Appendix I
COMPARATIVE GENERAL OFFICER RANKS1
|
GERMAN |
FINNISH |
US |
|
Reichsmarshall2 |
Suomen Marsalkka3 |
None |
|
Generalfeldmarshall |
Sotamarsalkka4 |
General of the Army |
|
Generaloberst |
Kenraalieversti5 |
General |
|
General der Infanterie, der Artillerie, etc |
Jalkavaenkenraali |
Lieutenant General |
|
Generalleutnant |
Kenraaliluutnantti |
Major General |
|
Generalmajor |
Kenraalimajuri |
Brigadier General |
The German Waffen SS had its own general officer rank structure.
Below are the four ranks and their equivalent in the German Army:
|
SS |
GERMAN ARMY |
|
Oberstgruppenführer |
Generaloberst |
|
Obergruppenführer |
General der Infanterie, der Artillerie, etc |
|
Gruppenführer |
Generalleutnant |
|
Brigadeführer |
Generalmajor |
Appendix II
OPERATIONAL CODE NAMES
|
Bagration |
Soviet summer offensive in Byelorussia in 1944. |
|
Barbarossa |
German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. |
|
Birke |
German plan for the 20th Mountain Army to North Finland in 1944. |
|
Blaufuchs 1 & 2 |
Movement of XXXVI Corps forces from Germany and Norway to Finland in June 1941. |
|
Claymore |
British/Norwegian operation in the Lofoten Islands in March 1941. |
|
Harpune Nord & Sud |
German deception operations staged to divert attention from Operation Barbarossa from May to August 1941. |
|
Jupiter |
Planned British operation against Pechenga and Banak in 1942–43. |
|
Klabautermann |
German boat operations on Lake Ladoga to interdict Soviet supply and evacuation operations for Leningrad in the summer of 1942. |
|
Lachsfang |
Proposed German-Finnish operations against the Murmansk Railroad at Kandalaksha and Belomorsk in the summer and fall of 1942. |
|
Nordlicht |
Planned German operations against Leningrad in the fall of 1942. |
|
Nordlicht |
Withdrawal of the 20th Mountain Army from Finland to Norway, October 1944—January 1945. |
|
Panther Line |
Narva River—Lake Peipus line of German field fortifications constructed in the fall of 1943. |
|
Parkplatz |
Proposed German operations against Leningrad in the spring of 1943. |
|
Platinfuchs |
Operations by Mountain Corps Norway in 1941. |
|
Polarfuchs |
Operations of German XXXVI Corps in 1941. |
|
Renntier |
German plan for the occupation of Pechenga, June 1941. |
|
Silberfuchs |
Operations of Army of Norway (including Finnish III Corps) out of Finland in 1941. |
|
Tanne Ost |
German plan for the occupation of Suursaari Island in 1944. |
|
Tanne West |
German plan to occupy the Åland Islands in 1944. |
|
Wiesengrund |
Proposed German occupation of the Rybachiy Peninsula in the summer of 1942. |
|
Zittadelle |
German operation against the Kursk salient in southern Russia in July 1943. |
Appendix III
FINNISH AND RUSSIAN GEOGRAPHIC NAMES
A problem encountered in writing this book was dealing with the names of places in territories now under Russian rule. In most cases the names have changed. Finnish references, including their military atlases, understandably use the former Finnish names while modern atlases give the Russian names. This created a problem because not all the names used in Finnish references can be located on an atlas and furthermore, one cannot be absolutely sure that one is dealing with the same place. Also, some of the places mentioned have apparently been depopulated and do not appear on maps.
With the help of the Finnish Embassy in Washington, D.C., and Jukka Juutinen in Finland, I have been able to come up with a list of Finnish names and their Russian equivalent for some of the places in question. The list is far from complete.
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Preface and Acknowledgments
1. Olli Vehviläinen, Finland in the Second World War. Between Germany and Russia. Translated by Gerard McAlester (New York: Palgrave, 202), p.ix.
2. John H. Wuorinen, editor, Finland and World War II, 1939–1940 (New York: The Ronald Press Co, 1948), p.4. The actual author of the book was Professor Arvi Korhonen who wrote the manuscript in 1945. Due to the political situation it was not considered possible to publish the manuscript under the real author’s name as the tone was clearly anti-Soviet. Professor Korhonen later became known as the father of the “drifting log theory.” This information, provided by Jukka Juutinen, is from Jari Leskinen and Antti Juutilainen (editors), Talvisodan pikkujättiläinen (WSOY, 2009), p.29 and Ohto Manninen, Molotovin cocktail-Hitlerin sateenvarjo (Painatuskeskus Oy, 1994), pp.144–145.
3. Waldemar Erfurth was also a doctor of philosophy and authored several books on military history and strategy. He also served as the official Wehrmacht historian.
Prologue
1. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.43.
2. Carl Gustaf von Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim. Translated by Count Eric Lewenhaupt (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, Inc., 1954), pp.285–286.
3. Väinö Tanner, Finlands Vag 1939–1940 (Stockholm: Albert Bonniers Forlag, 1950), p.13 and William L. Shirer, The Challenge of Scandinavia (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1955), pp.324–325.
4. Foreign Ministry Document as cited in Tanner, op. cit., p.15.
5. Tanner, op. cit., pp.24–25.
6. Ibid, p.25.
7. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.301.
8. Sontag, Raymond James and Beddie, James Stuart, editors. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939–1941 (hereinafter NSR) (German Foreign Office Documents released by the US Department of State. New York: Didier, 1948), p.78.
9. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.50.
10. It is worth noting that Winston Churchill showed considerable sympathy for the Soviet claims and advised that it would be a mistake to encourage the Finns not to make concessions. See David Reynolds, In Command of History (New York: Random House, 2005), p.121.
11. Finland, Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Development of Finnish–Soviet Relations During the Autumn of 1939 in the Light of Official Documents (hereinafter Documents Concerning Finnish–Soviet Relations) (Helsinki: FMU, 1940), pp.42–45.
12. Germany. Auswärtiges Amt. Documents on German foreign policy, 1918–1945 (hereinafter DGFP) (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1954), volume 8, p.240, Document No 206.
