maoris on 28 May, the first 700 men were being evacuated from Hora Safakion and about 4,000 members of the Iraklio garrison escaped from the Island. The risks that the Royal Navy took to bring ships to Crete to rescue the Army, when they had already been driven from the seas north of Crete, were considerable. The destroyers and cruisers of Forces B (Iraklio) and C and D (Safakion) lost a further three ships, with six being damaged. The principal evacuation took place from Hora Safakion on the nights of 29, 30 and 31 May and 1 June. Ships could only approach to within Luftwaffe range of Crete once it was dark and had to be well to the south by dawn. This gave a very short window between 2300 and 0300 hours in which to load the ships, which had to be by small boats ferrying troops out to the ships.
Ashore, the ad hoc arrangements for the evacuation were always under pressure, with up to 9,000 men awaiting evacuation lying up by day in cover at the foot of the dry Imbros Gorge, or around Komitades, where both water and food were in short supply. A full water bottle of potable water a day was a luxury but there was even less chance of a full belly. Commando Arthur Swinburn describes a meal that he had on arrival at Hora Safakion:
Twenty-seven men into one tin of sausages (one tin contains thirteen) so each man had half a sausage leaving the 27th man, poor blighter, with the tin, some fat and the smell of what was once there!
As the senior in each case had to distribute the ration, imagine how unlucky I was! But I did better on potatoes. Nine into a tin of potatoes left one over for me. Army biscuits were distributed 1 biscuit per man. This was the first food we had had for a very long time.
Selection of troops for evacuation was a tricky and political business. Correct proportions of New Zealand, Australian and British troops had to be allocated to the ever changing number of ships expected on a particular night. The principle that combat troops would be evacuated as a priority was more or less maintained but HQs were prime units that had a political significance of their own and they too were evacuated with a high priority. Brigadier Hargest personally filled the last of his quota by looking at a man, if he had a rifle, he stood a chance of selection but ‘If they came without rifles I turned them down cold – they were stragglers’.
Safakion in the 1940s and present-day.
To ensure discipline and security of the beach and village, a cordon was maintained by the Royal Marines and other troops of the MNBDO. A crowd of men milled around awaiting their opportunity but no one could get through the cordon without the correct written authority and those who tried to bluff their way through ‘found themselves on their backs, no matter what their rank!’ Unit nominal rolls were compiled and at check points on the route to the beach they were checked and rechecked. ‘Extras’ were ruthlessly weeded out. In most cases, with fewer places on the ships than men waiting, selection for evacuation was principally based on the need to regenerate the unit once back in Egypt.
Nominated for evacuation, Captain Baker of A Company 28 Maori Battalion recalled the instinctive soldierly preparation of his men:
… on the morning of the 30th, by a pooling of resources the personnel of my Company Headquarters numbering, I think, seven, had all managed to change. One man had managed to locate a safety razor with an ancient well-used blade, another had sufficient water in his water-bottle, a third provided a brush, while my steel helmet was used as the shaving mug. It had been hard work as none of us had shaved for some few days and I think we all balked when it came to shaving the upper lip. The proportion of moustaches in the Battalion was high when we eventually reached Egypt.
The final evacuation took place on the night of 31 May/1 June. Those who were serving with the infantry stood the highest chance of evacuation aboard the King’s ships, based on the natural assumption that they had done most of the fighting. For those among the gunners, drivers and Petrol Company soldiers who had fought exceptionally well at Galatas, ‘This was perhaps unfair’. On the afternoon of 31 May, an officer called a conference of his hundred men.
Two things could be done: either the men could make an illegal trip to the beach that night and try to gatecrash a boat, or they could wait their turn, staying put until officially told to move. Veale said: ‘If you do go down to the beaches tonight, other fighting troops will miss out. Make up your own minds. If you decide to go, I’ll help all I can. If you stay, I’ll stay.’ The RMT decided to wait another night.
In the morning the Germans came down to the coatal plain.
Amongst Australian and New Zealand veterans there is an abiding suspicion that during the final scramble for the ships, the ‘Johnny come latelies’ or the ‘one battle wonders’ of Layforce jumped the queues for evacuation. However, detailed post war explanations of orders given, times and locations would seem to put the issue to rest. But, technically available since the mid-seventies, though misfiled, the Layforce War Diary for 31 May contains a seeming smoking gun:
2200 hrs. On finding that entire staff of CREFORCE had embarked, in view of the fact that all fighting forces were now in position for embarkation and that there was no enemy contact, Col LAYCOCK on own authority, issued orders to Lt Col YOUNG to lead troops to SFAKION by a route avoiding the crowded main approach to town and to use his own personality to obtain priority laid down in Div orders.
LAYFORCE reached SFAKION outskirts in good time for boats but were unable to penetrate the rabble [the cordon with strict orders]; flank detachments were able to reach beach but main body remained ashore.
Col LAYCOCK, accompanied by Brigade Major and Intelligence Officer embarked HMS KIMBERLY. Total numbers of LAYFORCE evacuated 23 Officers, 186 ORs.
