Chapter Five
8 July
Before dawn the three battalions who had unsuccessfully attacked the previous evening, the 10th Sherwood Foresters, the 7th East Yorks and the 6th Dorsets were relieved. Taking their place was the 7th Borders on the left and replacing the two battalions in the centre and on the right was the 7th Green Howards.
XV Corps issued orders for another bombing assault on Quadrangle Support Trench. This would be the fourth attempt and instead of a frontal assault over the open it was planned to attack along the trenches at each end. On the left the 7th Borders would attack from where it joined Pearl Alley and the 7th Green Howards attack from the right hand end by bombing up Quadrangle Alley. The idea was to meet up in the middle.
At 7.00am the attack was delivered. The 7th Borders pushed forward up Pearl Alley and bombed up as far as the Cemetery but could not reach the junction of that trench with Quadrangle Support Trench. The trenches were over the knees in mud and in places flooded up to the waist in water. The mud was very impeding and stuck like glue. Eventually they reached the junction but were then bombarded by German artillery. If that was not enough they then found themselves facing the German counter-attack from both sides. Once again the assault had been unsupported and the 7th Borders were fired on from Contalmaison on the left flank as well as Quadrangle Support on their right.
Similarly on the left the 7th Green Howards found mud up to four feet deep in Quadrangle Alley and could progress no further than 100 yards up the alley where the ground was swept by heavy machine fire from both sides, Attempts to break through continued for five hours until by 12.00 noon it was apparent no further progress could be expected.
In the afternoon the 17th Division were asked for the fifth time to attempt to capture Quadrangle Support Trench once again by bombing attacks. This was intended to coincide with an attack by the 23rd Division on the village of Contalmaison, which would have meant that the 7th Borders would not be exposed on their left flank. This information, however, proved erroneous as no such attack was planned. Nevertheless they were ordered to press on. The artillery bombardment preceded the attack which commenced at 5.50pm. The 7th Borders and 7th Green Howards went forward again, reinforced by bombers of other battalions. First reports indicated that the 7th Borders had penetrated into Quadrangle Support Trench but news of progress was very slow in coming and very vague. The 7th Green Howards again failed to make progress past the strong point in Quadrangle Alley but on the right the 6th Dorsets attacking later at 8.50pm met with some success under the command of Major D Hughes-Onslow. A bombing squad led by Lance Corporal Routliffe assembled in the eastern end of Quadrangle Trench and rushing across the railway line in the valley got into the end of Wood Trench, following the route taken by Siegfried Sassoon. They bombed their way westwards up the trench and were able to establish a ‘stop’ within fifty yards of Mametz Wood. They were followed by a battle patrol led by Second-Lieutenant Moss and Private Hicks, who consolidated the trench some five hours before the appointed time and captured a large quantity of arms and ammunition. A trench of five feet in depth was then dug and connected Wood Trench with Quadrangle Trench. The whole operation had been coordinated by Captain O’Hanlon who subsequently held the trench against several German counter attacks. This advance had been planned as a preliminary attack to support and link with the 38th Division who were due to attack the southern end of Mametz Wood at 2.00am.
Map 11. The bombers’ assault on Quadrangle Support Trench 8 July.
On the eastern side of the wood the 38th Division were struggling to reconcile the orders of XV Corps who had indicated that they required the attack on the previous evening of the 15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers on Strip Trench to be ‘supported and developed’. The 38th Division asked for clarification. Up to that point all orders from XV Corps had been long, detailed and at times complex to the point, as we have seen of being confusing. Their reply marked a departure from that policy and their rather terse response was that the raid was to be made on something like a company front and that the ‘place must be chosen by the commander of 113 Brigade now holding the line, who should carry out the raid and fix the exact point. Neither, Corps nor Division not being on the spot could fix this’. Accordingly orders were drawn up but it was proposed to attack with the whole battalion of the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers
A message was sent at 9.05pm from 38th Division to XV Corps which stated:
‘113 BDE (15th Royal Welsh Fusiliers) made a bombing attack yesterday evening up Strip Trench but was driven back.
The 113 BDE now preparing to make an attack up Strip Trench with one battalion. Hour of attack not yet settled.’
In reply at 10.35am Lieutenant-General Horne himself telephoned Major General Phillips and told him again he did not want a complete battalion attack by the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers which would be isolated at the southern end of the wood that and that he was on his way to see him at 38th Divisional Headquarters.
