CHAPTER ONE

Introduction and Overview

During the Second World War Bomber Command flew around 390,000 sorties for the loss of 8,953 aircraft on operational missions; that number does not include another almost 1,400 that crashed in the UK whilst airborne on an operational mission. The cost in aircrew lives was over 47,000, to which must be added those killed in accidents or training – a further 8,000 plus; it is generally accepted that the total of lives lost is around 55,000. What did the six years of the bombing offensive achieve? Supporters and critics were active at the time and in the 60 years since the end of the war the argument has raged even more fiercely. As with all history the benefits of hindsight and access to previously classified documentary sources has to be balanced by the researcher’s removal in time and context from the period under study. To understand truly decisions, policies, actions and attitudes is all but impossible. This book covers the entire period of Bomber Command from its origin in 1936 to its demise – into Strike Command – in 1968. Whilst all periods of the Command are covered it is inevitable that the major focus is on the period of the Second World War. The book has been divided into five main sections: an Introduction and Overview, which sets the framework for the development of Bomber Command and includes both policy and politics; an Operations chapter, which focuses on the combat operations of the Command; a brief look at each of the operational Groups; an overview of aircrew training; and, finally, an Aircraft chapter, looking in chronological sequence at all operational aircraft types – and one ballistic missile used by Bomber Command. The annexes provide a variety of historical data.

It seems appropriate to open this overview with a few words from the most famous of Bomber Command’s leaders, Sir Arthur Harris: ‘There are no words with which I can do justice to the aircrew under my command. There is no parallel in warfare to such courage and determination in the face of danger over so prolonged a period.’ These words from Bomber Command’s wartime leader, Air Marshal Arthur T. Harris are a fitting tribute to the sacrifice made by the Command in six years of war. Only one force on the Allied side was continuously involved with active operations against the German homeland – RAF Bomber Command. The day the war started a Blenheim of 139 Squadron flew a reconnaissance sortie to locate German shipping and for the next six years the Command took the war to the enemy, at first with limited effect but from 1942 with increasing resources and greater accuracy, and with an ever greater impact.

Origins and doctrine

Strategic bombing theory was developed in the latter years of the First World War and was a combination of the German raids on England and the Allied, especially Royal Flying Corps/Royal Air Force, bombing campaign, although this was only just starting to get into its stride when the Armistice was signed in November 1918. Despite the fact that strategic bombing had not really been evaluated in the First World War it became a central tenet of air power theory in the post-war period. In part this was because it was the one independent decisive (potentially) role that the air forces could perform. For the RAF this was enshrined as the Trenchard Doctrine: ‘the nation that would stand being bombed longest would win in the end … to win it will be necessary to pursue a relentless offensive by bombing the enemy’s country, destroying his sources of supply of aircraft and engines, and breaking the morale of his people.’ This doctrine of a war winning bomber force remained the focus of doctrine with the major air forces throughout the 1920s. In May 1928 Trenchard, whose views still carried great weight, circulated a forceful memo to counter: ‘an unwillingness on the part of the other Services to accept the contention of the Air Staff that in future wars air attacks would most certainly be carried out against the vital centres of commerce and of the manufacture of munitions of war of every sort no matter where these centres were located.’ He stated that the RAF doctrine was to ‘break down the enemy means of resistance by attacks on objectives selected as most likely to achieve this end’ it being better to attack munitions at source (the factory) than on the battlefield – this would become a well-rehearsed argument by Bomber Command throughout the Second World War. It would, he believed, have greater effect for less effort, and would include dissuading workers from working in the factories. ‘The Hague Convention allows for military targets, including production centres. What is illegitimate, as being contrary to the dictates of humanity, is the indiscriminate bombing of a city for the sole purpose of terrorising the civilian population.’ Bomber Command would later take great care to stress the military significance of its city targets, whilst the German propaganda machine would refer to the Terrorflieger. The other Chiefs of Staff in their respective memos were not convinced, and also expressed concern over being bombed in return; it must be remembered that this was a period when the independence of the RAF, in part budget-driven, was under threat and the arguments, as such tri-Service ‘debates’ usually are, was writ large with vested interest.

Bomber Command suffered 55,000 aircrew casualties in the Second World War; a number of squadrons lost 1,000 aircrew during the war.

Bomber Command Badge: In front of a thunderbolt gules winged grey, an Astral Crown Or (elements of this badge were subsequently used in the Strike Command badge). The thunderbolt represents Bomber Command’s striking power and the Astral Crown is indicative of the success of its operations. Motto: ‘strike Hard Strike Sure’. The badge was approved in March 1947 by King George VI.

The debates were largely hypothetical at the time as the RAF’s bomber strength in the early 1930s was pitiful with five night- and six day-bomber squadrons, all with slow biplanes with very limited bomb loads, hardly the material with which to deliver an aerial bombardment of any significance.

Although the stagnation of the 1920s, which in military terms had been a dismal decade for all of Britain’s armed forces, had started to change in the early 1930s both doctrine and equipment were outdated and with little immediate prospect of improvement. In terms of aircraft there was a glimmer of hope with the issue of Specification B.9/32 for a ‘twin-engined medium bomber of good performance and long range’, although the requirement for a 720 mile range and 1,000 lb bomb load was not particularly inspiring! Two of Bomber Command’s early stalwarts – the Wellington and the Hampden – were a result of this Specification. The following year saw Britain wake up to the realities of a changing Europe. A Foreign Office appraisal of 1933 stated that Germany ‘… controlled by a frenzied nationalism and resolved to assert her rights to full equality, will proceed to the building of formidable armaments on land and especially in the air.’ The Government suggested that the Services draw up expansion plans; the Defence Requirements Committee sat from November 1933 to February 1934 and in its report gave priority to the establishment by the RAF of a Home Defence force (including bombers) strong enough to counter any attack. Expansion Scheme A was announced in July 1934 to provide the basis for a deterrent force and a training establishment on which future expansion could be based; under this scheme the RAF would be ready for war in eight years (1942). The old One-Power standard, which had seen planning based on France as the ‘enemy’ had to shift to reflect the reality of the growth of German power and belligerence. It was all very well to talk of an offensive bomber force capable of attacking targets in the Ruhr and Rhineland districts of Germany, the two main industrial areas, but quite another to make it a reality (even on paper). The initial solution was one of numbers over capability; create the squadrons even though the equipment might not be right as better aircraft could follow in due course. This was a mixture of financial constraint and lack of suitable aircraft; the latter would continue to plague the Command into the middle years of the war. As an indication, it cost £245,000 to acquire twelve Hawker Hart light bombers and £83,000 to operate them; in comparison it cost £375,000 to acquire ten Vickers Virginia heavy bombers and £139,000 a year to operate them. The financial aspect became a secondary consideration with Expansion Scheme C (May 1935) stating that: ‘Financial considerations were to be secondary to the attainment of the earliest possible security.’ In July the Air Staff confirmed the strategic doctrine: ‘Provided a sufficient weight of air attack could be brought to bear on the Rhineland-Ruhr-Saar area, Germany’s armament industry would be paralysed, which would in turn preclude her from maintaining an army in the field.’

It was only with the introduction of the four-engined ‘heavies’, such as the Halifax, that Bomber Command had the bomb-lift capability to wield an effective campaign.

The bomber force was organised into regional commands, such as the Wessex Bombing Area, and all were part of the Home Defence organisation, fitting neatly with the bombing offensive being seen as ‘attack as the best means of defence.’

By the time that Bomber Command formed on 14 July 1936, Expansion Scheme F (dated February 1936) was on the table. This called for a bomber force of 68 squadrons, with 990 aircraft, and was scheduled for completion by March 1939. Like the previous Schemes, and those that followed over the next two years, it was overly optimistic. Paper squadrons don’t fight wars and when Expansion Scheme H called for 1,659 bombers in ninety squadrons it was obvious even to the optimists that it was unrealistic, even though it was not scheduled for completion until 1943. For the first Commander-in-Chief of Bomber Command, Sir John Steel, aircraft were only one of the problems to be faced; of equal importance was personnel – aircrew and ground crew – as well as equipment, including bombs, and airfields. Lack of suitable weapons was to prove a major embarrassment to Bomber Command in the early part of the war and the problem could be traced back to a 1932 Air Staff decision that there would be no requirement for a bomb heavier than 500 lb and that the 250 lb bomb would be the standard weapon. The need for airfields further north to cater for Germany as the main target led to Expansion Period airfields from Norfolk to Yorkshire, with the latter county, along with Lincolnshire, becoming the heartland of Bomber Command. This expansion did not really start until 1935, with old First World War sites being looked at as part of a major search for airfield sites. The basic requirement was for a large patch of level ground for a grass airfield, the current bombers requiring little in the way of prepared surfaces, along with support facilities such as hangars, technical, administration and domestic buildings.

The impressive C-Type hangar became typical of bomber airfields of this period, although the exact facilities varied between locations. The provision of aircrew, and training in general is covered in a separate chapter. By the mid 1930s aircraft manufacturers who had been finding it hard to survive official disinterest in the 1920s were being called on to produce large numbers of new aircraft and it is remarkable that they were able to respond as well as they did. A great deal of criticism has been levelled by some commentators on the poor quality of equipment with which the RAF entered the war, an argument that could equally be aimed at the likes of tanks and other military equipment, but it takes time to design, develop and produce advanced items such as aircraft. It was only in 1935 that a medium/heavy bomber philosophy was adopted, based on the bomb lift of the proposed new types, and there was much debate on the subject at Air Staff and Government level. However, on the outbreak of war the Command was still substantially composed of light bombers and it would be 1943 before it lost the last of these. Indeed it was only in 1936 that two of the Command’s most advanced types – both light bombers, the Fairey Battle and the Bristol Blenheim, entered service. Perhaps the most significant decision was the issue of Specification B. 12/36 for a four-engined bomber of 250 mph cruise, 1,500 mile range and 4,000 lb bomb load. It was also to have the latest navigation equipment, plus power-operated gun turrets, including a four-gun rear turret. This was starting to sound like a real strategic bomber – but the war would be well underway before the products of this Specification were ready for service. In the meantime, the expansion plans had to go ahead with whatever was to hand. Continued examination of overall air doctrine and assessment of the enemy air strength and employment, including tactical and strategic air operations in the 1936 Spanish Civil War, led to a revision in the expansion plan. In October 1938, Expansion Plan M was approved, which envisaged a strength of eighty-two bomber squadrons (1,360 aircraft) by April 1941, and with renewed focus on defensive requirements by increasing the number of fighter squadrons. Meanwhile, doctrine was being turned into reality and the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), with its eyes firmly fixed on offensive bombing, envisaged a three-phase campaign:

The late 1930s saw a large number of new airfields under construction for Bomber Command, such as Finningley in South Yorkshire.

1.Countering the all-out German air offensive by attacking Luftwaffe installations.

2.Countering the German land offensive by attacking ground forces.

3.A war-winning air offensive against German industry and transport.

The JPC also stated that: ‘the offensive employment of our own and Allied bombers is the only measure which could affect the issue during the first weeks of the war. The three classes of objective are:

1.Demoralise the German people, by methods similar to those we foresee the Germans themselves using against us, [so that] their Government might be forced to desist from this type of attack.

2.Discover and attack some target, the security of which was regarded by Germany as vital to her survival during the limited period within which she hoped to gain a decision over us, [so that] she would be forced to divert her air attacks to our own aerodromes and maintenance organisation.

3.Inflict direct casualties upon the German bombing aircraft, either in the air or on the ground, or upon their maintenance organisation; the intensity of German attacks would be directly and quickly affected.

The overall philosophy was translated into ‘Planning for a War with Germany’ and in late 1936 the Air Targets Intelligence sub-committee developed the Western Air (WA) plans and these became the focus for Bomber Command’s strategic planning. On 13 December 1937 the Command was instructed to commence detailed planning for WA1 (German Air Force), WA4 (German Army concentration areas and lines of communication) and WA5 (manufacturing centres), with planning to be complete by 1 April 1938. It was a massive task and was carried out with incomplete information on the targets and an over-optimistic appreciation of bombing capability. A Bomber Command appraisal of the list suggested that only the third was realistic as the others comprised targets of an inappropriate nature for offensive strategic bombers, a stance that would be taken by bomber leaders, especially Arthur Harris, at various times throughout the war.

