CHAPTER FOUR
(For full details see Battleground PLUNDER)
Unlike Operations HUSKY, OVERLORD and MARKET GARDEN, which all opened with airborne operations, PLUNDER, the Rhine Crossing, was to begin with the amphibious assault in order to establish a viable bridgehead before XVIII US Airborne Corps would begin its drop.
The air bombing and artillery bombardment by the prodigious number of guns assembled to support the operation started to grow from 1700 hours on 23 March 1945. This was the beginning of what was the greatest British artillery bombardment of the war, being fire by some 5,500 guns. Major Martin Lindsay of 1 Gordons, recalled that:
There was a continuous ripple of slams and bangs as all our guns, stretching across so many fields behind, were firing, and it went on for four hours … Meanwhile quite a lot of stuff was beginning to come back from the other side, mostly medium and light mortars. One mortar in particular was dropping its bombs all round this house. At 7.30 p.m., there was still one and a half hours to go. A tremendous rumble of guns behind us, their shells whistling overhead, and the nice sharp banging sound of our 25-pounders landing on the far bank.
Operation TURNSCREW
In typical Montgomery style, the Rhine Crossing began with an attack designed to widen the frontage of the assault, focus the enemy’s attention away from the site of his main effort and to get enemy reserves heading away from where they would be most required. To this end, XXX Corps launched 51st Highland Division, in Operation TURNSCREW astride the riverside town of Rees ten miles north of the point where XII Corps (the main effort) would cross.
In flickering light of the bombardment, at 2030 hours, as described in Second Army’s history, the 51st Division’s:
‘… assault formations slipped out of their hides and turned their LVTs towards the east. Across the broad floodplain toward the dark swift-running waters of the great barrier of the R Rhine amphibians picked their careful paths, assisted by movement light. A tremendous artillery barrage roared encouragement. The curtain had risen on the opening phases of the last battle of the European war’.
Landing Vehicle Tracked (LVT) more commonly known in British Service as the Buffalo.
As any force forming up on the riverbank would be detected by the enemy, the initial assault troops were all mounted in LVTs (Buffalos) and, with the DD tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry following, they motored down from their hides, on pre-recced routes, to the crossing points. The bombardment covered the noise of the track, while softening up the 8th Fallschirmjäger Division, dug-in on the far bank. Several artillery regiments engaged the landing areas on the far bank with the aim of detonating enemy landmines.
The four leading battalions from the two assault brigades, 153 and 154, were mounted in 150 amphibious Buffalos, with one troop of four LVTs being allocated per infantry company. Their tasks were to secure the bank and objectives little more than a thousand yards inland. In the case of 153 Brigade, their second wave (1 Gordon) was to capture Rees, while that of 154 Brigade (1 Black Watch) was to expand the bridgehead by capturing the villages of Speldrop and Klein Esserden. 152 Brigade was to send a battalion (2nd Seaforth) over the river to support 153 Brigade in the capture of Rees before midnight on D-1. The remainder of the Division were to follow and further expand the bridgehead.
Trooper Walter Fuller of 4 RTR, carrying 153 Brigade, recalled:
For this operation our Shermans had been replaced with American Buffalo amphibious tanks [LVT personnel carriers], supporting the 51st Highland Division. It was pitch black as we led our vehicles into the water, we couldn’t see and had no idea what to expect, other than that being the first unit over the Rhine no doubt meant resistance would be heavy. It was an extremely nerve-wracking crossing, especially as we had only just changed over from the Shermans we were used to! After a while though we realised that in fact there was next to no resistance and our crossing was all but uncontested, which was a huge relief. When we reached the other side I remember one man, Colonel Alan Jolly [CO 4 RTR], planting the regimental flag on the eastern bank of the river. It was in fact the very same flag taken into battle by the unit in the First World War and was a proud moment for us all.
Buffalos on the Rhine on the Operation PLUNDER D-Day.
Highland infantryman Bill Robertson crossing with the first wave of 154 Brigade recalled that things looked difficult for a time.
