Germany and Scandinavia in World War II
The war in Finland cannot be considered as an isolated event, but must be viewed in relation to German goals in Scandinavia as a whole. The northern theater of war presented Germany with four major strategic advantages:
1. Access to mineral resources—Swedish iron and Finnish nickel.
2. Expansion of its base for naval operations against the Allies.
3. Control of the Baltic and Baltic approaches.
4. Interdiction of the Murmansk supply route after the German attack on the Soviet Union.
Ziemke claims that the Germans, for a variety of reasons, did not accomplish their objectives and that the German presence in Scandinavia was not enough to discourage its enemies from focusing their activities in other directions.1
These observations neglect important points by concentrating on specific strategic considerations. It is in the general realm of German interests that we have to look for answers to the question of what Germany perceived as its advantages in Scandinavia. Walter Hubatsch claims that the flow of high-grade Swedish ore made the great battles of 1942–44 possible for the Germans and a similar claim can undoubtedly be made for Finnish nickel as well as the supply of finished products from Sweden, such as ball bearings.2
We have to place ourselves in the position of the German planners and ask what the situation would have been for the Germans if they had not moved into Scandinavia. By failing to do so, the Allies could have exerted pressure on Sweden and Finland and may well have succeeded in eliminating Swedish export of iron ore and Finnish export of nickel to Germany. An Allied presence in Scandinavia would probably have kept Finland from joining Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union and Stalin would not have had to worry about an arctic front or a threat to his supply lines from the west. A further advantage in the minds of German planners was the protection of Germany’s northern flank, and this they ranked quite high. Allied air power from Scandinavia would have been very effective in the Baltic and over German ports on the southern shores of that sea.
Whether the German preoccupation with Scandinavia was an unnecessary drain on its resources is debatable. Hitler’s exaggerated concern for an invasion of the north must be ranked as a major error. The enormous resources that Germany poured into this theater drained them away from other areas. It took a reinforced army and vast expenditures in resources to defend Norway. Another army was tied down in Finland from 1941. These armies were trapped into defensive missions that had virtually no influence on the outcome of the war.
Finland’s Decisions
The debate over whether Finland’s decision to side with Germany in its attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 was made out of necessity, or simply reflected a conscious choice, has continued unabated for nearly 65 years and there is no unanimity. Wuorinen’s book in 1948—actually written by Professor Arvi Korhonen—states that “Finland had been drawn into the war—against her will—…”3 In another place he describes the start of hostilities in 1941 as “Finland, having fallen victim to an unprovoked attack, could in the beginning have no other ‘war aims’ than to repel the attack….”4
Fifty-four years later Vehviläinen writes that “there was no way that Finland could have avoided becoming involved in a new war” and that at the beginning of their contacts with the Germans in 1940 “Finland’s aims were to get security guarantees from Germany.”5 He goes on to state that “Without realizing the real nature of National Socialism and Hitler’s war aims, the Finns fought to preserve their way of life and to ensure security from what they considered an eternal threat from the east.”6
A few comments on what has been written by these authors—and others—are in order. The opening of hostilities by the Soviets was provoked and Mannerheim and other leaders admitted as much in a conversation (between Mannerheim, Tanner, Linkomies, General Walden, and General Heinrichs) on August 9, 1943—as I quote in Chapter 2. There were several German divisions in the country with the rather obvious intention to initiate ground operations and the Finns had ordered a general mobilization several days earlier. The first air attacks against Soviet targets were carried out by German aircraft operating from Finnish bases or through Finnish airspace. The German and Finnish navies had already begun laying mines in the Gulf of Finland.
Vehviläinen’s claims that the Finns were unaware of the real nature of National Socialism or Germany’s war aims are likewise absurd. What were they doing while Germany swallowed up Czechoslovakia, invaded Poland, overran their fellow Scandinavians in Denmark and Norway, and invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, and the Balkans. While the details of the persecution of the Jews and others may not have been known, enough was known about the conditions in Germany for them to make up their minds about the nature of National Socialism.
As far as Germany’s war aims are concerned, they were well known to some Finnish leaders. See, for example, General Heinrichs’ pro memoria of June 3, 1941, and the verbal comments he made at that time which I quote from in Chapter 1.
Finland’s initial aim may well have been to obtain security guarantees from Germany after it became isolated. They should have known that such guarantees would carry a costly price tag. The aim of security guarantees quickly gave way to the recapture of lost territories and the conquest of East Karelia. Wuorinen writes that “Finland’s military objectives were strictly limited: her own defense and security. At no time during the war did the country want to go, or go, any further than these objectives.”7 I believe that this erroneous explanation is put to rest in this book.