The WA Plans underwent a number of modifications over the next few months but by mid 1938 had settled down as:

WA1	German Air Force organisation and associated industries.
WA2	Reconnaissance of Home Waters and East Atlantic, in co-operation with the Royal Navy.
WA3	Convoy protection in Home Waters and East Atlantic.
WA4	German Army concentration areas and lines of communication.
WA5	Manufacturing Resources; WA5(a) Ruhr, WA5(b) Inland waterways, Ruhr, Baltic, North Sea ports, WA5(c) Outside of Ruhr.
WA6	Stores, especially oil.
WA7	Counter-offensive in co-operation with Royal Navy in defence of sea-borne trade.
WA8	Night attacks.
WA9	Kiel Canal and associated waterways.
WA10	Shipping and facilities, especially the Baltic.
WA11	Forests and crops.
WA12	German fleet in harbour or at sea.
WA13	Administrative centres, especially Berlin.

An indication of the optimism of the bomber theorists was a suggestion that an offensive against the Ruhr, especially the coking plants and power stations, would, ‘Prevent Germany waging war on a large scale in less than three months.’ This outcome could be achieved with 3,000 sorties, at a cost of 176 bombers, by knocking out twenty-six coking plants and nineteen power stations. With hindsight of the first years of the war this level of optimism seems incredulous!

Whilst plans were being prepared, the Command was undergoing a major reorganisation as aircraft types and roles were concentrated into individual Groups and units moved to more appropriate airfields within the new structure. The progress made in the two years since the Command was formed was incredible and those who criticise Bomber Command’s performance in the first years of the war fail to recognise just how much had been achieved in such a short period. Despite the optimism expressed above, Ludlow-Hewitt (C-in-C since September 1937) clearly stated that his Command was: ‘Entirely unprepared for war, unable to operate except in fair weather and extremely vulnerable in the air and on the ground.’ These words proved to be far more prophetic. However, the military always has to play with the cards it has and Bomber Command was to enter the war with a far from ideal hand. The arrival of the Wellington, the first squadron equipping in late 1938, was one positive indication but by the outbreak of war there were only six operational squadrons with this type. It could have been worse; Bomber Command may have gone to war in September 1938 when the Munich Crisis took Europe to the brink of war. Most parties knew that the Allied ‘sell-out’ provided only a respite and that war with Germany was inevitable; for the RAF the extra year was crucial.

To war

At the outbreak of war in September 1939, Bomber Command had an average daily availability of 500 aircraft (total aircraft establishment was 920 aircraft) organised in fifty-five squadrons controlled by five operational Groups. No. 1 and No. 2 Groups were equipped with light bombers – Fairey Battles and Bristol Blenheims respectively – and the other three Groups (3, 4 and 5) with twin-engined ‘strategic bombers’ – Handley Page Hampdens, Armstrong-Whitworth Whitleys and Vickers-Armstrongs Wellingtons respectively.

On 2 September all aircraft of the Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) were ordered to deploy to France, the Battles of No. 1 Group duly crossed the Channel, one ditching en route but with the crew being rescued. There were effectively four operational Groups left in the UK – Nos 2, 3, 4 and 5 – with No. 6 Group taking on the training role to administer the Group Pool squadrons. These latter units were squadrons within each Group which were given the task of training the crews arriving from Flying Training Schools to a standard whereby they were fit to join operational squadrons and of providing a pool of replacement crews. Any expansion of Bomber Command was faced with a number of hurdles, the most important of which were availability of aircraft, crews and airfields. Each of these aspects was to cause major problems in the early years of the war and in almost every instance the solution was, in some respects, a compromise. The overriding consideration throughout the expansion of the Command was that of maintaining the attack on Germany. Lead times required for new aircraft, airfield construction and the training of aircrew had an effect on the speed with which the expansion progressed.

Bomber Command was in action on day one of the war, a number of Blenheim reconnaissance sorties later followed by a Hampden/Wellington force in search of German shipping were conducted, whilst on the first night of the war Whitleys flew over the Ruhr dropping propaganda leaflets. The Ruhr was a most appropriate destination in Germany for this first, albeit only with paper, visit by Bomber Command as it was the Ruhr that was to receive a great deal of the Command’s effort once the bombing offensive was launched.

Blenheim of 44 Squadron at Waddington; the Squadron had re-equipped by 1939 and the Blenheim’s bombing activities with Bomber Command were confined to No. 2 Group.

This pattern of activity of daylight searches for shipping and night leaflet dropping was to be the focus of Bomber Command’s war for the next few weeks; only small numbers of aircraft were involved and little action took place, although there were early indications of bomber vulnerability such as the loss of five Hampdens on a shipping sortie on 29 September. There appears to have been little reaction to this high level of losses from an attack with no result in terms of damage to the enemy. October and November were quiet months although in addition to limited operational flying a number of exercises were flown, such as that on 22 November to, ‘Investigate the factors of time and concentration of aircraft in attacks on targets situated in a relatively small area’ and that on 28 November on ships in the Belfast area to, ‘Give training and experience in the delivery of concentrated and rapid attack upon warships located in or near harbours.’ The latter exercise involved sixty aircraft from Nos 3 and 5 Groups. Despite losses and lack of success to date, the general opinion was still that aircraft could find and hit their targets and that they would be able to defend themselves. Indeed, the report on an attack on 3 December appeared to confirm this view: ‘Twenty-four Wellingtons carried out an attack upon enemy warships anchored in the vicinity of Heligoland. A total of sixty-three 500 lb semi armour piercing (SAP) bombs were dropped; a direct hit was obtained on a cruiser and probably on a second. At least three bombs were dropped so close to enemy warships as to make it likely that damage was caused and casualties were sustained. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered and some twenty enemy aircraft, including Me 110s, were seen, some of which attacked. One Me 109 was shot down and one appeared to have been hit. Three of our aircraft were hit but all returned safely to their bases.’ This report would seem to suggest that all was well and later that week the Air Ministry ordered attacks on naval forces in German estuaries ‘as soon as possible.’ On 14 December twelve Wellingtons from 99 Squadron were sent to patrol the Elbe Estuary and the Frisian Islands to attack shipping – and it was a disaster. Under fighter attack and in the face of heavy flak half of the attacking formation became casualties; not a promising start to the new campaign. Two days later the Commander-in-Chief presided over a conference of his Group commanders and senior staff to, ‘Examine the existing operating procedures with a view to making such modifications as might be considered desirable in the light of the experience gained in war conditions.’ The ink was hardly dry on the minutes of this meeting, which had reached no firm conclusions, when a second disastrous operation took place. On 18 December No. 3 Group sent twenty-four Wellingtons from three squadrons to patrol the Schillig Roads and Wilhelmshaven to report upon any enemy naval forces. ‘In Wilhelmshaven a battleship, two cruisers and four destroyers were seen in the harbour and alongside. They were not therefore attacked. There was heavy anti-aircraft fire and some twenty-five Me 109s and Me 40s (sic) attacked – at least twelve of which were shot down. Twelve of our aircraft failed to return, of these two are known to have descended into the North Sea on the way home.’ One initial reaction to this disaster was an Air Ministry order suspending attacks on naval forces until the armouring of the Wellington’s fuel tanks had been completed.

So with new aircraft types promised and a major growth in numbers, Bomber Command entered the first winter of the war. With a political injunction against attacks on land targets, the rationale for the strategic bombers had disappeared. The doctrine of bombing the enemy heartland and destroying his industrial capability had been removed at a stroke by the politicians. This was not so much on humanitarian grounds, although the American President had requested both sides to refrain from unrestrained bombing, but more because of a belief that the German bomb lift, i.e. weight of bombs to a target, was greater than that of the RAF.

Whilst the Wellingtons endeavoured to find and attack German shipping, the Whitleys were operating over Germany at night – but only dropping leaflets. This propaganda leaflet-dropping campaign (nickelling as it was called by Bomber Command) continued throughout the war. The first real test for the daylight bombing campaign came in December 1939 when, on a number of occasions, formations of Wellingtons were intercepted by fighters and suffered heavy losses. Another pillar of doctrine, that bombers flying in close formation using mutually supportive fire from their gun turrets could defeat fighter attack, was shattered. The number of sorties had been small and taken overall the losses were still seen as acceptable – and by no means an indicator that an offensive over the Ruhr would not succeed. Nevertheless, from January the Wellingtons and Hampdens joined the night leaflet campaign as there were no suitable bombing targets and it was an excellent way of giving crews practice in night operations. Losses from these sorties were low, as the Germans had not yet developed a night defence system.

Wellington R3213 of 38 Squadron; the Squadron was part of the Marham bomber force in No. 3 Group.

Equipped with fleece-lined suits the crew climb aboard their Whitley for another cold trip over Germany.

One of the major dangers faced by the bomber crews was severe weather, icing being a particular hazard. The Whitley was prone to wing icing and, despite the use of anti-icing aids such as Kilfrost paste, the only real solution was to avoid the icing layers in the cloud. Given the poor performance of the aircraft and the often inadequate Met forecast this was easier said than done – once icing had been detected the only option was a descent in search of warmer air.

April/May 1940 brought a number of developments. The German invasion of Denmark and Norway in April gave Bomber Command a new set of targets, and on 11 April a small force of Wellingtons attacked the airfield at Stavanger in Norway – the first intentional bombing attack on a land target in Europe. The same month saw Hampdens fly the first of a new type of mission: minelaying. Gardening, as these sorties were code-named, was to become a major part of the Command’s work over the next five years. Finally, the German invasion of France in May led to a dramatic and short-lived tactical employment of the AASF Fairey Battles in attempting to stem the enemy armoured columns – with much heroism, and crippling losses among aircraft and aircrew.

The Blenheim squadrons were also heavily tasked in this period; indeed between 10 May (the date of the German invasion) and 25 June, the Blenheims operated on all but four days – flying 1,616 sorties for the loss of 104 aircraft.

By early June the battered remnants of the Bomber Command light bomber force had left France and returned to airfields in England; No. 1 Group had effectively ceased to exist.

The most significant event in May was the lifting of the ban on attacking targets in Germany; the first attack took place on the night of 15 May on oil and rail targets in the Ruhr area – the strategic offensive had started. As major industrial towns were concentrated in the relatively small geographic area of the Ruhr, this part of Germany was to be the focus of much of the bomber effort until the last months of the war. Italy’s entry into the war in June provided additional targets for the bombers.

With the launch of bombing raids on Germany the focus of attack on industrial centres was intended to, ‘Cause the continuous interruption and dislocation of industry, particularly where the German aircraft industry is concentrated.’ On 4 June a new directive had been issued to Bomber Command but with the rider that: ‘The initiative lies with the enemy; our strategic policy is liable to be deflected by the turn of events from the course we should like to follow. The Command was instructed to pursue its campaign against German industry but to be ready to assist in countering any invasion.

With the launch of the bombing offensive the Command endeavoured to attack industrial targets in the Ruhr, this being deemed the area most likely to produce results as it was a major industrial area, often referred to as the ‘weapon smithy’ of the Reich. It was a major mining centre for coal and produced large quantities of coke to feed its own industries and those of other areas. It was home to major industrial towns such as Bochum, Dortmund, Duisburg and Essen, the latter being home to the massive Krupps works. However, the very nature of this industrial centre meant that it had a permanent haze, which made it very difficult for bombers find targets visually. All of these places became regular targets for the Command, as did places such as Gelsenkirchen where the two hydrogenation plants of Gelsenberg-Benzin and Hydrierwerke-Scholvern between them produced 575,000 tons of aviation fuel a year. In addition to the actual industrial targets great importance was attached to the comprehensive rail and canal network that linked Germany’s industrial centres. Indeed, the importance of the rail network became one of the Command’s justifications for its area bombing of cities.

A new directive was issued on 13 July, which stated that the primary aim was to, ‘Reduce the scale of air attack on this country with the aircraft and oil industries being the priority targets’. The Air Staff directive also recommended concentration of effort against a limited number of targets rather than the widespread attacks that had been made so far. It listed ten aircraft factories and five oil installations as the main targets, and it also estimated that bombers would have to hit an aircraft factory with 140 of the standard 500 lb bombs in order to have any effect. Secondary targets included communications centres. However, Portal as AOC-in-C considered the directive too restrictive and sought, and received, authority to be more flexible in his choice of targets. A new target category was added on 30 July with the Command ordered to attack power stations, the experts having decided that these were key targets that if destroyed would seriously disrupt German industry. Power stations featured in the summary of operations over the next few years, some as daylight attacks by the light and medium bombers, others as an aiming point within an area attack on a city. A summary in August showed that the Command had expended 41 per cent of its effort, in terms of bomb tonnage, against Luftwaffe-related targets and a further 21 per cent against oil targets.

