CHAPTER 1
"In August [1943], two weeks were spent out at Hell Cat Camp. It was a battle training camp and mighty rough. Dust lay all over afoot thick, and the men were perpetually covered in and out with it. There was usually so much dust in our throats that when we spit, a ball of dirt came out."
-History of Company "C", 44th Tank Battalion, 1942-1945
the U.S. Army's separate armored battalions in World War II labored in obscurity by comparison with the flashy armored divisions, but they overwhelmingly carried the heavier burden in the grim, global struggle to destroy the Axis Powers. The armored divisions were few in number; attracted war correspondents; frequently had dashing, well-known commanders; and flaunted memorable nicknames, such as the 1st "Old Ironsides," 2d "Hell on Wheels," and 3d "Spearhead" Armored Divisions. The separate battalions almost always worked for somebody else's division, were led by unknown lieutenant colonels, and were labeled like generic products, usually a forgettable three-digit number beginning with "7" If a battalion had a nickname, it was likely to be something like the "Seven-Five-Zero."
The separate tank, amphibian tank, or amphibian tractor battalions, though, were present at every amphibious assault that the U.S. Army conducted where armor was used at all, while armored divisions participated in landings only in North Africa and Sicily, which were also the only two campaigns in which the armored divisions played a preponderant combat role. The separate battalions did most of the bloody work in Italy and constituted the entire effort in the Pacific. The respective roles were most equally balanced in Western Europe, and the separate tank battalions fought everywhere the infantry divisions did. The men fought beside the foot soldier in dust, mud, and sand. They were the dirt-grimed tankers.
It is easy to forget how difficult it was to make this feat possible. On 1 September 1939, the day the largest and most destructive war in history ignited, the United States possessed a small and obsolete armored force. The Regular Army's infantry branch had only the just-organized 66th Infantry (Light Tanks) and the 67th Infantry (Medium Tanks) based at Fort Benning, Georgia, plus one tank company in each of seven infantry divisions and eighteen National Guard infantry divisions. The 7th Cavalry Brigade was mechanized, but only two of its battalionsize squadrons were equipped with light tanks-and they carried nothing more lethal than machine guns. Other than World War I-era tanks, the total American tank inventory amounted to some 240 machine-gun-armed M 1 and M2 light tanks, plus a single M2 medium tank prototype equipped with a 37-millimeter gun. There were tentative budgetary plans to allocate $7 million for additional infantry tanks, but the country had no tank in large-scale production.'
Adolf Hitler changed all that when he unleashed his Wehrmacht on Poland in the first stunning display of blitzkrieg. Distressingly for American planners, the Polish army was similar to the U.S. Army in terms of size, reliance on cavalry, and lagging mechanization. Hitler's legions broke the Polish army's back in about two weeks, the panzer divisions cutting through defenses with ease.
During the 1930s, the U.S. Army had decentralized authority over mechanization, and the cavalry and infantry branches had pursued tank development after their own visions. They were mired in rivalry, bickering over whether the tank should support the doughboy as it had in the Great War or join the horse in slashing maneuver, as well as over more prosaic matters of stature and resources. The cavalry called its tanks by a different name-"combat cars"-because Congress had decreed that it could not own tanks. Even within the branches, visionary advocates of armored warfare struggled to overcome resistance from old-school officers.
Brig. Gen. Adna Chaffee, who was in command of the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized) the day Hitler invaded Poland, led other mechanization advocates in calling for the establishment of "cavalry divisions, mechanized" built roughly along the lines of the German panzer divisions.' During Third Army maneuvers in May 1940, the 7th Cavalry Brigade formed part of a provisional armored division, along with the 6th Infantry Regiment (Motorized) and the infantry's Provisional Tank Brigade, which included the two tank regiments from Fort Benning. The provisional division dominated the exercise.'
At the conclusion of the exercises, Brig. Gen. Frank Andrews, the War Department's assistant chief of staff, G-3 (operations), met on 25 May in a high-school basement in Alexandria, Louisiana, with now-Maj. Gen. Adna Chaffee and other officers from cavalry and mechanized units.' As the men talked, the German armed forces were just beginning the third week of their dazzling campaign to destroy the French Army, as they had the Polish.
