Unless otherwise noted all references are from the Presidential Papers of Lyndon Baines Johnson, 1963–1969, located in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas. The materials available for research on the war and utilized in this book include the National Security File (NSF) which was the working file of President Johnson’s special assistants for national security affairs, McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow. The NSF file contains several important categories: Country File, Vietnam; Country File, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand; Head of State Correspondence; International Meetings and Travel File (February 1966 Honolulu conference and 1967 Guam conference); Speech File; Agency File; Name File; Intelligence File; Subject File; National Intelligence Estimates; National Security Action Memorandums; National Security Council Meetings; National Security Council Histories (especially Honolulu Conference, February 6–8, 1966, Manila Conference and President’s Asia Trip, October 17–November 2, 1966 and March 31, 1968 speech); Memos to the President; Files of McGeorge Bundy; Files of Robert Komer.
The White House Central Files (WHCF) and White House Central Files-Confidential File (C.F.) also contain important material in ND 19/CO 312 (National Defense-Vietnam War.) The Meeting Notes File and Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings provide detailed transcripts of meetings on Vietnam and Tuesday luncheons.
The collection entitled “Tom Johnson’s Notes of Meetings” includes notes for more than 190 White House meetings which were taken by W. Thomas Johnson. Tom Johnson served as deputy press secretary under President Lyndon Johnson from October 1967 through January 1969. He started taking notes at White House meetings on a regular basis in July 1967 and continued to do so through December 1968. President Johnson attended all but one of the meetings for which there are notes in this collection.
Three-fifths of the notes in this collection date from 1968. Of the remaining two-fifths, virtually all were taken at meetings held between July and December 1967, but five sets of notes date from June 1966 through June 1967.
The collection includes notes for more than eighty meetings that President Johnson held with House and Senate leaders, correspondents, his Cabinet, the National Security Council, businessmen, and other groups. These notes have been processed and opened for research, but some are still undergoing declassification review or have been exempted from declassification. This first group of notes is currently located in boxes 1 and 2 of Tom Johnson’s notes of meetings.
In addition, the collection includes notes for close to 110 other meetings that President Johnson held with his senior civilian and military foreign policy advisers, including some 45 Tuesday luncheons. These have not yet been processed or opened for research, except for those portions that were released in response to a subpoena issued in 1982 in connection with General William Westmoreland’s lawsuit against CBS. Only those portions of Tom Johnson’s notes that pertained to enemy strength in South Vietnam and the infiltration of North Vietnamese troops into South Vietnam were released in response to the subpoena. The released portions of this second group of notes are currently located in box 3 of Tom Johnson’s notes of meetings.
For notes similar to those included in both the groups described above—but taken by individuals other than Tom Johnson—consult the Meeting Notes File, Boxes 1–3.
Preface
1. “Notes of the president’s meeting with Chalmers Roberts,” October 13, 1967 (Meeting Notes File). “Notes of meeting with foreign policy advisors,” November 1, 1967. See also Rostow, Memo to the president, “Summary of discussion and suggestions for today’s meeting,” November 2, 1967.
2. “Notes of the president’s activities during the Detroit crisis,” July 24, 1967.
I. Introduction
1. Lodge to the president, February 1, 1966. (Weekly telegram).
2. Bundy to the president, “Memorandum on Vietnam policy,” May 4, 1967.
3. Data released in February 1987 by the Federal Center for Disease Control in Atlanta. The study of 18,000 discharged enlisted men who served tours of duty between 1965 to 1971 as well as a control group who served elsewhere, found that the Vietnam combat veterans had an overall higher death rate of 48 percent.
4. See Ben Franklin, “Scrutiny of Agent Orange Data Allowed,” New York Times, November 17, 1987. William Welch, “White House Doubts Study Finding ‘Agent Orange Risk,’” Sacramento Bee, September 15, 1987. Phillip Boffey, “Cancer Deaths High for Some Veterans,” New York Times, September 4, 1987. p. 6. Phillip Boffey, “U.S. Halting Study on Agent Orange,” New York Times,September 1, 1967.
