Chapter Six
10 July
Mametz Wood was the first and largest of those woods that the British and Dominion troops were to capture during the Battle of the Somme. The Wood was intersected by rides or avenues but these had been blocked in many places. During the previous two years it had grown wild through neglect and in parts the undergrowth was very dense. Shelling had damaged many of the tall trees which had splintered and fallen, causing additional hazards to the barbed wire - erected by the Germans.
The 38th Division attack plan differed only from that being prepared by Major-General Phillips prior to his departure in that it was to be a heavier attack with an initial assault of four battalions. The main innovation was an elaborate artillery bombardment Two different methods were to be used, the first was to proceed with a conventional bombardment on the German front line and lift back when the expected attack would normally be delivered. The defending troops would emerge from their dugouts to meet their attackers. The artillery, though, would then drop back on to the front line and find the exposed defenders. The second was to use a creeping barrage through the Wood. The idea of this kind of barrage was to place a protective curtain of shells just in front of the advancing infantry which would be timed to lift back at regular intervals to allow the advance to proceed. All this, of course, depended on good artillery observation and very accurate work by the gunners. The creeping barrage was organised to commence at 4.15am and lift forward fifty yards every minute to just beyond the first objective which would give the infantry two hours to reach and consolidate their position. At 6.15am it would move on again to the second objective and again one hour later at 7.15am it would lift to the northern edge of the Wood.
During the early hours of 10 July the attacking battalions assembled in their positions forward of White Trench on Fusilier Ridge overlooking the rising ground over which they were to make the attack. The disposition of the assaulting troops placed the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers on the extreme left of the attack. Overlooking Strip Trench, they had the shortest distance to travel to reach the edge of the Wood. Following behind them would be the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. In the centre of the attack from their forward position the 14th Welsh Regiment had about 500 yards to travel and on the extreme right the 13th Welsh Regiment had an advance of up to 750 yards.
The 38th Division orders made brief reference to the 17th Division and mentioned co-operation on the eastern side of the Wood where the 6th Dorsets were still holding Wood Trench and also to attacks on Quadrangle Support Trench, but no specific instructions were issued except that in the attack on Strip Trench care should be taken in remembering the 6th Dorsets position, especially by the trench mortar batteries in Cliff Trench and Queen’s Nullah.
Lying in wait for the Welshmen in the southern part of the wood were the 2nd Battalion of the Lehr Infantry Regiment which was part of the 3rd Guards Division. The Lehr Regiment were highly professional soldiers and had been specially selected before the war to train drafts of the Prussian Army. Later the Kaiser’s personal body guard was created with elements drawn from the Regiment.
The attacking battalions were in position by 3.00am on the morning of the attack which at that time was cool but dry. The day was to become very hot and humid with thick cloud and temperatures in the lower eighties. Both attacking brigades were to be supported by machine gun crews. Initially eight guns were to be taken in by the 113th Brigade Machine Gun Company with the attack of the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. Four of these would be in position along the road below Fusilier Ridge to cover the start of the advance. The other guns would go in with the third wave and consolidate the edge of the wood. Similarly the 114th Brigade Machine Gun Company, commanded by Captain Job, were to take eight guns in with the 13th and 14th Welsh. Four were detailed to cover the centre of the wood while four were to cover the eastern edge of the wood. Additional guns were situated in Marlborough Copse and Caterpillar Wood to cover any counter attack on the eastern edge of the wood and the ground to the south. The artillery barrage opened up and lasted for forty five minutes and smoke barrages were put down along the whole of the front of the attack.
Map 13. 38th Welsh Divisions’ second attack on Mametz Wood 10 July.
Aerial view of ground over which the attack of 10 July was delivered. Strip Trench points like a finger towards the left flanck of the Welsh positions. The edge of ‘Hammerhead’ is on the extreme right. Caterpilar Wood in the foreground. (See Map 13)
Overlooking Strip Trench, the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Carden, held what amounted to a short religious service. They sang hymns in Welsh and their commanding officer addressed them. He said ‘Boys make your peace with God! We are going to take that position and some us won’t come back, But we are going to take it.’
As the first streaks of light brought the dawn the 13th and 14th Welsh moved forward before the appointed time because of the greater distance they had to travel. This caused some confusion for the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers as Carden who shortly before 4.00am had gone over to speak with officers of the other attacking battalions had not returned.
The soldier’s view across the rising ground of the attack of 10 July.
