Chapter Two
During 1941, as the American embargo on Japan was intensified, Malaya was sought after as a great prize by the Japanese High Command. Apart from Malaya’s production of approximately 40 per cent of the world’s rubber and 58 per cent of its tin, capturing the great British naval base at Singapore would open up the entire area for further invasions and acquisitions. The Japanese already knew that Singapore Fortress was practically defenceless facing northwards towards Johore, RAF and RAAF fighter strength was exaggerated for propaganda purposes, and although there were five to six divisions of the British Army stationed in Malaya, totalling about 80,000 troops, less than 50 per cent were British.
The Japanese invasion plan, utilizing the 25th Japanese Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and comprised of three crack Japanese infantry divisions, the 5th, 18th and Imperial Guards Division, was to concentrate on the RAF and RAAF airfields in northern Malaya during the initial stages. The plan for each of the three divisions was strictly mapped out. The IJA 5th Division with a tank regiment’s support would land at Singora and Patani, both harbours with beaches on Thailand’s east coast, just north of the Thailand-Malaya border, and then rapidly drive south across Thailand’s border into western Malaya. The aim of this advance was to capture the Kedah Province airfields along the north-western Malayan coast in the vicinity of Jitra, Aloe Star and Butterworth, and then cross the Perak River into Perak Province. Then, the IJA 5th Division was to continue southwards and capture Kuala Lumpur, the capital of Malaya’s Federated States. The 18th Division’s 56th Regiment, also known as the Takumi Force (after its commander Major-General Takumi), was to land on the north-eastern Malay coast near the key northern airfield of Kota Bahru, just south of the Thai border, capturing the airfields there. Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, Chief of Operations and Planning Staff, 25th Japanese Army, believed that RAF and RAAF aircraft stationed in the vicinity of Kota Bahru particularly threatened the landings at Singora and Patani to the north. The 56th Regiment was then to trek southwards along Malaya’s eastern coast to Kuantan and capture its airfield there. Another regiment from this Chrysanthemum Division was to seize British Borneo while the third regiment landed at Singora-Patani as a reserve for the IJA invasion operation. The Imperial Guards Division would land later at Singora, or another port to be selected, and follow the 5th IJA Division into Malaya to become part of the 25th Army’s reserve after it assisted in the seizure of Thailand and the start of the Burmese invasion. Once the advance south was proceeding, these two divisions would occupy the main trunk road down Malaya’s west coast and head southwards. The 18th IJA Division would operate along the eastern coast of the Malay Peninsula.
The Japanese intended to first neutralize the threat of the RAF and RAAF in Malaya with over 500 of its aircraft from the Japanese 3rd Air Division, and then allow this air armada to provide the necessary tactical air support against Commonwealth forces on the peninsula. The IJN’s second fleet provided the amphibious arm to the landing operations and then surface support as needed. The Japanese wanted the conquest of Malaya and Singapore to occur in less than 100 days before significant British and Commonwealth reinforcements could reach the island or peninsula.
The Japanese fighters, both of the army and navy, were vastly superior to the RAF and RAAF Brewster Buffaloes. The Ki-43 Oscar (Hayabusa, meaning peregrine falcon to the Japanese), was a formidable aircraft being considered the Japanese Army’s best fighter in terms of lightness, manoeuvrability and speed. The Ki-43 was developed in 1937 when the Japanese Army decided to produce a fighter with a retractable undercarriage to succeed the Ki-27. This newer fighter went into service in June 1941. The Oscar was armed with only two 12.7 machine-guns and it had no pilot armour, self-sealing fuel tanks or starter motor until later in the war. This fighter proved very successful against Allied aircraft early in the war despite its light armament. After encounters with more advanced Allied fighters, later in the war armour and selfsealing fuel tanks were added. The Ki-43 was deployed in greater numbers than any other Imperial Army fighter and was second only to the Imperial Japanese Navy’s Zero in terms of sheer numbers in the air armamentarium. The A6M Mitsubishi Reisen was known to the Allies as the Zero or Zeke. It was the Japanese Navy’s main and superb fighter aircraft in all Pacific theatres and was the first carrier-borne aircraft in the world to achieve full parity with its land-based contemporaries. When fitted with a drop tank, the Zero had a phenomenal range and had superior armament to the Oscar with its two 20mm fixed forward-firing cannon in the leading edges of the wing and two 7.7mm forward-firing machine-guns in the forward fuselage.
