OPPOSING ARMIES

A Panzer IV and motorcycle advance across a field and toward a smoke-filled horizon. (Topfoto)

German Forces

National Leadership

Mercifully for mankind, throughout two world wars Germany’s national leadership showed very little strategic aptitude. Neither the Kaiser and his generals nor the Führer and his showed much understanding of the wider world beyond Germany’s immediate frontiers. The OKW was theoretically a Department of Defense-type organization but was intentionally kept weak in accordance with Hitler’s leadership style.¹⁵ It managed to coordinate neither national political, military, and economic objectives, nor Germany’s four armed services: Heer (Army), Kriegsmarine (Navy), Luftwaffe (Air Force), and Waffen-SS.

Personalities at the top played critical roles. Hitler flaunted his lack of formal military training and operated primarily on intuition. In view of the racial, cultural, and national importance he placed upon Barbarossa he set his imprint on that campaign more than any other, completely eclipsing every other member of the leadership. As a military leader Luftwaffe commander Hermann Göring was an unqualified buffoon although he played a much bigger role in Barbarossa through his various economic positions and titles than he did in actual Luftwaffe operations; Kriegsmarine commander Erich Raeder never played more than a marginal role in what was mainly a land and air war; and Heinrich Himmler of the SS was militarily irrelevant in 1941.

Senior German army leaders were uniformly ineffectual. As professional head of the army, von Brauchitsch peaked on November 5, 1939 when he stood up to Hitler and vetoed an autumn 1939 invasion of France. Completely unable to duplicate that feat later, he slipped farther into the shadows over the next two years, finally retiring at the end of Barbarossa for health reasons. His chief of staff, Halder, worked tirelessly to subvert the German war effort and advance his own agenda until replaced in September 1942. Supposedly Hitler’s primary military adviser as chief of OKW, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel was a mere toady of the Führer who failed his subordinates and his nation at every turn. The OKW operations chief, General of Artillery Alfred Jodl, practically worshipped Hitler to the point where he lost all objectivity (Jodl skipped lieutenant general when Hitler promoted him to full general). Generals in charge of the armaments industry, personnel replacements, and logistical sustainment of the fighting front doubtless worked hard but never rose to the level of difficulty required by Barbarossa.

Doctrine

German success prior to Barbarossa rested on the weakness and disorganization of its enemies and the blitzkrieg. The vast extent of the USSR and the internal cohesion of the Communist state negated the former advantage, but the latter would still dominate land combat. The blitzkrieg was never a doctrine in the sense of a system of theories and practices spelled out in German military manuals. The phrase seems to originate in attempts by contemporary Western theorists to define Wehrmacht techniques in Poland and, later, the West. At the highest levels it was executed in discrete steps, isolating its victims and destroying them one by one; it is therefore more proper to speak of a blitzkrieg campaign than of a blitzkrieg war. This technique gave resource-poor Germany a way to fight a war on the cheap – or so it thought.

The German military commanders concentrated on Waffenkrieg (the operational level of war) and tactics. What written doctrine they did have, Truppenführung (Part I was unclassified and published in 1933), discussed leadership techniques the world would come to recognize as blitzkrieg, but made very little mention of armored warfare or CAS. Once on the field of battle German officers applied this theory in combination with the independent Stosstrupp infiltration tactics of World War I, with General Hans von Seeckt’s theories of combined arms, the meeting engagement, and the Schwerpunkt, all wedded to the internal combustion engine and the radio in order to create the blitzkrieg.

Arguably the strength of the German Wehrmacht peaked on June 21, 1941. The army’s manpower stood at 3.8 million, up from 115,000 when Hitler took power. Although to a lesser degree than its Red Army adversary, it was an army still in transition. Since the physical isolation of Britain and America (Germany’s assumed next victims) made them less vulnerable to blitzkrieg tactics, Hitler told von Brauchitsch to disband 35 divisions after the fall of France, but on June 30, 1940 in fact only stood down 17. Others were reclassified as Urlaubsdivisionen (furlough divisions) whose soldiers reported to the war industries since Germany already suffered from a shortage of qualified manpower.

A hasty divisional officers’ conference takes place surrounded by a variety of vehicles (clockwise from top): an SdKfz 251 half-track, SdKfz 263 eight-wheel command vehicle, a Horsch Pkw staff car, motorcycle, and Flak gun mounted on a Krupp L2H143 “Schnauzer.” (HITM)

Subsequent re-expansion negated the army’s planned modernization, stretching limited resources. On August 21 Hitler reduced the amount of infantry in each panzer division. He also halved the number of panzers in each division, thereby doubling the number of divisions, but never corrected this supposedly temporary expedient of slashing the divisions’ panzer strength. Manpower and material shortages throughout the Third Reich meant that units varied in organization, strength, and equipment according to when they were created.

A German Pack Wireless Type d2 for company–battalion– regiment communications. Radios gave the Germans an advantage in command and control. During all of Barbarossa they captured only 149 radios from the Soviets, who relied excessively on the telegraph. (NARA)

All of the Ostheer can be divided into two groups; a small motorized elite and the vast bulk of marching and horse-drawn troops. When, after the victory in France, Hitler doubled the number of panzer divisions he robbed the German infantry of much of its motor transport in the process. As a result, lessons learned in the earlier campaigns, for example the benefits of motorizing both antitank guns and artillery forward observers, could not be applied to Barbarossa.

During Barbarossa, corps’ and armies’ tables of organizations changed at a confusing rate. Large numbers of non-divisional units made up corps and higher echelon formations. These combat support or combat service support units often doubled the number of men in a corps beyond those simply assigned to divisions. Together the synergistic effect of all the forces in a corps greatly multiplied its combat power beyond that of the divisions alone; by task-organizing these assets, the commander built his Schwerpunkt, reinforced success, or plugged holes in his lines.

A convoy of trucks carrying Bautruppen (construction personnel) and boats for a pontoon bridge. German forces were provided with everything they thought they would need, from truckloads of beans and bullets to the telegraph poles required to string new communication lines. The failures of the logistic system lay in its inability to deliver materiel reliably to the frontlines. (HITM)

ARMY GROUP NORTH

	Mtn Corps Norway	Army Group North	Eighteenth Army	I Inf Corps	XXVI Inf Corps	Pz Group Four	XLXI Pz Corps	LVI Pz Corps	Sixteenth Army	II Inf Corps	X Inf Corps	XXVIII Inf Corps
Artillery			2 2/3**	6*	1		4*	1	2*	6**	3	3
StuG				1						1		2
Nebelwerfer							3			2
Eng/Construction		2	2	2	2		2	3	3	2	2	2
Eng/Pioneer				1	1	1	1	1	1***	4		3
Lt/Med Flak			2	2/3	1/3		2		2
Hvy Flak
LW Flak						3	3	2	3
Inf/Machinegun	3		2		1
Pak	1				2/3	1		1

ARMY GROUP CENTER

	Army Group Center	Ninth Army	VIII Inf Corps	XX Inf Corps	Pz Group Three	V Inf Corps	VI Inf Corps	XXXIX Pz Corps
Artillery			14*	7*				3*
StuG			1	1		2
Nebelwerfer			2					3
Poison Gas NW	1		1
Eng/Construction	2	3	5	2		2	4
Eng/Pioneer	1	2	3***	1		1	3	1
Lt/Med Flak	1/3	1	1 2/3				2/3	1
Hvy Flak		1						2 2/3
LW Flak		5			1/3
Inf/Machinegun
Pak		1						1 1/3
Reconaissance
Flamethrower Pz

ARMY GROUP SOUTH

	Army Group South	Seventeenth Army	IV Inf Corps	XLIX Mtn Corps	LII Inf Corps	Sixth Army	XVII Inf Corps	XLIV Inf Corps
Artillery		1	7*/**	2		1*	2	3*
StuG			1
Nebelwerfer								1/3
Poison Gas NW	1
Eng/Construction	4	9	1	1	1	4	3	2
Eng/Pioneer			1	2		1***	1
Lt/Med Flak	1/3	1 1/3	1/3	1/3		1 1/3	1/3	1/3
Hvy Flak		1				1
LW Flak		3				3
Inf/Machinegun	1				1
Pak				1
Flamethrower Pz			1

LVII Pz Corps	Fourth Army	VII Inf Corps	IX Inf Corps	XIII Inf Corps	XLIII Inf Corps	Pz Group Two	XII Inf Corps	XXIV Pz Corps	XLVI Pz Corps	XLVII Pz Corps
3*	2*	5*/**	4*		4*	2*	6*	3*		4*
		1	1				2
							1 2/3	1		2
							1
	3	3	3	2	3		3
1	1	2			1		2	1	1	1
		1/3	1/3		1 1/3	2	1 1/3
	2					1
3	5					7
						1
							1	1		1
								1
										1

Pz Group One	XIV Pz Corps	III Pz Corps	XXIX Inf Corps	XLVIII Pz Corps	Eleventh Army	XI Inf Corps	XXX Inf Corps	LIV Inf Corps
1		9*	2*	6*		2	2	4
		1		1	2/3	1/3
		1		1 2/3
		2	2	2	1
1		2	1	3***	3	1
2/3		1	1/3	1/3	1 1/3
6				1	3
1		1				1

Sixty of the 73 officers of Infantry Regiment 12 (31st Infantry Division), photographed in April 1941 at Kutno in occupied Poland. By December the regiment would be on its fourth commander since the start of the campaign; its losses would also include the two majors shown here, two of the three captains, one of the five physicians, and 27 of the 56 lieutenants. (Podzun)

Infantry

Despite the dominant position occupied by armored divisions in many military histories, it was the infantry that bore the brunt of the Nazi–Soviet War. The Ostheer suffered 300,000 killed during Barbarossa – the equivalent of one regiment per day – and most of them were infantrymen, the Landsers. Except for the few who rode to battle with armored or motorized divisions the vast majority marched. Many considered the constant marching worse than the sporadic fighting. Regardless of how they got into combat, the infantry all fought on foot.

Most German soldiers carried a Mauser Kar98k 7.92mm bolt-action rifle with five-round magazines. German designers adapted the same ammunition to an automatic weapon when they created the excellent MG34, giving the infantry squad its own general purpose machine gun. John English calls the MG34 the “most advanced machine gun of its time.”¹⁶ After the Western campaign many squad leaders were armed with 9mm MP38 and MP40 machine-pistols. Based on observations made during the Spanish Civil War, the Landsers had learned how to defeat enemy tanks in individual combat. But they could not rely solely on individual acts of bravery to win a campaign of this nature.

Despite the German infantry’s prestige, within the Wehrmacht it lost the manpower battle to the SS, Luftwaffe, and Panzertruppen. Further dilution occurred when the best infantry divisions were transformed into mechanized units. Therefore, with its modernization stillborn, the infantry of 1941 looked like that of 1939 (or 1914 for that matter). According to S.J. Lewis, the better infantry divisions were those of the earlier mobilization waves: 1st (26 divisions), 2nd (16), 4th (14), 5th (4), and 7th and 8th (24) waves. Infantry leaders had suggested many improvements based on their experiences in Poland and France, but few were implemented in time for Barbarossa. In fact, two days before the campaign began, army inspectors judged 73 infantry divisions to be of “reduced offensive strength and mobility.”

German infantry formations were organized along triangular lines (a division of three regiments, each with three battalions, etc). They depended heavily on horses, which the German soldiers discovered could not be pushed as hard as men, but needed regular water, food, and rest. Not far into campaign, small, hardy panje horses, native to Poland and Russia, met many of the infantry’s logistics needs. As early as June 22 it became obvious that war in the USSR would be much harder than that in Poland or France. The 111th Infantry Division noted roads rendered impassable by rain as early as June 24, while clouds of dust rose from the bone-dry steppe a day later. One company commander wrote: “the roads and the day belonged to the Germans. But the forests and the night belonged to the Russians.”

Artillery

In modern warfare artillery usually causes the most destruction – in both offense and defense. German artillery had been highly developed at the end of the Great War but had not progressed markedly by 1941. The German artillery branch expanded from seven regiments in 1927 to over 100 in 1940. During that period it concentrated on swift movement, rapid fire control adjustment, and combined-arms operations. Another modern innovation was to equip forward observers with radios.

At the lowest level infantry platoons were equipped with 50mm and 82mm mortars. The campaign in the West had made clear that the former were too small to be effective. Excellent 105mm infantry guns and 150mm howitzers served as the backbone of divisional and corps artillery throughout World War II. Corps and army echelon support artillery provided additional heavy artillery assets, usually deployed at critical points. Very heavy-caliber weapons were 210mm, 240mm, and 305mm cannons, howitzers, and mortars. The indirect fire weapons of infantry divisions, corps, and armies were generally horse-drawn while mechanized units possessed vehicle-towed or self-propelled artillery pieces. Nebelwerfer (“smoke projector”) rocket launchers, demoralizing multi-barreled weapons, were generally found at corps level. These 150mm weapons threw an antipersonnel round over 7,600 yards. Army Groups Center and South possessed poison-gas Nebelwerfer battalions, but uncommon Nazi restraint prevented their use.