5. See Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: The Vietnam War in Context (Carlisle Barracks, Penn: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1981); General Bruce Palmer, Jr., The Twenty-Five-Year War: America’s Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, Ky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1984); Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Timothy Lomperis, The War Everyone Lost—And Won (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1984); Admiral U.S. Grant Sharp, Strategy for Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (San Rafael, CA: Presidio Press, 1978).
II. Setting the Stage
1. Lyndon Baines Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives on the Presidency, 1963–1969 (New York: Popular Library, 1971), p. 383.
2. See Time, February 18, 1966; Newsweek, February 18, 1966 and February 11, 1966; Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 244.
3. William Westmoreland, trial testimony and deposition. For insights into McNamara see David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1969); Henry Trewitt, McNamara (New York: Harper and Row, 1971); William Kaufman, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); Douglas Kinnard, The War Managers (Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1977); Jonathan Rinehart, “The Man Who Wields Power,” USA.1 (May 1967); Stewart Alsop, “McNamara: The Light that Failed,” Saturday Evening Post (November 18, 1967); Stewart Alsop, “Vietnam: How Wrong Was McNamara?” Saturday Evening Post (March 12, 1966); Neil Sheehan, “You Don’t Know Where Johnson Ends and McNamara Begins,” New York Times Magazine (October 22, 1967); Tom Wicker, “The Awesome Twosome,” New York Times Magazine (January 30, 1966).
4. See Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 168–72.
5. See Sharp, Strategy for Defeat, p. 164.
6. General John Paul McConnel, “Oral history transcript” (Johnson Library).
7. Admiral Thomas Moorer, “Oral history transcript” (Johnson Library).
8. McNamara to the president, “Actions recommended for Vietnam,” October 14, 1966.
9. Wheeler to McNamara, “Actions recommended for Vietnam,” October 14, 1966.
10. For an extended perspective and documentation see the NSC history, in the National Security File, “President’s Trip to Manila.”
11. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 249.
12. Carver to Komer, November 22, 1966 (Joint Exhibit 221). Komer to McNamara, “Vietnam prognosis for 1967–68,” November 29, 1966.
13. Westmoreland to Sharp and Wheeler, “Year-end assessment of enemy situation and enemy strategy,” January 2, 1967.
14. Sharp to Westmoreland and Wheeler, “Operational concept for Vietnam,” January 3, 1967.
15. Cited in Rostow to President Johnson, January 19, 1967.
III. The Slippery Slope to Stalemate
1. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 441–43.
2. Wheeler to Westmoreland, March 9, 1967 (Joint Exhibit 231). Wheeler to Westmoreland and Sharp, “VC/NVA battalion and larger attacks,” March 11, 1967 (Joint Exhibit 233).
3. Text of cable from Lodge to Rusk, March 13, 1967.
4. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 259–60.
5. See Newsweek, March 27, 1967, p. 29.
6. Rostow to the president, “Major themes for Thieu and Ky,” March 18, 1967. See Rostow to the president, “Four major points to be made in private session with Thieu and Ky,” March 20, 1967.
7. “Notes from meeting of president with Vietnamese leaders,” March 21, 1967 (CBS Subpoena Case #27, Document #258). See Carver to Rostow, “Transmittal of Working Notes,” March 23, 1967.
8. Rostow to the president, March 22, 1967. See “North Vietnamese Infiltration Into South Vietnam,” March 17, 1967 (CBS Subpoena Case #8, Document #1). Rostow to the president, “Covering memo to Lodge’s weekly telegram: Saigon 22177,” April 6, 1967 (CBS Subpoena Case #22, Document #U3).
9. See The Pentagon Papers, Gravel edition, vol. 4 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp. 151–53. Meeting notes transcript, April 27, 1967. See General William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, (New York: Doubleday, 1976) p. 227–28.
10. Remarks by General Westmoreland before a Joint Session of Congress, April 28, 1967 (Congressional Record). See Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 228.
11. Memo for secretary of defense, “Increase of SEA forces,” May 1, 1967. See Enthoven to McNamara, “Force levels and enemy attention,” May 4, 1967.
