CHAPTER THREE
With the Allies having closed up to the Rhine in March 1945, there was to be no single thrust across the great river but a series of attempts to cross, on a broad front, before launching the final offensive from the resulting bridgeheads into the heart of Germany.
Though often dismissed by the likes of Patton, as ‘… more of a politician than a general’, Eisenhower maintained a focus on his immediate aim; the elimination of the Ruhr as the heart of Germany’s war fighting capability. He placed the Anglo American main-effort in the north, under the command of the master of the deliberate attack; Montgomery. The commitment of an airborne corps to Montgomery is confirmation that this was to be the main effort.
With what he was confident would be an assured crossing north of the Ruhr, Eisenhower justifiably believed that further south, the other US Armies would be able to‘bounce the Rhine’where it was narrower and less well defended. The Supreme Commander was in effect playing to the strengths and qualities of his army commanders and the nature of the soldiers under their command.
Planning for the Rhine crossing and final campaign began well before the New Year, with the issue of directives. With the Ninth US Army and XVIII US Airborne Corps under command of Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, a force of British, American and Canadians would carry out a deliberate assault crossing of the Rhine, north of the Ruhr aimed at isolating and taking the vital industrial area. To complete the envelopment of the Ruhr from the south, First US Army, who had already captured the bridge at Remargen would advance in a north-easterly direction.
General Dempsey.
While General Crerar’s First Canadian Army was fighting the Battle of the Rhineland, General Dempsey’s uncommitted Second Army HQ prepared the deliberate crossing of the river with both overwhelming numbers and overwhelming resources. By early February they had produced a study of the tasks involved in an assault crossing of the Rhine and airborne drop. This study was sub-divided into the four major parts: ‘The assumptions on which the subsequent corps study was to be based on, intelligence, problems relating to the crossing, engineer tasks and maintenance (logistic) problems’. With this ground work established, the task of conducting a corps study and developing the assault method was allocated to XII Corps who had been relieved of operational tasks and moved to an approximately similar piece of terrain on the River Maas south of Maastricht.
XVIII US Airborne Corps, who had yet to conduct an operation for the Allied Airborne Army, consisting of 6th British and 17th US Airborne Divisions, was nominated to plan airborne aspects of PLUNDER in their own sub-operation, code named VARSITY. This account concentrates on the operations of 6th Airborne Division. Great care was taken to integrate the airborne plan into the assault river crossing operations, thus addressing another of the MARKET GARDEN failings.
Ground
For the planning of PLUNDER and VARSITY, considerable data was made available from a wide variety of sources, regarding the river’s flood plain, the flood dykes, the approaches to the river banks, the average water level and sundry other detail necessary to prepare an amphibious plan.
The river in this sector was on average 300 yards wide, with certain sectors being up to 500 yards. The current flowed at an average speed of 3 knots opposite Wesel. At its narrowest point this stretch of the Rhine was twice the width of the location where Patton had successfully sneaked across on the night of 22/23 March 1945 and an altogether more challenging obstacle. While British and American engineers were able to examine the home bank and select entry points into the river, there was a degree of uncertainty about the state of the bank on the far side and its suitability for amphibious armour.
The area north of the Dieserfordterwald, including the bridges across the River Issel, where the two divisions of XVIII US Airborne Corps were to drop, was more easily analysed by conventional air photography and maps. Up to seven miles from the Rhine, it was a relatively open area but dominated on its fringes by large wooded areas and the significant village Hamminkeln, in the British area. Sources information regarding the bridges across the Issel were the subject of much analysis to produce briefing material for Airlanding battalions of 6th Airborne Division.
XVIII US Airborne Corp’s Varsity area and plan.
Resources
As 21st Army Group was Eisenhower’s main effort, allocation of manpower and logistic resources, in contrast to the MARKET GARDEN campaign, were generous enough not only to be able to get across a heavily defended strategic barrier of the Rhine but to take the battle into the heart of Germany. Eisenhower, during the planning phase, envisaged that 21st Army Group would strike east ‘from the Lower Rhine north of the Ruhr and into the North German Plain’ because this route offered the most suitable terrain for mobile operations … [and] … the quickest means of denying the Germans the vital Ruhr industries’.