It is not difficult to judge Lieutenant-General Horne’s demeanour as he made the journey from Heilly to see Major General Phillips at Grovetown and evidence of this can be drawn from the fact that the copy of the telephoned message sent to 38th Division which was to be kept in the file at XV Corps Headquarters was heavily endorsed in bold handwriting – possibly by Horne himself – ‘Told to stop this attack’ and ‘Keep carefully.’
Whatever was said at the meeting between Horne and Phillips the end result was that the proposed attack on Strip Trench by the 38th Division was postponed and rescheduled to take place on the night of 8/9 July.
Later that afternoon XV Corps issued the orders as discussed between Horne and Phillips which the division fixed to take place at 2.00am on the 8 July. What occurred in the time between the order being issued to 38th Division Headquarters and the orders being received by the officer responsible for launching the attack is not clear. Lieutenant-Colonel G H Gwyther, commanding the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers was still unaware he was not to attack with his whole battalion and wrote later that he was very surprised to learn, only late in the evening of the 8 July, that the attack was not to be undertaken by a battalion but on a much smaller scale than he originally thought, by only one platoon and he had to reorganise at the last moment. Lieutenant Colonel Gwyther continues:
‘The party started off down the communication trench leading to the front line and our starting place in good time under normal conditions; as however the communication trench was full of other troops of our brigade, progress was so slow that I attempted to get to the position overground, but found that our advance was so impeded by barbed wire and other obstacles that I considered it advisable to resort to the communication trench again, and the result was that the party arrived very late at the point from which the attack was to be made. Daylight was commencing, the element of surprise was problematical and I therefore decided not to risk men’s lives unnecessarily and reported the situation to Brigade Headquarters.’
9 July
As dawn broke on Sunday 9 July a message was sent from 38th Divisional Headquarters to XV Corps which was received at 4.10am giving news of the failure of the 14th Royal Welsh Fusiliers to make their attack.
The performance of both the 38th Division and the 17th Division had already come under scrutiny and been questioned by Sir Douglas Haig himself and he had recorded in his diary that Lieutenant General Horne was enquiring into General Phillips’ conduct as Divisional Commander. Under pressure from Haig and following his visit to see Phillips on the afternoon of 8 July, Horne was compelled to act. At 6.30am he ordered an investigation into why the attack failed.
It seems, though, whatever the investigation revealed, Phillips’ fate was already decided. Ten minutes later the following order was sent to 38th Divisional Headquarters:
‘6.40am Corps Commander desires to see Major-General Phillips at Corps Headquarters at once.’
Thick tangled undergrowth of Mametz Wood. TAYLOR LIBRARY
It could not have been a comfortable journey to Heilly for Major-General Phillips, a man of some status and influence as a Member of Parliament and he may not have been well prepared to receive his dismissal and orders to return to England. The precise time of his departure is not recorded but it is likely that having had his orders to come ‘at once’ he had departed by the time Major-General A A Montgomery telephoned from Fourth Army Headquarters at 10.20am.
Major-General C G Blackader had already been summoned to XV Corps Headquarters to take over the 38th Division, but the Montgomery telephone call was to forestall that decision. Montgomery said that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Douglas Haig had intervened and suggested that Major-General Watts, currently commanding the 7th Division, should take over the 38th Division and ‘dispose of it as he wished.’
When Major-General Blackader arrived just fifteen minutes later he was told of the new arrangements and left to report to Fourth Army Headquarters. Major-General Watts arrived at 11.10am and was instructed to review the situation and make all arrangements to launch an attack in Mametz Wood which should be undertaken as soon as possible. Thus the flurry of activity and the arrivals and departures at Heilly mid-morning on the 9 July left Major-General Watts, as Haig’s choice, with the initiative, while Lieutenant-General Horne’s influence, for the time being at least, somewhat diminished.
Lieutenant-General Henry Horne Commander of XV Corps.
If the news on the morning of the 9 July at XV Corps Headquarters from the 38th Division had been, to say the least, disappointing, it was little better from the 17th Division. Although Wood Trench had been taken and held by the 6th Dorsets news of the failure of the fifth and most recent attack on Quadrangle Support Trench was not received well. As well as having to deal with the leadership crisis of the 38th Division the pressure was increasing to show some results from the efforts of the 17th Division to clear the Quadrangle. XV Corps with growing impatience urged the 17th Division on and in a telephoned message at 8.20am which had a flavour of desperation, threw plenty of advice at Major-General Pilcher but, strangely, there followed no detailed orders for an attack or an alternative idea on how to capture Quadrangle Support Trench. Pilcher was urged to use fresh troops to attack Quadrangle Support today, but the message continued ‘the plan must be yours … at an hour to be fixed by yourself … and get in the best way you can.’
