Chapter One
On 15 February 1942, the island fortress of Singapore surrendered with its 85,000 men, not including the 45,000 that had previously surrendered on the Malayan Peninsula, thus ending one of the largest military disasters in the history of British arms since Cornwallis’s capitulation to Franco-American forces at Yorktown in 1781 during America’s revolutionary war. Lieutenant-General Arthur E. Percival’s surrender to the invading Japanese Army permanently destroyed Britain’s military and colonial prestige in the Far East. Since Percival sought out the best terms with the Japanese Army, thereby refusing to participate in any last stand heroics, he failed to meet Prime Minister Winston Churchill’s standard as a consummate military commander. In mid-January 1942, Churchill had written to his chiefs of staff, upon receiving a report from Wavell that Singapore’s northern coast was undefended, ‘Not only must the defence of Singapore Island be maintained by every means, but the whole island must be fought for until every single unit and every single strong point has been separately destroyed. Finally, the city of Singapore must be converted into a citadel and defended to the death. No surrender can be contemplated.’ Although humiliated in both photographs of the surrender ceremony and as a prisoner-of-war, analysis of Percival’s pre-war assessment and plans for the defence of Singapore demonstrate that he was not entirely culpable for the Malayan and Singapore garrison’s defeat. Poor planning of the defensive aspects of the island coupled with an under-equipped garrison to fight a modern battle with tanks and suitable aircraft ultimately may have been more causally related to the fortress’s surrender than its army leadership. One must wonder whether Percival was a convenient scapegoat for a wider failure of British leadership and responsibility, both locally and at Whitehall.
As often is the case, however, the burden of responsibility falls on the shoulders of the battlefield commander. In support of this, Percival’s chief engineer, Brigadier Ivan Simson, on Boxing Day, 26 December, pleaded with his commanding officer to build defence works on the northern shore of Singapore Island. To his dismay, Percival told him, ‘Defences are bad for morale – both troops and civilian.’ Almost exactly one month later Wavell visited Singapore and insisted that Percival erect defences on the northern shore. However, due to Wavell’s underlying tacit personality, he did not impress the zeal and alacrity with which this defensive work needed to be completed. Up until a week before the Japanese crossed the Straits of Johore, no solid defensive works existed. A few of Singapore’s 15-inch naval guns were directed north, but firing armour-piercing naval shells at Japanese troop positions on the very southern tip of the Malay Peninsula was futile.
Arthur Percival was born on 26 December 1887 in Hertfordshire, England. After schooling at Rugby he became a clerk for an iron mercantile company. When the First World War erupted, Percival enlisted as a private but was quickly promoted to second-lieutenant. Within three months he was again promoted to captain. Wounded during the Battle of the Somme, he was awarded the Military Cross. Further promotions ensued along with a Croix de Guerre and a Distinguished Service Order award. He was described in his confidential report as very efficient, beloved by his men, a brave soldier and recommended for staff college.
After the First World War, he served with the Archangel Command of the British Military Mission in 1919 in north Russia during the Russian Civil War. This was followed by a posting brutally fighting the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as an intelligence officer in 1920–21. It was during this service combating the IRA that brought him to the attention of Winston Churchill, then a cabinet minister, and Prime Minister David Lloyd George. Percival was selected as a student for the Staff College, Camberley, from 1923–24 upon a recommendation of Lloyd George. Thereafter, he served as a major for four years in the Royal West African Frontier Force in its colonial garrison as a staff officer culminating in a promotion to lieutenant-colonel in 1929. After studying at the Royal Naval College in 1930, he became an Instructor at the staff college in 1931–32. With the assistance of his mentor, General Sir John Dill, Percival commanded a battalion of the Cheshire Regiment from 1932–36, becoming a full colonel in 1936. Dill regarded Percival as an outstanding instructor and staff officer and wrote in his confidential report of 1932, ‘He has not altogether an impressive presence and one may therefore fail, at first meeting him, to appreciate his sterling worth.’ Dill recommended that Percival should attend the Imperial Defence College in 1935. In 1936, his mentor again helped Colonel Percival become the GSO I Malaya Command, serving as chief of staff to General William G.S. Dobbie, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Malaya. In 1937, Percival returned home as a brigadier on the General Staff, Aldershot Command. However, it was during his posting with Dobbie that Percival made important observations about the defence of Singapore and conducted a detailed analysis about Singapore’s vulnerabilities, not from the sea but from the Malay Peninsula. However, critics would cite that Percival had a ‘gift for turning out neatly phrased, crisp memoranda on any subject […] he was excellent in any job which did not involve contact with troops’.