The notion that Finland fought a separate war is also absurd to an outsider although many Finns undoubtedly believed it. The notion that a small nation such as Finland launched an attack on the Soviet Union and surprisingly found itself at the side of Germany is hard to swallow. Nevertheless, the fact that they did not have a formal alliance with Germany eventually served Finland well and gave them a special status among the nations that fought at Germany’s side.
There are no doubts that the Soviets followed a policy that made Finland fear for its safety. This short-sighted policy helped propel isolated Finland into the arms of Germany. For example, at the time of the Moscow Peace in March 1940, Finland approached Sweden and Norway about a defensive alliance. Things looked promising until the Soviet Union vetoed the idea. Such an alliance may have worked to the great advantage of the Soviets by causing the Germans to have second thoughts about their planned attack on Denmark and Norway.
In October 1940, after Norway was removed from the calculations by the German invasion, Sweden agreed to a defensive alliance and political union with Finland provided the latter agreed not to wage a war of revenge against the Soviet Union. Finland agreed. The idea was again resisted by the Soviet Union and this time also by Germany (see Chapter 1).
Proceeding with this military/political union even against the wishes of the Soviet Union and Germany presented the Finns with an option that might have proved viable. It is unlikely that the Soviet Union would have attacked both Finland and Sweden since it would have threatened vital German interests and may have seriously affected their relations with both the UK and the US. Germany is also unlikely to have resorted to military measures in view of the potential loss of Swedish iron and Finnish nickel at a time when these were sorely needed by the German armament industry.
Later, the Soviets had second thoughts as Finland drew closer to Germany. A Finland tied to a neutral Sweden no longer looked like a bad option. They told Finland that they were prepared to re-evaluate their earlier opposition to a Swedish/Finnish defensive alliance and political union. This was in May 1941, too late to change Finland’s new orientation to Germany.8
Finland, unlike many of Germany’s allies, retained its independence after the war and the terms of peace could well have been harsher. The reason was probably not any sense of magnanimity on the part of the Soviet Union. Credit must be given to the fighting quality of the Finnish soldiers and the Soviets may have concluded that it was not worth another costly offensive to impose harder terms. Credit must also be given to the fact that the Finns still enjoyed considerable sympathy in the western democracies, especially in the US. This may have served as a brake on Soviet policy.
German Mistakes in 1940–41
Germany’s association with Finland is a classic study in how not to enter into a military coalition. Since Germany had decided to bring Finland into the war on its side in July 1940, sufficient time existed to iron out issues presented in coalition warfare. These include war aims, allotment of tasks, campaign plans, and command relationships.
As demonstrated in this book, there were no operational agreements between Germany and Finland much past the opening salvoes in the war. That Finland made no effort to have these issues discussed and resolved prior to the outbreak of hostilities is understandable. Their aim was to maintain maximum flexibility in their coalition with Germany, and leaving things rather vague fit in well with this aim. It is much more difficult to understand why the German military planners did not insist on nailing down these issues. The most likely answer is that all were caught up in the rosy scenario of a quick campaign that would destroy the military potential of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the notion that no elaborate arrangements or understandings were necessary was a major miscalculation that caused friction within the coalition almost from the very beginning.
If Finland had recoiled at making such arrangements, it would have been infinitely better for the Germans to learn that as early as possible. That would have allowed them to adopt the plan for Operation Barbarossa along the lines of the one prepared by General Erich Marcks at OKH, discussed in Chapter 2. His plan recommended postponing Finnish participation since the weight of the German attack would be in the south and center without a major drive to Leningrad. The anticipated benefits from Finnish participation along with the desire to control the Baltic Sea may have led to the dissipation of effort involved in three major drives into the Soviet Union.
The Germans had a very important lever that they could have used in the planning stages to get Finland to agree to support their two major goals of advances against the Murmansk Railroad and Leningrad. The Finns were eager to recover their lost territory, but would probably not have been able to do that while also defending the 500-kilometer long front in the arctic and in Lapland. This problem had become abundantly clear during the Winter War. With Germany taking over these fronts the Finns had sufficient forces to undertake the recovery of lost territories and the conquest of East Karelia. When leverage exists and is not used at the appropriate time, it is lost. The last time it could have been used was in 1942, to get the Finns to undertake operations against the Murmansk Railroad while German armies were making spectacular advances on all fronts. A German threat to withdraw from central Finland unless the Finns were more cooperative might have energized them.
