Chapter Three
The sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse was a seminal naval engagement in the Second World War, which illustrated the effectiveness of aerial attacks against naval forces that were not adequately protected by air cover and the resulting importance of including an aircraft carrier in any major fleet action. The British High Command had decided to seek out and sink the Japanese invasion fleet to counter the heavy losses already incurred in northern Malaya in early December 1941. Force Z was comprised of the new 35,000-ton British King George V class battleship HMS Prince of Wales (under the command of Captain John C. Leach) and the older 32,000-ton battle cruiser HMS Repulse (under the command of Captain William George Tennant). Force Z was under the command of Rear Admiral Sir Tom Spencer Vaughan Phillips, who was aboard HMS Prince of Wales, and sortied, without air cover as the RAF and RAAF were now eliminated as threats in north-eastern Malaya, to counterattack the Japanese fleet. Phillips was sceptical that battleships could be sunk by aircraft, as had been demonstrated by the American aviator Billy Mitchell several years earlier. On 10 December, the IJN Air Force’s land-based, twin-engine Mitsubishi G4M Betty and Mitsubishi G3M Nell medium attack planes of the 22nd Air Flotilla, functioning as both high-level bombers and sea-level torpedo-bearing aircraft, from their base in Saigon, sank both capital ships east of Malaya, near Kuantan, effectively rendering the Commonwealth and British Army without naval support in addition to the destruction of the RAF and RAAF forces in Malaya a couple of days earlier.
Phillips was regarded by Winston Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, as one of the Royal Navy’s highest intellects. Phillips’ last action was in 1915. By the time Britain was combating Germany during the Second World War, Phillips was deputy chief of naval staff. He had taken over the job from Admiral Andrew Cunningham, who had left to command the Mediterranean Fleet. Cunningham, a man of action, considered Phillips to have been promoted above his talents. Nonetheless, Phillips interacted quite well with Churchill. Other British admirals, though, clashed with Phillips. When confronted by fellow Admiral Sir John Tovey, commander-in-chief of the Home fleet, about the need for air cover for ships at sea, Phillips became irate and virtually accused Tovey of being a coward. Phillips was quoted as saying that ‘bombers are no match for battleships’. He was renowned for his impatience with those sailors who believed in naval air power, while Tovey had been against sending HMS Prince of Wales to the Orient as it would leave the Home fleet with only one modern battleship to counter the German surface fleet desperately trying to sever the tenuous Atlantic convoy lifeline from North America.
Captain Leach’s career was noteworthy for his involvement during the stalking and sinking of the German battleship Bismarck in late May 1941, in which an obsolete Fairey Swordfish biplane from the British carrier HMS Ark Royal had its torpedo strike the stern of the German battleship causing its rudder to jam, thereby preventing its passage to safety at Brest. The Bismarck, like Force Z, lacked air cover, so Captain Leach knew first-hand of his ship’s potential vulnerability from aerial attack. Captain Tennant earned military praise when he led the Royal Navy’s shore party in orchestrating the evacuation of the BEF off the beaches of Dunkirk in June 1940 and personally saw the Luftwaffe’s destruction of surface ships, despite the presence of the RAF.
The original British plan had called for a larger fleet, which included the new Illustrious-class aircraft carrier HMS Indomitable for air cover. The plan had to be revised when HMS Indomitable was damaged en route, after running aground in the British West Indies. Ultimately, it was Churchill’s decision to allocate HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse to Singapore’s defence, without the initially intended air cover, in October 1941 to deter expansionist Japan from entering the war. However, it was only a token compromise to demonstrate how the British needed to protect its various colonial territories in Malaya, Borneo and the Straits Settlements. The British prime minister assured the Commonwealth prime ministers, ‘In my view, Prince of Wales will be the best possible deterrent’ to Japanese aggression.
It is ironic that it was the British, who had invented the aircraft carrier during the First World War, but were still reluctant two decades later to fully grasp the vulnerability of surface vessels from aerial attack. Furthermore, this disaster for the Royal Navy occurred just over a year after the Mediterranean fleet’s brilliant attack on Italian battleships at Taranto in November 1940, by carrier-based Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers flying at less than 150 miles per hour at sea level. Parenthetically, it was the Taranto attack that served as a blueprint for the Japanese Navy’s plan to attack the United States’ Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor in 1941. Also, German planes, especially the slower Stuka dive bombers, destroyed numerous British warships without air cover off Crete, in May 1941, that were attempting to both reinforce and evacuate the island.