Major McLellan who was second in command waited for Carden to return but by 4.12am when the battalion should have moved off there was no sign of him. McLellan tried to find the commanding officer but without success and by 4.30am assuming he had become a casualty gave the order to advance. As they reached the top of the ridge they saw some men already retiring and while a few men continued forward the majority of the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers also retired. At that point Lieutenant-Colonel Carden returned - the men were reorganised and the advance commenced again. Being late they lost the cover of the artillery barrage and as they advanced they were hit by fire not only from the front of the wood but also from Strip Trench and other German positions in the Quadrangle trench system.
Leading his men forward Carden tied a coloured handkerchief to his walking stick which he held up to give them a focal point on which to rally shouting “this will show you where I am”. He was also a conspicuous figure to the Germans and he fell wounded. Refusing to give up he got up, struggled on and was again hit and this time fell dead at the edge of the wood.
Following the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers attacked but with only two companies, the other two being left behind owing to a mistake in brigade orders. They too made initial progress towards the wood but also came under heavy fire about 200 yards from the wood.
Some men came running back shouting retire and there was much confusion. Major Mills and Captain Glynn-Jones attempted to regroup the men even threatening use of their revolvers to exercise control. Through all this there was heavy machine gun fire and artillery bombardment. Major Mills was killed and Glynn-Jones reorganised the men in the shelter of the railway embankment, below the ridge. Lieutenant-Colonel Gwyther, commanding the battalion, had been severely wounded but Glynn-Jones found him and organised evacuation. There seemed to be no British troops in front and no support from the rear and being isolated Glynn-Jones set up machine gun posts on each flank whilst sending two runners back to battalion headquarters asking for support. Meanwhile men were crawling back from shell holes in front with reports of heavy casualties, many among the officers and non-commissioned officers.
In the centre the 14th Welsh were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J H Hayes and the battalion moved in good formation making quick progress under the leadership of Captain Godfrey leading B Company and Captain Dagge leading C company. Casualties were slight until the edge of the wood was reached as the enemy had been unprepared for the attacking troops to be so close to the barrage. Captain Wilson distinguished himself at the head of his company by bayoneting a burly German and then with a single shot brought down a sniper who was hiding in a tree. Lieutenant Hawkins equally brave charged and captured two machine guns on separate occasions although he was wounded the second time. The battalion took casualties in the latter stages of the advance with the second in command Major Brock Williams being wounded and three company commanders were also casualties.
Lieutenant-Colonel Ronald James Walter Carden commanding 16th Battalion RWF
On the far right the 13th Welsh commanded by Major G D’A Edwardes – not only had the greatest distance to cover – but were also close the to the Hammerhead, that part of the wood originally attacked on 7 July. The Germans had machine gun positions in that part of the Hammerhead immediately to the right of the assaulting troops and they were able to enfilade the attack with heavy fire. Although the 13th Welsh had moved 150 yards to the left on the approach to the wood to foreshorten the distance to be covered and to ensure contact was made with the 14th Welsh in the centre, casualties were heavy and those arriving at the edge of the wood also met with heavy resistance. An attempt to enter the wood was repulsed. Reinforcements came forward and a second attempt was also thrown back. A third attempt was made and this time the 13th Welsh managed to get into the wood and some prisoners were taken. Once in the wood they found the undergrowth very dense and the only clear passages were through where the artillery shells had struck whilst cleverly placed machine gun positions swept the obvious approaches.
Lieutenant F J Hawkins a Welsh Rugby Union International
At 4.30am the 10th Welsh were drawn into the battle and sent one company forward to assist. They were soon followed by the remainder of the battalion. They suffered heavily from machine gun fire from the direction of the Hammerhead and the portion of the wood nearby that had not been attacked because the 13th Welsh had veered to the left. Lieutenant-Colonel P E Ricketts the commanding officer was twice wounded going down the slope, from the ridge. One bullet cut the femoral artery but he refused to be taken away and continued for some time to direct the attack although he could only do so lying down and was unable to see clearly what was happening.
A platoon of A Company led by Second-Lieutenant Cowie advanced on the right towards the Hammerhead where they gained a foothold, silencing a machine gun and taking several prisoners. Second-Lieutenant Cowie was killed during the attack. Lieutenant Edwardes, too, captured two machine guns on separate occasions before being wounded. The remainder of the battalion entered the wood where it met up with elements of the 13th and 14th Welsh. The units in the wood were very mixed up and the situation was not helped by the British artillery barrage which was falling short. This was mainly due to their low trajectory causing shells to detonate on impact with the trees.
