FOUR

Operations in Central Finland

The Central Finland Operational Area

While about 350 kilometers south of the Mountain Corps Norway area of operations, Salla is still 50 kilometers above the Arctic Circle. The terrain in this area, while there were patches of tundra, was characterized by vast virgin coniferous forests and rocky hills with elevations up to and over 2,000 feet. The valleys were swampy with numerous rivers, streams, and lakes. Ziemke observes that it was particularly hot in July 1941 with the temperature rising to above 85° Fahrenheit on 12 days, twice reaching 97°.¹ Swarms of mosquitoes flourished in the hot swampy forests and made it virtually impossible to work except during the cool nights.

A large triangular area running east from Salla was ceded to the Soviet Union after the Winter War. The town of Salla was included in a corner of this triangle. The Kuola River is on its north and flows into the Salla River to the west of that town. To the south of Salla is a range of hills with their highest peak at 2,156 feet. The mountain slopes were bare.

The Soviets had completed a railroad from Kandalaksha to the new Finnish border. By the terms of the treaty in March 1940 the Finns were obligated to construct a connecting line from Kemijärvi. The Finns were in no hurry to complete this line since they viewed it as a threat by which the Soviets could cut across central Finland to the Swedish border. However, as it became clear that it now could be used by German and Finnish forces to regain the lost territory, the Finns became energized and rapidly pushed the project towards completion.

In the period since March 1940 the Soviets had fortified the Salla area and the town had become a defensive strongpoint. The Germans and Finns did not have accurate information on enemy forces. They estimated enemy strength opposite north and central Finland at five infantry divisions and two weak armored units. They had identified one division, the 122nd Rifle Division, in Salla with about 50 tanks and believed there was another division, possibly two, at Kandalaksha.

The Soviet forces in the north operated under the 14th Army, commanded by Lieutenant General Valerian Alexandrovich Frolov. Its major combat formations, in addition to artillery and other units, consisted of the 104th and 122nd Rifle Divisions and the 1st Tank Division which came under the XLII Corps as the operation progressed. In addition there were the 14th and 52nd Rifle Divisions in the Murmansk region. The 23rd Murmansk Fortified Region, an artillery regiment, several border guard detachments, and the 1st Mixed Air Division also came under his command.

The 6th Finnish Division, attached to the XXXVI German Corps, was located north of Kuusamo and therefore did not have to make a lengthy move in preparation for the offensive. The two German divisions of XXXVI Corps, the 169th Infantry Division and the SS Division Nord, moved up close to the border opposite Salla at the end of June.

The III Finnish Corps constituted the right wing of the Army of Norway front and occupied a 100-kilometer stretch of the Finnish–Soviet border between Kuusamo and Suomussalmi. With the 6th Finnish Division attached to the XXXVI German Corps, it had only one division—the 3rd—plus some miscellaneous units. This corps was commanded by Major General Hjalmar Fridolf Siilasvuo. He was one of the heroes of the Winter War when, as a colonel commanding the forces at Suomussalmi, he conducted one of the most classic shallow encirclement operations in military history, leading to the virtual annihilation of two Soviet divisions.²

General Siilasvuo had reorganized the 3rd Division in anticipation of the upcoming operation. The division was divided into two groups—labeled F and J. Each group consisted of one regiment and assorted attachments, including border guards. One regiment was kept back as a corps reserve. The corps had attached one battalion from the 6th Finnish Division as well as a German tank company.

The command setup in central Finland plagued operations almost from the very beginning. General Falkenhorst³ came under the direct control of OKW. German operations in Finland were begun with inadequate forces and reinforcements had to come from the OKH and OKL (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe—Air Force High Command) not the OKW. OKH and OKL were reluctant to provide substantial reinforcements that would detract from the main effort against the Soviet Union, particularly after it became obvious that the Finns would not assist the Germans against Leningrad.

Another problem already mentioned in Chapter 2 was the failure to achieve unity of command within the theater. While the Finnish III Corps was under the operational control of Falkenhorst, it had also a direct line to Marshal Mannerheim and this soon caused problems. When you add to this the German failure to firmly designate a main effort within their theater, you had a recipe for failure.

Plans

The XXXVI Corps planned to capture Salla by a double envelopment as the first step in a quick drive to Kandalaksha to cut the Murmansk Rail road. The main attack would be carried out by the 169th Infantry Division making up the northern envelopment. The 169th Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Kurt Dittmar, was organized into three task forces, each approximately one regiment in strength, as follows:

1. The northern or left task force would advance eastward 13 kilometers to the north of Salla. Its primary mission was to screen the corps’ northern flank. At the appropriate time it would become the northern pincer in another envelopment the Germans planned in the Kayrala area.

2. The center task force was also to advance eastward to the north of Salla, but only eight kilometers to the north. It would drive in a southeastern direction to the road between Salla and Kayrala. When reaching that road it would turn southward and become the northern pincer in the Salla envelopment.

3. The southern or right task force of the 169th Division would jump off from a location just north of the road leading from Salla to Savukoski. It would assault the border fortifications frontally.

Two regiments from SS Division Nord would start out from positions to the south of the road from Rovaniemi to Salla. They would bypass Salla on the south and then swing in behind that town and become the southern pincer of the Salla envelopment.

The German XXXVI Corps had grave doubts about SS Division Nord. The unit was officially formed on February 24, 1941 as SS Kampfgruppe Nord and commanded by SS Brigadeführer Richard Hermann. Both its regiments—6th and 7th SS Infantry Regiments—had been in Norway since April 1940. They were equipped with Czech arms. SS Kampfgruppe Nord was officially renamed SS Division Nord (motorized) on June 17, 1941. At the same time the command was transferred to Major General of the Waffen SS Karl-Maria Demelhuber. The unit strength was 8,150 when it arrived in Finland. Artillery and antiaircraft components from Germany joined the division in Finland. The units of the division had not worked together and were poorly trained. Erfurth writes that the division “consisted of elderly men without combat experience and was an improvised unit over which hovered an unlucky star. During transport 105 casualties had occurred as a result of a fire on board ship.”⁴ Ziemke makes the following observation:

The march from northern Norway had been so poorly executed and revealed such a profound ignorance of military procedures that it resulted in the relief of the commanding general and his operations officer. The new commanding general, after looking over his troops, reported on 23 June that he could not assume responsibility for committing them in battle.⁵

General der Kavallerie Hans Feige, commander of XXXVI Corps, was reluctant to use the SS Division against Salla, particularly after the report by its commander on June 23. Falkenhorst appears to have overruled Feige on this issue. It may be that Falkenhorst and the Army of Norway underestimated the quality of their opponents.

The 6th Finnish Division, attached to XXXVI Corps, would cross the Finnish–Soviet border about 70 kilometers south of Salla. The division would advance in a northeast direction, making a deep penetration towards the town of Alakurtti while sending part of its force to attack Kayrala from the south. The 6th Finnish Division would thus become the southern pincer in the second planned envelopment.

Group J of III Finnish Corps, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Johannes Turtola, assembled south of Kuusamo in preparation for the attack. Its immediate objective was Kestenga. Group F, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Arne Somersalo, assembled further to the south, just east of Suomussalmi. The final objectives of the groups were Loukhi (Group J) and Kem (Group F), both on the Murmansk Railroad.

Attack on Salla

The 6th Finnish Division was the first unit to cross the border at 0200 hours on July 1. The 169th Infantry Division and the SS Division did not cross the border until 1600 hours on July 1. It is unclear why the attacks were staggered but it may have had something to do with the scarcity of air support.

The timing of the attacks by the main elements of the XXXVI Corps also took into consideration the fact that there were 24 hours of daylight and that in the afternoon the sun was in the face of the defending Soviet troops. July 1 was a hot day with temperatures in the high 80s (Fahrenheit). The air and artillery bombardment started forest fires and the smoke reduced visibility to near zero in some places.

Any doubts that the Germans may have had about the quality of the Soviet troops were soon dispelled. The right flank task force of the 169th Infantry Division, advancing on the fortifications in front of Salla with two battalions, was stopped dead in its tracks 500 meters east of the border. A sharp Soviet counterattack threw the lead German battalions back to the border, briefly creating panic in the rear echelons of the task force.

