CHAPTER 5
UNDER THE COMMAND of 12 Corps, 1 Commando Brigade was to conduct another important preliminary assault crossing of the Rhine an hour after the initial assault by 51st Highland Division and ten miles up stream. Brigadier Mills-Roberts was given the task of seizing the town of Wesel, an important communications centre on the east bank, which was a strongpoint that, if not captured promptly, would dominate important crossing and bridging points and routes in the centre of 21st Army Group’s area of operations.
Lieutenant General Ritchie, Commander XII Corps:
... had given it as his considered opinion that the whole of the operation as it affected his formation depended on this assault being successful. It was considered too, that the success of the attack on the town depended in turn largely on the success of two very heavy bombing raids on the area.
At Wesel the Rhine was a little narrower than elsewhere, at about two hundred yards wide but the speed through the narrower channel was slightly higher at around five knots. As usual the river was prevented from flooding the surrounding country by dykes, from fifteen to twenty feet in height. While the town was built on the banks of the river behind high dykes, to the north west, there were in the surrounding area the usual several hundred yards of open flood plains. Wesel itself was a medium size town of some twenty-four thousand inhabitants. The old town, much of it medieval, was strongly built, largely of stone, but with a high proportion of wood. Like most towns on the Rhine, Wesel had already received the attentions of the Allied air forces, finally by 77 Lancasters of No. 3 Group on the afternoon immediately before the attack.
Brigadier Mills-Roberts.
There was not much information on the dispositions of the enemy in the town, which was in the sector thought to be held by Major-General Heinz Fiebig’s 84th Volksgrenadier Division. In fact the town had its own garrison of volkssturm, under Major General Deutch, with at least one of the numerous ersatz battalions (probably 317th), made up of administrative troops extracted from the rear areas. Brigadier Mills-Roberts wrote:
When I was eventually told to make my preliminary recce I walked through the small riverside villages, which nestled beneath the enormous flood dyke on our side of the river.... Looking across the river, I saw the town of Wesel, with the tall spires of several churches. It was going to be difficult to marshal our 1,600 men for the crossing without being observed by the Germans.
Using air photographs and maps he and his commanding officers,
... could barely see the enemy defences at this distance but with the help of our marked maps we could see that the flood plain was defended by a trench system close to the river bank itself, while further back were two large isolated waterman’s houses garrisoned by stronger forces. There were even stronger German forces further back, where the flood plain merged with higher ground. And I could see that a frontal assault on the town of Wesel was virtually impossible – the Germans had taken elaborate precautions against such an emergency.
1 Commando Brigade’s Plan
The mission given to 1 Commando Brigade was ‘to seize Wesel and hold the eastern and southern exits bombing raids the Commando brigade was to cross rush into the city while its defences were still ‘punch drunk’; secondly, to achieve surprise, it was decided to cross at the most unlikely spot, some open and the river before the second raid and form up ready to of the town’. Brigadier Mills-Roberts’ recce and appreciation led him to base his brigade plan on five points: first, that to take full advantage of the muddy flood plain two miles west of Wesel; thirdly, there was to be no attempt to secure the entire town, as it would not be possible to clear the whole area, before the inevitable counter-attacks; the brigade would therefore seize a compact area including a large factory area dominating the northern approaches to Wesel; fourthly, there should be no trace of the Brigade on the flood plain at dawn, leaving the Germans unaware of their strength and whereabouts. This meant that the commandos would have to carry their own supplies, as a ferry would not be established until the town was clear. Fifthly, Mills-Roberts knew that by landing across the muddy flood plain he would be unable to take heavy weapons on the crossing. He believed, however, that the German armour would have been drawn away by 51st Highland Division’s landing and that they would wish to avoid the risk of fighting in the rubble of an urban area where they would be vulnerable. Consequently, with limited carrying capacity and the river mud, the anti-tank guns were to be left behind but it was, however, expected that the ubiquitous German Panzerfausts would be captured in large numbers from the defenders, which could be used by the commandos in extremis.
1 Commando Brigade shoulder flash.
The four commando units, 45 and 46 Commandos Royal Marines and Nos. 3 and 6 (Army) Commandos, were joined by, amongst others, 84 Field Company RE and parties from a Mountain Regiment RA. This regiment, the nearest thing to commando gunners at that time, would provide forward observation parties and direct fire support. Their rear link from Brigade HQ, to Regimental HQ and CRA 12 Corps, on whom the commandos relied for their heavy fire support was vital. The LVTs allocated to the Brigade were to be operated by 77 Assault Squadron RE, who had sufficient vehicles to carry a single commando across the river in one lift before returning to collect the next of two waves.
Brigadier Mills-Roberts summarised his plan:
I decided to send 46 Commando over first in the Buffaloes and go with them with a small Brigade Headquarters. No. 46 had to capture the bank of the river and 6 Commando – which would be next ashore from the storm boats – had to sweep up the river bank and enter Wesel. The other two commandos would be brought across the river by the Buffalo ferry.
Having captured much of the town, reenforcement of the lightly armed commandos, was to come in the form of 1 Cheshires being ferried across the river at the earliest opportunity. Meanwhile, 17th US Airborne Division was to drop north of Wesel at 1000 hours and link up with the Commando Brigade in the northern part of the town. The airborne drop would take between three and four hours, during which artillery fire would not be possible. For that period, the Commando Brigade would have to hold on to Wesel without fire support.