From 1937–40, Dill enabled Percival to manoeuvre through a variety of staff and command positions, the latter including the 43rd (Wessex) and 44th Divisions. Then, as chief of the imperial general staff (CIGS), Dill appointed Percival GOC Malaya with the rank of lieutenant-general, promoted over the heads of many senior and more experienced officers, and he returned to Singapore on 15 May 1941. Dill’s support of Percival was based on his evaluation of his protégé, who was an intelligent, efficient, tireless and professional staff officer. Critics of Percival have claimed that he was a colourless character, more a staff officer than a commander and certainly not a natural leader. Furthermore, it was asserted that he played everything by the rules, however ludicrous these might be, and if he did not lack urgency he certainly lacked passion. He was not a man for a crisis and certainly not a man for a desperate campaign. Ironically, when General Sir Alan Brooke was appointed CIGS replacing Dill, he reflected on such appointments that ‘officers were being promoted to high command because they were proficient in staff work – which was quite wrong – and urged that fewer mistakes of this nature should be made in the future’. To exemplify Brooke’s future concern, it had not helped Percival that in 1937 he had written an appreciation of the defence of Malaya and Singapore rather than holding an active command of British or Commonwealth troops in the field or combat. As CIGS, General Dill wanted more troops and armour sent to the Malaya command. However, Churchill would not acquiesce to this request, probably because of the need to reinforce the Middle East, which was then in heated combat with Rommel’s Deutches Afrika Korps (DAK).
For over two decades the combined British military establishment pondered how to best defend Malaya and the Singapore naval base. Unfortunately, there was interservice rivalry and often the RAF disdained to consult the army in regards to the placement of airfields along the Malay Peninsula. In 1937, Major-General William G.S. Dobbie, GOC Malaya, along with Percival as his chief of staff, looked at the problem of defence using the Japanese viewpoint as a new perspective. Percival and Dobbie had as an operational tenet that a British fleet could not arrive in less than seventy days (ironically the exact amount of time for Yamashita to conquer Malaya and Singapore) to carry out relief. The pair began conducting exercises with troops in October 1937 and reported that, contrary to the orthodox view, landings by the Japanese on the eastern seaboard of the peninsula were possible during the northeast monsoon from October to March, and this period was particularly dangerous because bad visibility would limit air reconnaissance. Both Dobbie and Percival warned that as a preliminary to their attack, the Japanese would probably establish advanced airfields in Thailand, and might also carry out landings along the coast of that country. If the appreciation composed by Percival, under Dobbie’s oversight, was accepted, large reinforcements should have been sent without delay. Percival’s appreciation was ignored. Furthermore, in July 1938, when Japanese intentions were more obvious, Dobbie warned that the jungle in Johore Province (i.e. southern Malaya) was not impassable to infantry, but again he was ignored.
By 1939, all Dobbie and Percival were able to wring out of the government was the small sum of £60,000, most of which was spent on building machine-gun emplacements along the southern shore of Singapore island and in Johore. Incredibly, the pre-war defence of northern Malaya was left in the hands of the Federated Malay States volunteers. A newly arrived Indian brigade group was held as a reserve for the defence of Johore Province. Singapore Island was entrusted to five regular battalions, two volunteer battalions, two coastal artillery regiments, three anti-aircraft regiments and four engineer fortress companies. The six air force squadrons had a total of fewer than 100 aircraft, including such venerable models as the Vicker Vildebeest biplane torpedo bomber, Hawker Harts and Audax biplanes. There were no tanks, which would prove important as the IJA would deploy armoured vehicles against British and Commonwealth defensive positions in the Malay States to the north of Singapore Island over and over again. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders had been issued with Bren carriers carrying the 0.55 inch Boys anti-tank rifle as well as Lanchester and Marmon-Herrington armoured cars, the former of which was obsolete and the latter rushed into production. The Lanchesters were built in 1927 and were equipped with two 7.7mm Vickers machine-guns and a 0.55-inch Boys anti-tank rifle. The South African-manufactured Marmon-Herrington vehicle, built in 1938, also had a Vickers 7.7mm machine-gun and a 0.55-inch Boys anti-tank rifle. The Boys anti-tank rifle had limited effect on the Japanese medium tanks while the Japanese 37mm tank gun was very adequate in piercing British armoured cars. For example the Marmon-Herrington had only 12mm of armour. It is no surprise that when Percival took up his new appointment, he had little enthusiasm or confidence. He wrote after the war, ‘in going to Malaya I realized that there was the double danger either of being left in an inactive command for some years if war did not break out in the East or, if it did, of finding myself involved in a pretty sticky business with the inadequate forces.’