Pilcher, we know, had been critical of some of the orders he had received and had not been slow to voice these criticisms and it is possible that Lieutenant-General Horne decided to concede and give Pilcher the opportunity to prove his point. We also know that General Rawlinson was impatient and was never convinced that the capture of Mametz Wood was a necessary precursor to the main assault planned on the Bazentin-Longueval front and he was drawing support from his commanders – including Horne – to convince Sir Douglas Haig of the validity of his plans. With Major-General Watts in firm control of the 38th Division, Horne, therefore, by also giving Major-General Pilcher some autonomy would neatly give himself some respite and find time to attend to the demands of General Rawlinson.
In another departure, XV Corps belatedly conceded that an unsupported attack by the 17th Division, a point argued by Major-General Pilcher, should be avoided if possible. Referring to a proposed attack by 23rd Division on Contalmaison on the left, Horne said he now thought the better battle plan would be to wait until that had been achieved but in a clear criticism of the way the battalions of the 17th Division had been deployed urged that, whatever, fresh troops should be used and said that ‘it is no use attacking two or three times with the same troops.’ In another concession the decision on the artillery bombardments were to be left to the discretion of the 17th Division. By now, instead of being the forerunner to a joint attack on Mametz Wood with the 38th Division, the capture of Quadrangle Support Trench in front of Pilchers’ troops had become a major objective itself.
The 7th Green Howards it will be recalled, had already made two unsuccessful attacks up Quadrangle Alley to break through the ‘block’ and capture the junction of the Alley and Quadrangle Support Trench. They were ordered again to make their third attempt, and the sixth overall to break through. The attack was timed to commence at 3.35 am on 9 July and was in isolation, no other attack being attempted from the right flank in Pearl Alley. 50 Brigade and 17th Divisional diaries both omit to record much detail of the attack except that it failed. The 7th Green Howards diary fails to make any reference at all.
On the extreme right the valiant efforts of the 7th Borders who had been subjected to heavy fire from both sides at the western end of Quadrangle Trench and up Pearl Alley were concluded when they were relieved by the 7th Lincolns. They too were ordered to hold on at all costs. During the morning of 9 July orders were received from Major-General Pilcher by the 7th Lincolns and the 7th Green Howards to make the seventh attack on Quadrangle Support.
It will be recalled that Pilcher had been told that he should cooperate with the 23rd Division, and avoid an isolated attack. He was also told that the attack on Contalmaison was to take place at midday. Accordingly, Pilcher timed his advance for 12.15pm. Preparations were made and additional Stokes mortar emplacements were constructed in Quadrangle Trench. The 7th Green Howards on the right in Quadrangle Alley were withdrawn and the ‘block’ in the Alley which had so far denied all attempts to cross it was bombarded with 6″ Howitzers in an attempt to break it up, prior to the assault. There was an artillery bombardment of one hour and fifteen minutes prior to the advance and once again the 7th Green Howards set off up Quadrangle Alley towards the ‘block’.
The Stokes mortar guns in Quadrangle Alley were unable to fire at all because of the soft and muddy ground which made them unstable. The 7th Green Howards found the mud very heavy and any attempt to make a rapid advance was impossible and quickly exhausted the men who were once more under fire from machine guns. The German machine gun positions noted from the previous attack had been subjected to bombardment and counter-fire from the British machine guns, but with plenty of options, especially on the right in Mametz Wood, the German crews simply moved to an alternative site and carried out their effective work. Any troops advancing slowly up the relatively shallow and badly damaged Quadrangle Alley trench were easy targets.
Germans under bombardment.
On the right flank, similarly, no progress was made by the 7th Lincolns who attempted to move up Pearl Alley and capture the junction of the Alley and Quadrangle Support Trench.
At 1.00pm one company of the 8th South Staffordshires was called up to reinforce the 7th Lincolns in Quadrangle Trench. With progress over the open in daylight impossible in the face of machine gun fire and progress through the trenches prevented by mud and strong points the seventh attempt to capture Quadrangle Support Trench was abandoned.