13. Ibid, volume 8, p.240, Document No 215.
14. Tanner, op. cit., pp.39–41.
15. DGFP, volume 8, p.248, Document No 223.
16. Ibid, volume 8, p.251, Document No 226.
17. Ibid, volume 8, p.267, Document No 240.
18. Ibid, volume 8, p.252, Document No 227.
19. Ibid, volume 8, p.252, Document No 228.
20. Ibid, volume 8, p.255, Document No 232.
21. Documents Concerning Finnish–Soviet Relations, p.49.
22. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.311 lists the size of territory the Soviets were willing to give up in East Karelia as 3,455 square miles (8,948 square kilometers).
23. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.58.
24. Hugh Shearman, Finland. The Adventures of a Small Power (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1950), p.89.
25. DGFP, volume 8, p.469, Document No 404.
26. Ibid, volume 8, p.268, Document No 241.
27. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.69.
28. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.359.
29. DGFP, volume 8, p.651, Document No 526.
30. Ibid, volume 8, p.706, Document No 574.
31. Churchill, Winston S. The Second World War. The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948), pp.538–548.
32. Tanner, op. cit., p.271.
33. DGFP, volume 8, p.774, Document No 612.
34. Ibid, volume 8, p.778, Document No 617.
35. Ibid, volume 8, p.869, Document No 661.
36. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.76.
37. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.370 and Richard W. Condon, The Winter War. Russia against Finland (New York, Ballantine Books, 1972), p.153.
38. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.388.
39. DGFP, volume 8, p.650, Document No 526.
40. Harold C. Deutsch. Presidential address presented on December 27, 1946, at the 25th Anniversary meeting of Phi Alpha Theta, held in New York jointly with the meeting of the American Historical Association.
41. General Otto Ruge, the commander in chief of the Norwegian Armed Forces, sent a courier to Marshal Mannerheim at the end of the conflict in Norway. This courier, Captain Tage Ellinger, was asked about the military situation in Norway. After Captain Ellinger completed his briefing, Marshal Mannerheim remarked caustically that it was lucky for Finland that English troops had not come to help during the Winter War. Tage Ellinger, Den Forunderlige Krig (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1960), p.116.
42. Trygve Sandvik, Operasjonene til lands i Nord-Norge 1940 (Oslo: Forsvarets Krigshistoriske Avdeling, 1965), volume 2, p.334 and Birger Gotaas, Fra 9. april til 7. juni. Episoder og opplevelser fra krigen i Norge (Oslo: J. Dybwand, 1945), p.229.
43. Halder War Diary, entry for July 21, 1940.
44. Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters 1939–45. Translated by R. H. Barry (Novato, California: Presidio Press, 1964), pp.112–114. Warlimont notes that Hitler had already hinted at the necessity of dealing with the Soviet Union earlier in 1940, even before the campaign in the west was concluded.
45. Albert Speer, Erinnerungen (Frankfurt am Main, 1969), p.188.
46. Warlimont, op. cit., p.112.
47. The preparations continued based on Hitler’s verbal order on July 29 and 31. This order was confirmed in September 1940.
48. Halder War Diary, entries for July 21 and 30, 1940.
Chapter 1
1. C. Leonard Lundin, Finland in the Second World War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1957), p.80.
2. Ernst von Born, Levnadsminnen (Helsingfors: Sönderström, 1954), pp.327–375.
3. Carl Olof Frietsch, Finlands Ödesår 1939–1943 (Helsingfors, Sönderström, 1945), p.244.
4. Earl F. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations 1940–1945 (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army (Pamphlet No. 20–271), 1959), p.115.
5. Wipert von Blücher, Gesandter zwischen Diktatur und Demokratie (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951), p.194.
6. Ibid. pp.194–195, 197.
7. DGFP, volume 8, Nos. 310 and 398.
8. Halder’s diary for July 22 mentions Finland as one route by which to attack the Soviet Union.
9. Messages from Zotov to Molotov on July 12 and August 1, 1940, as cited in Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.82.
10. Veltjens, a highly decorated pilot, was an old friend of Göring from WWI. He was engaged in what can be called the business of arms dealing.
11. NSR, Foreign Office Memorandum w/4646/40g, dated October 8, 1940.
12. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.399–400.
13. Prime Minister Risto Ryti held two positions at this time. He was Prime Minister but also acting President because President Kyösti Kallio was ill.
14. The delivery of arms to Finland and the presence of German troops on its soil were violations of the spheres of influence established in the secret protocol of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact. However, it can be argued that the Soviet Union had already violated the secret protocol when it occupied Lithuania in 1940 since the agreement called for the Soviet sphere of influence to stop at the northern border of that country.
15. Blücher, op. cit., p.198.
16. Ibid, p.198.
17. Ibid, p.221.
18. Hjalmar J. Procopé, editor, Fällande dom som friar (Stockholm: Fahlcrantz & Gumælius, 1946), pp.67–68.
19. Blücher, op. cit., pp.198–199.
20. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.427.
21. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.115.
22. NSR, Telegram from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to Ambassador Schulenburg on September 16, 1940.
23. Ibid, Telegram from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the German Minister in Finland on September 16, 1940.
24. Ibid, Telegram from the German chargé Tippelskirch to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on September 27, 1940.
25. Ibid, Telegram (No 1787) from Foreign Minister Ribbentrop to the German Embassy in Moscow on October 2, 1940.
26. See, for example, Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923–45 (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1949); and NSR.
27. Paul Schmidt, Hitler’s Interpreter (New York, Macmillan, 1951), p.212. This is a much-shortened version of the book referenced in note 26, primarily because it leaves out that part dealing with the period before Hitler’s rise to power.
28. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich. A History of Nazi Germany (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1960), p.805.
29. Winston S. Churchill. The Second World War. Their Finest Hour (New York, 1948–1953), p.584.
30. These words are not in the German minutes of the meeting but come from Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p.586 based on a later conversation with Stalin.
31. NSR, Telegram from Ambassador Schulenburg to Foreign Minister Ribbentrop containing a memorandum (No. 2362, dated November 20) of a meeting with Foreign Minister Molotov. The other conditions included a mutual security pact with Bulgaria, bases in the Black Sea within range of the Straits to include joint military action against Turkey if that country caused troubles, a recognized Soviet sphere of influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf, and a renunciation by Japan of commercial rights (oil and coal) in northern Sakhalin.