12. McNamara deposition and trial transcripts in author’s possession.
13. Rostow CBS interview transcripts in author’s possession.
14. Bundy to the president, May 4, 1967.
15. Wheeler to the president, May 5, 1967 (CM-3218–67).
IV. Choosing Among Imperfect Alternatives
1. McNaughton to McNamara, May 16, 1967. See “Proposed bombing program against North Vietnam,” May 9, 1967. See McNaughton draft presidential memo, May 5, 1967. See Rostow memo to the president, May 6, 1967 in which Rostow evaluates options before endorsing bombing in the panhandle regions; see also William Bundy memo of May 8, 1967, in Pentagon Papers, vol. 4, p. 155.
2. McNamara to the president, “Future actions in Vietnam,” May 19, 1967 (EXH. 955).
3. Wheeler to the president, “Operations Against North Vietnam,” May 20, 1967 (JCSM 286–67). See also JCS to secretary of defense, “Future actions in Vietnam,” May 29, 1967 (Case #85-151, Doc. #6).
4. Rostow to the president, May 21, 1967.
5. Ibid. See Rostow to the president, May 19, 1967. William Bundy, “Comments on DOD First Rough Draft of May 19–May 30, 1967.”
6. Sharp to Westmoreland, June 10, 1967 (Joint Exhibit 242, JX 242, p. 1). See Special National Intelligence Estimate 14.3–67. SAVA to Louis Sandine, Saigon 7423 (Exhibit 239A JX239A).
7. McNamara to the president, June 12, 1967,
8. Bunker to the White House, “Eyes only the president,” July 14, 1967.
V. The Summer of Discontent
1. Meeting notes, July 7, 1967.
2. Notes of meeting with Peter Lisagor of Chicago Daily News, August 4, 1967. Meeting notes, July 12, 1967.
3. Russel Baker, “Observer: Let’s Hear It for a Really Swell Policy,” New York Times, August 8, 1967.
4. Clark Clifford, “A Viet Nam Reappraisal,” Foreign Affairs (July 1969), pp. 601–23.
5. Rostow to the president, July 22, 1967 (CBS Subpoena Case #19, Document 20).
6. Rostow to the president, July 27, 1967 (Re. Saigon 1954). Bunker to the president, July 26, 1967 (CBS Subpoena Case #10, Document 63).
7. Westmoreland to Wheeler, Johnson, and Sharp, August 2, 1967.
8. See Hedrick Smith, “Army Chief Sees End of Build-up,” New York Times, August 13, 1967. Rostow to the president, August 11, 1967 (LBJ wrote over the memo, “Bring him in Saturday if George OK’s”)
9. See Westmoreland to Wheeler and Sharp, August 12, 1967 (Exhibit 1605A); Wheeler to Westmoreland and Sharp, August 8, 1967 (Exhibit 1607A).
10. Meeting Notes, July 25, 1967.
11. See Senate Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, Air War Against North Vietnam, 90th Congress, August 25, 1967. Douglas Kinnard, The Secretary of Defense (Lexington, Ky: University Press of Kentucky, 1981) pp. 104–5. Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, The Wise Men, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 683. See James Clay Thompson, Rolling Thunder: Understanding Policy and Program Failure (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
12. Komer cable to Carver, “RE: Wide discrepancy between MACV and CIA figures on enemy strength,” August 19 (CBS, JE 250). [See also Lawyers’ Brief, Bk. I, pp. B195-B196, Bk. II, and Bk. III.] Davidson cable to Godding, “RE: Unacceptability of including SD and SSD forces’ strength in any strength figure released to the press,” August 19, 1967 (Lawyers’ Brief, Bk. I, p. B198, Godding 8/24/67 cable to Davidson, Bk. II, and Bk. Ill—all JE 251). Ginsburgh memo to Rostow, “Increased estimates on Communist strengths in SVN to be published soon,” August 18, 1967 (CBS). Ginsburgh to Rostow, August 23, 1967. See Ginsburgh to Rostow, August 18, 1967, “Recommend that you make the following points with Mr. Helms: Now is the time to ‘bite the bullet,’ The intelligence community should not attempt to sneak up on the new estimate by adding periodic increments into current figures.”