Commando qualification badge.
1 COMMANDO BRIGADE’S OPERATION WIDGEON PLAN
LVTs preparing for the Rhine crossing.
The view across the Rhine from Grau Insel.
The Crossing
With the codeword confirming that the operation was on, finally being received at 1715 hours, the battle was started at 1730 hours by the afternoon air raid on Wesel by medium bombers. Mills-Roberts commented that ‘It was a short sharp attack, lasting fifteen minutes’. The Commandos watched from their hide locations, the procession of a hundred aircraft going over to their target in a steady stream. As the drone of aero engines faded ‘a great pall of dust hung over the city’. At 1800 hours, the artillery bombardment started and ‘from that moment the roll of gun fire until long after H-hour was continuous’.
Bill Sadler of No. 6 Commando recalled the march from their Assembly Area down to the Rhine:
After some miles of continuous marching, the packs and equipment began to assume twice their original proportions and weight but shortly before reaching the river, a halt was called to supply the column with some unexpected and welcome refreshment. Our packs and equipment were left in position to move off again, while each man collected his issue of tea, rum (a dessertspoon of rum – a life-giving fluid) and sandwiches – the last bread we would see until the end of the war.
There is some evidence that a mere dessertspoonful of rum, as issued to the commandos, was meagre, when compared with that issued elsewhere to the assault troops.
The loads carried by the Commandos were considerable. For instance, No. 5 (Heavy Weapons) Troop of 6 Commando, manhandled two medium machine guns, along with their tripods, sights, ammunition and three ‘K-guns’, with an ample supply of preloaded reserve magazines, so that each man in the troop was carrying at least 100 pounds.
Meanwhile, Brigadier Mills-Roberts with his tactical HQ, along with Major Ted Rushton of 3rd Mountain Regiment and his signals detachment, embarked in the Buffaloes carrying 46 Commando RM. Time dragged around to H Hour. Mills-Roberts recalled the final wait and the move to the river:
I looked at my watch – ten minutes to go – we were due off at 2200 hours. I said to Donald, ″My watch has stopped.″ We checked. ″No″ he said. ″This is a long ten minutes.″
The Buffaloes were now warming up ... the large vehicles lurched forward. Our driver put his foot down and soon in front of us loomed the dyke. The momentum we carried sent us three quarters of the way and then we slid drunkenly back to the bottom, but the driver took another run and this time there was no mistake.
All accounts of the crossing describe how the 25-pounder shells of 6 Field Regiment, who were firing at a rapid rate for ten minutes, were bursting on the bank opposite and drowning out the sound of everything else. Suddenly the area was lit up by fifteen foot flames from a direct hit from an enemy mortar on one of the Buffaloes ahead on the far river bank. This beaconlike blaze attracted the Germans’ attention and brought further shells and mortar bombs.
Captain Gibbon, an Army commando attached from the Border Regiment, commanding B Troop, was the first man of 46 Commando to leap ashore. The Germans in the trenches on the river bank were stunned by the bombardment and within a few minutes, Captain Pierce RM, at the head of Y Troop, had rounded up sixty-five prisoners. Meanwhile, Captain Gibbon was pushing inland with B Troop. His artillery forward observation officer and his signallers had been in the Buffalo which had been hit, and he was, consequently, unable to call for fire support. Realising this, he led his men close under the preplanned creeping barrage and reached the assault position for their objective, the Wardmann’s Haus, five hundred yards from the river bank, while shells were still bursting around it. So close to their own fire was B Troop that their sergeant major and another man from Troop HQ were killed approaching the building. The fighting around the first Wardmann’s Haus was over quickly, with the defenders, a company HQ and two platoons, being overwhelmed by the Commando’s aggression. The last of them surrendered promptly when their commander was killed and grenades were thrown into the cellar. Some sixty Germans were taken prisoner, including two officers.
Wardmann’s Haus just inland from 46 Commando’s landing point.
Meanwhile, the second flight of Buffaloes, carrying the rest of 46 Commando, had by now landed. A and Z Troops moved across the flood plain to their objective, the second Wardmann’s Haus about a thousand yards from the landing point. It was quickly secured and the A Troop swung left and overran a light flak position that had been causing trouble. Z Troop passed through to consolidate their sector of the perimeter. By 2215 hours, 46 Commando RM had established a bridgehead, into which the remainder of the Brigade would land and assemble for the next phase of the operation. Brigadier Mills-Roberts said ‘We had been ashore for less than a quarter of an hour, but we had no time to lose’.
The other brigade units crossed as planned. No. 6 Commando was allocated storm boats, while No. 45 Commando RM had had the convenience of the Buffaloes. The storm boats were launched in a lagoon some two thousand yards downstream of the crossing place. The boats were to move down the lagoon at full speed, up stream, stop, pick up No. 6 Commando, and then cross the Rhine. The Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Lewis recalls that excessive speed led to an unfortunate incident:
One boat was overloaded. When the driver took off, the thing drove straight under water. Many of the men had their bregans still on their backs (instead of loosening them as they were meant to once they got aboard), and some were drowned with the weight of them.
Out in the main river, the boats were seen almost at once by the enemy, who opened fire. In addition, some storm boats were hit by smallarms fire, and one sank with its motor still running, drowning Lieutenant Hume-Spry and several of his section. RSM Woodcock had three boats shot under him before he landed on the enemy bank.