The forward observer for a light field howitzer battery – perched atop a haystack, with “scissors” binoculars – searches for targets, while his radio operator below relays instructions. Quick communications and accurate fire adjustment somewhat compensated for the relatively smaller German artillery branch. (MHI)

Each army group possessed super-heavy artillery consisting of K5 “Bruno” (280mm) railroad guns plus some one-off variants. A single gun required two trains to move and operate and could send a 561-pound projectile up to 37½ miles. These were mainly used to reduce massive fixed fortifications of the kind found at Brest or Sevastopol.

Antitank artillery (Pak) was stretched to the limit against Red Army tanks. German 37mm guns were useless against the new Soviet models, the 50mm gun only slightly better. Larger-bore artillery, normally used for indirect fire, frequently operated to good effect against tanks over open sights. In addition to helping keep the Red Army Air Force at a distance, army and Luftwaffe large-caliber Flak (antiaircraft artillery), most notably the 88mm, were the Landser’s best hope of defeating Soviet armor. However, in the first half of 1941 when the Royal Air Force stepped up attacks on Germany, Hitler ordered 15,000 army Flak guns held back to guard the Reich. The charts above show how sparsely Flak units were distributed. Often only one or two batteries covered an entire corps area; clearly only high-value targets could be protected in these cases. Finally, Germany only partially adopted the infantry-support tank (the 75mm short-barrel PzKpfw IV) used by other nations and instead employed the Sturmgeschütz (StuG or assault gun), which was employed in the infantry-support role. During Barbarossa most StuG consisted of the same short-barrel 75mm gun mounted on a PzKpfw III chassis.

The loader of a 105mm artillery piece. Artillery fire exceeded that of previous Wehrmacht campaigns by a massive margin. Artillery ammunition was the largest single commodity in the German logistics system. (NARA)

Panzers

German mechanization, especially in the form of tanks, was cutting-edge in the 1930s. The German Army experimented with armored warfare at their Grafenwöhr training area and during autumn maneuvers prior to 1932. Panzers gained essential political support during Guderian’s famous demonstration in 1933, the year that Hitler came to power. In 1935 the first three panzer divisions were established, and two years later one of them made its debut at the autumn maneuvers. The German Army also created its first panzer corps in 1935; the panzer branch had come into its own and from that point forward became a truly operational weapon.

The new panzers epitomized much of Germany’s success during the first part of World War II. Panzer divisions usually had two to three panzer battalions, five infantry battalions (four truck or half-track mounted, one on motorcycles), and three artillery battalions. Motorized infantry divisions, which often combined with the panzers to create a panzer corps, consisted of seven infantry, three to four artillery battalions, and occasionally a panzer battalion.

A panzer battalion usually included three companies of PzKpfw IIIs and one company of PzKpfw IVs. Light panzers, such as the PzKpfw II, were most numerous but had been intended primarily as a stopgap measure pending the introduction of the PzKpfw III and IV. The Ostheer also fielded many captured tanks, including the Czech tank designated PzKpfw 38(t) in German service. They were well-built, reliable and roughly equivalent to the 37mm PzKpfw III: the 8th Panzer Division having 118 on its order of battle. The older and smaller Skoda 35(t)s were obsolete in 1941, although the 6th Panzer still possessed 155 of them. Captured French tanks were unsuited to German doctrine and were generally passed on to Germany’s allies.

Despite impressive performances in 1939–40, one-quarter of all the German tanks employed in the West in 1940 had been lost – a total of 683. In 1941, when the Wehrmacht still relied upon modestly updated versions of prewar designs that were at least equal to the great bulk of even older Soviet types, the Red Army was receiving a new and superior generation of tanks in the form of the T-34 medium and KV heavy designs. These made their mark during Barbarossa’s first days and German inferiority in production capacity would soon prove equally significant.

Barbarossa’s armored formations were concentrated in the panzer groups. As “groups” these did not have the full complement of engineer, artillery, signals, and other support units associated with a numbered army. After the panzer groups became panzer armies between October 1941 and January 1942 they gained these assets.

Logistics

Barbarossa suffered from weak logistics from its earliest days as planners tried unsuccessfully to wish away monumental logistics problems. It is doubtful that if Germany had fielded larger forces its logistics system could have supported them. Planners assumed the Ostheer would live off the land, in much the same way as had Napoleon’s armies in 1812. This is essentially what happened in fact, and the German commanders were quite successful at improvisation. OKH wargames recommended a logistics pause less than a month into the operation. The German forces would indeed slow down to allow supplies to catch up but relentless Soviet counterattacks would give them no “pause” while continuous defensive combat also puts a massive strain on support. Logisticians based Barbarossa’s ammunition usage on the highest expenditures in the campaigns in the West – a flawed assumption. Separate and redundant supply systems for the army, Luftwaffe, and individual allies added further problems.

The chaotic internal administration of the Nazis spilled over into the sustainment arena. Wehrmacht agencies operated the railroads while the Grosstransportraum (figuratively a bridge between railroads and units) and the Aussenstelle (a higher-level depot system) reported to the army’s Quartermaster General – none accountable to the operational commander. In one example, Army Group North was supposed to receive 34 supply trains per day but never got more than 18, and achieving even that figure was rare. Non-standard vehicles created supply and maintenance nightmares; one artillery regiment fielded 69 different vehicle types.

An SS private and Unterscharführer attempt to cross a swollen stream with their field kitchen (“Goulash cannon”). Cooked food might be a luxury where campaign planners figured living off the land was good enough for the Ostheer. (NARA)

In a theater of war with very few paved roads and where most other roads alternated between chocking dust and glutinous mud depending on the weather, rail transport was especially important. Soviet railroads had to first be cleared of Red Army units, and then German specialists converted the rail system to one they could use. Not only did the Germans have to change the rail gauge, a simple but manpower-intensive job, but Soviet signal facilities required modernization, Russian water stations were too far apart for smaller German locomotives and German coal had to augment the poor-quality Russian coal. German logistics plans also assumed taking some rail lines and rolling stock intact, something not always possible due to over-zealous Luftwaffe “train busters.”

The Grosstransportraum, the truck transport between the railheads and the armies and forward to tactical units, was stretched to the limit. Poor convoy discipline caused further, self-inflicted hardships. A normal infantry division had 942 vehicles (not counting motorcycles) and 1,200 horses. Often augmented with hundreds of panje horses, these beasts carried many supplies. As the Ostheer moved east and numbers of POWs mounted, many of these men volunteered to drive wagons, care for horses, handle supplies, and prepare food. At times these Hiwis (volunteers) numbered up to 2,000 per division, or one-fifth of its strength. However, partisans represented a constant threat to rail lines, bridges, rearward communications, and support infrastructure throughout the Nazi occupation of the USSR.

Regauging railroads in the USSR was labor-intensive and time consuming. Decades earlier, when developing their rail network, the Russians modeled theirs on American and Canadian examples, where continental distances were more similar than those in France or Germany. (Nik Cornish at www.Stavka.org.uk)

Two special army formations present in Barbarossa deserve mention:

Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland (GD): This elite army formation began as a Berlin guard company with ceremonial duties; by the war’s end it had grown into a complete mechanized corps. Its name, meaning Greater Germany, indicated that its soldiers were chosen from all over the country rather than from a specific Wehrkreis¹⁷ as with most of the army. In 1941 it was much stronger than its official designation suggested; GD had three infantry battalions, each with three line companies, a machine-gun company, and a heavy company. A fourth battalion grouped a light infantry gun, an antitank, a heavy infantry gun and an assault gun company; reconnaissance, pioneer, signal, and Flak companies made up the 5th Battalion; and the regiment also had an artillery battalion and a logistics column.

Lehr Brigade (Motorized) 900: In order to keep army branch-of-service schools current with developments in the field, instructors needed combat experience; so the Replacement Army commander agreed to requests from these schools to create a unit to participate in Barbarossa, so long as this did not compromise their primary instruction mission. The brigade’s organization was unsatisfactory, since minimizing the impact on the schools outweighed the need to create an efficient fighting unit. Lehr Brigade (mot) 900 consisted of a headquarters, two battalions from the Döberitz Infantry School, one each panzer (using captured French tanks) and antitank battalions from the Wünsdorf Panzer School, an artillery battalion, and an assault gun battery from the Jüterbog Artillery School, plus medical and logistics support. Its supposed three-month deployment in fact lasted until March 1942, by which time it had been worn down to two companies and a few heavy weapons.

Luftwaffe

The Luftwaffe entered Barbarossa using the same Bf-109s, He-111s, Ju-52s, and Ju-87s (with some modifications) as it used during the Spanish Civil War. After the costly Battle of Britain the Luftwaffe entered Barbarossa on June 22, 1941 with fewer aircraft than it had for the Western campaign 13 months earlier. Führer Directive 21 gave the Luftwaffe three concurrent missions: 1) defend Germany, its allies and occupied territories; 2) continue the war against England and its shipping; and 3) attack the Soviet Union. Luftwaffe strength was thus dissipated over the continent of Europe (and, soon, north Africa). More than 1,500 aircraft were employed in these secondary theatres while the Luftwaffe simultaneously tried to rule the skies over the world’s largest theater of war. It employed many obsolete aircraft that were considered good enough to confront the even more antiquated equipment of the Red Army Air Force. Further, no less than half of its transport aircraft had been lost on Crete during the German invasion of the island in the weeks immediately prior to Barbarossa. Lastly, despite the efforts of von Richthofen and others, German air-ground coordination was still rudimentary.

Even with the astounding destruction meted out to the Red Army Air Force during Barbarossa’s opening days, the Luftwaffe did not have the strength to fly both air-superiority and CAS missions so the Soviet airpower rapidly bounced back. The same miserable conditions on the ground with which the army had to contend created boggy airfields and prevented the forward movement of maintenance, supply, and communications assets. Furthermore, the Luftwaffe underestimated the situation in the air in three critical ways: 1) they evidently did not realize that most of the Soviet aircraft destroyed during Barbarossa’s first days were obsolete; 2) while they destroyed a great number of aircraft many of the pilots survived; and 3) they misjudged the recuperative powers of the Soviet aircraft industry.

A Bf 109F of II/JG-53 Pik As (Ace of Spades) on an Estonian airfield alongside the burnt-out shell of a Red Army Air Force Polikarpov fighter. Except when reinforced by VIII Fliegerkorps, Luftflotte 1 was another formation trying to fight Barbarossa’s northern tier on a shoe-string, much to the Army’s frustration. (HITM)

The air component in the north, Luftflotte 1, was smallest of those supporting the army groups. It possessed 592 aircraft, with 453 of those in an airworthy condition on June 22. Luftflotte 5 in Norway contributed little (just 200 aircraft) considering its huge area of operations. In the north the Red Army Air Force outnumbered the Luftwaffe nearly 3:1 in bombers, over 7:1 in fighters, and nearly 4:1 overall. Against these Army Group North had only three Flak regiments assigned. Airborne forces made a brief appearance in the Leningrad area. After recovering from its losses on Crete, the 7th Flieger Division fought on foot around Shlisselburg from mid-September until mid-December.

Luftflotte 2 supporting Army Group Center represented the largest air component with two Fliegerkorps, II and VIII, plus the I Flak Corps. Including VIII Fliegerkorps (see below) Field Marshal Albert Kesselring counted two fighter, one Zerstörer, two bomber and one Stuka Gruppen plus reconnaissance and transport units. He commanded 1,367 aircraft, of which 994 were operational on Barbarossatag. The I Flak Corps had two Flak regiments. The operational area of Luftflotte 2 measured 180 miles wide by 600 miles deep.

Von Richthofen’s elite VIII Fliegerkorps had to move from Greece and Yugoslavia to Suwalki after the Balkan campaign, so 600 of its vehicles and 40 percent of its aircraft were unavailable on Barbarossatag. At its peak the VIII Fliegerkorps consisted of 87 twin-engine medium bombers, 50 Ju-87B Stukas and 26 Henschel Hs-123 biplane dive-bombers, 22 Messerschmitt Bf-110 twin-engine fighters, and 66 Bf-109 single-engine fighters. However, von Bock did not always have VIII Fliegerkorps flying overhead in support of his army group; as a strategic asset higher headquarters moved it throughout the theater in order to create an aerial Schwerpunkt.

Army Group South air operations suffered from a number of handicaps: it was not the German main effort and so not fully resourced, it had no Stukas and many of its air assets were committed to the defense of Rumania’s oil fields. In all von Rundstedt could count on the aerial support of 887 aircraft, 694 of which were operational on June 22. Luftflotte 4’s CAS came from two Gruppen of Ju-88s and one fighter Gruppe fitted with ground-attack sights and ordnance mounting points. Seven Gruppen of Bf-109s provided fighter cover while the II Flak Corps, including the elite General Göring Regiment, mainly protected First Panzer Group’s spearheads.

A truck-mounted 20mm Flak 38 takes on a Soviet column. The truck’s white “K” stands for von Kleist’s First Panzer Group. An entire Luftwaffe Flak corps accompanied von Kleist. (NARA)

In April V Fliegerkorps deployed from the Channel coast to southeast Poland. It flew in support of the Sixth and Seventeenth Armies and von Kleist’s panzers. It covered an area 200 miles wide at the start and ultimately 900 miles deep, reaching all the way to Rostov. The IV Fliegerkorps moved from France to Rumania in May. From there it supported the southern flank, initially against Bessarabia and the Crimea. Its front was approximately 350 miles wide and 300 miles deep.