The other two task forces in the 169th Division, however, made good progress. By the end of the day the northernmost task force had gained over three kilometers. The center task force was even more successful and by the end of July 1 it was closing in on the road between Salla and Kayrala.

The questions about the combat effectiveness of SS Division Nord were answered on the first day of battle. Against determined Soviet defenders the division broke and ran. Panicky SS troops streamed past the Corps headquarters on the road between Rovaniemi and Salla. There was total confusion at the front. The division operations officer could only account for two of the six battalions. Major General Demelhuber declared that his division was not fit for combat operations in the morning of July 2. Losses in the SS Division on July 1 included one regimental commander, one battalion commander, and 600 men.

The enveloping units had made good progress initially but that came to an end on July 2. The Soviets realized that encirclements were in process and threw everything they had at the center task force—whose mission was the northern pincer in the planned encirclement of Salla. The Soviet attack was assisted by armor and air support. The task force, which had reached the Salla–Korya (Korja) road, was forced to fall back. The 169th Division reinforced the center task force with two infantry battalions and a tank company on July 3 but also changed earlier plans. The mission of the left task force under the original plan was to screen the division’s north flank and thereafter advance on Kayrala. The Kayrala advance was now cancelled and the left task force was ordered to turn south behind Salla along the Salla–Korya road.

The left task force moved south on July 3 and the center task force also regained the Salla–Korya road and pushed down along the Tennio River. The Soviets hit the German front with no fewer than seven counterattacks. Their main effort was in the area north of Salla. The Germans were able to repel the attacks, but the heavy fighting was beginning to take its toll on the German infantry.

On the following day, while the left task force moved south, the center task force regained the road and pushed down to the Kuola River. The division also committed the third regiment in the river crossing and assault on Salla. The crossing of the river was set for July 6.

The SS Division was moved into defensive positions behind the Finnish border after its panic on July 1. Now, while the 169th Infantry Division was assembling its forces for a crossing of the Kuola River and the assault on Salla, there was another panic in the SS Division. This particular incident, which happened in the morning of July 4, is described by Ziemke but not mentioned by Erfurth. The episode evidently started when General Demelhuber, believing that his division was under an armored attack and having no confidence in his troops, ordered a withdrawal that turned into the panic described by Ziemke:

Early on the morning of the 4th the XXXVI Corps headquarters staff witnessed an astonishing scene as the motorized SS-Division came streaming down the road toward Rovaniemi swearing Russian tanks were at its heels. For several hours the corps staff, including the chief of staff and Feige himself, was out on the road getting the SS-men headed back toward the front. Some of the vehicles were stopped and turned back at the Army of Norway advanced headquarters halfway down the road toward Kemiyärvi, and a few went the full 50 miles to Kemiyärvi where an SS-man urged the local commandant to blow the bridge across the Kemi River to hold up the Russian tanks which he claimed were in hot pursuit.⁶

Feige decided to remove the SS Division from the frontline on July 6. He had to abandon this plan when Hitler, very annoyed at the behavior of the SS troops, ordered the division to remain at the front. After the virtual disintegration of the SS Division, the XXXVI Corps decided that it no longer had the strength to complete the encirclement of Salla since it also had to hold the front west of Salla. The Army of Norway offered up its reserves—a Finnish battalion, a motorized machinegun battalion, and a battalion of the SS.

The 163rd German Infantry Division was on its way to Finland from Norway, by way of Sweden. It was planned to attach this division to Mannerheim’s army as his strategic reserve. General Feige, the XXXVI Corps commander, now asked Falkenhorst to request that a regiment from this division be attached to his corps. The last regiment of this division was still at Torino on the Swedish–Finnish border. Hitler approved Falkenhorst’s request on July 5.

General Erfurth is rather critical of Falkenhorst’s request and OKW’s acceptance of that request. He notes that the additional regiment was not required since Salla was captured on July 7, before the requested regiment was in place on the Salla front. He goes on to say that the 163rd Division was “torn into two parts” by the decision.⁷

The virtual disintegration of the SS Division caused plans to be changed that had far-reaching consequences for the Salla offensive. General Feige became concerned about the 6th Finnish Division attached to his corps. That division began its advance from a position about 70 kilometers south of Salla. General Feige’s concern was that the 6th Division, moving cross-country, would be exposed to Soviet attacks against its northern flank now that the German drive through Salla was stalled. Feige ordered the 6th Division to abandon its deep penetration to Alakurtti and turn its whole force north towards Kayrala.

The safety of the 6th Division was not Feige’s only concern. The 169th Infantry Division was worn down after having fought for Salla almost single-handedly after the collapse of the SS Division. It would need considerable help if it were to carry out the second envelopment.

The 169th Division was meantime ready to cross the Kuola River and assault Salla from the east. It hoped to trap the Soviet forces in Salla by crossing the terrain behind the town to the hills in the southeast. With dive-bomber and artillery support, the attack made progress against stubborn resistance and at noon the right-flank regiment was within a half-mile of Salla. The northern wing of the attack reached the fork in the road east of Salla where one road leads to Kayrala and the other to Korya.

The Soviets launched fierce counterattacks that were repelled. The Kuola River was crossed in the evening of July 6. The intensity of the fighting is attested to by the fact that 50 destroyed Soviet tanks littered the battlefield by the end of the day. The division’s right flank task force entered Salla in the evening but was thrown back in a strong counterattack. The withdrawal threatened to become another panic until the commanding general and two of his regimental commanders personally intervened.

Salla was captured in the evening of July 7. The bulk of the 122nd Rifle Division disengaged on the morning of July 8 and withdrew through the southern part of the planned encirclement. The area through which the Soviets withdrew was supposed to have been closed by the SS Division but it was still not closed.

German-Finnish Drive Stopped at Kayrala

The pursuit of the Soviets withdrawing from Salla was left to the SS Division, not a particularly good choice in view of its earlier performance. However, the Germans did not have much choice since they were afraid that the Soviets would make a stand in the narrows of the chain of lakes in the Kayrala area; they needed their best unit, the 169th Infantry Division, to try to prevent the Soviets from establishing themselves in these narrows.

The Finnish 6th Division had already reached Apa Lake and was pressing northward along its eastern shore. This division was lacking some of its punch as it had to leave all its artillery behind on its long diagonal trek across the wilderness from the border. The Finns encountered prepared Soviet positions south of Mikkola. General Dietl’s need for reinforcements in his attempt to penetrate the Litsa River line now took its toll on the XXXVI Corps as it was ordered to detach its motorized machinegun battalion and send it north to be attached to Mountain Corps Norway.

The line of advance of the XXXVI Corps was through the lake narrows west of Kayrala, an area that the Soviets had fortified as a fallback position since their takeover of the region in 1940. In the more northern part of this front—around the Maaseljaen Hills—defensive positions were blasted from the rocky hillsides.

The Germans soon learned that a frontal attack would not succeed. The Soviets had brought up a new division that held the Kayrala narrows—the 104th Rifle Division—while the 122nd Rifle Division had withdrawn behind the chain of lakes to regroup. The 1st Soviet Tank Division, which had forward elements in Salla, was in positions between Kayrala and Alakurtti. This division consisted of two tank regiments, a motorized infantry regiment, and artillery. The units holding the Kayrala positions and deployed between Kayrala and Alakurtti were grouped under the command of the XVII Soviet Corps. The drives of the Germans and Finns were stopped. The 6th Finnish Division managed to cut the road and railroad leading east from Kayrala on July 9, but vigorous Soviet counterattacks from the north and east drove it back.

Over the next five or six days the Soviets kept pouring in reinforcements via Kandalaksha that brought the 122nd Division back to full strength. These came primarily by sea from Archangel. The Luftwaffe failed to hinder the sea transport but carried out attacks as Soviet troops moved from Kandalaksha to the front.