The decision to include Operational Training Unit aircraft on ops was in part based on the desire to increase the number of aircraft operating each night but more particularly to provide trainee crews in the latter stages of their course with easy and relatively risk-free operational experience, the favoured mission being night leaflet-dropping over France. The first such op was flown by three OTU aircraft on the night of 18/19 July.

The increased threat from U-boats brought Bomber Command into this aspect of the maritime war, the first specific attack being made against the U-boat pens at Lorient on 2/3 September by thirty-nine Hampdens. A directive of 21 September instructed the Command to allocate three squadrons employed on minelaying to be transferred to attacks on U-boat targets. The same directive dictated a continued focus on the oil industry and also mentioned Berlin: ‘Although there are no objectives in Berlin of importance to our major plans, it is the intention that attacks on the city and its environs should be continued from time to time when favourable weather conditions permit. The primary aim of these attacks will be to cause the greatest possible disturbance and dislocation both to the industrial activities and civilian population generally.’ By the end of September the immediate threat of invasion had receded and the bomber effort was able to focus once more on the strategic offensive, with the light bombers of No. 2 Group contributing to the night attacks, although Blenheims also flew cloud-cover and anti-shipping operations.

The weather in October frustrated the attempt to return to the offensive over Germany, although it was fog at the home airfields that caused the greatest number of losses. On a bad night the Command could lose 10–20 per cent of the bombers to crashes in England; of seventy-three bombers that operated on the night of 16/17 October, fourteen crashed because of fog over their bases (and only three were lost over enemy territory). There had been a similar situation the previous month, as recounted by Ken Wallis (103 Squadron Wellington L7586): ‘At this stage of the war we had orders only to drop bombs if we could identify a military target and so we brought ours back until we could drop them on a harbour target in Holland. This meant of course that we had used more fuel than planned. As we flew over the North Sea we received a message that all aircraft were being diverted to Scotland – not an option for us, we didn’t have the fuel. Using the Darkie system we eventually persuaded someone that we had to try to land at an airfield on the east coast and so made for Binbrook, not that far from our own base. The fog was extensive and despite pass after pass over the airfield, during which we could dimly see the Chance Light, a landing was impossible and each time I just glimpsed a building or obstruction at the last moment and put the Wellington into a steep climb. The petrol gauges had been reading empty for some time and I requested permission to bale out the crew. I was told to fly a little further north – at which point both engines stopped. All the crew were able to get out but I was pretty low when I jumped. It was impossible to see where you were going to come down and I landed heavily and was knocked out, also damaging my back.’ So much for the crash: the subsequent few hours are also worth recounting: ‘When I came to I was near a hedge and had no idea where I was, the fog was still thick and moisture was dripping off the hedge. A few shots from the Mauser pistol that I always carried with me and a Policeman found me. He took me to a nearby large house and the owner was persuaded, with some reluctance, to take pity on a poor pilot. The owner was making tea as he couldn’t sleep and he grudgingly offered me a cup. When I asked to use his phone to call my base and check on my crew he was less than happy – until I offered to reverse the charges. At 6.00 am the next morning the maid arrived and I was looking forward to a good breakfast, especially after I gave her the chocolate and orange I had not eaten from my flying rations. No such luck. The Squadron Commander picked me up in his car at 8.00 am and we then picked up the rest of the crew from some cottages – they had done somewhat better than I had and had been plied with brandy for much of the night!’ They went to the crash site but little survived of the aircraft except the tail, Ken acquired the fabric from the part of the fin with the mission marks painted on it and this now hangs in the hall of his house. After this incident he was given 10 days leave and then it was back to operational flying.

Pair of 50 Squadron Hampdens. The Hampdens of No. 5 Group played a lead role in minelaying in 1940.

Tour lengths for aircrews varied throughout the war but by 1942 the normal tour was thirty operations for Main Force. At certain periods of the war the chance of survival for this 50 Squadron crew would have been poor.

October was a quiet month for the Command because of bad weather but on the 24th it acquired a new commander when Portal moved up to become Chief of the Air Staff, his place being taken by Air Marshal Sir Richard Peirse. The strategy for the winter offensive was laid out in a directive of 30 October; it was not new in that oil was to be the priority target, followed by aircraft component and aluminium factories. However, the overall stated aim was for, ‘Regular concentrated attacks on objectives in large towns and centres of industry, with the primary aim of causing very heavy material destruction, which will demonstrate to the enemy the power and severity of air bombardment and the hardship and dislocation which will result from it.’ This core doctrine remained with Bomber Command to the end of the war, although it is interesting to note that oil and the aircraft industry became the focus of the USAAF’s daylight bombing offensive from 1942 onwards, whilst Bomber Command concentrated on area bombing of cities of industrial and communications importance. The directive also called on the Command to continue its contribution to the maritime war; indeed it could only reduce this involvement with prior agreement from the Admiralty. Agreement was reached to reduce the minelaying force to one dedicated squadron.

It must be remembered that at this stage of the war Bomber Command’s nightly aircraft availability was limited, and a night when around 100 bombers operated was close to a maximum effort. The attack on Hamburg (16/17 November) was the largest to date but only comprised 130 aircraft; the raid was mounted in retaliation for the attack on Coventry the previous night. Only half the crews reported bombing the target and it is likely that if night photographs had been available from all of them that the true percentage would have been far lower. Evidence was beginning to mount that the bomber offensive was failing to have any major effect as bombers were unable to find or hit targets. Other developments in this first full year of war included consideration of tour length for aircrew – and the introduction to service of new bomber types. Discussions on tour lengths had been prompted by concern over the strain of continual operational flying; the ‘squadron commander’s discretion’ policy was gradually replaced by a fixed tour of 200 operational hours, which equated to thirty to thirty-five ops, the policy being circulated to Group commanders on 29 November. Although this calculation changed at various times during the war the basic tour length was generally around thirty ops, more for Pathfinder crews and with some targets only counting as half an operation.

New aircraft – new problems

Three new bombers had entered service in 1940 and all had suffered problems even before they became operational. The Stirling entered service with 7 Squadron in August and amongst the problems noted by Command was that, ‘It appears that a small degree of icing will invariably cause the aircraft to become unstable’. The Manchester joined 207 Squadron in November and the Command recorded: ‘Losses due to failure of bearings and a tendency to catch fire in the air after an engine failure’. The Halifax started with 35 Squadron the same month and after an initial favourable impression, it, too, began to experience problems. All three types started their operational careers in the first months of 1941. The major increase in bomb lift that these new bombers promised was vital to the Command’s plans. The planners also had other concerns. Bomber Command’s airfields had also started to suffer through heavy use and lack of facilities, and with a forecast that by 1943 some 170 bomber airfields would be needed to accommodate up to 9,000 heavy bombers, drastic action was required.

During the first few months of 1941 there were a number of developments in terms of targets, weapons and aircraft. Oil having been determined as a weak link in the German military-industrial establishment, Bomber Command was directed, on 15 January, to concentrate on oil targets: ‘The destruction of German synthetic oil plants will reduce the enemy to such a shortage of oil within the next six months that there will be widespread effects on German industry and communications, while it is even possible within this time an appreciable effect may be felt in the scale of effort of her armed forces.’ The basis for this ‘rosy picture’ was an estimate by the economic warfare experts that 6.7 per cent of the total bomber effort, if applied to key oil installations, could reduce production by 15 per cent and produce the result outlined in the directive, which also listed seventeen key targets, nine of which were given priority for attack. The Command had attacked one of these, at Gelsenkirchen, on the night of 9/10 January but of the 135 bombers that flew on the attack less than half claimed to have attacked the target. Only one Whitley was lost. The German night defences were still poor but as the offensive was stepped up in 1941 the defenders became far more efficient and loss rates became a major cause for concern in Bomber Command. Oil installations at Rotterdam were attacked on 10/11 February, the significant point being that this was the first Stirling operation.

The Stirling was the first of the ‘heavies’ to enter service, with 7 Squadron in summer 1940 and with its operational debut in early 1941.

1,000 lb bomb being prepared for loading into a Wellington of 115 Squadron; until the introduction of the High Capacity (HC) 4,000 lb blast bomb (‘cookie’) the ‘thousand-pounder’ was the most effective explosive weapon in the Command’s arsenal

The light bombers (Blenheims) had been contributing to the night war but in regard to their numbers the effort was small-scale. A new role was found for them in January 1941 with the Circus operations; these daylight ops were escorted by fighters and the bombers’ main role was that of ‘encouraging’ the Luftwaffe to intercept so that the fighters could engage them.

Just as the Command was settling down to a planned offensive it was issued with a new priority directive. This directive of 9 March changed the emphasis to naval targets, especially those connected with U-boats, as the war in the Atlantic was going badly. However, the wording was kept vague to allow a wide range of target options, especially those in ‘congested areas where the greatest morale effect is likely to result.’

As far as weapons were concerned, the 4,000 lb blast bomb, often referred to as a ‘cookie’, was introduced in late March – this bomb would play a major part in the campaign against industrial cities. More squadrons were being formed and the new heavy bombers were in service, which meant that a greater weight of bombs could be delivered each night, and the training system was turning out an adequate supply of aircrew. March had also brought a definitive policy on tour lengths; a standard tour was set at 200 operational hours, to be followed by a six-month rest and then a second tour of 200 hours.

Despite the introduction of heavy bomber types from late 1940 onwards, it was the medium bombers, primarily Wellingtons, which continued to shoulder the bulk of the Command’s operations. In June 1941 the operational force comprised forty-nine squadrons:

Heavy	Halifax	2 squadrons
	Manchester	3 squadrons
	Stirling	2 squadrons
	Fortress	1 squadron
Medium	Wellington	21 squadrons
	Hampden	6 squadrons
	Whitley	6 squadrons
Light	Blenheim	8 squadrons

Canadians had been part of the Bomber Command since the start of the war but on 12/13 June Wellingtons of 405 (Vancouver) Squadron made the first operational sortie by an RCAF squadron, four aircraft taking part in an attack on rail yards at Schwerte. The Squadron had formed at Driffield in April and the RCAF contribution would continue to grow over the next few months, leading to an all-Canadian operational Group – No. 6 (RCAF) Group.

The Unit Establishment of bomber squadrons at this time was 16+2 per squadron, although the Hampden units had three flights to give 24+3 and the single Fortress squadron (90 Squadron) had nine aircraft. As always, bare statistics paint only part of the picture and the paper strength was far greater than the true operational strength. Problems with the new aircraft types meant they were slower to enter service than planned. In the first half of 1941 heavy bomber production was only 54 per cent of that predicted and the expansion plan had to be continually revised in the light of this and other factors. Loss rates had started to increase as the German defences built up and became more effective. Finally, whereas it had been predicted that a bomber would survive twenty-five operational sorties the average was running at around half that – with implications for aircrew and aircraft. Churchill was convinced of the value of the bomber weapon and the War Cabinet approved a higher priority of resources for bomber production, plus acquisition of American aircraft. Britain had limited resources, including manpower, and there was a continual juggling of these resources to meet each new crisis. To achieve the required bomber strength of 4,000 front-line aircraft by spring 1943 would mean the production/purchase of 22,000 bombers. All attempts were to be made to achieve this figure and combined with a conservation policy (i.e. an attempt to reduce losses) by Bomber Command, it was considered to be achievable. However, by January 1942 the Command was forty squadrons short of its target, although in terms of aircraft this was partly offset by increased aircraft strength per squadron.

The Manchester was not a success, mainly because of problems with its Vulture engines – but the basic airframe provided much for the Lancaster.