My most vivid memory of WWII was crossing the Rhine …1945; four days after my 19th birthday … in amphibious vehicles called buffalos with were run by the Northamptonshire Yeomanry. We were halfway across when our tracks locked and we went around in a circle and drifted. We all thought we were going to have to jump or swim for it, but at the last minute the tracks started up again.
Commander XXX Corps, General Horrocks, in an observation post on some high ground overlooking the Rhine, recalled that ‘All around me were the usual noises of battle but I could see very little except the flicker of the guns’. Horrocks, however, soon received a message, at 2117 hours; ‘The Black Watch has landed safely on the far bank’.
The task given to 154 Brigade was to form a bridgehead a mile and a half deep, to the east of Rees, including the villages of Kline Esserden and Speldrop. The assault was to be led by 7 Black Watch and 7 Argyles, with the third battalion, 1 Black Watch, crossing into the bridgehead later.
The leading battalions climbed up the steep banks, out of the river in their tracked amphibians with a little difficulty, astride Mahnenburg. One of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry’s LVT was knocked out by a Teller-mine, on the enemy bank. While 7 Black Watch were debusing from their Buffalos, further casualties were sustained from anti-personnel Schumines that had been scattered thinly along the banks. Accompanying the infantry were engineers of 274 Field Company, whose task was to clear the bank of mines before the arrival of the subsequent waves, as well as helping construct exit ramps to ease their passage. Enemy opposition was minimal to start with; the Fallschirmjäger defenders were still stunned by the effect of the bombardment. However, moving inland, resistance stiffened and fighting around the villages of Kline Esserden and Speldrop went on for much of the day, with repeated attack and counter-attack.
The light airborne bulldozer carried across the Rhine in a LVT proved its worth on the enemy bank.
153 Brigade’s attack astride Rees, on the Divisions right, went equally well but also faced challenges as they advanced from the immediate area of the river bank. They had benefited from the British barrage, which:
… had been murderously heavy; it had included salvos of rockets fired from tanks; much of the kick had been taken out of the defence. The first companies passed over many positions whose garrisons were still dazed; as the succeeding companies reached them they were just coming to life.
5 Black Watch cleared Esserden, while 5/7 Gordons, to the south east of Rees landed on an island created by the old course of the Rhine. 1 Gordon Highlanders, following in assault boats, landed between the two leading battalions and headed towards the town of Rees, which was the divisional main effort. The town was, however, not taken for another thirty-six hours. Meanwhile, to complete the isolation of Rees, 152 Brigade crossed the river and 2 Seaforth established itself north of the town against growing opposition.
The first phase of Operation PLUNDER had got underway successfully but it was already apparent that the Germans were going to fight for every inch and their armoured reserves had not yet arrived.
DD Tanks
Meanwhile, two squadrons of DD tanks of the Staffordshire Yeomanry had started crossing the river behind and between the two infantry brigades. They were responsible for making their own exits and on the far bank, they took a considerable amount of time and, in many cases, the tanks found the designated exits impossible. However, crossing in one of the Yeomanry’s six Buffalos was an airborne bulldozer, which once ashore, was able to reduce the bank to a slope and several carpets made of coir matting, stiffened with scaffolding poles, were laid to provide a firm surface. With the exits made, the tanks could cross. Lieutenant Sadler continued:
I was first tank into the River. We went down the slope, on the way we had quite a bit of gunfire and one or two of the tanks had their canvas screens holed so they couldn’t do the trip.
We got into the river, which was quite fast flowing. I seemed to have been there a long time and I didn’t see the two green lights, but suddenly I saw one green light. I thought, well, the other one might have gone out or something, so I started to land and I found out I was on a mud bank. Before I realized where I was (I thought I’d crossed the river), I let the canvas side down and of course my other two tanks, or three in actual fact, came over and one got stuck in the mud. There was a shellfire going on at that time. It was very uncomfortable and I had to get out of the tank, get the chains out and hook on to the other tank and pull it out. Of course, then I had the problem of whether to risk going from the mud bank to the actual true bank of the river. I probably didn’t have enough air anyway to inflate the screen again, … as it happened, the water didn’t come up above turret level so we were all right. The other three tanks followed.
