Chapter Two
Over the next few days both the German Northern and Southern groups continued to make furious thrusts on all fronts. As this great advance gathered momentum, more towns and villages fell to the onrushing forces. The campaign had taken on the character that was to remain for the few weeks that followed. Everywhere north, south and east the fronts were shrinking, cracking slowly but surely under the massive German pressure. In this unparalleled armoured dash, some units had covered 40-60 road miles in just twenty-four hours. For many soldiers it was an exhilarating dash, Panzers bucketing across the countryside, meeting in some places only isolated pockets of resistance.
In just over five days of unbroken combat, Kluge’s Fourth Army had cut through the Polish corridor, established a breach between Pomerania and East Prussia, and encircled thousands of enemy soldiers from the Poznan and Pomorze Army. Elements of Guderian’s XIX Corps crossed the Vistula and were informed under the direct command of von Bock to transport its tank battalions through East Prussia; thereafter the corps was to effectively concentrate on the left wing of the Third Army. It was to operate close co-ordination with Kuechler’s force and move out through Lomza, heading east of Warsaw.
In Third Army, infantry and armoured forces continued to push southwards. Already by September 5 Kuechler’s force alone had captured 15,000 prisoners, were driving the Modlin Army back, Panzer Division Kempf had broken through and its spearheads were less than thirty-five miles from Warsaw. Already some forward units were reporting that they had reached strong defensive positions on the Narew river. In the following days to come there would be thousands of German troops crossing the river, hurling themselves east of Warsaw.
South of the country operations were moving as rapidly as those in the north. Both the Eighth and Tenth armies especially fought a measured, stage by stage battle in which the enemy retreated to fresh defensive positions as their lines were driven in by successive German attacks. The bulk of Blaskowitz’s Eighth Army maintained a steady drive on the city of Lodz. But constantly units found themselves confounded by the appalling traffic jams clogging the advance by refugees, and by the Polish army vehicles entangled upon the roads that had been endlessly strafed by air-attack. Most vehicles, particularly the Panzers, struck off across country to escape the chaos and continued their unopposed dash.
Two photographs showing exhausted soldiers taking a much needed respite during the army’s rapid advance east. Never-ending foot marches were very common during the campaign and as result many soldiers suffered by fatigue, especially during the day with the warm weather.
In Tenth Army, armour of formidable size and anger made a number of deep penetrating thrusts. Only on the roads did the traffic slow; the deep dust billowing above the columns, choking men and horses, and sifting into motors. All along Reichenau’s front unceasing attacks embraced the dwindling enemy lines. For striking power the Tenth Army relied on its tremendous superiority in tanks and artillery. By 6 September Reichenau boasted that his front stretched south from Lodz to within sixty miles north of Krakow. His armoured dash was now threatening the capital. He had beaten off heavy counter-attacks against his northern flank with his Panzer divisions, smashed the Polish 29th Infantry Division, and captured the commander of Poland’s reserve. By evening he had bypassed the Lodz Army on his northern flank and virtually enveloped the Krakow Army at Radom on his southern flank. Reichenau was now ordered to destroy the Polish forces at Radom, an operation that would cause delay in the advance on the Vistula, especially since von Rundstedt decided to detach two of Tenth Army’s XI and XVI Corps to Eighth Army on Reichenau’s left flank.
By 7 September Reinhardt’s 4th Panzer Division had finally brought it to the main road to Warsaw. Within hours of this engagement reports reached Rundstedt’s headquarters that leading parts of the division were now no less than 20 miles from the suburbs of the capital.
During early evening on 8 September a few miles south-west of Warsaw’s Ochota suburb, Polish outposts identified enemy tanks and infantry. Before reports of the sighting had time to be relayed back, Panzers supported by artillery began a number of close-quarter attacks. Though the fire power showed no evidence of a fully equipped motorised division, the bombardment on the suburb was no less impressive. The forces making the first attacks on Warsaw were advanced elements of Reinhardt’s 4th Panzer Division. By the time advanced elements of Reinhardt’s force arrived at the most southern western edge of the city the inhabitants had already prepared themselves for a prolonged defence. The defence of Warsaw mainly consisted of anti-tank and flak batteries, including anti-tank trenches and barricades, with some buildings left to soldiers to construct fortified positions. The barricades were built with a multitude of crude objects consisting of tram cars, furniture and timber that had been hastily erected across the main roads leading into the centre.