The difficulties of the crossing were, as predicted, increased by the breakdown of many of the outboard motors. Following similar experiences of mechanical breakdown during training, despite stripping down and thorough servicing, the outboard engines proved to be unreliable as expected. Small Dory craft, used by the commandos in coastal raids, had been brought to the Rhine for use as rescue boats, were soon proving their worth and vindicating Brigadier Mills-Roberts, who had insisted on them. Most of No. 6 Commando, was, however, across the river in fifteen minutes.
Meanwhile, having dropped off 45 Commando, the Buffaloes of 77 Assault Squadron, returned to the home bank and ferried across the final unit of the Brigade, No. 3 Commando. The ferrying operation, which was crucial to the Commando Brigade’s clearance of the open approaches and establishing themselves in the town, was carried out in an exemplary manner.
Canadian BBC reporter Stewart MacPherson before being issued with an army uniform.
BBC correspondent Stewart MacPherson was watching the crossing from the home bank and recorded the following:
I watched the [last] commandos take off for Wesel ... . A few minutes after they were due to arrive on the far side, bomber command were to deliver a crushing blow on the enemy in Wesel, while the commandos lay doggo over there, a bare thousand yards from the bomber target, and waited. Smack on time, Arthur Harris & Company, House Removers, as they were called by the commandos, arrived and delivered a nerve-shaking blow on the former Wesel stronghold. Back at Headquarters, minutes ticked by. Officers waited anxiously for word from the commandos across the river. Suddenly there was a signal, and a voice literally purred over the wireless: ′Noisy blighters, aren’t they?’
The ‘noisy blighters’, 201 RAF heavy bombers, arrived at 2230 hours and dropped 1,100 tons of bombs. The Army had in fact requested a raid of only 300 tons of high explosive. Mills-Roberts described the attack in slightly more technical terms:
We saw the Pathfinder aircraft of Bomber Command drop their red flare markers over the town. These were followed a few seconds later by two hundred Lancasters, each with a double block-buster load. As the bombs dropped, showers of debris flew into the air accompanied by great banks of fire. The noise was colossal and the ground shook under us although we were a thousand yards away – which was the margin allowed by Bomber Command. The whole plain was illuminated by a red, lurid glow.
‘It seemed,’ said Major Bartholomew, ‘as if more than mortal powers had been unleashed.’
While the heavy bombing of the town was in progress, the commandos had waited on the ‘safety line’, with the nearest troops only 1,250 yards away from the aiming point. This precision raid by RAF Bomber Command was the closest ever made to ground troops and quite remarkable when it is recalled that in 1942, the RAF classed as a hit, any bombs on a night raid that landed within five miles of its target!
The devastation of Wesel was almost complete but the rubble provided cover for the enemy.
A member of the Volkssturm armed with a panzerfaust.
As the last bombers approached Wesel at 2230 hours, No. 6 Commando was poised to move forward toward the town. The atmosphere was still laden with dust and smoke, as No. 6 Commando set off, with a sub section of 6 Troop under Lance Sergeant Tonse leading the way, as the bombers were completing their final run. Their Commanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Lewis of the Dorset Regiment, recalled:
They used the same method of marking the route as had been used in Normandy. Behind the leading troop came a tape laying party which laid a trail of white mine tape. This marked the route of the leading formation like a paper chase. 6 Troop, under Major Leaphard, led the way in a purposeful arrowhead formation, in three blobs [sections] of twenty men in single file.
The rest of the Brigade simply followed the tape into Wesel, with German prisoners co-opted into carrying some of the commando’s equipment. During this move it was important to avoid contact with the enemy, with whom they may well have become fixed in battle and, consequently, delay the whole operation or, worse, be caught out in the open at first light.
Even though they were trying to avoid contact, when observed, they had to deal with the enemy. En route across the open flood plain to the city, Major Leaphard came under fire from a strongly defended flak position. He attacked straight of the route of march and cutting through the perimeter wire, his men killed or captured all the gun crews. With the enemy dealt with, he then led his troop straight into the city via its north west corner before midnight, ‘through an arch of contorted and buckled railway lines’.
Into Wesel
No. 6 Commando secured an entry point just beyond the smashed railway embankment. Lieutenant Colonel Lewis received the Distinguished Service Order for this action. His citation summarised the action.
Speed was the vital factor in this operation, as it was necessary to enter the city as soon as possible after the bombing. This was achieved largely by the skill and daring displayed by Lt-Col Lewis who led his troops with such dash that three separate platoon localities were quickly overrun on his way to the city. His entry into the city itself in spite of considerable opposition from small arms and Panzerfausts was affected so quickly that the remainder of the Brigade was enabled to consolidate before the enemy became aware of the situation. Lt-Col Lewis was at all times at the head of his troops, and his trust and courage contributed largely to the success of the whole operation.
Off the flood plain and into the city the ground changed totally. One commando described the scene that greeted them:
The streets were unrecognisable from our briefing material and many of the buildings were mere mounds of rubble. Huge craters abounded and into these flowed water mains and sewers, accompanied by escapes of flaming gas. We were held up in one street because the two leading scouts found great difficulty in making their way between a crater and one of the buildings. It took some minutes before a better route was found further to the right. The scene was well illuminated for the ensuing battle in the streets by the many fires that blazed on all sides. Despite the heavy bombing the Germans were alert and came out of the cellars to fight with a courage and perseverance which did them great credit. The air was full of smoke and dust which was like breathing a particularly nauseous fog.