German Flak forces deployed 239 heavy and 135 medium and light batteries in the east on Barbarossatag. These numbers represented respectively only 20 percent and 15 percent of Germany’s total, with the mass of the remainder defending the Reich in the west.

Each Axis ally had its own air force. Rumania contributed approximately 350 front-line aircraft, Finland 300, Italy 80, and Hungary an additional 50.

Waffen-SS

In the bizarre polycracy of Nazi Germany fiefdoms competed for power. Around the time of Barbarossa, Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler’s personal army eclipsed Göring’s Luftwaffe as the hyper-politicized darling of the Wehrmacht. Two SS divisions fought in Army Group North: Totenkopf and Polizei. Totenkopf was essentially a motorized infantry formation. Polizei, foot infantry, consisted of mobilized policemen. It received recognition as an SS division in 1942. Division Nord, another ad hoc organization, fought in Finland with very uneven results. It was the Army of Norway’s only motorized formation.

The crew of an SS 37mm Pak 36 cross a stream in their Krupp L2H 43 “Schnauzer” truck. Maintenance and supply for the bewildering number of non-standard vehicles from all over Europe multiplied the Wehrmacht’s logistical woes. (NARA)

Justice, Nazi occupation style: Soviet citizen hanged from a telephone pole for some now unknown reason and left for all to see as life in the town goes on. (Corbis)

SS Division Reich in Army Group Center began as a collection of SSStandarten (regiments) during the Polish campaign. These were united as the SS-Verfügungs Division for France and then renamed “Reich” on February 25, 1941. During Barbarossa, Reich was a motorized division made up of three motorized infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and more than the usual number of assigned battalions.

Von Rundstedt’s army group included two SS formations – Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler (LSSAH) and SS Motorized Division Viking. Like all SS units in 1941 they consisted of volunteers drawn from among the best of German manpower. The LSSAH grew out of Hitler’s personal bodyguard and was commanded by the Führer’s crony, Josef “Sepp” Dietrich. Starting in 1940 it grew from a regiment into a brigade and finally a division, although this reorganization was incomplete on Barbarossatag. Viking was a full division, originating with Standarte Germania. Its uniqueness came from its Scandinavian and Western European volunteers. Regiment Nordland hailed largely from Denmark and Norway while Westland was made up of Dutch and Flemish volunteers.

In addition to these Waffen SS formations, security units such as Einsatzgruppen and Polizei units under SS command followed close behind the army groups to pursue the Nazis’ genocidal policies of summary execution on racial and political grounds.

Kriegsmarine

While the German Navy’s primary mission was to fight the Royal Navy, it had much in common with its Soviet counterpart: in their national-strategic schemes, both were subordinated to the army and air force; both underwent accelerated development in the 1930s, and both stressed undersea warfare, especially using submarines and mines. Kriegsmarine ships operating in the Baltic usually consisted of three to four light cruisers, five U-Boats, 30–40 fast patrol boats, plus numerous minelayer/sweepers and sub-chasers. The Finns contributed two heavy monitors, four gunboats, five submarines, and six patrol boats. However, coordination between the two navies was weak.

The Navy was not fully integrated into the Barbarossa plan; sea transport in the Baltic came as an afterthought and an all-out naval effort was not considered necessary. The Germans began mining the Gulfs of Finland and Riga on June 12. Other Kriegsmarine missions included preventing the Red Banner Fleet from escaping from the Baltic and from launching amphibious operations. In the south, the German Navy was essentially absent from the Black Sea.

Other Nationalities

In addition to lacking certain key natural resources, for which it was at least partly dependent on the Soviet Union, Germany had other weaknesses which Hitler sought to offset to some degree with the Tripartite Treaty of September 27, 1940 between Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan. Intended to build an anti-Soviet coalition and warn the US to keep out of Europe, the Pact of Steel only gave “the image of Axis solidarity.”¹⁸

Hitler did not, however, include his more senior Italian and Japanese allies in Barbarossa’s planning, preferring instead to rely on his smaller Eastern European allies. Interestingly, centuries of hostility meant that the Hungarians and Rumanians hated each other as much as their common Soviet foe. Another planning headache for the German High Command was keeping their two antagonistic allies from serving side-by-side. Reliability, both at home and on the battlefield, and logistics would remain a constant problem for all of Germany’s allies. In reality, the German leaders had very little faith in the fighting abilities of any of their allies, even the Finns.

Austria

While fully absorbed into the Greater German Reich in 1938, Austria had its own identity and military traditions. Numerous Wehrmacht units had Austrian origins and Austrian personnel. On April 1, 1936 Austria had thrown off the post-World War I Treaty of St Germain and instituted its own universal military service laws. Its forces grew from barely 20,000 men in six brigades to over 60,000 in seven infantry and one fast/mobile division plus two aviation regiments by the time of the Anschluss with Germany. Its Bundesheer officially became part of the Wehrmacht on April 1, 1938 and Austrian formations were subsumed into the German military.

Finland

Finland’s distance from Germany gave it a measure of independence from Hitler’s influence yet it still wanted to recover lost territories and gain some advantage in the new European order so obvious in the spring of 1941. As part of the restructuring of Europe’s power structure in 1809 by Napoleon, Finland became a Russian grand duchy and for the next 100 years the Finns strained under the Russian yoke. During the Russian Civil War (1917–22), with the help of a German army corps, forces under Marshal Mannerheim won Finnish independence. In the Winter War of 1939–40 the Soviet Union took its revenge. Stalin launched the Red Army against Finland and, despite an inept performance from the Soviet forces and heroic resistance by the Finns, the result was inevitable. Finland lost 23,000 killed and 45,000 wounded, and had to evacuate 420,000 people from lands ceded to the USSR, approximately 10 percent of its territory. So while Stalin secured Leningrad he created a dangerous enemy. On the other hand, Hitler’s tepid support for Finland during the Winter War frequently left lingering doubts in the minds of the small nation’s leadership.

Axis commanders in Finland; von Falkenhorst and Mannerheim. The Finnish border with the USSR was two-thirds as long as the main front from Memel to the Black Sea. However, the theater was doomed as a strategic backwater plagued by complicated command relationships and few mutual objectives. (Ediciones Dolmen)

Axis-Allied Dictators

Ion Antonescu, 1882–1946, Rumanian Marshal

The Rumanian dictator served as defense minister under King Carol II. In 1940, in that position, he proved incapable of halting the loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the USSR or Dobruja to Bulgaria or Transylvania to Hungary. In September of that year Carol abdicated in favor of his son Michael, and Antonescu was named Conductor(Leader) in the National Legionary State established jointly with the Fascist Iron Guard movement. In January 1941 Antonescu eliminated the Iron Guard with Hitler’s help (after a debate within the Nazi hierarchy as to which side Germany would back). A German military mission to Rumania soon followed, supposedly to train the Rumanian military, protect the oil fields, and prepare for Barbarossa.

Cavalry officer Antonescu served in staff positions during World War I and was personally decorated for bravery by King Ferdinand. When he was nominated as military attaché to France in 1920, the French objected, describing him as “vain, chauvinistic, and xenophobic.” Conversely, Hitler praised his “breadth of vision” and called him a “real personality.” Antonescu was an avowed anti-Communist and anti-Semite. With the German Eleventh Army, he led the Rumanians across the Prut River, “liberated” Bessarabia, and invested Odessa. His inept and wasteful siege of that Black Sea port cost 100,000 lives, basically the flower of Rumania’s prewar military. Thereafter Rumanian forces helped subdue the Crimea. The following year the battles of Stalingrad caused another 150,000 Rumanian casualties.

Suffering from undisclosed medical problems, Antonescu withdrew from active public politics but still led Rumania and supported Germany. As Red Army forces overran the Ukraine he possibly tried to negotiate a deal with the Western Allies. A royal coup on August 23, 1944 overthrew and arrested Antonescu. After the war a People’s Tribunal convicted him of crimes against peace and treason and executed him on June 1, 1946.

Miklos Horthy, 1868–1957, Admiral and Regent of the Kingdom of Hungary

An officer in the Austro-Hungarian Navy, Horthy served as prewar naval aide-de-camp to Emperor Franz Josef, won a minor naval engagement at Otranto and ended World War I commanding the navy. He was declared Regent (or “Protector”) and Head of State in 1920 following the brief Hungarian Socialist Republic. Horthy served as head of state in a parliamentary republic until the Depression caused Hungary to move toward extreme conservatism.

Wedged between Hitler to the west and Stalin to the east, anti-Communist Horthy favored the former. Horthy refused to participate in the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia but Hitler gave Hungary the southern portion of Slovakia anyway. Horthy joined the Anti-Comintern Pact in February 1939 and withdrew from the League of Nations two months later. In August 1940 Hitler rewarded Hungary with northern Transylvania taken from Rumania. On June 27, 1941 Horthy declared war on the Soviet Union. Eighteen months later, 200,000 poorly equipped troops of the Hungarian Second Army suffered 84 percent casualties during the Soviet’s Stalingrad counteroffensive. At this point Horthy’s already-lukewarm support of Hitler became downright tepid.

In April 1943 Hitler demanded that Horthy take tougher measures against Hungary’s 800,000 Jews; Horthy complied with Hitler’s demands as little as possible. In June, Horthy refused Hitler’s request for Hungarian reinforcement to Russia. Months later Hungary actively schemed to bail on the Axis cause. Goebbels recorded in his diary in September 1943, “As regards the possibilities of treachery by other satellite states, Horthy would like to desert us, but the Führer has already taken the necessary precautions against this.”

In March 1944 Horthy pleaded with Hitler to recall Hungarian troops fighting the USSR and to cease using Hungary as a base for military transport. When Hitler threatened occupation, Horthy decided to allow German troops to occupy Hungary. He also accepted Hitler’s demand to hand over Jews to the SS. However under pressure from the Western Allies, in August Horthy replaced the pro-Nazi ministers, stopped Jewish deportations, then announced Hungary’s withdrawal from the Axis and broadcast his intention to seek peace. Forced to resign in favor of the Fascist Arrow Cross Party leader, Horthy was promptly arrested and taken to Germany as a “guest of honor” until liberated by American troops in May 1945. The following December Horthy was released from Nuremberg to exile in Portugal where he wrote his memoirs.

Jozef Tiso, 1887–1947, President of Slovakia

A Roman Catholic priest who, following a short stint as a military chaplain in World War I, became involved in separatist Slovak politics. Tiso rose through the Slovak People’s Party (founded by another priest) until, upon the death of the party’s leader in 1938, he was in charge. In March 1939 as the Nazis destroyed Czechoslovakia Tiso arrived in Berlin to be blackmailed by Hitler: either submit to German “protection” or be partitioned between Hungary and Poland.

Slovakia contributed one corps-sized group to Barbarossa. Tiso’s anti-Semitism seemed to mesh nicely with Hitler’s and Tiso deported tens of thousands of Jews to their death. Hitler occupied Slovakia in October 1944 following the failed national uprising and the Red Army conquered the country in the following year. Tiso technically served as president until 3 April although the Slovak Republic had basically ceased to exist months earlier. He was tried and in April 1947 hanged for collaboration with Nazi Germany.

In August 1940, the USSR once more massed troops on the Finnish border, making new demands on Finland which Molotov amplified during his Berlin visit. Therefore both Germany and Finland discovered expedient reasons to reorient their relationship. Shortly thereafter a member of Göring’s staff made the first secret contacts. Both Führer Directive 21 and the Aufmarschanweisung allowed Finland a modest role in Barbarossa. The first tentative talks between German and Finnish military planners followed in the winter and spring of 1941. Hitler wanted Finnish assistance in three main areas: pressure on Leningrad, help against the Arctic ports and the Murmansk railroad, and raw materials – especially the nickel mines at Petsamo. Eager to avenge losses suffered during the Winter War, Finland agreed to most of the German expectations. However, Finland was not at war and Helsinki crawled with foreign diplomats. Partly as a result, Hitler kept Finland out of serious planning until late May 1941. Finland’s limited goals for World War II were: freedom from Soviet intimidation, reliable sources of food, and restoration of the 1939 borders.

Prior to the Winter War the Finnish Amy had not exceeded 200,000 men in nine operational divisions armed with World War I-era weapons. For Barbarossa it mobilized nearly 475,000 troops in 16 divisions and three independent brigades supplied with more modern German ordnance. Equipment, from helmets to tanks, came from every army in Europe – making for a logistical disaster. Between the Winter and Continuation Wars,¹⁹ 105mm and 120mm artillery and associated antitank forces benefited from new German weaponry. Finland fielded one tank battalion that was part of the 1st Jäger Brigade (light troops mounted on bicycles in summer) plus seven platoons of British and captured Soviet tanks. Divisions were relatively small and usually commanded by a colonel. A principal strength was the individual Finnish soldier and his familiarity with the extremes of fighting in the heavily forested far-north theater. By the end of 1941 Finland had suffered 75,000 casualties.

Hungary

Hitler lacked faith in Hungary as a result of its weak support during the crises of 1938 and 1939. Therefore he forbade most military contacts prior to Barbarossa. In the spring of 1941 Hungary volunteered to conduct mopping-up operations in Yugoslavia behind advancing German troops, alarming the USSR and linking Hungary to the Reich. In recognition of German assistance at the Vienna Award of August 1940 in regaining territory lost in the Trianon Treaty of 1920, Hungary contributed a small contingent to Barbarossa. Hungary formally joined the Axis war effort on June 27, 1941 after supposedly being bombed the day before by the Red Army Air Force (in reality possibly by Rumanian aircraft).