Reinhardt’s first assault on Ochota had been immediately repulsed by a heavy unrelenting screen of enemy artillery fire. Dozens of Panzers attempting to storm the suburbs were engulfed in a sheet of flames, severely limiting further tank strikes. Polish resistance in the area had become so stubborn that Reinhardt reluctantly aborted his attack. Later that evening a dispirited Reinhardt reported to von Rundstedt that, ‘After heavy losses, my attack on the city has to be discontinued. Unexpectedly sharp resistance, by the enemy, with all weapons, had reduced a single armoured division, by only four infantry battalions a quite insufficient force to obtain a decisive outcome’. Altogether Reinhardt lost 57 out of 120 Panzers engaged. Apart from illustrating the vulnerability of tanks on their own in urbanised areas, it also showed that the Poles were not prepared to surrender their capital at the first sight of the enemy. It seemed the capture of Warsaw was going to be a long drawn out blood-thirsty battle of attrition.
Although Reinhardt’s Panzer division spent the rest of the night counting the cost of its attack, by next morning on 9 September encouraging reports confirmed that the German Army were now beginning to arrive on the west bank of the Vistula. The Poles had not even had time to build a defence barrier along the river, let alone a close-meshed network of field fortifications which had been the intended plan. Before the Vistula the Germans committed their main forces in marginal, wholly unspectacular clearing operations, preparing to the front between the Vistula and Bug. There was never any doubt in the minds of both von Bock and Rundstedt that in the immediate days that followed the vital strategic ground would lie between these two rivers. Here for the Germans glittered the opportunity that would lead them to victory. As for the Poles, they fought on without any rational prospect of success. They were now preoccupied with the struggle to keep on resisting, to build a defensive line along the major rivers and keep hopes alive in the only theatre of the war where Germany felt threatened – the western powers of France and Great Britain. But already, well over 200,000 Polish troops had been captured, killed or injured. With the deteriorating shortages of ammunition and weapons wholesale collapses continued to result in mass surrenders of units, which were swamped by the German spearhead. Many divisions had simply disintegrated, leaving scattered bands of demoralised stragglers roaming the countryside without equipment or leadership.
In the north of the country, however, there were still large parts of the Pomorze and Poznan armies that had been undefeated. The German Fourth Army had simply bypassed them in their furious drive east. Now the Pomorze and Poznan armies took advantage of the situation and hastily joined together into one army commanded by General Kutrzeba. In an attempt to try and crush the onrushing enemy before Warsaw Kutrzeba’s army prepared to mount a series of surprise attacks from the Bzura River where they were now situated and strike German forces moving up from the city of Lodz, which had previously fallen.
A long column of horses with dismounted men have halted on a road. Because horses played a significant role in the task of conquering Poland, this meant that they were not immune from fatigue and the endless punishing distances they were forced to cover to keep up with the armoured spearheads.
10.5cm guns being pulled by animal draught along a congested road. In Poland rather than using motorised transport, the Germans used horses to pull artillery, ammunition carts, field kitchens, soldiers, bridge-laying equipment and other important material, all of which was needed to sustain the rapid spearheads across Poland.
In a field an artillery crew can be seen with their camouflaged 7.5cm le IG 18 gun. Behind them in the distance is a Pz.Kpfw.I. Poland was found by its soldiers to be a land whose sprawling territory contained every type of terrain; hot, dry sandy areas, fertile plains as well as swamps, extensive forests, high mountain ranges and the main rivers that generally flowed north-south of the country and constituted a natural barrier against an eastwest assault.
Many of the Polish roads were often sand tracks, and virtually inaccessible to horsedrawn transport. Here horses and their riders and wagons slog along a muddy road after a heavy downpour. Had the invasion of Poland been postponed any later than September, the German Army would have experienced great logistical problems due to the autumn rains.
A column of horses and riders from Army Group North are visible for as far as the eye can see. By 5 September operations in Northern Group began to enter a new and bloodier phase. As Polish columns lay strung over miles of open country trying in vain to escape the impending entrapment, German units began to fight with all their customary ferocity.