Meanwhile on the extreme left the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers had appealed for support having seen nothing of the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers led by Captain Glynn-Jones. All communications with 113th Brigade Headquarters had been cut so the 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers moved to the attack before any orders had been given by brigade, but they too saw nothing of the 14th Battalion. Strip Trench was successfully bombed though heavy casualties were taken including the bombing officer of the 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Second-Lieutenant Rees who was killed but both battalions made progress through the wood and the 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers made contact with the 6th Dorsets in Wood Trench. Following close behind the 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers two companies of the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers were moved from Danzig Alley to the Queen’s Nullah and later entered the wood. Thus, all four battalions of 113 Brigade were now committed to the attack.
The 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers were still sheltering by the railway line and they saw the reinforcements of the 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers enter Strip Trench. At about the same time some Germans came out of the wood with their hands up and a white flag was shown near the entrance to the main ride. They thought it might be a trick but allowed them to approach and then went forward to meet them. Glynn-Jones then sent a patrol forward to the wood. The rest of the battalion entered it at the entrance to the central ride running northwards and pushed ahead.
With representatives of seven battalions in the wood it was very congested. The troops however formed themselves into patrols and set about clearing the wood advancing quickly beyond the first objective. Units of the 13th and 14th Welsh outran the British barrage and at 4.50am Colonel Hayes commanding the 14th Welsh sent a message asking for the guns to lift. Another message was sent by Major Bond with the 13th Welsh at 5.10am stating that they were ‘through the wood’. Colonel Hayes request was refused and all units were ordered to fall back. Many casualties occurred, due to British shell fire, including Major Bond who was killed. Major Edwardes was also killed and command passed to Captain Johnson who had only eight other officers left in his battalion. Later this was reduced to seven when Second-Lieutenant Purdie and Second-Lieutenant Crossman went out on patrol in the wood and Second-Lieutenant Crossman returned to give the news that Second-Lieutenant Purdie was dead.
German gun abandoned in Mametz wood. The breech block has been removed so as to render it useless to the British. TAYLOR LIBRARY
Looking towards the hollow where under shelter of the railway embankment, Captain Glynn Jones reorganised the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers and attended to the wounded.
D Davies, 13th Welsh killed 10 July, age 30, no known grave.
Charles Mew 14th Welsh wounded in Mametz Wood, 10 July 1916.
Bevan Brothers 14th Welsh.
Map 14. The position at 4.30am – 5.00am 10 July.
Having been refused permission to press on Colonel Hayes began the task of organising the mass of troops at the first objective. Five commanders of the seven battalions involved had been killed or seriously wounded. He had help from Lieutenant-Colonel Bell the only other surviving battalion commander who instructed Captain Glynn-Jones to dig in to the rear of the line of the first objective on the right flank of the 6th Dorsets in Wood Trench.
The units of the three Royal Welsh Fusiliers battalions were concentrated on the western side of the wood facing Wood Support Trench on their left flank. In the centre the ground was held by the 14th Welsh and the right flank nearest the Hammerhead was held by the 10th and 13th Welsh – where German machine gunners still held out. The wait to advance was a nervous one. In addition to the German barrage snipers and machine guns were active from both flanks. When it came at 6.15am the British artillery barrage opened up and the troops moved forward. On the left the battalions of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers were attacked from Wood Support Trench and Quadrangle Alley.
Progress was very slow and disorganised and it was extremely difficult to find directions among the thick undergrowth and fallen trees. It was sometimes impossible to see more than a few yards forward and becoming totally disorientated some troops fired in the wrong direction on their own men at the slightest movement.
Private David Jones 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers author of In Parenthesis
Private David Jones who was in the 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers was another participant in the battle who, like Captain Wyn Griffith was to become a writer of some distinction after the war. His book In Parenthesis tells of his experiences in the war, the last part of his ordeal in Mametz Wood.
Sergeant T J Price 13th Welsh, wounded and lay out in the open for 36 hours before being found alive.
He was part of the congestion in the wood and describes the confusion thus:
‘But which is front, which way’s the way on and where’s the corporal and what’s this crush and all this shoving you along, and someone shouting rhetorically about remembering your nationality – and Jesus Christ – they ‘re coming through the floor, endthwart and overlong:
Jerry’s through on the flank … and: Beat it! – that’s what that one said as he ran past:
Bosches back in Strip Trench – its a monumental bollocks every time and but we avoid wisely there is but death’
Major d’Arcy Edwardes, Dragoon Guards attached Welsh Regiment killed in Mametz Wood.
Major C E Bond, 13th Welsh Regiment came out of retirement and was gazetted in June 1915. KiA.