After their initial repulses on July 9 and 10, the Germans concluded that they needed to resort to envelopments to have any chance of success. Since the XXXVI Corps had only two effective divisions (169th and 6th Finnish) the envelopment had to be limited in both size and scope. To avoid the risk of defeat in detail it was limited to trapping the Soviet forces holding the lake narrows.

The main effort was assigned to the 169th Division. The plan called for sending one regiment north along the Salla–Korya road and then for it to turn south and strike the Soviet right flank at a point about 13 kilometers north of Kuola Lake. This operation took some time since the regiment had to traverse the heavily wooded and hilly country between the Salla–Korya road and the Soviet positions east of the Kuola Lake. After having eliminated these positions, the regiment was to complete the northern prong of the encirclement. Two battalions from another regiment of the 169th Division were to work north along the western shore of Kuola Lake, around the northern tip of that lake, and strike the Soviet right flank. The Finnish 6th Division constituted the southern prong of the encirclement.

The northern prong of the German encirclement met stiff resistance as soon as it turned southeast from the Salla–Korya road. XXXVI Corps added another regiment and two battalions from its reserve—the 324th Infantry Regiment from the 163rd Infantry Division—to the northern encirclement force.

The Army of Norway had wanted a much wider envelopment—extending as far as to the Nurmi River—to ensure that the Soviet divisions in the lake region were trapped and destroyed. The XXXVI Corps maintained that such a deep encirclement was beyond its capability. This hotly disputed difference of opinion between the two headquarters led to a compromise involving the strengthening of the northern encircling force.

The troops of the northern prong of the encirclement struggled mightily in the difficult terrain and against repeated Soviet counterattacks. The two regiments were advancing abreast and they had to cut roads through the wilderness as they moved forward.

The Soviet reinforcements were beginning to make themselves felt by launching continuous counterattacks against the northern pincer movement and against the Finns east of Apa Lake. Falkenhorst viewed an immediate attack as the only solution to the XXXVI Corps problem. However, General Feige and the commander of the 169th Division were pessimistic since the 169th lacked the strength to cut the Kayrala–Alakurtti road.

Falkenhorst, running out of patience, visited the left flank of the 169th Division in person on July 23. In a one-sided conversation he had with General Dittmar, the commander of the 169th Division, he angrily castigated the division commander for having allowed two or three Soviet regiments, badly mauled at Salla, time to recover. As far as poor roads were concerned, he observed that they were boulevards compared to those in the Mountain Corps Norway area.⁸

Back at his headquarters, Falkenhorst composed a pointed message to General Feige describing the negative impressions he gained from his visit to the 169th Division. He stated that the time for debate and assessments were over and concluded with two directives and a warning: 1) An immediate end to any talk about stationary warfare or he would ask OKW for a more aggressive corps commander and 2) The establishment of a firm date for the resumption of the attack. Feige got the message and set the date and time of the attack for July 26 at 2300 hours.

The XXXVI Corps attack began on schedule but bogged down quickly against stubborn Soviet defenses. The 169th Division launched its attack with two regiments forward. The Soviets launched a counterattack against the left flank regiment before it got out of its attack positions. The other regiment gained less than two kilometers before it was also stopped and pinned down. The 6th Finnish Division was given the mission of tying down Soviet forces in the south until the 169th Division had broken through the northern defenses. Initially, the 6th Division made good progress but was then thrown back by a Soviet counterattack.

Feige informed Falkenhorst on July 27 that his attacks could not achieve any decisive results. Colonel Buschenhagen, the Army of Norway chief of staff, told Feige that the attacks had to continue because Hitler wanted to cut the Murmansk Railroad in at least one place. Feige thereupon committed his two reserve battalions to the attack on the northern flank but it failed.

The attacks by the XXXVI Corps had come to a complete standstill by July 28. The Army of Norway ordered the corps to conduct only limited offensive actions to keep Soviet forces tied down so that they could not be switched against the III Finnish Corps or against Mountain Corps Norway. The Army of Norway reported to OKW that the offensive could not be resumed unless it was assigned an additional division. Hitler validated the Army of Norway action on July 30 and ordered the termination of the XXXVI Corps offensive, an offensive that had started a month earlier with high hopes of success. The results of the hard-fought actions of the XXXVI Corps were meager and high in costs. The corps had advanced across the border to a distance of 20 kilometers and had suffered 5,500 casualties, 3,296 of them in the 169th Division.

III Finnish Corps Captures Kestenga

Führer Directive Number 34 on July 30 ordered that the attack in the direction of Kandalaksha be halted and the switching of the main effort by the Army of Norway to the Finnish III Corps’ drive to Loukhi. Only enough forces would be left with XXXVI Corps for defense of the terrain it had captured and as deception of future offensive operations. If operations against Loukhi also failed, the German forces with III Finnish Corps were to be withdrawn and transferred to the Karelian front.⁹ Falkenhorst had been a proponent of the idea that the Murmansk Railroad could be reached and cut most quickly at Loukhi.

Major General Siilasvuo had divided 3rd Division into two groups—F and J. The SS units had not yet been attached to III Corps. Siilasvuo sent Group J, consisting of one reinforced regiment, across the border in the direction of the town of Kestenga. Group F, consisting of two regiments, crossed the border east of Suomussalmi and advanced in the direction of Ukhta. The corps, in accordance with the Army of Norway plan, placed its main effort with Group F. The two regiments crossed the border at different points, about 60 kilometers apart, for a converging attack on the village of Voynitsa. The Soviet forces opposing III Corps, consisting of the 54th Rifle Division, split to meet the drives of both Finnish groups.

Numerically, the attackers and defenders were about equal but the advantage was with the attacker who presented multiple threats over a relatively wide area. The III Corps offensive therefore made good progress against weak and disorganized resistance. Group J reached Makarely, about 27 kilometers from the border, on July 5, and the southern prong of the concentric advance of Group F had reached Ponga Guba, 45 kilometers east of the border. The two regiments of Group F reached Voynitsa on July 10, one from the west and one from the south. Here they encountered a tough center of resistance, which they encircled and destroyed by July 19.

On that day, elements of Group J reached the 13-kilometer long Sofyanga River connecting Pya Lake and Top Lake. The river was a major obstacle and defended in strength by the Soviets. Lieutenant Colonel Turtola was confident that if he could seize the narrows between the two lakes he could then advance on Kestenga without worrying about flank threats. A good road covered the 67 kilometers between Kestenga and Loukhi. It appears that the actual commander of Group J was Major General Väinö Henrik Palojärvi after major elements of SS Division Nord were attached.

Colonel Buschenhagen, the Army of Norway’s chief of staff, visited Group J on July 18. He was surprised by the relative rapidity of the Finnish advance. They had covered over 65 kilometers and built a road as they advanced. Finnish expertise in forest warfare had been obvious.¹⁰

Colonel Buschenhagen discussed his observations with General Falkenhorst when he returned to headquarters. This discussion led to a decision to reinforce success by sending an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion from SS Division Nord to reinforce Group J. General Siilasvuo also contributed to strengthening Group J by moving two infantry battalions from Group F and attaching them to Group J. This group now had the strength of about three infantry regiments. Further SS reinforcements were provided at the end of July when the Army of Norway became concerned about partisan activities and the exposed northern flank of Group J.

Group F was also making good progress in its advance to Ukhta. After having eliminated the encircled Soviet forces in the Voynitsa area the group continued along the road to Ukhta via Korpijärvi, which was reached on July 23.

The group again split into two major columns. One approached Ukhta on both sides of the Korpijärvi–Ukhta road while the second column advanced southeast and then east along the north shore of Verkhneye Kuyto Lake. This column reached Enonsuu across Stredneye Kuyto Lake from Ukhta on August 2. The northern columns reached the Yeldanka Lake area on July 28. This put them about 19 kilometers northwest of Ukhta. By August 2, at the same time as the southern group reached Enonsuu, the northern group drew up to the Kis-Kis River line, about 10 kilometers from Ukhta.

