FIVE

The Finnish offensives

Military Situation and Operational Concept

The Finns were much better prepared for war in 1941 than in 1939. They had an officer and noncommissioned officer corps of proven leaders with solid experience from the Winter War. These men, who had proven themselves in the past, faced the prospect of another encounter with their traditional foe with confidence. Furthermore, they were not alone as they had been in 1939. They were now entering the fight at the side of Germany, the world’s leading military power.

The Finnish leaders, realizing that the imposed peace of 1940 was not the end of their troubles with the Soviet Union, had done all that could be done to prepare themselves for a new conflict. The stocks of supplies and equipment, exhausted in March 1940, had been replenished with German assistance. The increase in automatic weapons for the infantry had significantly improved their firepower. Heavy field artillery batteries, lacking in the Winter War, were now available. Air defenses had been improved and strengthened, however, although the Finnish Air Force was in better shape than during the Winter War, it was still inadequate in size for the tasks that lay ahead.

One of the most important improvements dealt with mobilization. New procedures instituted in the short period since the end of the Winter War resulted in the ability to field almost twice as many operational units. By the time the ground war began Finland had about 500,000 men under arms, an amazing feat for a country with a population of four million. When military construction and men and women auxiliaries are included, the number of individuals involved in the military or military-related activities amounted to 630,000 or over 15% of the population.¹ Even with such a massive mobilization it is highly questionable whether the Finns could have conducted their offensives in the south had it not been for the fact that the Germans had relieved them of the responsibility for defending a 500+ kilometer stretch of frontier in Lapland. In addition, the northward advance of German Army Group North served as a magnet that drew Soviet forces away from the Finnish front.

Such a large military was unsustainable in a prolonged war and it strongly suggests that Mannerheim and other Finnish leaders expected the war to be short. They, like so many others, were highly impressed by the string of spectacular German victories in Scandinavia, western Europe, and the Balkans and probably expected the Soviet armed forces to quickly crumble. When this did not materialize in the first six months of the war the large Finnish military establishment became a serious economic liability that had to be rectified.

The Finns had asked for a few days’ delay in the attack by their main army until operations in the far north and around Salla had begun. As related in Chapter 2, Erfurth explains that the Finns wanted to create the impression among the people and members of parliament that Finland was being drawn into the war by events outside its control. This accorded well with the wishes of OKH. That headquarters wanted the Finns to strike from the north at the most effective time, as Army Group North approached the last natural obstacle south of Leningrad—the Dvina River, which was reached on a wide front on July 1, 1941. By July 4 the OKH had sufficient confidence in the continued progress of Army Group North to ask the Finns to launch their attacks on July 10.

The general concept of operations by the main Finnish army had been thrashed out on January 30, and again in the period June 24–28. The Finns, despite Mannerheim’s disclaimer below, appear to have initially wanted to undertake operations west of Lake Ladoga with the goal of recovering the important territory on the Karelian Isthmus, which they had lost in the Winter War. The Germans, on the other hand, wanted the Finns to attack on both sides of Lake Ladoga, with the main effort in the east. This wish was again expressed by OKH on June 24 and reflected in the Finnish plans submitted on June 28, 1941.

Mannerheim writes that, despite the wishes in some Finnish circles for the immediate reconquest of the Karelian Isthmus, he opposed this idea from the beginning. He explains that by initiating operations on the Karelian Isthmus the Soviets would believe that he was aiming at Leningrad and would marshal strong forces in opposition at a time when Army Group North was still far to the south. Mannerheim writes “It was my firm opinion that such an undertaking was against the interest of the country, and from the beginning I had informed the President of the Republic and the government that under no circumstances would I lead an offensive against the great city on the Neva.”²

Mannerheim describes the development of the concept of operations by the Finnish Army as follows:

Instead of attacking on the Karelian Isthmus, I decided to commence an offensive north of Ladoga on either side of Lake Jänisjärvi, with the beach of the Ladoga west and east of the town of Sortavala as its first objective, and the next one the frontier. A thrust north of Lake Jänisjärvi towards the Suojärvi area formed part of the main operation. The aim was to sever the way of retreat for the Russian forces concentrated west of Sortavala, and to roll up the enemy’s position north of Vuoksi, thereby creating a favourable initial situation for a later offensive against Viipuri and the Isthmus³

While—as Lundin points out—the sources are murky, imprecise, and contradictory, there is no doubt that Mannerheim’s memoirs imply that the concept of operations was his, not that of the OKH.⁴ German sources claim that the initial wish of the Finns was for an offensive on the Karelian Isthmus and that this issue was thrashed out in the meetings between General Heinrichs, the chief of the Finnish General Staff, and General Halder, the chief of staff of OKH, on January 30 and the results were as expressed by the OKH on June 24.

General Waldemar Erfurth, the chief of the German liaison staff at Mannerheim’s headquarters, relates a completely different story from that told by Mannerheim:

As the Finns saw it, based on the experience of all former wars against Russia, the main theater of war had to be the Karelian Isthmus.… It was, therefore, quite natural that the thoughts of the Finnish Commander-in-Chief were occupied chiefly with the Karelian Isthmus as the main theater of war of the planned Finnish offensive. The deployment of Finnish forces was carried out mainly in accordance with this idea.⁵

Erfurth continues:

The German brothers-in-arms had other plans, however. The greater the success of the German offensive in western Russia, the more pressing became the demands of the German High Command that Marshal Mannerheim should not direct the main thrust of his army by way of the Karelian Isthmus toward Leningrad, but east of Lake Ladoga toward Lodeynoye Pole on the Svir. The German Army High Command desired that the strongest possible Finnish forces advance to the Svir and there unite for a decisive operation with Army Group North, which was proceeding across the Volkhov River.⁶

General Hermann Hölter, who was present in Finland at the time, supports Erfurth’s story. He writes:

During the first consideration of operations by the Finns, the Karelian Isthmus was instinctively in the foreground of strategic wishes. The wish of the German High Command, however, that the Finns should make their principal thrust east of Lake Ladoga, in order to “join hands” with the German Army Group on the Svir, led to the operations of the “Finnish Karelian Army” under General Heinrichs through Ladogan Karelia to the Svir.⁷

It is not clear why Mannerheim elected not to conduct simultaneous offensives on both sides of Lake Ladoga and across the Karelian Isthmus, or what the German views were on this issue. Mannerheim may have hoped that the German Army Group North’s continued drive towards Leningrad would cause the Soviets, in an effort to halt the German advance, to substantially reduce their forces on the isthmus. A delayed Finnish advance in this area would encounter less opposition. This appears to be what eventually happened. There may also have been logistical reasons for staggering the offensives.

It was important for the Finns to quickly occupy both Ladogan Karelia and the Karelian Isthmus. Soviet air attacks against Finnish towns presented a serious problem. Enemy bombers usually approached Finland across the Gulf of Finland from their airfields in Estonia. There was not much the Finns could do about this threat since their air force was too weak to prevent the raids. The Finns hoped that the advance of Army Group North would soon eliminate this threat.