Upon his arrival, Percival discovered that the northern airstrips on the Malay Peninsula had not been situated in defensible positions nor did they have sufficient men or planes to occupy them, even though in August 1939, Air Vice-Marshal J.T. Babington, the local RAF commander, believed that Singapore was best defended by ensuring that Malaya remained in RAF hands and that the army should be deployed to defend the airfields. Many of his troops were in fact dispersed to guard the RAF’s exposed airfields in northern Malaya. Percival deployed his three British and Indian Army divisions and three separate brigades in defensive positions near airfields, which was not too indifferent to Freyberg’s defence of Crete with his New Zealanders, Australians and British troops in June 1941. The III Indian Corps, commanded by General Sir Lewis Heath, who was knighted for his decisive victory over the Italians in Eritrea, was charged with the defence of northern Malaya with its 11th Indian Division deployed near the Thailand-Malayan border, under the command of Major-General David M. Murray-Lyon, while the 9th Indian Division was situated along the east coast of the Malay Peninsula. Construction of defence installations was stalled because of bureaucratic issues. Apart from a few regular British, Australian and Indian army battalions, the remaining troops were of mediocre or low-quality, under-trained and indifferently led. The reinforcements still on the way were no better and none had any idea of operating in the jungle. However, some units were well-led with a gallant tradition. The 2nd Battalion of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ian Stewart, arrived in August 1939, and turned out to be the best-trained British jungle fighters in Malaya, under Stewart’s exercises and manoeuvres in dense vegetation, rubber plantations and mangrove swamps.
In fact, Dobbie’s recommendations of 1937 were still a plan rather than a realized defensive framework to fend off a Japanese Army attack from the north. Some of the other service chiefs had held erroneous beliefs that their meagre resources and near-obsolete equipment would be sufficient to combat a battle-hardened Japanese war machine that was honed to a sharp edge after the conflict on the Chinese mainland for nearly a decade. Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, the commander-in-chief Far East, remarked incredulously, ‘we can get on alright with (Brewster) Buffaloes out here […] let England have the Super-Spitfires and Hyper-Hurricanes’. In fact, with most of the Royal Navy actively engaged fighting against the Germans, the British defensive plan focused on an aerial defence by 180 assorted aircraft operating from airfields on the Malay Peninsula and on Singapore Island. The Japanese, who had been in the planning stages of the invasion of Malaya, knew that RAF and RAAF aeroplane numbers were inflated for British propaganda purposes. Also, although thought by the Allies to be capable of defeating the Japanese aircraft that would oppose them, the Brewster F2A Buffalo was inferior in every respect to the Mitsubishi Zero except for armoured pilot and fuel protection.