One of the few surviving period houses in Rees. This example is on the outskirts.
Ruins and rubble of the Wesel battlefield.
Meanwhile, by midnight No. 45 Commando and No. 3 Commando, were following the white mine tape, with 46 abandoning its bridgehead on the riverbank once the wounded had been evacuate and bringing up the rear. The amphibious Weasels that the Brigade Commander had demanded proved their worth, being used to evacuated the wounded. The Commando Brigade and medical detachments left the riverbank just in time as a deluge of shells fell on their vacated position but having been spotted, the commandos suffered further casualties from artillery fire during crossing the open ground to Wesel.
Behind No. 6 Commando, in the order of march were the Royal Marines of 45 Commando, under ‘Lieutenant Colonel Gray, who was following up rapidly behind the leading unit who had broken into the city, he passed through and debouched into the streets’. The commandos fought their way through the rubble towards the factory on the northern edge of the city. Lieutenant Bryan Samain of E Troop 45 Commando RM describes the scene:
We advanced in single file along both sides of a main street running north, which we hoped would bring us to our final positions. There were a lot of supposedly dead Germans lying about here, and just as Colonel Gray and his headquarters party neared the corner of the street to turn north for the wire factory – our final position – a ′dead′ German (we later identified him as belonging to the SS) suddenly rose to his feet and fired a Panzerfaust at point-blank range. The result of this sudden onslaught was that two of the headquarters’ men were killed, Colonel Gray wounded in the arm, and nearly everyone in the immediate vicinity knocked off their feet by the force of the explosion.
Feeling very angry, we emptied a magazine of Tommy gun bullets into the German soldier, and into every subsequent ′corpse’, we saw lying around.
The loss of their commanding officer at a crucial moment would have been severe. As recorded in his DSO citation:
In spite of his wound he refused to be evacuated and completed his important task. Having captured the factory he disposed his troops so skilfully that during the next thirty-six hours they were able to beat off three major counter-attacks by infantry and self-propelled guns with enormous casualties to the enemy. Not until the last counter-attack had been broken, did this gallant officer allow himself to be evacuated.
The factory area along Wesel’s northern edge looking over 45 Commando’s position.
At about 0200 hours, 45 Commando reached their objective and an hour later, were consolidating their positions around the wire factory on the north east corner of the city. Much to their amusement, they discovered the ‘Wire’ factory actually manufactured lavatory pans. Their commanding officer, through he was suffering considerably from the pain of his wounded arm, deployed and encouraged his men, ‘who were inspired by his example’.
Lieutenant Bryan Samain and the men of his section of E Troop were immediately at work.
As soon as we got inside the factory, we set to work feverishly to barricade it as much as possible. Machinery, timber, doors, benches, coils of wire – all were used in an effort to prepare rough defensive positions, blocking windows and the like until they were mere loopholes... . We stood-to throughout the night waiting for an enemy counter-attack that never came.
Lieutenant Colonel Lewis chose a house for No. 6 Commando’s headquarters and ‘going down to a cellar I found seventeen Germans down there, all lying on their bunks. There was no sort of control or command at this stage’. He commented that ‘These people fought as individuals’.
See map on page 111
Lieutenant Colonel Peter Bartholomew’s No. 3 Commando had been last to cross the river using the Buffalo ferry but followed 45 into Wesel. Taking a more westerly route, No. 3. Commando promptly found themselves clearing barricades and attacking defenders who were coming to life in the smoking ruins of Wesel.
46 Commando, bringing up the rear from the bridgehead, took up a position between No. 3 and No. 45 RM Commandos. Thus deployed, the Brigade held the north and north-western outskirts of Wesel and were well positioned to be able to repel enemy counter-attacks and to clear the remainder of the town after dawn. However, the commandos may have secured their objectives but Mills-Roberts wanted to adopt an aggressive posture. He wrote, ‘While the commandos were digging-in, offensive patrols scoured the immediate area and brushes with the enemy were frequent’.
The result of one of these patrols was recorded by the Brigade Commander:
Major-General Deutch, the German Garrison Commander, was found by a patrol of 6 Commando in his headquarters in a cellar. He refused to surrender and was killed by a burst of Tommy gun fire. In his headquarters was a map giving full details of the flak dispositions of the whole area. It was invaluable because next day the 18th Airborne Corps, American and British, was to fly in and before that time it would be possible to get our own artillery on to the German flak positions to hammer them and do as much damage as possible.
What Mills-Roberts does not mention is that Deutch, who was actually commander of 16th Flak Division, as well as garrison commander, had his HQ located in a cellar almost next door to the building where he had established his own tactical HQ. There is also evidence that General Deutch died in more interesting circumstances when he was encountered by a 6 Commando patrol led by RSM Woodcock. Private Prichard recalled how:
In a garden area of Wesel, a Lance Corporal was digging a grave. This seemed strange and we asked him why. It appears that he was one of RSM Woodcock’s patrol searching through the cellars when he was confronted by a German officer. The Lance Corporal immediately said ′Hands up!’ whereupon the German replied, ′I am General von Deutsch and I only surrender to an officer of equal rank’. The Lance Corporal is supposed to have said, ′This will equalise you,’ and fired his Thompson at him with fatal results. The story was that the Brigadier was furious and ordered the Lance Corporal to bury the General as a punishment.
Targeting information was essential if full use was to be made of the mass of artillery such as this 5.5 inch gun.