The difficulty in locating the DD exit point was due to the fact that it was not directly or even obliquely across the river but almost a mile down stream. The 3 knot current swept the ungainly and barely ‘seaworthy’ tanks down stream through the 154 Brigade LVT crossing loop.
DD Shermans making their way to the Rhine.
By 0600 hours two troops of the Staffordshire Yeomanry’s DD tanks were across and ready for action. With the laying of the coir carpets further out into the river and daylight, the speed of crossing increased markedly and the first squadron was supporting the infantry at 0700 hours. The DD Shermans had been used to help solve the perennial problem of assault crossings of major waterways; being able to get tanks across in time to defeat enemy counter-attacks. The remaining two squadrons would, however not be able to cross until the Royal Engineers opened their Class 50/60 ferries.
Operation Widgeon
Under command of XII Corps, 1 Commando Brigade was to conduct another important preliminary assault crossing of the Rhine an hour after the initial assault by 51st Highland Division. They were given the task of seizing the city of Wesel, an important communications centre on the east bank, which was also an enemy strongpoint that, if not captured promptly, would dominate important crossing points and routes in the centre of 21st Army Group’s area of operations. Lieutenant General Ritchie, Commander XII Corps:
… had given it as his considered opinion that the whole of the operation as it affected his formation depended on this assault being successful. It was considered too, that the success of the attack on the town depended in turn largely on the success of two very heavy bombing raids on the area.
At Wesel, the Rhine was narrower than elsewhere; at about two hundred yards wide but the speed through the restricted channel was around five knots. The river was prevented from flooding by dykes, from fifteen to twenty feet in height. While the town was built on the banks of the river behind high dykes, to the north-west there was several hundred yards of open flood plain. Wesel itself was a medium size town of some twenty-four thousand inhabitants and strongly built, largely of stone, with a high proportion of wood. Like most towns on the Rhine, Wesel had already been bombed by the Allies, finally by seventy-seven Lancasters of No. 3 Group on the afternoon before the attack.
Armed Hitlerjugend were used in the front line across the Varsity and Plunder area.
There was not much information on the enemy in the town, which was in the sector thought to be held by General Major Heinz Fiebig’s 84th Volksgreandier Division. At least one of the numerous erzats battalions (probably 317th), made up of administrative troops extracted from the rear area had been identified in Wesel. Later, a two star German command post belonging to the garrison commander was also found within the town.
1 Commando Brigade was ‘to seize Wesel and the bridges over the Lippe to the south of it, and hold the eastern and southern exits of the town’. Brigadier Mills-Roberts’s plan was based on five factors: first, that to take advantage of the bombing raids they were to cross the river before the second raid and be ‘ready to rush into the city while its defences were still ‘punch drunk’; secondly, to achieve surprise, it was decided to cross at an unlikely spot, a muddy flood plain two miles west of Wesel; thirdly, there was to be no attempt to secure the entire town, as it would not be possible to clear it, before the enemy counter-attacks; the Brigade would therefore seize a factory area dominating the northern edge of Wesel; fourthly, there should be no trace of the Brigade on the flood plain at dawn, leaving the Germans unaware of their strength and whereabouts. Fifthly, landing across the muddy flood plain they would be unable to take heavy weapons.
The four commando units, 45 and 46 Commandos Royal Marines and Nos. 3 and 6 (Army) Commandos, were joined by 84 Field Company RE and forward observation parties from 1st Mountain Regiment RA, who would call for artillery fire. Sufficient LVTs were allocated to carry a single commando across the river in one lift, before returning to collect subsequent waves.
1 Commando Brigade’s Operation WIDGEON Plan.
At 2200 hours, H Hour for Operation WIDGEON, 6 Field Regiment’s shells, being fired at a rapid rate for the ten minutes of the initial crossing, were bursting on the bank opposite, drowning out the sound of everything else. Suddenly the area was lit up by fifteen foot flames from a direct hit on one of the Buffaloes on the far bank. ‘This beacon like blaze attracted the Germans attention and brought more shells and mortar bombs’.