The Brewster F2A Buffalo was ordered as the US Navy’s first monoplane fighter, the prototype of which appeared in 1938 and entered service in July 1939. The Buffalo Mk. I was delivered by the United States to both the British in Malaya and the Dutch in the NEI. The Brewster Buffalo was outmoded by the time of the Japanese invasion and had not taken part in either the European or North African theatres because it was superseded by faster, more efficient fighters. It was certainly outperformed by either the Japanese Army’s Oscar or Japanese Navy’s Zero, even though the Japanese did suffer several planes shot down by Allied aircraft and ground fire.
As planning for the invasion and capture of Malaya and Singapore began in earnest three months before the assault, attention to potential problems with such an invasion and the solutions needed were tackled quickly. For example, after a survey of the topography and infrastructure of Malaya was made, it was noted that there were no less than 250 bridges along the main trunk road between Singapore and the Thai border due to the many east-to-west running rivers. Japanese logisticians, principally among them Colonel Tsuji based at a jungle warfare training centre on Formosa, realized that the longer it took to repair destroyed bridges, the longer the British would have to build up their defences in Johore Province and Singapore Island. Therefore, it was decided that an entire engineer regiment (for bridge reconstruction) should be allocated to each of the three divisions in the 25th Japanese Army and a fourth one under the army commander General Yamashita’s direct control.
Lieutenant-General Yamashita was appointed commander of the 25th Japanese Army on 5 November 1941. Although respected by many of his peers, the newly-installed Prime Minister Tojo was an enemy of his and attempted to keep him out of Tokyo and the seat of power. Another enemy was his immediate superior, General Terauchi, commander of the Southern Army. Thus, when recalled as the army commander in Manchuko in northern China to lead the 25th Japanese Army’s invasion of Malaya and Singapore, Yamashita knew about his perilous political position and how only a quick and decisive victory could protect him from demotion, or worse. Two of the three division commanders of the 25th Japanese Army had good relationships with Yamashita and also possessed vast experience in opposed landings during the Sino-Japanese War. They were Lieutenant-General Matsui, commander of the 5th IJA Division, and Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi, commander of the elite 18th or Chrysanthemum IJA Division. The third division, the Imperial Guards Division, had as its commander Lieutenant-General Nishimura, who was another old enemy of Yamashita. Ancillary units supporting the three IJA divisions were two regiments of heavy field artillery and the III Tank Brigade. The total strength of the 25th Japanese Army was 60,000 men. Yamashita was also to be supported by the 3rd Air Division with approximately 450 aircraft and the IJN’s fleet air wing contributing an additional sixty aircraft.
At Singora and Patani, the 5th Division’s landings commenced on 8 December 1941 at 0400 hours, which was just over an hour after the Pearl Harbor raid. It was unopposed by Thai forces. However, the 56th Infantry Regiment’s landing on the eastern Malay coast at Kota Bahru was strongly opposed by British forces just a few hours later that day. With the IJN surface fleet lending naval gunfire, this regiment broke through the British brigade defending the coastline in close order combat with bayonet charges, which were typical of IJA training doctrine. However, the price to pay for pressing these attacks on the British positions at Kota Bahru was steep. By midnight of 8 December, the airfield at Kota Bahru was firmly in Japanese possession and the Japanese troops re-grouped after the heavy fighting following the amphibious assault.
The Japanese aircraft that occupied the airfields at Singora and Patani, on Thailand’s east coast, destroyed sixty of the 100 British aircraft in northern Malaya by 9 December, gaining total air domination by the end of the fourth day of the invasion. The British plan was already beginning to shatter. From the start the Japanese had kept the British off balance in Malaya. Outnumbered more than two to one, the Japanese, never hesitating to re-group or re-supply their forces, surged down the main roads on the western side of the peninsula on thousands of bicycles and in hundreds of abandoned British cars and trucks. Because of Malaya’s intense heat, the bicycles’ tires blew out. However, the resourceful Japanese learned to ride down the paved motor road trunk on the rims of the bicycles. The sound of metal to pavement sounded like tanks and the peninsula’s defenders, notably the relatively inexperienced Indian troops who were terrified of armour, often broke for the rear.