Many confusing and conflicting reports had been received by Brigadier-General L A E Price-Davies at 113 Brigade Headquarters. Telephone wires had been cut and many runners were casualties from the German counter barrage. Messages that got through asked for reinforcements and Lieutenant-Colonel O S Flower commanding the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers was sent forward with the remaining two companies of the battalion. Price-Davies also sent staff officers for news, but with little result. He decided to go himself and set off with another officer. While making his way up Strip Trench he encountered a group of men, he was later to describe as ‘running back in panic’ and the troops in very unsteady condition with very few officers. The reinforcements of the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers also became mixed up in the concentration of troops at the first objective.
Map 15. The position at 6.15am 10 July.
Major P Anthony fought in South Africa, Queen’s Medal with five Clasps. His family published the Hereford Times.
Over on the extreme right the 13th Welsh were attempting to push forward and consolidate the Hammerhead. They sent a message to 114 Brigade Headquarters in Pommiers Redoubt asking for reinforcements. Brigadier-General T O Marden commanding the brigade sent in the 15th Welsh under the command of Major P Anthony at about 7.00am. During the advance they were met by machine gun fire but managed to get through the enemy barrage as well with few casualties. Once in the wood they pushed on meeting little opposition except for a sniper and about twenty five Germans. By 7.45am they had established themselves on the eastern edge of the Hammerhead and sent two platoons of B company to establish contact with the 13th Welsh. At 8.05am when contact had still not been made, a further platoon from A Company was sent forward. Almost immediately it was noticed that the Germans were massing in the road below Flat Iron Copse for a counter attack. In addition to this a patrol of Germans with a machine gun had entered the northern edge of the Hammerhead, got through the gap between the battalion and the 10th Welsh, before the platoon from A Company had arrived and got in behind the platoons of B Company who were annihilated. Only four men eventually returned. The battalion were also enfiladed by fire on the right flank from the Germans now in the road along the eastern edge of the Hammerhead. Major Anthony was killed by a sniper and the 15th Welsh had to fall back in stages to the southern edge of the Hammerhead and dig in. Two platoons of men from C and D Companies bravely, under the command of Lieutenant J Evans, held on in the Hammerhead under intense pressure and were the last to retire. Further casualties were taken from machine gun and sniper fire including four more officers. The Germans continued to attack the eastern edge of the wood from the road where the British machine guns situated in Marlborough Copse and Caterpillar Wood were unable to direct fire on them. Contact was finally made with the 13th Welsh on the left at 9.30am.
Map 16. German patrol 8.00am 10 July.
The road where the Germans massed to counter attack the eastern edge of the ‘Hammerhead’. Flat Iron Copse Cemetery in the distance.
17th Division Support
On the western edge of the wood after the failure of the bayonet attack at night the 17th Division were instructed to co-operate with the attack on Mametz Wood. Further attacks on Quadrangle Alley and Quadrangle Support were to be made and patrols pushed forward to occupy the western edge of Mametz Wood. Major King prepared to attack Quadrangle Alley and the right-hand end of Quadrangle Support and sent his men forward at 9.00am.
In the German held trench Lieutenant Köstlin was waiting:
‘During the morning’, recorded Lieutenant Köstlin, ‘The British made further effort to reach our trench by the sap (Quadrangle Alley) that came within 20 yards of our own left. My sentries, however, noticed steel helmets moving about above ground level at the sap head (trench block) and kept it under careful watch. Each time the men began to climb up out of the sap head and run forward at us with bombs, the sentries gave the alarm and we were able to greet them with heavy fire at point blank range. Then the others crowded at the sap head and repeated the effort, but with equal failure and by midday a heap of British dead and wounded lay about the sap head. Each time they had been checked, one of my men in particular ran forward across the open and threw bombs into the sap head and returned unhurt. The last time however, about midday he was shot before he could get back.’
Map 17. Lieutenant Gales’ attack on the German ‘block’ 10 July.
The position as described by Lieutenant Köstlin in Quadrangle Support Trench. Note how the trench lay conveniently behind the crest of a ridge. On the Left just forward of the bushes in the rough ground was the infamous ‘block’. Further to the left and beyond is Quadrangle Wood. In this small area many brave British attackers perished. See Map 17
German belt buckle found in 1990 on the site of the battle. Gott Mit Uns (God with us).
The attack by C company of the 7th East Yorks on the trench ‘block’ and junction was led by Lieutenant Gale, who reported every time an attempt was made to swarm across the ‘block’ the men were easily shot down. Major King seeing no progress by the 38th Division in the wood decided to suspend operations temporarily and await events from that direction.