The Soviets had expanded old airfields and built new ones in the territory they had conquered in the Winter War on the Karelian Isthmus and in the area east of Lake Ladoga. Soviet aircraft using these fields presented a difficult problem for the Finnish early warning network and their air defense forces. Since the removal of this threat could be accomplished only with Finnish ground offensives, their elimination played a prominent part in Finnish planning.

Order of Battle

The Finnish forces were deployed generally along a line from Hanko on the Gulf of Finland to an area around Lieksa, southwest of Belomorsk (Sorokka). Along this line the Finns had deployed five army corps as follows:

1.	IV Corps, commanded by Major General Karl Lennart Oesch, had its right wing on the Gulf of Finland west of Viipuri and its left wing on the Vuoksi River. It consisted initially of three divisions—8th, 12th and 4th—and the 2nd Coastal Brigade. The 10th Division was apparently in a reserve status to the rear of the boundary between IV Corps and II Corps.8
2.	The II Corps, commanded by Major General Taavetti Laatikainen, occupied a front north of the Karelian Isthmus and Lake Ladoga stretching from the left flank of IV Corps to the right flank of VII Corps. It consisted initially of three divisions—the 2nd, 18th, and 15th.
3.	The Army of Karelia occupied the front from the left flank of II Corps opposite the narrows between Lakes Pyha and Ladoga in the south to just north of Ilomantsi in the north. Under normal circumstances Finnish corps were directed by the Finnish High Command without the interposition of an army headquarters. An exception was made in this case as it appeared doubtful that a multi-corps advance into Karelia could be effectively directed from Mannerheim’s headquarters. The decision was made to create an army—the Army of Karelia—under the command of Lieutenant General Heinrichs, Mannerheim’s chief of staff. He retained his job as chief of staff but the duties were actually performed by deputies, first by Major General Viljo Einar Tuompo, chief of the command section and later by Major General Edvard Fritjof Hanell, chief of fortifications. The major units of the Army of Karelia were two corps, one light corps-size group, and an army reserve.

a.	VII Corps, commanded by Major General Johan Woldemar Hägglund, occupied the right wing of the Army of Karelia, from Lake Pyha to the outskirts of Vyartsilya (Värtsilä). It consisted initially of two divisions—the 19th and 7th.
b.	VI Corps held the center of the Army of Karelia from Vyartsilya to Korpiselkya (Korpiselkä). It was commanded by Major General Paavo Juho Talvela and consisted initially of the 11th and 5th Divisions.
c.	Task Force Oinonen occupied the left wing of the Army of Karelia, positioned north of the Ilomantsi area. It consisted of the cavalry brigade and the 1st and 2nd Jäger Brigades.9 The task force was commanded by Major General Woldemar Oinonen.
d.	The 1st Division was in reserve behind the Army of Karelia.

4.	The 14th Division covered the left flank of the Finnish Army and filled the gap between that army and the Army of Norway. It was commanded by Colonel Erkki Johannes Raappana and stationed in the Lieksa area. This division was directly subordinated to Marshal Mannerheim.
5.	The 17th Division had the mission of sealing off Hanko.
6.	The 163rd German Infantry Division (minus one regiment) arrived in early July and Mannerheim stationed it initially at Joensuu behind the Army of Karelia as his reserve.10

The composition of the corps changed frequently during the war as corps headquarters were moved around and divisions and brigades were detached from one corps and attached to another.

The Soviet forces facing the Finnish Army were part of Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov’s Northwest Front. The 32nd Soviet Army¹¹ was responsible for the area north of Lake Onega. It consisted of five divisions. In the Army of Karelia sector north and east of Lake Ladoga the Soviet 7th Army had three divisions forward and one in reserve. The Soviet 23rd Army on the Karelian Isthmus had four divisions of stationary troops manning the border fortifications and three divisions in reserve. The Soviet troops at Hanko consisted of two infantry brigades plus a number of specialized units. At the outset of the war the Soviets had the equivalent of 18 divisions at the fronts in Finland and they faced 15 Finnish and four German divisions.¹²

German pressure from the south forced the Soviets to weaken their forces along the Finnish border in order to make units available to contest the advance of Army Group North. By the time the Finns began their operations, the Soviets had redeployed nearly all their reserve formations. The Finns were thus confronted by only seven divisions plus the two brigades at Hanko, giving them a 4:1 superiority in infantry and a 9:1 superiority in artillery.¹³ They could also remain relatively assured that the forces opposing them would not increase markedly in the near future as the Soviets were throwing all they had at the approaching Germans.

Ladoga Karelia Offensive

The Finns planned to attack on both sides of Yanis Lake (Jänisjärvi). They hoped this would split the Soviet defensive line, allowing the Finns to advance along the east shore of Lake Ladoga through Olonets (Aunus) to Lodeynoye Pole (Lotinapelto) on the Svir River. Both IV and II Corps would hold on the border initially but II Corps was to be ready to advance on orders towards the northwest shore of Lake Ladoga.

The Finns commenced offensive operations from the area between Lake Pyha in the southwest and Ilomantsi in the northeast on July 10. The offensive had the conquest of Ladoga Karelia as its objective.¹⁴ Small units had operated behind enemy lines before that date. The main Finnish effort was in the VI Corps sector between Vyartsilya and Korpiselkya (Korpiselkä), northeast of Yanis Lake. General Talvela organized two battle groups to cover his flanks. Battle Group South attacked from the area between Lakes Pyha and Yanis with the mission of penetrating the isthmus between Lakes Yanis and Ladoga. Battle Group North was to attack from the area between Korpiselkya and Ilomantsi in the direction of Tolvayarvi (Tolvajärvi) and Muanto.

Despite stubborn local resistance, Soviet defenses quickly collapsed under the weight of the Finnish attack in the Vyartsilya–Korpiselkya sector; and it became apparent that the main Finnish thrust had hit a weak sector in the Russian front. Colonel Ruben Lagus’ 1st Light Infantry Brigade from Group Oinonen was brought in and it managed to break through the Soviet defenses rather quickly.¹⁵ Through the gap thus created, the light Finnish infantry, some equipped with bicycles, penetrated deep into enemy territory in the direction of the village of Tolvayarvi. After hard fighting, the town of Kokkari was stormed on July 12 and the village of Tolvayarvi further to the southeast was occupied on the same day. Continuing its exploitation, the light infantry brigade moved on the town of Muanto, which it captured on July 14.

The advance of the right-flank units of VI Corps driving south through Vyartsilya met stiff opposition in the hilly landscape east of Yanis Lake. The VII Corps, expected to advance southward on the west side of Yanis Lake, met heavy opposition and made little progress. Soviet resistance along the east shore of Yanis Lake was eliminated on July 16 and VI Corps swept around the southern end of the lake and set up positions facing west along Yanis River.

Mannerheim ordered several units redeployed on July 16. The 1st Division, which had been his reserve, was ordered forward to protect VI Corps’ eastern flank near Loymola (Loimola). It was commanded by Colonel Paavo Paalu. The 17th Division, which had sealed off Hanko, was moved to the Vyartsilya area. It was commanded by Colonel Otto Snellman. The mission of sealing off the Soviet forces in Hanko was left to coastal defense units and a battalion of Swedish volunteers. Finally Mannerheim committed the German 163rd Infantry Division, commanded by Lieutenant General Erwin Engelbrecht, to the east with the mission of capturing the town of Suvilakhti. This town, located at the southern end of Suo Lake, was a road and railroad junction. By these redeployments Mannerheim effectively increased the forces available to the Army of Karelia by three infantry divisions. The stage was set for a rapid advance towards the Svir River.