13. Westmoreland cable to Wheeler and Sharp, “RE: To prevent erroneous conclusions from being drawn, SD and SSD strength figures should not be included in overall enemy strength,” August 20, 1967 (Lawyers’ Brief, Bk. I, p. B204, Bk. II, and Bk. Ill, JE 253). Abrams cable to Wheeler, Sharp, and Westmoreland, August 20, 1967, “RE: Continuing controversy over possible inclusion of SD and SSD strength figures in estimate of overall enemy strength” (CBS, JE 252) [See also Lawyers’ Brief, Bk. I, pp. B200-B202, Bk. and Bk. III].
14. Bunker to the president, August 23, 1967. “Notes from meeting with correspondents,” August 24, 1967.
15. Westmoreland to Wheeler, August 26, 1967. Westmoreland to Wheeler and Sharp, August 25, 1967 (Joint Exhibit 255).
16. Wheeler, “Summary of meeting of Joint Chiefs of Staff,” August 25, 1967.
17. Bunker to Rostow, August 29, 1967.
VI. Signs of Optimism
1. See “Notes of weekly meeting with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, Walt Rostow, George Christian, Dick Helms and General Harold Johnson,” September 15, 1967 and September 12, 1967.
2. Ibid.
3. See R.W. Apple, “Thieu and Ky are Victors,” New York Times, Sept. 6, 1967. Peter Braestrup, “‘Chicago Polities’ Benefited Thieu in Delta Province,” New York Times, September 4, 1967.
4. Bunker to the president, September 5, 1967. See “Notes of meeting with Vietnam election observers,” September 6, 1967.
5. Carver to Helms, September 12, 1967 (JX 258A), p. 1.
6. Carver to Helms, September 13, 1967 (Helms affidavit).
7. Helms affidavit in author’s possession.
8. Westmoreland to McConnell and Sharp, September 14, 1967 (Exhibit 1508A).
9. Carver to Helms, September 15, 1967.
10. Rostow to the president, September 20, 1967.
11. Johnson, The Vantage Point, pp. 408–11.
12. Notes of the president’s meeting, September 20, 1967.
13. Philip Habib to Harold Kaplan, “Statistical Defense of Progress in the War,” September 26, 1967.
14. See Rusk to Bunker, October 7, 1967 and Ambassador Locke to the president, October 7, 1967 (Saigon 7867).
15. Paul Walsh to George Carver, “MACV Press Briefing on Enemy Order of Battle,” October 11, 1967 (Joint Exhibit 265A). Rostow memo, “Vietnam Data and Progress Indicators,” October 13, 1967.
16. Carver to Goulding, October 13, 1967 (JE 266).
17. Rostow to the president, October 14, 1967.
18. Fortas to the president, “Vietnam,” October 14, 1967.
19. Wheeler to McNamara, “Inversed Pressure on North Vietnam,” October 17, 1967.
20. Bundy to the president, October 18, 1967. See Bundy to the president, “Vietnam—October 1967,” October 17, 1967.
21. Harry McPherson to the president, October 27, 1967.
VII. The Progress Report of November 1967
1. See Johnson, The Vantage Point, Appendices A.
2. McNamara to the president, “A Fifteen Month Program for Military Operations in Southeast Asia,” November 1, 1967.
3. See Isaaccson and Thomas, The Wise Men; “Notes of Wise Men Meeting,” November 1, 1967.
4. See Rostow to Clifford, November 1, 1967; Rostow to the president, “Summary discussion and suggestions for today’s meeting,” November 2, 1967.
5. Rostow to the president, November 2, 1967.
6. Quoted in Isaaccson and Thomas, The Wise Men p. 683, 646. See George Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, (New York: W.W. Norton, 1982).
7. Averill Harriman to the president and secretary of state, “Negotiations,” November 3, 1967.
8. Bundy to the president, “A Commentary on the Vietnam discussion of November 2,” November 10, 1967.
9. Rostow to the president, November 4, 1967.
10. Rostow to the president, November 2, 1967. Rostow to the president, November 3, 1967.
11. Bunker to President Johnson, November 2, 1967.
12. Fortas to the president, November 9, 1967.
13. Clifford to the president, November 7, 1967.
14. Rostow to the president, “Summary of responses,” November 21, 1967.
15. Rusk to the president, November 20, 1967.
16. Rostow to the president, “Westmoreland’s assessment for the month of October,” 21 p. (6–84). Helms to the president, “Capabilities of Vietnamese Communists for Fighting in South Vietnam,” November 14, 1967. See Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) #14.3-67, (Lawyers’ Brief, Bk. I, pp. B243-B272, Bk. II, Plate 12, and Bk. Ill, JE 273).