Material and stores of all natures flowed into the newly opened Army Road Head, which was sited in the wrecked country of the former Operation VERITABLE battle area. Into this area troops poured, not only to establish the logistic infrastructure but for training. Massive traffic circuits and dumps were laid out. The scale of the preparations was massive; 30,000 tons of engineer materiel was piled for miles along the road north from Goch, with an additional tonnage pre-loaded on 940 vehicles. 60,000 tons ammunition was stacked along ten miles of the north-south road just east of the Maas and 28,000 tons of combat supplies were dumped around the ruined town of Kevlaer, its rubble being used to create areas of hard standing.
All this activity presented problems of concealment that were considered by HQ Second Army to be ‘somewhat similar to those met in the UK before Operation Neptune’, except that German patrols could cross the river to look for evidence of dumping of bridging stores and other preparations of the home bank. Second Army reported that‘The planners accepted that it was impossible to conceal from the enemy the fact that 21st Army Group intended to assault the Rhine north of the Ruhr, but great care was taken to ensure that the date and place of assault were not prejudiced’. RE Camouflage companies laboured to conceal the preparations and their effectiveness was confirmed by an RAF recce sortie launched on D-1, which could find no evidence that would lead German aircraft and photo interpreters to identify the location of the coming assault.
21st Army Group Plan
For Operation PLUNDER, 21st Army Group comprised three armies; Ninth US Army, Second British Army and First Canadian Army. The assaults by Second and Ninth Armies would be launched simultaneously.
The task of Ninth US Army was, to mount an assault crossing of the Rhine in the area of Rheinberg and to secure a bridgehead from the junction of the Ruhr and Rhine rivers to Bottrop and Dorsten. Thereafter, General Simpson was to be prepared to advance to a line inclusive of Hamm and Munster. Their tasks also included the protection of the right flank of Second British Army and the vital bridging sites at Wesel.
Second British Army was to assault the Rhine in the area of Xanten and Rees and to establish a bridgehead between Rees and Wesel and subsequently advance on a three corps front north-east towards the town of Rheine.
Initially the task of First Canadian Army was to assist in broadening the frontage of Second Army’s assault by carrying out feint attacks along the Rhine on their left flank, while holding securely the line of the rivers Rhine and Maas from Emmerich westwards to the sea. The Canadians were, however, represented in the assault phase by 9th Canadian Infantry Brigade. Made up of Canadian highland battalions, such as the North Nova Scotia Highlanders, they were attached to 51st Highland Division, as a forth brigade. Later First Canadian Army was to be prepared to advance into eastern Holland and to protect the left flank of Second Army.
Air Operations
With some difficulty, the Allied ‘Bomber Barons’ were prevailed upon to coordinate their activities with that of the Army. The air forces would have rather continued to concentrate on the ‘THUNDERCLAP Plan’, which was designed to deliver a sudden and catastrophic blow by bombing Berlin, Dresden, Chemnitz and Leipzig, with a view to bringing about Germany’s surrender. The support needed by the ground forces required the bomber commanders to carry out a comprehensive programme of interdiction sorties in support of PLUNDER; the ‘Ruhr Plan’. Ninth Tactical Air Force was tasked to isolate the area north of the Ruhr and prevent the movement of German reserves to the battlefield. As the three railway lines in the area had already been heavily bombed, it would, therefore, concentrate on the sixteen most significant bridges giving access to the battle area. However, as a part of their attempt to bomb Germany into submission, the air forces tripled the tonnage of bombs requested by the armies, with the result that the final advance across northern Germany was often slowed by the over generous results of earlier bomber sorties.
All three Armies of 21st Army Group were to take part in the Rhine crossing. Montgomery, Eisenhower and Bradley seen here just before it took place.
The blue crusader’s cross of Dempsey’s Second Army.
Second British Army’s Plan
After much study, the plan that was eventually arrived at called for an assault on a frontage of two corps (XII and XXX Corps) with a planned D Day being the night of 23/24 March 1945. In outline, the plan made by General Dempsey, commander Second Army, was to assault with two corps:
RIGHT XII Corps, LEFT XXX Corps, each with one division up. VIII Corps was to hold securely the West bank of the R RHINE during the concentration period until the assault corps were ready to assume control of divisions holding the river line immediately before the assault.