Lieutenant-General Tomoyuki Yamashita, 25th Army Commander, who both politically and militarily needed a speedy conquest over Malaya and Singapore. After his victory he acquired the sobriquet Tiger of Malaya. (USAMHI)
Lieutenant-General Takuro Matsui, Commander of the IJA 5th Division, enjoyed an excellent relationship with Yamashita. His division was highly mechanized and experienced from service in China. (USAMHI)
RAF ground personnel with American-built Brewster Buffalo fighters at a northern Malayan airfield. Because of its shape, this fighter was pejoratively dubbed the ‘Flying Barrel’. (Author’s collection)
RAAF pilots with their Lockheed Hudson Mk. IVA bombers, which were acquired from the United States via Lend-Lease, at a northern Malayan airfield. In addition to its six .303-inch machine-guns and an internal bomb-load of 1,350lb, the Hudson (along with the Catalina flying boat) was instrumental for coast reconnaissance. (AWM)
A squadron of RAAF Brewster Buffaloes flies in formation over Malaya. Due to their slower speed and less manoeuvrability, they were no match for their contemporary Japanese counterparts. (Library of Congress)
Japanese troops in captured fishing boat appear cheerful as they prepare for their unopposed landing at Patani, Thailand on 8 December 1941. (USAMHI)
Japanese infantry settle on board an assault barge off Thailand’s eastern coast for their uncontested assault on Singora on 8 December 1941. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops leisurely landing their equipment from a small craft at Singora, Thailand. (USAMHI)
A Japanese Special Naval Landing Force, or Rikusentai, officer leads his troops ashore without opposition along Thailand’s coast. The IJN had no marine corps as such, but members of ships’ companies were chosen to act as landing parties when required. (USAMHI)
Japanese 5th Division infantrymen land unopposed on Singora beach, 8 December 1941. (USAMHI)
Lieutenant-General Renya Mutaguchi, 18th Division commander. He had served in China with Yamashita and they were on excellent terms. Mutaguchi would go on to command this same division, as well as the Japanese 15th Army, in Burma and for the invasion of Assam, India in 1944. (USAMHI)
Japanese assault troops from Mutaguchi’s 56th Regiment (Takumi Force) board a landing barge to attack north-eastern Malaya’s Kota Bahru, just south of the Thai border, on 8 December 1941. (USAMHI)
Colonel Masanobu Tsuji, the main Japanese logistician on Yamashita’s 25th Army Staff for the Malaya attack. He created manuals for jungle fighting and insisted on having an engineer regiment with each of the three invading IJA divisions to rebuild damaged bridges. (USAMHI)
Two Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa Oscar army fighters prepare for a mission on the Malayan Peninsula in early December 1941. This plane was the most advanced fighter available to the IJA in the opening phases of the Second World War and came as a very considerable shock to the Allied air forces. (USAMHI)
A trio of Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa Oscar army fighters patrols overhead after having won air supremacy of the RAF and RAAF in December 1941. (USAMHI)
Work crews assemble American-built Brewster Buffaloes in a Singapore hangar for transfer to northern and eastern Malayan airfields. On a few occasions, these planes and their pilots meted out some punishment to the Japanese air forces. However, the reverse was usually the case. (Library of Congress)
A Japanese Army pilot climbs into his Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa Oscar army fighter for a mission over the Malayan Peninsula in December 1941. (USAMHI)
A Japanese pilot lies dead after being shot down over Malaya by British anti-aircraft artillery. (USAMHI)
A Japanese soldier views a captured British anti-aircraft artillery that is fixed to its platform in a well-constructed gun pit. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops beside their diminutive Type 92 tankettes, which were armed with a single 7.7mm Type 97 machineguns, come ashore on the Malayan Peninsula. (USAMHI)
Japanese engineers build a new bridge over a Malayan jungle waterway with wooden beams and planks. (USAMHI)
Japanese engineers manhandle a bridge section into place to repair a damaged crossing in Malaya. Colonel Tsuji had anticipated such difficulties in his planning the operation a few months before the invasion. (USAMHI)
Heavily laden Japanese troops, some with bicycles, cross a wooden log improvised bridge. The engineers in the background are stripped of their clothes to keep them dry. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops haul a field artillery piece up a steep jungle embankment in the Malayan jungle. (USAMHI)
Camouflaged Japanese gunners move their Type 92 battalion Howitzer into position. (USAMHI)
The 25th Army commander, General Yamashita, reviews map co-ordinates with his subordinates during the advance down the Malayan Peninsula. (USAMHI)