32. NSR, p.304.
33. The German decision not to participate was actually caused by a misunderstanding since the German Foreign Office did not discover until the end of the month that an option existed and by then it was too late.
34. Blücher, op. cit., pp.211–212.
35. Ibid, p.215 and Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.118.
36. Ibid, p.119.
37. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.85.
38. Otto Meissner, Staatssekretär unter Ebert-Hindenburg-Hitler (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe Verlag, 1950), p.572.
39. Major General Talvela was a hero of the Winter War and held important commands in the war that began in June 1941. He commanded the VI Corps from June 1941 to January 1942. He was promoted to lieutenant general in 1942 and assigned as the Finnish representative to OKW and OKH. He served in that position from January 1942 until February 1944 when he took over as the commander of the Maaselkä Front until June 1944. In that month he became commander of the Svir Front for one month (June 16 to July 18). From July to September he was again assigned as the Finnish representative at German military headquarters. General Talvela was a trusted advisor and confidant to Marshal Mannerheim.
40. International Military Tribunal, Trials of the Major War Criminals (Nuremberg, 1947), volume VII, pp.327–328.
41. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.122.
42. Ibid, p.124.
43. H. R. Trevor-Roper, editor, Hitler’s Wartime Directives 1939–1945 (London: Pan Books Ltd, 1966), pp.93–98.
44. Waldemar Erfurth, The Last Finnish War (Written under the auspices of the Foreign Military Studies Branch of the Historical Division, Headquarters, European Command. Washington, D.C.: University Publications of America, Inc., 1979), p.8. Erfurth was Chief, Liaison Staff North, attached to Mannerheim’s headquarters as the representative of OKH and OKW from June 1941 to September 1944.
45. Carl Gustaf Mannerheim, Minnen (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1952), volume II, p.261.
46. Mannerheim had not always held this view. In 1919, as General Nikolay Nikolayevich Yudenich, Commander of The Northwestern White Army during the Russian Civil War, was approaching Petrograd (later Leningrad), Mannerheim proposed that the Finns attack the city from the north.
47. Helmuth Greiner, Die Oberste Wehrmachtführung 1939–1943 (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1951), p.357.
48. International Military Tribunal, op. cit., volume VII, pp.309–311.
49. Loc. cit.
50. Mannerheim, Minnen, volume II, pp.261–262.
51. General Hölter spent the whole war in Finland. He was chief of staff to General Erfurth from June to September 1941; chief of staff of the XXXVI Mountain Corps from October 1941 to October 1943; chief of staff of the XIX Mountain Corps from November 1943 to February 1944; and the chief of staff of the 20th Mountain Army from March 1944 to the end of the war.
52. As quoted by Lundin, op. cit., p.97 from Hermann Hölter, Armee in der Arktis. Die Operationen der deutschen Lapland-Armee (Bad Nauheim, 1953), pp.9f. I did not have access to the 1953 edition but to the somewhat shortened 2nd edition published in 1977: Hermann Hölter, Armee in der Aktis. Die Operationen der deutschen Lapland-Armee (München: Schild Verlag, 1977). In this edition a similar statement appears on p.15.
53. Hölter, op. cit., (1977 edition) p.17.
54. International Military Tribunal, op. cit., volume X, pp.947–949.
55. Ibid, volume X, p.982.
56. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.9.
57. Dr. Karl Schnurre was the chief of the Eastern European and Baltic Section of the Commercial Policy Division of the German Foreign Office with the rank of Ambassador.
58. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.406.
59. Ibid, p.408.
60. International Military Tribunal, op. cit., volume X, pp.998–1000.
61. Mannerheim, Minnen, volume II, pp.264–267.
62. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.410.
63. International Military Tribunal, op. cit., volume VII, pp.311–313.
64. The War Guilt Trials were not part of the Nuremberg process. Finland was permitted to conduct the trials in Finland under retroactive Finnish laws and with Finnish judges. The law passed by parliament to support the trials limited them to the highest Finnish political wartime leadership, exempting military leaders. It is rumored that the exception of military leaders, including Marshal Mannerheim, was at the direction of Stalin. The trials began on November 15, 1945, and ended in February 1946. The sentences of the eight found guilty ranged from two to ten years. Ryti was sentenced to 10 years’ hard labor. Most Finns considered the trials a mockery of justice and all those found guilty were quickly pardoned after the 1947 peace treaty. Ryti was pardoned in May 1949.
65. Procope, op. cit., pp.236–239. Questioned on this subject at his trial, Ryti answered: “To speak plainly, I was a little suspicious, in consequence of some vague rumors that military cooperation might have been prepared for in advance, besides other things, at the Salzburg-Berlin conferences. But I never had sufficient ground to doubt the assurances of the military authorities when I asked many times whether no consent at all had been given to enter into other negotiations or make agreements…. I trust the assurances of General Heinrichs that no oral or written declarations of any kind had been made.”
66. As quoted in Lundin, op. cit., p.103.
67. Greiner, op. cit., p.357.
68. Bernhard von Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtführungsstab. Bericht eines General stabsoffiziers (Hamburg: H. H. Nölke, 1949), pp.113–114.
69. As quoted by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of War, p.204, note 33, from official German military documents.
70. Ibid, p.204, note 33.
71. Ibid, p.134.
72. Ibid, p.135.
73. Göran Westerlund, Finland överlevde. Finlands Krig 1939–1945 i ord och bild (Helsingfors: Schildts Förlags Ab, 2007), p.65. Finland’s army was, since 1918, based on universal military training. The country was divided into nine military regions at the start of the Winter War. Each region was divided into three military districts. A military region was required to form a division when reservists were called up during a mobilization. The division was to consist of three infantry regiments, one from each district. Each region was also required to mobilize one artillery regiment. Other units, such as signal, engineers, support troops, naval, and air units were activated through the efforts of several regions. While the principle of regional mobilization was maintained after the Winter War, the loss of territory required the redrawing of the military regions to support the mobilization of 16 divisions and some independent regiments—see Ari Raunio, Sotaoimet. Suomen sotien 1939–45 kulku kartoin (Kustantaja: Ghenimap Oy, 2004), pp.104–107. The number given by Westerlund includes various support and auxiliary organizations including the Lotta Svärd, a voluntary auxiliary paramilitary organization for women. The Lottas worked in hospitals, manned some of the air-raid early warning stations, and carried out other non-combat auxiliary tasks for the armed forces.