Group J began its assault on the Sofyanga River line on July 30. While the main force attacked the river line near the village of Sof-Porog, one battalion crossed the western tip of Top Lake by boat to attack the Soviets in the rear. Group J penetrated the Sofyanga River line after three days of hard fighting. The town of Kestenga fell on August 7. The Finns and Germans believed that the Soviets had thrown their last reserves into the defense of Kestenga.¹¹

On August 11, a Finnish regiment of Group J reached a point about 32 kilometers southwest of Loukhi, in the narrows between Lakes Yelovoye and Lebedevo. The Soviets had rushed the 88th Rifle Division to the Loukhi front from Archangel in order to keep the Murmansk Railroad from being cut. The Finns met heavy resistance in the lake narrows and the resistance became even more determined in the next few days as the 88th Division reached the front.

Group F had become stalled on the Kis-Kis River line. Attempts at envelopments from the north failed against heavy resistance. The front stagnated and the actions boiled down to patrolling and probing attacks. The Army of Norway cancelled the offensive operations of Group F on August 19. An infantry battalion from Group F was ordered to join Group J in order to increase the weight of the attack against Loukhi.

One reason for further increasing the strength of Group J was that there were indications that enemy resistance in that area was weakening. However, the Finnish and German troops were also exhausted after nearly two months of offensive operations. Their losses were also significant. Group J managed to encircle and trap a Soviet regiment south of the Kestenga-Loukhi road but because of exhaustion and lack of strength they were unable to eliminate the trapped troops. General Siilasvuo informed General Falkenhorst on August 25, 1941 that he did not believe it possible for his troops to complete their drive to Loukhi without significant reinforcements. He asked to be assigned another Finnish division used to forest fighting.

General Siilasvuo’s assessment of the situation led to a hurried meeting between Generals Falkenhorst, Buschenhagen, and Siilasvuo at Kuusamo on August 29. Siilasvuo told his guests that both Group F and J were stalled. The six Finnish and three SS battalions in Group J faced 13 Soviet battalions in prepared defensive positions. Two of his SS battalions together had an effective strength of only 280 men. It now appeared possible that the Soviets would be able to strike southward from the Loukhi area to Kestenga. If successful, this could bring about the collapse of Group J. General Siilasvuo stated that it was an error to have stopped Group F before it reached Ukhta since it now found itself in poor defensive positions.¹²

General Siilasvuo’s pessimistic assessment of the situation in the III Corps area led Falkenhorst to make yet another change in the operational plans. His decision was basically to start up again the attack on Ukhta while Group J held its positions. To bolster the strength of Group J, the last two infantry battalions of the SS were assigned to that group. A motorized machinegun battalion was added in the mix. A regiment from the 6th Finnish Division would be released to increase the striking power in the attack on Ukhta. The exact date for the transfer of this infantry regiment was left undecided. It would be done as soon as conditions in the XXXVI sector permitted its detachment. Until that time, Group F was expected to remain on the defensive.

The Kayrala Encirclement

The attack on the Kayrala–Mikkola line by the XXXVI Corps had met initial failure by July 28 and the Germans limited themselves to minor offensive actions to keep the Soviets from switching their forces against III Finnish Corps.

The sharp differences between Generals Falkenhorst and Feige noted earlier continued. At times they became acrimonious. Feige, in accordance with earlier instructions from the Army of Norway (and also in accordance with Hitler’s directive of July 30), ordered his two divisions on August 3 to tie down the opposing enemy forces and await a favorable opportunity for resuming the offensive after reinforcements had arrived.

The Army of Norway immediately countermanded Feige’s order. It directed XXXVI Corps to prepare to resume its offensive with the weight of the attack in the sector of the Finnish 6th Division in the south—without waiting for reinforcements that could not be counted on for some time.

There is no doubt that Falkenhorst ignored the July 30 directive as far as the XXXVI Corps is concerned. In his defense it must be pointed out that OKW did not issue an implementing order for that directive and until they did Falkenhorst may have felt free to set XXXVI Corps in motion.

The Soviets withdrew the 1st Tank Division (minus one regiment) from the Salla front on August 1 and transferred it to the Leningrad front. This led the Army of Norway to order the XXXVI Corps to execute a deep envelopment to the road-railroad line just west of the town of Alakurtti. The XXXVI Corps viewed this as impossible because of lack of sufficient forces in terrain that did not lend itself to wide and deep envelopments. It insisted that the envelopment should not aim at a point further to the east than Nurmi Lake, halfway to Alakurtti.

The XXXVI Corps intended to send the 6th Finnish Division on a thrust to Nurmi Mountains as the southern prong of the envelopment. The Finns—the main effort—would advance with one regiment forward and two in reserve against the Nurmi Mountains and take up blocking positions. One regiment of the division would advance eastward along the Alakurtti road at Vuoriyarvi (Vuorijärvi). A German task force of two infantry battalions and six companies of mixed SS and engineer troops would cross the Nurmi River behind the left wing of the 169th Division and drive towards Nurmi Lake as the northern arm of the envelopment. Other units from the 169th Division would take over the 6th Division’s defensive positions to make the Finnish drive possible. Two regiments (one German and one Finnish) constituted the corps reserve.

The regrouping of forces for the offensive was a major task. It required the construction of a road from Lampela to the southern point of Apa Lake in order to bring artillery into the Finnish sector. This road was completed on August 14. Units of the 169th Division, which were to take over the Finnish defensive positions, were pulled back through Salla and sent south to where the Finnish 6th Division had crossed the border. From here they moved northeast along the route the Finns had followed in early July. While this maneuver may have confused the Soviets, it was a trying experience for the troops in the 169th Division. The straight-line distance from their start point to their new area of operations was only 28 kilometers. Now—because of the lack of lateral roads near the front—they had to make a strenuous move of 175 kilometers to arrive at the same destination.

The Finnish 6th Division began its northward attack in heavy rain and fog on the morning of August 19. The main attack made good progress and reached Lehtokangas, about halfway to Nurmi Lake, the same afternoon. A Russian pocket of resistance northeast of Lehtokangas was destroyed. The right flank regiment, however, met determined resistance and its progress was slow. The German regiment on the left barely managed to get out of its starting positions. The main Finnish force reached the railroad south of Nurmi Lake on August 20. The Finns had five battalions in defensive positions south of Nurmi Lake and across the road and railroad leading east from Kayrala, the route that the trapped forward Soviet forces would have to take in a retreat.

The infantry battalions from the 169th Division which were to drive south along the east shore of the Nurmi River to Nurmi Lake were making slow progress and this left the Soviets an escape route. It was imperative to close the pincer as rapidly as possible and troops in the forward German positions west of Kayrala were reduced to the minimum in order to increase the striking power of the northern pincer. Poor weather conditions kept the Luftwaffe grounded until August 25.

The Finnish 6th Division tried to move forces northward in order to link up with the Germans moving south but in the meantime the Soviets had begun to make their escape via an unknown east–west road north of Lake Nurmi. The advancing Finns did not reach and cut this road until August 25. The right flank Finnish regiment had captured the village of Vuoriyarvi, about 20 kilometers southwest of Alakurtti on the previous day.

The Soviet defenses north and south of Lakes Kuola and Apa were collapsing and Soviet soldiers from the forward areas were in headlong retreat to the east in order to avoid the trap that was about to close on them in the Lake Nurmi area. While a clear-cut victory was achieved, the failure of the German drive from the north to close the encirclement allowed the bulk of the trapped Soviet soldiers to escape although most of their vehicles and equipment were abandoned in the process.

Even as late as the morning of August 27 the Soviets managed to keep the encirclement from closing in desperate and bloody defensive fighting northeast of Nurmi Lake. The XXXVI Corps ordered a relentless pursuit of the beaten enemy in the direction of Alakurtti. A major reorganization for the pursuit was undertaken. The units that had earlier been detached from the 169th Division were now reattached. In addition, three SS battalions were attached to the Finnish 6th Division to make sure that unit had sufficient weight to overcome anticipated desperate Soviet rearguard actions. The pursuit made good initial progress and reached a point about seven kilometers from Alakurtti by the end of August 27.

The Soviet defenders held a narrow bridgehead on the western banks of the Tuntsa River and this bridgehead, with prepared positions, held the Germans and Finns at bay for several days despite vigorous frontal and flanking attacks. The bridgehead was finally eliminated on August 30 and the Soviets destroyed the road and railroad bridges over this formidable obstacle as they withdrew to the eastern bank of the river.