XVIII US Airborne Corps was to be dropped east of the R RHINE after the river assaults had taken place. The principles for its employment were that it should drop within range of artillery sited on the West bank of the R RHINE and that the link up with the ground forces should take place on D Day.
To release Headquarters XVIII US Airborne Corps as soon as possible, Headquarters VIII Corps was to take over from that corps within seven days.
Second Army would then be correctly positioned to continue the advance into the North German plains with VIII Corps RIGHT, XII Corps CENTRE and XXX Corps LEFT.
II Canadian Corps was to be passed through the LEFT of Second Army bridgehead and handed back to First Canadian Army when it was in a position to exercise command.
In the first phase of Second Army’s plan, the two assault divisions were to capture the low-lying ground east of the river up to approximately the line of the Wesel – Emmrich railway. XXX Corps would begin the attack on the left flank, astride Rees, at 2100 hours on 23 March, with 1 Commando Brigade crossing the Rhine to seize Wesel an hour later, while XII Corps would be led by 15th Scottish Division’s assault from the area of Xanten at 0200 hours. At the same time, XVI US Corps would launch their amphibious attack south of Wesel. The second phase was to be the capture of the Issel bridges, with or without the assistance of XVIII US Airborne Corps (scheduled for 1000 hours on 24 March), as they could easily be prevented from dropping by poor weather. By the time they launched the assault, Second Army were confident that they could, indeed capture the bridges unaided if necessary, all be it in slower time and with greater casualties. The breakout on to the North German Plain would be Phase Three of the operation.
With the fighting on the west bank of the Rhine having finally ended on 11 March, there was less than two weeks to complete the planning, deployment and implementation of the largest and most complex amphibious and airborne operation since the Normandy landings. This was a tall order but after nine months of campaigning the Allied planning staffs were up to the challenge.
Enemy
The area that 6th Airborne Division was about to drop into, was held by 84th Volksgrenadier Division, commanded by Generalmajor Fiebig, who was later described by his captors as being ‘a charming officer who it would seem to be more at home at a cocktail party than as a divisional commander’. In his post war interrogation, it was clear that Generalmajor Fiebig shared some of his commander’s views about the likelihood of an airborne landing in his area of responsibility. He:
… claimed that the Germans were not unaware of our preparations for an airborne operation in support of the Rhine crossings and appreciated that no fewer than four allied airborne divisions were available, although he confessed he had been badly surprised by the sudden advent of two complete divisions in this particular area, and throughout the interrogation reiterated the shattering effect of such immensely superior forces on his already badly depleted troops, which did not number more than 4,000 in all.
General Fiebig had no exact advance information about landing and dropping zones, or times, although he had fully appreciated the likelihood of a landing somewhere in his area. He rather expected the landing farther from the Rhine, in the area east of the River Issel and thought it would take place either at dusk before the land assault or else simultaneously with it.
The Airborne Plan
At the beginning of the planning process, while the Battle of the Rhineland was still in progress, General Sir Miles Dempsey considered it ‘absolutely essential to have airborne assistance in crossing the Rhine’. The airborne mission was to be twofold:
1. Seize the commanding ground from which artillery fire controlled the whole area.
2. Block possible arrival of enemy reinforcements from Wesel and the east.
It was decided to drop XVIII US Airborne Corps east of the Rhine after the main 21st Army Group assault across the river. According to Montgomery:
There were two main reasons for this decision: daylight was desirable for the employment of airborne troops and, secondly, it would be impossible to make full use of our artillery for the ground assault if airborne troops were dropped in the target area before we had crossed the river.
When, however, the airborne commanders learnt of General Ridgeway’s plans for Operation VARSITY they were shocked at the change of tactics. Gone were the drops deep behind enemy lines, on DZs remote from the enemy and miles from their objectives, in favour of surprise, heavy concentrations of artillery support and true vertical envelopment, by dropping directly on top of the enemy! The whole airborne plan was in effect a vast coup de main.
General Ridgeway.