In 1941 the Hungarian Army counted 29 divisions, each of which had only one regular regiment during peacetime. The army was well-trained and competent but lacked modern equipment and was not equal to the rigors of World War II combat. For Barbarossait contributed a 24,000-strong Fast Corps of two motorized and one cavalry brigades (largely using requisitioned civilian vehicles for mobility) under Lieutenant General F. Szombathely and a like number of marching troops. Armored forces consisted of 81 indigenous Toldi tanks, mounting only a 20mm gun. Hungarian air contingents flew mostly second-rate German (He-112s) and Italian (Fiat C.R. 42s) machines. Hungarian forces first saw action on July 9 but played a steadily declining role. They tried to remove the Fast Corps from the fighting in early September but Hitler refused permission. By November, obsolete weapons, high losses and a lack of enthusiasm led the Fast Corps to be withdrawn from the active front.

A Hungarian general talks on a field phone while a German liaison officer looks on. The Germans usually attached liaison officers to the commanders and headquarters of their allies, both to help and give advice, but also to keep an eye on the allies’ activities. (Nik Cornish at www.Stavka.org.uk)

Italy

In terms of preparedness the Italian Army had peaked in the mid-1930s and by World War II it was both trying to catch up with the other major European powers and in the middle of another reorganization. At fewer than 10,000 men its divisions were small and the same can be said of its under-gunned artillery, outdated armor and insufficient support echelons. Hitler left Germany’s closest ally out of Barbarossa’s plans; he wanted Italy to concentrate on the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, Benito Mussolini created the Italian Expedition Corps in Russia (CSIR), eventually under the command of 57-year-old General Giovanni Messe, a former aide-de-camp of King Victor Emmanuel III and one of the few competent Italian generals to emerge from the previous Albanian and Greek operations. Although technically taking orders from the Italian High Command in Rome, it was seldom actually commanded by Messe and initially came under the operational control of the German Eleventh Army. Italian Air Force units were subordinated to local Luftwaffe headquarters.

The CSIR consisted of two infantry divisions, the 9th Pasubio and 52nd Torino, and one “cavalry-motorized” division, the 3rd Principe Amedeo Duca d’Aosta. The former had two infantry and one artillery regiments plus the normal assortment of support troops. Duca d’Aosta counted two cavalry, one Bersaglieri (fast light infantry), and one motorized artillery regiments in addition to support troops. The CSIR included the 30th Corps Artillery Group. The Italians called their infantry units “auto-transportable,” which the Germans wishfully misinterpreted as “motorized.” This misnomer frustrated the Germans and upset the Italian troops, who marched everywhere! A mere battalion of L6/40 light tanks made armored operations difficult.

Altogether CSIR numbered 62,000 officers and men, 960 artillery pieces, and 670 antiaircraft and antitank guns, plus 5,500 wheeled vehicles (many commercial) and 4,600 horses and mules. Individual Italian soldiers were undeniably brave but shared none of the German soldiers’ crusading spirit. Italian officers had minimal contact with their troops and each company possessed only six to eight NCOs. Torino’s commander, Brigadier General Ugo de Carolis, died in December fighting along the Mius River as part of First Panzer Army; the Germans posthumously awarded him the Knight’s Cross. Of the CSIR’s 62,000 troops, over 8,700 became casualties during Barbarossa (half of those were killed in action) and barely 4,000 ever returned to Italy.

Rumania

The defeat of France, its traditional patron, and its fear of the USSR pushed Rumania into the German fold. Rumania put its entire military at Germany’s disposal for Barbarossa – the only Axis ally to do so. The country suffered approximately 100,000 casualties during Barbarossa alone. In the summer of 1940 the country was in dire straits; Stalin seized Bessarabia, former allies France and Britain were either crushed by Germany or struggling for self-preservation, and finally Hitler and Mussolini awarded large tracts of her territory to Bulgaria and Hungary.

Huge petroleum reserves and a lengthy border with the USSR made Rumania indispensable to the Reich. The Ploesti oil fields provided one-half of Germany’s needs. Occupying Bessarabia put Soviet forces only 100 miles away from the wells and refineries. Both main authors of Barbarossa, Marcks and von Lossberg, believed that the country was essential for attacking Odessa and the Crimea plus defending Ploesti. In November 1940, Rumania signed the Tripartite Agreement and soon German Army and Luftwaffe personnel in Rumania numbered 63,000. However, the German High Command formally briefed the Rumanians on Barbarossa only two days prior to the start of operations.

Battlefield Conditions

The northern theater began in Lithuania, basically the edge of the North European Plain, which has many wetlands and mixed forest regions. Latvia is heavily forested while Estonia is nearly one-quarter swampland. Two large lakes, Peipus and Il’men, dominated the center of the combat zone and the many watercourses that feed them create a swampy morass. Further east are the Valdai Hills which were not significantly higher than other terrain encountered during Barbarossa (c.1,100 feet elevation) but contain the headwaters of the Dvina, Dnepr, and Volga rivers. The interior of the theater consisted of terrain and vegetation that could be considered worst for mechanized warfare but ideal for partisan operations.

Leningrad was the most remarkable manmade feature in the Army Group North area. Famously made by slave labor under Peter the Great from drained swampland on the site of an old Swedish fortress on the Neva River delta, St Petersburg (Petrograd during World War I) was the Russian capital from 1712 to 1918. In 1941 its population was 3 million but the ravages of the 900-day siege cut that number by 80 percent two years later. To the city’s east is Europe’s largest lake, Ladoga, which became Leningrad’s lifeline during the siege. The barrier represented by the Gulf of Finland, Leningrad, and Lake Ladoga prevented the German and Finnish armies from ever linking up.

Belorussia has no natural frontiers, and for centuries the native population had resisted Mongol, Kievan, Lithuanian, Polish, Russian, German, and Soviet masters. The theater of war covered here literally and figuratively divided the western USSR. To the north lay the lake district, where Scandinavian ice sheets had scoured out the thin layer of earth; to the south were the Rokitno Marshes and other poorly drained areas. In between, marking the farthest advance of the glaciers, lay deposits that created the drainage divide along the line Grodno–Minsk–Smolensk–Valdai Hills. The contemporary highway and rail lines followed this traditional commercial and invasion route (called the Post Road in Napoleonic times). Roughly parallel routes ran from Latvia through Vitebsk and Rzhev (in 1941, Hoth’s area), and from Brest through Gomel and Bryansk (Guderian’s area).

This River Gate represented the ridgeline’s crowning feature – basically the relative high ground (in reality, only approximately 600 feet in elevation) – between Vitebsk and Orsha and centered on Smolensk. Hoth described this feature as being approximately 42 miles wide: enough room for three armored divisions to maneuver. The lobe pattern representing the glacier’s margin also had military significance – for example, in the northward jut of the Berezina River.

Some words on Ukrainian geography: south of the Rokitno Marshes mentioned above the soil was fine and humus-rich, producing particularly nasty mud that evaporated slowly. The rasputitsa ensued numerous times each spring and autumn as temperatures rose and fell and roads alternately turned into quagmires or froze solid. The Ukraine lacked the vast forests found north of the marshes. It did contain numerous large rivers, the Dnepr being over a mile wide in many places. Interestingly, these rivers did not constitute a significant tactical barrier but hamstrung logistics – operations east of the Dnepr caused German rear echelon troops constant headaches. The western Ukraine began rising elevations toward the Hungarian highlands.

Kiev was the Ukraine’s capital and largest city with a prewar population of under 400,000. To the east, near Kharkov and in the Donets Basin (Donbas), centered on Stalino, stood huge industrial and mining enterprises. The same could be found on the great bend of the Dnepr River at Dnepropetrovsk, Krivoi Rog, and Zaporozhe. Nikolaev on the Bug River was a large inland naval base. These resource areas were key objectives in Hitler’s economic concept of the war and they would see brutal urban fighting throughout Barbarossa and indeed the entire Nazi–Soviet War.

Field Marshal von Brauchitsch (center) and Marshal Antonescu (left) enter a car as staffers look on. During Barbarossa the Rumanian proved to be a staunch ally if not quite a stellar commander. (Nik Cornish at www.Stavka.org.uk)

Rumanian military reorganization on the German model took place amid political turmoil. The Rumanian army had previously concentrated on defensive doctrine using French methods where infantry and especially artillery benefited. German offensive doctrine and techniques were unfamiliar to the Rumanians and their armored forces struggled accordingly. Senior Rumanian officers trained earlier by the French resisted, while younger officers studied in Germany and caught on more quickly. Equipment consisted of a combination of purchased Czech, captured (by the Nazis) Dutch, loaned French, donated German, interned Polish, and indigenous Rumanian gear – a maintenance disaster.

The Rumanian Third and Fourth Armies – Army Group Antonescu – numbered 325,000 men. German training concentrated on the 5th, 6th, and 13th Infantry Divisions and the German leaders naturally considered these, along with the Frontier and Guards Divisions, the three cavalry and three mountain brigades, the most combat ready. They regarded Rumanian soldiers as resourceful and tough fighters with only modest needs. However, they also felt their allies’ officers were corrupt and indifferent to their troops. Nevertheless, a former German general gave the Rumanian military credit for Barbarossa’s successes. The German Military Mission headquarters, trainers, and “advisors” became the Eleventh Army in May 1941 and technically took control of all operations as soon as Axis forces crossed the Prut River on July 2.

Slovakia

As part of the former Austrian Empire the Slovak military had some familiarity with German methods and language. The German military did not train Slovak units although some officers and NCOs went to Germany for military schooling. Slovakia contributed c.45,000 men to Barbarossa, mostly marching infantry in two divisions under Minister of Defense and Chief of Staff Ferdinand Catlos. One motorized unit, the Slovak Mobile Command under 2nd Division commander Rudolf Pilfousek, numbering 132 tanks and 43 other armored vehicles, managed to keep up with the German forces and came under the control of 17th Army. The marching elements soon fell behind the front lines and were divided into two units: 1) the 1st Fast Division under 1st Division commander Augustin Maler, eventually rejoined the fighting in the First Panzer area; 2) the remainder, the 2nd Security Division, was relegated to rear security missions for Army Group South. German commanders considered Slovak officers indolent and lacking any concept of duty and their soldiers generally poor. Their first encounter with the Red Army at Lipovec resulted in a stinging defeat. By October the German leaders assigned even the better formations to reduced missions only.

Spain

In appreciation for German assistance during the Spanish Civil War, General Francisco Franco sent one 18,000-man formation, the Blue Division (so named because of its blue Falangist uniform shirts), to Germany. One of Franco’s trusted Moroccan comrades, General Augustin Munoz Grandes, commanded the outfit. Its “volunteers,” consisting mostly of army officers and soldiers but also Falangists and anti-Communist students, fought mainly around Leningrad and Volkhov with uneven results. After three months of combat the Blue Division had sustained 3,000 casualties.

Spanish volunteers from the 250th “Blue” Infantry Division, in this case former students from Valencia, photographed on September 18. The Spanish fought bravely in the Army Group North sector until as late as 1944. (NARA)

Members of the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) “Tomaschek” unit. Numerous paramilitary organizations competed with the military for a share of the German manpower pool. The RAD and “Organization Todt” perhaps contributed most to the military effort. (NARA)

Occupation Policies

With Barbarossa, the political lordship over eastern Poland and western Belorussia and Ukraine passed from the NKVD to the SS. The Soviet Union’s own brutal 21-month occupation of these areas prior to June 1941 caused many inhabitants to welcome the Wehrmacht; Nazi concepts on the relative value of human life soon put an end to such naive notions. The main outcomes of the Nazis’ genocidal racial obsessions were a vengeful populace, a new legitimacy for Stalin and Communism, the tying down of huge and wasteful occupation forces, and, ultimately, shame for the German nation.

Closely related is the German’s inhumane and illegal treatment of Red Army prisoners of war. On the one hand, they treated these Slavic Untermenschen in accordance with Nazi racial theories. On the other hand, despite accurately anticipating huge encirclements, they were completely unprepared for the massive numbers of POWs actually captured during Barbarossa (exacerbated by fact that the campaign far exceeded its anticipated eight- to ten-week length).

Wehrmacht lawyers urged proper treatment of POWs but Keitel overruled them. Seventy percent of Red Army POWs died in transit to the rear, most others died of gunshots, disease, starvation, and neglect. They were the first victims of Zyklon B poison gas at the new Auschwitz concentration camp. Nearly 3 million POWs died in 1941 alone. On October 31, 1941 Hitler somewhat reversed himself and ordered that Soviet POWs be sent to the Reich to fill some of the 1.5 million vacant industrial worker positions there.