Two photographs of halftracks, one towing a 15cm howitzer and the other a bridging section. The halftrack was used extensively in Poland to tow artillery and supplies to the front along with infantry.
Following in the wake of the armoured spearheads east, infantry became exhausted by the never-ending foot marches that were so common in Poland. Here in this photograph a soldier sleeps onboard a wagon being towed by animal draught and uses part of the tarpaulin as a cover.
A posed shot showing two machine gunners with their crew onboard a train destined for the front lines in Poland. During the war one of the quickest and most efficient ways of transporting troops to the front was by railway.
Two photographs one showing members of an artillery crew inside a halted halftrack and another showing a crew during a respite on the side of a hill. The halftrack had sufficient seating for the entire gun crew. However, when moved by horse, the howitzer always had to be divided into two parts with separate wagons for the barrel and gun carriage.
Horse drawn limbers carrying supplies have come off a road. The German drive east was constantly hampered by the bad road system. Often tracked vehicles avoided the roads and went across through fields.
A badly damaged Pz.Kpfw.I.The vehicle has been hit by an enemy antitank shell that has penetrated the side of the turret. By 1939 the tank was effectively obsolete, but still used extensively in the field against the Poles.
A typical scene in Poland showing a long column of horse drawn limbers full of supplies halted on a road. From the air this stationary convoy would have been as easy target. However, by 5 September the Polish Air Force was almost non-existent. The majority had been either destroyed or was hiding at various airfields further east.
Men and their horses rest during the relentless drive through Poland. German commanders were praised by their superiors for keeping their attacking infantry moving, not to cause incessant delays whenever they were confronted with the least sign of opposition. After nearly a week of constantly being on the move, the men and their horses, which they relied on so heavily, were completely exhausted.
Two photographs showing infantry with their horses. In Poland a typical German infantry division had approximately 5,300 horses, 1,100 horse-drawn vehicles, 430 motorcycles and 950 motor vehicles. A typical rifle company transported consisted of three-horse wagons, on which the troops loaded all their packs and other supplies.
A stationary Pz.Kpfw.38 (t) in a field. These tanks were reliable and easy to maintain and were used in the Panzerwaffe in Poland to bolster the already large contingent of light tanks that were spearheading across the country.
Two stationary Pz.Kpfw.35 (t) are parked along a cobbled road inside a captured Polish town. The fruits of the great dash east were exhilarating for the men riding the tanks and trucks. It had been an unopposed thrust across country against a disorganised jumble of retreating Polish units.
Tired infantry rest with their horses following more or less a continuous unopposed march across Poland for almost a week. The horse too, which played a significant part in conquering Poland, were not immune from fatigue and the endless, punishing distances which they were forced to cover in order to keep up with the Panzers. Their load was often huge as well putting great strain on their heart.
A column of Pz.Kpfw.Is hurtle along a dusty road. The Germans continued throughout the invasion to crush enemy defences, disrupting the logistic network and not being slow to use terror as an additional weapon. For the Poles, however, it was the beginning of the end. They were slowly withdrawing into a long, narrow pocket, within which they were to eventually be encircled, isolated and then destroyed.
The crew of a Pz.Kpfw.III confer with soldiers during a break in the advance. Because the Polish Air Force had virtually been wiped out practically all Panzer crews did not need to take precautionary measures of camouflaging their machines against possible air strikes. Note how visible the white cross is on the side of the turret.
One of the most common occurrences during the campaign for Panzer crews was trying to avoid the congested roads. Here a Panzer has turned off the road across country, but has unfortunately sunk into the soft soil.
German infantry watch as a Pz.Kpfw.III passes by. Note the white cross erased on the side of the turret. This vehicle is travelling across country avoiding the appalling traffic jams that were constantly clogging the advance by refugees, and by the Polish army vehicles entangled upon the roads that had been strafed by air attack.
Armoured crews wearing their familiar black Panzer uniforms and berets watch a reconnaissance aircraft on its final approach into a field. The Germans used extensive ground and aerial reconnaissance patrols to survey enemy positions.
Horse drawn transport move steadily along a road. Note that the middle part of the road has been divided by logs for either returning traffic from the front or for faster moving vehicles.
