REFERENCES

CHAPTER ONE: KNOWLEDGE OF THE ENEMY

1. N. Austin and N. Rankov, Exploration, Military and Political Intelligence in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople, London, 1995, pp. 26–27, 209–10.

2. Ibid., pp. 9–10.

3. Ibid., p. 246.

4. E. Christiansen, The Northern Crusades, the Baltic and the Catholic Frontier, 1100–1525, London, 1980, pp. 161–63.

5. S. Runciman, The First Crusade, Cambridge, 1951, Book III, chapters 2 and 3, book IV, chapter 1.

6. P. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (trans. M. Jones), Oxford, 1984, pp. 25–30, 219–28.

7. J. R. Alban and C. T. Allmond, “Spies and Spying in the Fourteenth Century,” in J. R. Allmond, War Literature and Politics in the Late Middle Ages, London, 1976, pp. 73–101.

8. T. Barker, The Military Intellectual and Battle: Raimondo Montecuccoli and the Thirty Years War, New York, 1975, pp. 160, 242.

9. C. Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, London, 1987, p. 186.

10. C. Duffy, Frederick the Great, A Military Life, London, 1985, pp. 59–64.

11. Austin and Rankov, p. 15.

12. For the harkara system and its capture by the British, see C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870, Cambridge, 1996, particularly chapter 2.

13. The origin of the term “Y” is mysterious. It may derive from the symbol used to denote sound-ranging by British artillery officers during the First World War, the arms of the Y perhaps representing the sound waves received at a central interception point.

14. For the question of whether Sorge did or did not influence Soviet decision making, and was or was not believed, see F. W. Deakin and G. R. Storry, The Case of Richard Sorge, London, 1966, particularly chapter 13. See also Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence, New York, 1985, pp. 236–37, 244. Sorge, whatever his success, is nevertheless an extremely significant figure, since his character, personality and career typify those of the dedicated ideological agent at his most dangerous. Sorge was highly intelligent, very brave and completely dedicated to his beliefs, which effectively took the form of unquestioning loyalty to a country not his own.

15. Laqueur, p. 244 and footnote 20, p. 381.

16. A. Boyle, The Climate of Treason, London, 1979, p. 371.

CHAPTER TWO: CHASING NAPOLEON

1. Geoffrey Bennett, Nelson the Commander, London, 1972, p. 59.

2. Hugh Popham, A Damned Cunning Fellow, St. Austell, 1991, p. xiii.

3. Bennet, pp. 61–62.

4. Brian Lavery, Nelson and the Nile, Chatham, 1998, p. 9

5. C. de la Jonquière, L’Expédition d’Egypte, Paris, 1900, vol. 1, pp. 96–98.

6. H. Nicolas, Dispatches and Letters of Nelson, London, 1845, vol. 3, p. 17.

7. Ibid., p. 26.

8. Ibid., p. 29.

9. Ibid., p. 13.

10. Ibid., p. 30.

11. Lavery, p. 124.

12. M. Duffy, “British Naval Intelligence and Bonaparte’s Egyptian Expedition of 1798,” in Mariner’s Mirror, vol. 84, no. 3, August 1998, p. 283.

13. Ibid., p. 285.

14. Lavery, p. 125.

15. G. P. B. Naish, Navy Records Society, 1958, vol. 100, pp. 407–9.

16. A. T. Mallon, Life of Nelson, Boston, 1900, vol. 1, p. 332.

17. S. E. Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential, Annapolis, 2000, p. 264.

CHAPTER THREE: LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: STONEWALL JACKSON IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY

1. J. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The American Civil War, Oxford History of the United States, New York, 1988, pp. 12–13, 318–19.