In Percival’s defence, he had too many political and logistical obstacles to overcome to make a meaningful contribution to the area’s defence. First he tried to intensify training among his troops as well as obtain funding from the government to carry out defensive works. Second, he tried to construct defensive positions up north near the border with Thailand. However, local British business interests interfered, not wanting troops near their plantations or property. Finally, when a plan was formulated to attack and seize potential Japanese troop staging areas in Thailand, Operation Matador, both the detailed logistics and orders for advance were stalled. Percival had pondered that in the event of an imminent Japanese invasion through Thailand, the 11th Indian Division was to execute Operation Matador, which called for the occupation of Singora, several miles inside of Thailand, and its nearby airfields. From this key terrain the British could defeat, or at least delay, any Japanese advance. However, the British government’s policy was to refrain from any act of provocation, bearing much similarity to the Phoney War on the Western Front prior to the Nazi onslaught in May 1940. Unfortunately for the British, because Operation Matador involved violating Thai neutrality, it was not politically feasible and thus never executed. This military vacillation continued until 6 December 1941, when it was known that the Japanese Army was en route to their staging areas in Thailand and their assault on the Malay Peninsula. Therefore, there was no realistic provision for a British attacking force to seize the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand to prevent a Malay invasion by the Japanese until that country had clearly demonstrated itself to be the aggressor. In fact, it was Brooke-Popham who finally cancelled the plan whereby the 11th Indian Division would have entered Thailand to seize the Kra Isthmus. South of III Corps’ area of responsibility, the 8th Australian Division was tasked to defend Johore Province, at the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula. An additional two infantry brigades were charged with the defence of Singapore Island proper, and a brigade remained in reserve. Because he had widely dispersed his divisions and brigades, General Percival was unable to concentrate his combat power at any one point until the Japanese had already overrun the peninsula. Royal Navy forces in Singapore, consisting of the recently arrived battleships HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales, along with accompanying destroyers and cruisers, were located principally in Singapore, with the flexibility to attack either west or east, as the situation dictated. The fate of Task Force Z is discussed in Chapter Three.
At the command level, a vacuum of leadership developed at a crucial stage. ACM Brooke-Popham, C-in-C Far East, was replaced by Lieutenant-General Henry Pownall in November 1941. Pownall had served as Lord Gort’s chief of staff with the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in northern France and Belgium during the Phoney War and amid the disastrous retreat to Dunkirk. Pownall did not arrive in Singapore until 27 December, and then command was further altered with Field Marshal Sir Archibald Wavell being appointed to the American-British-Dutch-Australian (ABDA) command, with Pownall becoming his chief of staff. Thus, Percival’s chain of command was initially more illusory than extant. In addition, one of Churchill’s political allies, Duff Cooper, was appointed chairman of the Far East War Council. He had a fractious relationship with the local military leaders and departed for England after Wavell assumed the ABDA command in early January. At the subordinate level, Percival had difficulties with Lieutenant-General Sir Lewis Heath, commanding III Indian Corps, and Major-General H. Gordon Bennett, commanding the Australian troops in Malaya and Singapore. Heath’s relations with Percival were acrimonious from the outset. Heath was more senior than Percival and had commanded the victorious 11th Indian Division in the Eritrean campaign under Wavell in 1940–41. After fighting commenced with Japan in northern Malaya, Percival lost confidence in Heath as III Corps Commander, but did not sack him. Bennett was a bitter, outspoken subordinate. As an Australian army veteran of the First World War, he was prejudiced against the British military hierarchy. Furthermore, like all commanding Commonwealth officers, Bennett had the option to discuss orders from Percival with the Australian government if he disagreed with them, thus giving him considerable freedom of action. Bennett’s view of Percival was that: ‘he does not seem strong, rather the Yes man type. Listens a lot but says little […] my estimate of him was right. Weak and hesitant though brainy.’ Although Percival had the opportunity to sack Bennett as well, he allowed him to continue commanding the Australian contingent. Finally, the relationship between Bennett and Heath was, to say the least, irascible. The recipe for disaster at Percival’s command level was complete.
As Percival noted after the war, his appreciation made in 1937, under Dobbie’s auspices, did not differ from that adopted by the Japanese when they attacked Malaya in December 1941. Percival also claimed that when he had joined Dill at Aldershot in 1938, he had warned him that Singapore was ‘far from being impregnable and would be in imminent danger if war broke out in the Far East’. As a case in point, Singapore Island’s 15-inch batteries numbered only two and were located on the southern side (Buona Vista Battery, two guns) and in the north-east corner (Johore Battery, just due south of Changi, three guns), covering the Johore River and South China Sea to the north-east). The island possessed two batteries of 9.2-inch guns: the Connaught Battery on Pulau Blankang Mati, south of Keppel Harbour, and the Tekong Besar Battery on the island of that name to the north-east of Singapore Island. In addition, there were nine batteries of 6-inch guns scattered across Singapore Island. However, it is worth noting that there were no naval gun batteries along the entire northern coast of Singapore Island, despite the expensive naval base being located there at Sembawang. Some have speculated that, after having composed the appreciation about Malaya and Singapore’s defence in 1937, Percival’s outlook about the likelihood of repelling a Japanese invasion was quite realistic rather than being pessimistic.