The risks, however, were considerable. An airborne force is at its most vulnerable when landing and to mitigate this, the two divisions of the Corps were to land well concentrated, over a short period of time, after a heavy bombardment, code named CLIMAX. A separate counterbombardment operation, BLOTTER, was aimed at destroying the enemy artillery. Even though the air forces had finally accepted that the risks to their aircraft in dispatching parachutists and gliders over heavy flak, in order to gain an early advantage, outweighed the cost of struggling to retrieve the situation later, they too demanded mitigating measures. These consisted of an artillery counter flak bombardment (CARPET) as well as the attacks on identified sites by fighter bombers immediately before the drop.
XVIII US Airborne Corps and Plans
General Ridgeway’s two divisions earmarked for Operation VARSITY had both been involved in the Battle of the Bulge. 17th US Airborne Division had been training at the time of Market Garden but were deployed by air on Christmas Day 1944 and marched to take up a defensive position on the Meuse. Later they relieved 28th US Division in the heart of the snow covered Ardennes and fought through the campaign until 10 February, when the division, like 6th Airborne, was withdrawn to prepare for the airborne assault. For a time it was intended to use 82nd Airborne as well but there were insufficient resources to lift three divisions and the ‘All Americans’ had also been at the heart of the Bulge and it was an easy decision to use just the fresh 17th Airborne Division.
XVIII US Airborne Corps’ badge.
Nicknamed‘Thunder from Heaven’, the 17th had been brought up to strength by the transfer of the Normandy veterans of 507 Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR) from 82nd Airborne. The experienced 507 PIR joined 513 PIR and 194 Glider Infantry Regiment (GIR) who would carry out their first operational drop during VARSITY.
In contrast to MARKET GARDEN where three airborne divisions had been dropped over several days up to sixty miles from the front line, XVIII US Airborne Corps was to land three to seven miles east of the Rhine, in a single daylight lift, with a P-Hour of 1000 hours on D Day (24 March 1945). They were to dislocate the enemy defences, seize vital ground, hold the bridgehead against enemy counter-attacks and capture bridges to facilitate the breakout of 21st Army Group onto the North German Plain. Even though Second Army thought they could possibly do without the airborne assault, in the event of bad weather, the dislocating effect of paratroopers arriving behind the enemy would be decisive in creating the opportunity for XII Corps to develop momentum necessary for a speedy breakout.
17th US Airborne Division’s badge.
In Operation VARSITY, the airborne divisions were not to be committed until a viable bridgehead across the Rhine had been formed by US and British infantry divisions (Operations TURNSCREW, TORCHLIGHT and FLASHLIGHT). In short, the inadequacies and over ambitious planning assumptions of MARKET GARDEN were not to be repeated. It was planned that 15th Scottish Division would link-up with the airborne troops on the first day of the battle and to the south, 30th US Infantry Division would link-up with 17th Airborne. The American Paratroopers were also to be responsible for establishing contact with the Commando Brigade.
The River Issel was about thirty yards wide, with steep banks and was a significant obstacle to armour. Therefore, holding the river-line and crossings was key to both defence against counter-attacks and for facilitating the breakout. The bridges once captured, were to be held but prepared for demolition in case they should fall into the hands of the German XLVII Panzerkorps, who would need the bridges to complete their counter-attack against XII Corps’s bridgehead between Rees and Wesel.
In the latter stages of the operation, once it had crossed the Rhine, 6 Guards Tank Brigade was to come under command of the Airborne Corps, when the heavy ferries were open. The leading squadron, provided by 3rd Tank Battalion Scots Guards, would be allocated to 6th Airborne Division. The remainder of the Brigade would cross as the development of the battle dictated.
6th Airborne Division’s Plan
Major General Eric Bols had taken over command of the division from General Gale, who was now the Deputy Commander of the Airborne Corps. Bols’s VARSITY plan for 6th Airborne Division was to drop and land on the northern or left sector in the area in front of XII Corps, with the tasks of seizing the wooded high ground of the Diesfordterwald, the large village of Hamminkeln and three bridges (code named X, Y and Z) over the River Issel. Linking up with 17th US Airborne Division and forming a defensive northern flank were also important considerations and as soon as heavy ferries were opened, the Scots Guards Churchill tanks would come under command of the British Airborne Division.