74. Westerlund, op. cit., pp.64–65 and M. Jokipii, Jatkosodan synty. Tutkimuksia Saksari ja Suomen sotilaallisesta yhteistyöstä 1940–41 (Keuruu: Otava, 1987), pp.620–622 and Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.89.
75. As quoted in Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.89.
Chapter 2
1. NSR, VII, Fuerher Directive 21, dated December 18, 1941.
2. NSR, Serial 260, Schnurre, Aufzeichnung, October 31, 1941.
3. Ryti is also alleged to have told Schnurre that he favored depopulating the Leningrad area and that Germany should retain it as some kind of “trading post.”
4. NSR, Telegram from Blücher to the Foreign Office, Serial 260, November 9, 1941.
5. Blücher, op. cit., pp.263–264.
6. Major General Sir Charles Maynard, The Murmansk Venture (London: Hodder & Stoughton Ltd., 1928), pp.95–98.
7. Rüdiger Graf von der Goltz, Als politischer General im Osten (Leipzig: K. F. Köhler, 1936), p.63.
8. Lundin, op. cit., p.121, quoting several historians.
9. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.20. This order of the day is not quoted in Mannerheim’s memoirs.
10. Lundin, op. cit., p.127. Also published in the New York Times, July 15, 1942 after it had been released by the Germans.
11. At the war-guilt trial in 1945, President Ryti stated that government was not informed of the July 7 order of the day and it did not reflect Finnish policy.
12. Blücher, op. cit., pp.245–246 and pp.249–250.
13. Waldemar Erfurth, Der finnische Krieg 1941–1944. (Wiesbaden: Limes Verlag, 1950), p.197.
14. Karl von Clausewitz, On War (Translated from the German by O. J. Matthijs Jolles. Washington, D.C.: Combat Forces Press, 1953), p.569.
15. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.57 and Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.133.
16. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.422; Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.187–188; and Waldemar Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan under Finlands senaste Krig. Translated by Azel Öhman (Helsingfors: Sönderström & Co. Förlagsaktiebolag, 1952), pp.18–19.
17. The source for this translation is Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.93–98.
18. Murmansk is a relatively new town, the last founded in the Russian Empire on October 4, 1916. It was first named Romanov-on-the-Murmane, after the Romanov dynasty. It was renamed Murmansk in 1917. Murman is the traditional Pomor name for the Barents Sea. The Pomors were Russian settlers who penetrated the White Sea and Kola regions. The name Murmane derives from the old Russian word for Norwegians. After a considerable increase in population during and after World War II, the population has recently shown a significant decline from 468,039 in 1989 to 336,137 in 2002. It remains the largest city north of the Arctic Circle.
19. Paul Carell, Hitler Moves East 1941–1943. Translated from the German by Ewald Osers (New York: Bantam Books, 1966), p.443.
20. Carell, op. cit., p.444.
21. The SS-Kampfgruppe Nord was composed of the 6th and 7th SS Death’s Head Regiments. It was a police unit and had just begun military training. It was the only motorized unit in the Army of Norway.
22. Erling Jensen and Ragnar Ulstein, Kompani Linge (Oslo: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1962), p.17.
23. Joseph H. Devins, The Vaagso Raid (Philadelphia: Chilton Book Company, 1968), p.202. and Henrik O. Lunde, Hitler’s Pre-emptive War. The Battle for Norway, 1940 (Drexel Hill: Casemate, 2008), p.550.
24. Carell, Hitler Moves East, pp.446–448.
25. Some sources refer to this organization as the Finnish V corps. That was its designation before it was attached to the German command on June 15, 1941 after which its designation became III Corps.
26. A dispatch by General Erfurth quoted by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.136.
27. Tanner, op. cit., p.94.
28. Carell, Hitler Moves East, p.447.
Chapter 3
1. I recommend, for example, the excellent work by Richard Woodman, Arctic Convoys 1941–1945 (London: John Murray Ltd, 1994).
2. Churchill, The Second World War, volume III, pp.378–380. Stalin wanted a landing in the north and, “if the British were afraid he would be willing to send round three or four Russian army corps to do the job.”
3. Woodman, op.cit., p.9.
4. Loc. cit.
5. An amazing achievement of the war was the mass construction of Liberty Ships in the United States based on a British concept. 2,751 of these ships were built between 1941 and 1945. The construction of each ship was incredibly fast. The average time from the laying of a keel until the ship was launched was 42 days. The fastest recorded was that of the Robert G. Perry, launched in Richmond, California on November 12, 1942, 4 days and 15½ hours after the keel was laid. (Woodman, op. cit., p.20). The Allied effort was also greatly assisted by the availability of the Norwegian merchant fleet—some 223 modern tankers and over 600 cargo vessels. Churchill wrote that they were “worth a million soldiers.” (Woodman, op. cit., p.22).
6. Prince of Wales was not to survive long. She was sent to the Far East in October 1941 and sunk by Japanese bombers operating from Saigon along with the battle-cruiser Repulse on December 10, 1941.
7. Stephen Wentworth Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945 (London: HMSO, 1954), volume II, p.143.
8. Woodman, op. cit., p.447.
9. Carell, Hitler Moves East, pp.456, 465–466.
10. Woodman, op. cit., p.14.
11. Ibid, p.444.
12. Ibid, p.443.
13. Ibid, p.444.
14. Chris Bellamy, Absolute War. Soviet Russia in the Second World War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2007), p.440.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Ibid, pp.440–441.
17. Ibid, pp.441–442.
18. Nikita S. Krushchev, Khrushchev Remembers. With an introduction, commentary and notes by Edward Crankshaw. Translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (New York: Bantam Books, Inc., 1971), p.239 and note 43.