Typically fifty percent of combat contingents escaped capture or death on Crete. Only twenty-five percent of Layforce were evacuated and the fact that most of 2/7 Australian Battalion was left behind, is only indirectly connected to Layforce.
Major General Weston left Crete with the final evacuation leaving orders to surrender.
Surrender
With the final departure of the ships well before dawn, the remaining 9,000 soldiers waited in their caves and patches of shade, having been ordered to surrender to the first Germans they saw. Most of the infantry had come down from the hills and down the gorges and the Germans ready to renew the battle found the rearguard that had held them back the previous day gone. The German view of the situation:
What a sight is presented by our Gerbirgsjäger. Sun-tanned and parched, our uniforms in rags, caps flattened and caked with sweat and mud. Our mountaineering boots are patched up with insulating tape and leather straps, soles worn through, nails torn out from jumping and falling. Arms and legs are grazed. Every group has its wounded and yet we carry on with unheard of élan. We no longer feel the heat and have overcome extreme exhaustion … Below us is the sea and the port of Safakion with the white cubes of its serried buildings. The rugged mountains drop steeply to the ground below. Crete’s southern coast towers over the blue waters of the Mediterranean.
Moving cautiously down the track from the mountain, the Germans could see men flying white flags on the beach below. Down below, as senior officer remaining, Colonel Walker was handed Major General Weston’s order to surrender. ‘He decided that resistance was hopeless.’ He gave instruction the men to destroy such equipment as they had, but despite the white flags, they were machine-gunned by Luftwaffe aircraft.
Colonel Walker returned back up to Komitadhes at the foot of the Imbros Gorge, where he formally surrendered the remains of the force to an Austrian officer. Back down at the beach, the transport drivers were waiting:
Orders to show anything white were ignored by the RMT party of a hundred which watched in dour silence a blond Bavarian hastily stumbling down the rocks, towing a huge swastika flag to call off the dive-bombers.
Driver Cumming, ordered out of his gully by the Gerbirgsjäger recalled:
It was funny even then to watch some chaps raise their arms above their heads while others raised them, and then lowered them, hesitant about being shot or looking silly. However, the Jerries were also glad it was all over, and patting us on the back made signs we could drop our arms. We were a motley looking crew then.
The war was over; drab prison camps lay ahead for the Division’s crack drivers.
Conclusion
While Student’s Fallschirmjäger and Gerbirgsjäger won a remarkable victory over the Commonwealth Armies in Crete, they suffered heavy losses in capturing an island that never delivered its supposed advantage of extending Germany’s air umbrella. Events in Russia (Operation BARBAROSSA), restored Allied naval superiority in the Mediterranean and steadily increasing air power, marginalised Crete. Worse, the partisan war waged by the fearsome Cretans in the island’s mountains represented a running sore and a drain on scarce German resources.
Student’s dream of a new form of warfare based on his airborne forces was over. The level of casualties, hitherto not experienced by Germany, led Hitler to conclude that ‘The day of the Fallschirmjäger is past’. When OKW would no longer consider accepting the risks inherent in mounting largescale airborne operations, General Student referred to Crete as ‘the grave of German airborne forces’. In contrast, the Allies were developing their own airborne capability, and when at the outset of MARKET GARDEN no less than three airborne divisions passed over his HQ in Holland during September 1944, Student mused ‘If ever I had such powerful means’. The lessons of Crete had not been lost on the Allies. Accounts of the battle and conclusions were all carefully studied.
Even though the Germans continued to train and equip Fallschirmjäger, they were never used in any significant operational level airborne operation, with the arguable exception of FJR 3’s drop into blocking positions on Sicily. Successful smaller scale parachute operations were mounted, including special operations, such as the rescue of Mussolini. The Fallschirmjäger, however, continued to be used as elite infantry, earning a fearsome reputation in battles such as Monte Cassino where the Division fought with distinction. The Gebirgsjäger never received their full measure of credit for their part in the Cretan Campaign but continued to be employed as high quality infantry.
What of the Commonwealth Allies? The New Zealand and Australian battalions were reconstituted and commanders progressed up the ranks as the war progressed. Freyberg became a Lieutenant General, commanding the New Zealand Corps at Cassino. Kippenberger, unsurprisingly rose to command the New Zealand Division but lost a foot when he stepped on a mine on the rocky slopes on Monte Trocchio in Italy, while preparing to battle his old adversary FJR 3 at Cassino. Brigadier Hargest who, though much criticised at Maleme, won admiration during the withdrawal across the mountains for his leadership and physical presence that did so much to keep his men going. He served as New Zealand’s observer in North-west Europe.
Let, however, an ordinary soldier, Private Diamond of 23 NZ Battalion, have the final word:
I long for the day when we can match the Germans in the sky, ‘plane for plane’. When that day dawns, Germany is beaten. We know by experience that we can whack his land forces, tanks included, any day of the week.
German cuff title for Crete celebrating victory, however, the Führer had decided that parachuting troops into battle had proved too expensive in casualties.