German infantry and Panzer men stand in front of a Pz.Kpfw.I with captured Polish prisoners. Although in many areas of the disintegrating front the Poles were ordered to hold their positions, they soon found that German units were surrounding them in their hundreds and often capturing them without a fight.
Pz.Kpfw.Is and infantry move forward across a field. Advancing down every road, across many adjoining open fields was the huge might of the German Army. There were the convoys of tanks, guns, heavy artillery being pulled by hundreds of horses and halftracks, armoured cars, ammunition and supplies for the troops, and bridging sections. Divisional headquarters were also on the move, with their staff cars, command caravans and radio vehicles. And wave after wave, chocking every road, were the troops marching – in trucks or on the back of armoured vehicles.
A damaged Pz.Kpfw.35 (t) knocked out of action by anti-tank fire is being transported on a trailer bound for one of the workshops in the rear.
A forward observation command post. Here reconnaissance vehicles would leave the post in a variety of armoured cars and motorcycles in order to probe and survey the battlefield. Often they would encounter enemy fire and then return with vital information, specifically regarding the location of the enemy.
A German motorcyclist halts on a road outside a captured town and surveys the carnage of battle. Littered along the pavement are dead horses and soldiers mingled with damaged wagons and limbers. Already well over two hundred thousand Polish troops had been captured, injured or killed. Wholesale collapses in morale continued to result in mass surrenders of units swamped by the German spearhead.
A pontoon bridge is being erected over the Narew River. On the Narew Division Kempf clashed at Rozan on 6 September and fought a bitter action there seizing the bridgehead, much to the anger of the Poles who were bitterly defending it.
Two German soldiers in an observation post use a pair of scissor binoculars to survey enemy movements. These binoculars were nicknamed ‘donkey’s ears’.
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A mortar crew in action attacking the rear of their defensive positions on the Lower Narew. Throughout the 6 September the Poles continued trying to defend the river but German firepower continued to be overwhelming.
Five photographs showing the 15cm howitzer, which was the backbone of German artillery firepower in Poland. When an attack progressed, heavy fire was maintained to engage successive lines of antitank defences. When the tank managed to break through the enemy forward defence lines, all the heaviest fire fell well ahead of the armoured assault or outside their sector. Every artillery commander was aware that the flanks of a tank’s attack were also vulnerable, so they assigned the artillery units the task of protecting the flanks by barrage of high explosive and smoke shells.
A 15cm howitzer is being towed along a dusty road by animal draught. Though the horse was much slower than tracked vehicles, it was the only alternative from tracked vehicles to move heavy artillery and supplies from one part of the front to another. In Poland, the advanced spearheads moved so quickly that heavy artillery was seldom used to soften up positions to allow the tanks to pour through.
A much preferred way to transport artillery to the forward edge of the battlefield. Here a halftrack is towing a 15cm howitzer along a road destined for the front lines.
Two photographs showing a Luftwaffe flak crew with their 2cm flak gun. The 2cm flak gun was most commonly used as a light anti-aircraft gun during the Polish campaign and all the crews were relatively successful downing what was left of the Polish Air Force.
A PaK35/36 crew aiming their gun along a road. The PaK35/36 became the standard anti-tank gun of the German Army during the early part of the war. It weighed only 432kg (952.5Ib) and had a sloping splinter shield. The gun fired a solid shot round at a muzzle velocity of 762m/s (2500ft/s) to a maximum range of 4025m (13200ft).
A nice photograph showing the moment a 10.5cm infantry gun is fired in action against a Polish position. This 15cm gun was used as the standard German infantry heavy cannon and supported the German Army into battle.
Here an 8.8cm flak crew prepares to manhandle their heavy weapon back on the flak limber in order to transport it to another part of the front. The 8.8cm flak gun became the most famous German artillery gun of World War Two. It was specifically designed for a dual purpose role, possessing a very potent anti-tank capability as well. In Poland troops did not appreciate the full of effectiveness of the weapon until later on in Russia.
Troops in position with their PaK35/36 anti-tank gun. Though these guns were very effective against Polish armour, it would not be until the war against France the following year that the German Army became aware of the tactical limitations of the gun as their forces increasingly encountered heavier enemy armour.