In detail, 3 Parachute Brigade was to lead the operation by dropping on DZ A at the north-west corner of the Diesfordterwald, then to clear the forest and seize the Schneppenberg feature at its western edge, overlooking the approach routes to be used by XII Corps. In the other side of the forest, the Brigade was to patrol and if necessary hold the area of the railway line which ran through the northeastern part of the Diesfordterwald.
Major General Eric Bols
Meanwhile, on DZ B to the north-west of Hamminkeln, 5 Parachute Brigade would drop, clear and secure the area astride the road from their DZ to Hamminkeln. While dispatching patrols westwards, the bulk of the Brigade was to hold the area to the east of the railway line.
A Locust light tank of the Recce Regiment aboard a Hamilcar glider.
Brigadier Bellamy’s 6 Airlanding Brigade, coming in after the two parachute brigades was ordered to land by company groups as close as possible to their objectives, with each battalion being allotted its own Landing Zone. 2 Ox and Bucks Light Infantry (LZ O) and 1 RUR (LZ R) would be responsible for coup de main attacks on the three bridges over the River Issel. 12 Devons would land on LZ O and capture Hamminkeln. The intelligence, however, was not reassuring, as air photography revealed that there were numerous flak positions in the area of their glider LZ’s.
Following 6 Airlanding Brigade, Divisional HQ and the Airborne Division’s artillery group would land by glider in the centre of the divisional area on LZ P. Along with these troops and other essential fly in elements, was C Company of 12 Devons who were to clear and secure the area, as the Division was, after all, landing on its objectives and they could therefore expect opposition across their DZs and LZs.
A divisional reserve was to be formed by two troops totalling eight light Locust tanks from 6 Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment. These tanks had replaced the Tetrarchs when the division was withdrawn from Normandy in August 1944. They were to fly into LZ P, with one of the 7 ton tanks per Hamilcar glider, and along with guns of the Anti-Tank Regiment, be deployed, as needed, to blunt the expected counter-attacks by XVII Panzerkorps.
The Recce Regiment’s main tank, the Cromwell, along with its heavy Daimler armoured cars and carriers, left camp to cross the Channel by sea, with the remainder of the Division’s Land Tail on 19 March. They masqueraded as ‘Stewarts Horse’ (after the commanding officer) and their vehicles had their divisional patches and numbers painted out. These vehicles were to be among the first armour across the Rhine, to help the division in its role during the breakout, once the ferries were open.
The organic artillery support of airborne formations was perforce, strictly limited to a single light artillery unit, 53rd (Worcestershire Yeomanry) Airlanding Light Regiment, with its twelve 75mm guns and an attached 4.2-inch mortar troop from the Armoured Recce Regiment. To address the Division’s lack of artillery, the guns of XII Corps were to provide support from positions west of the Rhine. The medium and field regiments of 8 Army Group Royal Artillery were on call to XVIII US Airborne Corps as a whole, while the 25-pounder gun group of 52nd Lowland Division, who were out of the line, were in direct support of 6th Airborne Division. Observation officers dropping or landing with the airborne troops would call for fire missions over the radio.
Amphibious Training
While 6th Airborne Division was holding the line of the Maas and enjoying a short period of post operational leave, Second Army was training for the Rhine crossing. Having taken part in the first half of Operation VERITABLE, 15th Scottish Division was selected to lead the assault across the Rhine and were placed under XII Corps on the River Maas for the purposes of developing crossing techniques and for training. Grouped with the Corps was G Wing of 79th Armoured Division (‘Hobart’s Funnies’), who had already been working on developing or adapting amphibious equipment and tactical doctrine for river crossings. In January, 33 Armoured Brigade joined exchanging their Sherman tanks for the amphibious Buffalo or as it was officially known, the Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT). The Staffordshire Yeomanry and 44 Royal Tank Regiment under HQ 4 Armoured Brigade also joined the division to retrain with DD tanks. Lieutenant Colonel Hopkinson, Commanding Officer 44 RTR wrote:
Amphibious armour, the DD Sherman and the Buffalo Landing vehicle were key elements in the plan to cross the Rhine and hold the resulting bridgehead.