These officers called for a unified approach to mechanized development free of the chiefs of cavalry and infantry.' Within a month, U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. George C. Marshall had approved a proposal to organize a separate armored corps that would incorporate most of the army's mechanized formations. A formal plan reached the War Department General Staff on 10 June. Detailed consideration followed, and despite resistance from the chiefs of cavalry and infantry, the War Plans Division altered mobilization plans to include armored divisions.'
The G-3 proposed to establish two mechanized divisions, one based at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and the second at Fort Benning, Georgia. Mechanized units would be redistributed among them to ensure that the divisions started from roughly the same basis. The infantry's light tank formations were to be reorganized along the lines of mechanized cavalry regiments, and cavalry officers would be spread among the two divisions, where they were expected to wield strong influence. On the other hand, the new divisions inherited the organization of distinct light and medium tank battalions, a concept approved by the War Department in 1938 to meet the declared needs of the infantry branch.'
On 10 July, the adjutant general authorized the creation of the Armored Force as a "service test," which sidestepped the need for congressional approval and allowed the War Department great flexibility in modifying the organization. The Armored Force consisted of the 1st and 2d Armored Divisions and the separate 70th Tank Battalion (Medium), a General Headquarters (GHQ) "reserve" battalion. The nucleus of GHQ was activated on 26 July, initially to oversee the training of tactical units in the States. The units were stationed, respectively, at Fort Knox, Fort Benning, and Fort Meade in Maryland.
ORGANIZATION OF THE BATTALIONS
Fittingly for the separate tank battalions, their most important patron during the early evolution of the Armored Force was the decidedly unglamorous, hard-ofhearing Lt. Gen. Lesley J. McNair, who, as commander of GHQ, lacked any clear authority over the newly created Armored Force. His views on the subject nevertheless carried great weight at the War Department. Along with senior infantry officers, McNair, an artilleryman, continued to champion the traditional infantrysupport role of armor, which had a pedigree dating back to World War I.
As of 1940, the War Department planned to activate only fifteen GHQ tank battalions subordinated to three Reserve (later called Tank and then Armored) Group headquarters. Plans called for the activation in 1941 of the 71st through 75th Tank Battalions (Medium) and the 76th through 79th Tank Battalions (Light), though the War Department on 8 May ordered that these battalions instead receive designations in the series 751 to 759. The separate tank battalion of 1940 consisted of a Headquarters and Headquarters (H&H) Company and three tank companies, each consisting of three five-tank platoons and a two-tank headquarters section. By 1942, the battalion gained a service company.'
The 70th Tank Battalion (Medium) had some real advantages over outfits formed later. Manpower was entirely Regular Army personnel until August 1940, when several reserve officers joined the unit. Many of the men were drawn from the 34th Infantry, and the others were tankers from the 1st Battalion, 67th Infantry (Medium Tanks), from which the 70th Battalion had been created. They merged infantry and armored thinking. The first draftees arrived on 11 December 1941.9
Decisions involving the armored divisions tended to drive how the separate tank battalions were organized until 1943, when establishment of amphibian and other specialized battalions created a remarkable diversity in non-divisional armored units. The GHQ tank battalions were the stepchildren of the Armored Force from the start. The 70th Tank Battalion (Medium) initially ranked last in priority for deliveries of new tanks.10 Indeed, despite its formal designation, the outfit never received medium tanks, and it organized and trained with worn-out M2A2 light tanks beginning in the summer of 1940; it received new-by then obsolete-M2A2s in November. This fact was acknowledged with the reclassification of the outfit as a light battalion on 7 October 1941.11 The 193d Tank Battalion (Medium), called into active service from the National Guard in January 1941 and attached to the 2d Armored Division for training, had to recondition hand-me-down M2A2 and M2A3 light tanks from the armored division for training. When alerted for movement overseas in December, the battalion was issued used M3 light tanks from armored regiment stocks.12 The 191st Tank Battalion (Light), which assembled at Fort Meade in February 1941, possessed only eight old M2A2s. The 756th Tank Battalion (Light), activated on 1 June 1941, did not receive any tanks at all until February 1942.13
McNair was convinced that the Armored Force was the most wasteful of the ground arms in its use of men and equipment, and he argued in 1942 and 1943 that the armored divisions were bloated and unwieldy. Combat experience helped McNair make his case by showing that tanks frequently needed escort by foot troops to locate and destroy antitank defenses. In 1943, McNair wrote in a memorandum: "It is believed that our 1943 troop basis has entirely too many armored divisions, considering their proper tactical employment, and too few GHQ tank battalions. It is particularly important that the latter be available in quantities to permit all infantry divisions to work with them freely and frequently. 1114
In part because of McNair's influence, the armored divisions were reorganized twice, first in March 1942 and again in September 1943. The latter reorganization affected all but the 1st, 2d, and 3d Armored Divisions and released two tank battalions per division into the GHQ pool. Standard separate battalions were made identical to the divisional ones and thus could theoretically be attached to armored divisions-although that appears to have occurred only in Italy.