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE*:

ARMY GROUP NORTH AREA OF OPERATIONS

NORTHERN THEATER

Army of Norway – GenObst N. von Falkenhorst

Mountain Corps Norway – Gen MtnTr E. Dietl

2nd Mtn Div – GenMaj E. Schlemmer

3rd Mtn Div – GenLt H. Kreysing

Higher Commando XXXVI – Gen Inf H. Feige

169 Inf Div – GenMaj K. Dittmar

SS-Division Nord – SS-Brigadeführer K.-M. Demelhuber

6th Div (Finnish)

Finnish Army – Marshal Mannerheim

14th Div – Col Raapana

Karelian Army – GenLt Heinrichs

1st Div (Res) – Col Paalu

17th Div – Col Snellman

163rd Inf Div (Germ) – GenLt Engelbrecht

Group Oinonen – GenMaj Oinonen

Cavalry Bde – Col Ehrenrooth

2nd Jäger Bde – Col Sundman

1st Jäger Bde (Res) – Col Lagus

VI Corps – MajGen Talvela

5th Div – Col Koskimies

11th Div – Col Heiskanen

VII Corps – MajGen Hagglund

7th Div – Col Svensson

19th Div – Col Hannuksela

II Corps – MajGen Laatikainen

2nd Div – Col Blick

15th Div – Col Hersalo

18th Div – Col Pajari

10th Div (Res) – Col Sihvo

IV Corps – LtGen Oesch

12th Div – Col Vihma

4th Div – Col Viljanen

8th Div – Col Winell

ARMY GROUP NORTH – GFM W. Ritter von Leeb

XXIII Corps – Gen Inf A. Schubert

206th Inf Div – GenLt H. Hoefl

251st Inf Div – GenLt H. Kratzert

254th Inf Div – GenLt W. Behschnitt

CDR Rear Area 101 – GenLt F. Roques

207th Sec Div – GenLt K. von Tiedmann

281st Sec Div – GenLt F. Bayer

285th Sec Div – GenMaj W. Elder Herr und Freiherr von

Plotho

In transit to the theater:

Polizei Division – SS-Gruppenführer A. Mülverstedt/

SS-Obergruppenführer W. Krüger

86th Inf Div – GenLt J. Witthoeft

18th Army – GenObst G. von Küchler

291st Inf Div – GenLt K. Herzog

I Corps – Gen Inf K.-H. von Both

1st Inf Div – GenLt P. Kleffel

11th Inf Div – GenLt H. von Boeckmann

21st Inf Div – GenLt O. Sponheimer

XXVI Corps – Gen Art A. Wodrig

61st Inf Div – GenLt S. Haenicke

217th Inf Div – GenLt R. Baltzer

XXXVIII Corps – Gen Inf F.-W. von Chappuis

58th Inf Div. – GenLt I. Heunert

4th Panzer Group – GenObst E. Hoepner

SS-Division Totenkopf – SS-Obergruppenführer T. Eicke

XLI Pz Corps – Gen PzTr G.-H. Reinhardt

1st Pz Div – GenLt F. Kirchner

6th Pz Div – GenMaj F. Landgraf

36th Mot Inf Div – GenLt O. Ottenbacher

269th Inf Div – GenMaj E. von Leyser

LVI Pz Corps – Gen Inf E. von Manstein

8th Pz Div – GenMaj E. Brandenburger

3rd Mot Inf Div – GenLt C. Jahn

290th Inf Div – GenLt T. Freiherr von Wrede

16th Army – GenObst E. Busch

253rd Inf Div – GenLt O. Schellert

II Corps – Gen Inf W. Graf von Brockdorff-Ahlenfeldt

12th Inf Div – GenMaj W. von Seydlitz-Kurzbach

32nd Inf Div – GenMaj W. Bohnstedt

121st Inf Div – GenMaj O. Lancelle

X Corps – Gen Art C. Hansen

30th Inf Div – GenLt K. von Tippelskirch

126th Inf Div – GenLt P. Laux

XXVII Corps – Gen Inf M. von Wiktorin

122nd Inf Div – GenMaj S. Macholz

123rd Inf Div – GenLt W. Lichel

Naval Command Group North

* No two sources on orders of battle for Barbarossa agree. The primary source for the German order of battle is Boog (ed.), Germany and the Second World War.

ARMY GROUP CENTER AREA OF OPERATIONS

ARMY GROUP CENTER – GFM F. von Bock

OKH Reserve:

Higher Command XXXV – Gen Kav R. Koch-Erpach

15th Inf Div – GenLt E-E. Hell (from July 3)

52nd Inf Div – GenMaj L. Rendulic (from June 26)

106th Inf Div – GenMaj E. Dehmer (from July 1)

110th Inf Div – GenLt E. Seifert (from June 26)

112th Inf Div – Gen Inf F. Mieth (from July 1)

197th Inf Div – GenLt H. Meyer-Rabingen (from June 26)

Lehr Bde (mot) 900 – Obst W. Krause (from June 22)

Army Group Reserve:

293rd Inf Div – GenLt J. von Obernitz

Third Panzer Group – GenObst H. Hoth

XXXIX Panzer Corps – Gen PzTr R. Schmidt

7th Pz Div – GenMaj H. von Funck

20th Pz Div – GenMaj H. Stumpff

14th Mot Inf Div – GenLt F. Fuerst

20th Mot Inf Div – GenMaj H. Zorn

LVII Panzer Corps – Gen PzTr A. Kuntzen

12th Pz Div – GenMaj J. Harpe

19th Pz Div – GenLt O. von Knoblesdorff

18th Mot Inf Div – GenMaj F. Herrlein

V Army Corps – Gen Inf R. Ruoff

5th Inf Div – GenMaj K. Allmendinger

35th Inf Div – GenLt W. von Weikersthal

VI Army Corps – Gen Pi O-W. Foerster

6th Inf Div – GenLt H. Auleb

26th Inf Div – GenMaj W. Weiss

Ninth Army – GenObst A. Strauss

VIII Army Corps – Gen Art W. Heitz

8th Inf Div – GenMaj G. Hoehne

28th Inf Div – GenLt J. Sinnhuber

161st Inf Div – GenLt H. Wilck

XX Army Corps – Gen Inf W. Materna

162nd Inf Div – GenLt H. Franke

256th Inf Div – GenLt G. Kauffmann

XLII Army Corps – Gen Pi W. Kuntze

87th Inf Div – GenLt B. von Studnitz

102nd Inf Div – GenLt J. Ansat

129th Inf Div – GenMaj S. Rittau

Fourth Army – GFM Günther H. von Kluge

VII Army Corps – Gen Art W. Fahrmbacher

7th Inf Div – GenLt E. von Gablenz

23rd Inf Div – GenMaj H. Hellmich

258th Inf Div – GenMaj W. Henrici

268th Inf Div – GenLt E. Straube

XIII Army Corps – Gen Inf H. Felber

17th Inf Div – GenLt H. Loch

78th Inf Div – GenLt C. Gallenkamp

IX Army Corps – Gen Inf H. Geyer

137th Inf Div – GenLt H. Kamencke

263rd Inf Div – GenLt F. Karl

292nd Inf Div – GenLt M. Dehmel

XLII Army Corps – Gen Inf G. Heinrici

131st Inf Div – GenLt H. Meyer-Buerdorff

134th Inf Div – GenLt C. von Cochenhausen

252th Inf Div – GenLt D. von Boehm-Benzing

Second Panzer Group – GenObst H. Guderian

Reserve:

255th Inf Div – Gen Inf W. Wetzel

XXIV Panzer Corps – Gen PzTr L. Geyr von Schweppenburg

3rd Pz Div – GenLt W. Model

4th Pz Div – GenMaj W. von Langermann

10th Mot Inf Div – GenLt F-W. von Loeper

1st Cav Div – GenLt O. Mengers

267th Inf Div – GenMaj R. Martinek

XLVI Panzer Corps – Gen PzTr H. von Vietinghoff

10th Pz Div – GenLt F. Schaal

Inf Regt “Grossdeutschland” – Obst W-H. von

Stockenhausen

SS Reich – SS-Ogruf P. Hausser

XLVII Panzer Corps – Gen PzTr J. Lemelsen

17th Pz Div – GenLt H-J. von Arnim

18th Pz Div – GenMaj W. Nehring

29th Mot Inf Div – GenMaj W. von Boltenstern

167th Inf Div – GenLt H. Schoenhaerl

XII Army Corps – Gen Inf W. Schroth

31st Inf Div – GenMaj G. Berthold

34th Inf Div – GenLt H. Behrendorff

45th Inf Div – GenMaj F. Schlieper

Rear Army Area 102 – GenLt M. von Schenkendorff

221st Security Div – GenLt J. Pflugbeil

286th Security Div – GenLt K. Mueller

403rd Security Div – GenLt W. Ditfurth

ARMY GROUP SOUTH AREA OF OPERATIONS

ARMY GROUP SOUTH – FM G. von Rundstedt

Chief of Staff: Gen G. von Sodenstern

99th Light Inf Div – GenLt K. von der Chevallerie

Higher Commando XXXIV

4th Mtn Div – GenMaj K. Eglseer

113th Inf Div

125th Inf Div – Gen W. Schneckenburger

132th Inf Div

LI Army Corps

79th Inf Div

95th Inf Div

First Panzer Group – Col Gen E. von Kleist

13th Pz Div – GenLt F-W. von Rothkirch

16th Mot Inf Div – GenMaj S. Henrici

25th Mot Inf Div – GenLt H. Cloessner

SS Mot Div LSSAH – Obergruppenführer S. Dietrich

III Motorized Corps (Pz) – Gen Kav E. von Mackensen

14th Pz Div – GenMaj F. Kuehn

44th Inf Div – GenLt F. Siebert

298th Inf Div – GenMaj Graessner

XIV Motorized Corps (Pz) – Gen Inf G. von Wietersheim

9th Pz Div – GenLt Dr. A. Ritter von Hubicki

16th Pz Div – GenMaj H. Hube

SS Mot Div Viking – Brigadeführer F. Steiner

XLVIII Motorized Corps (Pz.) – Gen W. Kempff

11th Pz Div – GenMaj L. Cruewell

57th Inf Div – GenLt O. Bluemm

75th Inf Div – GenLt E. Hammer

XXIX Army Corps – Gen Inf H. von Obstfelder

111th Inf Div – GenLt O. Stapf

299th Inf Div – GenMaj W. Moser

II Flak Corps – Gen O. Dessloch

Sixth Army – FM W. von Reichenau

LV Army Corps (Res) – Gen Inf E. Vierow

168th Inf Div – GenLt Dr. Mundt

XVII Army Corps – Gen Inf W. Kienitz

56th Inf Div – GenMaj K. von Oven

62nd Inf Div – GenLt W. Keiner

XLIV Army Corps – Gen Inf F. Koch

9th Inf Div – GenMaj F. von Schleinitz

297th Inf Div – GenLt M. Pfeffer

Eleventh Army – Col Gen E. Ritter von Schobert

Rumanian Cavalry Corps (Res) – Gen M. Racovita

22nd Inf Div – GenLt H. Graf von Sponek

Rumanian Defense: 72nd Inf Div – GenLt F. Mattenklott

XI Army Corps – Gen Inf J. von Kortzfleisch

76th Inf Div – GenLt M. de Angelis

239th Inf Div – GenLt F. Neuling

8th Rumanian Inf Div

6th Rumanian Cav Bde

XXX Army Corps – Gen Inf H. von Salmuth

198 Inf Div – GenMaj O. Roettig

14th Rumanian Inf Div

5th Rumanian Cav Bde

LIV Army Corps – Gen Cav E. Hansen

50th Inf Div – GenLt K. Hollidt

170th Inf Div – GenMaj W. Wittke

Rumanian Mtn. Corps – Gen G. Arramescu

7th Rumanian Inf Div

1st Rumanian Mtn Div

2nd Rumanian Mtn Div

4th Rumanian Mtn Div

8th Rumanian Cav Bde

Seventeenth Army – Gen Inf C-H. von Stulpnagel

97th Light Inf Div – GenMaj M. Fretter-Pico

100th Light Inf Div – GenMaj W. Sanne

IV Army Corps – Gen Inf V. von Schwedler

24th Inf Div – GenMaj H. von Tettau

71st Inf Div – GenMaj A. von Hartmann

262nd Inf Div – GenLt E. Thiessen

295th Inf Div – GenMaj H. Geitner

296th Inf Div – GenMaj W. Stemmermann

XLIX Mountain Corps – Gen Mtntr L. Kuebler

1st Mtn Div – GenMaj H. Lanz

68th Inf Div – GenMaj G. Braum?

257th Inf Div – GenMaj C. Sachs

LII Army Corps – Gen Inf K. von Briesen

101st Light Inf Div – GenMaj E. Marcks

Slovak Corps

1st Slovak Inf Div

2nd Slovak Inf Div

Rear Army Area 103 – Gen Inf K. von Rocques

213rd Sec (Security) Div – GenLt l’Homme de Coubiere

444th Sec Div – GenLt Russwurm

445th Sec Div – GenLt Krantz

ARMY GROUP ANTONESCU – Gen I. Antonescu

11th Rumanian Inf Div

II Rumanian Corps – Gen N. Macici

9th Rumanian Inf Div

10th Rumanian Inf Div

7th Rumanian Cav Bde

Third Rumanian Army – Gen P. Dumitrescu

IV Rumanian Corps

1 x Cav Bn

6th Rumanian Inf Div

Fourth Rumanian Army – Gen N. Cuiperca

III Rumanian Corps – Gen V. Atanasiu

Rumanian Guards Div

15th Rumanian Inf Div

35th Rumanian Res Inf Div

V Rumanian Corps – Gen L. Gheorghe

Rumanian Frontier Div

21st Rumanian Inf Div

XI Rumanian Corps – Gen I. Aurellian

1st Rumanian Fortress Bde

2nd Rumanian Fortess Bde

Luftflotte 4 – Col Gen A. Lohr

Luftwaffe Mission Rumanian – Gen W. Speidel

Fliegerkorps IV – GenLt K. Pflugbeil

KG 27

JG 77

Fliegerkorps V – GenLt R. Ritter von Greim

KG 51

KG 54

KG 55

JG 3

Rumanian Air Combat Group

1st Bomber Wing

2nd Bomber Wing

2nd Fighter-Bomber Wing

1st Fighter Wing

Soviet Forces

At three times the size of the continental United States, the USSR was the world’s largest country. While it also had the largest army, internal tensions, including the effects of the purges and doctrinal turbulence, almost negated much of this advantage. Far from being the brittle “colossus of clay” hoped for by the German High Command, it survived despite many failings. However, the Red Army very nearly proved incapable of saving the USSR. In fact during Barbarossa numerous Soviet units mutinied or killed their commissars. In the final analysis, despite losing 4.5 million men in first five months of war, it was the Soviet system that held the state together.