Back with the 38th Division
Soon after 9.00am reports had come in that the Germans were reinforcing the northern end of the wood from the German main position in front of Bazentin Wood. A bombardment was organised to attempt to prevent this from continuing but being limited to only fifteen minutes was ineffective. At 10.30am Brigadier-General Marden put Lieutenant-Colonel Hayes in command of all troops of 114 Brigade on the right hand side of the wood with orders to push ahead to the second objective.
Because of overcrowding in the wood the 15th and 16th Royal Welsh Fusiliers were withdrawn. Also withdrawn from the wood was the remnants of the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers who were told to return to the railway cutting. They spent the time assisting the many wounded by giving water and first aid as best they could with many calling for help. Captain Glynn Jones recalled his sorrow and that “the circumstances were too tragic for description to one who had a share in the enlistment of and training of these men and who, in many cases, knew their people at home.”
At 2.00pm an advance was made by 114 Brigade and the diary of the 10th Welsh records:
‘At 2.00pmf the 10th had orders to advance to the 2nd objective which was done in 2 files of 2 companies each.
One file was strongly opposed by machine gun fire and sniping and returned to the trench to reorganise. This file again advanced after about 20 minutes and went through to the second objective.’
On the left, intense fire from Wood Support had still prevented any progress of the 113th Brigade now commanded by Brigadier-General Price-Davies and orders were sent from Major-General Watts at 38th Division Headquarters to try and work round to the trench and move forward without its capture. Price-Davies actually had a telephone that worked but could not make himself heard above the noise of battle.
Map 18. The afternoon attack on the second objective 10 July.
Major-General Watts then decided to commit the 115th Brigade to the attack and two companies of the 10th South Wales Borderers and the 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers moved forward to reinforce the 114th and the 113th Brigades respectively. The orders of the 10th South Wales Borderers given to them by Brigadier-General Marden at Brigade Headquarters were to go straight in and ‘sweep through the wood’ attacking the southern edge of the Hammerhead and clear it to the northern edge. A preliminary bombardment for half an hour was launched at 2,00pm and the attack got under way at 2.35pm. After only ten minutes though Colonel Hayes saw the officer commanding the 10th South Wales Borderers, Lieutenant-Colonel Harvey and told him to halt the attack and that a resumption would be made at 4.00pm.
The 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers, the commanding officer Lieutenant-Colonel J A Ballard already a casualty, likewise, on the left at the lifting of the barrage attacked at approximately 2.30pm and fought their way forward with magnificent spirit as far as the second objective where they arrived at 3.50pm. Meanwhile Brigadier-General Marden went over to the wood from Brigade Headquarters and found that Brigadier-General Price-Davies and Lieutenant-Colonel H E ap Rhys-Price who had come from 38th Division Headquarters were arranging another assault at 4.30pm and to this he gave his support. Prior to this advance Price-Davies also made arrangements for the capture of Wood Support Trench bombers of the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers were to make the initial advance.
Private H T Jenkins, 17 th Royal Welsh Fusiliers killed in action 11 July 1916. A bullet passed through his New Testament. His remains were lost and he is commerated on the Thiepval Memorial to the Missing of the Somme.
With the 17th Division
Back on the western side of the wood Lieutenant Köstlin was still established in Quadrangle Support Trench. He was no longer bothered by the British machine gun of the 8th South Staffs to his rear in Acid Drop Copse. That had been taken care of by a British shell which had landed directly on it killing all of the crew outright. He was able to concentrate on events in Mametz Wood and was surprised to see men of his regiment retiring from Wood Support Trench.
‘I looked through my glasses. I looked again, it was incredible. But there he was, an Englishman in khaki and steel helmet, standing bolt upright, regardless of cover as usual, near a long bare tree trunk. Looking more carefully, I saw others among the trees nearby. They must have broken through and come past our left flank under cover of the trees in the bed of the valley, and that explained the sudden withdrawal of the 5th and 9th Coys. I ordered fire to be opened on the patrol at the wood edge, and the men moved away into the cover. It did not alter the fact however, that Mametz Wood was now probably in British possession, threatening our line of retreat to Bazentin.’