A new directive of 9 July stated that: ‘It is accepted as a principle of this plan that the successful attack of a specific target at night can only be undertaken in clear moonlight. It follows, therefore, that for approximately three-quarters of each month it is only possible to obtain satisfactory results by heavy concentrated and continuous attacks on large working-class and industrial areas in carefully selected towns …. The weakest points in his armour lie in the morale of the civilian population and in his inland transportation system … direct main effort towards dislocating the German transportation system and to destroying the morale of the German population as a whole and of the industrial workers in particular.’ In other words, the directive proposed pinpoint targets whenever conditions (moonlight) permitted but outside of that to concentrate on ‘area’ targets that contained elements of the primary target systems such as transportation. This was essentially to remain Bomber Command operational doctrine for the rest of the war.

The directive included a list of targets drawn up with the help of the Railway Research Service; nine major rail centres were listed for attack, two each in Cologne and Duisburg, plus Duisburg-Ruhrort, Hamm, Osnabruck, Schwerte and Soest. The scale of German rail movements was massive, a typical daily figure for Hamm being 10,000 movements, the vast majority of which was military. In addition, Cologne, Duisburg and Dusseldorf were listed for attack on moonless nights. Other priority targets included inland waterways, such as the Dortmund-Ems Canal and the Ems-Weser Canal, plus the synthetic rubber plants at Huls and Schopau. The list of secondary targets included Bremen, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover, Mannheim and Stuttgart.

‘Only one-in-three bombers within 5 miles of target’

At the same time that this directive was being implemented the Command’s effectiveness was under the spotlight. The Cherwell Commission examined 100 raids on 28 targets between 2 June and 28 July, with 650 ‘target photos’ used for the assessment. The Butt Report was issued on 8 August and concluded that only one in three bombers were within 5 miles of the target, with an even worse figure of one in ten for the Ruhr area. This was devastating news to those under the impression that bombers had been achieving reasonably precise attacks against industrial targets. Whilst some called for the virtual disbandment of Bomber Command and the allocation or resources elsewhere, others concentrated on addressing the problem of accuracy. Bomber Command’s immediate retort was, ‘Do photographs indicate such important factors as the loss of skilled workers killed or injured, or the loss of time during periods of air-raid alarms and post-raid disorganisation, the disruption of transport facilities serving factories and building yards, aggravated by the adverse impressions made on the workers’ morale.’ These were valid points but could not disguise the fact that the Command was achieving far less than it had been claiming in recent months.

Whilst this depressing news was being debated the first of a series of navigation and bombing aids – Gee – entered service in August 1941, although it was to be many months before its use was widespread but it did point the way forward. In the meantime there was little alternative but to carry on as before – Bomber Command was, after all, the main method of striking back at Germany and this important morale point should not be forgotten. The same month brought a supplementary directive that added a number of minor towns to the target list, all connected with the German rail transportation system. The night of 29/30 August saw the operations debut of the RAAF, with 455 Squadron Wellingtons taking part in the attack on Frankfurt. The Squadron had formed in June and as with the Canadians a large number of Aussies had been serving with the Command since the start of the war; however, there was less pressure applied to create ‘national’ squadrons and combine them into a Group – so no Australian operational Group was formed.

Bombing photographs were used to assess the accuracy of the attack; Cologne from a 49 Squadron aircraft on the night of 26/27 August 1941 when, in clear conditions, ninety-nine bombers attacked the city. Intelligence Officers would compare the photos against maps and assess where the bombs fell

A number of other reports and studies were undertaken in 1941, one of which looked at the reasons for aircraft losses. It had always been considered that a sustained loss rate of around 4 per cent was acceptable – or at least tolerable in terms of maintaining operational capability. However, studies showed that whilst German defences were improving and losses to enemy action on the increase, the incidence of losses not directly related to enemy action was also on the increase, and on a number of occasions was 2 per cent. The two main components of this were fuel shortage (26 per cent of incidents) and ‘bad landings’ (24 per cent). Although these were put down as ‘non operational’ it was often the case that enemy action played a part – damage to fuel systems leading to fuel shortage or damage to aircraft systems contributing to ‘bad landings’.

Fuel was always a problem and many crews had nail-biting experiences of, ‘Will we make it, won’t we make it’. Bomb and fuel loads were specified by Group, although the Station – and to some extent the Squadron – could query the calculation and make adjustments. Crews had no choice in the matter, although bomb loads were sometimes ‘adjusted’ by dropping one or more 1,000-pounders in the North Sea on the way to the target in order to lighten the load. One of the main reasons for adding a Flight Engineer to the crew of the four-engined heavies was to manage aircraft systems, including fuel. Crews treated it as a matter of importance to get the best out of the engines, including fuel consumption and Captains who could nurse the aircraft in this way were always more popular. Some squadrons ran competitions to see which crews could achieve the most economical fuel consumption, and ground crew would always dip the tanks to see just how much was left (aircraft fuel gauges were notoriously unreliable). There were many unknowns once the bomber was airborne, the most worrisome of which was unreliable Met forecasts. The commonest reason for shortage of fuel was inaccurate wind forecasts – a strong headwind made all the difference to a thirsty bomber. So too did cruising altitude, icing and a number of other weather-related factors. Add to that evasion, with engines on higher power and burning more fuel and the potential for disaster was always present. Many crews began their return flights knowing that fuel was going to be tight – would they end up in the sea, would they make it to an airfield in Eastern England, or might they just get back to their own base? Having reached England safely it was time for another glance at the fuel gauges – enough to get home or should a landing be made at the nearest airfield? There were strong reasons to press on to home base; it was a familiar airfield to land on at night, it was better for the operational readiness of the squadron and the Mess and perhaps a local pub beckoned. Many crews pressed on, many made it, some took to the silk having had engines cough and die en route, others crash-landed (always dodgy at night) and some picked up a light or used the Darky (An emergency radio navigation aid) system to find another airfield.

The geodetic structure of the Wellington fuselage proved rugged and even with the fabric burnt away and part of the structure damaged aircraft frequently made it home.

Stirling of 218 Squadron; the Shorts bomber became the primary equipment for No.3 Group.

It was certainly true that the Germans’ somewhat ad hoc defensive system was growing; for example, in August the XIIIth Air Corps was formed with two searchlight Divisions, three signals Regiments, day fighter units and a night fighter Division. A Bomber Command report of August showed that of 3,449 sorties some 6.9 per cent reported interceptions and of these, 36 per cent turned into fighter attacks. Reports appeared to flow thick and fast within the Command and in September the Bomber Command Operational Research Section (ORS) was formed under Dr B. G. Dickins. This was to be an incredibly important and influential organisation and the ORS is quoted frequently in this book. They were given four main areas of study:

1.Bomber losses.

2.The success of bomber operations.

3.Vulnerability of bombers.

4.Radar and Radio problems.

The study of daylight operations was added later. The ORS combined the expertise and knowledge of scientists, technicians and operational personnel and its contribution cannot be too highly stressed. Its reports pulled no punches and whilst highly classified and with a limited circulation their recommendations were often acted upon.

Loss rates had risen in the latter part of the year and a new directive of 13 November introduced a policy to, ‘Conserve our resources in order to build a strong force to be available by the spring of next year.’ This was in part a reflection on the losses for the raid of 7/8 November and the AOC, Peirse, saw this as a slur on himself and his Command. He pointed out that most decisions were taken in close consultation with a wide range of experts and with consideration of the overall tactical environment – and that plans sometime went awry. This was not an isolated spat between Bomber Command and the Air Ministry staff (with Portal as CAS) and within weeks Peirse had gone, although this move was not officially connected with such disagreements.

This difficult year of 1941 year closed with the testing of another accuracy aid – Oboe – which showed great potential; Stirlings of 7 and 15 Squadrons used the new equipment during an attack on Brest but this was a one-off for fear of the equipment falling into enemy hands should one of the aircraft be shot down. Tests continued through December and Oboe-equipped Mosquitoes flown by Pathfinder crews were eventually to prove one of the most successful combinations of the war – but that success was still some way off, although a crystal-ball gazer may have started to see a bit of light at the end of the tunnel. At the end of the year the Command had 56 operational squadrons, of which 27 per cent were heavies. It had operated on 240 nights in 1941, dropping 31,000 tons of bombs, of which 12 per cent were incendiaries; it also flew 1,250 mining sorties on which 1,055 mines were laid. The next year was without doubt a turning point in the capability of Bomber Command.

Growing power

The conservation policy was maintained during the winter of 1941/42 in order to build up strength for a renewed offensive from the spring, when weather conditions would improve. Politics dominated the first few weeks of the New Year; a temporary C-in-C, AVM Baldwin held the reins from 8 January pending the arrival in February of the new bomber chief, AM Arthur T. Harris. Despite continued support from Prime Minister Churchill, the Command was under pressure; the influential Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW) added its voice to the detractors with a report of 4 February stating that, ‘The MEW depends directly on the Director of Bombing Operations to resist, in the higher levels any unsound tendencies to dilute, by-pass or emasculate policies which have been agreed between ourselves [the MEW Bombing Target Information Committee] and the Air Staff as being unsound in the respects which are within our respective provinces …. Bomber Command is still paying more attention to techniques and operational problems than to economic strategy, though there are signs that this phase is now passing.’ Optimism of a change of attitude would prove premature for all the Commanders, Harris was the most dogmatic – indeed stubborn – in terms of the focus of bombing strategy as he saw it and he had an aversion to panacea targets.

The determined – indeed dogmatic – head of Bomber Command from early 1942 was Arthur ‘Bomber’ (or ‘Butch’) Harris.

It was in this overall situation that Arthur Harris took over the Command on 22 February. He arrived at Bomber Command HQ with the determination to prove that his was indeed the decisive weapon of the war. Although Harris’s main focus was to be on achieving a front-line strength of 4,000 four-engine bombers, the first new type to enter service in 1942 was a Blenheim replacement, the Douglas Boston commencing its operational career in February.

Although a new operational Directive took effect the same month (before Harris took over), which approved area bombing of cities, it also cited that aids such as Gee would, ‘Confer upon your forces the ability to concentrate their effort to an extent which has not hitherto been possible under the operational conditions with which you are faced … and will enable results to be obtained of a much more effective nature.’ The primary objective was still that of ‘the morale of the enemy civilian population and in particular of the industrial workers.’ The directive was accompanied by a list of suitable cities, with Essen top of the list, along with the bomb tonnage required to inflict critical damage; in the case of Essen this was given as 1,000 tons of bombs. The Air Staff also stated that the Command should focus on a particular target until the required bomb tonnage had been dropped and the desired level of destruction achieved. The final point was that each attack should be led by Gee-equipped aircraft to ensure accuracy, which in effect was the first real proposal for a ‘target marking’ force. The question of how best to employ the new aid had been under debate and trial within Bomber Command for some time and the next result was the Shaker technique. This tactical plan used three waves of aircraft, the first two of which comprised aircraft with Gee:

First wave:	Illuminators dropping triple flares to illuminate the target from Zero hour.
Second wave:	Target Markers dropping a maximum load of incendiaries from Zero+2.
Third wave:	The Followers (Main Force) with a mainly HE load over the target from Zero+15.

When Arthur Harris took up his post Bomber Command had a total average availability (aircraft with crews) of only 378 aircraft, and only 69 were ‘heavies’. He summarised his initial views: ‘The bomber force of which I assumed command, although at that time very small, was a potentially decisive weapon. It was, indeed, the only means at the disposal of the Allies for striking at Germany itself and, as such, stood out as the central part in Allied offensive strategy.’ This was despite, ‘A lack of suitable aircraft in sufficient numbers, absence of efficient navigation aids, and deficiency of trained crews.’

All of these aspects were addressed in the coming months. Although bomber production had been given a high priority by Beaverbrook the ‘heavies’ were slow in coming off the production line, with only sixty-seven new four-engined aircraft being delivered in the first quarter of 1942, a major limitation on re-equipment and expansion plans. The situation with medium bombers had improved with the American Lend-Lease programme, types such as the Boston being acquired for No. 2 Group, but the one and only B-17 squadron in the RAF had given up its Fortresses – a combination of poor performance and lack of commitment from the Americans as to future supplies; the ‘heavies’ would have to come from British sources. It was therefore significant that on 3/4 March the Avro Lancaster made its operational debut.