National Leadership

The Soviet Union was born in war and was in crisis, at war, or preparing for war for most of its existence. Despite the dictator’s supposed leadership experiences gained during the Russian Civil War, Zhukov considered Stalin strictly a military dilettante. During the early stages of the Nazi–Soviet War he constantly interfered in military decisions with disastrous results. Unlike Hitler, however, Stalin learned to trust his professional experts as the war progressed. Quite apart from the manifest failures of the Tsarist army, Soviet theorists blamed Russia’s collapse during World War I on three other factors: the incompetence or outright rebellion of the peasantry, the corrupt bureaucracy, and poor railroads. Uncompromising Communist Party leadership rectified these issues and took pains to eliminate earlier “isolated caste relations” so that no alternative to Stalin’s state arose during what was referred to as the Great Patriotic War in the USSR.

A Soviet described in the German caption as a divisional political officer (“commissar”) is interrogated by his captors, although the red star forearm badge of that status is not visible in this print. If he is a commissar then his life expectancy is now minimal; Hitler issued express orders that such prisoners were to be executed. (Author’s collection)

By 1941 the USSR was a garrison state; if it was to survive, internal security had to be the first priority. Stalin’s notorious purges lasted from 1937 right up to Barbarossatag; among their first and most famous victims was Marshal M.N. Tukhachevsky, who was persecuted on the basis of trumped-up evidence known to have originated with the Gestapo. The psychological damage of the purges was perhaps greater than the material. It is often said that fear stifled the initiative of field commanders; as significant is the fact that the purges caused a widespread lack of trust in the Soviet leadership and a diminished faith in the institutions of the state. Soldiers might wonder why it had taken Stalin so long to uncover the “traitors”; and, if the rank and file could not trust stalwarts such as Tukhachevsky, whom could they trust?

Other forms of turbulence plagued the Soviet military during the interwar period as well. Political commissars in military units had proved their worth during the Russian Civil War, lost favor in the 1920s, and regained influence during the purges, but were again discredited after the Winter War. The Red Army led much of the world in military mechanization through the mid-1930s, but stagnated after the Spanish Civil War only to rebound after watching the blitzkrieg dismember France. By mid-1940 the Red Army re-established general and admiral ranks and toughened discipline. There became no such thing as a criminal order from above; all orders needed to be obeyed accurately, punctually, and without contradiction.

New commanders came to the fore in mid-1940 following the debacle in Finland. Marshals S.K. Timoshenko and B.M. Shaposhnikov took over as Defense Commissar and Deputy/Chief of Staff respectively. They, and Zhukov from January of the next year, tried but failed to reform the Soviet military after decades of chaos bordering on negligence. Entrenched conservatives (as everywhere) challenged the efforts of the reformers, as did the NKVD. Like Germany, the USSR suffered from a lack of strategic thinking. At a three-week meeting of the Main Military Council held immediately before the famous December–January wargames, most participants concentrated on the tactical lessons of the Spanish Civil War, Khalkin Gol, and the Winter War (these three small wars made up the bulk of the USSR’s interwar combat experiences); it seemed that only Timoshenko thought of strategy and a possible war against Hitler.

German Generals

Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, 1881–1948, German Army Supreme Commander

Field Marshal von Brauchitsch was German Army Supreme Commander from 1938–1941. He was a page in the court of Wilhelm II. Commissioned as a lieutenant in the guards artillery, he served as a captain and general staff officer throughout World War I. He succeeded General Werner von Fritsch as army commander when the latter succumbed to Nazi intrigues. In 1938, von Brauchitsch divorced his estranged wife of 28 years (with whom he had four children) and remarried with Hitler’s financial support. His second wife was an ardent Nazi. The general always seemed to be short of money and compensated for an unhappy family life by “working like an ox” in his office at all hours.

While negotiating with Hitler for the army commander position he agreed to 1) “lead the Army closer toward the state and its philosophy”; 2) choose a more suitable chief of staff to replace Beck; and 3) reorganize the Army High Command structure. He refused to participate in any of the anti-Hitler opposition prevalent in the Army’s leadership. Supposedly von Brauchitsch admired Hitler personally yet detested the Nazis: however, in many photographs a Party pin is conspicuous on his uniform.

Von Brauchitsch complained but went along with preparations for the Polish operation. The 1939 campaign was his first and last in a position of real operational authority. When Hitler unilaterally decided to invade the West later that same autumn, von Brauchitsch demurred, citing army ill-discipline and uneven training. The Führer grudgingly went along with the recommendation, one of the last times he paid serious attention to his army commander. Von Brauchitsch showed some understanding of the blitzkrieg and made positive contributions to the Western campaign. However, by then Hitler and Halder had taken increased roles. Nevertheless, on July 19, 1940 he was rewarded by Hitler with a field marshal’s baton.

As commander in chief von Brauchitsch was involved in Barbarossa’s planning, operations, and direction. In many instances he intervened in the petty personality conflicts between senior commanders. But as the campaign went on he became marginalized by stronger-willed men such as Hitler himself, Halder, von Bock, and von Rundstedt. Evidently Hitler did not speak to his generals with the decorum to which they were accustomed; this had a negative effect on the health of von Brauchitsch. On November 10 he suffered a heart attack and deteriorated further. With the failure before Moscow Hitler cast about for scapegoats and settled on von Brauchitsch.

The field marshal retired for medical reasons on December 19 and disappeared into relative obscurity while Hitler took the title of Army Supreme Commander for himself. Never recalled, he was captured by British forces in May 1945. Nearly blind, in October 1948 he died of heart problems awaiting war crimes trials.

Colonel General Franz Halder, 1884–1972, Chief of the German General Staff

Halder was a Bavarian Protestant and artillery officer who during World War I never served below the corps echelon. He earned a reputation as a solid officer with a good mind for staff work. Early in the Third Reich he helped oversee the Wehrmacht’s massive expansion and he seems to have had a generally positive view of Hitler’s chancellorship. Like many German officers he disliked radical Nazism but approved of Hitler’s strengthening Germany’s position in Europe. After the Nazis engineered the removal of Ludwig Beck as army chief of staff, Halder replaced him in August 1938.

Halder’s superiors and peers, including Beck, saw him as a diligent but dull mediocrity, “a very good soldier but hardly a man of great caliber.” Telford Taylor described him as “a stuffy, schoolmasterish and unimpressive, a little man who was, like von Brauchitsch, constantly torn between ambition and anxiety.”¹ His moral fiber was stronger than the commander-in-chief’s, but he was also more opinionated and prideful and not bound by personal obligation to Hitler. Halder, “deeply resented being overruled by Hitler in the sphere of military questions.”²

Prior to the outbreak of World War II Halder developed a pattern of passive-aggressive resistance to Hitler. His plot against the Führer during the Czechoslovak crisis was stillborn when Britain and France caved in at Munich. He frequently schemed against the dictator but always insisted that others do the heavy lifting. Alan Clark wrote that Halder and the Generaltät were “outmanoeuvred politically, forsaking one foothold after another in a downhill retreat from their pinnacle of influence [under von Hindenburg].”³ Many factors contributed to this phenomenon, none vital in isolation, but in the atmosphere of disillusionment, confused loyalties, self-interest, and escapist devotion to the narrow technicalities of their positions, all combined to create discontent.

Halder assertively intrigued against Hitler well past the Polish campaign. In every case Halder backed down, a sobbing, trembling nervous wreck. His Case Yellow plan against France was an unimaginative rehash of the von Schlieffen plan. When von Manstein presented Hitler with a brilliant alternative Halder did all he could to subvert it. After the fall of France, William Shirer attended Hitler’s Reichstag victory speech on July 19, 1940. “Saddest figure in the assembly was General Halder,” he wrote. “I watched him – classically intellectual face – seemed to be hiding a weariness, a sadness, as he warmly congratulated the younger generals who were now … over him as field marshals.”

As the present narrative makes clear, Halder strived to make Barbarossa work only so long as it suited his selfish purposes. When Hitler deviated from the chief of staff’s concept, notably over the importance of Moscow, Halder conspired against him like a petulant adolescent. Unlike von Brauchitsch, the general evaded becoming a casualty when Barbarossa smashed against the rocks of Zhukov’s Moscow defenses.

After Hitler dismissed von Brauchitsch relations between Hitler and Halder grew steadily worse. Von Manstein saw the two men in August 1942: Hitler taunted Halder with his lack of combat experience while Halder mumbled under his breath about the differences between professional and “untutored” opinion. Finally on September 24, 1942, Hitler released Halder, who according to John Toland, had annoyed him above all others as a prophet of doom.⁴ Hitler told Halder, “Half my exhaustion is due to you. It is not worth going on.” Halder somehow avoided execution, either after the 1944 Attentat or at Nuremberg. After the war he worked for the US Army’s Historical Division, where he would foist his self-serving revisionist history on anyone who would listen.

1 Taylor, Sword and Swastika, p.214.

2 Ibid

3 Clark, Barbarossa, p.20.

4 Toland, Adolf Hitler, p.719.

Soviet riflemen in action. Infantry bore the brunt of the fighting for both armies. The Red Army proved tenacious in defense, always ready to counterattack and willing to continue fighting past the point where soldiers of other armies would have surrendered. (NARA)

Of course Stalin stood at the top of the Soviet national security hierarchy as the chairman of the State Defense Committee. That war cabinet functioned through the Stavka – the new headquarters of the High Command – created the day after Barbarossa began, and directed operations by issuing orders which coordinated their timing, conduct, and objectives. Stavka’s main executive organ was the Red Army’s General Staff, the chief of which since January 1941 was Zhukov.

Doctrine

Writings in the 1920s had voiced fuzzy theories about a “proletarian” way of war; but, even in 1939, a Field Regulation boasted that the “invincible, all shattering Red Army” would take war to the enemy and “achieve decisive victory with little blood” – an emphasis that carried over to the next year’s edition. Soviet doctrine was essentially offensive: after a brief defense along their borderlands, the Red Army would attack into the enemy’s home territory. Even after the fall of France, Soviet leaders – ignoring both the lessons of blitzkrieg and their own maneuver doctrine – thought in anachronistic terms of a lengthy border battle followed by breakthrough operations.

Marshal Tukhachevsky and others stressed the attack. Nevertheless, in the winter of 1939–40 Soviet offensives failed against Finland despite a 5:1 superiority. In the aftermath of the fall of France and the Soviet High Command shakeup of January 1941, Stalin and Zhukov hoped Hitler would not attack until 1942, allowing them time to improve the Red Army’s defensive capabilities. The official Soviet history states, evidently without irony, “Our prewar theory had not fully worked out the problems of organizing and conducting the defense.”

The assumption that the Red Army would have time to mobilize before launching its counteroffensive stands out as a critical failure of the October 1940 and May 1941 State Defense Plans; however, prior to June 22 the Soviet commanders had actually implemented most of the conditions required of their “special threatening military period.” Since the Red Army had given little thought to the defense it had no shield behind which to prepare. They also failed completely to anticipate the nature of a potential German attack. After the war, Zhukov wrote that neither he, Timoshenko, nor Shaposhnikov “calculated that the enemy would concentrate such a mass of armored and motorized forces and hurl them in compact groups on all strategic axes on the first day.”

Prewar German assessments rated Marshal S.K. Timoshenko (center left) as the Red Army’s best senior general. Events proved to be a harsher judge, and within a year Stalin had relegated his old Civil War crony to marginal jobs. Never far from power, the stooping General G.K. Zhukov stands to the marshal’s immediate left. The senior generals in both German and Soviet armies had to subordinate their prerogatives to strong and revolutionary political overlords, to learn new technologies and doctrines, and to adjust to massive expansions of forces. (Elukka)

Time to go! Seemingly in a hurry, Red Army soldiers with Maxim machine gun abandon their fighting position. (From the fonds of the RGAKFD in Krasnogorsk via Stavka)

Force Structure

Stalin’s purges certainly weakened the senior Soviet military and administrative leadership; but new scholarship shows that this NKVD Yezhovshchina²⁰ had less impact than earlier thought. Nevertheless, disruptions in most echelons of command were great as nearly 55,000 officers were affected from 1937 to 1941. Slightly more than 8 percent of Red Army officers were purged in 1938 (the worst year) – far short of the 30–50 percent previously quoted. Massive Soviet military expansion, especially following 1938, had far more impact on the decline of the army’s quality. The Red Army added 111 rifle divisions, 12 rifle brigades, plus 50 tank and motorized divisions between January 1939 and May 1941, overall personnel strength growing from 1,500,000 to more than 5 million. Therefore in a great number of cases officers were promoted significantly above their competency levels. During that period the proportion of officers attending required schooling plummeted, course length shrank from 36 to 24 months and later to 18 months, and the rank of instructors fell from major or captain to senior lieutenant.