HMS Prince of Wales was commissioned in 1941 and as armament formidably possessed ten 14-inch guns, four twin 5.25-inch dual-purpose (anti-ship or anti-aircraft) guns, six sets of eight-barrelled 2-pounder pom-poms, a 40mm Bofors gun, and a number of 20mm Oerlikon light cannons and Lewis machine-guns. The admiralty believed that this ship had the most modern design and weaponry for comprehensive protection from either torpedo or aerial bomb attack given the fact that HMS Prince of Wales was well-equipped with horizontal armour. HMS Repulse was commissioned in August 1916 and as her main armament carried six 15-inch guns and nine 4-inch guns. Her anti-aircraft armament was of limited quantity and was composed of just six hand-operated, high-angle 4-inch guns and three sets of eight-barrelled 2-pounder pom-poms. HMS Repulse was also an older ship and in 1941 was deficient in the horizontal armour needed for protection against aerial bombardment. Force Z arrived at Singapore Harbour on 2 December 1941 to a triumphant and jubilant reception, just days before the IJN attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December and the start of the IJA invasion of Malaya the following day. For the inhabitants and military command at Singapore, it was a welcome reinforcement, especially since the considerable armaments of the two capital ships strengthened the two 15-inch shore gun batteries that formed Singapore’s main defence on its southern (Buono Vista battery) and eastern (Johore battery) coasts. To Admiral Phillips’ credit, he did request Hawker Hurricanes for land-based air cover;. However, he was informed that none of these fighters were available. The RAF could offer only a combat-untested squadron of the much slower, under-gunned Brewster Buffalo fighters piloted by the Australians. These now-obsolete planes were no match for the much-vaunted Japanese Navy and Army fighters.
On 6 December, reports were received in Singapore of a Japanese invasion fleet off the south coast of Indochina, and HMS Repulse and two destroyers, which were on a training cruise to Port Darwin, were hastily recalled back to their new base. Force Z, along with four escorting destroyers, HMS Express, HMS Electra, HMS Tenedos and the Australian vessel Vampire, sortied from Singapore during the early evening hours of 8 December. After intelligence reported that a Japanese invasion fleet was advancing on the northern Malayan Peninsula, Admiral Phillips devised a plan to launch a surprise surface attack against it off Kota Bahru, but he could not even count on Malayan-based RAF or RAAF cover since those airfields were already in the process of being overrun in northern Malaya. Instead, Phillips requested planes from Singapore to provide air reconnaissance to the north of his intended target at Kota Bahru and fighter cover over Singora. Phillips intended to strike at the enemy as they landed their forces, hoping to sever their supply lines and give the British troops ashore the chance to throw the invaders back into the sea.
The next day, 9 December, during the afternoon, Phillips received a message from Singapore categorically stating that fighter cover over Singora was not possible. Admiral Phillips was also unaware that Japanese Vice-Admiral Takeo Kurita’s invasion fleet had two battleships escorting the thirty troop transports. In addition, his invasion fleet could count on approximately 100 bombers, forty fighters and six air reconnaissance planes of the 22nd Air Flotilla stationed at Saigon in French Indochina. Concealed by rain and clouds over the Gulf of Siam, HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse were sighted by the Japanese submarine I-65 (later to be re-numbered I-165) at 1345 hours. There was some signals interference, initially from that submarine. However, within two hours, IJN headquarters in Saigon received the submarine’s message giving the composition of the British task force, its speed and direction. Later that afternoon, the British fleet believed it had been sighted by three Japanese reconnaissance planes in the Gulf of Siam. In reality, these three planes were Allied ones. With Phillips now believing that the element of surprise was lost, he decided to return to Singapore, much to the chagrin of his crews who had been on high alert for a surface engagement against the Japanese. Ironically, Japanese Admiral Kurita’s surface force was only a few miles away to the north of Force Z. Coincident with all of this reconnaissance activity and the Japanese submarine’s reporting of the British capital ships’ presence, Japanese planes at Saigon quickly aborted their mission to attack Singapore and instead loaded torpedoes onto their land-based Mitsubishi G4M Betty and Mitsubishi G3M Nell bombers to begin the hunt for the British ships during the early evening hours. Due to rain and cloud cover, the Japanese bombers could not locate the British force and returned to their French Indochinese aerodromes, while Phillips steered Force Z to Singapore.