2. T. Harry Williams, Lincoln and His Generals, London, 1952, pp. 13–14.

3. McPherson, pp. 245–46.

4. J. Waugh, The Class of 1846, New York, 1994, p. 264.

5. R. G. Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley, Mechanicsburg, Penn., 1996, pp. 3–23.

6. Williams, p. 5.

7. E. B. McElfrish, Maps and Mapmakers of the Civil War, New York, 1999, p. 23.

8. The Imperial Gazetteer of India, Oxford, 1907, vol. IV, pp. 481–507.

9. D. W. Meinig, The Shaping of America, New Haven, 1986, vol. 2, pp. 161–63.

10. McElfrish, p. 18.

11. C. Duffy, Frederick the Great, London, 1985, pp. 325–26. The practice of deeming maps to be state secrets was of considerable antiquity. King Manuel of Portugal, in the sixteenth century, threatened the death penalty to any subject caught sending abroad any chart of Cabral’s vogage to India. The Spanish had already adopted the practice of weighting maps and charts so that they could be sunk if a ship was threatened with capture (by the twentieth century, the weighting of codebooks was universal in Western navies). On the value of local knowledge, acquired by everyday reconnaissance, see Machiavelli, The Prince, chapter XIV; the prince, he wrote, “should always be out hunting so accustoming his body to hardships and also learning some practical geography . . . This kind of ability teaches him where to locate the enemy, how to lead his army on the march and draw it up for battle.” I am indebted to Dr. Paige Newmark, of Lincoln College, Oxford, for these references.