Four interesting photographs showing the Pz.Kpfw.I operating in Poland.
This light tank was armed with a 7.92mm gun and also carried two radios, the Fu2 and Fu6.The Ausf. A type variant was powered by a Krupp M305 engine that generated 57hp.The Ausf.B variant was slightly heavier and was fitted with a Maybach NL38TR 6-cylinder 100hp engine. The Pz.Kpfw.I formed a major part of the strength of the Panzerwaffe in Poland. Although it would be soon overshadowed by much more powerful tanks like the Pz.Kpfw.III and IV, its contribution to the German Army`s early victories during the Second World War were undoubtedly very significant. Within three years of the war the Pz.Kpfw.I was finally taken out of service and given to the police and anti-partisan units.
A Pz.Kpfw.II advances along a road. A total of 1226 Pz.Kpfw.IIs were employed for the Polish campaign and despite the vehicle suffering from very thin armour, which offered minimal protection in battle, it was used successfully against the Polish Army, which only possessed antiquated armour.
Two photographs showing German infantry and Panzer men posing for the camera after successfully capturing a Polish bunker. Pz.Kpfw.I and IIs can be seen halted in front of the fortification.
The Polish Army modernised many of their bunkers from World War One in to strong fortresses consisting of antitank and antiaircraft equipment.
Three German motorcyclists rest at the side of the road with their machines. Motorcyclists were used extensively in Poland and were also utilised for reconnaissance duties as well. Because they were very versatile machines it enabled the rider to survey enemy positions until he encountered fire and then returned swiftly with important data and other important information relating to location and strength of the enemy.
A motorcycle combination can be seen advancing along a road towards a bridge. Each Panzer division in Poland had a very capable motorcycle company. In fact, a whole battalion of Panzer division`s rifle brigade were given motorcycles with sidecar combinations.
An interesting photograph showing a motorcycle combination navigating along a muddy road after a heavy downpour. Note the soldier seated in the sidecar armed with a mounted MG34 machine gun for local defence.
A posed shot showing a motorcyclist wearing a double-breasted rubberised motorcycle coat. The garment was waterproof and was worn with army canvas leather issue gloves or cloth mittens, with overshoe leggings or army boots.
A column of motorcycle combinations move slowly along a road. One of the hazards of travelling by motorcycle, especially in Poland, was the lack of good-quality roads for vehicles. Motorcyclists that decided to avoid the roads and travel across country often proved a perilous undertaking, and the casualty rate among motorcyclists was inevitably high.
A motorcycle combination advances along a road with a long column of support vehicles closely following behind. Preparing for action relied on various light and heavy trucks and many civilian and armoured vehicles for transport. Maintaining the momentum the armoured drive through Poland was vital to success, and without support vehicles, the whole advance might stall.
Three Pz.Kpfw.IIs have halted in a field. This tank played a very crucial part in the invasion of Poland and its standard 2cm cannon, which could fire 280 rounds per minute, proved more than capable of knocking out Polish armour.
Two photographs, one showing a motorcycle and a motorcycle combination driving along a dusty road, and the other a posed shot of a ride on a motorcycle. Although a great number of motorcyclists in Poland rode into battle and dismounted to fight, motorcycles and motorcyclists were regarded as vulnerable to small arms fire and booby traps.
Two photographs showing a Pz.Kpfw.I. Contrary to popular belief during the first week of the invasion a number of German tank attacks were poorly coordinated with the accompanying infantry. This was a reflection of the difficulty German commanders had of putting the new doctrine of Blitzkrieg into practice.
After a week of campaigning the Poles were withdrawing back towards Warsaw. By 7 September Reinhardt`s 4th Panzer Division had finally brought it to the main road to Warsaw. During early evening on 8 September a few miles south-west of Warsaw’s Ochota suburb, Polish outposts identified enemy tanks and infantry. To Reinhardt`s surprise the first assault on Ochota was immediately repulsed by a heavy unrelenting screen of enemy artillery fire. Dozens of Panzers attempting to storm the suburbs were engulfed in a sheet of flames, severely limiting further tank strikes. Here in these two photographs stands a knocked out Pz.Kpfw.IIs in Warsaw’s suburb.
