By 1968, the United States had committed over 525,000 men to Vietnam and bombed virtually all military targets recommended by the joint Chiefs of Staff. Yet, the United States was no closer to securing its objectives than it had been prior to the Americanization of the war. The long-promised light at the end of the tunnel was a mirage. This absorbing account reveals the bankruptcy of the bombing campaign against North Vietnam, the failures of political reform in South Vietnam and the bitter bureaucratic conflicts between the US government and its military commanders.
Chapter 1. Introduction: Vietnam Vogue vs. Vietnam as History
Chapter 3. The Slippery Slope to Stalemate
Chapter 4. Choosing among Imperfect Alternatives
Chapter 5. The Summer of Discontent
Chapter 7. The Progress Report of November 1967
Chapter 8. The Big Sell: The Tortoise of Progress vs. the Hare of Dissent
Appendix A: Memo from Townsend Hoopes to Clark Clifford, February 13, 1968
Appendix B: Memo from Townsend Hoopes to Clark Clifford, March 14, 1968
Appendix C: Memo from Walt Rostow to the President, March 19, 1970