19. Bellamy, op. cit., p.443 and Woodman, op. cit, p.444.
20. Joan Beaumont, Comrades in Arms: British Aid to Russia 1941–45 (London: Davis Poynter, 1980), pp.212–213.
21. Ibid, op. cit., pp.213–214.
22. Krushchev, op. cit., p.239.
23. Ibid, p.237.
24. Bellamy, op. cit., p.444.
25. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.25.
26. M. Kräutler and K. Springenschmidt. Es war ein Edelweiss. Schicksal und Weg der zweiten Gebirgsdivision (Graz: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1962), p.165.
27. Carell, Hitler Moves East, p.451.
28. Ibid, p.449.
29. Ibid, p.452.
30. Kräutler and Springenschmidt, op. cit., p.169.
31. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.154. This was based on a 1957 review of the draft of Ziemke’s work by General Erich Buschenhagen.
32. Kräutler and Springenschmidt, op. cit., pp.152–153.
33. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.155.
34. Gerda-Luise Dietl and Kurt Hermann, General Dietl, München: Münchner Buchverlag, 1951, pp.231–233.
Chapter 4
1. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of War, p.166, note 12.
2. Condon, op. cit, pp.80–103.
3. General Falkenhorst was not a stranger to Finland. In 1918, at the end of WWI, he had served as operations officer of General Rüdiger von der Goltz’ forces in Finland. In this capacity he had undoubtedly encountered Marshal Mannerheim and some of the other key military leaders.
4. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.26.
5. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.158. If Ziemke is right, the transfer of command on June 17 must have been a relief of command.
6. Ibid, p.160.
7. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.27.
8. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, pp.165–166.
9. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p.147.
10. One additional advantage of Finnish experience, which became obvious as the war progressed, dealt with encirclements. The Germans favored wide encirclements but in an area of dense forests such encirclements were time-consuming and difficult to seal. The Finns, on the other hand, favored smaller and tighter encirclements that were easier to accomplish and seal in difficult terrain. These types of encirclements were made famous in the Winter War and gave rise to a new military term—motti.
11. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.169.
12. This after-the-fact assessment may be right but it should be remembered that it was weakening Soviet resistance in Group J’s sector that led to its reinforcement with one regiment and an artillery battalion from SS Division Nord and General Siilasvuo himself contributed to the strengthening of this group by taking two battalions away from Group F. Both groups were fought to a standstill by the Soviets. The Army of Norway order stopping Group F’s offensive came after that unit’s offensive had bogged down. There may have been a difference between the Finns and the Germans as to which group should constitute the main effort but at least as late as the end of July there seems to have been a consensus that it should be with Group J.
13. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.174.
14. The Soviets threatened the whole XXXVI Corps on September 15 when they briefly recaptured Hill 366.
15. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.176.
16. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.155–159.
17. Bellamy, op. cit., p.277.
18. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.159–163.
19. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.179.
20. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.44, 47.
21. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.432–433.
22. Wuorinen, op. cit., pp.136–137.
23. Ibid, p.137.
24. Bellamy, op. cit., p.269.
25. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.185.
26. Jukka Juutinen provided the following translation of a passage from Juri Kilin and Ari Raunio’s article Sodan taisteluja 2: Jatkosota, pp.12–13: “On February 5, 1940, the central committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet government approved the decision to lay an additional railway to the Kirov [Murmansk] railway…. The Belomorsk–Obozersk railway that was to be of decisive importance to the end result of the Great Patriotic War was being constructed with the forces of the NKVD Gulag of Belomorsk. In July 1940 about 60,000 prisoners worked on the site. According to the report the railway was temporarily opened on December 28, 1940, that is 2 days before the completion deadline. After reporting having finished the work NKVD opened a railway that was basically unfit for traffic, a railroad which wasn’t fully operational until over a half year later in the summer of 1941.”
27. Waldemar Erfurth, Surprise. Translated by Dr. Stefan T. Possony and Daniel Vilfroy (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1943), p.5.
28. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, p.14.
29. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.187.
30. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, pp.5–6.
Chapter 5
1. This would be the equivalent of the United States today mobilizing 45,000,000 individuals for its armed forces.
2. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.416.
3. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.417.
4. This is also the impression given by Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.93, in 2002. He does not mention that German sources tell a different story.
5. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.20.
6. Ibid, pp.20–21.
7. Hölter, op. cit., p.16.
8. Westerlund, op. cit., pp.72–73. There is disagreement in the sources as to the location of the 10th Finnish Division. Westerlund has it located as a reserve behind corps IV and II. Colonel K. J. Mikola, Finland’s Wars During World War II (1939–1945), p.XXIII, locates it behind II Corps. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.189, and Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.23, has it as part of IV Corps. Ari Raunio, op. cit., p.117, appears to give the 10th Division a separate sector between IV Corps and II Corps, under V Corps. The explanation may be that these sources depict the location of the division at different times leading up to the offensives.
9. The Jäger brigades were highly mobile light infantry units ideally suited for the heavily forested areas in Finland. Their functions were those that are normally performed by armored cavalry regiments in more open country. The Germans were very impressed by these units and General Falkenhorst repeatedly tried to have one of the brigades assigned to the Army of Norway.
10. Original plans had called for the 163rd Infantry Division to be used in the attack against the leased Russian naval base at Hanko. This would have allowed the 17th Finnish Division, which had sealed off Hanko, to be used by Mannerheim for other purposes.
11. The size of a Soviet Army can be more accurately compared to a corps in the German Army.
12. Jatkosodan historia (Porvoo: WSOY, 1988–1994), volume I, p.193.
13. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.93.
14. The area is variously referred to as Far Karelia, Aunus (Olonets) Karelia, or Ladoga Karelia. Aunus is the main town in the southern part of the isthmus between Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega.
15. It appears that General Talvela was not satisfied with the aggressiveness of Colonel Eino Koskimies’ 5th Division at Korpiselkya and relieved him of his command.
16. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.33.
17. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.193, note 9.
18. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.36.
19. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.192.
20. Blücher, op. cit., pp.246–248.
21. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.43.
22. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.96.
23. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.47–48.
24. Ibid, p.68.
Chapter 6
1. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared War, 1940–1941 (New York: Harper, 1953), p.551.