In their withdrawal to the east bank the Soviets neglected to destroy a footbridge north of the main east–west road, which a regiment of the 169th Division used to cross the river. There followed a day of hard fighting in town before the Soviets suddenly withdrew in the evening of September 1, 1941. They withdrew to the river running through the village of Voyta 10 kilometers to the east of Alakurtti.

As the Germans and Finns were pressing on east of Alakurtti, the Army of Norway redeployed some units that reduced the strength of the XXXVI Corps. Two SS battalions from the 7th SS Infantry Regiment were transferred to the Finnish III Corps while one battalion from the 9th SS Infantry Regiment, which had earlier been transferred to the XXXVI Corps from Mountain Corps Norway, was now sent back north to General Dietl.

It was thus a reduced-strength corps that closed on the Voyta River line on September 2. This had been the border between the Soviet Union and Finland prior to March 1940 and the old Finnish border fortifications were now manned by five Soviet regiments. Some of these regiments—from the 104th and 122nd Rifle Divisions—were at a severely reduced strength from the previous two months of fighting. One motorized regiment from the 1st Tank Division had been attached to the 104th Rifle Division. It held the center of the Soviet defensive line. The Soviets were also bringing forward a steady flow of replacements from Kandalaksha.

The XXXVI Corps halted along the west bank of the Voyta River for four days with the 169th Division on the left and the 6th Finnish Division on the right. The Germans and Finns began their assault across the river on September 6. Four regiments made the frontal assault while one regiment enveloped the enemy’s north flank and headed for Hill 366 just southwest of the northernmost of the two Verman lakes. While the frontal attack by the four regiments was repelled, the enveloping regiment made rapid progress towards Hill 366 (elevation in meters). This was one of several places where high ground dominated the road and railroad to Kandalaksha. Faulty intelligence from a reconnaissance two days earlier had made the Germans believe that Hill 366 was unoccupied. They now discovered that it was occupied and strongly fortified. The German regiment found itself in a dangerous position, over eight kilometers behind the Soviet line along the Voyta River. This situation led to heated exchanges between the regiment and corps and illustrated the raw nerves symptomatic of exhausted units.¹³ Much of the recrimination dealt with the lack of artillery and air support, priority for which was still with Mountain Corps Norway.

The attack by the XXXVI Corps on September 7 made no progress due to heavy rainstorms. Intercepted Soviet radio traffic indicated that the Soviet troops had orders to hold their positions at all cost, even at the risk of encirclement. The corps decided to abandon the frontal attacks and concentrate on what had started out as a promising northern envelopment. However, as we have seen, the regiment in the north was in trouble. It had managed to take Hill 366 on September 7 and also reported securing Hill 386 to its south. It was learned the following morning that Hill 386 had in fact not been secured. The corps ordered an additional regiment forward on the north flank and sent a Finnish regiment to take up a position northeast of Hill 366 to cover the corps’ left flank. Another Finnish regiment was at the northern tip of Tolvand Lake to cover the southern flank.

The German attack bogged down in front of the high ground east of Voyta for two days until Hill 386 was captured on September 10. The corps ordered the new regiment it had sent forward to push east along the road to Verman River. The regiment, which had been in this area since the beginning of the attack, was ordered to move west and attack the Soviet defenses in the Voyta area from behind. The regiment hesitated for almost a day and moved out only after General Feige intervened personally. The 169th Division managed to push a battalion across the Voyta River on September 11 and contact with the regiment approaching from the east was established on September 12. While the road to the east was now open, the Soviet forces to the south of that road clung to their positions and it took the Finnish 6th Division one week of heavy fighting to reduce those positions.¹⁴

As the XXXVI Corps drew up to the line of the Verman Lakes, they again found themselves facing the same foes as they had since operations began—the 122nd and 104th Soviet Rifle Divisions. Over 8,000 replacements had joined these two units by September 15, bringing them up to 80% of full strength.

These two divisions occupied prepared positions along the Verman River that flows between the two lakes by that name. The Soviet positions were anchored in the north on the North Verman Lake and in the south on Tolvand Lake. The Soviets, who had a much better appreciation of the importance of Murmansk to their war effort—were obviously committed, at all costs, to preventing the Germans and Finns from reaching the Murmansk Railroad. Forced labor had been working for months on three additional fortified defensive lines between the two lakes and Kandalaksha.

As the XXXVI Corps drew up to the Verman Lake line the Army of Norway made another change in its strategy that brought relations between Generals Feige and Falkenhorst to breaking point. With the failure of the last attack across the Litsa River in the Mountain Corps Norway’s area of operations, the Army of Norway switched the effective main effort in Finland back to the XXXVI Corps—just a few days after two battalions of the 7th SS Infantry Regiment were transferred to the Finnish III Corps, and one battalion from the 9th SS Infantry Regiment was sent north to Mountain Corps Norway.

The XXXVI Corps had suffered 9,463 German casualties since the campaign was initiated and was hardly in a position to become the main effort. The 169th Division was so worn out and depleted that it was hardly capable of performing defensive missions, much less offensive operations. The Army of Norway proposal elicited some very unusual harsh comments from General Feige. The XXXVI Corps characterized the proposal as “grotesque” and “hardly calculated to arouse confidence in the higher leadership.”¹⁵

General Feige did not limit himself to pointing out the futility of switching the main effort to the XXXVI Corps. He leveled—in an appreciation of the situation on September 16—some harsh criticism against the Army of Norway for having missed excellent opportunities in the past. He pointed out that, by the earlier emphasis on the operations of Mountain Corps Norway to the detriment of reinforcing the XXXVI Corps, two good opportunities had been missed within a month—one after the Kayrala encirclement and another as the corps drew up to the Verman line. He concluded his assessment with the statement that the corps could advance no further with the forces it had assigned. While there was still a possibility of reaching Kandalaksha before winter, Feige stated that to do so he needed another Finnish division and a German mountain division. However, time was of the essence since the Soviets were improving their defenses with each passing day.

General Feige must surely have been aware of the efforts made by the Army of Norway to obtain additional forces, although those efforts were late. Falkenhorst had requested the two remaining regiments of the 163rd Division on August 25, 1941 and on September 4 General Buschenhagen had requested the use of the 6th Mountain Division. On September 14 Falkenhorst had again requested the remainder of the 163rd Division and the 6th Mountain Division. There was no reply to the August 25 request for the 163rd Division and, as we saw earlier, both Hitler and Dietl were determined to use the 6th Mountain Division in the far north. With respect to the second request for the 163rd Division on September 14, OKW promised a reply as soon as the operations around Leningrad were sorted out.

The request for the 163rd Division on August 25, even if OKW had acted on it, came too late to add much punch to the pursuit after the Kayrala encirclement. It would take some time to withdraw the 163rd Division from East Karelia and move it and its support base several hundred miles. The request for the 6th Mountain Division on September 4 was likewise too late. The division was still on its way from Greece by way of Norway and was not expected to reach the Mountain Corps Norway’s area of operations until sometime in October.

The Army of Norway instructed XXXVI Corps on September 17 to rest its troops for the time being on the Verman River line. Feige was promised two battalions from an organization referred to as Schützenverband Oslo. This was a regimental-size unit of two battalions organized in Norway. The unit was not yet available; it was on the way to Finland from Norway and the quality of this makeshift organization was open to question. General Feige predicted that the operations of his corps had come to an end since winter was fast approaching.

Hitler’s War Operational Directive Number 36, issued on September 22, still called for the XXXVI to continue its offensive against Kandalaksha in October.¹⁶ The Army of Norway was told that Mannerheim would be asked to release the 163rd Division in time to take part in the offensive. The directive also called for the release of all German troops from the Finnish III Corps and for them to be reattached to XXXVI Corps. Finnish III Corps was to halt all its offensive operations. This was yet another change to German strategy in Finland and the promised additional forces were too little and too late. It was soon learned, for example, that the 163rd Division was not expected to join the XXXVI Corps for four to five weeks, after the full fury of winter had set in on the central front in Finland.