Prior to the reshuffle in 1943, a sharp distinction existed between medium and light tank battalions. The fighting in North Africa showed that light tanks operating alone were generally not effective against the Germans. Most tank battalions therefore reorganized to incorporate both types of armor. Each battalion now had three medium tank companies (seventeen tanks and one assault gun each) and one light tank company (seventeen tanks). Each also had a service company and an H&H company, which included a reconnaissance platoon, a mortar platoon with three 81-millimeter tubes, and an assault gun platoon with three guns and a small tank section that brought battalion strength to a total of fifty-four medium tanks.
Several outfits-including the 744th, 758th, 759th, 764th, and 767th- remained light tank battalions. They retained the old structure: only three tank companies, a three-vehicle assault gun section incorporated in H&H Company, and a service company.15
Six battalions-the 701st, 736th, 738th, 739th, 740th, and 748th-organized in great secrecy as special formations code-named "Leaflet" battalions that were equipped largely with M3 medium tanks mounting special searchlights codenamed Canal Defense Lights (CDLs).16 Developed by the British in 1939, the primary mission of CDL tanks was to provide illumination for aimed fire at night. Secondary missions included dazzling enemy soldiers with a flicker effect and protecting friendly foot troops in triangles of darkness formed between adjacent lights. No CDL battalion was used in combat as such, and in October 1944, the 701st, 736th, 740th, and 748th were converted to standard battalions; the 738th and 739th became mine-exploder battalions.17
Starting in October 1943, the renamed Armored Command reorganized nine tank battalions as amphibian tank ("amtank" or, less frequently, "amphtanlc') or amphibian tractor ("amtrac") battalions and raised more from other sources.18 Nearly all served in the Pacific theater. The amphibian tank battalion had a headquarters and headquarters/service company (four amtracs) and four seventeen-tank companies organized into three five-tank platoons and a two-tank headquarters section. In January 1944, the number of amtanks per company rose to eighteen, and companies received two amtracs each; the headquarters company received three amtanks. The amphibian tractor battalion consisted of a headquarters and a service company, plus two line companies with fifty-one amtracs apiece. The battalions by 1945 were reorganized into three line companies, each with sixteen amtracs. Each company had two maintenance amtracs and its own mechanics, electricians, and radio repairmen.19
An oddball formation, the 28th Airborne Tank Battalion, was activated on 6 December 1943. The outfit had a headquarters and service company and three line companies lettered A through C. No theater commander ever requested an airborne tank battalion, so the 28th Battalion was converted to a standard tank battalion in October 1944. It shipped to the Pacific but never saw combat.20
The 44th Tank Battalion was separated from the 12th Armored Division in February 1944 and sent to the southwest Pacific while the remainder of the division prepared for Europe.21 The 714th Tank Battalion, which had become a separate tank battalion when the 12th Armored Division reorganized as a "light" armored division in 1943, returned to replace it.