Major-General Pilcher could hardly have failed to notice that the promised assault on Contalmaison by the 23rd Division he had prepared his attack to coincide with had failed to take place and once again an isolated and piecemeal assault had ended in failure.
While all this was taking place, XV Corps despatched a message at 11.10am that stated that during the morning air reconnaissance was made of the 17th Divisional front. Lieutenant-General Horne expressed his opinion as to the reason for the want of success of the attacks of the previous night again taking the opportunity to criticise the deployment of the troops of the 17th Division.
At 2.00pm another message was sent to both 38th Division and the 17th Division stating that prisoners captured within the last twenty four hours had given information about German withdrawal and they had said that there would be little opposition to a concentrated attack in strength. The prisoners had said they were surprised that the British attacked in such small numbers ‘in twos and threes’ and XV Corps again urged the utmost determination and vigour.
These comments seem to overlook several things. Firstly, proposals to put in heavier attacks, especially by the 38th Division on the 7 July and also the failed attack on the night of 8/9 July had been overturned by XV Corps. Secondly, Major-General Pilcher’s opinion that the effect of machine guns and the likely failure of unsupported attacks on the Quadrangle were disregarded. The casualties were mounting and the ranks were thinning with some battalions of the 17th Division at less than half strength. The exceptionally heavy concentration of machine gun fire facing the attackers was reducing the numbers to such an extent that by the time the German positions were reached it would probably appear to the German defenders that the assault was made with only small numbers. Another factor to remember is that, even assuming the withdrawal they refer to took place prior to the night of 6 July this message was sent at 2.00pm on the 9 July and the information was somewhat out of date. Indeed, German reports later proved that encouraged by the ease with which they repulsed the attack of the 38th Division on the morning of 7 July the Germans had decided to reinforce Mametz Wood and the Quadrangle.
At 3.15pm yet another sternly worded message from XV Corps made no apology for the confusion over the intentions of the 23rd Division, which had intended no such action at all, but took the opportunity to emphasise Lieutenant-General Horne’s belief that the troops of the 17th Division had not been efficiently deployed and had not been determined enough in the face of the German machine guns.
Signallers in the cellars of Fricourt Chateau.
During the afternoon a conference was held at Fricourt Chateau with officers of 50 and 51 Brigades and staff of the 17th Division Headquarters to plan the capture of Quadrangle Support Trench.
Similarly at Grovetown some five miles away Major-General Watts at 38th Divisional Head-quarters was engaged in preparing a battle plan that would finally ensure the capture of Mametz Wood. Watts decided to throw the greater weight of the 38th Division against Mametz Wood, but this time the attack was to be on the southern portion of the Wood. Sir Douglas Haig was still insistent on the Wood being in British hands before the planned main assault and during the same afternoon had travelled to Heilly and visited Lieutenant-General Horne. Horne, under such direct pressure sent a message to the 38th Division saying that the ‘Commander-in-Chief had visited the Corps Commander and impressed upon him the great importance of the occupation of Mametz Wood.
10 July
The first attack to take place on the night of 9/10 July was to be launched by the 17th Division at 11.20pm. No consideration appears to have been given co-ordinating the efforts of the two divisions and the attack of the 38th Division was timed to commence at 4.00am. Dealing first then, with the 17th Division, at the suggestion of XV Corps Major-General Pilcher devised a surprise night frontal attack, over the open with the intention of taking Quadrangle Support Trench by the bayonet.
As a preliminary to the assault orders were given to the 7th Lincolns to attack Pearl Alley initially and capture the junction of Pearl Alley and Quadrangle Support Trench and so safeguard the left flank of the 8th South Staffordshires who were to make the main attack.
The main attack was to be delivered over the open on the front of Quadrangle Support Trench. The 8th South Staffordshires would take the major part of the trench (350 yards) on the left while the 7th Green Howards would capture the block in Quadrangle Alley and 50 yards of Quadrangle Support on the right. The portion of the trench left between these two points was then to be cleared during the remainder of the night.
Before looking at what happened during the attack it is interesting to see how the Germans had been able hold out particularly in Quadrangle Support Trench against repeated artillery bombardment, bombing and infantry attacks.