This realization led to yet another shift in strategy by the Army of Norway. Falkenhorst disregarded Directive 36 since the premise on which it was based—the timely arrival of the 163rd Division—was no longer realizable. Instead of terminating operations by III Finnish Corps, Falkenhorst began withdrawing troops from the XXXVI Corps for use in the Finnish III Corps area. Offensive operations in the XXXVI area were delayed until winter.

This was not the end of the back-and-forth about strategy in Finland between the Army of Norway and the OKW. On October 8 the OKW ordered a stop to all operations in the Army of Norway sector. This resulted in a call from the Army of Norway to OKW for an explanation. This was at a time when the great encirclement battles by Army Group Center at Bryansk and Vyazma had been concluded with Soviet losses estimated at 300,000 killed and 700,000 captured.¹⁷ With Army Group Center beginning its final drive against Moscow a sense of unwarranted optimism prevailed in Berlin. OKW believed that the military collapse of the Soviet Union was imminent. In view of this, it was felt that it was not necessary to push things in central Finland. This is essentially the explanation given to General Buschenhagen by General Jodl. It was confirmed by Führer Directive Number 37 on October 10, 1941.¹⁸

Offensive operations by the Army of Norway were to cease and its mission reverted to protecting the nickel mines and making preparations for seizing the Rybachiy Peninsula and Murmansk. It was planned to give Mannerheim control of the Finnish III Corps as part of his planned reorganization of the Finnish Army and the XXXVI Corps was instructed to detach its Finnish units and have them revert to III Corps control and at the same time transfer the SS Division Nord to the control of the XXXVI Corps.

Finnish III Corps Operations

The operations in the Finnish III Corps area had also turned decisively against the Army of Norway. The Soviets had increased their forces confronting both Groups J and F. The 88th Soviet Rifle Division was moved into the Group J area along with an ad hoc unit referred to as Independent Brigade Grivnin. This unit was made up of one regiment from the 54th Rifle Division and a unit referred to as Special Regiment Murmansk. Group F, west of Ukhta, confronted the 54th Rifle Division (short one regiment). Under constant pressure, Group J had to abandon its forward positions and fall back. It ended up in new defensive positions about 13 kilometers east of Kestenga. Group F attempted to resume its offensive but was stopped dead in its tracks by the 54th Rifle Division.

As the situation in the Group J area looked very threatening, possibly necessitating a further withdrawal, the Army of Norway asked for an additional Finnish regiment for this sector on September 9. Ziemke writes that General Erfurth, the chief German liaison officer at Mannerheim’s headquarters, refused to relay the request to the Marshal.¹⁹ Erfurth does not mention this in his book. He only observes that the difficulties in the Army of Norway area caused Falkenhorst to ask the Finns for help. He also observes that the frequent changes in German plans decreased Finnish willingness to heed the German requests.²⁰

On September 12 the Army of Norway pulled the SS Reconnaissance Battalion out of the XXXVI Corps sector in order to provide the Finnish III Corps with a reserve. The transfer of the regimental headquarters and one battalion of the 14th Finnish Regiment from Pechenga to the III Corps area were also ordered. This reshuffling of forces to the III Corps area took place while the main effort was still assigned to the XXXVI Corps and while that commander was virtually begging for reinforcements. It underscores the lack of an overall strategy and may well have contributed to a Finnish refusal of a second request from Falkenhorst for a fresh regiment. Mannerheim did promise to provide 2,800 troops as replacements for losses in III Corps.

Relations had soured between Falkenhorst and subordinate Finnish commanders. The transfer of the SS Reconnaissance Battalion to the Finnish III Corps brought virtually all SS Division Nord units into that corps. General Siilasvuo, the III Corps commander, had split the SS Division and assigned its units to his two groups—primarily Group J. This left General Demelhuber, the commander of SS Division Nord, and his staff as mere onlookers. The SS Division had improved since its debacle at Salla but the Finns still considered it an unreliable unit if left on its own. Demelhuber had obviously complained about this state of affairs to Falkenhorst who now insisted to General Siilasvuo that all SS units be placed under the command of General Demelhuber with their own sector of operations. While General Siilasvuo resisted, Falkenhorst was not about to have a German division commanded by a Finnish colonel. Siilasvuo appealed the decision later in the month but Falkenhorst refused to reconsider.

A trip by Falkenhorst to Hitler’s headquarters on September 14 resulted in yet another change of plans for the Army of Norway. Falkenhorst was ordered to stop the attack by Group F against Ukhta and have Group J and SS Division Nord take up defensive positions. These orders were later confirmed in Führer Directive 36.

Intelligence from prisoner interrogations convinced III Corps at the end of September that Soviet morale was poor among the forces in the area between Kestenga and Loukhi. III Corps planned to resume its advance against Loukhi and asked the Army of Norway for reinforcements. Falkenhorst agreed with the request despite Hitler’s orders on September 14 to halt all offensive operations in the III Corps sector and he offered Siilasvuo the following units:

1. One regiment from the 6th Finnish Division.

2. The two infantry battalions that constituted Schützenverband Oslo.

3. The 9th SS Infantry Regiment from Mountain Corps Norway.

4. One regiment of artillery.

5. The last battalion of the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment, also from the Mountain Corps Norway sector.

The Army of Norway issued orders for the III Corps attack on October 6 but had to cancel the order on October 8 since OKW, in accordance with Hitler’s earlier instructions, ordered that all offensive operations cease. The cancellation order came as the troop deployments were underway. The 9th SS Infantry Regiment and the lone battalion from the 14th Finnish Infantry Regiment were allowed to move into the III Corps sector but remained under Army of Norway control.

Generals Falkenhorst and Siilasvuo had a meeting on October 11, 1941. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss developments in the left sector of III Corps. It had been learned that one of the major units facing Group J and SS Division Nord—Independent Brigade Grivnin—had been dissolved. One of its regiments was moved south to join the 54th Rifle Division while another regiment had been identified in the XXXVI Corps sector. Both generals agreed that the prospects for an attack were good but, in view of Hitler’s orders, it was decided to characterize their planned attack as an attempt to improve the defensive positions of Group J and SS Division Nord.

Major General Siilasvuo reported to Falkenhorst on October 23 that he believed the attack discussed on October 11 would prove to be a complete success. Falkenhorst asked if Siilasvuo believed that a drive directly to Loukhi was possible. The Finn gave an affirmative answer. Falkenhorst’s question to Siilasvuo is a clear revelation of his intention. He saw a chance to accomplish the Army of Norway’s mission of cutting the Murmansk Railroad and grabbed it despite Hitler’s instructions on September 14 and the OKW order on October 8. The redeployment of forces that the Army of Norway had ordered on October 6 gave Siilasvuo and Falkenhorst the extra forces they believed necessary for the new offensive.

Major General Siilasvuo set the objectives for the attack. It involved a close encirclement of the Soviet forces along the front and then a quick drive to Loukhi. The SS Division Nord was given the mission of tying down the Soviet forces on their front while three Finnish regiments and the 9th SS Infantry Regiment broke through the Soviet positions along the railroad. The breakthrough forces would then turn north and encircle the Soviet troops tied down by the SS Division Nord. A task force of two Finnish battalions would bypass the southern Soviet flank and advance to Verkhneye Lake south of Lebedevo Lake.

The attack began on October 30 and by November 1, III Corps had encircled the Soviet regiment holding the front in the SS Division Nord sector. It had been General Siilasvuo’s intention to destroy the encirclement as quickly as possible while the bulk of his forces pushed on to seize the narrows between Lakes Lebedevo and Yelovoye on their way to Loukhi. However, there was a sharp change in his intention soon after the encirclement was completed. He insisted to the Army of Norway that he needed time to eliminate the Soviet pocket before he could resume his advance.

A message from OKW on October 9 requested information about Falkenhorst’s intentions and reminded him pointedly about Führer Directive Number 37, which had prohibited offensive operations in the III Corps area. In its reply, the Army of Norway pointed to the successes already achieved: the destruction of two regiments of the 88th Soviet Rifle Division and the seizure of the narrows between Yelovoye Lake and Lebedevo Lake. This area provided an excellent starting point for operations against Loukhi.