Although the chiefs of staff in August 1940 recommended reinforcing Malaya and Singapore, Churchill vehemently objected. The prime minister’s overriding concern was combating the Italians in the Mediterranean and Middle East, where he knew it to be the only theatre in which he could actively combat Axis forces at that time. It must be remembered that the epic struggle between the RAF and the Luftwaffe was in full height at this time and the British Isles were bracing for a Nazi invasion just two months after the debacle at Dunkirk. It may well be that the prime minister was incorrect on a number of different levels. First, Japanese military assets had always been undervalued by the Western democracies. Second, the presence of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse was, by no means, a satisfactory replacement for a large British fleet with aircraft carrier fighter protection, nor could it deter Japanese aggressive movements long enough for additional vessels to arrive. As for the ongoing training and supply of equipment of British and Commonwealth troops, shipments of Lend-Lease military ordnance from the United States as well as armaments from Britain continued to arrive at Singapore for assembly and transport to Malaya as well as troop arrival, training and transfer of air assets and pilots from Singapore Island to Malayan airfields. Finally, Churchill had already decided to have the United States guarantee the safety of British garrisons in the Far East. However, America was waiting for Japan to act as the aggressor before taking an active military stance.
Percival and staff officers march to the Ford factory at Bukit Timah accompanied by Japanese Staff Officer Sugita to enter into formal surrender negotiations with the Japanese 25th Army Commander, Lieutenant-General Yamashita. (NARA)
British troops erecting only southern beach obstacles to stop Japanese landing craft at certain tidal levels on Singapore Island, December 1941. Defensive works on the northern shore facing Johore Bahru were considered bad for civilian morale by the commanding British general, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival. (USAMHI)
Official photograph of Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, GOC Malaya, who, though maligned after the capitulation of Singapore, had developed cogent plans to repel an anticipated Japanese invasion before the war while GSO I for then GOC Malaya, General Sir William Dobbie. (USAMHI)
Field Marshal Archibald Wavell, appointed to lead the ABDA Command on 3 January 1942, inspects a 15-inch naval gun emplacement with subordinates on Singapore Island in January 1942. Two such batteries were present at Buono Vista on the southern coast and the Johore Battery on the island’s eastern tip. (USAMHI)
General Sir William Dobbie, GOC Malaya 1937. Together with his GSO I, Colonel Percival, this pair of British officers conducted a prescient detailed analysis about Singapore’s vulnerabilities not from the sea but from a Japanese seaborne invasion of the Malay Peninsula using neutral Thailand’s eastern beaches as an initial staging point. (USAMHI)
Field Marshal Sir John Dill (centre) was Percival’s mentor and later CIGS prior to the outbreak of war in the Far East. Churchill ended his tenure as CIGS in December 1941, in large part due to a dispute over Dill’s written comments of May 1941 to strengthen Singapore’s defences with armour and other tools of war at the expense of the Middle East theatre and possibility of losing Cairo. Dill then became Churchill’s chief of the British joint staff mission (JSM) as well as the senior British member on the combined chiefs of staff (CCS) in Washington, DC, where he developed a close working and personal relationship with US Army chief of staff, General George C. Marshall (right). Here both are seen reviewing troops at the United State Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia. School Commandant General Leven C. Allen is saluting (left background). (USAMHI)
Lieutenant General Percival (right), GOC Malaya, Field Marshal Wavell, C-in-C India, and soon-to-be-appointed ABDA commander (centre), and Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham C-in-C Far East (awaiting General Pownall as his replacement) (left) at Singapore HQ in December 1941. (USAMHI)
British soldiers in camouflaged solar topees man a Vickers machine-gun in an attempt to strengthen Singapore Island’s southern shore defences before the war. (Library of Congress)
Federated Malay States Regiment at bayonet practice. Relatively inexperienced troops such as these were to counter any anticipated Japanese invasion of northern Malaya. (USAMHI)
Federated Malay States Regiment troops during field exercises before the war to heighten their preparation for the anticipated conflict with Japan. (USAMHI)
Indian troops line-up after landing at Singapore to reinforce the Johore Province garrison in southern Malaya. (NARA)
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders on training march in Johore Province to get acclimatized to the equatorial conditions of southern Malaya. (Library of Congress)
British troops arrive in Singapore before the war with their solar topees and much enthusiasm. (USAMHI)
Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders rest after training in Mersing, Johore Province before the war. The fatigue they exhibit was due in large part to the harsh equatorial heat and humidity. (USAMHI).