79th Armoured Division.
Yes it was all too true, we the 44th Royal Tank Regiment had joined the Wavy Navy and were to sail our way across the Rhine in the same type of DD tanks with inflatable skirts as were used for the amphibious landings on D Day. Then ensued a furious period of training- 10 days – from morning to night. Nautical terms were freely used …!
Also training on the Maas was 1 Commando Brigade, still under former Guardsman, Brigadier Derek Mills-Roberts, who had taken over command when Lord Lovat was wounded in Normandy. His immediate task was to prepare his men to take the city of Wesel just to the south west of the VARSITY DZs and LZs.
The Brigade commander believed in through training and had his commandos repeat exercises until they were perfect, all the while with the incentive of time off for those who got it right more quickly. Minimizing casualties was also one of his major concerns and he ensured that that his men would not suffer for the want of resources and that casualties would be promptly evacuated. Throughout training, problems were identified, resolved and the mitigating measures were built into the plan.
Preparations
While the British and American paratroopers trained at their respective bases in southern Britain and in France (east of Paris) the Second Army assembled everything that was required for the assault and breakout. Lieutenant Peter White of 4 KOSB, who as part of 52nd (Lowland) Division, holding the area just west of the Rhine, recalled:
Interesting units and vehicles, including amphibious tanks and Buffaloes, bridging pontoons, hundreds of guns and mountains of ammunition, were piling into every available space. During daylight hours, more and more smoke generators and canisters tended by pioneers appeared over the countryside, pouring out coiling billows of bluish and yellow smoke screens to keep the enemy guessing on the date and place of the crossing.
A well camouflaged truck brings forward a 40mm Bofors anti-aircraft gun.
A sixty-six mile long smoke screen enveloped the west bank, from Nijmegen south, concealing preparations from observers on the other side of the river. The smoke screen was maintained by four Pioneer Corps smoke companies made up of no less than 1,350 men, who one old soldier described as’ineligible for any other arm of the service, with a sprinkling of intellectuals considered to be of no military value elsewhere’. They worked under a headquarters known as Smoke Control and expended during VERITABLE and PLUNDER 8,500 zinc chloride smoke generators and 450,000 gallons of fog oil in order to maintain the smoke screen. When their work was combined with smoke from the fires in Wesel, it was extremely effective, however, the pilots carrying the airborne divisions into battle, perhaps found their work a little too effective.
Smoke generation equipment used thousands of gallons of fuel.
If the location of the assault were to remain a secret one thing that had to be controlled was reconnaissance. Lieutenant General Horrocks, commander XXX Corps, explained:
Before an attack of this sort a large number of people must go forward and reconnoitre the position they are to occupy. This applies particularly to the Gunners, who have many mysterious rites of their own to perform before they can bring down accurate concentrations of fire. Nobody was allowed forward on to the flat Polderland stretching back from the banks of the Rhine without reporting to a special branch of XXX Corps HQ, where a very large-scale map of the forward area was maintained. This was known as ‘The Pig Hotel’. After examining the accommodation on the map which they had been allocated, the reconnaissance parties were allowed to go forward a few at a time to see their ‘rooms’, which, if satisfactory, were then marked up on the plan as ‘booked’.
General Horrocks highlighted the fact that not every one was as careful as they should have been in the conduct of their recce:
I was particularly angry one day to hear that a certain Major General, who was much too brave to take the normal precautions, had walked along the near bank of the Rhine, wearing his red hat. He subsequently left our area, with a monumental flea in his ear.
To facilitate commanders’ daylight recces, the smoke screen was briefly allowed to disperse but on one occasion the wind changed and the commanders peering from camouflaged observation posts built into the dykes only got a ‘watery eye squint’.
Potentially, the most obvious preparations were those being made by the Royal Artillery. 1,300 British and 600 US field, medium and heavy guns, their myriad of vehicles and stockpiles of ammunition were hard to conceal. These guns had to be far enough forward, not only to fire in support of the amphibious crossing but the medium artillery was to be in position to provide immediate support to the airborne troops.