The Army of Norway also received a message from General Erfurth. The message requested that III Corps cease offensive operations as soon as possible because Mannerheim wanted to proceed with the reorganization of the Finnish Army (to be discussed in Chapter 6). This message elicited the logical question from the Army of Norway—what was meant by as soon as possible? Erfurth replied that the timing was left up to the Army of Norway but Mannerheim wanted to proceed with his reorganization plans quickly.

The cleaning out of pockets of Soviet soldiers was completed by November 13. Over 3,000 dead were reported as well as 2,600 prisoners. While the Soviets had moved reinforcements into the area in form of the 186th Rifle Division, it was not viewed as a serious obstacle since it was less than 3,000 men strong. It was in fact the Polyarnyy Division, which had made an appearance in the Mountain Corps Norway sector in September. It had been renamed and moved south when operations on the Litsa front came to an end.

Despite the successes achieved, General Siilasvuo made no move to exploit them. In fact, he grew downright gloomy in his assessment. On November 16 he reported that his troops were facing 17 enemy battalions and his conclusion was that further attacks by his corps would produce no results. This was followed by a report on November 18 that his corps was not capable of continuing the operation and that he would instead adopt a defensive posture. His immediate subordinates, the commanders of Group J and SS Division Nord, disagreed openly with Siilasvuo’s assessment and felt that the prospects for a continued offensive were good. The German liaison officer at III Corps reported that the commander of Group J, as late as November 18, considered his unit fully capable of continuing the offensive and his regimental commanders concurred. The drawbacks of coalition warfare were beginning to haunt Falkenhorst’s efforts.

Major General Buschenhagen, Falkenhorst’s chief of staff, traveled to Helsinki on October 15 to try to sort out various aspects relating to the Army of Norway and to visit Major General Warlimont from OKW. It probably came as no surprise to Buschenhagen that OKW was upset with the activities by the Army of Norway in view of earlier directives not to engage in offensive operations. Warlimont repeated General Erfurth’s earlier arguments that Mannerheim wanted control of his troops in order to carry out his reorganization plans. Warlimont told Buschenhagen that the Germans had to start removing their troops from III Corps no later than December 1, 1941. He also told Buschenhagen that Heinrich Himmler wanted the SS Division Nord sent back to Germany with a rather vague promise that he would provide replacement units.

Although the Finns maintained that the reason for halting offensive operations was to facilitate Mannerheim’s plans for reorganizing the Finnish Army, it is more likely that the primary reason was political. Diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Finland were broken on July 31, 1941. A note from the British government to the Finnish government sent via the Norwegian Embassy in Helsinki on September 22 demanded that Finland end hostilities and pull its troops back to the 1939 borders. If the Finns continued their advance into Soviet territory the British would treat Finland as a hostile nation. After lengthy discussions within the Finnish government, in which Mannerheim participated, the Finns politely rejected the British note.²¹

What may have had a more decisive impact on Finnish behavior as far as III Corps operations were concerned was an intervention by the US (although not a belligerent at this time). The US ambassador to Finland presented a memorandum from the US government to President Ryti on October 27, 1941. The note included the following demands:

Insofar as the Finnish government is anxious to preserve the friendship of the United States now and in the future, the United States government must be given satisfactory assurances that the intention of the Finnish government is immediately to cease operations against Russian territory, and that Finnish forces will immediately be withdrawn (in principle) from Russian territory to a line corresponding to the 1939 boundary between Finland and the Soviet Union.

In the event that attacks are made against shipments of military supplies from the United States en route to Russia via the Arctic Ocean, and such attack is presumably made or may be claimed to be made from Finnish-controlled territory, it must be assumed that in view of the public opinion now prevailing in the United States such an incident must be assumed to lead to an immediate crisis in Finnish–American relations.²²

The US warning was elaborated on in another memorandum on October 30 and at a press conference by Secretary of State Cordell Hull on November 3, 1941. The October 30 memorandum stated that Finnish military operations (presumably against the Murmansk Railroad) “constituted a definite threat to the security of the United States.”²³

While the Finnish government rejected the US demands, we may assume that Finland did not want a Finnish unit (III Corps) under German command posing the only serious danger to the route by which American military equipment and supplies were delivered to the Soviet Union. It was therefore important to stop the offensive operations of III Corps, return the German units under its control to the Army of Norway, and bring III Corps back under Finnish control. This is also what Falkenhorst suspected as the reason for the unusual attitude of Major General Siilasvuo who was probably briefed by Mannerheim.²⁴ Mannerheim, in his memoirs, is silent on this subject.

German Command and Organizational Changes

Mannerheim was not the only one contemplating organizational changes. Führer Directive Number 37, issued on October 10, ordered the Army of Norway to go over to defensive operations. It is not surprising that Falkenhorst fell by the wayside in the wake of this directive. It was the inevitable price for the failure of the Army of Norway to achieve its main objectives—the capture of Murmansk or its isolation. Falkenhorst was also a demanding officer with rough edges who frequently ruffled feathers of fellow Germans as well as his Finnish “brothers-in-arms.”

Falkenhorst did not leave in disgrace—he remained as commander in chief in Norway until December 18, 1944—and he may have been pleased by the change. Up to now he had been saddled with enormous responsibilities, and had to operate two army headquarters more than 1,600 kilometers apart. In Norway he commanded a single army with a very specific defensive mission.

The selection of General der Gebirgstruppe General Eduard Dietl as a replacement for Falkenhorst was also almost pre-ordained. He was an early supporter of Hitler. He and his company stood ready to support Hitler and his followers during the Beer Hall Putsch on November 9, 1923. His stubborn defense of Narvik for two months in 1940 when many, including Hitler, were ready to give up the game gave him an almost legendary status. Dietl was one of the few generals that Hitler had grown to like and trust over the years. He was loved by his troops and had a personality and charm well suited for dealing with the Finns who also admired him.

The instructions issued on November 7, 1941, by the OKW directed an early transfer of command. Falkenhorst and the Headquarters, Army of Norway, would return to Norway. Dietl would assume command of all German forces in Finland and northern Norway and establish a new headquarters, designated the Army of Lapland.

Everyone appears to have been pleased by the new command arrangement—except Dietl. He was basically a troop commander, not a manager, and was happiest when he was at the front with his troops. A briefing at the Army of Norway headquarters brought home to him the enormity of the job he was about to assume and he may well have sincerely doubted his own abilities to deal with this managerial task. Dietl wrote a letter to General Jodl on November 24 asking that his assignment as commander, Army of Lapland be withdrawn. This unusual action by an officer who was being promoted resulted in an order for him to report to Hitler’s headquarters. In the end, Hitler and Jodl prevailed on him not to give up the command to which he had been appointed.

Analysis of Operations in Central Finland

The OKW and the Army of Norway made a number of serious strategic and tactical mistakes in 1941 that are complex in nature and difficult to understand. Most have their inception in the planning and preparations for operations out of Finland. Ziemke attempts to explain the problems in a different way. He writes:

In the first place, the objective of the Army of Norway [with respect to Murmansk and the Murmansk Railroad] was political and psychological rather than strategic…. There is some reason for believing that the operation was directed more against Great Britain, to demonstrate its isolation and helplessness, then against the Soviet Union. Under those circumstances it became worthwhile to disregard sound tactics and attempt to stage a quick march along the arctic coast to Murmansk.²⁵

Hitler’s obsession with the defense of Norway—where no real threat existed in 1941—played a large part in his decisions regarding Finland. Hitler’s views regarding Murmansk were heavily influenced by his concerns for the security of the nickel mines near Pechenga—and the iron mines in north Sweden—shown by the arguments he used in his meeting with Dietl in April 1941. He viewed Russian troops in Murmansk as a threat to those mines and to northern Norway. Therefore, it is unlikely that a demonstration of Great Britain’s helplessness was foremost in Hitler’s mind when it came to Murmansk.