During his return voyage to Singapore, Admiral Phillips received some new intelligence that the Japanese were landing troops at Kuantan, which lies halfway down the eastern side of the Malayan Peninsula between Kota Bahru and Singapore Island. The British admiral immediately noted that the reported landings, if successful, would have the drastic effect of cutting the land supply line up the Malay Peninsula to the forces in the north. Phillips now elected to confront the Japanese landing there, but after arriving off Kuantan in the early dawn hours of 10 December, no enemy invasion force was sighted. Unbeknown to Phillips, his force had been stalked by the same Japanese submarine, I-65, since 0230 hours, with six torpedoes being fired at Repulse, all of which missed.
Japanese Admiral Nobutake Kondo, commander-in-chief of the Japanese invasion forces, had ordered all of his available naval aircraft to attack during the early morning hours of 10 December, while he sailed his surface vessels southwards to attack the British ships. In addition, the IJN launched against the British its twin-engine Nell and Betty bombers carrying both torpedoes and bombs southward again from their airfields in Indochina soon after dawn on 10 December. Phillips’ whereabouts were unknown to the RAF or Singapore’s command centre because he had kept radio silence. His decision to maintain radio silence was to hide his intentions to the enemy. However, by doing so, he had to rely on the Singapore command staff to anticipate his reaction to the Kuantan landing and automatically send fighters to cover his surface vessels. Phillips error then was to rely on the intelligence of his shore-based colleagues in following his line of reasoning, thus, the maintenance of radio silence and the absence of a clear request for Singapore-based fighter cover for Force Z off Kuantan. Another error involved those in Singapore, who were oblivious that their signal of the Kuantan landing, although false information, had been sent to Force Z, and it apparently never occurred to them that Phillips would head for that locale and rely on Singapore to send up the RAF and RAAF fighters for air cover.
At 1107 hours on 10 December, HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales were attacked by ninety-six high-level horizontal and torpedo bombers as well as ten search planes sent out from Saigon before dawn. At 1113 hours, the high-level bombers scored one hit on the hangar deck area of HMS Repulse, which started a small fire. At 1140 hours, six torpedoes hit HMS Prince of Wales. Meanwhile, Captain Tennant of HMS Repulse had sent an emergency radio signal to Singapore at 1150 hours that Force Z was being attacked. This was the only signal ever received on shore to indicate that air support was urgently needed by HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. How Admiral Phillips believed that he would automatically be provided RAF or RAAF air cover if he ran into trouble while maintaining radio silence remains an enigma. Tennant, as well as print and radio correspondents, notably CBS correspondent Cecil Brown, aboard HMS Repulse were amazed at the tenacity of the Japanese torpedo pilots to press on with their near sea-level attacks despite withering British naval anti-aircraft fire. Nine torpedo bombers launched their torpedoes at the old battle cruiser. Six minutes after the solitary signal requesting air cover was sent, Tennant showed incredible skill of manoeuvre and succeeded in evading all the tracks of nine torpedoes. Just prior to sending the emergency radio signal to Singapore, Tennant had asked the flagship what damage she had suffered but got no answer. He then signalled Phillips, ‘We have dodged nineteen torpedoes thus far, thanks to Providence,’ adding that all damage done from the one Japanese bomb hit was under control.