So large was the number of guns and so few the routes available for them, it was necessary to bring them up over the nights of 21 to 23 March, using staging areas about six miles from the river. By the morning of 23 March, the majority of the guns were in their forward positions and Captain Whately-Smith wrote:
As one looked around it was hard to believe that these fields and orchards concealed a mass of artillery waiting in silence for the evening zero hour’.
While Second Army’s preparations for the amphibious assault across the Rhine were underway, XVIII US Airborne Corps were similarly making ready at their bases in the UK and France.
Airborne Training
With the plan made, all be it still being refined in detail, and landing tables being prepared by unit air adjutants, the British soldiers and airmen who were to take part in the largest ever airborne operation, undertook task related training packages, culminating in a series of large airborne exercises. Harry Clark a glider infantryman from 2nd Ox and Bucks Light Infantry recalled:
Glider infantry deploying from a Horsa glider during training for Operation VARSITY.
Before this massive operation was launched, a rehearsal for ‘Varsity’ took place. On the 14 March 1945, Exercise ‘Vulture’ got under way. Two groups of sixty Dakotas each towed a Mark 2 Horsa glider from RAF Down Ampney. Tasked with flying very big formations, this successful practice gave us an insight into what would take place in just a few days time.
Meanwhile, the two parachute brigades took part in Exercises MUSH I and II in the Bury St Edmunds area of East Anglia, which were in fact the final rehearsal for VARSITY.
Amongst the members of the Glider Pilot Regiment (GPR) there were a few crews who had taken part in the Sicily, Normandy and Arnhem operations and survived to tell the tale. However, flying many of the gliders were RAF aircrew. So heavy had the casualties been amongst the Glider Pilot Regiment at Arnhem, only 700 were available to meet VARSITY’s requirement for up to 2,000 pilots.
The RAF, with a surplus of pilots following a significant drop in Bomber Command casualties, once British and Canadian night fighters were able to operate with the bombers, was well placed to make good this deficiency. In the immediate aftermath of MARKET GARDEN they had set about training selected men from their thousands of surplus aircrew as glider pilots. As Stan Jarvis, who had been taught to fly at Falcon Field in the USA, said ‘it was necessary to borrow a number of RAF pilots, of whom I was one, to fly the military gliders across the Rhine’. Warrant Officer Len Macdonald recalled that he had completed training in Oklahoma, when:
Stan Jarvis trained RAF pilot and ‘volunteer’ glider pilot.
… in October 1944 I found myself in the company of some 200 RAF pilots on parade at 0830 hours on the car park of the Majestic Hotel in Harrogate. Roll-call completed we were addressed by the officer in charge of the parade (who must for the sake of his personal safety remain nameless). ‘You lot’, he said, ‘You lot have just volunteered to fly gliders’. He said this with a certain amount of relish, happy at being shot of, at a single stroke, some 200 bods who neither he nor the RAF quite knew how to gainfully employ at that time.
A company commander with maps and air photography briefs his men.
The flying training was relatively straightforward for men who were already trained pilots, except they had ‘…to learn that they could not simply throttle up to get out of trouble’. Len Macdonald continued:
Apart from the odd run-march and a night march armed only with a compass, with the rendezvous at some Godforsaken pub in Berkshire very little time was spent on trying to turn me into a soldier…The importance of DCOSF (Down, crawl, observe, sight, fire)[reaction to effective enemy fire] was heavily underlined.
Sten gun and magazine. Standad issue for glider pilots.
Other pressed glider pilots were taken in hand by their Glider Pilot Regiment partners, with whom RAF pilots were normally paired, and taken on the range to fire their Sten guns. They were also introduced to unfamiliar field equipment and most of them listened avidly to the war stories of Sicily, Normandy and Arnhem told by their Army comrades in the NAAFI canteen. Consequently, despite the brevity of their training, they were imbued with the ethos of the GPR and understood their role and what was expected of them in the coming battle. A measure of their success is afforded by contrasting the esteem that their USAAF counterparts were held; few American airborne soldiers had anything good to say about their glider pilots once on the ground. On the other hand, the RAF glider pilots are universally considered to have earned their red berets in battle. There can be no higher praise than this.