17. Renata Adler, Reckless Disregard (New York: Knopf, 1986) p. 239.
18. Bill Gulley with Mary Ellen Reese, Breaking Cover (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1980), pp. 44–45.
VIII. The Big Sell
1. Richard Moose deposition and affidavit in author’s possession.
2. Westmoreland’s remarks to the Joint Chiefs, Friday, November 17, 1967.
3. Rostow to the president, November 19, 1967.
4. Nicholas Katzenbach to the president, “Memorandum,” November 16, 1967.
5. Carver memo to director, Office of Current Intelligence (for president), “Regarding potentially controversial judgments or data holding changes in NIE 14.3-67,” (CBS, E 711) [See also Lawyers’ Brief, Bk. I, pp. B386-B392, and Bk. II, Plates 9A, 9B, JE 711]. See Rostow to the president, “Issues you wish to raise a noon meeting with Westmoreland,” November 16, 1967. See Helms to the president, “The validity and significance of Viet Cong loss data,” November 22, 1967.
6. Westmoreland cable to Abrams. “Regarding attempt to encourage hope that Vietnam war was winnable,” (Lawyers’ Brief, Bk. II, and Bk. III, 1967. JE 285)
7. Jason study in Pentagon Papers, Vol. 4, p. 116, 224–25.
8. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 233–34.
9. R.W. Apple, “Johnson Backs Military Leaders More Firmly Than Ever in Vietnam Visit,” New York Times, December 24, 1967.
10. Walt Rostow, The Diffusion of Power. (New York: MacMillan, 1972), p. 464–67.
11. Transcript of meeting with the pope, December 23, 1967, (LBJ Library).
IX. The Tet Offensive
For a complete list of documents used in the chapter consult the National Security Council History, “The March 31st Speech” at the LBJ Library. The project traces the events between the 1968 Tet attacks and the presidents’ speech on March 31st in which he announced the partial cessation of the bombing and his decision not seek reelection.
1. Quoted in Kenneth Thompson, ed., The Johnson Presidency (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), pp. 89–90, 258.
2. Robert Ginsburgh, deposition for CBS-Westmoreland trial in author’s possession.
3. See Tom Johnson’s meeting notes.
4. See Newsweek, February 2, 1968.
5. See Tom Johnson’s meeting notes.
6. See Doris Kearns, Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) pp. 360–1.
7. Sam Adams to George Carver, February 1968 (CBS-Westmoreland trial document in author’s possession).
8. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, p. 357.
9. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 192–93.
10. See Daniel Hallin, The Uncensored War: The Media and Vietnam. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 169–70.
X. The Ides of March
1. Clifford, “A Vietnam Reappraisal,” pp. 608–9.
2. Alain Enthoven, “Alternative Strategies,” Pentagon Papers, Vol. 4, pp 556–57.
3. Clifford, “A Vietnam Reappraisal,” pp. 608–10.
4. Palmer, The Twenty-Five Year War pp. 80–81.
5. Ralph Huitt, “Democratic Party Leadership in the Senate,” American Political Science Review, 55 (June 1961) pp. 336–38.
6. Fortas to the president, March 12, 1968.
7. See Isaaccson and Thomas, The Wise Men. p. 638–35.
8. See Don Oberdorf, TET! (New York: Doubleday, 1971); Herbert Shandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977); Stanley Karnow, Vietnam (New York: Viking, 1983); Townsend Hoopes, The Limits of Intervention (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987).
9. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, pp. 361–62.
10. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, pp. 407–9.
11. Isaacson and Thomas, The Wise Men, p. 700.
12. Quoted in Shandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam, Chapter 15.
13. Ball, The Past Has Another Pattern, p. 409.
14. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 408–9.
15. Quoted in Schandler, Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam, p. 260–61.
16. Quoted in Maxwell Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York: W. W. Norton, 1972), pp. 390–91.
17. Johnson, The Vantage Point, p. 415, see Chapter 18.
18. Quoted in Oberdorf, TET! p. 317.
19. Leonard Marks Oral History.