While units of the VI Corps secured their positions at Tolvayarvi against possible Soviet attacks from the east, the main body continued southward. General Talvela saw an opportunity and immediately committed all his mobile forces to capture Loymola. This would allow the Finns to interdict the railroad from Petrozavodsk (Petroskoi). A Finnish armored infantry battalion captured Loymola on July 15.

An even more promising opportunity presented itself to General Talvela. This involved a quick thrust to the shores of Lake Ladoga near the town of Koirinoja. A successful drive to the shore of Lake Ladoga would isolate the forces holding Sortavala and contesting the Finnish advance on both sides of Lake Yanis. While flank security forces were sent to the east the bulk of the troops were committed in the direction of Koirinoja on the northeast shore of Lake Ladoga. That town fell to Finnish forces on July 16. Colonel Lagus’ 1st Light Infantry Brigade completed its 110-kilometer contested drive with the capture of Koirinoja.

General Talvela sent two strong columns on a drive towards the east and south. One column was sent eastward to the Tulm Lake area while the main force advanced south along the east shore of Lake Ladoga. The Soviets had reorganized some of its forces and brought in reinforcements from the Karelian Isthmus. Units from the 452nd Motorized Infantry Regiment had reached the front and set up defensive positions around the town of Salmi, where the Tulm River empties into Lake Ladoga. Colonel Lagus’ troops crossed the Tulm River five kilometers north of Salmi, isolating the Soviet defenders. Salmi was captured on July 21 after some heavy fighting and only a small number of the defenders managed to escape the encirclement. The corps crossed the 1939 border on July 23 and on July 24 Mannerheim ordered it to halt along the Tuloksa (Tuulos) River and take up defensive positions.

The Soviet forces facing the Finns on the Ladogan front had reorganized on July 21. The 7th Army had been organized into two groups. One, called the Petrozavodsk Group, was commanded by Lieutenant General M. Antonjuk. Its main combat units consisted of an infantry regiment, two motorized regiments, and an armored regiment. The other group was referred to as Group South under Lieutenant General V. Tsvetajev. It consisted of a marine brigade, two motorized regiments, and some smaller units.

The old border marker erected by King Gustav II Adolphus at Aajakontu was reached by troops of the VI Corps on July 22. General Talvela’s message to Mannerheim reads in part: “After the capture of Manssila today at 1130 hours, the Russians have been chased out of Finland in the operational area of the VI Corps. The area, whose rear boundary is formed by a line Korpiselkä–Jänis River, has been freed from our hereditary foe.”¹⁶

The Finnish columns advancing inland from Lake Ladoga were also making good progress. One column crossed the historic boundary on its way to Lake Tulm. The northern settlement on this lake was captured on July 18 and the rest of the settlements along the lake during the following two days. The Soviets put up strong resistance in the Rajakonru area and it was not overcome until July 23 when a Finnish column advancing from the southern part of Lake Tulm towards Vidlitsa (Vitele) threatened the Soviet line of retreat along the shore of the lake. This threat caused the Soviets to withdraw and both Vidlitsa and Rajakonru were taken after light fighting on July 24. The Finnish forces, in accordance with orders from Mannerheim, took up defensive positions.

While the reasons for Mannerheim’s decision to cease offensive operations in Karelia may have been complex, he had ample operational reasons to worry about this front. The rapid advance of the 5th Division along the eastern shore of Lake Ladoga had exposed a 100-kilometer stretch of shoreline in his rear that could be interdicted by the Soviets from the sea. Furthermore, strong Soviet forces were still present in the area north and northeast of Lake Ladoga and in the important Lake Suo area.

Mannerheim’s concerns were soon validated by Soviet actions. Heavy counterattacks by an armored regiment and parts of four infantry regiments in the Vidlitsa area resulted in ten days of heavy fighting before the Finnish front was stabilized about 10 kilometers east of Lake Vidlitsa. Meanwhile, Major General Pavlov, the Soviet commander of the coastal defense forces on Lake Ladoga launched a night amphibious assault in the rear of the Finnish 5th Division at the same time as a strong attack was launched against the Finnish line at Tuloksa. The landing took place on the two small islands of Lukulansaari and Mantsi, just offshore from the town of Salmi. General Talvela had to scrape together whatever forces were at hand, including support troops, in order to keep the Soviets from establishing themselves on the two islands. The Finns were able to destroy four of the 15 ships used in the landing and managed to split the Soviet marines into three encircled pockets, which were eliminated by the evening of July 26. The Soviets made another landing on Mantsi on July 27 and almost succeeded in capturing the islands before enough Finnish forces could be brought in to reinforce the defenders. The fighting was heavy before the Soviet landing force was eliminated on July 28.

The 163rd German Infantry Division, on the Army of Karelia’s left flank, ran into difficulties north of the rail line between Loymola and Suvilakhti. This area is interspersed with numerous lakes that channel any advances and therefore favored the Soviet defenders. The German soldiers, not used to fighting in a forest wilderness, had difficulties from the start. An attempt on July 16 to capture Suvilakhti by forces advancing from Loymola failed.

The VI Corps sent a force from the Tulm Lake area to help the Germans. This force cut the railroad between Suvilakhti and Petrozavodsk east of Suvilakhti on July 26. However, the German division was still unable to resume its advance at the end of July and Mannerheim sent Group Oinonen with its two brigades to its assistance—the cavalry brigade and the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade under Colonel V. Sundman. These forces had assembled in the Ilomantsi area in preparation for their missions in the Ladoga Karelia offensive. During the first part of that offensive the cavalry brigade and light infantry brigade slowly made its way in the direction of the upper Aitto River east of Suo Lake against stiff Soviet resistance.

The attack in the Lake Suo area by German and Finnish forces from two directions (south and west) needed systematic preparation and several weeks passed before it was executed. The Finnish forces from Group Oinonen were merged with the 163rd Division and named Battle Group Engelbrechtunder, under the command of Lieutenant General Engelbrecht. Even this combined force found the going difficult. It was not until August 4 that the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade and the German 307th Infantry Regiment began their attack on the village of Aglajarvi east of Tolvayarvi, which was captured the following day. The Finnish Cavalry Brigade cut the road between Alajarvi and Tolvayarvi and made contact with the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade on August 6. The Soviets retired behind the Aitto River to avoid encirclement.

The 11th Finnish Division was located to the south of Battle Group Engelbrecht and it moved northward and reached the Petrozavodsk railroad on August 19. This unit continued northward and captured Suvilakhti on August 21. The 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, the Cavalry Brigade, and the German 307th Infantry Regiment crossed the Aitto River on 19 August. The Cavalry Brigade tried to encircle the enemy forces east of the river but the Soviets recognized the danger and withdrew before the 11th Division cut their last escape route at Tsalkki on August 23. While VII Corps established a front in the narrows between Lakes Syam and Shot, the 163rd Division was withdrawn from the front and stationed at the rear of the Army of Karelia as Mannerheim’s strategic reserve.