It is a long-standing principle that each partner in a coalition must benefit from its membership. This was not the case in Finland. Finland benefited hugely in 1941 because of the German presence in their country, as described above. They benefited equally from the advance of Army Group North as it drew forces away from the Finnish fronts.
The Germans, on the other hand, reaped virtually no benefits from the coalition after the Finns recovered their lost territories and conquered East Karelia. The Finns refused to help the Germans against Leningrad and effectively did the same with respect to interdicting the Murmansk Railroad. The end result was that the Germans were left to dance to the Finnish fiddler. Their army in Lapland and the arctic was trapped both geographically and operationally. It did not have the strength to cut the Murmansk Railroad alone. That army could have served the German war cause better on other fronts. For Germany, Finland was a blind alley.
The Human Cost of the War
The war in Finland was a costly experience in lives and resources for the Soviet Union, Finland, and Germany. Finnish losses amounted to 52,500 killed, 7,300 missing, and 148,000 wounded. This includes 800 killed and 3,000 wounded in engagements against the Germans in Lapland. To these must be added the losses in civilian lives. The German losses are placed at 84,000. About 16,400 of these were killed, 60,400 wounded, and 6,800 missing. Again, this includes the losses in their fights with the Finns in Lapland. The Soviet losses, as estimated by the official Finnish history of the war, were 270,000 killed and 550,000 wounded.9
Military Lessons
The problems of coalition warfare, without a proper foundation, were glaringly apparent throughout the war in Finland. The failure to agree on war aims, lack of agreement on each nation’s contribution to a common strategy, and the failure to achieve unity of command were age-old principles that were violated from the outset. This was a recipe for failure.
The Germans also failed to assign adequate forces to the theater of operations so as to quickly accomplish the all-important task of seizing Murmansk or interdicting the Murmansk Railroad. This may have been the result of an underestimation of Soviet capabilities and the problems caused by terrain and weather. However, the fact that Germany’s military was overextended was obvious at the start and became worse as the war progressed.
The Germans grappled with the problem of establishing and maintaining a clear-cut main effort from the very beginning. They conducted offensive operations from three areas with no definitive focus. The problems of adequate lines of communication made the support of large-scale operations difficult in all areas, but the best road network was in the Kandalaksha sector where there was also a railroad on both sides of the border. This is where the main effort with adequate forces should have been made, leaving forces in other sectors just sufficient to tie the Soviets down by presenting them with potential threats.
The problems caused by lack of lines of communication within Finland were exacerbated by long and inadequate routes for reinforcements and supplies. One gets the impression that these problems were not adequately addressed or solved in the planning process.
The war in Finland established a historical precedent. It was the first time—except for the campaigns around Narvik and in the Nordland Province of Norway in 1940—that major troop formations conducted prolonged operations in an arctic wilderness. The Germans found that mobility was severely restricted, that sweeping encirclements were not possible, and that momentum was difficult to regain once lost.
War in the arctic cannot be successfully conducted with troops who do not have specialized training and equipment. The human element predominates in warfare under the conditions found in the arctic. The Finns, native to the area, proved superior to the Germans in the kind of terrain and weather encountered in Finland.
While the effectiveness of machines and equipment is greatly reduced in arctic warfare, the Soviets proved in 1944 that it is possible to maneuver large units, including armor. There are no ideal periods for offensive military operations—climate and terrain always pose obstacles. From the standpoint of mobility, winter is often the best period for action but troops are confronted with the practical and psychological problem of severe cold and total darkness. Specially trained and equipped troops are required. The thaw invariably presents insurmountable problems for military operations in spring and early summer. One or two good lines of communication—such as the Murmansk Railroad—can prove decisive.
Long Term Effects
Their experiences in World War II led the Scandinavian countries to take different paths in their foreign and defense policies. Sweden, which had successfully maintained its security through a flexible policy of armed neutrality, has continued that policy. Although it joined the European Union (EU) it has not joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For Denmark and Norway there was no return to the policy of neutrality. They both embraced collective security and became charter members of NATO. Denmark also joined the EU while Norway, showing its independent streak, twice turned down membership through plebiscites. It remains one of only a few countries in western and central Europe that has not joined or petitioned to join that organization. Finland has also joined the EU but has continued a neutrality-oriented security policy by not joining NATO.