2. Blücher, op. cit., pp.260–262.
3. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.435.
4. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.61.
5. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, p.15.
6. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, pp.195–196. For more on this issue see also Lossberg, op. cit., pp.131–134; Adolf Hitler, Hitler’s Secret Conversations 1941–1944. Translated by Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1953), pp.325, 505; and Lundin, op. cit., p.151.
7. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.429–430.
8. Ibid, p.427.
9. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.198.
10. Message from Erfurth to OKW on August 26, 1941 as quoted by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.198 and note 16. Erfurth does not mention this request or the basis for it in his book. Likewise, he omits the conversation he had with General Hanell.
11. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.40.
12. An entry in the War Journal (Kriegstagebuch) of Army Group North as quoted by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.198 and note 20.
13. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.41.
14. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.427.
15. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.199.
16. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.430 claims that the Finns were kept in the dark about the transfer. It would be odd for the Finnish liaison staff at OKH not to inform Mannerheim since such an important decision could not be kept from them.
17. The encirclement was not total. There was a 25–40 kilometer area between the Neva River and the Finnish front on the Karelian Isthmus that allowed for communications across Lake Ladoga to areas under Soviet control outside the German encirclement. This route across the lake became known as the “Ice Road” in winter and in summer it was used by numerous boats. Operation Klabautermann, discussed in Chapter 7, was an attempt to interdict this summer traffic.
18. Based on a message from the operations section of the German Liaison Group at Mannerheim’s Headquarters to OKW on September 15, 1941 cited by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.201 note 25.
19. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.201.
20. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.52.
21. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.202.
22. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., p.167.
23. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.221.
24. To say that it is highly unusual for an army to undertake a major reorganization in the middle of a campaign is an understatement. The only positive result of the reorganization effort was to return a considerable number of troops to the civilian economy. It would appear that this could have been achieved through a process of attrition by dismissing elderly year groups as new inductees became available. It would have avoided the disruption caused by the reorganization. From a Finnish standpoint, the reorganization produced other positive results. It was a convenient reason to end the intermingling of units and brush aside German requests for more active prosecution of the war.
25. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.71 and Mannerheim, op. cit., p.441.
26. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.76.
27. Army of Lapland War Diary entry for 25 May 1942, as cited by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.227.
28. Carell, Hitler Moves East, p.469.
29. Devins, op. cit, p.202.
30. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.215.
Chapter 7
1. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.435.
2. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanen, pp.27–28.
3. Ibid, p.30.
4. Ibid, pp.30–31.
5. Ibid, pp.32–34.
6. Message from the Operations Section of the Finnish Liaison Staff at Mannerheim’s Headquarters to OKW on September 25, 1941 as quoted by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of War, p.208 and note 54.
7. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanen, p.34.
8. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.57.
9. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, pp.39–40.
10. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.159–163.
11. The Army of Norway implementing decision for Directive 37, message from the Army of Norway to OKW on November 21, and a telegram from Dietl to Jodl on November 24, referenced by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.209 notes 57–59.
12. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, p.38–40.
13. Ibid, p.40.
14. Lundin, op. cit., p.152; Hölter, op. cit., p.64; and Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, pp.5–6.
15. Message from Erfurth to OKH on December 5, 1941 as cited by Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p. 210 and note 62.
16. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.60. This would be true only if Kandalaksha were to be captured as well.
17. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, p.46.
18. Blucher, op. cit., pp.271–272.
19. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.70.
20. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.443.
21. Ibid, pp.443–444.
22. Ibid, p.444.
23. Lundin, op. cit., p.154, note 16.
24. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.444.
25. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.71.
26. Ibid, p.156.
27. Waldemar Erfurth’s Der Finnische Krieg, pp.201–202.
28. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.230 and note 42.
29. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, p.50.
30. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.191–193.
31. Ibid.
32. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.84.
33. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.232.
34. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.84.
35. Erfurth, Problemet Murmanbanan, p.52.
36. Ibid, p.53.
37. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.86.
38. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.456.
39. Lundin, op. cit., p.160.
40. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.91.
41. Lundin, op. cit., p.162.
42. Army Group North War Diary entries from August 8, 21, and 28 as cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.234.
43. Greiner, op. cit., pp.405–406.
44. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.87.
45. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.457–458.
46. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.89.
47. A southward advance by the Finns on the Karelian Isthmus would have closed this all-important route of supply for the Soviets in Leningrad.
48. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.235.
Chapter 8
1. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.107.
2. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.460–462.
3. According to Richard Ernest Dupuy and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History, New York: Harper & Row, 1970, p.1100, the German losses were 70,000 killed or wounded, 3,000 tanks, 1,000 artillery pieces, 5,000 motor vehicles, and 1,400 aircraft. The Soviet losses were probably slightly less.
4. Blucher, op. cit., pp.341–342.
5. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.108–109.
6. A 20th Mountain Army document dated January 14, 1943 as cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.243.
7. Ibid, p.245.
8. Ibid, p.249.
9. Trevor-Roper, op. cit., pp.216–217.
10. Blücher, op. cit., p.342.
11. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.468–469.
12. Ibid, p.469.
13. Blücher, op. cit., pp.342–343.
14. Ibid, p.343.
15. Message from the 20th Mountain Army to OKW on February 3, 1944 as cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.273.
16. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.467.
17. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.133.
18. Ibid, pp.135–136.
19. Ibid, p.138.
20. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.474–475.
21. Not to be confused with General Alfred Jodl, the Chief of Operations at OKW, who was Ferdinand’s brother.
22. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.144.
Chapter 9
1. As quoted in Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.135.
2. Westerlund, op. cit., p.155.
3. Ibid, p.154.
4. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.137 and K. A. Meretskov, Serving the People (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1971), pp.286–301. See also S. M. Shetemenko, The Last Six Months. Russia’s Final Battles with Hitler’s Armies in World War II. Translated by Guy Daniels (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1977), pp.340–359.
5. Raunio, op. cit., p.212.
6. Ibid, p. 220 and Westerlund, op. cit., p.156.
7. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.279.
8. Westerlund, op. cit., p.156.
9. Vehviläinen, op. cit, p.138.
10. General Erfurth’s comments on Part II of Ziemke The German Northern Theater of Operations, in June 1957 as cited by Ziemke in that work, p.279.
11. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.279.
12. Vehiläinen, op. cit., p.137.
13. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.487.
14. Vehviläinen, op. cit., pp.137–138 citing inter alia Jatkosodan historia, volume IV, pp.280–281.
15. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.475.
16. Comments by General Erfurth to Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.279.
17. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.138.
18. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.476.
19. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.176–177.
20. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.280 and Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.476.
21. Westerlund, op. cit., p.163.
22. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.476 and Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.177.
23. Westerlund, op. cit., p.163 and Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.138.
24. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.178. The 200th Estonian Infantry Regiment was formed from Estonians who had fled to Finland.
25. Westerlund, op. cit., p.164.
26. Some sources have the badly mauled 10th Division in the line instead of the 3rd Division, which they place behind the line. I believe that the 10th Division withdrew to the rear of the VT line through the 3rd Division.
27. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.178.
28. 20th Mountain Army messages to General Jodl on June 14 and to Hitler on June 16 as cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of War, pp.280–281.
29. Translation of quote in Westerlund, op. cit., p.172.
30. The Panzerfaust was a small, disposable pre-loaded tube firing a 6.4lb high-explosive warhead capable of penetrating 7.9 inches of armor. It served as a model for the Soviet RPG-2 and the later RPG-7.
31. The Panzarschreck was an 88mm reusable antitank rocket launcher similar to the US 2.36-inch rocket launcher (bazooka).
32. The 303rd Assault Gun Brigade was actually a battalion-size unit commanded by Captain Hans-Wilhelm Cardeneo. It was equipped with 22 StuG III Ausf. G., each with a 75mm high velocity assault gun as main armament. The brigade was also equipped with nine StuH 42 assault howitzers.
33. Fighter Detachment (Gefechtsverband) Kuhlmey was an ad hoc unit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Kurt Kuhlmey. It arrived at Immola Airfield in Finland on June 17, 1944. Kurt Kuhlmey was a famous Luftwaffe pilot who was awarded the Knight’s Cross of the Iron Cross. After WWII he entered the West German Air Force and retired as a major general. He died in 1993. Detachment Kuhlmey flew over 2,700 missions in Finland and is credited with shooting down 150 Soviet aircraft and destroying 200 tanks. It lost 41 aircraft. See Christer Bergström, Bagration to Berlin: The Final Air Battles in the East 1944–1945 (Buress Hill: Classic Publications, 2008).
34. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.139.
35. Notes by Tanner, June 19 and 20, 1944 as cited by Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.139.
Chapter 10
1. OKW War Diary (Kriegstagesbuch), Report, The Northern Theater of War, January 4–December 31, 1944, pp.29–30 as cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of War, pp.284–285.
2. Ibid, p.285.
3. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.138 and Shtemenko, op. cit., pp.360–361.
4. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.194.
5. Westerlund, op. cit., p.203.
6. Matti Koskimaa, Veitsen terällä: vetäytyminen Länsi-Kannakselta ja Talin-Ihantalan suurtaistelu kesällä 1944 (Porvoo: W. Sönderström, 1993), p.70 as cited in Westerlund, op. cit., p.181.
7. Westerlund, op. cit., pp.182–184.
8. Ibid, p.184.
9. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.139.
10. Earl F. Ziemke. Stalingrad to Berlin: The German Defeat in the East (Army Historical Series. Original publication date 1968. New York: Barnes & Nobles, 1996), p.300.
11. Waldemar Erfurth writes that he had “some evidence of a possible Finnish decision to bind themselves closer to the Reich.” Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.186.
12. Blücher, op. cit., p.371.
13. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.482.
14. Loc. cit.
15. Loc. cit.
16. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.186–187 and Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.142.
17. Ziemke, op. cit., p.283.
18. Vehviläinen, op. cit., pp.142–143.
19. Raunio, op. cit., pp.252–253. The discrepancy in the numbers given by Vehviläinen and those units listed by Raunio is probably due to the former counting the 122nd German Infantry Division and not counting the 3rd Coastal Regiment along the shore of Lake Ladoga.
20. Westerlund, op. cit., p.194.
21. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.190.
22. Clausewitz, On War, VIII: 6, p.603.
23. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp.300–301.
24. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.189.
25. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.284.
26. General Rendulic was one of several officers who rose to high position in the German Army in the closing months of World War II. Another who also came from the Finnish theater of war was Ferdinand Schörner. They were valued by Hitler for their unquestioned loyalty and harshness bordering on brutality. In his book Stalingrad to Berlin (pp.432–433) Ziemke writes “Rendulic, in the few months left in the war, was setting out to carve for himself a niche in history next to Schörner. One characteristic remarked on by all of his former superiors had been his absolute nervelessness…. In one order he made the battalion and regimental commanders responsible for every ‘foot of ground’ voluntarily given up and appended the example of a captain he had ordered shot the day before for taking his battalion back a mile after it had been broken through. In another, he ordered ‘flying courts-martial’ created to scour the rear areas. Every soldier not wounded, picked up outside his unit area, was to be tried and shot on the spot.”
27. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.286.
28. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.188, 192, 193.
29. Ibid, p.194.
30. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.143 citing Tanner’s notes from July 22, 1944.
31. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.492.
32. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, p.387.
33. Ibid, p.388.
34. According to General Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.201, the idea of the visit originated with General Rendulic, the commander in chief of the 20th Mountain Army. Rendulic had reported to Hitler that the quick turn in the political situation in Finland was caused by a message from Roosevelt to Ryti, discussions with British representatives in Lisbon, and the withdrawal of the 122nd Division. He recommended that the 122nd Division be left in Finland.
35. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.492–493; Blücher, op. cit., pp.395–396; Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.206; and Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.144.
36. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.145.
37. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.493.
38. Blücher, op. cit., p.369, Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.290.
39. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.145.
40. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p. 493.
41. Lothar Rendulic, Gekämpft, Gesiegt, Geschlagen (Wels: Verlag Welsermühl, 1952), p.283–284, and Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.495–496.
42. Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp.497–498.
43. Ibid, pp.494–495.
44. Ibid, pp.499–500.
Chapter 11
1. The number of men drawing rations in the middle of August was 204,064. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.221.