Dear Mrs Robinson
I hope you will forgive me for being so long in writing to you to offer my sincere sympathy. As you know Sam and I were deeply attached to each other and your loss is also my loss for I have lost a brave and good hearted chum. I do not know what to say to you as it all seems so strange. We were together just before we started on the charge but we soon got separated owing to the dense brushwood and broken branches. I thought no more, for it was every man for himself and then I saw J Roberts, the dark man who was with us. I said ‘Hello Jack, hot isn’t it’. He replied, ‘Yes Sam has been killed’. I did not know what to think for it never entered my head that either of us would go under but we had no time to talk as the Germans were playing hell. So on we went and I paid them in full for I threw some bombs amongst them and then I got knocked out myself. I have been very lucky indeed and I only wish that Sam could have come through alright. He was a brave chap and one of the best and I shall always remember him. I must now close asking you to be brave and true and although you are denied the meeting on this earth yet remember that God ordained that all people shall meet in the Great Unknown. I am writing to some of the lads to know where he was buried and I will let you know.
Private Sam Robinson, 17th Battalion RWF killed at Mametz Wood 10 July.
Lieutenant Köstlin had fired on a forward patrol of the 6th Dorsets led by Lieutenant Clarke moving up the strip of woodland in the valley towards Wood Support Trench. After this action Lieutenant Clarke was listed as wounded and missing. Also watching these developments was Major King of the 7th East Yorks. He too saw German troops retreating from the western fringe of the wood and also British troops behind Wood Support Trench on the edge of the wood. He immediately fired on the fleeing Germans and convinced the enemy was in retreat launched his second attack of the day, having received information that a bombing attack was to be made on the eastern end of Wood Support by the 38th Division. He had organised two platoons to be led by Lieutenant Cracroft to assault the junction by leaving Quadrangle Alley before the ‘block’ and rushing the trench over the open. Meanwhile Captain Heathcock would lead his men up the valley and to the western end of Wood Support with the south-west corner of Mametz Wood as the final objective.
Map 19. Attempts by 17th Division to reach the south-west corner of Mametz Wood 10 July.
Above: Lieutenant R B Cracroft
The Germans had re-occupied Acid Drop Copse by now and as Lieutenant Cracroft charged the trench with his men he was met not only with fire from Lieutenant Köstlin’s defenders but machine gun fire from the copse. Captain Heathcock advancing in extended order of two lines, came under machine gun fire from the western end of Wood Support and another at the south-west corner of Mametz Wood. Both attacks failed and both officers were killed, Captain Heathcock just as he reached the line of trees in the valley.
Lieutenant Köstlin recorded the attack led by Lieutenant Cracroft:
‘Our ammunition was getting short, and we scraped together all we could find in the trench and the dug outs from the dead and wounded. Shortly afterwards a line of skirmishers suddenly appeared from a fold in the ground near the line of tall trees in the valley and advanced against the left of our trench. We were only just in time to stop them, the first extended line being shot down within a few yards of us. Already the second line was moving forward, and this was dealt with in the same way.
Fortunately, our old enemy in the sap had remained quiet after the lesson we had given him in the morning, an attack from there at this moment might well have been fatal for us.’
The view today from the position of Quadrangle Support Trench, Lieutenant Köstlin would have had of the line of trees, the clearing and Mametz Wood beyond.
Lieutenant-Colonel Oswald S Flower, killed at Mametz Wood.
Lieutenant Köstlin did not realise that this attack was indeed made by his ‘old enemy’ the 7th East Yorks.
Major King seeing that there was no co-operation on his right called off his attack not feeling justified in sending in any more men. In his report he was clearly disappointed although he could not have | been aware of the situation in the wood and the crisis caused by the loss of so many officers, he reported:
‘Although all those British troops were in rear and right flank of the position and the enemy were clearly retiring, no attempt was made by them to co-operate with us, and I must state that I am convinced Wood Support could easily have been taken by them at that time while we were occupying the whole attention of the enemy by our attack.’
PART 2
The 38th Division Attacks Again
At 4.00pm the troops of the 38th Division had been reorganised and the advance through the wood was ready to commence.
The battalions leading the attack were as follows:
On the right the 10th South Wales Borderers were to attack the eastern portion of the wood and clear that portion of the Hammerhead not already in their possession. On their left was the 15th Welsh and continuing on their left was the 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers. While on the extreme left were the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers whose bombers had been busy attacking the eastern end of Wood Support Trench. About fifty prisoners were taken and it was thought that the trench had been captured. However, this was not the case and considerable resistance was encountered at the western end before it finally fell to the attack of the 6th Dorsets much later in the evening. In close support behind these battalions were the 13th and 14th Welsh who were to advance up the central ride. All other battalions were held in reserve.