Straits Settlement Volunteer Force (SSVF) set out on a training march. This detail was going to set up mines. Note the second soldier from the left is carrying a Very flare pistol. (USAMHI)
Indian Anti-Aircraft Artillery (AAA) battery at Singapore prepares to insert a shell into the breach of a 3.7-inch AAA gun. The British Army in all theatres failed to seriously employ this excellent weapon in an anti-tank role like the vaunted German 88mm gun. (USAMHI)
Indian Bren gun team using the weapon as an anti-aircraft one on Singapore. Although very accurate as an infantry section’s support weapon, the Bren’s limited magazine capacity clearly limited sustained fire in an anti-aircraft role. (USAMHI)
British universal carriers training in Malayan dense vegetation. The one shown here is armed with a Bren light machine-gun and a Boys 0.55 inch anti-tank (AT) rifle, which proved ineffective against Japanese medium tanks. The Boys AT rifle became obsolete soon after its debut in 1937. (USAMHI)
Argyll and Sutherland Highlander jumps from his Lanchester armoured car in Malaya with a Vickers Mk. I medium machine-gun with a front bipod and rear monopod mounted on. The Vickers Mk. I gun fired the same .303 inch calibre cartridge as the lighter machine-guns such as the Bren gun, as well as the standard issue SMLE rifle. As a result of its water cooling it was exceptionally suited for continuous firing. The other Highlander to the right is getting the water can and ammunition box ready. (Library of Congress)
Major-Generals H.G. Bennett, C-in-C Australian troops in Malaya and Singapore and D.M. Murray-Lyon, GOC 11th Indian Division of III Corps. Both commanders had a fractious relationship with Percival. (USAMHI)
Australian 22nd Brigade disembarks at Singapore 18 February 1941. The 22nd Brigade would bear the brunt of the main Japanese assault on Singapore Island almost a year to the date of their arrival. (AWM)
Wavell, as C-in-C India, inspecting soldiers of the 2nd Gordon Highlanders in Singapore in November 1941. To the left of Wavell in the photograph is ACM Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, C-in-C Far East. (Author’s collection)
Here, 9th Gurkha Regiment soldiers train with 3 inch mortar in Malayan jungle. Along with the 25-pounder field artillery piece, this weapon was quite effective in disrupting massed Japanese infantry assaults. (Library of Congress)
Indian troops of the Dogra Regiment training in the Malayan jungle. The sergeant leading this section of soldiers has a map folder in his left hand and an encased compass hanging from his neck. (Library of Congress)
Officers and NCOs of the 2nd Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders at a briefing on a rubber plantation in Malaya. This was the backbone of the battalion that had superbly trained the Highlanders for jungle warfare. (Library of Congress)
Brewster Buffalo fighters of Australian 454 Squadron RAAF lined-up wingtip to wingtip for this photograph. Although the pilot had armour protection, this fighter, which was the United State Navy’s first monoplane fighter in 1938, was outclassed by both the IJA’s ‘Nate’ and Oscar fighters as well as the IJN’s Zero. (AWM)
Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, C-in-C Far East, who dithered about ordering Operation Matador into effect, such that the Japanese landed unopposed on the Thai beaches of Singora and Patani. (USAMHI)
General Sir Henry Pownall took over as C-in-C Far East from Air Chief Marshal Brooke-Popham in November 1941, but arrived at Singapore in late December. He had previously been Lord Gort’s chief of staff during the German blitzkrieg in May 1940, resulting in the evacuation at Dunkirk. After only a few days as C-in-C Far East, he stepped aside to become Wavell’s chief of staff when the latter assumed the ABDA Command in early January 1942, which incorporated the Far East Command. (USAMHI)
Lieutenant-General Sir Lewis Heath, III Indian Corps commander, who was knighted after his victories over the Duke of Aosta’s Italian Army in Eritrea, while leading the 11th Indian Division there during January – April, 1941. (USAMHI)
Lieutenant-General Percival and Major-General H. Gordon Bennett, GOC Australian troops in Malaya pose for a photograph in Singapore. In addition to Bennett’s prerogative to contact his home government if he questioned Percival’s orders, he also worked closely with Wavell on a plan to defend Johore Province, which was contrary to Percival’s strategy. Their military relationship was a cantankerous one. (USAMHI)