The capability of the bombers to hit pinpoint targets was proven the same night, with an attack on the Renault factory at Billancourt. This was followed up a few nights later with an accurate attack on Essen, using Gee on a large scale for the first time. Gee did not, however, help with all Ruhr targets as the industrial haze continued to hamper accurate attacks. The month ended with a devastating attack on the Baltic port of Lubeck and when Harris looked back on his first weeks in command it was mixed picture. The new aids showed promise but his Command had lost ninety aircraft in the six weeks to the end of March, losses in aircraft and crews that were hard to replace. In terms of crews he had instigated a number of studies and one immediate result was the adoption of a single-pilot system, which immediately freed-up a large number of qualified pilots. Another member of the crew would take on the role of Pilot Assistant and be given a certain amount of pilot training for emergencies and to help the pilot. Harris also focused on what his crews were doing; he expected commanders to rest crews when operational requirements were light, but he also expected trained aircrew to fly two operational tours and two training tours – and he did not want aircrew posted to other Commands or ground tours. His expansion plans were hit by an Admiralty demand for eight and a half squadrons to be transferred to Coastal Command, mainly for employment in the Battle of the Atlantic. The argument closed at six squadrons, with Harris ‘agreeing’ to release three Whitley, two Wellington and one Hampden. The maritime war once more became the focus of attention with the spring campaign priorities being:

1.To destroy enemy ports, ships and the mainspring of his great offensive against our ocean convoys.

2.To inflict the maximum damage on German and German-controlled war industries … in the course of such operations it is now part of our policy to create havoc in those German towns and cities which house the workers on whose efforts the Nazi war machine is dependent.

The latter phrase would spell increasing misery for German civilians, especially when a ‘de-housing’ campaign was proposed. This strategy was debated at the highest levels and the War Cabinet established the Singleton Committee to review the arguments and determine ‘what results are we likely to achieve from continuing our air attacks on Germany at the greatest possible strength during the next six, twelve and eighteen months respectively. Various developments took place before the Committee made its report.

A daring but costly daylight raid by Lancasters on the MAN factory in Augsburg caused another spat between the Ministry of Economic Warfare and Bomber Command when the MEW expressed the opinion that it had the, ‘Gravest doubts whether this attack was planned, in the light of the intelligence available, to hit the enemy where it would hurt him most.’ Harris was forceful in his reply that the, ‘MEW allows no weight to the other, over-weening, factors which strategy, tactics and technicalities bring to bear on such an operation.’

The Whitley bowed out of Bomber Command’s front-line on 27/28 April, two aircraft of 58 Squadron taking part in an attack on Dunkirk. This was not the last time that Whitleys appeared over enemy territory as they were back in action for the Thousand-Bomber raids and the OTUs continued to send aircraft on leaflet dropping missions. A few days before, 23/24 April, the town of Rostock was subjected to the first of four consecutive nights of attack, a test of the policy of concentrating on a single target. It appeared to work in as much as damage, including the important Heinkel factory, was heavy whilst bomber losses (8 out of 520 over the 4 raids) were light.

Lancasters entered service in 1942 an soon became the main focus of production, eventually equipping the majority of Bomber Command squadrons.

On 5 May Harris received a modified directive that once more placed the aircraft industry as the first priority, with factories at Augsburg, Leipzig, Regensburg, Warnemunde and Wiener-Neustadt given particular mention. It also added industrial targets in France to the list, although these were already under attack, the main aim being to, ‘Discourage the nationals of enemy-occupied countries from working in German controlled factories.’ Three provisos were given for target selection: economic importance, ease of identification and maximum morale impact with the minimum of casualties. The attack on the Renault factory at Billancourt showed what could be done, and the Philips factory at Eindhoven was listed by name.

Harris was an experienced bomber leader and he was convinced that this was still a war-winning weapon, though he knew he would have to prove it to its many detractors. The three Thousand Bomber raids of May–June 1942 were designed to prove this point and large areas of Cologne, Essen and Bremen were destroyed. On the first of these attacks, 30/31 May, Cologne was targeted by 1,047 bombers, by far the largest force assembled by the Command and only achieved by using aircraft from the training Groups. This was an incredible achievement when it is remembered that when Harris took command a few months previously his available force was less than 400 bombers. By the end of the third raid, Harris felt that he had a convincing argument – and there was the added bonus that loss rates had been reasonably low as the defences had been swamped. Nevertheless he still had to defend the role of his Command and on 17 June sent a note to Churchill, who fortunately was almost unwaveringly supportive of the bomber offensive. In part this said: ‘An extraordinary sense of lack of proportion affects outside appreciation of Bomber Command’s operations. What shouts of victory would arise if a Commando wrecked the entire Renault factory in a night, with the loss of seven men!

Preparing a 4,000 lb ‘Cookie’; this High Capacity (HC) blast bomb proved very effective.

What credible assumptions of an early end to the war would follow upon the destruction of one third of Cologne in an hour-and-a-half by some swift-moving mechanized force which, with 200 casualties, withdrew and was ready to repeat the operation twenty-four hours later? What acclaim would greet the virtual destruction of Rostock and the Heinkel main and subsidiary factories by a Naval bombardment! All this and far more has been achieved by Bomber Command – yet there are many who still avert their gaze, pass on the other side, and question whether the thirty squadrons of night bombers make any worthwhile contribution to the war.’ They were forceful and appropriate comments, with barbs at the other Services that coveted the resources of Bomber Command. Harris would continue to fight such battles for the rest of the war and as the Command’s destructive potential increased so too did its detractors, especially those seeking the moral high ground. As reported in the British Press in July Harris made his intentions clear: ‘The German people have been told to expect devastating air raids every night and every day, rain, blow or snow. The man who gave them this message, in a broadcast in German, is Air Marshal Sir Arthur Harris, who took over as Chief of Bomber Command last February. He promised to scourge the Third Reich from end to end.’ This may have been wishful thinking in 1942 but by late 1944 it had become a reality.

Just before this series of raids the Singleton Committee Report had been issued (20 May) and concluded that: ‘The bomber strength of the RAF is increasing rapidly. I have no doubt that if the best use is made of it, the effect on German war production and effort will be very heavy over a period of twelve to eighteen months and such as to have a real effect on the war position’. He also concluded that with the exception of a number of attacks accuracy was still a problem and that a trained target-finding force would greatly increase the efficiency of the bombing.

It appeared that the, ‘Corner had been turned’ and it is certainly true that despite a number of crises that the Command was subsequently to face, the general trend was one of increased effectiveness. However, despite the rhetoric above, all was not well, especially with the new bombers. The Manchester had been faring particularly badly and had a loss rate almost double that of the Stirling; an ORS report ascribed this in part to the fuel system. ‘The Manchester has two main petrol tanks and two small ones, whereas the Stirling has fourteen’, with the implication being that damage to the fuel system was more crucial in the Avro bomber. They could also have cited the continued problems of overheating with the Vulture engines and the all-round poorer performance that made the Manchester more vulnerable. It became apparent over the next few months that the aircraft lowest and slowest in the bomber stream were those that suffered the highest loss rates. The Halifax was also criticised in an ORS report as its loss rate of 5.3 per cent in 1,467 sorties in the year to June 1942 was not sustainable. The report concluded that most losses were to night fighters and two main problems were cited: poor exhaust shrouds made the Halifax easier to find and once found the aircraft was not manoeuvrable enough. The latter suggestion was further investigated in conjunction with a review of the experience levels of pilots in No. 4 Group. This report concluded that: ‘There is no reasonable doubt that pilots on their first two operations have a casualty rate well above the average and that those who had survived twenty sorties had a rate well below the average. This must be aircraft related as the Lancaster does not suffer the same problem. The record on lightly defended targets is good; the problem comes on highly defended targets. New pilots are a bit nervous of the aircraft, the aircraft having gained a bad name for instability in manoeuvres. It thus may happen that a new pilot is reluctant when he meets defences to manoeuvre his machine sufficiently in combat or that in a sudden emergency he puts his machine into an attitude in which he has had no previous experience of controlling it.’ More general handling during training and fighter affiliation sorties were seen as at least partial solutions, although moves were also underway to improve the manoeuvrability of the Halifax.

Chocques power station under attack by 88 Squadron and 126 Squadron, 19 July 1942.

The ORS had also been looking at the Command’s daylight operations in a summary report of the six months to the end of June, the main focus being in the Circus operations of No. 2 Group’s Boston squadrons. The conclusion was that the tactic’s main aim of destroying the Luftwaffewas not working. The bombers had flown over 1,000 sorties and had achieved reasonable results for their 3 per cent loss rate; however the fighter combats – the main purpose of the Circus – had resulted in 118 victories and 166 losses in 9,486 sorties.

Summer with its shorter nights was normally a time when the bomber’s radius of action was reduced and with the exception of another long-range Lancaster raid, to Danzig on 11 July, this pretty much held true.

The summer campaign was, however, not going well and on 10 August an ORS report examined interception rates, with statistics for June of 8.3 per cent of 4,788 sorties being intercepted, with 25 per cent being converted into attacks; the report concluded that: ‘Losses have reached a very high level, since they have occurred mostly under conditions of heavy cloud and in the absence of searchlight co-operation it seems likely that effective GCI [Ground Control Interception] must be responsible. The proportion of attacks from below which results in serious damage emphasises the need for more protection from this direction.’ One worrying feature was the particularly high loss rates of OTU aircraft, the 31 July raid on Duisburg having cost No. 92 Group eleven of its 105 aircraft. Although Harris was keen to put the maximum number of bombers over the target this use of the training units was counter-productive in operational and morale terms.

The Blenheim made its last Bomber Command ops on 17/18 August when 18 Squadron flew intruder sorties over Holland in support of the Main Force attack on Osnabruck.

Pathfinders

In May 1942 the de Havilland Mosquito joined Bomber Command and was soon to prove one of the most effective bomber types for specialist operations and for the pathfinding role with Main Force. Accuracy remained a goal for the bombers and the creation of a target-marking element, the Pathfinder Force (later No. 8 Group), under Air Commodore Don Bennett, was a major development, as was the introduction of new target-marking methods. The first Pathfinder Force (PFF) operation took place on 18/19 August, when the target was Flensburg, and results were poor. The birth of this specialist organisation had not been an easy one. Harris favoured further development of the present tactical use of experienced crews to lead attacks but was against the hiving off of crews to form specialist units. The Air Staff, and bomber leaders such as Group Captain Bufton, Deputy Director of Bomber Operations, favoured the creation of a specialist force. An Air Ministry conference in June came down in favour of the latter idea and on 20 June Harris instructed No. 3 Group to set aside two Wellington and two Stirling squadrons to become the nucleus of the Pathfinder Force (PFF). This was later changed and each operational Group ‘donated’ a squadron:

No. 1 Group – 156 Squadron, Wellington.

No. 3 Group – 7 Squadron, Stirling.

No. 4 Group – 35 Squadron, Halifax.

No. 5 Group – 83 Squadron, Lancaster and 109 Squadron, Mosquito.

The PFF was officially formed on 11 August 1942 under Air Commodore (later AVM) Don Bennett), an experienced, determined and effective bomber leader with assets at Graveley, Oakington, Wyton and Warboys.

The first success for the Pathfinders came on 28/29 August when 159 bombers, led by PFF aircraft, attacked Nuremberg. The Pathfinders dropped a new marker, called Red Blob Fire, and the results seemed reasonable – although twenty-three bombers failed to return (including four Lancasters). Bomber Command was slowly becoming more effective – but so were the German defences, especially the night fighters. The Command continued to develop new tactics to counter the defences: a tight stream of aircraft to compress the time spent over the target, spoof or decoy raids to confuse and dilute the night fighters, adopting electronic equipment to confuse the enemy, and at the same time it developed improved marking techniques.

With all three heavies in service and with the PFF now leading most attacks, all the major elements of Main Force Bomber Command were in place. In many respects, all that changed between this point and early 1945 was the scale of the offensive and the tactics employed to counter the increasing effectiveness of the German night defences. With the arrival of the Americans in 1942, the bomber offensive became the Strategic Bombing Offensive (SBO) – the Americans bombing by day and the RAF by night. The 97th Bombardment Group’s attack on Sotteville-les-Rouen’s rail yards on 17 August was the opening shot in the American daylight offensive, an offensive that would assume epic proportions but that is beyond the scope of this account. Oil was to become one of the favoured target systems for the 8th Army Air Force and it was also a regular feature of Bomber Command’s operations log. On 3 September Harris was given a directive to concentrate on oil as the Joint Intelligence Committee Technical Sub-Committee had determined that the Axis oil situation was critical and that effective attacks on a limited number of targets, Politz being listed as the highest priority, could be decisive. Harris hated such specific instructions, especially from organisations for which he had no respect and as on many other occasions he simply ignored the instruction.