On the right wing of the Army of Karelia, the VII Corps also began its offensive on July 10, but its advance was not as spectacular as that of VI Corps. Its offensive was launched from the area between Lakes Pyha and Yanis. VII Corps pressed the stubborn enemy slowly southward and by the end of the month had reached the town of Ruskeala. A division detached from VI Corps occupied defensive positions along the Yanis River between the lake by that name and Lake Ladoga. The Soviets were facing and fighting in two directions—against the forces at Ruskeala in the north and the division along the Yanis River in the east. Under constant pressure and in order to avoid encirclement, the Soviets withdrew slowly in the direction of Sortavala.

The Army of Karelia had gone into defensive positions on orders from Mannerheim on July 19 and after minor local advances ended up along a line with Group Oinonen in the north, VII Corps in the center, and VI Corps in the south. General Talvela, commander of VI Corps, was not happy with the halt as indicated by a conversation he had with General Engelbrecht, commander of the 163rd German Division, on September 2. Ziemke quotes the operational log of the 163rd Division pertaining to this conversation:

Talvela said he regretted that his sector had been left completely inactive for the past several weeks even though he had repeatedly tried to get permission to resume the attack. He regretted the inactivity the more since the impact of his first advance had thrown the Russians into a panic which in his opinion would have made it “positively easy” at that time to push to the Svir and, possibly, create a bridgehead across it. The entire advance to the Tuloksa River line, he said had cost the VI Corps 3,500 casualties; the period of inaction since had cost as many.¹⁷

On the Army of Karelia’s right flank, II Corps occupied the border between Vuoksi River and Pyha Lake. It did not begin its offensive until July 31. The corps’ immediate objective was the railroad junction at the town of Khitola. Its capture would completely isolate the Soviet forces in the Sortavala area. The offensive made excellent progress and Mannerheim, who had earlier detached the 10th Division from the IV Corps as his reserve, committed that division on August 6 to exploit the success. In a rapid advance the 10th Division reached the shore of Lake Ladoga at the town of Lakhdenpokhya (Lahdenpohja). The main force of II Corps captured Khitola on August 11, the same day that a more southern column from the corps reached the shore of Lake Ladoga between Kegsgolm (Käkisalmi) and Khitola.

The Soviet forces, caught in a pocket between the forces of VII Corps in the east and north and those of II Corps in the west and north, were split into two groups by the advancing Finns. A group of about two divisions found itself isolated by II Corps forces in the vicinity of the town of Kyrikiyoki. The Soviets put up a fierce resistance despite their desperate situation. Many managed to withdraw to Kilpola (Kilpolansaari), a large island connected to the mainland by a causeway. The Soviets were evacuated by sea in mid-August but suffered heavy losses in men and ships. The fighting at Kilpola was concluded on August 24. The area of the Karelian Isthmus between Lake Ladoga and Vuoksi River was now in Finnish hands.

The Russian division fighting in the area west of Sortavala was pressed against the shore of Lake Ladoga between Lakhdenpokhya and Sortavala. After fierce resistance it was surrounded at Rautalahti. Resistance ceased on August 20. Some of the Soviet troops managed to escape by ship to Valaam Island.

Mannerheim made some further organizational changes before moving against Sortavala. He moved the VII Corps Headquarters to the area between the VI Corps and the 163rd German Infantry Division. The units that had been under VII Corps control—7th and 19th Divisions—were placed under the control of the newly created I Corps, as was the 2nd Division from II Corps. It was I Corps that took over the attack on Sortavala. The Soviet forces defending the city could not hold out against simultaneous Finnish attacks from three directions and Sortavala was captured on August 16. Most of the Soviet troops escaped by sea to Valaam Island and from there they were transported to the Leningrad area. Finnish and German aircraft could not prevent the Soviet evacuation.

The Karelian Isthmus Offensive

The front between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Pyha was relatively quiet during the month of July. The discussions at Finnish Headquarters about action on the Karelian Isthmus assumed increasing importance towards the end of the month. General Erfurth notes that Mannerheim was not prone to make hasty decisions and observes that the inactivity of the Finns west of Lake Pyha allowed the Soviets to shift forces not only against the approaching German Army Group North but also to move forces to the area east of Lake Ladoga to contest the advance of the Army of Karelia.¹⁸

Mannerheim ordered General Laatikainen’s II Corps to begin its attack on July 31. The initial phases of this attack were related under the Army of Karelia offensive since its mission to clear the northwest shore of Lake Ladoga was more in support of the operations of that army than a separate offensive on the Karelian Isthmus. Nevertheless, by capturing Khitola and reaching the shore of Lake Ladoga between Kegsgolm and Khitola on August 11, the forces were in an ideal position to continue their advance southward on the Karelian Isthmus.

Ziemke writes that “the Finnish plan of operation underwent a fundamental change” during the first half of August.¹⁹ He notes that General Erfurth, the German liaison officer at Mannerheim’s headquarters, had reported as early as July 14 that he had detected opposition on the part of Mannerheim to operations east of Lake Ladoga but that this warning had been dismissed by OKH. That headquarters changed its mind in early August. On August 2, OKH requested that the Finns resume their offensive towards Lodeynoye Pole to coincide with the final push towards Leningrad by Army Group North. Mannerheim refused and in his reasoning shifted the blame back to the Germans by stating that the Army of Karelia could not resume its advance as long as the 163rd German Division had failed to take Suvilakhti. The OKH thereupon proposed on August 10 that the Finns conduct an offensive towards Leningrad on the Karelian Isthmus. Mannerheim accepted this proposal.

There is little reason to believe that the Soviet forces in the Lake Suo area were capable of preventing a resumption of the offensive east of Lake Ladoga. It may be that Mannerheim, as noted by the Germans, was a pessimist and that unexpected developments, such as the inability of the 163rd German Division to eliminate Soviet resistance in its area of operations, could have influenced him more than it should.

However, two other possibilities are more likely to have affected his plans. One was his wish—and that of the government and the vast majority of the Finnish people—to recover lost territories and to incorporate areas in East Karelia. The second reason is that the performance of German units in Finland had disappointed Mannerheim and may have colored his views of the progress of Field Marshal Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb’s Army Group North. This Army Group had made rapid progress through the Baltic States mainly because Marshal Voroshilov did not intend to make a stand in those areas and had successfully withdrawn his forces virtually intact. There were no great encirclement battles as in other areas on the Soviet front. Voroshilov began to offer stiffer resistance when the Germans reached Russian territory. The countryside was unfavorable for the use of armor between Lakes Ilmen and Peipus and the advance of Army Group North slowed to a crawl. Leeb planned to begin his final push from the area west of Lake Ilmen and Hitler reinforced him with an armored corps from Army Group Center. It was this drive that the Germans wanted the Finns to support, first by an attack east of Lake Ladoga and finally by an attack towards Leningrad over the Karelian Isthmus.