The Lance Corporal concluded his story by commenting ′That’s the last time I kill a General’.
RSM Woodcock took numerous maps from the German headquarters, which proved to be marked with detailed locations of the flak batteries. To ensure that this vital information reached XII Corps’ Artillery Intelligence Cell, the best swimmer in the Brigade was called for to take the map back across the Rhine in a sealed package. However, the gunner radio nets were working well:
Ted Ruston, my Gunner representative from the Mountain Regiment, was standing by to pass all the information over the R.A. signal net, and our own signallers were ready to pass it over their own net – but it would necessarily be a long and detailed message.
Other prisoners were being brought into Brigade Headquarters, which was ‘in a cellar, with a low archaic catacomb of pillars, lit by dozens of candles provided by the enemy’. Here Mills-Roberts received the surrender of a German colonel:
There was a slight commotion as he went on his way into captivity. He made the fatal mistake of asking Arthur de Jonghe to assist him with his bag. Arthur, in fluent German, advised him that as a member of the Master Race he should be well able to deal with any minor impedimenta, which included a bag. The colonel looked embarrassed and unhappy and I was not sorry to see him go.
The Oberst was added to the mounting number of prisoners and was directed to a large crater near Brigade Headquarters where the PoWs had been gathered in order to control them and give them some cover.
Lieutenant Samain recalled, after a sleepless night that:
When dawn broke the next morning Easy Troop were ′standing-to’ in their positions, which lay in the right-hand corner of the factory, facing east. There was still nothing happening: it seemed, in fact, as if all would be quiet, and that the airborne troops would have nothing at all to worry about ...
Suddenly a marine, looking out of his loophole, saw a dozen rather weary German soldiers wheeling cycles down the road leading back to the town. They were heading straight for the factory. Everyone in the troop waited for them to come closer, their weapons at the ready.
The Germans obviously thought that, wherever the British were they were certainly not in the lavatory pan factory. They chatted amongst themselves quite unsuspectingly as they came towards the men of Easy Troop, all of whom were now in the aim, awaiting orders to open fire.
A few minutes later, the Germans passed within a few feet of Easy Troop: but we held our fire. Then as the last German presented his back we opened. After thirty seconds, there were twelve corpses lying in the road.
The situation did not remain favourable for long, as by 0500 hours, it was obvious to the Germans that Wesel, in the centre of the Allied bridgehead, was their key terrain and that this was the main crossing. Consequently, XLVII Panzer Korps was ordered to counter-attack with all available resources. Shortly after dawn, at 0530 hours the enemy were reported arriving north of the town for the expected counter-attack and before long, there was the sound of tracked vehicles and engines. Brigadier Mills Roberts wrote:
This report came from each of the four Commandos and we asked for map references. The map references were supported by approximate compass bearings: curiously enough these bearings all crossed in the vicinity of a small copse where several roads joined, making it a likely place for armour to concentrate, ...
When this had been verified Ted Ruston said, ′We’ve still got the Corps artillery on call for a bit yet. Shall we give them a pasting?’ ′Yes,’ I said. ′If we can deter this suspected counter – attack it’s going to make quite a difference.’
He laid on the shoot with all speed and a very satisfactory noise followed in due course.
Siegfried Waldenburg commander 116th Panzer Division.
By 1945 the bicycle was a common means of mobility for Germany’s last reserves.
The armoured attack failed to materialise, which is not entirely surprising when one considers the weight of fire provided by a heavy battery (7.2″ guns), two medium regiments and two field regiments of 3 AGRA along with the guns of the mountain artillery.
Particularly well-equipped Hitlerjugend soldiers in 1945 armed with panzerfausts.
As daylight came, further patrols were sent out to scour the town for centres of enemy resistance and according to the Brigadier, ‘small battles were taking place everywhere in the streets’. Both sides used Panzerfausts as an anti-personnel weapon in the absence of tanks in these sharp, if a little one-sided fights.
We also had a number of these weapons which were proving more destructive than accurate. One man was missed by one of these Panzerfausts and, to his amazement, saw a large slice of the building behind him collapse.
Communications
As the commandos were not forming a permanent bridgehead on the riverbank they had not had the opportunity to tow a telephone line across the river as the infantry brigades had been able to do. To ensure communications, as radios were a tenuous link, with battle damage, running out of batteries and jamming just a few of the potential problems, a line was needed from Wesel back to the home bank. This was to be the task of Lieutenant Christie (Royal Signals), the Lines Officer of 1 Commando Brigade Signal Troop. The line was to ‘be laid at the earliest possible moment’ and was considered to be an ‘extremely hazardous task’.
As soon as the Brigade’s initial objective had been captured and a tactical HQ established, Christie took a small hand-picked line party through the city to the demolished railway bridge. At this point, of course, Wesel had not been completely cleared of the enemy and the line party had to work in full view of the enemy, including a machine-gun post sited upstream on the east bank of the river.
Lieutenant Christie’s Military Cross citation reads:
Ordering his small party to pay out the line, Lieut Christie commenced climbing across the twisted bridge spans carrying the line with him. At times he had to climb over girders 100 feet above the river while at other times he picked his path along spans which were partly submerged in the water.