At 4.30pm the advance commenced from the second crossride; there was little opposition and progress was made by all battalions. On the right the 10 South Wales Borderers attacked the Hammerhead. In the centre the 15th Welsh and the 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers also made an advance. On the left the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers still engaged at Wood Support Trench were left behind. The battalion had earlier lost its commanding officer and adjutant, both wounded by a British shell, and was now under the command of Captain Hardwick but shortly after 5.30pm made contact with the other attacking battalions. At about that time the commanding officer of the 13th Royal Welsh Fusiliers Lieutenant-Colonel Flower was severely wounded. He had worked tirelessly throughout to the point of exhaustion, even falling down and getting up again, determined to continue and refusing to retire. The damage was done by a British shell in a flat trajectory that hit the top of the trees under which he was resting with his men just north of the intersection of the second crossride with the main ride.
The valley along which Captain Heathcock attacked. He was killed just in front of the large clump of trees on the left. Mametz Wood on the right was protected by Wood trench and Wood Support Trench.
Private H E Evans, 10th South Wales Borderers was wounded in Mametz Wood and evacuated to England.
While in hospital he was presented with the Military Medal for actions on 29 April 1916. He was killed in Salonika in 1918.
The advance to the Northern perimeter of the wood continued; at about 6.30pm it reached within about forty yards of that objective when the attacking battalions came under heavy rifle and machine gun fire from Middle Alley a trench leading from the northern edge of the wood. During the confusion during which men retired under the fire Lewis gun crews of 113 Brigade Machine Gun Corps which had accompanied the attacking battalions were also caught up in the scramble. Second-Lieutenant Cullen though remained at his post with his gun and was cut off for some time. Before he could get back he was shot by his colleagues who advancing again mistook him in his isolated position for the enemy. In the advance, efforts to counter attack Middle Alley by the 14th Welsh and the 17th Royal Welsh Fusiliers were held up by thick undergrowth and they failed to get through in sufficient numbers although a bombing party led by Lieutenant Strange and Lieutenant Yorke made a determined effort to drive the Germans back down the trench and Lieutenant Rosser jumped out of the trench to try and throw bombs more effectively but was shot down. The troops were then all withdrawn to a line that varied in distance between 200 and 300 yards from the northern edge where digging in commenced.
In the rear the 13th Welsh sent forward their officers and a hundred men to assist with the consolidation. One of the officers was Second-Lieutenant Crossman who had earlier gone out on a patrol with Second-Lieutenant Purdie. Only when they arrived at the entrenching position was it realised that Second-Lieutenant Crossman was missing and a search failed to locate him.
A further attack was proposed at 8.00pm but by then the troops were exhausted and short of water and this was abandoned. The men were very nervy and the slightest noise or disturbance brought a response of wild firing well into the early hours of 11 July. If the troops of the 38th Division were exhausted and short of water, unknown to them at that time the Germans too were in a sorry plight. Communication had been badly disrupted and no clear picture of the situation was available to any of the German commanders. In addition to taking heavy casualties over four hundred men had been captured and the only defenders left were one hundred and forty men.
Second Lieutenant G D M Crossman
Map 20. The attack from the second cross ride 4.30pm 10 July.
That evening, having visited Lieutenant-General Horne at Heilly, Sir Douglas Haig was pleased with the news of the days events in Mametz Wood and no doubt, felt justified in his choice of Major-General Watts to command the 38th Division.
PART 3
A Last Effort by the 17th Division
Major King was still in Quadrangle Alley with the 7th East Yorks and at 6.45pm again seeing British troops at the back of Wood Support Trench ordered one more attack in an attempt to reach his objective at the south-west corner of Mametz Wood. Another assault was to be made on the western end of Wood Support and in addition half of B Company was sent forward up the valley towards the south-western corner of the wood. This was led by Lieutenant Goodwin who came under fire from two machine guns in Acid Drop Copse and another at the end of Wood Support Trench which his attacking colleagues could not dislodge.
Unknown to Major King ten minutes before he attacked a message had been received at 17th Division Headquarters that the Germans had been seen withdrawing from Quadrangle Support Trench. Some Germans were, indeed, withdrawing, but had left the strong points and machine gun positions manned.
Lieutenant Köstlin remained in Quadrangle Support Trench in spite of the flight of some of the German troops and easily repelled the attack led by Lieutenant Goodwin.
His report goes on:
‘But the surprises of the day were not at an end. Whilst searching with my glasses, there suddenly appeared in the big open clearing in Mam. Wood – across which was Wood Support Trench, lines of skirmishers who advanced across the open directly against Wood Support. From that trench came no sound, it seemed that both the 5th and 9th Coys had vanished into space. Nevertheless from our trench the advancing lines offered an excellent target, as we were in a position to enfilade them at a range of 600 yards. I scarcely needed to give the order. My men had already seen the target, and a rapid fire opened almost at once. Every rifle was at work, the officers picking up rifles and joining in, until soon all the rifle barrels were red hot. Not a single Englishman seemed to reach Wood Support Trench, and a large no. lay dead and wounded about the open clearing….. From the firing in the wood it was evident that we had only held up the left flank guard of the main force advancing through the wood itself.’