The 713th Tank Battalion reorganized on 1 January 1945 as the army's only "Tank Battalion, Armored Flamethrower." The battalion had three companies of flame-throwing medium tanks divided into three six-tank platoons, plus standard fighting tanks for the company and battalion commanders. The outfit deactivated the light tank company and mortar platoon to provide personnel for an expanded service company to handle increased supply problems.22
From the initially planned fifteen separate tank battalions, the number of such units rose to twenty-six by late 1942, forty-one by mid-1943, and sixty-five by late 1944. The separate battalions by that time outnumbered the fifty-four battalions incorporated into sixteen armored divisions.23 Another seven amphibian tank and twenty-three amphibian tractor battalions filled out the armored force. Not all of these outfits saw combat.
Several separate tank companies also served during the war. Company C, 70th Tank Battalion (Light), for example, was detached in January 1942 and deployed to Iceland, where it became the 10th Light Tank Company. It later rejoined the standardized 70th Tank Battalion as its Company D.25 The 603d Tank Company fought in the Pacific with six different divisions.'
SEPARATE-BATTALION DOCTRINE
Beyond a substantial common base, specialized doctrines evolved for the use of tanks in armored divisions and separate tank battalions, as the latter outfits had to accommodate infantry doctrine. The infantry initially used a wave-attack concept that it had pioneered in 1938 and 1939. Doctrine in 1940 called for two echelons of tanks to work with the riflemen. The first would neutralize antitank guns, while the second worked closely with the infantry against machine guns, pillboxes, personnel in trenches, and so on.27 But doctrine for the infantry-support tanks did not receive the attention that doctrine for the armored divisions did. Field Manual (FM) 100-5 on tank operations, issued in May 1941, provided a little more than two pages on the use of GHQ tank battalions, with dubious guidance such as "Tanks should not be tied too closely to foot troops."28 The 1942 Armored Force field manual on tactics devoted ten sentences to tank-infantry operations, and the army did not even issue a field manual on the use of tanks with infantry until 1943.29 As a result, infantry and supporting armor were left to figure out many things on their own in battle.
The doctrine captured in the 1942 field manuals anticipated that light tanks would provide the main strike force in most cases and that medium tanks would support them. This was appropriate for armored divisions, which had both light and medium tanks, but not very useful to the separate battalions that were to be either light or medium. Medium tanks, meanwhile, were to form the leading echelon of attack against known enemy resistance when antitank defenses were strong and to support light tanks, other medium tanks, and infantry in tank-versus-tank action 30
Battle experience in North Africa, mainly that of the 1st Armored Division, led to the conclusion that light tanks generally could not operate alone against the Germans. The idea that medium tanks should lead the advance into the teeth of strong antitank defenses also proved a bloody failure. The organization in late 1943 of the standardized tank battalion and a modified doctrine sought to address these problems.
The mission of the standardized separate tank battalion was outlined in FM 17-33 (19 December 1944) as follows:
• to lead the attack;
• to support by direct fire the advance of light tanks, other medium tanks, and ground troops;
• to feel out the enemy and develop weak spots;
• to serve as a reserve for exploiting a success or breaking up a counterattack against the supported unit;
• to accompany the infantry and assist the advance by destroying or neutralizing automatic weapons and pillboxes holding up the advance;
• to fight enemy tanks when necessary;
• to reinforce artillery fires; and
• to assist the infantry in mop-up.