After clearing out the northwest shore of Lake Ladoga, Mannerheim ordered II Corps to turn south against Pakkola, at the narrowest part of the Vuoksi River. That river was crossed north of Pakkola on August 18, and before long the Finns had a sizable bridgehead that favored both a continued advance southward and a move to the northwest to threaten Soviet forces facing IV Corps. At the same time another column on the left flank of II Corps drove southward from Kegsgolm, clearing the east shore of Lake Ladoga as they advanced.

The IV Corps began its offensive on August 22. The nine-day delay between the time II Corps was turned south and east and the launching of the attack by IV Corps made excellent military sense. Those nine days allowed II Corps to get on the flank and rear of the Soviet forces facing IV Corps. In fact, the Soviets became so unnerved by developments that they began destroying their own border fortifications on August 21. There was little resistance at the outset of the attack and the Finns reached Kilpenjoki on August 23. A northwest drive by II Corps from its bridgehead north of Pakkola got to within 12 kilometers of Viipuri.

The Soviets had three divisions in the Viipuri area. Their plans were to hold the city with one division while the other two launched a drive against Pakkola to eliminate the Finnish bridgehead over the Vuoksi River. It was planned that a division coming from Kilpola Island to the northeast would join them in the Pakkola attack.

The Finns acted so rapidly that the Soviets were unable to put their plan into operation. The city of Viipuri was quickly encircled. The 12th Finnish Division under Colonel Einar Vihma advanced southwards along the right bank of the Vuoksi River and made contact on August 22 with the 18th Division from II Corps, coming from the southeast from the bridgehead north of Pakkola. This put the whole right bank of the Vuoksi River in Finnish hands.

The Soviets launched a counterattack with two divisions—123rd and 115th—against the Finnish forces east of Viipuri on August 24. They managed to push the Finns back about five kilometers without breaching the front. The Soviet forces were pushed back to their starting positions the following day when the Finnish 26th Infantry Regiment from the 12th Division was committed. On the same day that division succeeded in cutting the railroad between Viipuri and Leningrad.

The 8th Finnish Division, commanded by Colonel Winell, had been engaged in clearing operations along the western shore of the Bay of Viipuri in preparation for crossing that bay. The crossing of the bay to Lihaniemi Peninsula began on August 24 with the 3rd Battalion of the 45th Infantry Regiment leading the way. The peninsula was secured by the end of the day. Forces from the 8th Division expanded their beachhead the following day and cut the railroad from Viipuri to Primorsk running along the shore of the Gulf of Finland. The 12th Finnish Division had also continued its advance. On August 27 it cut the main road from Viipuri to Leningrad, effectively sealing off Viipuri from the outside world.

The Supreme High Command of the Soviet Armed Forces (STAVKA) recognized the hopeless situation in the northwest corner of the Karelian Isthmus and permitted the 23rd Army to withdraw from Viipuri to a new defensive line near where the Mannerheim Line had been located in the Winter War. They gave up trying to defend Viipuri, which was occupied by Finnish forces on August 29. However, the withdrawing Soviet forces soon found their route of retreat to the south blocked by the 8th Finnish Division. They managed to force several convoys of trucks through before the Finns permanently closed that escape route. The retreating Soviet troops were encircled about 10 kilometers south of Sveklovichnoye (Porlampi). They defended themselves desperately and a sizable part of the force—about 12,000 men—managed to break through the western encirclement force and escape to Koivisto Island after abandoning most of their vehicles and equipment. They remained on that island until they were evacuated in November. The remaining Soviet forces in the encirclement were cleared out by the Finns on September 1. At least 9,000 surrendered to the Finns and over 7,000 were killed in the fighting. A large amount of equipment was captured, including 306 artillery pieces, 55 tanks, 673 trucks, and approximately 4,500 horses.

The rapidity of the Finnish advance—particularly that of the 12th Division—kept the 23rd Soviet Army from carrying out its plan to make a stand in the vicinity of the old Mannerheim Line. They continued their fighting withdrawal towards the lower part of the Karelian Isthmus. Finnish forces continued their advance across the Karelian Isthmus in the direction of the town of Koivisto (Primorsk) without encountering serious opposition. Units of IV Corps reached the old border on August 31 and Koivisto on September 2.

The Finnish advance along the western shore of Lake Ladoga towards the old border had also continued. Mannerheim shifted I Corps headquarters, under Major General Einar Mäkinen, from Sortavala to the eastern part of the Karelian Isthmus on August 24. It was assigned two divisions from II Corps—the 10th and 15th—and given the mission of clearing the Ladoga side of the isthmus south of the Vuoksi River. It reached the border on August 31, as did the 2nd Finnish Division. The whole stretch of the old border was secured by September 2.

In a one-month offensive the Finns had driven the 23rd Soviet Army out of Finland and recaptured their lost territory on the Isthmus of Karelia. Only a few islands off Koivisto and in Lake Ladoga were still in Soviet hands. The islands of Valaam and Konevitsa on Lake Ladoga were captured at the end of September 1941.

Mannerheim and the Finnish government now had to consider whether their offensive should stop at the border or, as the Germans pressed for, continue southward. This question had both political and military ramifications. There was opposition within the Finnish government, particularly from the Social Democrats, to continuing the offensive past the border on the Karelian Isthmus. These opponents also wanted to rein in Mannerheim’s offensive plans for East Karelia. This split was reflected in the cabinet. Blücher, the German ambassador to Finland, claims that this opposition was just a passing thing and that the Finnish cabinet almost immediately returned to favoring an aggressive pursuit of the war.²⁰

Mannerheim had already decided, on September 1, that the offensive should continue across the frontier far enough that his troops would be able to occupy favorable defensive positions. The new, more defensible line ran from the mouth of Sestra (Rajajoki) River northeast to Lake Ladoga—basically a diagonal line a short distance north of the towns of Sestroretsk and Agalatovo. There was little fighting involved in moving to the new positions except a sharp engagement in the sector of I Corps where the 10th Division managed to encircle and destroy the 941st Soviet Infantry Regiment. The whole length of the new defensive line had been reached by September 9.

East Karelian Offensive

Up to this point, the Finns had basically recaptured territories taken from them during the Winter War. While their forces had crossed the pre-1940 borders in some places, particularly in Ladoga Karelia and the area to the west of Seg Lake (Seesjärvi), those incursions into pre-1940 Soviet territories could be justified on military grounds as providing flank protection or as an attempt to obtain positions better suited for defense. This all changed with the commencement of what is commonly referred to as the East Karelian offensive, in September 1941.

Offensive operations into East Karelia had actually begun before the Ladoga Karelia offensive. The unit undertaking this operation was the 14th Finnish Division, under the command of Colonel Erkki Raappana. It began its operations from the Lieksa area, approximately 200 kilometers north of the northernmost point of Lake Ladoga. The 14th was not part of the Army of Karelia, but a separate division answering directly to Mannerheim.

The 14th Division formed a link between the Army of Karelia operating against the Svir River and the III Finnish Corps, which was part of the Army of Norway. The border between the Finnish and German sectors ran southwest from Lake Oulujärvi in Oulu Province to the border. This link was rather tenuous since large tracts of virgin, roadless forests separated it from both the Army of Karelia and the right flank of the Army of Norway. While a north–south railroad running from Oulu on the Gulf of Bothnia to Sortavala and on to Helsinki came within 20 kilometers of the border in the 14th Division’s area, there was no east–west railroad and the east–west roads in the area were few and can hardly be described as roads. The 14th Division was therefore in a difficult logistic position and had to rely on its own resources.