12. Imperial Gazetteer of India, Vol. IV, p. 499.

13. C. A. Bayly, Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India, 1780–1870, Cambridge, 1996, pp. 108, 110.

14. McElfrish, p .22.

15. Tanner, p. 115.

16. McElfrish, p. 29.

17. Ibid., p. 85.

18. V. Esposito, The West Point Atlas of American Wars, New York, 1959, vol. 1, map 39.

19. T. Roosevelt, Autobiography, 1913, quoted in P. G. Tsouras, Warrior’s Words, London, 1992.

20. Tanner, p. 117.

21. Jackson Papers (b), 19 March 1862, Virginia Historical Society, Richmond.

22. Tanner, p. 124.

23. M. A. Jackson, Life and Letters of General Thomas J. Jackson, New York, 1892, p. 248.

24. U.S. War Department, War of the Rebellion, IV, I , pp. 234–35.

25. Tanner, p. 194.

26. Quoted in ibid., p. 260.

27. Ibid., p. 297.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid., p. 352.

30. R. Taylor, Destruction and Reconstruction, New York, 1955, p. 76.

31. Ibid., p. 438.

32. Ibid., p. 420.

CHAPTER FOUR: WIRELESS INTELLIGENCE

1. P. Kemp (ed.), Oxford Companion to Ships and the Sea, Oxford, 1976, pp. 770–71.

2. A. Hezlet, The Electron and Sea Power, London, 1975, p. 6.

3. Tanner, see note 5, chapter 3, pp. 417–21.

4. See J. Keegan, The Mask of Command, London, 1987, Chapter 3, pp. 210–12.

5. Hezlet, p. 31.

6. P. Kennedy, “Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1820–1914,” EHR, October 1971, pp. 728–52.

7. D. Kynaston, The City of London, London, 1995, vol. II, pp. 8, 40–41.

8. Hezlet, p. 77.

9. Ibid., p. 68.

10. Kennedy, p. 741.

11. A. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Oxford, 1965, vol. II, pp. 4–5

12. Ibid., II, p. 22

13. Ibid., II, p. 34

14. Quoted in J. Steinberg, Yesterday’s Deterrent, London, 1965, p. 208.

15. P. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, Annapolis, 1994, p. 65.

16. C. Burdick, The Japanese Siege of Tsingtau, Hamden, CT, 1976, p. 51.

17. Geoffrey Bennett, Navel Battles of the First World War 1968, p. 56.

18. D. Van der Vat, The Last Corsair, London, 1983, p. 41.

19. Bennett, p. 7.

20. Ibid., pp. 182–83.

21. Ibid., p. 78.

22. J. Corbett, Naval Operations, 1920, vol. I, p. 305.

23. Quoted in Bennett, p. 86.

24. Halpern, p. 36.

25. Quoted in Bennett, p. 92.

26. Halpern, p. 93.

27. Corbett, p. 344.

28. Ibid., p. 346.

29. Quoted in ibid., p. 349.

30. Quoted in ibid., p. 353.

31. Ibid., p. 357.

32. Quoted in Van der Vat, p. 61.

33. Quoted in ibid., p. 75.

34. Bennett, p. 110.

35. Ibid., p. 129.

36. K. Middlemas, Command the Far Seas, London, 1961, p. 194.

37. Ibid., p. 196.

38. See note 28.

CHAPTER FIVE: CRETE: FOREKNOWLEDGE NO HELP

1. See D. Showalter, Tannenberg, Hamden, 1991, p. 170.

2. P. Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, Annapolis, 1974, p. 316.

3. A. Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, vol. III, p. 42.

4. Ibid., pp. 134ff.

5. Ibid., p. 40.

6. Halpern, pp. 36–37; but see A. Lambert, The Rules of the Game, London, 1996, p. 49, who doubts the circumstances; the incident was certainly referred to by those in the know as “the miraculous draught of fishes,” Halpern, p. 37.

7. S. Singh, The Code Book, London, 1999, pp. 46–51.

8. R. E. Weber, Masked Dispatches: Cryptograms and Cryptology in American History, 1775–1900, National Security Agency, 1993, pp. 43–44.

9. Maffeo, Most Secret and Confidential, Annapolis, MD, 2001, p. 83.

10. Singh, p. 120

11. S. Budiansky, Battle of Wits, New York, 2000, pp. 70–71.

12. R. Kippenhahn, Code Breaking, Woodstock, NY, 2000, pp. 28–29.

13. Singh, p. 136.

14. Ibid., pp. 134, 136.

15. Quoted in W. Kozaczuk, Enigma, London, 1984, p. 270.

16. Ibid., p. 277.

17. Ibid., p. 284.

18. Ibid., note 2, pp. 22–23.

19. Ibid., p. 304.

20. G. Welchman, The Hut Six Story, London, 1982, p. 63.

21. Ibid., p. 71.

22. R. Lewin, Ultra Goes to War, London, 1988, p. 47.

23. Budiansky, p. 48.

24. Welchman, pp. 76–77.

25. See Andrew Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma, London, 1992, particularly pp. 96–99 and, for Bletchley, chapter 4.

26. Welchman, p. 168.

27. F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, London, Appendix 4, vol. II, pp. 658ff.

28. Welchman, p. 98.

29. Hinsley et al., p. 657.

30. C. MacDonald, The Lost Battle: Crete 1941, London, 1993, pp. 11–12.

31. H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives, London, 1965, pp. 68–9.

32. A. Beevor, Crete: The Battle and the Resistance, London, 1991, p. 76.

33. Ibid., p. 72.

34. I. Stewart, The Struggle for Crete, Oxford, 1966, p. 58.

35. Beevor, p. 349.

36. Ibid., p. 351–52.

37. Paul Freyberg, Bernard Freyberg VC, London, 1991.

38. Bennett, Ultra and Mediterranean Strategy, 1941–45, London, 1989, pp. 57–58.

39. Beevor, pp. 346–48.

40. Ibid., p. 105.

41. Ibid., p. 112.

42. Ibid., p. 107.

43. Quoted in ibid., p. 107.

44. MacDonald, p. 216.

45. Ibid., p. 196.

46. Stewart, pp. 317–18, 374–75.

47. MacDonald, p. 203.

48. Ibid., p. 212.

49. Bennett, p. 20.

50. Ibid., p. 19.

51. Ibid., p. 20.

CHAPTER SIX: MIDWAY: THE COMPLETE INTELLIGENCE VICTORY?

1. H. Strachan, The First World War, Oxford, 2001, vol. I, p. 458.

2. R. Spector, Eagle Against the Sun, London, 1985, p. 42.

3. Ibid., pp. 46–47.

4. H. P. Willmott, Empires in the Balance, London, 1982, p. 71.

5. S. Budiansky, Battle of Wits, New York, 2000, p. 120.

6. Ibid., p. 32ff.

7. Pearl Harbor Revisited. United States Navy Communications Intelligence, 1924–41, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, 2001, p. 17.