Clearing a bridgehead took just fifteen minutes against some resistance and 46 RM Commando were soon waiting for the RAF raid on Wesel. BBC correspondent Stewart Macpherson was watching the crossing from the home bank and recorded the following:
I watched the [last] commandos take off for Wesel … A few minutes after they were due to arrive on the far side, bomber command were to deliver a crushing blow on the enemy in Wesel, while the commandos lay doggo over there, a bare thousand yards from the bomber target, and waited. Smack on time, Arthur Harris & Company, House Removers, as they were called by the commandos, arrived and delivered a nerve-shaking blow on the former Wesel stronghold. Back at Headquarters, minutes ticked by. Officers waited anxiously for word from the commandos across the river. Suddenly there was a signal, and a voice literally purred over the wireless: ‘Noisy blighters, aren’t they?’
The‘noisy blighters’, 201 RAF heavy bombers, had arrived at 2230 hours and dropped 1,100 tons of bombs. The Army had in fact requested a raid of only 300 tons of high explosive but as usual the RAF had increased the tonnage.
Leading off with a tape laying party No. 6 Commando headed for Wesel and entered the city, with the remainder of the Brigade following through a bomb damaged archway formed of hideously buckled rails and sleepers. Once in the city the ground changed totally. One commando described the scene that greeted them:
The streets were unrecognisable and many of the buildings were mere mounds of rubble. Huge craters abounded and into these flowed water mains and sewers, accompanied by escapes of flaming gas. We were held up in one street because the two leading scouts found great difficulty in making their way round between a crater and one of the buildings. It took some minutes before a better route was found further to the right. The scene was well illuminated for the ensuing battle in the streets by the many fires that blazed on all sides. Despite the heavy bombing the Germans were alert and came out of the cellars to fight with a courage and perseverance which did them great credit. The air was full of smoke and dust which was like breathing a particularly nauseous fog.
The Rhine to the east of Wesel in the Widgeon Area.
Rather than attempt to clear the city the commandos headed to pre-selected positions on the northern edge of built up area. With the last commando in place by 0200 hours, the men laboured to prepare defences to meet the expected counter-attacks. Meanwhile, to dominate the ground and to gather information, patrols probed back into the city. The result of one of these patrols was recorded by the Brigade Commander:
Generalmajor Deutch, the German Garrison Commander, was found by a patrol of 6 Commando in his headquarters in a cellar. He refused to surrender and was killed by a burst of Tommy gun fire. In his headquarters was a map giving full details of the flak dispositions of the whole area. It was invaluable because next day the 18th Airborne Corps, American and British, was to fly in and before that time it would be possible to get our own artillery on to the German flak positions to hammer them and do as much damage as possible.
At dawn the German counter-attacks began and built as leading elements of XLVII Panzerkorps started to arrive. The most dangerous period for the Commando Brigade was between 1000 hours and 1300 hours, during the fly-in, as artillery firing on the approaches to Wesel was subject to a check-fire. As expected, this coincided with them coming under severe pressure from 115th Panzer Division and some question the decision to not take antitank guns with the commando units; instead relying on captured panzerfausts.
Operation TORCHLIGHT
The Second Army’s Operation PLUNDER main effort lay with XII Corps who were to lead their assault across the Rhine with 15th Scottish Division, who had, as has been explained, been extracted from VERITABLE, after the initial phases, to train and prepare for PLUNDER.
XII Corps’s task was, with or without the drop of XVIII US Airborne Corps, to force a crossing of the Rhine, seize the Issel bridges (if not captured by 6th Airborne), establish ferries and eventually bridge the Rhine. From the resulting bridgehead, the Corps was to be prepared to operate eastwards. To this end, a Mobile Striking Force based on an armoured regiment and an infantry battalion mounted in Kangaroo armoured personnel carriers, was to be given the highest priority on the ferries and was to be ready for operations by first light on D plus 2.
15th (Scottish) Division was to launch its assault at 0200 hours on 24 March, some five hours after the attack by 51st Highland Division and four hours after that of 1 Commando Brigade. The crossing was timed to be coordinated with that of the crossing of XVI US Corps to their south (Operation FLASHLIGHT).