The pull on the quadruple cable whenever it touched the water was tremendous, nevertheless by sheer courage and determination, Lieutenant Christie crossed the full 1,500-ft. length of the demolished bridge under heavy shell fire and spasmodic sniping and machine gun fire, and thus enabled vital communication to be established before the first pontoon bridge had been commenced. This officer’s devotion to duty and complete disregard for his own safety was an inspiration to all who witnessed it.
The line link was duly established and despite needing almost constant repair, provided a speedy method of passing information until the town was secured and the bridges built.
Counter-Attack
The most dangerous period for 1 Commando Brigade was as expected, at 1000 hours, when the copious artillery support from the home bank that the assault formations had hitherto used liberally, had to be checked for three and a half hours during the airborne operation. Unfortunately, this coincided with the likely arrival time of German operational reserves, in the form of armoured counter-attacks. In the seven hours available to them, when not patrolling, the commandos had done their best to dig-in or build sangars in the piles of rubble and had gathered as many panzerfaustsas possible from prisoners and defended locations to make up for the lack of their own anti-tank weapons.
As predicted, the pressure against 1 Commando Brigade mounted, just as the artillery check fire came into force. The enemy was a Kampfgruppe of 116th Windhund Panzer Division, consisting of infantry supported by assault guns. This was one of the battle groups that had been held back to counter-attack Allied bridgeheads on the Rhine. Harried by fighter-bombers they had only been able to concentrate in the woods and copses north of Wesel, slowly and with losses to both men and armour. Hitherto, the fire of the Mountain Regiment, supplemented by that of the Army Group’s Royal Artillery, had disrupted the enemy’s assembly but now with further troops arriving the main weight of the attack fell on 45 Commando who struggled to keep the enemy at bay. Waves of grenadiers, supported by Panzer IVs and assault guns, attacked the commandos. Concentrated fire from Bren guns and other small arms fire, however, halted the German infantry assaults and, according to German sources, the attack principally failed because the Panzers were overly cautious. Presumably, deterred by the presence of Allied fighter-bombers and even medium bombers in cab ranks above the battlefield. Also, they would have been at a considerable disadvantage if they had attempted to fight amongst the rubble of the town.
A Vickers machine gun was the heaviest weapon that the Brigade possessed at Wesel.
A Waffen SS soldier operating a Panzerschrek.
45 Commando’s historian recalled that with the check fire period in force: ‘The Hun chose this moment to launch a counter-attack to regain the all important factory.... the enemy was able to advance across the open ground with infantry and tanks supported by his own sporadic mortar fire’. Colonel Gray without artillery support or other heavy weapons ordered that all PIATs should be used in the unusual ‘mortar’ role. Angled up, these weapons had a range of some three hundred yards – ‘at the receiving end, the effect was very similar to that of an artillery barrage’.
Lieutenant Samain recalled:
... It was not until 1000 hours that they put in their first organised counter-attack; and when it came it seemed to be a most half-hearted affair, consisting of a few waves of infantry, supported by cumbersome Mark IV tanks and self propelled guns. The infantry were easily beaten off, and for some unknown reason the tanks did not attempt to come too close.
There were in fact two really serious attempts to dislodge us later in the day. The first was when a solitary Mark IV, braver than its fellows, started to rumble ominously down the main road towards us. It got to within one hundred and fifty yards of the factory, then became indecisive. Major Beadle, meanwhile had mustered every available PIAT and Panzerfaust, and these were ready. Suddenly, however, the tank stopped, its engines coughing and arguing, then turned around and went back. Discretion being the better part of valour, Easy Troop let it go.
Lance Corporal John Sykes of B Troop 45 Commando RM had an altogether more difficult battle, and received the Military Medal for his action during the battle on 24 March. He commanded the forward Bren group sighted outside the north east corner of the wire factory. What were thought to be two 88 mm self-propelled guns approached to within 500 yards and engaged the troop position with HE and machine gun fire. His citation describes the action:
A shell-burst four feet above his position on the wall seriously wounded his No. 2 of the Bren. He immediately assisted the medical orderly to remove the casualty and organised a relief and then engaged an enemy machine gun position 250 yards from his right front. Five minutes later another shell burst immediately in front of his trench blowing his Bren gun out of the position. Sykes again left his cover and under machine-gun fire recovered the gun, which was still serviceable, returned to his trench, and again engaged the enemy.
A third shell hit the wall to the left of his position, this time breaching the barrel of the gun. Sykes jumped from his trench with the damaged gun, ran to Troop HQ for the spare Bren and returned to his post and returned the enemy’s fire. His aggressive spirit and determination to fight back was a shining example of courage during a most trying period...
A little further along the line another self-propelled gun was ‘sniping’ at E Troop from the cover of a cemetery wall. Lieutenant Samain wrote:
About half an hour later ... a second Mark IV approached to within 250 yards of the factory and commenced to pump shells into it. As it was out of PIAT range and because the artillery had been forbidden to fire during the airborne operation there was really nothing that could be done about it: so we just lay quietly under what cover we could, enduring a most unpleasant bombardment of 75-millimetre shells, until the German crew finally tired of their party games and withdrew. E Troop suffered six or seven casualties.
The workhorse of the German army, the Panzerkampfwagen IV, with its 75 mm gun, served on all fronts.
The area of 45 Commando’s open right flank. The railway now crossed by a road bridge was the site of a level crossing.
45 Commando’s historian considers that the decision not to bring anti-tank guns across with the Brigade, as ‘there wasn’t a significant tank threat’, was ‘extremely questionable’. Lieutenant Samain, supporting this view, commented that ‘Had the Mark IVs pressed home their attack, of course, they would have caused untold damage, for our defensive positions were far from perfect, and we had nothing more than PIATs and a Panzerfaust or two’.