Lieutenant Köstlin had witnessed an attack on Wood Support Trench by the 6th Dorsets. It will be recalled that under the command of Major Hughes-Onslow the Dorsets had occupied Wood Trench and had held it since the evening of 8 July. At 11.00am on 10 July they had lost their acting commanding officer when he was killed by a stray bullet. Captain O’Hanlon took over and later that evening made one more assault on the strongly defended western end of the trench.
The German officer was mistaken in thinking that none of the 6th Dorsets reached their objective. The assault was led by Lieutenant Davidson who took the same route as the patrol fired on earlier by Lieutenant Köstlin, along the valley and up to the western edge of Wood Support Trench. While many men fell in front of Wood Support Lieutenant Davidson and some men entered the trench and captured the strongly fortified ‘block’ and then fought down the trench towards the wood. Lieutenant Davidson was twice wounded but was eventually evacuated. A report was received at 10.55pm at 17th Division Headquarters that Wood Support Trench had been finally occupied.
News had also been received of the capture of Contalmaison by the 23rd Division and orders were issued for the 10th Sherwood Foresters who had relieved the 8th South Staffordshires in Quadrangle Trench to attack Quadrangle Support Trench, together with the 7th Lincolns supported by the 8th South Staffordshires. Lieutenant-Colonel Bunbury commanding the Sherwood Foresters after consulting the 7th Lincolns ordered the attack to commence at 9.45pm. After a bombardment the battle patrols and Lewis gun crews advanced and attacked under a heavy enemy counter barrage. The trench was occupied. On the right the 7th Green Howards relieving the exhausted 7th East Yorks later pushed patrols up Quadrangle Alley to the ‘block’ and the junction of Quadrangle Support. The only occupants of the trench were two wounded Northumberland Fusiliers in the company of some wounded Germans in a deep dugout. Lieutenant Köstlin and the remnants of his defending companies had slipped away under cover of their machine guns once they realised that the 38th Division were making progress on their left and Contalmaison had fallen on the right.
Major D Hughes-Onslow
The ground behind our trench was being continually shelled but about midnight the fire ceased and we decided to rush for it. The plan worked successfully and although a number of men were wounded by shells and stray bullets we succeeded, a total of five officers and 120 men, in reaching the barbed wire entanglements in front of the second line position at 1.30am. Here we were greeted by a machine gun which suddenly opened from the trench, but throwing ourselves on the ground and shouting we soon convinced the gunner of his error and luckily with no cost to ourselves.’
Lieutenant G C Davidson
The last recorded casualty of the 17th Division was Lieutenant Kimber of the 7th Lincolns who together with Lieutenant Barrett, it will be recalled, successfully led the first battle patrols of their battalion into Fricourt village on the 2 July. Lieutenant Kimber was killed by shellfire when the 6th Lincolns advanced. His colleague, Lieutenant Barrett had been wounded on the 3 July in the attack on Railway Alley and died the following day. The 17th Division had been due to be relieved by the 21st Division on the night of the 10/11 July and this duly took place.
Major-General Pilcher at least had the satisfaction of seeing his men in occupation of Quadrangle Support Trench, even if it was at such a cost. In the period from 1 July to 11 July the Division lost 197 officers and 4,574 other ranks (91 officers and 1,634 other ranks killed or missing). Only part of 50 Brigade had attacked on the 1 July and although the 10th West Yorks suffered the highest number of casualties by any battalion on that day with (710 of which 396 were killed) the great majority of the Division’s casualties were, therefore, incurred in the push towards Quadrangle Support Trench between 2–10 July.
A message was sent at 7.45am on the 11 July from XV Corps Headquarters to 17th Division Headquarters requesting Major-General Pilcher to go to Heilly to see Lieutenant-General Horne as soon as he had finished handing over to the 21st Division. Later that day Pilcher’s military career was effectively over when he was relieved of his command.
On 13 July a special order was issued to the 17th Division which stated:
‘On giving up command of the 17th Division Major-General T D Pilcher wishes to thank all ranks for the invariable support they have given him and for the magnificent work which they have always done.
He wishes the Division every good fortune and hopes it will add laurels to the fame it has already gained.’
It was rather a sad end for a soldier who had a long and creditable career in the service of his country.