Lancaster of 83 Squadron; the Squadron flew Hampdens, Manchesters and Lancasters during the war, the latter from May 1942.

In the remaining months of 1942 the Command turned in mixed results with a number of exceptionally effective raids, including special low level attack on Le Creusot (17 October), and it was evident that the PFF was developing its tactics and equipment with great promise. In November a meeting of the War Cabinet’s Chiefs of Staff Committee considered the future of the Anglo-American bomber offensive and concluded that: ‘A heavy bomber force rising from 4,000 to 6,000 heavy bombers in 1944 could shatter the industrial and economic structure of Germany to a point where an Anglo-American force of reasonable strength could enter the Continent from the West.’ It was predicted that the bomb lift per month would increase from 50,000 tons by the end of 1943 to 90,000 by late 1944. The shattering effect would be used against fifty-eight towns and cities in Germany with populations of 50,000, with the top eighteen targets having populations of 250,000. Each named town also had listed the industries or economic and political rationale for its destruction. The report continued: ‘Germany is in no condition to withstand an onslaught of this nature, her strength has passed its peak and is diminishing … it is difficult to estimate the morale consequences of a scale of bombardment which would far transcend anything within human experience. But I have no doubt that against a background of growing casualties, increasing privations and dying hopes it would be profound indeed. As resources were destroyed the Germans would have three options:

1.Reduce the level of civil resources below that needed to maintain the national economy.

2.Divert effort or armed forces and munitions industry to defensive measures to hold off the bombers.

3.Divert resources into civil industries.’

The report was signed by Portal as CAS but was very much the view of the Combined Chiefs – the bomber war against cities was an approved Allied strategy (despite what some later claimed). The basic points were accurate but the conclusion was false as it was based on the effect such a campaign would have had on Britain; it was still not appreciated that the Nazi regime, and the war footing of its industries, was more resilient. In part this was due to the slow build-up of the bomber offensive which had allowed time for defences, civil and military to develop and adapt.

November also brought new arguments between Harris and the Ministry of Economic Warfare with the latter’s call for a renewed offensive against the ball-bearing industry being translated into an Air Ministry directive of 21 November. This stated that: ‘The destruction of the Schweinfurt factories would result in a loss to the Germans of considerably more than half their requirements in ball-bearings for the production of armaments …. I require that you [Bomber Command] now reconsider your plans to attack Schweinfurt and the associated ball-bearing factories on the principle that their destruction should be regarded as of critical importance to our strategy, and devastation of the factories and town in one overwhelming operation’. An annex to the directive even gave details of a suggested plan of attack! Harris was not amused and two days later objected to the suggested large-scale attack on a variety of grounds, including the tacit acceptance by the Air Staff of a loss of 200 crews. He queried the overall effect that the successful destruction of the target would have, his aversion to panacea targets being a major factor. Finally, he objected to the type of attack, suggesting that a night low-level pinpoint raid would be more effective. In the event it was irrelevant as he essentially ignored the instruction; it was eventually left to the Americans to mount a daylight raid, with heavy losses and little overall effect.

On 24 November Harris had been sent new instructions, with future policy stated as:

1.Render material support to the Russians.

2.Prepare for the invasion of Europe.

3.Soften-up Europe by bombing.

The latter point was phrased in terms that Harris could relate to: ‘From now on we must strike with ever-increasing strength at the German industrial and economic system, submarine construction, sources of air power, and morale of the German people.’ Despite this directive the major focus of Bomber Command in autumn 1942 was against Italy. From the operational perspective there were two important developments towards the end of the year; the introduction of a new countermeasures system, Tinsel, and the operational trial of Oboe when six Mosquitoes of 109 Squadron used this device for an attack on the power station at Lutterade. Further evaluation raids were carried out in December, culminating on the 31 December with two Oboe Mosquitoes acting as part of the marker force for an attack on Dusseldorf. These early results looked very promising despite some technical snags with the equipment.

The Air Historical Branch Narrative gave this conclusion for 1942: ‘something had been achieved in terms of material damage and very much more in tactical and technical developments. Even more important, it had been demonstrated to the enemy that nowhere or at any time were they secure from air attack.’ Of more import in terms of the effectiveness of attacks was the imminent operational employment of two new aids – H2S and Oboe – plus new weapons and a steadily increasing daily bomb lift. In future the Command would wield effective destructive power, but only if it could survive in the face of the German defences. Various tactics had been tried during the latter part of the year, such as concentration over the target, diversionary and spoof raids, deceptive routeing, intruder ops against night fighter airfields, and the employment of Radio Counter-measures. This tactical mix would be used for the rest of war as each side tried to gain the upper hand in the cat-and-mouse night war. It would become increasingly important because, although 1942 had been a turning point year, it had also brought deep concern over loss rates. Of the sixty squadrons in the Command, just over half were ‘heavies’.

The arrival of the American 8th Army Air Force added a new dimension to the strategic bombing offensive.

Throughout this book I refer to loss rates and at times it is hard to focus on the fact that these bare statistics refer to people as well as operational capability. In a lecture just after the war, Air Chief Marshal Sir Norman Bottomley had this to say in respect of loss rates: ‘The rate of night bomber losses was highest in 1942, before our tactics and counter-measures were properly developed. The loss rate in this year was 4.1 per cent. I often wonder if the significance of a loss rate of 4.1 per cent is generally realised. The normal operational tour of bomber crews was thirty sorties. If they survived, they were then withdrawn for a change of occupation – say for six months – before a second tour. A loss rate of 4 per cent meant therefore that the chances were against completing the first operational tour; and it meant that on an average there was a complete turn-over of aircrews in squadrons in about four months, due to casualties. It is a matter of pride that morale in the heavy bomber forces remained so high in the face of these casualty rates.

The loss rate fell to 3.7 per cent in 1943 and in 1944 it amounted to 1.7 per cent. In the last months of the war in 1945 it was less than 1 per cent.’

The night war had been hotting up and 1943 was to be a showdown year.

Wielding the weapon

Harris was planning an intensive start to 1943 with a series of major blows against Ruhr targets (‘Happy Valley’ to Bomber Command aircrews) and other major industrial cities. However, a directive of 14 January called for focused attacks on targets connected with the U-boats, the German Wolfpacks having once more gained the upper hand in the Battle of the Atlantic. However, and with a few named exclusions, the War Cabinet was persuaded that the best way for Bomber Command to achieve this effect was by area attacks on appropriate industrial towns: ‘With the object of effectively devastating the whole area in which are located the submarines, their maintenance facilities and the services, power, water, light, communications and other resources upon which their operations depend.’ The named exclusions that the Command was required to attack as soon as possible were the U-boat facilities at Lorient, Brest, La Pallice and St Nazaire, the home bases for most of the Atlantic U-boats. Lorient was duly bombed on 14/15 January by 122 aircraft in the first major raid of 1943. Damage was light and, as Harris argued, this type of target was unsuitable as the accuracy of attack and effectiveness of the bombs was such that small, hardened targets such as U-boat pens were almost impossible to damage. This was true – but he was also against the idea on the grounds that it detracted the Command from the main war over Germany. The Bomber Command argument was enumerated as: ‘If the number of operational U-boats is to be substantially reduced, the menace must also be powerfully attacked at earlier stages in its career and the continued flow of reinforcements decisively choked. The achievement of a decision is hastened by strategic bombing of the factories employed on the construction of component parts and by the bombing of the U-boat building yards.’ The Lorient raid was also the operational debut for No. 6 (RCAF) Group, although some of its squadrons and many of its aircrew were already experienced in the bomber war.

This was to be a year when new equipment and tactics were introduced on a regular basis; the first such event being the use of purpose-built Target Indicators (TIs) by the PFF, the target on 16/17 January being Berlin. A week later another new aircraft started its operational career with No. 2 Group when twelve B-25 Mitchells of 98 and 180 Squadrons joined Bostons and Venturas attacking airfields in France. The light/medium bomber force of this Group was heavily involved with attacks on a variety of targets in Occupied Europe, the Circus ops continued to bring mixed results but the intruder work was definitely proving useful. January also saw the Pathfinder Force raised to Group status as No. 8 (Pathfinder) Group on the 25th of the month. At the end of the month another navigation aid went operational when the H2S radar was used during an attack on Hamburg (30/31 January), although only a few aircraft carried the device.

The Allied leaders met at Casablanca to discuss the prosecution of the war, one of the items on the agenda being the Strategic Bombing Offensive. In due course, the Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a new directive (21 January) stating that the ‘primary objective will be the progressive destruction of and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.’ The directive gave five target categories for attack – submarine construction yards, aircraft industry, transportation, oil plants and ‘others in the war industry’. It also gave added support to the concept of a 6,000-strong heavy bomber force.

However, in February the Air Staff switched its instruction – an all too frequent occurrence in Harris’s view – and ordered attacks on Berlin to emphasise the Allied success of recent weeks, by which they meant the surrender of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad. It was March, however, before the ‘Big City’ was targeted by Main Force and February saw a wide variety of targets attacked. Overall the scene was now set for the first of a series of ‘battles’ to be fought between Bomber Command and the Luftwaffe. That most desirable but elusive set of targets in the Ruhr was first on the list for what the Command intended, and hoped, would be effective concentrated raids taking advantage of the impressive bomb lift and new target-finding aids. This was to be the first real operational test of the appreciable operational capability (at least on paper) of Bomber Command. The Battle of the Ruhr ran from March to July 1943 and at best could be described as a draw in which both sides learnt many lessons and from which both had a momentary rest prior to the next battle.

The Lancaster had the lowest loss rates of Bomber Command’s operational types, but almost 4,000 were lost on operations.

The Battle of the Ruhr was in full swing when Harris was issued with a new directive on future bombing strategy. This was a result of the Casablanca Conference and under the codename Pointblank it gave four main target types for attack by the combined British and American bomber forces:

1.Aircraft industry.

2.Submarine construction yards and U-boat bases.

3.Ball-bearing production.

4.Oil installations.

This was based on a proposal put forward earlier in the year by the American bomber chief, Ira Eaker, and the focus on the enemy aircraft industry was in response to the loss rates the USAAF was suffering in its daylight campaign: ‘If the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly it may become impossible to carry out the destruction planned and thus create the conditions necessary for ultimate decisive action by our combined forces on the Continent.’

There was also much debate at this time as to the future of No. 2 Group, the light bombers no longer fitting the strategic role of Bomber Command but slated to play a major role in a tactical sense with the invasion of Europe. The decision was eventually taken to move the Group to the new Tactical Air Force (TAF) with effect from 1 June 1943, although when this took place the Mosquito-equipped 105 and 139 Squadrons were transferred to No. 8 Group.

Provision of airfields had remained a problem for much of 1942, despite an accelerated building programme, but the rapid expansion of Bomber Command also created difficulties in operational and administrative control of units. To ease the latter problems it was proposed to introduce a base system whereby three airfields would be linked, one as the HQ base and two as satellites, under the command of an Air Commodore. This concept was finally approved in February 1943 and the first three bases were:

No. 3 Group:	Mildenhall with satellites at Lakenheath and Newmarket (although East Wretham was also allocated).
No. 4 Group:	Pocklington with satellites at Melbourne and Elvington.
No. 6 Group:	Topcliffe with satellites at Dishforth and Dalton.

In addition to operational control, elements of the technical and servicing activities were also centralised and servicing echelons were allocated to squadrons. These were given 9000 numbers, hence that attached to 9 Squadron became 9009 Servicing Echelon.