8. R. Lewin, The American Magic, New York, 1982, p. 42.

9. Pearl Harbor Revisited, Appendix A, “Messages Intercepted Between 6 September and 4 December, 1941,” pp. 53–65.

10. Spector, pp. 153–55.

11. H. Shorreck, A Priceless Advantage, Naval Historical Center, Washington Navy Yard, 2001, p. 9.

12. Ibid., p. 11.

13. Ibid., p. 5.

14. Ibid., p. 6.

15. Ibid., p. 8.

16. Ibid., p. 9.

17. Ibid., p. 10.

18. Spector, p. 166.

19. Shorreck, p. 10.

20. Ibid., p. 12.

21. A. Marder, Old Friends, New Enemies: The Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, Oxford, vol. II, 1990, p. 93.

22. J. Winton, Ultra in the Pacific, London, 1993, p. 58.

23. W. Lord, Midway: The Incredible Victory, Ware, 2000, p. 119.

24. H. Bicheno, Midway, London, 2001, p. 149.

CHAPTER SEVEN: INTELLIGENCE, ONE FACTOR AMONG MANY: THE BATTLE OF THE ATLANTIC

1. F. H. Hinsley and A. Stripp, Codebreakers, Oxford, 1993, p. 11.

2. Ibid., p. 12.

3. W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, London, 1949, p. 529.

4. P. Padfield, Dönitz, London, 1964, p. 101ff.

5. Ministry of Defence,The U-Boat War in the Atlantic, London, vol. I, 1989, p. 1.

6. Ibid., pp. 3–4.

7. J. Terraine, Business in Great Waters, London, 1983, p. 142.

8. Ibid., pp. 618–19.

9. Jane’s Fighting Ships, London, 1940, p. 60ff.

10. Terraine, pp. 54, 119.

11. Padfield, p. 201.

12. Terraine, pp. 266–8.

13 . Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, London, 1981 and later, Vol. 1, p. 336, Vol. 2, p. 179.

14. Ibid., Vol. 2, Appendix 4, parts 3 and 6.

15. Ibid., Vol. 2, Appendix 9, p. 681.

16. Ibid., Vol. 2, Appendix 19, pp. 751–52.

17. C. Blair, Hitler’s U-Boat War, vol. 1, The Hunters, New York 1939–42, 1996, pp. 727–32, 695.

18. D. Kahn, Seizing the Enigma, London, 1991, pp. 211–12.

19. Ibid., chapter 16, passim.

20. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, appendix 8.

21. Kahn, chapter 20.

22. Blair, vol. 1, p. 424, vol. 2, The Hunted. 1942–45, p. 712.

23. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 421.

24. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 743–44.

25. Ibid., vol. 1, p. 418.

26. Terraine, p. 629.

27. Blair, vol. 1, pp. 741–45.

28. Ibid., p. 247.

29. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 791–92; J. Terraine, pp. 314–15.

30. Blair, vol. 2, pp. 519–20.

31. Terraine, p. 619.

32. Ministry of Defence, pp. 109-18; Blair, vol. 2, Appendix 2.

33. Kahn, pp. 211–13.

34. Hinsley et al., vol. 2, Appendix 19.

35. Blair, vol. 2, Appendix 18.

36. Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 710–11.

CHAPTER EIGHT: HUMAN INTELLIGENCE AND SECRET WEAPONS

1. D. Irving, The Mare’s Nest, London, 1964, pp. 13–14.

2. F. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War, London, 1981 and later, vol. 1, appendix 5.

3. M. Smith, Foley, London, 1999.

4. Irving, p. 34.

5. P. Wegener, The Peenemünde Wind Tunnels, New Haven, 1996.

6. Ibid., p. 27.

7. Irving, p. 35.

8. Ibid., p. 38.

9. Ibid., p. 43.

10. Wegener, p. 10.

11. Ibid., pp. 34–40.

12. B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, London, 1957, pp. 353–55.

13. Irving, pp. 140–41.

14. T. Wilson, Churchill and the Prof, London, 1988, pp. 2–4.

15. Irving, title page.

16. Ibid., pp. 45–47, 53.

17. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 369.

18. Ibid., p. 385.

19. Ibid., part 1, p. 390.

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid.

22. Hinsley et al., vol. 1, p. 57, n. 277.

23. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 389.