Mannerheim directed Colonel Raappana to advance eastward to the town of Rugozero (Rukajärvi) on the road to Kotshkoma on the Murmansk Railroad. Colonel Raappana initiated operations several days before the Army of Karelia in the south opened its offensive against Ladoga Karelia. Patrols crossed the border on July 1 and the main advance began two days later. The Soviet forces that initially opposed the advance of the 14th Division consisted of the 337th Infantry Regiment of the 54th Soviet Infantry Division and the 73rd Border Guard Detachment.

The 14th Division captured Reboly (Repola) on July 6 and the advance continued. The Finns crossed Lake Leksozero (Lieksajärvi) northeast of Reboly on July 11. The village of Lendery was captured by another column. The advance in the wilderness was slow because the 14th Division lacked light infantry. Nevertheless, it managed to score a brilliant tactical victory by encircling major Soviet forces in the isthmus areas of this lake country. The encirclement at Omelia was completed on July 23 and Soviet attempts to break out of the pocket were only partially successful. Over 100 drowned in an attempt to cross one of the lakes and 300 were captured. The troops in the encirclement surrendered on July 24.

The 14th Division encountered stiff resistance at the Ontrosenvaara Hills west and south of Rugozero. The fighting for these hills took place between July 30 and August 12. The Soviets had brought in reinforcements in the form of the 137th Regiment from the 54th Division and the 71st Border Guard Detachment. These forces were unable to halt the Finnish advance and a new Soviet division—the 27th—was formed. The Soviets had well-prepared positions at the Rukavaara Hill and were able to halt the Finnish advance for three weeks.

The Finns initiated an encirclement of the Rukavaara Hill, forcing the Soviets to abandon their positions on September 8. Rugozero was captured on September 11. The 14th Division had accomplished the mission assigned it by Mannerheim with comparatively small losses. The division crossed the Onkajoki River just east of Rugozero and took up defensive positions.

At the beginning of September 1941 the Army of Karelia was deployed with Group Oinonen on the left from the 1939 border to Syam (Syamozero) Lake. The Group consisted of one cavalry brigade and the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade. The VII Corps was located just east of Lakes Syam and Vedlo. It consisted of two divisions—the 1st and 4th. The VI Corps, consisting of three divisions (5th, 17th, and 7th) and the 1st Light Infantry Brigade, was located on the right between Vedlo Lake and the point where the Tuloksa River empties into Lake Ladoga. The 163rd Division was located behind the VI Corps as Mannerheim’s reserve.

The offensive began on the night of September 3–4, with the heaviest artillery preparation of the war. This allowed the 5th Division of VI Corps to cross the Tuloksa River seven kilometers from the coast. Finnish units managed to cut the coastal road by noon on September 4 but were hit by a Soviet counterattack, which created a dangerous situation until the corps reserve was committed. After blunting the Soviet counterattack the Finns drove to the shore of Lake Ladoga behind the Soviet defenders along the south bank of Tuloksa River. The trapped Soviet forces—3rd Marine Brigade and two infantry regiments—were practically destroyed.

The successful attack by the 5th Division opened the road to Olonets for Colonel Lagus’ Task Force—1st Light Infantry Brigade and one infantry regiment. The task force passed through the 5th Division and captured Olonets after a brief fight on September 7. A Finnish detachment from Task Force Lagus continued the eastward advance and captured the northern end of the railroad bridge at Svir Station on September 8. This severed the rail connection between Murmansk and Volkhov and took place on the same day as Army Group North captured Schlusselburg in the southwest corner of Lake Ladoga.

The 17th Finnish Division in the corps center was less successful in its attack. The 3rd Soviet Division was able to stop the Finnish attack. The 7th Finnish Division, on the left flank of the VI Corps, had more success. The 13th Infantry Regiment reached and cut the road from Olonets to Petrozavodsk. The 34th Infantry Regiment moved south along this road at the same time as the 44th Infantry Regiment, which had been attached to Task Force Lagus, moved north. Both advances were aimed at the town of Nurmoyla, which was captured on September 7.

The capture of Nurmoyla meant that all road connections to the 3rd Soviet Division were severed. The Soviet division tried to recapture Nurmoyla but failed. It was trapped but most of the personnel managed to slip out of the pocket by abandoning their vehicles and equipment.

After reaching the Svir River, the 7th Finnish Division began clearing both banks. The Soviets had reinforced the area with the 314th Division and the clearing operation was slow. The Finns succeeded in establishing a bridgehead on the southern banks of the Svir by September 22. The bridgehead was approximately 40 kilometers wide and 5–10 kilometers deep.

The Finns were organizing a multidirectional attack against Petrozavodsk, the capital of Soviet Karelia. The 1st Light Infantry Brigade was approaching the city from the south along the railroad. The VII Corps on the left wing of the Army of Karelia, reinforced by the 4th Division from the Karelian Isthmus, was moving against Petrozavodsk from the west. The corps captured the important road junction at Krasnaya Pryazka, 40 kilometers west of Petrozavodsk on September 8. Major General Hägglund sent the 1st Division on a very strenuous march eastwards against Petrozavodsk through the great trackless forest south of the road, a task that it completed with considerable speed. Group Oinonen and II Corps, under Major General Laatikainen, which had been transferred to East Karelia from the Karelian Isthmus, approached Petrozavodsk from the northwest.

The concentric Finnish attack on Petrozavodsk began on September 18. The Soviets soon recognized the gravity of the situation and began to evacuate forces from the city. By the time the 11th Finnish Division cut the main road and railroad leading north from the city on September 30, most of the Soviet troops had been evacuated by sea across Lake Onega. The city fell to Finnish troops on October 1, 1941.

The 3rd Soviet Division, which had offered stubborn resistance to the northward drive along the road and railroad, now found itself completely isolated. Equipment and vehicles had been abandoned and the remaining troops began a southward trek through the forest with the Finnish 30th Infantry Regiment in pursuit. Only a few hundred men from the division managed to escape two weeks later across the Svir River.

The VI Corps had meanwhile crossed Svir River at its Lake Onega end. The Finnish bridgehead across the Svir was expanded to 100 kilometers in width and 20 kilometers in depth. This expansion was necessitated by the need for better defensive positions before the onset of winter.

Capture of Medvezhyegorsk

Mannerheim decided the Army of Karelia should continue the northward offensive towards the town of Medvezhyegorsk (Karhumäki) despite signs of an early and hard winter. The first objectives were the string of lake isthmuses along the Suna River. The Finnish divisions advancing from Petrozavodsk and Porosozero (Porajärvi) were able to maneuver the Soviets into the rough lake and river country between Medvezhyegorsk and Lake Seg. II Finnish Corps reached and cleared the Suna River line on October 19, and units from this corps also reached the area west of Lake Seg. Finnish forces from the south captured Kondopoga (Kontupohja) on November 3 and met the forces from the north at Lizhma Lake on November 5. Soviet forces tried desperately to prevent this juncture. When they failed to stem the multi-pronged Finnish advance, they withdrew to Medvezhyegorsk.