The purges had also caused a decline in respect for all officers. This attitude applied to a purged officer’s replacement and even to those officers who were quickly reinstated to service (one-third of the total). Discipline throughout the army was universally poor, with what was called shapkozkidatel’stvo (hat tossing) symptomatic of the malaise. The transfer of too many field-grade officers to new higher headquarters contributed to this weakness and one report described the loose relations between company-grade officers and their men as “pseudo democratic.” The system then in place had no formalized rewards or punishments. Timoshenko implemented changes in summer 1940, but nearly a year later inspections of units reported frustratingly little progress. Barbarossawould expose these weaknesses all too clearly.

Red Army infantry firing from a trench while their comrades advance with the ubiquitous fixed bayonets. (Corbis)

Fatefully, the Soviet leaders made a conscious decision to field more partial-strength formations rather than fewer full-strength ones. This sent many field-grade officers and generals to the staffs of additional division and corps headquarters rather than retaining quality leadership at the lower tactical levels. The infantry, which would do most of the fighting in any future war, also gave up many of its junior officers to other branches such as tank troops, the Red Army Air Force, and NKVD security units.

After the shocking wake-up call represented by Hitler’s destruction of France, the USSR accelerated its frantic military reforms. These changes negatively affected nearly every aspect of its national security establishment. Also, the closer one got to the frontier region adjacent to Nazi-occupied Poland the worse the situation became. Stalin’s old warhorse Timoshenko faced a daunting task.

Furthermore, on the eve of Barbarossa the 170 divisions in the western USSR were short by 1.5 million men. Even if all 800,000 soldiers mobilized in the spring of 1941 had gone to these units they would have made up only half the shortfall; in fact, half of those newly mobilized men went to the Army Air Force, and to units deep in the interior of the USSR. Combined, these factors meant that at the critical point of attack the Red Army was missing essential leadership at the battalion and regiment level in addition to being under-strength everywhere.

Guards Divisions

In a bow to Imperial tradition, the Red Army reintroduced the honorific title of Guards for divisions (and later corps and armies) which excelled on the battlefield. Following the battles of Smolensk, on September 18 it created the first four when the 100th, 127th, 153rd, and 161st Rifle Divisions became the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Guards Rifle Divisions (the first-named already had elite status as the Order of Lenin Division, established in 1923). Initially the only benefit of the new title was a boost to morale; however, later in the war Guards organizations received greater numbers of above-average personnel and equipment.

Infantry

The infantry represented the Red Army’s backbone. The Wehrmacht acknowledged this before the campaign when it listed tough and brave soldiers plus indirect-fire weapons as Soviet strengths. German soldiers discovered through harsh experience that the Red infantry was also Panzersicher (secure against panzers). Prewar infantry divisions technically consisted of 14,483 men although new tables of organization in July reduced this to 10,859 (in reality closer to 6,000). These divisions were also short of weapons, trucks, and equipment in general. Rifle divisions supposedly included a tank battalion, but earlier these had been removed and absorbed into the mechanized corps. Most fronts had an airborne corps of three brigades of four battalions each but these were never used in their intended roles. In fact, most airborne soldiers had made only one or two parachute jumps and many none at all.

The Russian infantryman had a well-earned reputation for toughness, especially in the defense. The German soldiers noted how they “sat in their slit trenches until they were either run down or killed by hand grenade or bayonet.” In the forests common in the north any advantages were magnified; the German troops left their artillery behind and the MG34 lost much of its effectiveness. Here close combat was the rule. Soviet soldiers did not have a scabbard for their bayonet; it was always fixed on their rifle.

Despite conventional wisdom that Red Army soldiers possessed natural field craft skills, the Soviet campaigns of 1939–40 revealed a poor grasp of personal camouflage, entrenching, river-crossing, and other basic tasks. Officers could not read maps, and displayed both drunkenness and naprasnoi smelosti (futile bravery). All were too prone to panic when confronted with opposition or the unexpected. Excessive secrecy, which pervaded all of Soviet society, meant that leaders and soldiers at all levels were surprised by battlefield situations and conditions and therefore less able to adapt. (One week into Barbarossa, rumors ran rampant that Marshal S.M. Budenny had taken Warsaw and Voroshilov was advancing on Berlin!)

Artillery

The Red Army considered artillery its decisive branch. In contrast to that of the Germans, Russian artillery performed poorly in the Great War requiring a complete overhaul between the wars. A rifle division included 12 152mm and 20 122mm howitzers and 16 76mm guns, all excellent pieces. Approximately 37,500 indirect-fire weapons were deployed in the western border areas. Even so, prior to Barbarossatag the artillery branch also suffered from shortages in gun tubes, prime movers, and ammunition. Combat losses almost obliterated divisional artillery by July. Most Red Army artillery operated in the direct-support role at corps and division level where it was easier to control. The Katyusha (codenamed Guards Mortars) fired 36 82mm or 16 132mm rockets per launcher. They were cheap and easy to produce and terrified the German soldiers but suffered from inaccuracy and a slow reload rate plus from being deployed as a new, untried weapons system directly onto the battlefield.

Early in Barbarossa, a Red Army gun crew training prior to going into action. (Elukka)

Antitank artillery represented a critical part of the Red Army’s defensive doctrine and was a sub-set of Soviet artillery. It represented the Red Army’s preferred weapon to destroy enemy tanks. Guns of 45mm and 57mm size and mines were concentrated in antitank brigades. The standard 45mm gun could defeat all contemporary panzer variants. Supposedly motorized, the brigades lost many of their trucks to the new mechanized corps so were essentially unmobilized like the rest of the artillery branch on Barbarossatag. Another part of the artillery branch was antiaircraft artillery, which was also playing a desperate game of catch-up following the blitzkrieg’s demonstration in 1940.

The world’s most technologically advanced tank squandered in a bog: behind a knocked-out T-26, three T-34s are stuck where incompetent crews drove them. The T-34 was the world’s best tank until the arrival of the German PzKpfw V Panther in 1943. (Author’s collection)

Armor and Mechanized Forces

The Red Army had the world’s largest tank park in 1941 while Soviet industry produced prodigious numbers of excellent tanks during the interwar years. Many were obsolete by Barbarossatag, but “older” BT-7 and T-26 tanks were better than Panzer Is or IIs and equal to some marks of Panzer IIIs and IVs. A new generation of tanks, led by the T-34 about which the German military had known since late 1940, was just arriving on the battlefield. The T-34 epitomized the first true main battle tank, combining antitank and infantry-support functions. But even the T-34 had limitations, specifically its weak transmission and two-man turret. The heavy KV-1 mounted the same 76mm gun but its much greater armor weight overtaxed the defective T-34-type transmission. Poor crew skill, maintenance, and supply deprived the Red Army of their potent armored offensive weapon, accounting for fully one-half of all Red Army tank losses during Barbarossa.

The Red Army drew many misguided lessons from the Spanish Civil War, notably identifying tanks as primarily infantry-support weapons. In 1939 they attributed the fall of Poland to the rotten regime, not the Wehrmacht’s panzers, with the result that a month later they disbanded their mechanized corps, only to recreate them the following summer in the aftermath of France’s defeat. David Glantz calls the mechanized corps the armored heart of Red Army. He mentions, however, that there was confusion in the Red Army over the mechanized corps’ two missions: the frontier fight and operational counterattacks.

Always thinking bigger is better, the Red Army created huge unwieldy organizations with the mechanized corps, which were further hamstrung by weak leadership and poor training. Usually consisting of two tank and one motorized division, they proved far beyond their commanders’ ability to manage and lacked any of the panzer corps’ flexibility. The Soviet leadership vainly tried to raise 20 new mechanized corps in the six months preceding Barbarossatag. Mechanized corps that the Red Army did manage to field suffered personnel, weapons, and equipment shortages endemic to the entire Red Army.

Soviet cavalry scout returns from patrol. Early in Barbarossa cavalry was the perfect weapon for the wide open spaces of the USSR. (Corbis)

Cavalry

Partially because of tradition and partly out of common sense, cavalry played a larger role in the Red Army than many other World War II armies. Unfortunately cavalry command cadres were frequently stripped to create mechanized corps headquarters. The branch’s four corps and 13 divisions in many cases represented the only “mobile” formations in some areas of the fighting. It managed to avoid the dangerous reorganization that hamstrung other elements of the Red Army on the eve of war.

NKVD

The political enforcement forces and border guards under the People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD) contributed over 170,000 men to Soviet manpower numbers. The NKVD’s main mission was internal security, and during the interwar years, mass murder throughout Eastern Europe. NKVD and other security forces included numerous division-, regiment-, and battalion-sized units which guarded important state organizations, railroads, critical defense enterprises, and other sensitive sites. Neither border guards nor NKVD troops were heavily armed and cannot be considered trained combat forces.

The terrible mud of the rasputitsa season affected all equally. Here soldiers and civilians (note the woman in a skirt, left) man-handle a Soviet supply truck which has got itself stuck axle deep. (Podzun)

Logistics

Soviet logistics were arguably in an even worse state than the German. All teeth and no tail meant the Red Army had difficulty conducting sustained operations. Much of their logistics base consisted of easily captured or destroyed static dumps. Their mechanized corps, for example, carried only one day’s supplies. In the swirling conditions of Barbarossa the German forces easily interdicted soft-skinned supply vehicles. Out of fuel and often broken down due to untrained crews and poor maintenance, their tanks became, at best, immobile pillboxes. Further, stories are legion about units of all descriptions beginning the war with no ammunition.

Trucks were at a premium despite the high production values of the Five-Year Plans. Mechanized corps’ tanks attacked without motorized infantry because their trucks were hauling supplies in the rear and, critically, many artillery pieces had no prime movers.

Fortifications

An integral part of the shield behind which the Soviet leaders would prepare for their strategic counteroffensives was their fortified regions. Called the Stalin Line by the Germans, these were in no way comparable to the Maginot Line; the main works consisted of bunkers with light artillery and machine guns guarding a specific geographic location or axis of advance. Each fortified region was manned by a regiment with five to ten artillery bunkers, 10–15 machine-gun bunkers, and 15–30 antitank bunkers. One of the two oldest fortified regions was that at Polotsk astride the River Dvina, where the Soviet, Polish, and Lithuanian borders came together. Others, at Minsk, Mozyr, and Slutsk, dated from the 1930s.

Stalin insisted that the defensive lines move west into occupied Poland in 1939. In June 1940, a month after replacing Voroshilov, Timoshenko ordered new construction in these areas, including updating fortress Brest’s defenses. On Barbarossatag most divisions manning the Soviet–German frontier lacked their engineer battalions which were busy building new bunkers and obstacles, markedly degrading the divisions’ combat power. Construction went slowly, partially owing to the same miserable transportation infrastructure that would soon hamstring the Germans’ advance.

After March 1941 Kirponos put maximum effort into their construction, employing 43,000 workers per day. Prior to Barbarossa, Red Army inspectors found the Minsk defenses “deplorable.” The German after-action report claimed that only 193 of the 1,175 forts throughout the Western Front area were equipped and occupied. In the Southwestern Front area the Germans subsequently counted 1,912 completed, combat-ready positions and 192 under construction.

Red Army Air Force

Unlike their brothers on the ground, the air force suffered no inferiority complex after their occupation of Poland or the Winter War. By 1940 the Red Army Air Force received 40 percent of the Soviet military budget. It had fewer than 10,000 aircraft based in the border regions. However, its effectiveness had also peaked in the 1930s and by 1941 it was growing increasingly obsolete. Many veterans of the Spanish Civil War had been framed and arrested during the purges. The dangerous paucity of radios mirrored that of the army. Further, Soviet aviators stubbornly retained the ineffective, three-aircraft “V” formation.

Red Army Air Force crew training and combat experience was far behind that of the Luftwaffe. It also had weak antiaircraft artillery, no protected parking, and limited temporary airfields to which aircraft could disperse when threatened. Only senior leaders carried radios, maps, and target information in their aircraft. The Air Force did have some advantages over the Luftwaffe, however: the benefits in sub-zero temperatures enjoyed by the air-cooled engines of some Soviet fighters over the water-cooled Messerschmitts were obvious. The German military considered the IL-2 Sturmovik “an excellent machine” while the I-16 fighter possessed twice the rate of fire of the Bf 109 and fired a heavier projectile.

The Air Force’s mission under the 1936 regulations was limited to CAS; the USSR gave up on strategic bombing in the late 1930s, when it disbanded its three strategic air armies and canceled the four-engine TB-7 bomber. Fighter forces grew correspondingly. The air force reorganization impacted more than force development, its basing and infrastructure on June 21 were also in turmoil. Prewar Luftwaffe intelligence identified 38 air divisions (120–240 aircraft each) and suspected the existence of 50 more.