Enemy Forces
XII Corps, although they were unsure of the exact enemy boundaries, knew that their assault area was opposite elements of 7th Fallschirmjäger Division and 84th Infantry Division, both of which, as already discussed were shadows of their former selves. However, in prepared positions they were still expected to give a good account of themselves against the vulnerable Scottish infantry advancing across the river and open flood plain. It was known that the defenders in the 84th Division area now included Volkstssturm but these reinforcements, on the face of it, of very low quality but similar troops had given a good account of themselves during the battle of the Bulge and of course during VERITABLE, when they had already faced 15th Scottish Division.
An estimate of the quantity of enemy artillery that XII Corps would face was made by gunner intelligence:
‘… 84th Inf Div assisted by GHQ and non-divisional resources, was thought to have only about fifty medium guns: in fact there were probably more, and they were in any case very difficult to locate, as they were mostly sited in very enclosed country. To thisfigure must be added the guns which 7 Para Div might bring to bear against 12 Corps.’
79th Armoured Division’s CDL tanks join Monty’s Moonlight Operations.
This total did not include the more manoeuvrable and even more difficult to locate, medium mortars, which, throughout the North West European Campaign, was the weapon system that inflicted the greatest proportion of casualties amongst the Allies.
15th Division’s Plan
Major General Barber’s task was, on a two brigade frontage, to establish a bridgehead between Bislich and Vynen, ‘preparatory to securing the area of Bergerfurth along with its bridge’, which is referred to as ‘Bridge A’. This bridge was important, as the old course of the Rhine was, in effect, a second obstacle or potential line of resistance to be crossed before the Scots could relieve 6th Airborne Division in the area of Hamminkeln. If not already secured, 15th Division was to go on and capture the bridges over the Issel. No less than six field regiments four or five medium regiments one or two heavy AA batteries and a pair of heavy and super heavy batteries would support each of the assault brigades. The crushing weight of fire delivered by these guns would be supplemented by those of the remainder of 8 Army Group Royal Artillery in the case of emergency. The apogee of the British artillery’s power was the ‘Pepper Pot’. These bombardments included all available guns being concentrated in an annihilating strike against specific targets and were built into the general fire plan to maximise effect on important targets.
A key part of Major General Barber’s plan included 100 Anti-Aircraft Brigade. In addition to its normal role of protecting the ferry and bridging sites from enemy aircraft, this brigade was also to provide river security by coordinating the efforts to prevent the Germans from destroying the crossing sites and bridges with mines laid by divers swimming down stream.
44 Lowland Brigade – Codeword POKER
On 15th Division’s right flank the Lowland Brigade was to cross the Rhine and capture and hold the area Schuttwick, Loh and Bislich. 11 RTR (LVT) were to lift the assault battalions of 44 Brigade, 6 Royal Scots Fusiliers (6 RSF) were right assault and 8 Royal Scots (8 RS) left. Their initial objectives were to clear the line of the bund immediately west of Bislich, between Fahrhaus and Ronduit and to occupy the western half of Bislich. Thereafter, 6 King’s Own Scottish Boarders (6 KOSB) ‘was then to pass through 6 RSF and seize the remainder of Bislich, after which the whole brigade was to advance between north and east to the Dieserfordterwald where it was anticipated they would link up with the British and American airborne Troops.
Infantry crossing the home bank’s bund during the morning of 24 March.
Staffordshire Yeomanry’s DD tanks on the morning of 24 March, ready to support the Jocks.
Having received word of the success of the crossing by 51st Highland Division to their north and the Commandos just to their east, ‘soon after midnight 23/24 March, the assaulting battalions boarded their LVTs in the Marshalling Area.’Under the cover of the sound of fighting to the flanks and their own ”Pepperpot” barrage falling on the opposite bank, the two regiments of Buffaloes each set out for the river, in a single file, at 0330 hours. By 0155 hours … waves of tightly packed Buffaloes roared and squeaked their way through gaps blown by the REs in the dyke wall to splash towards their objectives.’ Here ‘the columns paused momentarily … to check timings’, and then the first flights, comprising three companies per assaulting battalion, passed through the gaps, fanned out into line and entered the water at H Hour (0200 hours).