Wayne Robinson, who served with and wrote the informal history of the 743d Tank Battalion, described a separate tank battalion's role in these terms (tankers during the was overwhelmingly used "doughboy" or "dough" as slang for the infantryman, as did many infantry officers; the postwar favorite "GI" never appears):
A separate tank battalion assigned to work with an infantry division fought at the foot soldier's pace. Its job was to give the doughboy's attack the added punch that tanks have, to bull ahead when the going got rough, to knock down houses Jerry tried to use as forts, to stop enemy tanks in the counterattacks, to spearhead a way for the doughboy and his rifle, his machine gun, and his mortar.... Often the doughboy regiment and its attached tank battalion slugged it out with the Jerry on the line for days, inching painfully ahead to engineer an opening in the enemy defenses through which the star ball carriers, the armored divisions, could do their free and fancy open-field running. When this happened, it became the job of the doughboy and his supporting tanks to follow up as fast as they could, moving behind the swift, surging, twenty-mile-a-day drives. The infantry moved and fought, mopping up the pockets of resistance always left in the wake of such drives. But mostly, while the big armor waited in reserve for the quarterback to call their number and set them going through the line, the infantry and the separate tank battalion were in the thick of the line play, fighting and getting hurt, always under fire, within enemy artillery range, doing their work ever at the front of the division's sector.31
Robinson's description held true for the tank battalions that fought in the Pacific, as well, except that there were no armored divisions to exploit an opening. The tankers and infantry had to do that, too. By the end of the war, infantry and tank commanders in Europe appended an additional role on the basis of combat experience: transporting infantry on tanks in fast-moving operations 32
The results of a doctrinal dispute over whether tanks should fight tanks was to result in tankers in the separate battalions and the armored divisions going into battle with machines designed mainly to destroy targets other than tanks. Maj. Gen. George Lynch, chief of infantry, in July 1940 argued, "[Ulnarmored antitank units cannot counterattack.... The best antitank defense lies in the defeat of hostile armored forces by our own armored units."" That same month, Lesley McNair, then a brigadier general soon to become chief of staff at GHQ, countered, "The [antitank] gun, supported properly by foot troops, should defeat hostile armored units by fire and free the friendly armored units for action against objectives which are vulnerable to them."34 McNair was not hostile to armored forces; he just thought they should concentrate on their comparative advantages.
McNair and his allies ultimately prevailed on most counts, which resulted in the establishment in October 1941 of a separate Tank Destroyer Force charged with battling enemy armor. Tank destroyers were to carry high-velocity guns to kill tanks, while medium tanks would carry the lower-velocity 75-millimeter gun that fired an effective high-explosive round but had more modest penetrating power against armor. Ironically, the first stopgap tank destroyers were equipped with the same 75-millimeter and 37-millimeter guns found in medium and light tanks.
The notion that tanks were enjoined from fighting tanks has become somewhat overblown in the popular perception, as the matter was more one of emphasis. Armored Force Field Manual FM 17-10, published in March 1942, specified, "Against equal or superior hostile armored forces, friendly armored units will avoid frontal assault and maneuver to cut off or destroy armored units' supply facilities, followed by blows against the rear of enemy detachments" Tank destroyers were assigned the primary role in defense against hostile mechanized forces, but the manual acknowledged that medium tanks were to protect light tanks from enemy armor and could be "used offensively against hostile tanks"35
Moreover, for the infantry-support tankers, tank battles were the exception rather than the rule, and machine guns were usually the most important weapon in the vehicle. Tankers were happy enough with their.30 calibers, which fired more slowly than the German counterpart but were more accurate.36 Most units carried 50 percent more .30-caliber ammunition than could be contained in organized stowage.37 Tankers had mixed feelings regarding the .50-caliber gun mounted on the turret top: German soldiers were afraid of it, but a tank could carry only 500 to 600 rounds of .50-caliber ammunition.38 Tankers in the Pacific and Italy generally viewed the weapon as useless.
Amphibian units appear to have adopted wholesale the doctrine being worked out by the U.S. Marine Corps-which pioneered the use of tracked amphibiansthrough often-bloody trial and error in the Pacific. When Col. William Triplet arrived at Fort Ord, California, in 1943 to organize the 18th Armored Group (Amphibious) to train amtank and amtrac battalions, he asked what manuals were available. "There are no manuals of any type," he was told. "The Marines are start ing to train five battalions at Camp Pendleton, but all they have is the Navy stuff on boat landings. Training manuals will probably be written after a study of your experience. 39 Army manuals on amphibious operations did not even mention landing vehicles, tracked (LVTs)-navy terminology for both amtanks and amtracs. An army history of amphibian battalion training in the Pacific wryly described the instruction available to the first outfits to go into combat as "improvised.""