Soviet partisans were especially active in the north and particularly effective in the broken, wooded, and swampy terrain that the Germans encountered as they pressed further into Russia. Here some mine a road while their comrades keep watch for German troops. (NARA)

Red Army Air Force losses during the first days and weeks of Barbarossa are well known. But it came fighting back, many aircraft flying 10–14 sorties on June 22. In the Soviet leadership vacuum that day (and for many days to follow) regimental commanders improvised by sending their men against any target. They made little effort to evade German fighters or flak. But total German losses that day of 78 aircraft significantly exceeded their worst day during the Battle of Britain (61 aircraft on September 15, 1940).

Soviet Partisans

From Barbarossa’s first days many Soviet people rose up against the Axis invaders and did not wait for Stalin’s famous speech of July 3. Numerous partisan bands sprang up spontaneously. These could include any mix of civilians, Communist cadres, soldiers who had avoided capture, and escaped POWs. The line between legitimate combatants (soldiers) and partisans (civilians, “bandits” to the Germans) became quickly blurred, as if Hitler would have paid much attention to legal subtleties. Throughout Barbarossa and indeed all of the Nazi–Soviet War rear area security duties took more and more German strength due to the partisan threat, diluting combat power at the front lines.

Soviet Navy

The Red Banner Baltic Fleet had great potential on June 21. It had a competent leader in Admiral Tributs and two battleships, two light cruisers, 47 destroyers or large torpedo boats, 75 submarines, over 200 smaller craft, and hundreds of aircraft. Outnumbering the Kriegsmarine, it nevertheless relied mainly on mines and submarines.

Unfortunately, the loss of all but one naval base and a passive doctrine meant the Red Banner Fleet did not realize its potential. It did survive, however, and in May 1945 it, not the Kriegsmarine, was the victor. In the Arctic Ocean the Northern Fleet was more active, often with the assistance of the Royal Navy.

The USSR dominated the naval war in the south. Against the small Rumanian Navy and a few German E-boats, the Black Sea Fleet counted one old battleship, five cruisers, 17 destroyers, 43 submarines, numerous smaller craft, and 624 aircraft. The Dnepr Flotilla had four monitors weighing up to 900 tons and mounting guns as large as 150mm, plus many gunboats.

SOVIET ORDER OF BATTLE*:

SOUTHWEST FRONT, SOUTHERN FRONT

SOUTHWEST FRONT

LtGen M.P. Kirponos

5th Antitank Brigade

Front units

31st Rifle Corps – MajGen A.I. Lopatin

193th Rifle Division

195th Rifle Division

200th Rifle Division

36th Rifle Corps – MajGen P.V. Sisoev

140th Rifle Division

146th Rifle Division

228th Rifle Division

49th Rifle Corps – MajGen I.A. Kornilov

190th Rifle Division

197th Rifle Division

199th Rifle Division

55th Rifle Corps – MajGen K.A. Koroteev

130th Rifle Division

169th Rifle Division

189th Rifle Division

1st Airborne Corps – MajGen M.A. Usenko

1st Airborne Brigade

204th Airborne Brigade

211th Airborne Brigade

19th Mechanized Corps – MajGen N.V. Feklenko

213th Rifle Division

40th Tank Division

43rd Tank Division

24th Mechanized Corps – MajGen V.I. Christyakov

216th Motorized Division

45th Tank Division

49th Tank Division

5th Army – MajGen M.I. Potapov

1st Antitank Brigade

15th Rifle Corps – Col I.I. Fedyuninsky

45th Rifle Division

62nd Rifle Division

27th Rifle Corps – MajGen P.D. Artemenko

87th Rifle Division

124th Rifle Division

135th Rifle Division

9th Mechanized Corps – MajGen K.K. Rokossovsky

131st Motorized Division

20th Tank Division

35th Tank Division

22nd Mechanized Corps – MajGen S.M. Kondrusev

215th Mechanized Division

19th Tank Division

41st Tank Division

6th Army – LtGen I.N. Muzychenko

3rd Antitank Brigade

6th Rifle Corps – MajGen I.I. Alekseev

41st Rifle Division

97th Rifle Division

159th Rifle Division

37th Rifle Corps – BrigGen S.P. Zibin

80th Rifle Division

139th Rifle Division

141st Rifle Division

5th Cavalry Corps – MajGen F.V. Kamkov

3rd Cavalry Division

14th Cavalry Division

4th Mechanized Corps – MajGen A.A. Vlasov

81st Motorized Division

8th Tank Division

32th Tank Division

15th Mechanized Corps – MajGen I.I. Karpezo

212th Motorized Division

10th Tank Division

37th Tank Division

12th Army – MajGen P.G. Ponedelin

4th Antitank Brigade

13th Rifle Corps – MajGen N.K. Kirillov

44th Rifle Division

58th Rifle Division

192nd Rifle Division

17th Rifle Corps – MajGen I.V. Galanin

60th Mountain Division

69th Mountain Division

164th Rifle Division

16th Mechanized Corps – BrigGen A.D. Sokolov

240th Motorized Division

15th Tank Division

39th Tank Division

26th Army – LtGen F. Ya. Kostenko

2nd Antitank Brigade

8th Corps – MajGen M.G. Snegov

72nd Mountain Division

99th Rifle Division

173rd Rifle Division

8th Mechanized Corps – LtGen D.I. Ryabyshev

7th Motorized Division

12th Tank Division

34th Tank Division

KIEV V.V.S. – A.P. Ionev

19th Bomber Division

62nd Bomber Division

14th Mixed Aviation Division

15th Mixed Aviation Division

16th Mixed Aviation Division

17 Mixed Aviation Division

63rd Mixed Aviation Division

44th Fighter Division

64th Fighter Division

SOUTHERN FRONT

Front units

7th Rifle Corps – MajGen K.L. Dobroserdov

116th Rifle Division

196th Rifle Division

206th Rifle Division

9th Rifle Corps – MajGen V.A. Batov

116th Rifle Division

156th Rifle Division

32nd Cavalry Division

3rd Airborne Corps – MajGen V.A. Glazunov

5th Airborne Brigade

6th Airborne Brigade

212th Airborne Brigade

47th Rifle Division

9th Army – LtGen Ya. T. Cherevichenko

14th Rifle Corps – MajGen D.G. Egorov

25th Rifle Division

51st Rifle Division

35th Rifle Corps – BrigGen I.F. Dashichev

95th Rifle Division

176th Rifle Division

48th Rifle Corps – MajGen R. Ya. Malinovsky

30th Mountain Division

74th Rifle Division

150th Rifle Division

2nd Cavalry Corps – MajGen P.A. Belov

5th Cavalry Division

9th Cavalry Division

2nd Mechanized Corps – LtGen Y.V. Novoselsky

15th Motorized Division

11th Tank Division

16th Tank Division

18th Mechanized Corps – MajGen P.V. Volokh

218th Motorized Division

44th Tank Division

47th Tank Division

ODESSA V.V.S. – Gen F.G. Mishugin

20th Mixed Aviation Division

21st Mixed Aviation Division

45th Mixed Aviation Division

BLACK SEA FLEET V.V.S.

63rd Bomber Brigade

62nd Fighter Brigade

* As with the Axis order of battle, the sources conflict on the details of Red Army organization. The primary source for the Soviet order of battle is Glantz, Barbarossa.

NORTHERN FRONT, NORTHWEST FRONT

NORTHERN FRONT

LtGen M.M. Popov

177th Rifle Division

191st Rifle Division

8th Rifle Brigade

Northern PVO – MajGen M.M. Protsvetkin

39th Fighter Aviation Division

3rd Fighter Aviation Division (PVO)

54th Fighter Aviation Division (PVO)

2nd Mixed Aviation Division

14th Army – LtGen V.A. Frolov

14th Rifle Division

52nd Rifle Division

1st Tank Division

1st Mixed Aviation Division

42nd Rifle Corps – MajGen R.I. Panin

104th Rifle Division

122nd Rifle Division

7th Independent Army – LtGen F.D. Gorelenko

54th Rifle Division

71st Rifle Division

168th Rifle Division

237th Rifle Division

55th Mixed Aviation Division

23rd Army – MajGen P.S. Pshennikov

19th Rifle Corps – MajGen M.N. Gerasimov

115th Rifle Division

142nd Rifle Division

50th Rifle Corps – MajGen V.I. S’cherbakov

43rd Rifle Division

70th Rifle Division

123rd Rifle Division

10th Mechanized Corps – MajGen I.G. Lazarev

21st Tank Division

24th Tank Division

198th Motorcycle Division

7th Motorcycle Regiment

41st Bomber Aviation Division

5th Mixed Aviation Division

NORTHWEST FRONT – ColGen F.I. Kuznetsov

5th Airborne Corps – MajGen I.S. Berugly

9th Airborne Brigade

10th Airborne Brigade

214th Airborne Brigade

Baltic VVS – MajGen A. Ionov

57th Fighter Aviation Division

4th Mixed Aviation Division

6th Mixed Aviation Division

7th Mixed Aviation Division

8th Mixed Aviation Division

9th Antitank Brigade

8th Army – LtGen P.P. Sobennikov

10th Rifle Corps – MajGen I.F. Nikolaev

10th Rifle Division

48th Rifle Division

50th Rifle Division

11th Rifle Corps – MajGen M.S. Shurnilov

11th Rifle Division

125th Rifle Division

12th Mechanized Corps – MajGen N.M. Shestopalov

23rd Tank Division

202nd Mechanized Division

10th Motorcycle Regiment

11th Army – LtGen V.I. Morozov

23rd Rifle Division

126th Rifle Division

128th Rifle Division

16th Rifle Corps – MajGen F.S. Ivanov

5th Rifle Division

33rd Rifle Division

188th Rifle Division

29th Rifle Corps – MajGen A.G. Samokhin

179th Rifle Division

184th Rifle Division

3rd Mechanized Corps – MajGen A.V. Kurkin

2nd Tank Division

5th Tank Division

84th Mechanized Division

27th Army – MajGen M.E. Berzarin

16th Rifle Division

76th Rifle Division

3rd Rifle Brigade

22nd Rifle Corps – MajGen M.P. Dukhanov

180th Rifle Division

182nd Rifle Division

24th Rifle Corps – MajGen K. Kachalov

181st Rifle Division

183rd Rifle Division

Red Banner Baltic Fleet – Vice Adm V.F. Tributs

Northern Fleet – Rear Adm Gorlovko

WESTERN FRONT

WESTERN FRONT

Colonel General D.G. Pavlov

Front units:

2nd Rifle Corps – MajGen A.N. Ermakov

100th Rifle Division

161st Rifle Division

21st Rifle Corps – MajGen V.B. Borisov

17th Rifle Division

24th Rifle Division

37th Rifle Division

44th Rifle Corps – MajGen V.A. Yushkevich

64th Rifle Division

108th Rifle Division

47th Rifle Corps – MajGen S.I. Povetkin

50th Rifle Division

55th Rifle Division

121st Rifle Division

143rd Rifle Division

4th Airborne Corps – MajGen A.S. Zhandov

7th Airborne Brigade

8th Airborne Brigade

214th Airborne Brigade

8th Antitank Brigade

17th Mechanized Corps – MajGen M.P. Petrov

27th Tank Division

36th Tank Division

209th Motorized Division

22nd Motorcycle Regiment

20th Mechanized Corps – MajGen A.G. Nikitin

26th Tank Division

38th Tank Division

210th Motorized Division

24th Motorcycle Regiment

3rd Army – LtGen V.I. Kuznetsov

4th Rifle Corps

27th Rifle Division

56th Rifle Division

85th Rifle Division

11th Mechanized Corps – MajGen D.K. Mostevenko

29th Tank Division

33rd Tank Division

204th Motorized Division

16th Motorcycle Regiment

7th Antitank Brigade

4th Army – MajGen A.A. Korobkov

28th Rifle Corps – MajGen V.S. Popov

6th Rifle Division

42nd Rifle Division

49th Rifle Division

75th Rifle Division

14th Mechanized Corps – MajGen S.I. Oborin

22nd Tank Division

30th Tank Division

205th Motorized Division

20th Motorcycle Regiment

10th Army – MajGen K.D. Golubev

1st Rifle Corps – MajGen F.D. Rubtsev

2nd Rifle Division

8th Rifle Division

5th Rifle Corps – MajGen A.V. Garnov

13th Rifle Division

86th Rifle Division

113th Rifle Division

6th Cavalry Corps – MajGen I.S. Nikitin

6th Cavalry Division

36th Cavalry Division

6th Antitank Brigade

6th Mechanized Corps – MajGen M.G. Khatskilevich

4th Tank Division

7th Tank Division

29th Motorized Division

4th Motorcycle Regiment

13th Mechanized Corps – MajGen P.N. Akhliustin

25th Tank Division

31st Tank Division

208th Motorized Division

18th Motorcycle Regiment

15 While Wehrmacht translates to “armed forces,” in common usage it can refer to the army alone.

16 English, On Infantry, p.89.

17 Military District – one of 17 army administrative divisions of Germany who were responsible for milization, recruiting, etc.

18 Erickson and Dilks, Barbarossa, p.87.

19 Finnish names for wars against the USSR respectively from November 30, 1939 to March 13, 1940 and June 25, 1942 to September 19, 1944.

20 The NKVD’s (People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) arbitrary arrests and shootings, named after commissariat chief N.I. Yezhov.