Following this incident, Major Beadle received a message from the CO that he could pull E Troop back into less exposed positions in the centre of the factory complex. However, believing that this would allow the enemy to gain a foothold in the area and that ‘getting them out would be a costly business’, he declined to move his troop.
At about the same time, Brigadier Mills-Roberts redeployed A Troop of No. 3 Commando to join 45 Commando, strengthening the Brigade’s open flank, by covering the remains of a level crossing. Here the Army Commandos found that they were ‘being pestered by enemy self-propelled guns’.
Meanwhile, a troop of 46 Commando, who were positioned in a builder’s yard on the far side of the road opposite 45 had been ‘conducting a small war of their own against scattered parties of Germans who were scurrying about isolated buildings in a small village three hundred yards to the east of the town’. The Commandos sniped at them throughout the morning with commendable accuracy, ‘and there is no doubt at all that this largely contributed to the enemy’s failure to mount a really large scale attack on them’. Every time they brought up an SP gun, or infantry started forming up in the village for a counter-attack, their arrangements were disrupted by small arms fire.
The drop of 17th US Airborne Division took place just to the north of Wesel, with the paratroopers of 3rd Battalion 507 Parachute Infantry Regiment landing on DZ W to the north west of Wesel on the self-same open ground that the commandos had crossed the night before. The paratroopers were followed by the Wacos of 2nd and 3rd Battalions 194th Glider Infantry swooping in to land little more than a mile away. The dramatic arrival of the airborne in the middle of the battle caused a noticeable slackening of the Germans’ resolve but due to a combination of mist, smoke and heavy flak 17th US Airborne’s landing had been dispersed and they had suffered heavy casualties in landing, as planned directly on top of the enemy. Consequently it would be some time before the Glidermen whose principal objectives were the bridges on the Issel and Issel Canal would be able to make their presence felt to the benefit of the commandos.
Colonel Gray who had been wounded during 45’s initial advance into the town, eventually succumbed to the pain of his wound and was forced to hand over command to Major Blake, who in the early afternoon, reported that another enemy attack was coming in. To defeat this attack, which was getting perilously close to his position, Captain Day called for fire from the 3.7-inch guns of the Mountain Regiment, immediately in front of him. ‘The response was so rapid and accurate that a badly shaken Captain Day barely had time to dive into his bunker’. The attack was beaten off.
By 1300 hours, two sizeable kampfgruppen were forming up east and north-east of 45 RM Commando’s position, supported by self-propelled guns. Brigadier Mills-Roberts recalled:
We arranged an artillery programme with Ted Ruston but they would not be able to fire before 1.30 p.m. – till then we would have to manage with small – arms fire as no mortars were allowed either.
At 1.30 p.m. down came the long-awaited artillery support, which we had been unable to get till the Airborne troops were all in. Less than half an hour later the battle in No. 45’s area was well under control.
This is a graphic example of the power of artillery to swing a battle and the Brigadier considered that this was ‘the turning point of the whole battle and now I felt that the brigade was secure in Wesel’.
At about 1700 hours, patrols from 2nd Battalion 194th Glider Infantry of 17th US Airborne Division entered the Brigade position through the forward troops of 45 Commando and passed on details of their dispositions along the Issel Canal. At this stage, these were the only patrols that had infiltrated across no-man’s-land and through German-held ground. A proper link up was not made until the following day. However, the presence of the American Glidermen to the north east, did much to prevent the Germans from attacking the Commando Brigade’s defences on the northern perimeter. Consequently, with the situation on the northern outskirts of the town more or less under control, Brigadier Mills-Roberts was able to progressively increase the number of men clearing the town’s central area.
The Clearance and Occupation of Wesel
While the battle on the northern edge of the town had been going on, 6 Troop of No. 6 Commando had been tasked to secure a bridgehead on the river bank at the opposite end of Wesel, through which, the Brigade would be reinforced and resupplied. At about 1300 hours they reported that they had cleared the bank of the Rhine in the area of the blown railway bridge. Shortly afterwards Brigade HQ ordered the LVT ferry to be opened, at 1420 hours, at a site upstream side of the demolished bridge.
There was, however, a delay passing the order to 81 Field Company RE and the first Buffalo, carrying an RE recce party, crossed without incident at 1500 hours. The site had been chosen from air photographs and in the end proved to be too steep for Buffaloes. To make matters worse, the ferry site promptly came under fire from a spandau in the uncleared part of the town. One Buffalo was holed and sank at the foot of the ramp, blocking it. By 1600 hours, however, an alternative landing site was located just downstream of the bridge.
Meanwhile, 1 Cheshire, the spare battalion of 115 Brigade that was not providing Bank Control Parties for the two assaulting corps, came under command of the Commando Brigade. At 1400 hours, the two commanders of A and B Companies were briefed and shortly afterwards the Battalion left its assembly area in trucks but as the leading vehicle approached the river the column came under fire from a spandau and the column was halted. It is reported that:
Mortars of 4/5 Royal Scots Fusiliers laid a smoke screen and put down HE on the enemy position, which was neutralised so that the trucks could proceed back to the Battalion area to pick up the remainder of the troops.