FROM ACTIVATION TO ACTION
As the separate tank battalions stood up, they often obtained cadre troops-those needed to form the organizational skeleton of a unit-from another battalion. An order from Headquarters, Armored Force, on 16 March 1942 indicated that ten of the twelve then-existing separate tank battalions were to be manned at their tableof-organization-and-equipment strength "plus a cadre equivalent over strength" in order to provide trained troops later to newly activated battalions." The 746th Tank Battalion, for example, drew its activating officers from the 760th Tank Battalion and its initial cadre of enlisted men from the 70th Tank Battalion .12
William Duncan, who commanded the 743d Tank Battalion after D-Day, described the men who filled his outfit-a similar observation could have applied to most battalions-with regional variations regarding hunting knowledge: "The officers ... were all products of the university ROTC (Reserve Officer Training Corps) or 90-day wonders of the OCS (Officer Candidate School). The enlisted men on the other hand were volunteers or draftees, but they were all great American youth.... A majority of the officers and men were from farms and small towns in the Midwest. When they joined the battalion, they brought with them knowledge of tractors, trucks, and other farm equipment which blended well with the tanks, half-tracks, jeeps, and trucks of a tank battalion. Most also had a basic knowledge of guns from their hunting deer, pheasants, ducks, and rabbits.""
Referring to its civilians-become-soldiers, the history of the 726th Amphibian Tractor Battalion records, "[T]hey weren't anybody in particular; they were everybody.... They were a cross-section of America."44
TANK BATTALION TRAINING
Newly formed battalions typically went through a basic-training regimen of about thirteen weeks and qualification on tank weapons, but the details varied from unit to unit. Most courses were at the battalion's home base, but some officers and men attended the Armored Training Center at Fort Knox. Some outfits had to conduct their own basic training for raw recruits received directly from replacement centers. First furloughs followed the completion of basic training, and for most men, this was the first opportunity to visit their homes as soldiers.45
The army's assumption was that six months was the time required to train a unit for combat.46 Maneuvers followed, normally in combination with a permanent change of station for the battalion. Major maneuver areas included Camp Polk, Louisiana, and the Desert Training Center, which included Camp Young in Indio, California, and Camp Laguna, thirty miles north of Yuma, Arizona. Describing the Desert Training Center, then-Lt. Raymond Fleig recalled, "The ever-present dust rose in choking clouds as vehicles moved at the pace of a snail. Dust was everywhere; in your eyes, nose, mouth, ears, in the food, your clothing, bedding, weapons, and worst of all the moving parts of machinery.""
Several battalions organized in Hawaii, where no such large-scale maneuvers were possible. The 767th Tank Battalion, activated on Oahu, trained there under the oversight of the 4th Armored Group, which as "near as possible," observed the battalion's history, complied with training requirements in the States.48
The training that the separate tank battalions underwent was to some extent appropriate for what would come. Brand-new outfits were able to learn the basics of firing and maneuvering as coherent units. Battalions in Hawaii went through weeks of jungle training, which gave men some appreciation for what they were going to face. The tankers in some cases were already learning critical lessons, such as the need to establish direct liaison contact with the infantry. There is no indication in the records, however, that such lessons were pulled together and shared among the tank battalions.
In other respects, the training did not give the soldiers in most outfits a realistic appreciation for-or preparation to handle-the realities they would face in battle. In the worst cases, the training appears to have been simply inadequate or to have created unrealistic notions about the likely course of battle.
Some of the earliest-formed battalions, such as the 193d Tank Battalion, were attached to armored divisions for training. So, too, were some battalions that separated from armored divisions in 1943 yet remained with the old division for training. This guaranteed that they would get little or no instruction on how to work with an infantry division.49 The army also realized that even subordinating many separate battalions to armored groups removed the tankers from close contact with infantry divisions and that few infantry regiments had trained beside tanks."
By 1943, the army concluded that tank-infantry training in the States was inadequate, and it was recommended that a separate tank battalion be activated jointly with each infantry division. Army Ground Forces mandated that separate battalions be attached to infantry divisions and corps as soon as they completed battalion-level training and anticipated that the reorganization of the armored divisions would release enough such formations to make the idea practical. Instead, the distractions caused by the reorganization prevented such attachments, and few infantry divisions had a chance to work with tanks before they shipped overseas.5' Homer Wilkes, a lieutenant in the 747th Tank Battalion, recalled that for his outfit, there was no training with the infantry, artillery, or air support, and no amphibious training. Battalion officers on their own taught the men indirect fire with tank cannons.52
There were other major shortcomings. Training did not include the use of tanks in towns, which was common in combat.53 Battalion records provide no evidence that units were given any practice in dealing with known enemy capabilities (beyond basic enemy vehicle identification training) in the tactical or technical sense.