Lend-Lease material to aid the British arriving at Singapore’s Keppel Harbour from the United States before Pearl Harbor when the Americans were neutral but supplying arms and munitions to Britain, then the only Western democracy combating Germany and Italy. After Pearl Harbor, the United States would become an active belligerent against the Axis forces in both the Pacific and Europe. (Library of Congress)
Here, 25-pounder field artillery pieces with their Quad tractors and ammunition limbers embark at Keppel Harbour on Singapore Island for a rail journey to the Malayan Peninsula. Without tanks these guns would be the most formidable weapons among the British and Commonwealth ground forces. (Library of Congress)
The Bristol Blenheim Mk. IV Long Nose bombers arrive at Singapore for assembly. In this model, the forward fuselage was revised and lengthened by 3 feet to include a navigator’s station under a glazed upper surface with a downward-scalloped port side. The Blenheim Mk. IV equipped one squadron in the Far East. (Library of Congress)
Here, 25-pounder field artillery pieces are being transported on railcars in Singapore for their final destination on the Malayan Peninsula. (Library of Congress)
Lanchester armoured cars ready for transport from Singapore to the Malayan Peninsula. Earlier models of these armoured cars served in the First World War with these later ones being produced in 1927. By 1939, most Lanchesters were sent to the Far East and assigned to the Selangor and Perak battalions of the Federated Malay States Volunteer Force as well as the 2nd Battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders in Malaya. The main armament of the vehicle included a .50 calibre Vickers machine-gun and two other .303 calibre Vickers machine-guns, the latter ones in a dual mount. Their thin armour of 9mm made them easy prey for Japanese light and medium tanks and, although they had good cross-country performance, they were too big, heavy and slow for reconnaissance missions. (Library of Congress)
Indian soldier flashes a victory sign from a porthole on a troopship arriving at Singapore’s Keppel Harbour. (Library of Congress)
Indian troops boarding a train to depart Singapore Island for their new garrisons on the Malayan Peninsula. Many of the reinforcements lacked sufficient battle experience like the 11th Indian Division that had served in Eritrea during Wavell’s East Africa campaign of January until May 1941. (Library of Congress)
British troops pose in tropical kit upon arrival to Singapore’s Keppel Harbour. After arriving in Singapore, a lot of time was required for acclimatization to the equatorial environment. (Author’s collection)
Scottish officer teaches Indian soldier how to play the bagpipes aboard a troopship bound for Singapore. The officer is wearing his traditional kilt and demonstrates the polyglot nature of the British and Commonwealth forces in Malaya and Singapore. (Library of Congress)
British troops in tropical kit standing at ease with their camouflaged solar topees in Malaya before the outbreak of hostilities. Members of this infantry section are armed with SMLE rifles, while an NCO carries his Thompson submachine-gun at ease. They are practising the rudiments of camouflage and concealment in the jungle. (Author’s collection)
A platoon from the 9th Gurkha Regiment is seen advancing during Malayan manoeuvres before the war. The NCO (far right) kneels with his Thompson submachine-gun while the soldier behind him next to the tree rests his Bren light-machine-gun on its bipod. (Library of Congress)
A pair of 9th Gurkhas training in a cautious, slow advance against an enemy position with the soldier in the foreground lying prone. Both Gurkhas have their fearsome 18-inch sword bayonets attached to their SMLE rifles in the Malayan jungle before the Japanese invasion. (Library of Congress)
A Gurkha warrant officer giving map directions to his NCOs in the Malayan jungle during field exercises in preparation for the anticipated outbreak of war with Japan. (Library of Congress)
A section of camouflaged British infantry troops training in the dense Malayan vegetation. The section’s NCO is carrying a Thompson submachine-gun with a drum magazine, while the other soldiers have the standard issue SMLE rifle. (Library of Congress)