A British pillbox at Kota Bahru. The Japanese were heavily confronted by the British and their fortifications in their defence of this north-eastern Malayan coastal position causing significant Japanese casualties in the initial assault waves. (USAMHI)
Japanese soldiers lie dead by the tide’s edge near their 49-foot Type A landing barge (Daisatsu), which was the most common one used by the IJA. It could carry 100–120 men, ten horses, an artillery piece or a light tank. (USAMHI)
A Japanese officer with his sword drawn leads his troops in an assault on British forces at Kota Bahru on 8 December 1941. (USAMHI)
A Japanese infantryman fires his Arisaka 6.5mm Type 38 rifle. A longer 7.7mm variant was also produced but the shorter one was more useful in jungle terrain. (USAMHI)
A Japanese infantry group, armed with a flamethrower, attacks an enemy pillbox. These British entrenchments strongly contested the initial Japanese landings at Kota Bahru with deadly machine-gunfire on assaulting troops leaving their barges. (USAMHI)
Japanese assault troops with their highly successful light infantry support weapon, the knee mortar, which could hurl a grenade 75 yards. The Japanese soldier (left) holds the grenades in his hands. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops with bayonets fixed and helmets camouflaged use stealth as a tactic while warily approaching an enemy position in dense vegetation. (USAMHI)
Japanese soldiers pose in a martial stance with their bayonets fixed and helmets donning vegetation as camouflage. (USAMHI)
Lying in the prone position, awaiting the order to commence an assault, a Japanese soldier fixes his bayonet to his Arisaka rifle. The Japanese were heavily instructed on using the bayonet as a major infantry weapon at their training depots. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops preparing for a bayonet charge. Often the soldiers would tie a family inscribed banner to the end of their Arisaka rifle for good fortune. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops charging through a Malayan rubber tree plantation. Direct bayonet assaults and stealthy outflanking were typical infantry manoeuvres that unnerved the British and Commonwealth troops defending Malaya. (USAMHI)
A Japanese flamethrower assists infantry in their assault on enemy slit trenches and earthen fortifications. Very often the retreating British and Commonwealth forces had too little time to prepare extensive defence works to meet the Japanese who were pressing their attack. (USAMHI)
Japanese soldiers lay dead in dense Malayan growth victims of their reckless but effective style of assault on enemy positions. The 25th Army commander, Yamashita, enforced a very strict time agenda, less than a hundred days, in capturing the peninsula and Singapore Island. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops, using portable filtering devices, purify Malayan jungle water sources. Waiting for supplies and reinforcements was not part of the Japanese plan as they relentlessly pushed down the peninsula. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops find some time for rest in their intense campaign for Malaya. The capture of Malaya and Singapore took Yamashita’s forces just under seventy days. (USAMHI)
Three Japanese ground personnel prepare their Nakajima Hayabusa Ki-43 Oscar for a mission. A bomb is suspended from the forward fuselage. The Allied air forces learned in a bitter way how versatile this IJA fighter was. (USAMHI)
British civilian cars and trucks were abandoned in Malaya by the droves after the December 1941 invasion. The Japanese not only used these vehicles to their advantage down the Malayan Peninsula but after the capitulation shipped many to New Guinea for use on the Papuan Front. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops ride on or walk beside their bicycles. The troops walking are exercising different muscles to give the individual infantryman more endurance for the advance. (USAMHI)
A Japanese soldier carries his loaded bicycle over a log bridge. His full kit attached to the rear and front fenders could weigh as much as 60lb. (USAMHI)
Japanese troops walking beside their bicycles to rest certain muscle groups during the advance down the western Malayan road trunk. In addition to capturing the north-western Malayan airfields, the IJA 5th Division’s axis of advance was to get to this road trunk on the western side of the peninsula to expedite the southward advance towards Singapore Island. (USAMHI)
Japanese Type 95 light tanks with a 37mm gun on the turret and two 7.7mm machine-guns advance past captured civilian vehicles down the Malayan trunk road on the western side of the island. Certain members of the British High Command before the war had concluded that tanks were not suitable for operation in Malaya, which was clearly a lethal mistake. (USAMHI)