Ziemke is definitely right in his observation that the operations in Finland were begun with inadequate forces and that OKH was correct in not providing substantial reinforcements that would detract from the main effort in Russia. Substantial forces could, however, have been provided from those seven divisions that sat idle in Norway but here again we are confronted with Hitler’s obsession with the defense of Norway.

When it comes to German operations in Finland in 1941 we are again faced with a complex and confusing picture. One is forced to conclude that there was a great amount of uncertainty in the Army of Norway and at the highest level in Germany, caused by a lack of a coherent strategy. This resulted in constant changes. Some of these changes originated with the Army of Norway but others were caused by OKW meddling in the operations of that army.

Seven divisions (five German and two Finnish) were employed at four different points and the effective main effort kept shifting throughout 1941. Two German divisions and one Finnish regiment were used in the far north. Two German divisions and one Finnish division were used initially on the Salla front. SS Division Nord was subsequently fragmented and eventually sent to the III Corps area. The III Finnish Corps, with one division initially, was employed 140 kilometers to the south of Salla. It was subsequently reinforced in driblets by units from the SS Division Nord. Finally, the badly split 163rd German Infantry Division was used in the far south, in Mannerheim’s main offensive.

Although a main effort was designated initially, the force levels in each of the three areas reveal that no main effort existed. In failing to come up with a strategy supported organizationally within the German armed forces, the Germans let a golden opportunity for decisive results slip away in 1941. The Finns, seeing shifting plans and the lack of progress, became increasingly difficult to deal with, a situation aggravated by outside influences on the Finnish government.

The blame for the lack of a coherent strategy cannot be laid at the feet of Falkenhorst alone as Erfurth and Feige appear to do. Much of the fault can be traced back to inadequate planning and preparation and OKW meddling. The shifting of forces from one area to another to exploit opportunities rather than to create opportunities was not wise in view of the enormous transportation and supply difficulties in northern and central Finland.

Falkenhorst had a thankless job. He did not have the complete control of operations that you would expect of an army commander. He did not control air operations in his area of responsibility—the 5th Air Fleet in Norway answered to Göring and if he did not want to cooperate he had the ear of Hitler. Similarly, the SS Division he had assigned had a direct channel to Himmler. The commander of the Finnish III Corps had a direct line to Mannerheim who kept a close eye on the happenings in the Army of Norway area since Finnish troops were heavily involved.

Falkenhorst’s force requests were submitted to OKH. That headquarters, completely absorbed with operations in the Soviet Union proper and North Africa, increasingly viewed the operations by the Army of Norway as a drain of valuable resources that were sorely needed elsewhere.

Finally, there was a surprising disregard for the chain of command within the army. Dietl was subordinate to Falkenhorst but in Chapter 3 we saw that he frequently dealt directly with OKW on operational matters. He even took positions opposing those held by the Army of Norway (for example, the use of the 6th Mountain Division).

It has already been noted that Generals Feige and Dietl felt that the real main effort should be in the Kandalaksha sector. Dietl had felt this way since April 1941 and never changed his views. Falkenhorst, on the other hand, was a proponent for cutting the Murmansk Railroad further south at Loukhi, from the III Corps sector. Feige and Dietl were correct from a tactical standpoint and also on strategic grounds. The place to cut the Murmansk Railroad for the most decisive results was at Kandalaksha. Cutting it further south—between Kandalaksha and Belomorsk—would not be as effective since the Soviets could bring supplies and equipment by rail to Kandalaksha and from there across the White Sea to Archangel or Onega by ship. Cutting the line south of Belomorsk would serve no purpose because a recently completed rail line from Belomorsk connected with the line from Archangel, thus avoiding the use of the southern part of the Murmansk Railroad from Belomorsk to Volkhov.²⁶ The Kandalaksha sector was also the only one of the three that had a relative good road and rail network that could logistically support the large forces required to interdict the Murmansk Railroad.

General Erfurth was a strong proponent of achieving relative superiority. In his book, Die Überraschung im Krieg, published in 1938 he writes “To achieve relative superiority somewhere is the main objective of almost all military movements and the essential purpose of generalship.”²⁷ It is therefore surprising that he supported the movement of the 163rd Infantry Division to Karelia—where it accomplished virtually nothing—and was very critical of the decision to give one of its regiments to Falkenhorst. Giving the whole division to Falkenhorst might have given him the necessary forces to carry out his mission.

Erfurth argued later that General Siilasvuo would probably have reached Loukhi if he had been given an additional division in a timely manner and that Marshal Mannerheim had expressed the same opinion on several occasions.²⁸ By an additional division they are undoubtedly referring to the 6th Finnish Division attached to XXXVI Corps, and they are probably right. However, Falkenhorst had already given Siilasvuo SS Division Nord and, in view of the condition of the 169th Division, he had no further forces to spare based on security requirements in XXXVI Corps’ sector. The presence of the whole 163rd Division would have allowed him to release the 6th Finnish Division.

In an article published in Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau in 1952 and cited by Ziemke, General Erfurth suggested that the Army of Norway failed to follow OKW orders on several occasions. Falkenhorst did deviate from plans and orders several times to seize opportunities. The prerogative and expectation that a commander would do so had been part of German military doctrine since the late 1600s. The concept was referred to as Selbständigkeit der Unterführer (Independence of Subordinates).

Erfurth also claims in the same article that the orders violated were intended to create a main effort. The orders to which he must be referring are the ones issued on July 7 and 30. It is somewhat misleading to characterize those as establishing a main effort. If anything, they were disruptive.

The July 7 OKW order dealt with the transfer of forces to Mountain Corps Norway after the capture of Salla. Dietl needed reinforcements—he had asked for one regiment. There is no indication that this represented a change in the main effort. The other order to which Erfurth is referring must be the Führer Directive of July 30. It stopped the XXXVI Corps offensive and directed increased efforts in the Mountain Corps Norway and III Corps sectors. By this time Falkenhorst had unfortunately already switched his efforts to the Mountain Corps Norway and Finnish III Corps sectors. If the July 30 directive did anything, it appears to have blessed actions already taken by Falkenhorst. The effort in the far north was stopped by atrocious terrain and lack of lines of communication. The effort in the III Corps sector also had poor lines of communication but here the effort collapsed through Finnish refusal—probably on political grounds—to carry it out.

The frequent movement of regiments and battalions from one sector to another during the summer and fall point to uncertainty in German headquarters caused by a lack of cohesive strategy. However, Ziemke’s explanation for the shifting of forces should be kept in mind as it was obviously a contributing factor:

Falkenhorst maintained consistently and correctly that to relax the pressure at any one point meant giving the Russians an opportunity to exploit the superior maneuverability which the Murmansk Railroad afforded them to pull out troops and shift them to one of the other sectors. With the troops at its disposal the Army of Norway could not create a true main effort anywhere without defeating its own ends in the process and could not shut down any single sector without creating a potential threat elsewhere.²⁹

This observation in turn reveals the fact that the Germans were overcommitted. When overcommitted, the judicious use of available forces is more important than ever. The correct place for judicious offensive action was opposite Kandalaksha. General Erfurth agrees despite his above support for an increase of forces in the III Corps sector.³⁰

The Germans underestimated both the difficulties that the terrain posed for an attacker, and the capabilities and determination of their foe. These were surprises for the Germans and had a devastating effect on some of the poorly trained units that were sent to Finland.

Finally, when it comes to air operations—a factor that cannot be overemphasized in the spectacular string of German victories up to this point—the resources were not up to the demands placed on them. This again supports the observation of overcommitment. They had to support operations of three corps separated by great distances. If the Murmansk Railroad could not be seized, adequate air assets should have been provided so as to render the railroad and trans-shipment facilities useless for considerable periods of time.

When Dietl assumed command of the Army of Lapland, his command had been forced into a defensive posture in all sectors and the outlook for the future was bleak. After about 100 days of fighting the Germans had suffered nearly 22,000 casualties and the Finnish forces in the German areas had close to 7,000 casualties. Those who had watched the performance of the German Army in Finland with a sense of disillusionment were hoping that the Hero of Narvik could turn the situation around.