Amphibious Training
Armored Force men engaged in two distinct forms of operations from sea to shore, amphibious and amphibian. Amphibious operations revolved around getting a land force from oceangoing transports to a hostile shore. Amphibian battalions were equipped so that they could conduct amphibious assaults, but they also were able to return to the water under their own power.
The army and navy anticipated that armor would play a role in amphibious assault operations as they geared up for what seemed increasingly likely involvement in a global war. As of 30 September 1941, the two services had obtained only 46 tank landing craft, but they had 101 under construction and 131 funded and awaiting contract; 300 amphibian tractors were under construction, and 188 more were awaiting contract. The number of landing craft of all types available or under procurement was sufficient for three army or marine corps triangular infantry divisions to land nine battalion combat teams each.
The army was deeply involved in obtaining the wherewithal-transports and landing craft-to mount its own amphibious operations to be supported by the navy, and as late as April 1942, it argued that it should be responsible for all amphibious operations in the Atlantic while the marine corps conducted those in the Pacific. Instead, the Amphibious Forces of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets were established on 14 March and 10 April 1942, respectively, and the navy took responsibility for getting troops onto hostile shores and training the men needed to do that .14
Regular tank battalions destined for early amphibious operations practiced landing techniques well in advance. The army had trained one infantry division on each coast for amphibious operations, the 1st Division on the east and the 3d Division on the west. Company A, 70th Tank Battalion, participated in secret amphibious maneuvers with the 1st Infantry Division between 17 June and 16 August 1941, which was the first such training for an American tank battalion. Combat elements underwent additional amphibious training with the Amphibious Force in Norfolk, Virginia, during the spring and summer of 1942.11
At the same time, the 756th Tank Battalion underwent amphibious training at Fort Ord, California, with the 3d Infantry Division, with which it would land in North Africa.56 Then-Lt. David Redle, a twenty-three-old ROTC graduate from Wyoming, recalled that his Company B was attached to the 3d Division on 1 October 1941 and first shipped to Tacoma to qualify all the men as swimmers and conduct initial training with light tanks in Higgins boats, also known as tank lighters. These plywood vessels had a ramp on the front that went down on the beach and allowed men or a vehicle to exit. Upon arriving at Fort Ord, odd-looking wading stacks or shrouds were attached to the backs of the waterproofed M5 light tanks in order to keep water out of the air intake and exhaust when in the surf .51
Amphibian outfits first began training at Fort Ord when the North Africa landings were a receding memory, and later battalions trained both there and in Hawaii. The 534th, 715th, and 773d Amphibian Tractor Battalions-the first a reorganized armored infantry battalion and the latter two converted from medium tank battalions-were all designated as such at Fort Ord in October 1943.
The 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which received orders for Fort Ord on 27 October 1943, underwent a massive mental and organizational reorientation. Only a month earlier, it had been the 3d Battalion, 69th Armored Regiment, in the 6th Armored Division, with which it had gone through the desert training center equipped with M3 medium tanks. The outfit had been transformed into a separate tank battalion for several weeks before being redesignated for an amphibian battalion.