Elements of a British platoon practice charging with fixed bayonets on their SMLE rifles while their NCOs (front row) have Thompson submachine-guns. The soldier in the left rear is carrying his Bren light-machine-gun. (Library of Congress)
A camouflaged soldier of the 1st Battalion Manchester Regiment, which had previously seen action against Arab insurgents in Palestine before the war, leans against a tree to better aim his shot using a SMLE rifle. (Library of Congress)
British troops train in deploying barbed wire for a roadblock as they unload some from a lorry on a Malayan road. (Library of Congress)
One British soldier helps another fasten his webbing while on training manoeuvres in dense Malayan vegetation. (Library of Congress)
Indian soldiers of the Dogra Regiment practising with rubber boats on a lake near Singapore. (Library of Congress)
A British soldier helps load another drum onto a Lewis machine-gun positioned on its front bipod while on a training exercise on Malaya in 1941. This venerable weapon of First World War vintage was designed by an American and used .303 inch ammunition while being operated by gas and air cooling. It was one of the first infantry support weapons to be widely deployed. (Author’s collection)
Malay troops training using a smoke screen to conceal their attack on Malaya. (USAMHI)
A crewman of a 2nd Argyll and Sutherland Highlander Lanchester armoured car sends a hand signal while on manoeuvres before the war. (Library of Congress)
Australian troops march before the Sultan Abdul Samad’s palace before the war. (Library of Congress)
Indian troops with an impromptu bipod for Bren gun prepare during an air-raid drill. The limited number of rounds per magazine made the Bren light-machine-gun very ineffective with sustained fire at rapid flying aircraft. (USAMHI)
Indian soldiers of the Dogra Regiment train on a lake near Singapore in a variety of watercraft and are assisted by a British soldier lending his cane to help land the boat. (Library of Congress)
Indian soldiers practice with 3-inch mortars in Malaya. These mortars were used frequently due to a lack of adequate artillery support against the Japanese infantry advance. (Library of Congress)
Indian gunners practice loading their field artillery piece in a Malayan rubber plantation. Note how the soldier at the right has opened the breach and is waiting for the round to be loaded. (Library of Congress)
Field Marshal Wavell (far left) inspects Indian mortar section on one of his visits to Singapore as C-in-C India just before the war in November 1941. To the right of Wavell is Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, C-in-C Far East, in the solar topee. (Author’s collection)
Indian soldiers embark onto a wooden boat tied to a pier in southern Johore Province during an invasion exercise. (USAMHI)
Indian mountain artillery battery gunners train on a rubber plantation in Malaya. (USAMHI)
Bristol Blenheim Mk. I bomber over Tengah Airfield on Singapore Island en route to its new base at Alor Star in north-western Malaya’s Kedah Province south of the Thai border during the first few days of December 1941. All but one of the bombers in the squadron would eventually be destroyed by repeated Japanese air attacks commencing on 8 December 1941. (AWM)
Catalina flying boat lies still with a relaxed crew on the aircraft’s wings and engines before its preparation to take off in Malayan waters to patrol Indian Ocean and South China Sea before the Japanese attack. (AWM)
Tamil helpers assist in the launch of a Catalina flying boat down the slipway for an aerial reconnaissance patrol mission from Singapore. (Library of Congress)
RAF pilot gears up before take off from a Malayan airfield. The RAF and RAAF antiquated fighters were no match for the Japanese III Air Division’s Zero fighters or the IJA Oscars and Nates. (AWM)
Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival with Averill Harriman, President Roosevelt’s emissary to Britain at Sembawang Airfield, just south of the naval base, on Singapore Island before the war in the Pacific started. Part of Harriman’s position was to evaluate the efficiency with which Lend-Lease supplies were arriving to Britain and its overseas garrisons. (USAMHI)