2. Hölter, op. cit., p.37.
3. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.221.
4. Shtemenko, op. cit., p.347.
5. Ibid, pp.369–371.
6. Vehvilainen, op. cit., p.149 and Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.224.
7. Vehvilainen, op. cit., p.149.
8. 20th Mountain Army War Diary scattered entries September 1–December 18, 1944, as referenced in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.293. See also Rendulic, op. cit., pp.286–287.
9. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.292 and Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.224.
10. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.296.
11. Mikkola, op. cit., p.30.
12. Westerlund, op. cit., p.212.
13. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.226 reports that the fighting lasted two days. This is not supported by Finnish sources.
14. Raunio, op. cit., p.187. Earl F. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, p.394, writes that the Finns reported the capture of 700 prisoners based on a German Naval War Diary entry.
15. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, p.394, reports that Rendulic initially refused but that a compromise was worked out with the Finns.
16. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.225–226 and Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.295.
17. Hölter, op. cit., pp.38–39.
18. Ibid, p.43.
19. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.503.
20. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.150.
21. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, p.394.
22. Westerlund, op. cit., p.213.
23. Ziemke, Stalingrad to Berlin, pp.394–395.
24. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.227.
25. Ibid, p.229.
26. Emil Schuler, Mit dem Bergschuh im Russland und Finnland, München: Eigenverlag Emil Schuler, 1959, pp.152–197 and Roland Kaltenegger, Schicksalsweg und Kampf der “Bergschuh” Division (Graz: Leopold Stocker Verlag, 1985), pp.287–331.
27. Kräutler and Springenschmidt, op. cit., p.385.
28. Hölter, according to Lundin, op. cit., p.242, denies the destruction of villages. This is in sharp contrast to his frank admission of the thorough destruction carried out in the Province of Finland in Norway a few months later—Hölter, op. cit., p.71.
29. Lundin, op. cit., p.245.
30. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.301.
31. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.235.
32. Lundin, op. cit., p.243.
33. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.150.
34. Loc. cit.
35. Mannerheim, Memoirs, p.504.
36. Westerlund, op. cit., p.214.
37. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.235.
38. Hölter, op. cit., p.51.
39. Loc. cit.
40. 20th Mountain Army War Diary entries of October 2 and 3, 1944, as cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, pp.299–300.
41. It should be noted that General Rendulic was tried as a war criminal by the Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. The charges dealt with his activities in Yugoslavia and Finland. He was found guilty on the charges related to treatment of civilians in Yugoslavia but the charges concerning the scorched-earth policy in Lapland were dropped. On the Yugoslav charges he was sentenced to 20 years in prison. The sentence was later reduced to 10 years and he was released from prison on February 1, 1951.
42. Westerlund, op. cit., p.214.
43. Rendulic, op. cit., p.306.
44. Hölter, op. cit., pp.52–53.
45. Westerlund, op. cit., p.214.
Chapter 12
1. Anabasis was Xenophon’s history of the Greek retreat from Persia around 400 B.C. The word anabasis refers to an expedition from a coastline up into the interior of a country. Katabasis, on the other hand, describes a trip from the interior down to the coastline and is therefore more appropriate in describing the journey of the 20th Mountain Army.
2. Major James F. Gebhardt, The Petsamo-Kirkenes Operation: Soviet Breakthrough and Pursuit in the Arctic, October 1944. Leavenworth Papers Number 17 (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1989), pp.6–8.
3. Ibid, p.8.
4. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.237.
5. Gebhardt, op. cit., pp.10–11.
6. Ibid, p.14.
7. Meretskov, op. cit., pp.317–319.
8. Shtemenko, op. cit., p.372.
9. Gebhardt, op. cit., p.17.
10. Ibid, pp.24–25.
11. Meretskov, op. cit., p.320.
12. Gebhardt, op. cit., p.21.
13. Shtemenko, op. cit., p.373.
14. Gebhardt, op. cit., p.19.
15. Ibid, p.43 quoting from Semen Petrovich Mikulskii and Minzakir Absaliamov, Nastupatel’nyee boi (Moscow: 1959), p.28.
16. Ibid, pp.40–41.
17. Shtemenko, op. cit., p.373.
18. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.306.
19. Gebhardt, op. cit., pp.35–36.
20. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, pp.239–240.
21. Ibid, p.240.
22. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.307.
23. Shtemenko, op. cit., p.374.
24. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.242.
25. Meretskov, op. cit., p.324.
26. Erfurth, The Last Finnish War, p.245.
27. Westerlund, op. cit., p.215.
28. Stein Ugelvik Larsen, Norsk Krigslexikon, part of NorgesLexi, directed and edited by Stein Ugelvik Larsen at the University of Bergen, Tvangsevakueringen i Finnmark.
29. Report by Headquarters, Army of Norway, dated December 15, 1944 titled Bericht über Evakuierung Nordnorwegens as cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.308.
30. Colonel Dahl (later Lieutenant General) was the only Norwegian officer in the Narvik campaign with previous combat experience. He had fought as a young lieutenant in a British unit in the Battle of Somme in 1916. He was also the first Norwegian officer to attend the US Command and General Staff College in 1941.
31. Shtemenko, op. cit., p.377.
32. Ibid, p.378.
33. Larsen, op. cit., Frigjøringen av Finnmark.
34. Message from the Army of Norway to OKW dated May 19, 1945 cited in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.314.
Epilogue
1. Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.315.
2. Lunde, op. cit., p.550.
3. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.184.
4. Ibid, p.123.
5. Vehviläinen, op. cit., p.171.
6. Loc. cit.
7. Wuorinen, op. cit., p.114.
8. Frietsch, op. cit., pp.241–242 and Lundin, op. cit., pp.83–84.
9. These figures are from Jatkosodan historia, volume 6, pp.277, 388ff, 478 and Westerlund, op. cit., pp.234–235.
Appendix I
1. Based on table in Ziemke, The German Northern Theater of Operations, p.318.
2. Held only by Göring.
3. Rank given to Mannerheim in 1942 on his 75th birthday and held only by him.
4. Held only by Mannerheim.
5. No Finnish officer held this rank in World War II.