Two minutes after the torpedo attack, HMS Repulse had some near misses from high-level bombers. Tennant now brought HMS Repulse closer to HMS Prince of Wales to ask if he could assist her. There was no reply. Soon it was HMS Repulse’s turn again to be attacked. A group of nine torpedo-bombers was spotted low on the horizon on the starboard bow. One torpedo struck home amidships ‘with a great jarring shudder, as though a giant hand had shaken the ship’, recalled one officer. Yet she still steamed at 25 knots with her 4-inch guns and eight-barrelled pom-poms attempting to provide anti-aircraft artillery cover for the wounded ship. HMS Repulse was hit by more torpedoes, as the planes were attacking from all directions so it was impossible for Captain Tennant to evade every track. Listing heavily, Captain Tennant ordered everyone on deck. Again he demonstrated decisive leadership and later reflected, ‘the decision for a commanding officer to cease all work in the ship below, is an exceedingly difficult one, but knowing the ship’s construction I felt very sure that she would not survive four torpedoes, and this was borne out, for she only remained afloat six or seven minutes after I gave the order for everyone to come on deck’. Captain Tennant recollected, when seeing 200 or 300 men collecting on the starboard side of the ship prior to its rolling over, ‘I never saw the slightest sign of panic or ill discipline. I told them from the bridge how well they had fought the ship, and wished them good luck.’ The escorting destroyers HMS Electra and HMS Vampire picked up the survivors, who numbered forty-two out of sixty-six officers (including Tennant) and 754 out of 1,240 ratings. At 1233 hours, HMS Repulse rolled over and plunged out of sight, stern first.
Barely able to make any speed, HMS Prince of Wales, having been hit by six torpedoes, was now under attack by nine high-level bombers. At 1244 hours, Japanese bombs were dropped with only one hitting the battleship. However, it caused the flagship to founder and when her beams were almost awash Captain Leach gave the order to abandon ship. At 1319 hours, HMS Prince of Wales keeled heavily to port and began to sink. As she went down, eleven Allied Brewster Buffalo fighters arrived on the scene, prompting a distant group of Japanese bombers to jettison their bombs and make for home. Tennant’s emergency signal had reached the Air Operations Room at 1219 hours, and eleven RAAF Buffaloes of Squadron 453 were in the air only seven minutes later, having departed from Sembawang Airfield on the northern part of Singapore Island. Now the Buffaloes patrolled overhead while the survivors of both ships were picked out of the water or from floats and lifeboats. It has been reported that while swimming for their lives, the survivors of HMS Repulse gave three cheers for their captain and their lost ship. As for HMS Prince of Wales, both Captain Leach and Admiral Phillips went down with their ship, neither one making an attempt to save himself, while waving to their departing men. Leach, in fact, was heard to call out from the sinking vessel, ‘Goodbye. Thank you. Good luck. God bless you.’ HMS Express, an escorting destroyer, crammed ninety out of 110 officers and 1,195 out of 1,502 ratings aboard. Whether it was the presence of the Allied fighters or some other factor, the Japanese chose not to strafe the survivors in the water or the destroyers attempting to save the British seamen.
It is worth repeating that the Brewster Buffalo fighters were dispatched in response to the only message, that is Tennant’s, for help that had come through from the task force. Also, Tennant had warned his crew twenty-four hours earlier to carry or wear their life-saving apparatus. When the squadron of Buffaloes, detailed to give air cover, arrived from Singapore, the sea was littered with wreckage and men floating around in the water waiting to be picked up by the destroyers. Curiously enough, the men were far from dispirited, as the pilot reported later: ‘It was obvious that the three destroyers were going to take hours to pick up those hundreds of men clinging to bits of wreckage and swimming around in filthy, oily water. About all this the threat of another bombing and machine-gun attack was imminent. Every one of those men must have realized that. Yet as I flew round every man waved and put up his thumb as I flew over him. It shook me, for here was something above human nature.’ According to Churchill’s history of the Second World War, ‘Captain Tennant realized that his ship was doomed. He promptly ordered all hands on deck, and there is no doubt that this timely action saved many lives.’
The cost to the Japanese for the sinking of two British capital ships was only eight aircraft. On the heels of the disaster at Pearl Harbor, the loss of Force Z brought grim prospects for the Allies at their isolated bastions in the Far East. All that was left for the RAF and RAAF in northern Malaya was to abandon their airfields, which had been the strategic linchpin all along for the defence of Singapore. Without an air presence in northern Malaya, British and Commonwealth troops would eventually be forced to retreat southwards towards Singapore barely ahead of the Japanese troops rapidly advancing down Malaya’s western coast.