Instructors from the Marine Corps provided training to the first outfits to reach Fort Ord, where the 2d and 18th Armored Groups were setting up operations. Drivers found that amphibian tanks handled similarly to the land tanks to which they were accustomed, and mechanics learned that the drive trains were about the same as those on light tanks. The former armored infantrymen in the 534th Battalion, however, had to learn everything from scratch .51
The 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion shipped out for Hawaii on 9 December, having gotten little more than a month of instruction, followed by the three amtrac battalions. They joined the 4th Armored Group, Combat Training Command, Central Pacific Area, which was organized to train land tank battalions and could provide little help. Upon arrival, the 708th Battalion was alerted for the invasion of the Marshall Islands, while the tractor battalions organized for subsequent landings on Saipan. The amphibian units snagged a Marine Corps veteran of Tarawa, and they patched together a training regimen.59
CHARIOTS OF IRON
On 14 June 1940, the army established a technical board to examine the material requirements of the divisions, which laid down several goals. All new tanks would be outfitted with 37-millimeter guns, thicker front armor, and powertraversing turrets while development began on a medium tank mounting a 75millimeter gun. Diesel engines would power all new tanks (the army would pick gasoline instead). The board also addressed the possibility of mounting flamethrowers in medium tanks, upgrading radio sets, developing observation aircraft with short takeoff and landing capabilities, and improving air-ground communi- cations.6°
The army owned only sixty-six obsolete M2 and M2A1 medium tanks in June 1940, and ramping up tank production took two years. Ordnance received a $200 million appropriation in August 1939, mostly for tank production, but only 1,467 medium tanks of all types rolled off the assembly lines through 1941. By July 1941, the army still possessed enough tanks to equip only two armored divisions at a time when all branches-plus the British-were demanding scarce production resources to meet their needs.61
The first separate tank battalions went to war in the thirteen-ton M3 light tank (nicknamed the Stuart by the British), which was standardized in July 1940 just as the Armored Force stood up. Armor was one and a half inches thick on the front and one inch on the sides, while the turret walls were one inch thick. The vehicle had a 250-horsepower Continental radial aircraft engine.
Four men crewed the M3. The commander had to service the gun, as well as keep track of the battlefield and his own unit's maneuvers. The early M3 lacked an intercom system for the crew, which suggests that the army had not fully realized the vital importance of the men working together as a seamless team in battle.
The turret had a manual traverse system, which was not a terrible deficiency given its small size. The 37-millimeter main gun was installed with a coaxial .30caliber machine gun. The M3 had stowage for 103 37-millimeter rounds, which would typically be a mix of armor-piercing, high-explosive, and canister shells. Canister, which spewed a cloud of steel balls like a shotgun shell, was highly effective against infantry to a range of 200 yards and could be fired on the move.62 Four additional .30-caliber machine guns were provided: one in a hull ball mount for the assistant driver (bow gunner or "bog"), two in the side sponsons, and one on the turret roof for antiaircraft defense.
By the time the 70th Tank Battalion landed in North Africa in November 1942, it had received an improved model, the M5 (also called the Stuart). The M5, standardized in February 1942, introduced an improved welded, sloped armor layout and twin Cadillac engines that could move the tank at thirty-six miles per hour. The M5 had a gyrostabilized 37-millimeter main gun and coaxial .30-caliber machine gun, and the bog retained a .30-caliber machine gun in a hull ball mount. The crew could traverse the turret using either a hydraulic or manual mechanism. The vehicle had organized stowage for 123 37-millimeter shells.
The first separate medium tank battalions in both North Africa and the Pacific entered battle in the M3 medium tank (nicknamed the Lee by the British), as the limited number of M4 and M4A1 Shermans were going to the British and the armored divisions. Designers had started with an M2A 1 medium tank hull and mounted a 75-millimeter gun on the thirty-ton M3 in a side sponson that allowed only fifteen degrees of traverse in either direction. Atop the tank, a fully traversing turret carried the same 37-millimeter gun used in the M3/M5 light tank series, a coaxial .30-caliber machine gun, and a rotating cupola with a .30-caliber for antiaircraft defense.
Frontal armor was two inches thick, sloped to provide the ballistic protection of four and three-eighths inches, and the sides and rear had armor a half-inch thinner. The nine-cylinder Continental (Wright Whirlwind) R-975-EC2 or R-975-C1 aircraft engine enabled the tank to attain a speed of twenty-six miles per hour on level ground.
Three members of the six-man crew-the commander, a gunner, and a loader-sat in the upper turret. The driver and a radio operator sat forward in the hull, while the 75-millimeter gunner perched to the left of his weapon. The crew had an intercom system.
The first assault gun issued to light and medium tank battalions was the halftrack-based T30, a stopgap similar to the ad hoc first-generation M3 tank destroyer. The T30 consisted of an M3 half-track with an MIA 1 75-millimeter pack howitzer mounted in the bed pointing forward over the cab.