Final Preparations
With training and exercises completed, 6th Airborne Division was moved to sealed camps for detailed briefing. The Division left its camps at Bulford and Larkhill on Salisbury Plain by circuitous route (for security reasons) at 0600 hours on 18 March. They arrived at their RAF transit camp at 1630 hours. One member of 12 Devons commented that Gosfield Camp in Essex was ‘Very badly arranged, with a twenty minute walk for meals and very inadequate messes’. Virtually all soldiers’ accounts of this period describe the food in these camps as being what can only be politely described as ‘execrable’, even by wartime standards. The day after arrival, the Battalion was able to stretch its legs with an eight mile march and run after breakfast before settling down to loading their aircraft.
Corporal Cooper of the Airlanding Field Ambulance wrote:
On the 20th March, we were moved to a transit camp, as part of the US Airborne Corps. Here we were kept busy making up payloads for the gliders. The maximum load for a Horsa glider was 6,000 lbs; each glider carried 24 men or a jeep and 15 men or a jeep with a trailer and 6 men. The average weight of a man and his personal equipment was 210 lbs, and the weight of every piece of extra equipment had to be determined. A great deal of juggling was entailed so that eventually the contents of each glider were as near as possible to the maximum payload, without exceeding it. The glider that I was to travel in carried a jeep and 15 men. The jeep occupied the centre of the glider with 9 men at the front and 6 men at the rear of the glider, the jeep effectively cutting off communication between the two parties.
Security surrounding the operation was tight and the camps and airfields were sealed in order to prevent word of the coming operation leaking. On 23 March, all officers and NCO’s were called to briefings, which were very thorough. Unlike during the run-up to Arnhem, every piece of information was analysed and every contingency considered by commanders from General Bols downwards. Corporal Cooper recalled some of the detail that was passed down to him
Aerial photographs of the area of the landing zones were shown to us as these were in 3D [stereo pairs] we got a very good idea of the terrain and were actually able to pick a point at which to assemble after landing, from where we would proceed to the building which had been chosen as a suitable for the Main Dressing Station. We were also advised that along the base of our triangular landing zone were high-tension power lines, and the glider pilots were warned not to come too low although there was no current passing along the cables as the RAF had bombed the power station.
Lieutenant Allanson, a platoon commander in B Company 12 Devon recalls that his briefing was equally thorough: ‘Major Wally Barrow then briefed the officers and sergeants of the Company in every detail from maps, photographs and a model. This took nearly three hours and all felt extremely tired ...’ After tea Lieutenant Allanson got his ‘own stuff together and wondered how I was going to carry it all’.
Corporal Cooper recalled the final pep talks.
We were also told that aerial observation had seen no heavy artillery in the area and the operation was regarded as ‘A piece of cake.’ Indeed, General Montgomery, we were told, had expressed the view that he did not think that we were really necessary but that we were thrown in as a makeweight, - Not exactly morale raising.
Brigadier James Hill, Commander 3 Parachute Brigade was more positive in the final section of his briefing to 1st Canadian Para Battalion:
Gentlemen, the artillery and air support is fantastic! And if you are worried about the kind of reception you’ll get, just put yourself in the place of the enemy. Beaten and demoralised, pounded by our artillery and bombers, what would you think, gentlemen, if you saw a horde of ferocious, bloodthirsty paratroopers, bristling with weapons, cascading down upon you from the skies? And you needn’t think, just because you hear a few stray bullets flying about, that some miserable Hun is shooting at you. That is merely a form of egotism. But if by any chance you should happen to meet one of these Huns in person, you will treat him, gentlemen, with extreme disfavour.
Brigadier James Hill talking to officers of 1st Canadians Para battalions at the end of his MUSH Exercise.
6th Airborne Division was briefed that neither the politicians nor the public would stand for another Arnhem and they were told that the operation could be cancelled right up to the moment of the drop if Second Army had not already established firm bridgeheads and was in a position to guarantee a prompt link up.
All was ready but 12 Devon’s historian described an ‘air of unreality’ that pervaded their transit camp during the final hours before take off, with men going to bed about 2200 hours to try and ‘avoid that sinking feeling’ that grows in a sleepless night before an operation.