Finnish troops were beginning to show the strain of months of continuous operations. The early onset of winter did not help. It appeared that their offensive strength had reached its limit. The planned transfer of one division and several heavy artillery batteries to East Karelia from the Karelian Isthmus for the attack against Medvezhyegorsk could not be carried out because of rail transportation problems.²¹ The terrain around Medvezhyegorsk had become almost impassable due to deep snow. An attack by the 4th Division from the north was stopped only four kilometers from the town center. The attack by the 1st Division was also stopped. It appeared that the Finnish offensive had come to an end in front of Medvezhyegorsk.

At the urgings of their corps commander, General Laatikainen, the Finns began another supreme effort on November 29, successfully breaching the outer Soviet defenses on December 2. The Finns launched their final attack on the morning of December 5 with the 4th Division from the north and the 1st Light Infantry Brigade, followed by the 2nd Light Infantry Brigade, from the west. Advancing in bitter cold, and with snow up to their knees, the Finns breached the final defensive line and entered Medvezhyegorsk. The town of Povents (Poventsa) on the Stalin Canal was captured by Colonel Lagus’ 1st Light Infantry Brigade on December 6, 1941. A large Soviet force was surrounded south of Medvezhyegorsk and destroyed on December 8.

The Finns established a defensive line on the Maaselkä, the watershed between the Gulf of Finland and the White Sea. This watershed ran across the isthmus between Lake Seg and the northern point of Lake Onega. The Finnish defensive positions overlooked this isthmus. With the capture of Medvezhyegorsk, active operations ended on the Finnish front.

The Finnish victories in the south were impressive. But the cost in lives was high. Total Finnish casualties by the end of the year had reached 75,000, including 25,500 who had paid the ultimate price. Vehviläinen points out that the number who fell was almost equivalent to a whole year group of conscripts.²²

Operations in the Gulf of Finland

There are some aspects of the war in southern Finland that cannot be covered in the same detail as the land operations because of space considerations. They were nevertheless important and deserve to be mentioned. Both naval operations in the Gulf of Finland and air operations fall into this category.

The small Finnish Navy was divided into two branches, coastal artillery, and naval ships. The latter were few in number—two coastal defense ships, five submarines, and a number of smaller ships. German naval units in the Baltic had the primary mission of protecting the sea route for the iron ore that came from Sweden. Support of operations in Finland was accorded a lower priority.

Recognizing their own inferiority to the superior Soviet Navy, the Finns and Germans had agreed before the war to rely primarily on mine warfare to neutralize the enemy surface fleet. This fleet was substantial—2 battleships, 2 light cruisers, 19 destroyers, and 68 submarines. In addition there were over 700 naval aircraft. Furthermore, the Soviet naval base at Hanko was to be besieged from both land and sea. Belts of mines were laid in the Baltic and Gulf of Finland beginning shortly before the commencement of hostilities. The German/Finnish tactics proved very successful and the Soviets were unable to make use of their naval superiority. The fleet remained bottled up in the Bay of Kronstadt. The Finnish Navy thereby accomplished its primary mission of neutralizing the much superior Soviet fleet.

As Army Group North advanced through the Baltic states, the Soviets were forced to make a number of sea evacuations along the coast. The German and Finnish navies tried to interfere with these evacuations by laying mines in the approaches to and from the seaports. A total of 3,000 mines were laid outside Tallinn to interfere with the large-scale evacuation from that city. A fleet of 160 ships evacuated 28,000 personnel and 66,000 tons of matériel. This evacuation began on August 27, 1941, despite heavy and almost constant attacks by German aircraft and artillery. The Soviet ships ran into the heavily mined area near Cape Jumida on August 28 while under attack by Finnish and German torpedo boats. Sixty-five of the 160 ships were lost and a large number damaged. Personnel losses were heavy with 16,000 perishing.

Both the German and Finnish navies suffered serious losses on September 14. Three German minesweepers exploded in Helsinki harbor due to unknown causes. On the same day, the Finnish coastal defense ship Ilmarinen struck a mine and sank southwest of Hanko with the loss of 271 sailors.

The Soviets evacuated the islands off Koivisto before the Gulf of Finland froze. These islands would have been very difficult to defend after the ice became thick enough to support troops. The Finns occupied the islands in early November.

Things remained relatively quiet at the leased Soviet naval base at Hanko, which had begun to lose its importance for the Soviets in view of the northward progress of Army Group North. The Soviets did not have the strength to undertake any offensive operations and the Finns confined themselves to keeping the place blockaded from both land and sea. The Soviets decided to evacuate Hanko when the Gulf of Finland began to freeze. They may have assumed that the Finns had delayed any offensive operations against Hanko pending the freeze, which would prevent Soviets from sending reinforcements.

A strong Soviet naval force from Kronstadt Bay set out for Hanko on November 3, 1941. They managed to avoid the minefields and brought off the garrison without interference from the Finns who were taken by surprise. Several Soviet ships heading back to Kronstadt Bay struck mines and sank with heavy losses. The Finns occupied Hanko on December 4.

German naval assault units attacked and occupied the Osmussar Islands off the Estonian coast. They also planned to occupy Suursaari Island (Gogland), important for controlling shipping traffic because of its location more or less in the center of the Gulf of Finland east of Helsinki. The operation was postponed because the necessary forces for a continued occupation were lacking.

The plan to occupy the islands in the Gulf of Finland was revived in early March 1942, this time at the urging of Army Group North. The Finns were also eager to occupy Suursaari Island before the ice disappeared from the Gulf. Suursaari was important for the air defense of Finland and in blockading Leningrad. The participation of German troops in the operation became doubtful by the middle of March since the situation in Army Group North’s area did not permit a withdrawal of forces.

Marshal Mannerheim decided on March 17, 1942 to act alone against Suursaari. Forces from the 18th Finnish Division, commanded by Major General Aaro Olavi Pajari, were assembled near Kotka. German participation was limited to air support.

The Finnish attack on Suursaari began at night on March 26 and the island was secured on March 27. Tytaersaari (Bolshoi Tyuters), a smaller island about 20 kilometers south of Suursaari, was also captured on April 1. A German garrison relieved the Finns on Tytaersaari on April 4 and the Soviets chose that time to launch an attack on the island, which was repulsed. This island remained occupied by the Germans, while Suursaari was occupied by the Finns. These difficult operations were carried out quickly and with relatively light losses. Any delay would have made the operations impossible since the ice in the Gulf of Finland lost adequate carrying capacity within a few days.

Air Operations

The Finnish Air Force was seriously outnumbered by the Soviets but was nevertheless very successful in its operations. Finnish fighter planes contested Soviet air superiority and their pilots showed great ability and courage in numerous air fights. Finnish aircraft gave excellent support to ground operations.

The Finnish anitaircraft artillery forces were stronger and better equipped than they had been in the Winter War. However, their limited size and the vastness of the territory to be defended prevented them from giving adequate protection to some of the cities. For example, an air attack on Helsinki on November 3, 1941, caused severe damage.