The reports that the trench was lightly held may well have been accurate but as we have seen it was situated in open country sandwiched between Contalmaison and Mametz Wood from which heavy machine gun fire from both positions could be directed across its front. At each flank a communication trench connected it to the rear (Pearl Alley and Quadrangle Alley) and these had also originally provided access forward to Quadrangle Trench. It was therefore possible to re-inforce Quadrangle Support at either end as long as the two junctions held out and with a frontal attack as the British discovered, an impossibility even by night because of enfilading machine gun fire from both flanks, the trench could be held by concentrating on the defence of the junctions.
The trench was held by the 11th Company of the 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment commanded by Lieutenant Irion. He had constructed a large ‘block’ near the junction of the trench with Pearl Alley with sandbags and it was protected by a machine gun. As a communication trench Pearl Alley was fairly straight and provided limited cover and protection for any troops advancing up it. On the other flank as we know a ‘block’ some twenty yards from the junction with Quadrangle Support had provided very adequate protection for the German troops defending the junction. On the higher ground behind the trench, machine guns were able to provide additional frontal fire over the top of the trench from Acid Drop Copse.
Map 12. The Bayonet attack on Quadrangle Support Trench 10 July.
At 4.50pm the battalion bombers of the 7th Lincolns led the preliminary attack supported by one company of infantry with orders to clear Pearl Alley. The 7th Lincolns again found the going equally as hard. In Pearl Alley the mud was just as deep and clinging and inhibited every attempt to get forward. Lieutenant Jones who led the assault with the bombers sent a message back at 7.45pm reporting that because of the conditions it was even impossible to stand securely to throw grenades with any effect, at all, and the battalion returned to Quadrangle Trench.
Lieutenant-Colonel W A J Barker commanding the 8th South Staffordshires had made meticulous preparations during the evening for the main assault. He reconnoitred the ground with his company commanders and detailed B and D Companies to lead the attack in three waves. A Company was to be in reserve and C to remain in Quadrangle Trench. Orders were issued for complete silence and all accessories to equipment removed. Bayonets were to be covered in mud in case the moon glinted on them. Battalion bombers were not only to accompany the infantry but also detailed to assist the 7th Lincolns in Pearl Alley where they had previously made no headway. Wire cutters were issued in case the wire was substantially intact in front of the German trench. New telephone wires were run up from Battalion Headquarters to Quadrangle Trench. As darkness fell white tapes were laid out in the open in front of Quadrangle Support Trench to enable the troops to line up and attack in the right direction.
At 10.45pm an officer patrol went forward to locate any enemy listening posts and all was ready by 11.00pm. At 11.05pm the eighth attempt began under undirected but sweeping machine gun fire from the direction of Contalmaison. The attacking companies made quick progress and were already in the enemy trench before the agreed start time. This, however, left the 7th Green Howards on the right with the disadvantage of facing an enemy already alerted and waiting for them. Already depleted, only one company of forty men led by Captain Barmby attacked across the open four minutes later but were met with intense fire and no-one got into the trench.
Attacking in greater numbers the 8th South Staffordshires had entered Quadrangle Support Trench in the face of machine gun fire, rifle fire and bombs. In hand to hand combat a section of the trench was cleared. The 7th Lincolns made no progress up Pearl Alley but the battalion bombers of the 8th South Staffordshires left the trench and advanced over the open as far as Acid Drop Copse, albeit with heavy losses.
German machine gun crew operating over a trench ‘block’ of sandbags in a smashed and flooded trench.
In Quadrangle Support the outnumbered Germans led by Lieutenant Irion were all but overwhelmed, they were pushed back to the western end of the trench from where the 7th Green Howards had been repelled. Lieutenant Irion managed to form another ‘block’ with sandbags and protected it with a machine gun and so prevented total capture of the position. The attack progressed as far as Acid Drop Copse where the 8th South Staffordshires set up a machine gun post. On the British right the 7th Green Howards again approached the ‘block’ in Quadrangle Alley defended by the German 10th and 12th Companies.