Admiral Sir Tom Phillips (right) with his chief of staff, Rear-Admiral Palliser, in Singapore before the illfated departure of Force Z. Fortunately Palliser remained in Singapore when Force Z sailed. (NARA)
An IJN Mitsubishi G3M2 (Nell) medium attack bomber in flight. Although relatively obsolete when the Malaya invasion began, this craft contributed greatly to the sinking of HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. Here the plane has bombs attached to its fuselage and was capable of delivering almost a ton of explosive. (NARA)
A formation of Mitsubishi G4M 1 (Betty) medium attack bombers searching for Force Z. Initial searches for Force Z failed but the horizontal and torpedo bombers caught up with it on 10 December 1941 off Kuantan, Malaya. (USAMHI)
Air crew of a Japanese Mitsubishi G4M1 (Betty) medium attack bomber search the South China Sea for Force Z’s location. (NARA)
Japanese naval air crew help to load bombs onto their twin-engined Mitsubishi G3M2 (Nell) medium attack bomber at an airfield in Indochina. (NARA)
Japanese naval pilots race to board their Mitsubishi G3M2 (Nell) medium attack bombers at their airfield near Saigon on 9 December 1941. (USAMHI)
A flight of IJN medium attack bombers sortie over the South China Sea in search of Force Z. The horizontal and sea-level torpedo bombers sank the HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse within minutes of locating them, proving that a protective air cover was an absolute necessity even for capital ships. (USAMHI)
First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston S. Churchill (left) with his vice-chief of the naval staff, Admiral Sir Tom Phillips, in London in February 1940. The soon-to-be prime minister had great respect for Phillips’ intellect, although some of his fellow admirals questioned his views on the invincibility of battleships to air attack as well as his own sea-going experience. (NARA)
HMS Prince of Wales, the flagship for Admiral Phillips Force Z entering Singapore Harbour. Churchill believed that Force Z’s presence would be a deterrent to Japanese expansionist plans. (NARA)
HMS Repulse was a formidable battle cruiser for her day. However, the ship lacked sufficient horizontal armour for bomb protection and adequate anti-aircraft guns to repel aerial attack. Ironically it was Japanese torpedo planes flying at sea level that sunk her. (NARA)
One of HMS Repulse’s hand-operated 4-inch anti-aircraft guns. This weapon had limited vertical positioning and was too few in numbers to mount an adequate aerial defence against a determined enemy, especially torpedo bombers at sea level. (NARA)
The Japanese I-65 submarine, which was subsequently renamed I-165 as shown in this photograph, initially spotted Force Z and unsuccessfully fired torpedoes at HMS Repulse the day before the IJN aerial assault. (NARA)
An aerial view from an attacking Japanese plane on 10 December 1941. The HMS Prince of Wales (top) and the battle cruiser HMS Repulse early in the attack. Repulse has just sustained a bomb hit, evidenced by the plume of black smoke rising from the ship. Several near misses are also apparent on both sides of the vessel. (NARA)
Captain William G. Tennant, RN, who commanded the HMS Repulse. His brilliant naval career included co-ordinating the Royal Navy’s evacuation of the BEF from the beaches and moles of Dunkirk in late May 1940. (NARA)
The crew of HMS Prince of Wales abandoning ship. The escorting destroyer HMS Express picks up survivors from the listing battleship. Moments after this photograph, the destroyer’s lifelines had to be severed as HMS Prince of Wales was going to capsize imminently. These lucky survivors would arrive in Singapore only to become prisoners of the Japanese five weeks later. (NARA)
Captain Tenant (left) with Canon Bezzant, HMS Repulse’s ship chaplain, aboard the Australian destroyer Vampire after the rescue. (NARA)
Rescued survivors from HMS Repulse aboard the destroyer HMS Electra. Captain Tennant’s early and decisive action to abandon ship contributed to the large percentage of HMS Repulse’s crew being saved. (NARA)
HMS Prince of Wales beginning to sink as seen from aboard one of the rescuing destroyers. (NARA)
RAAF Squadron flying Brewster Buffaloes with one Bristol Blenheim flying over Malaya. HMS Repulse’s Captain Tennant sent an emergency signal to Singapore’s Air Operations Room just over an hour after the aerial assault commenced. Immediately after, eleven RAAF Brewster Buffaloes of Squadron 453, such as those shown, were airborne and dispersed the Japanese bombers from further attack and strafing. (AWM)