The Buffalos, having been carried down stream to the approximate area of their proposed landing, headed for the bank and started to climb out of the river. At this point, it was intended that the soldiers of 6 RSF would be led into battle by a battalion piper. BBC radio reporter Wynford Vaughan Thomas was aboard an LVT with the Commanding Officer who:
… gave the signal, the piper lifted his pipes to his lips, and he blew, and only an agonised wailing came from his instrument. Again he tried, and again the wail. If ever a man was near to tears, it was our piper. His great moment, and now, as he cried in despair: “Ma pipes, man, they’ll no play.”
Battalion records, however, differ and show that Piper McGhee played the regiment march Cutty’s Wedding. He recalled ‘There was nothing to do it, but I was a bit scared when I first boarded the Buffalo. There was a good deal of sniping and mortar fire, but the actual crossing wasn’t too bad.’
The leading battalions were all across on time, around dawn, having been disembarked‘dry shod’. There was some shelling and mortaring and both 6 RSF and 8 RS reported ‘a certain amount of trouble from light automatic fire’. Casualties from anti-personnel mines around the landing sites, drop shorts from their own artillery and the few determined enemy machine gun posts, were overcome with considerable dash. The Jocks occupied the western outskirts of Bislich and Gossenhof Farm, which was captured after a sharp fight with the enemy who were all killed or captured.
By 0330 hours, the Brigade’s initial objectives were taken, ‘though mopping up was still continuing, some enemy parties having gone to ground in cellars’. As a result, ‘patrols were sent out to clean up any enemy who might be lying up in houses or entrenched in their respective areas’.
A Buffalo climbs the steep river bank.
When the message came through to HQ 44 Brigade that the leading assault companies were established, Brigadier Cumming-Bruce ordered his reserve battalion, 6 KOSB to cross the river by boat. At 0330 hours, two Companies started crossing and, suffered the usual breakdowns of the unreliable storm boat engines. Eighteen year old Private Frederick Hambly recalled his trip across the river:
The noise of the battle raging overhead was terrific as we approached the area of embarkation. We, D Company, 6th Bn KOSB embarked on our frail craft, cast off from the west bank. We were nearly halfway across when the engine cut out. We watched as our landing area on the far bank, with its white tapes denoting that that area has been cleared of mines, receded from us, as being without engine power we were swept by the strong current, broadside towards the North Sea!
We were however fortunate enough to be spotted by another boat returning for its second run, and its skipper manoeuvred around the stern to our port side, lashed the two boats together and steadily moved upstream to our disembarkation area.
Having formed up and crossed the flood plain, the second wave of the Borderers cleared the north east part of Bislich and Feldwick. Here they met some resistance from Grenadier Regiment 1062 but by 0700 hours, they were secure in the village.
Once the KOSB were in their position, 44 Lowland Brigade had a continuous bridgehead and were ready to push forward towards the Deiserfordterwald where, just beyond, in a matter of hours, 6th Airborne would be dropping.
227 Highland Brigade – Codeword NAP
The Highland Brigade was to cross the Rhine, capture and hold the area of Haffen and Mehr. Brigadier Colville’s plan was to assault with two battalions up, 10 Highland Light Infantry (10 HLI) on the right and 2 Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (2 A&SH) to the left. 2 Gordon, initially in reserve, and was to cross on orders, when Overkamp and Lohr were reported clear, relieving 10 HLI and 2 A&SH respectively: the latter battalions were then to exploit to Bellinguoven and Wisshof. Once established in their bridgeheads, the two assault brigades would close the gap between them, up to their mutual boundary, while 227 Brigade would be responsible for linking up with 51st Highland Division near Rees.
227 Highland Brigade’s crossing of, however, did not go nearly as well as that of 44 Brigade. The leading companies of 10 HLI crossed without casualties, but were landed several hundred yards to the right, missing their objective of Wolffskath, opening a wide gap between the two assault battalions. The HLI found the bund strongly held by three companies of 1/21 Fallschirmjäger Regiment, with a strongpoint at Wolffsrath. A Company suffered heavy casualties, including all their officers.