Overall expansion was progressing at a rapid pace in early 1943 and as part of this process an agreement was reached with the Air Ministry in April to increase the establishment of existing squadrons. Under this agreement, squadrons with two flights had their aircraft UE increased by two (to sixteen IE and four IR), with a corresponding increase in aircrew strength of one crew (from twenty-one to twenty-two crews plus the CO). Squadrons with three flights acquired three extra aircraft (to twenty-four plus six) and one extra crew (to thirty-three plus the CO). There was also a corresponding increase in ground-crew strength. By February 1943 the Command’s operational force comprised fifty-one heavy/medium squadrons and eleven light squadrons, made up as follows:

Heavy:	Lancaster	17 squadrons
	Halifax	11 squadrons
	Stirling	7 squadrons
Medium:	Wellington	16 squadrons
Light:	Ventura	3 squadrons
	Boston	3 squadrons
	B-25	2 squadrons
	Mosquito	3 squadrons

This expansion in the first half of 1943 took place as and when aircraft became available as there was, at this time, no significant limitation in terms of aircrew availability. It was then standard policy to add a third flight to an operational squadron and split this flight away to form the nucleus of a new squadron at the same airfield. The splitting of a squadron to form a new unit had been a tried and tested technique since the start of the war and it seemed to create few problems. By May 1943 the following units had been given third flights:

Aircraft, aircrew and airfields – the Command needed all three in increasing numbers as the war progressed; it was an amazing achievement.

No. 1 Group: 12, 100, 101, 103, 460 Squadrons

No. 3 Group: 75, 90, 149, 214 Squadrons

No. 4 Group: 10, 76, 77, 78, 102 Squadrons

No. 5 Group: 57, 467 Squadrons

No. 8 Group: 97, 156 Squadrons

May brought the award of two Victoria Crosses to Bomber Command pilots; one to Wing Commander Guy Gibson of 617 Squadron for leading the Dams Raid (Operation Chastise), and one to Squadron Leader Trent of 487 Squadron in what was one of the final series of raids by No. 2 Group. Neither of these attacks was central to Bomber Command’s overall strategy. A further modification of the Pointblank directive was issued on 10 June, with four main aims:

1.The destruction of airframe, engine and component factories, and the ball-bearing industry on which the strength of the German fighter force depends.

2.The general disorganisation of those industrial areas associated with the above areas.

3.The destruction of those aircraft repair depots and storage parks within range, and on which the enemy fighter force is largely dependent.

4.The destruction of enemy fighters in the air and on the ground.

The vague wording of much of this enabled Bomber Command to continue its area bombing or industrial centres. Cities such as Dortmund, Dusseldorf, Cologne, Essen, Bochum, Wuppertal, Munster and Oberhausen had all been attacked by Main Force formations of up to 800 aircraft in an intensive series of attacks over four weeks from the last week in May. In this same period the Command also flew a highly successful low-level attack on a factory at Le Creusot (19/20 June) and an accurate long-range attack on the Zeppelin Works at Friedrichshafen (20/21 June). These were still, however, sideshows in the main strategic offensive. In this four-month period Bomber Command had despatched over 23,000 night sorties and lost around 1,000 aircraft; the average loss rate of 4.3 per cent was in line with predictions and was, on paper, ‘acceptable’ in terms of attrition in terms of maintaining the overall aircraft and aircrew strength of the Command. However, it was becoming increasingly apparent that certain aircraft types were far more vulnerable than others and that the 4 per cent average was being exceeded on a regular basis by the Halifax and the Stirling.

While the reports were still being compiled on the first Battle of the Ruhr, the next Battle was about to begin. Hamburg was designated as the target to receive a concentrated series of attacks over a short period of time, the codename being Operation Gomorrah. The first of these, 24/25 July, was also significant as it saw the first operational use of another defensive aid – Window. It was an incredibly successful tactic and one that reduced bomber losses for a number of raids, although the Germans soon developed tactics that lessened, though never negated, the use of this simple and cheap countermeasure. The Main Force consisted of 791 bombers, including 354 Lancasters from nineteen squadrons (four of these being Pathfinder units), with 103 Squadron sending no less than twenty-seven aircraft (although three of these returned early and three were lost). This series of four Main Force attacks on Hamburg caused major destruction in the city and seriously disrupted its war industries. A German report after the final raid stated: ‘The port was severely hit, the damage was gigantic. The failing of the water system, and the fighting of fires which remained from earlier attacks, hampered all work severely. The whole of Hamburg was on fire. Rescue, evacuation, clearing of vital roads, fire fighting, etc, asked the impossible from the available LS forces. Economically, Hamburg was knocked out, as even the undamaged parts had to stop work on account of the destruction of water, gas and electricity supplies.’ Propaganda Minister Goebbels in his private diary recorded the damage as a ‘catastrophe, the extent of which simply staggers the imagination’; whilst Armaments Minister Speer stated that if another six big German cities were similarly destroyed he would not be able to maintain armaments production. Too many studies of the Battle of Hamburg have focused on the tragic loss of life, and it is true that the firestorm was horrendous, but it is the comments of the likes of Speer that show the strategic value of attacks on German cities.

Plan showing Bomber Command summary of the damage caused to the Krupps Works at Essen during 1943.

Hamburg had suffered, but Bomber Command was also suffering. With improvements in the German defences – ‘flak’ and fighters – the RAF increasingly turned its attention to the provision of Radio Countermeasures, of which Window was one example. A range of equipment was developed as either warning aids to show crews that they were being tracked by a fighter (Monica and Fishpond being two such devices) or as a means of jamming German radar or radio. Jamming systems included specialist operations such as ABC (AirBorne Cigar), Corona and Tinsel. The technical aspects of the night war would play an increasingly important role in the final two years.

Early August brought a large-scale return to Italy and it is accepted that the Bomber Command attacks played a part in the decision by Italy to seek an Armistice in September. In addition to the usual run of Main Force attacks, special ops were also flown. Bomber Command launched an effective and important raid against the Germans’ main weapons research and testing site at Peenemunde on 17/18 August, the result of which was a significant delay in the development of the V-weapons.

By August 1943 the Command had fifty-seven squadrons operational, of which forty-nine were heavies; however, the actual strength in terms of aircraft in service amounted to the equivalent of sixty-seven standard size squadrons. The limiting factor was still availability of aircraft and this situation was not helped by, as the AHB narrative puts it: ‘Changes in operational requirements due to experience and improvements in tactics’. The Lancaster and Mosquito had already proved themselves satisfactory and only minor modifications and additions were made during this period. The only complaint of Bomber Command was that supplies were never sufficient – as a result, the other inferior types had to be accepted.

The Germans realised that the destructive power of the Combined Bomber Offensive was becoming a major factor in the war strategy and that only fighters could provide an effective counter. On 25 August Milch (Nazi chief of aircraft production) declared: ‘… must decide on priorities … only the 110 in sufficient numbers can give us the necessary relief at night … our fighters have to hit the enemy hard day and night to force him to abandon the policy of destruction of our arms production. Germany is the real front-line and the mass of fighters must go for home defence … the only chance to defeat day and night bombers.’ It was not a universally shared view; for example Jeschonneck (Chief of General Staff of the Luftwaffe) expressed the opinion that: ‘Every four-engined bomber the Western Allies build makes me happy, for we will bring these down just as we brought down the two-engined ones, and the destruction of a four-engined bomber constitutes a much greater loss to the enemy.’ The Luftwaffe was certainly doing its best to develop new weapons and tactics; one of the most effective new weapons, in service from August 1943, was the Schrage musik upward-firing cannon. This twin-cannon mounting permitted the fighter pilot to fly beneath the bomber and fire upwards into the bomb bay and fuel tanks, the result being critical damage with little risk from the bomber’s gunners. The ORS had suspected the presence of such a weapon and evidence mounted that it was being extensively employed; German night fighter experten were soon making multiple kills each night, with some claiming six or seven bombers in a single sortie. Once the bomber stream had been found, an experienced crew ‘swimming with the stream’ was able to pick up bomber after bomber.

The German night fighter defences became very potent and included a number of ‘experten’ pilots, such as Egmont Lippe-Weissenfeld.

On the Berlin raid of 23/24 August the loss rate had been 7.9 per cent (56 of the 727 bombers), with the Halifax units suffering almost 10 per cent casualties, including 6 out of 34 Pathfinder aircraft. The 121 Stirlings of the third wave lost 13 per cent (16 aircraft), the majority to fighter attack. Such loss rates were unsupportable in the long term – and the Battle of Berlin was to throw the whole question into sharp relief. Over the next few months Bomber Command’s Main Force would become a Lancaster/Halifax force, the Wellington bowing out of front-line bombing opsover Europe after the attack on Hannover of 8/9 October and the Stirling being withdrawn from bombing operations in summer 1944.

Following the Allied Commanders’ Quebec conference in August, a new Directive was issued, giving the bombers new priorities in the air build-up for the planned invasion of Europe. Many of the existing industrial targets were still included, but there was to be increasing emphasis on lines of communication and the enemy air assets. However, after the Ruhr and Hamburg ‘battles’ Harris had already lined up his next target – Berlin. On 3 November he sent a memo to Churchill: ‘We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the USAAF will come in on it. It will cost us between 400–500 aircraft. It will cost the Germany the war.’ The Americans were not keen as they wanted to maintain their focus on what they believed were key industrial targets and they didn’t join the Battle even though they agreed to attack Berlin when it seemed appropriate. This did not deter Harris and from late November Berlin was the preferred target for the Command.

The same day that Harris had sent his memo to Churchill, the Command mounted a very accurate raid on Dusseldorf (3/4 November), with 90 per cent of bombs estimated as falling within the target area even though it was a blind attack. This attack had included the operational debut of another new navigation/bombing aid – Gee-H (or G-H). The same raid brought the award of the Victoria Cross to Flight Lieutenant Bill Reid of 61 Squadron.

The first raid of the Berlin campaign took place on 18/19 November when 400 Lancasters attacked the ‘Big City’, with a second force attacking Ludwigshaven to split the night fighter force. A combination of poor weather and poor PFF marking led to a scattered raid, although losses were light. The night of 22/23 November saw the Command mount a maximum effort against Berlin, 765 aircraft taking part. Marking was accurate and Berlin was hit hard. The Battle of Berlin took place in three phases and lasted to February 1944, by which time the Command had mounted 9,099 sorties against the ‘Big City’, dropping 29,804 tons of bombs; overall losses were 501 aircraft. Bomber Command was able to reach and hit its targets, but it was paying a high price.

The Bomber Command Quarterly Review summarised the last months of 1943 as: ‘The most difficult phase of bombing yet carried out. These three winter months presented the first opportunity of operating large forces over the important but distant targets in Central Germany, including Berlin. Two conditions had essentially to be fulfilled if we were to obtain the desired results. First, it was imperative that the bomb load should be concentrated around the aiming point, and second, the rate of loss had to be maintained at an economic level. These essentials were achieved in the main by constant improvements in aids and counter-measures coupled with improved navigation by crews and a better understanding of the methods involved in marking the target. Tactical surprise was created by diversionary and “spoof” raids in conjunction with carefully planned routeing so that the enemy was kept guessing as to the real target for the night, with the result that he was seldom able to bring his full defences to bear at the crucial moment. In addition, every endeavour was made to jam his air defence communications system.’ This was an over-optimistic assessment of the half-way point in the Battle of Berlin; although damage to some parts of Berlin had been extensive the German defences were adapting to the threat and hundreds of night fighters were available to counter the bombers on their flight over German territory. The increased use of Wild Boar and Tame Boar fighters, which gave greater flexibility to pilots in searching out and attacking the bombers had a significant impact on the Battle.

Berlin remained the main target into early 1944 but after an intensive, and expensive, series of attacks in January the Battle petered out and only two more attacks were made before the ‘official’ ending of this particular campaign. The termination was not primarily brought about by Bomber Command’s concern over losses, although there certainly was concern, but rather the pressure being applied for support of the preinvasion campaign.

The Air Ministry issued a revised directive on 17 February with a change of target priorities; the overall mission stayed the same and the primary objective (Schweinfurt) was also unchanged, but other objectives were listed as Crossbow, and ‘Berlin and other important industrial areas’. An attack on the ball-bearing factory by the Americans was followed on 24/25 February by a Main Force attack by 734 aircraft. The attack was made in two waves – one hour apart, with the first wave losing twenty-two aircraft, mainly to fighters, and the second wave losing eleven aircraft. The factory reported only slight damage. Berlin and other German cities were attacked during the winter of 1944 but it was spring before Crossbow targets became a routine task.