At 12.35am Lieutenant Brooke of the 7th Green Howards managed to get back to Quadrangle Trench where the 7th East Yorks were waiting in support. He reported the attack had failed again and that Captain Barmby had been severely wounded. The original orders of the 7th East Yorks had been to move forward and hold the block and junction in Quadrangle Alley after the 7th Green Howards had captured it. However they were ordered forward immediately as re-inforcements and forty men led by Second-Lieutenant Goodwin took up more bombs. By 2.30am a third attack had not yet been organised and reports were coming through that the assault on the left by the 8th South Staffordshires had failed. 50 Brigade Headquarters ordered a withdrawal before daylight. On hearing this Major-General Pilcher immediately countermanded it, ordering the attack to be pushed home. This was received at 50 Brigade Headquarters at 3.08am and this was sent on at once. However the order to withdraw had already reached the front line and the troops were on their way back. Finding the trenches blocked with troops, wounded and equipment they returned over the open and so missed Pilcher’s order as it was sent forward by runner. As it happened 17th Division just half an hour later called the whole attack off at 3.40am and thus the mix up eventually saved the 7th Green Howards who were being regrouped at the time to make the attack.
Lieutenant-Colonel Barker was desperately looking for support from either flank and while holding on was taking heavy casualties. Machine guns from the direction of Contalmaison were playing heavily on the rear of Quadrangle Support, and not troubled by further attacks from the right Lieutenant Irion in the western end of the trench re-organised and led a heavy counter attack with his bombers against the 8th South Staffordshires occupying the other part of the trench. The assault was held off but by now the Pioneer Company should have arrived to build strong points and reinforce the trench. They had got lost on the way forward and Lieutenant-Colonel Barker sent six different runners to find them. They eventually arrived at 2.30am but by 2.45am Lieutenant-Colonel Barker, aware that his men were now being pushed back down Pearl Alley felt he could hold on no longer without support from either the right or left and would be left further exposed in the approaching daylight. Instructions were given at 3.30am to withdraw to Quadrangle Trench bringing all wounded men back and this was successfully achieved. The exception to this was a patrol occupying Acid Drop Copse where they had set up a machine gun post. News of the withdrawal never reached them and they remained isolated in enemy territory. Lieutenant Irion was eventually able to re-occupy the major part of Quadrangle Support Trench unopposed and the casualties of the 8th South Staffordshires were nineteen officers and over 200 other ranks.
Lieutenant Irion’s troops in Quadrangle Support were badly in need of reinforcement and assistance was to be soon arriving. On the evening of 9 July behind the German second line in Martinpuich the 6th Company of the 122nd Reserve Infantry Regiment under its commanding officer Lieutenant Köstlin was preparing to comply with orders to move towards Mametz Wood. His men had to re-stock with ammunition and grenades and were about to have a meal from the battalion field kitchen cart before setting out on their journey. Just then a British shell landed and the horse pulling the cart bolted in terror taking the cart, food and everything else away into the darkness!
British troops making their way through shattered trees. TAYLOR LIBRARY
It was after midnight when the company finally left Martinpuich loaded with ammunition and two machine guns. Guides from the 3rd Battalion were supposed to lead the way through the trenches but Lieutenant Köstlin decided to push on across the open, marching on a compass bearing. The journey between Martinpuich and Bazentin was very slow and the men soon became very spread out with great difficulty being encountered crossing the shell holes and trenches. As they moved across the German second line at Bazentin the British shelling got heavier, shrapnel shells sometimes burst causing casualties among his men. Nearing Mametz Wood he decided not to enter it as it would be very easy to get lost and made for the open country between the wood and Contalmaison. It was his intention to reach the wood by going down Pearl Alley and along Quadrangle Support.
After crossing the Bazentin-Contalmaison road the company halted and the guides went forward to see where they were required. About twenty minutes the guides came back and told Lieutenant Köstlin to move straight ahead where reinforcements were urgently needed. it was now approaching 3.00am and they had not gone much further when a machine gun suddenly opened up at short range on higher ground on their right.
The gun crew of the 8th South Staffordshires in Acid Drop Copse were unable to take very accurate aim at the German columns as there was only just a glimmer of daylight but the Germans scattered. Attempting to rally his men Lieutenant Köstlin urged them to dash forward to the cover of their trench. It was further than he thought, over 300 yards and only thirty of his men eventually made it safely. Some were casualties, some hid in shell holes while others ran back towards the German main position near Bazentin.
Lieutenant Köstlin joined up with Lieutenant Irion in Quadrangle Support Trench where all communication with Battalion Headquarters in Mametz Wood had been lost since midnight. His last orders were to act independently without waiting for battalion instructions. As the senior officer present, Lieutenant Köstlin then took over command of the trench. The total strength holding it, including the new arrivals was six officers and 160 other ranks.