The ferrying of A and B Companies began at about 1600 hours and the only enemy reaction was intermittent firing by the spandau, which was again temporarily neutralised by mortars of 4/5 RSF. The Cheshires crossed the Rhine without casualties but it was found that the Battalion’s Jeeps and carriers could not be landed at the new ferry site. As a result, A and B Companies moved inland without waiting for them at 1700 hours. As they moved towards their objective, the spandau again came to life and one soldier was wounded and evacuated. No further resistance was encountered and by 1730 hours, both Companies were digging themselves in the north west portion of the green belt in Wesel along with their Tactical HQ.
At 1800 hours, C and D Companies crossed and moved inland. The spandau that had caused problems earlier was still firing and a second machine gun in the area also opened up, but without causing any casualties to the Cheshires. On the bank, there were still anti-personnel mines and a Sergeant Major was wounded by a Schumine. By 1830 hours, the two companies had reached the south side of the railway embankment and were digging in. The Battalion’s main HQ crossed the river at 1900 hours and joined Tac HQ in the cellar of a house in the battalion area. The Cheshires reported:
Thus, by 1900 hours 1 CHESHIRE, less Support Company and all the vehicles, had crossed the Rhine and settled for the night in slit trenches and cellars. A firm belt from the river to the 6 Commando bridgehead was held and the supply route to the Commandos was secure. Enemy activity had been limited to intermittent firing from one, and in the later stages two, machine guns and a small amount of shelling and a few AP mines. There was no contact with the enemy on the ground, except that two Germans surrendered to the battalion.
The bombing, the arrival of the commandos and the moral effect of the airborne drop had together totally dislocated the enemy who were not capable of putting up an organised defence.
The difficulty that the Cheshires had with the pair of spandaus was replicated on the opposite side of Wesel, where small arms artillery and mortar fire seriously delayed ferrying and bridging operations by 30th US Infantry Division. This was to cause a delay which, in circumstances other than the almost complete collapse of the 180th Grenadier Division, could have been serious. As it was, 116th Panzer Division, committed to battle piecemeal, to stem the tide of the Allied advance, was easily held.
The Cheshires finally ashore west of the blown bridge at Wesel.
British troops escorting a column of prisoners.
While the Cheshires were crossing and occupying the southern portion of Wesel, A Troop of 3 Commando who had been released from their earlier task of reinforcing 45 Commando with the arrival of the Americans, were now clearing their way into the centre of the town. Fighting in light battle order, using No. 38 radio sets for communication, they ambushed several German patrols working their way north through the rubble and developed a technique for dealing with enemy riflemen who wished to fight on, which involved drawing fire and then concentrating several Brens on the snipers’ position.
Elements of No. 6 Commando who were now fighting in the town were also facing some determined resistance:
One patrol reported that when a number of the enemy had approached them in apparent surrender, one of them dropped down on his hands and knees with a spandau strapped to his back. The patrol were the ones to return so they must havereacted swiftly.
The German barrack area across the railway from 45 Commando’s position.
Troops of 30th US Division on the east bank of the Rhine near Wesel.
46 Commando RM eventually pushed through the town to link up with the Cheshires, who had deployed to clear and defend the south west part of the town. With pressure from the east reducing, they were able to assist with the aggressive patrolling operations in the main part of the town, where a smoky haze hung over Wesel ‘that got into one’s nostrils and eyes’.
No. 3 Commando had cleared the centre of the town by late afternoon and Brigade HQ reported the town clear during the evening of 24 March but this is considered ‘to have been a little premature’ by Second Army, as there were a few pockets of resistance still holding and disrupting movement in and around the city.
The following day (25 March), firm contact was made with 507 Parachute Infantry, to the north west of the town, at 1330 hours. With the link-up made, 1 Commando Brigade was passed from command of XII Corps to that of XVIII US Airborne Corps, for subsequent operations.
In this final phase of the battle, as planned, 45 Commando was to clear a German barrack area to the south east of their position. B Troop was ordered to send out a patrol to clear some houses on the far side of the railway prior to the attack on the barracks, which was one of the last bastions of resistance.
The patrol commander, Lt McDonald, with his section cleared the first buildings without difficulty, but further progress was checked by the Germans who were still occupying strong defences near their barracks. The patrol was withdrawn when it was discovered that this phase of the operation was to be undertaken by US Paratroopers. B and D Troops had a ringside seat for the attack by the US paras supported by British self-propelled guns [Archers].
Later in the afternoon of 25 March, 46 Commando reported a link-up with troops of the Ninth US Army astride the Lippe Canal, south of the town. The clearance of the town was finally completed at 2100 hours and the Commandos were able to ‘sample the contents of captured hock barrels’.
As a result of the bombing and fighting to clear Wesel, the town had been ‘reduced to a mass of rubble, twisted girders and beams, smouldering fires and precariously balanced walls verging on collapse’. The total number of prisoners taken was over eight hundred and fifty: several hundred enemy lay dead by their slit trenches on the flood plain and in the streets of Wesel. In contrast, commando casualties totalled ninety-seven killed, wounded and missing.
A Commando patrol combing the ruins for enemy resistance.
Before leaving 1 Commando Brigade in Wesel, it is worth noting that the large town of Wesel was captured as rapidly as could be expected, and cleared to enable bridging operations by Ninth United States Army to commence. Whereas the smaller town of Rees, which was not attacked by bombers immediately before the assault, was the scene of severe fighting that lasted for over forty-eight hours.