The Finnish Air Force had great success over the Gulf of Finland in early 1942. Bitter air battles were fought after the Finnish attacks on Suursaari and Tytaersaari Islands. Finnish fighter planes downed twenty-seven Soviet planes on March 28, 1942. During the entire war, Finnish aircraft and pilots proved themselves superior to their Soviet opponents.

The German Luftwaffe had the dual missions of supporting the fight for Leningrad, and at the same time, conducting air warfare in the arctic. German bombers from the 5th Air Fleet made numerous attacks on Soviet installations along the Murmansk Railroad, trains, the port of Murmansk, and Soviet installations and bases on the Rybachiy Peninsula. The 1st Air Fleet, supporting Army Group North, also flew numerous missions in support of Finnish operations in the Lake Ladoga area and to interdict the Soviet supply route after Lake Ladoga froze in December. It was bombed regularly by German planes.

The Germans, because of their own stretched resources, made frequent requests for Finnish Air Force support in the spring of 1942. The 1st Air Fleet requested Finnish assistance in providing air cover over the Gulf of Finland on April 5. On the same day the 5th Air Fleet (in Norway, and responsible for supporting operations of German forces in Finland) requested that the Finnish Air Force support Army of Lapland operations. The Finns were not able to meet these requests but it revealed to them the fact that the Luftwaffe was overextended as a result of the Soviet winter offensive.

The Finns turned down a request by the Germans to station two bomber groups at the Malmi Airport near Helsinki. The reason for the German request was that stationing the aircraft there would allow them to approach Leningrad from the north. Mannerheim turned down this request for political reasons and to avoid exposing the Finnish capital to Soviet air attacks. The Finns offered the Germans the use of Utti Airport, just east of the town of Kuovola and around 80 kilometers northeast of Helsinki. The 1st Air Fleet used Utti until the end of October 1942.

The 5th Air Fleet had begun an extensive program to enlarge and strengthen its ground support elements in Finland. This program put a strain on the Finnish economy because of the large requests for building material. The Finns were engaged in large programs to fortify the areas they had captured and the German requests competed with these projects.

Lieutenant General Jarl Fritjof Lundquist, the commander in chief of the Finnish Air Force, a very outspoken individual with a growing skepticism about the outcome of the war, gave the German liaison officer at his headquarters an earful about the constant German changes in plans and their extravagant demands on the Finnish economy:

The Finns are beginning to be fed up with being led by the nose by the Germans. Considering the large ground organization needed by the Luftwaffe, we Finns cannot adapt ourselves every four weeks to another plan…. For the time being we shall do nothing but wait and see how the situation develops.²³

Lundquist let it be known that the Finns were becoming leery about German ability to encircle Leningrad and thus provide the Finns some security.

General Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, commander of the 5th Air Fleet in Norway, came to the Finnish headquarters in Mikkeli on January 17, 1942, primarily to discuss operations against Belomorsk with the Finnish General Staff and General Lundquist. Both General Stumpff and General Erfurth, who also attended the meetings, came away with the distinct and uneasy impression that the Finnish officers were unusually reserved and noncommittal on all issues.²⁴

Adolf Hitler and Field Marshal Mannerheim when Hitler visited Finland on June 4, 1942 to honor Mannerheim on his 75th birthday. Source: Wikimedia

Finnish troops crossing the pre1940 border into Soviet territory during Operation Barbarossa in 1941. Source: Wikimedia, Sa-kuva

Finnish soldiers marching towards the border near Raate in Suomussalmi, July 1941. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

German tanks on their way to the frontline, Vasonvaara, July 1, 1941. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish soldiers crossing the river in the area of Pajarinjärvi, August 8, 1941. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

A Soviet soldier surrenders as Finnish soldiers capture a Soviet pillbox, Termola, September 10, 1941. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Marshal Mannerheim visiting the city of Aunus, September 10, 1941. Behind him are Lieutenant General Erik Heinrichs, commander of the Army of Karelia, and on the right, Major General Paavo Talvela, commander of the Finnish VI Corps in Karelia. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Heavy artillery on a narrow and slippery road, Juustjärvi, October 21, 1941. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish troops crossing the Murmansk railway, as part of battles in the Käppäselkä area, October 27, 1941. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

General der Gebirgstruppe Eduard Dietl, commander of the Army of Lapland, congratulating Major General Hjalmar Siilasvuo (commander of the Finnish III Corps) on Siilasvuo’s 50th birthday on March 18, 1942. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

General Erik Heinrichs, chief of the Finnish General Staff, and Heinrich Himmler in Mikkeli, July 1942. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish soldiers in their machine gun pillbox, in snowbound Sunku, March 28, 1942. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Snow tunnel on Route 50 in north Norway. Snow tunnels are used for movement in areas where snow is likely to form deep drifts, or where there is a danger of snow avalanches. The climate in this theater was often as dangerous as the enemy. Source: M. Kräutler, Es war ein Edelweiss. Schicksal und Weg der zweiten Gebirgsdivision

German gebirgsjäger in the sap, taking cover from Russian fire in the area of Loukhi, May 15, 1942. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

This German staff car is mired in the deep mud of a road near Kiestinki, northern Finland, in April 1942. The spring thawrestricted effective movement of troops on or off road. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

German gebirgsjäger advancing in the forest towards Loukhi, May 15, 1942. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Generaloberst Eduard Dietl and Colonel Oiva Willamo, head of the Finnish liaison staff at the 20th Mountain Army Headquarters. Source: Wikimedia, Mikko Uola/SA-kuva

The trench leading to a famous battlefield Sormenkärki, Ollila. May 1944. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Soldier moving carefully in a trench. The sign says: “Beware of the sharpshooters,” Rajajoki. April 18, 1943. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish heavy mortar on the east side of Ihantala, July 7, 1944. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish troops disembarking at Tornio in October 1944. Source: Wikimedia, Kallioniemi, Lapin sota 1944–1945

Finnish soldiers from Infantry Regiment 12 passing a destroyed Soviet T-34 tank on the Imatra road in Tali-Ihantala. The two soldiers carry Panzerfausts on their shoulders and the one to the right carries a Finnish-made Suomi M31 machine gun as a personal weapon. Source: Wikimedia

Heavy mortar firing on German positions near the Tornio–Kemi road. October 3, 1944. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish troops on a badly damaged bridge over the river Raumo during the German/Finnish fighting near Tornio in October 1944. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

The Germans had almost completely destroyed Rovaniemi, October 19, 1944. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

German message in burned Muonio, photographed October 31, 1944. The sign says: “Als dank für nicht bewiesene Waffenbrüderschaft” (Thank you for not being real brothers in arms). Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish soldiers planting their flag on the border stone between Finland, Sweden and Norway on April 27, 1945. By then the Germans had left Lapland. Source: The Finnish Defence Forces

Finnish political leaders tried at the War Guilt Trials in 1945. Left to right: Henrik Ramsay, Tyko Reinnika, Antti Kukkonen, Edwin Linkomies, J. W. Rangell, Risto Ryti, Väinö Tanner, and T. M. Kivimäki. Source: Wikimedia, Osvald Hedenström