The second flight also landed incorrectly, resulting in ‘a highly confused situation’, not helped by the absence of Battalion HQ, which had landed to the right and was temporarily stranded in no-man’s-land, where it was attacked and ‘only extricated at 0500 hours with some difficulty’. That ‘difficulty’ included ‘…the complete O.P. party of the 131st Field Regiment, R.A., being ambushed and wiped out’. However, with the guns of the artillery finally answering the call for fire:
Down came the concentration exactly where it was wanted, whereupon C and D Companies - totalling together much less than one company’s strength -went in, in open order. They took Bettenhof together with forty-four prisoners, and there in the southern portion of Overkamp they dug in.
By dawn, 10 HLI were secure in the outskirts of Overkamp, where they were joined by Support Company and essential vehicles
Crossing at the same time, 2nd Argyles had considerable difficulty in getting their Buffaloes ashore thanks to mud banks obstructing the proposed exits from the river. As a result, five out of D Company’s six Buffaloes, found it impossible to land at the eastern corner of the inlet as planned, so they climbed ashore on the west side.‘Thus D Company had a mile’s march round the inlet before they could tackle Hübsch, so all hope of surprise was lost’. Consequently, outside Hübsch they were engaged in close quarter fighting with Fallschirmjäger, who were positioned on the reverse side of the bund and in scrub to the southward. By first light, however, the Argyle’s cleared Hübsch, losing many men in the process.
Meanwhile, on the Argyle’s left, B and A Companies who landed without casualties, had pushed north without waiting for Hübsch to be cleared and took Hoverhof, north-west of Haffen. Also seen off, was a two-company Fallschirmjäger counter-attack with the help of artillery fire.
Pushing north against enemy positions held by Fallschirmjäger, the Argyles closed up to the right flank of 51st Highland Division (5/7 Gordons). The actual linkup was not, however, made until P.M. 26 March.
At 0615 hours, 227 Brigade’s reserve battalion, 2 Gordons, were ordered to send a company across the river in storm boats. A Company, who were expecting orders for a direct crossing, now found themselves cruising a mile down stream to to join the Argyles. In doing so, they suffered fourteen casualties from small arms fire from isolated enemy posts along the riverbank. B Company were mortared very badly in their assembly area and with the loss of boats, temporarily abandoned their attempt to cross. The presence of these isolated posts caused a significant delay in 15th Scottish Division’s build up during the morning of 24 March.
Further advances east were made by the Argyles towards Lohr and Riswickhof but by the time the attack got going, the artillery check fire had been imposed, while air strikes prior to the airborne operation were launched. 1 Middlesex’s medium machine guns, however, were available in quantity. The enemy put up significant resistance and it was slow going for the Scots infantry it wasn’t until 1330 hours that Lohr, five hundred yards further on, was clear.
Meanwhile, starting at 1030 hours, the remainder of 2 Gordons crossed the river. Their historian wrote:
Fallschirmjäger machine gunners await the enemy.
Scottish infantry in one of the riverside towns.
A Scottish infantryman provides covering fire with his No 4 Enfield rifle from well inside a room, thus avoiding being framed in the window.
227 Brigade’s crossing.
… the Battalion crossed to reinforce the Argylls. There were some minor troubles. The boat conveying the commanding officer and the adjutant ran out of petrol in mid-stream and was paddled until the sapper in charge produced a reserve tin.
Their task was to follow elements of the Argyles around the left flank to attack Haffen and secure the eastern part of Area X. This area in the centre of the ‘Bend’ formed the largest area of houses, fields and orchards and was a natural defensive position for the Germans, which was firmly held by 18 or 19 Fallschirmjäger Regiment. This large area was too big for a single battalion to take and clear and, consequently, Divisional HQ needed to coordinated an attack on the eastern portion of the village by elements of 227 Highland Brigade. While this was coordinate, there would be another pause in operations.
Meanwhile, the XVIII US Airborne Corps had dropped into their DZs.