24. Ibid., p. 379.

25. Ibid., p. 391–92.

26. Ibid., p. 402.

27. Ibid., p. 412.

28. Ibid., p. 428.

29. B. Collier, The Battle of the V-Weapons, London, 1964, pp. 45–46.

30. Collier, Defence of the United Kingdom, Appendices XLV, L.

31. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 446.

32. F. H. Gibbs-Smith, The Aeroplane, London, 1960, chapter 14.

33. N. Longmate, Hitler’s Rockets, London, 1985, p. 187.

34. Hinsley et al., Vol. 4, p. 184.

35. M. Howard, British Intelligence in the Second World War, vol. 5, 1990, pp. 18–20, 231–41. It has to be said that Garbo was a genuine anti-totalitarian and strongly pro-British.

36. Ibid., vol. 5, p. 12.

37. Ibid., pp. 177–79.

38. Ibid., p. 183.

39. Hinsley et al., vol. 3, part 1, p. 360.

40. Private information, Professor D. C. Watt.

41. D. Irving, The Virus House, London, 1967, passim.

EPILOGUE: MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SINCE 1945

1. N. West, The Secret War for the Falklands, London, 1997, pp. 20, 37–38.

2. A. Finlan, “British Special Forces and the Falklands Conflict,” in Defence and Security Analysis, December 2002, pp. 319, 332.

3. West, p. 144.

4. Ibid., pp. 145–47.

5. Finlan, p. 826.

6. M. Hastings and S. Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, London, 1983, p. 316.

CONCLUSION: THE VALUE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

1. The Ultra secret was first revealed, in a book of that title written by F. W. Winterbotham, in 1974. Winterbotham, a regular air force officer, had been head of the air section of MI6 (the Secret Intelligence Service, or SIS) and moved to Bletchley in 1939. The reason he was given permission to publish the book—which contains serious inaccuracies—is that there were official British fears of the story coming out anyhow; articles were appearing in Poland, which initiated the attack on Enigma before 1939, describing the Polish success; it was suspected that disclosures about Bletchley would shortly follow.

2. Reinhard Gehlen achieved fame as head of Foreign Armies East, branch 12 of the German General Staff, which collected intelligence about the Red Army. Since Hitler, however, disliked inconvenient facts, and Gehlen failed to insist on his accepting them, he cannot be reckoned a great intelligence officer, though he was a very efficient one. After 1945 the “Gehlen organisation” was adopted by the Americans as a source of Cold War intelligence. It later evolved into West Germany’s foreign intelligence service, the Bundersnachrichtendienst.

Bacler d’Albe achieved fame as intelligence officer to Napoleon, but Bonaparte, like Wellington, usually acted as his own intelligence officer. He travelled with a compact filing-cabinet of essential information, cleverly constructed to display a summary of the contents on the doors of each of its compartments. For Gehlen, see D. Kahn,Hitler’s Spies, New York, 1978.

3. See A. Boyle, The Climate of Treason, Five Who Spied for Russia, London, 1979. Now somewhat outdated factually, it continues to provide the best description of the university traitors’ disposition.

4. See J. Lunt, Imperial Sunset, Frontier Soldiering in the 20th Century, London, 1981, for such exotic forces as the Iraq Levies, the Hadrami Bedouin Legion and the Somaliland Scouts. Histories of the Indian army are many but an interesting modern one is by General S. Menezes, Fidelity and Honour, New Delhi 1993. General Menezes served in the Indian Army both before and after independence.

5. See A. Clayton, France, Soldiers and Africa, London, 1988.

6. See M. Binney, The Women Who Lived for Danger, London, 2002.

7. See J. Horne and A. Kramer, German Atrocities 1914, New Haven and London, 2001, Appendix 1.

8. See R., Kipling, The Complete Stalky & Co, London, 1929. “ ‘The surprises will begin when there is a really big row on . . . Just imagine Stalky let loose on the south side of Europe with a sufficiency of Sikhs and a reasonable prospect of loot.’ “ Stalky was modelled on Kipling’s schoolfellow Dunsterville, who as a First World War general led a sensational intervention into the Caucasus. See Horne and Kramer, Appendix 1.

9. D. Kahn, Seizing the Enigma, London, 1991, p. 91.