Supporting the invasion

The March 1944 Bomber Command ORB recorded a statement by Lord Portal, Chief of Air Staff in respect of switching production capacity: ‘A very careful study has been made of the problems involved in changing Halifax production over to the Lancaster, but the jig and tool capacity of the country was not sufficient to permit changing the Halifax firms to Lancaster production at the same time as changing from the Stirling. Further, that even if it were practicable to make such a switch there would be a prohibitive loss of bombing effort during the vital period between mid 1944 until probably late 1945’. He further stated that: After doing everything practicable to increase Lancaster production, including diversion of Halifax resources, delivery will still be at the rate of four Halifaxes to seven Lancasters to the end of this year, although the proportion of Lancasters will continue to increase until the end of 1945.’ The final part of his statement is even more telling: ‘There is every hope that the German Air Force would be so weakened by the fighting this year that the Halifax can be retained as a front-line bomber in 1945. If this proves false, first-line bomber operations must be limited to Lancasters, delivery of which will rise to 350–50 per month in 1945, and employing the Halifax for mining and other second-line targets and for training.’

Bomber Command’s ‘heavies’ played a major role in preparing the D-D ay battlefield by cutting German rail links.

The outline overall Air Plan called for four phases of air operation in support of Overlord:

1. Preliminary:	January–February 1944, but also a continuation of the air offensives of late 1943.
2. Preparatory:	March–May 1944, main weight of attacks on invasion targets.
3. Assault:	D minus Two to D plus One.
4. Follow-up:	D plus Two onwards.

Before we look at the actual elements of the pre-invasion strategy a few general points need to be made: first; an enormous effort had to be expended on convincing the Germans to expect the invasion in the wrong place and as soon as the decision had been taken in favour of Normandy it became vital to make the Germans look to the Pas de Calais. The major aspect of this as far as the air campaign was concerned was to be the policy of attacking two targets outside of the designated invasion area for every one attacked within it. Second, the Allied air forces were by no means a cohesive whole and there were problems both in the command structure and air power doctrine; both of these problems had an effect on the campaign but neither proved to be of a critical nature.

With over 10,000 aircraft the air forces arrayed for the invasion of Europe would be the most powerful ever assembled. However, whilst the number of aircraft was impressive the list of targets prepared by the planning staffs was equally impressive and there was no shortage of experts with opinions as to which targets were the ‘war winners’ and so merited the greatest weight of air effort.

The preparatory phase

Attacks on enemy lines of communications had been an aspect of the Bomber Command bombing strategy, albeit as a bonus effect of destroying the centres of cities through which such major communications routes passed; however, it was now to be an objective in its own right, a directive to this effect being issued in early March. This is one of the key elements of the pre-invasion bombing strategy and one in which the effective employment of air power was crucial. On 4 March Bomber Command received instructions to carry out a series of trial attacks on French marshalling yards to provide planning data for a series of such attacks planned in support of the Overlord Transportation Plan. The targets for the trial were Trappes, Aulnoye, Le Mans, Amiens/Longeau, Courtrai and Laon. The first of these attacks took place on the night of 6/7 March when 261 Halifaxes led by six Mosquito aircraft attacked Trappes; weather conditions were excellent with good visibility and little opposition. The attack was one of the most successful yet undertaken by the Command and there were no losses. Bomber Command analysts enthused over the results concluding that: ‘It is appreciated that this new-found ability to saturate with bomb strikes a given area of approx 500 × 1,000 yards square constitutes a weapon of war of enormous power.’

The following night a slightly larger force of Halifax and Lancaster bombers attacked Le Mans, again without loss and, despite cloud cover, with good results, although the number of French civilian casualties did cause concern. At least 300 bombs fell on the rail yards causing several cuts and the destruction of 250 wagons, a number of locomotives and substantial damage to installations.

During the remainder of March several more such raids were carried out against marshalling yards – Le Mans (13/14 March), Amiens (15/16 and 16/17 March), Laon (23/24 March), Aulnoye (25/26 March) and Courtrai (26/27 March). The question of bombing marshalling yards in towns where French civilian casualties might result, as had been the case with the Le Mans attack, continued to trouble some Allied planners and politicians, although many saw such casualties as a price that France would have to pay for liberation.

Harris, however, was determined to maintain his offensive against German cities. On the night of 30/31 March, the major industrial city and communications interchange of Nuremberg was chosen for a Main Force attack and 795 bombers left their bases in England. It was to be a disaster for Bomber Command, with ninety-five aircraft failing to return.

General Eisenhower, the Allied Supreme Commander, held a crucial conference on 25 March to finalise the employment of air power in the two months leading up to the invasion and during the immediate post-invasion period. Much of the discussion centred around items that had already been given tacit approval in the outline air plans, the real arguments started when it came to the employment of the heavy bombers of the US 8th Air Force and RAF Bomber Command. The conference was presented with two very different proposals, from Air Marshal Tedder, the Deputy Supreme Commander, came the Transportation Plan’ and from Spaatz, commander of the United States Strategic Air Forces (USSTAF) the “Oil Offensive’. Both had rehearsed their arguments and both held very vehement opinions – it was to be a bitter struggle. Much of the basis of the Transportation Plan came from Tedder’s experience in the Italian campaign and he had enlisted the same scientific adviser, Solly Zuckerman. His proposals had been put forward in January in a paper entitled: ‘Delay and disorganisation of enemy movement by rail’, in which he ventured that if the seventy-six most important rail servicing and repair facilities in North-West Europe were destroyed the effect would be to: ‘Paralyse movements in the whole region they serve and render almost impossible the subsequent movement by rail of major reserves into France.’

Amiens marshalling yard a few days after an accurate Bomber Command night raid.

The view of the 21st Army was quite similar and concentrated on the need to win the race to build up Allied strength ashore before major German reinforcements could be brought to bear: ‘… There is little doubt that unless we can disrupt the enemy’s communications, the Germans have a 4 to 1 chance of winning the race. It is not too much to say that this would result in the failure of Overlord at a very early stage.’ As railways were the main military transportation system they were the key to the proposed strategy of isolating the invasion area.

With the tactical and strategic bombers being tasked against railway centres the Allies began a progressive degradation of the French railway network; it must be remembered however that the effort had to be widespread in order to maintain the deception policy of not focusing solely on targets within the proposed invasion area. The allocation of effort to counter the V-weapon threat has been omitted from this article because of space, although they did play a significant part in the overall Allied air strategy.

The pre-invasion bombing strategy was well underway by spring 1944 and in an April 1944 review paper the role of the heavy bombers was discussed: ‘A major conclusion emerging from the air operations which have so far been undertaken in preparation for operation Overlord, is that outstanding bombing concentrations can now be achieved by RAF Bomber Command upon any given objective of limited size within Oboe range, and in certain circumstances outside Oboe range. The density of bomb strikes per acre achieved upon, for example, Juvisy and Aulnoye railway centres or Mailly le Camp has much exceeded expectations. The area attacked has been reduced to a wilderness of bomb craters which in many cases are lip to lip, or actually overlapping.’

On 8 April the draft Joint Fire Plan was issued, in essence the ‘fire-power’ timetable for the assault, and all but one of its schedules concerned air bombardment, such was the importance of this aspect. Operational control of the strategic bomber forces finally passed to SHAEF on 14 April. The most powerful air armada ever assembled was now, in theory at least, under the operational control of the Supreme Commander. All previous restrictions on rail targets were removed on 5 May with the strategic bombers being given clearance to bomb rail yards in densely populated areas, including Paris. Although a huge amount of damage had been inflicted on the rail network it remained a key target category; in the days either side of the invasion even more air effort was tasked to ensure that nothing of any significance was able to move by rail.

One of the major fears of the amphibious operation planners was the destruction that could be wrought by the coastal defence and field artillery batteries located along the stretch of coast selected for the landings. The 155 mm guns in some of the sites had a range of 26,000 yards and with the assault force only able to move at approx 12,000 yards per hour this would mean a period of exposure of two and a half hours. It was considered essential that these sites be destroyed or at least damaged to such an extent as to limit their effectiveness. Early in 1943 discussions and trials took place to consider the best way to attack the coastal batteries, with options ranging from mass bombing to airborne assault. Detonation trials of heavy bombs on the ground close to concrete emplacements proved that only a direct hit would knock out the guns and that the percentage of such hits in even a mass bombing raid would be small. With this type of attack it was considered that the best result would be the effect on crews that might make them incapable of operating the guns. In May trials were carried out with rocket projectiles (RPs) against open emplacements and these showed promise. The studies conclude that the most effective tactic was a three-pronged attack:

1.Heavy blitz bombing and low-flying attack by fighters to soften the defences and cause some damage.

2.Attack by RP aircraft, followed swiftly by

3.Airborne forces to destroy guns not already put out of action.

There was much heated debate as to the employment of bombers against these sites and the bomber chiefs continued to be reluctant to divert effort to what they still considered to be unprofitable targets. One analysis claimed that it would take 420 tons of bombs to ensure damage to a single gun, 2,500 bombs to secure one strike within 5 yards of the aiming point – and that such bomb loads could be more profitably expended elsewhere, the bomber chiefs returning to their favourite argument of bombing the gun before it reached the site (i.e. in the factory or in the rail siding en route). Nevertheless, attacks against coastal batteries were considered essential and so they remained on the target list.

By D-Day minus ten, Bomber Command had dropped 3,700 tons and AEAF 5,000 tons of bombs on such installations; the assessment being that eighteen of the fifty-one major guns within the assault area had been damaged. A later report by the Bombing Analysis Unit stated that: ‘Bombing both delayed further construction and was very successful in reducing the efficiency of the batteries, not only because of the damage it caused but also because of the threat of further attacks’.

On 2 June Leigh-Mallory outlined to Eisenhower the bombing plan aimed at establishing a belt cutting the major routes through towns and villages to prevent or slow down passage of enemy reinforcements into the assault area. Eisenhower approved the plan and suitable targets joined the list for the medium and heavy bombers, for attack from D minus Two. The air commander saw the transportation campaign as crucial to the Allies in preventing the Germans concentrating in the invasion area once they had identified where the landings had taken place: ‘Any large scale reinforcement of his troops near the invasion area could only be made if the railways behind are in good working order. My first object, therefore, in the preparatory stages was to make such a mess of the railway system that the movement of reinforcements would be impossible. The railway experts whom I consulted when considering the programme urged the destruction of railway centres, that is to say, those places where servicing and maintenance shops exist and also where signalling systems are concentrated. Moreover, to clobber junctions with a large number of points would be of immediate assistance, for they are not easily replaced when destroyed. I am quite sure that, speaking at this moment, the potential carrying power of the French and Belgian railways has been very considerably reduced and that there are good prospects of being able to keep them in a state of paralysis.’

The final few days before the invasion brought an intensification of air effort against the three key target systems of transportation, coastal guns and radars. Bomber Command was active in this period against the same type of targets; in the three nights from 2/3 June eleven gun batteries were attacked. In the period 1 April to 5 June, Bomber Command flew 24,629 sorties, dropping 87,238 tons of bombs – and losing 557 aircraft – on targets related to the pre-invasion bombing strategy. The bomb tonnage represented around 40 per cent of the total dropped by all Allied aircraft, whilst the sorties were only 12 per cent of the total – an indication of the impressive bomb lift of the heavy bombers.

The landings went well and, with the exception of Omaha Beach, losses were far lighter than predicted. Nevertheless, victory was by no means certain and everything now rested on who would win the build-up race. Allied air power had been a key factor in ensuring the successful amphibious assault; it would be a key factor in stabilising the lodgement area and the eventual breakout.

During the first week after D-Day the Command flew over 2,500 sorties in support of the landings, attacking road and rail communications and a range of other targets. June 14 marked Bomber Command’s return to daylight operations when 200 Lancasters attacked German naval targets threatening the invasion supply lines. A great deal of effort was also being expended against V-weapon targets. The first of the V-1 rockets had fallen on England on 6 June and the destruction of construction, storage and launch sites became a high priority – and yet another diversion from the strategic offensive against the German homeland. Major raids were mounted in July to bomb fortifications around Caen in an effort to break the deadlock that had gripped British ground forces around the city. Operation Goodwood saw the employment of massed heavy bombers in a tactical operation dropping thousands of tons of high explosive close to friendly troops. The tactic was used on a number of occasions in this breakout phase.

Throughout 1944 the size of the heavy bomber force continued to increase and by June the Command had almost seventy squadrons with an operational strength of 1,250 Lancasters and 780 Halifaxes, as well as an increasing number of Mosquitoes. By the end of the year the force had grown again, the largest gain being in Mosquito units as this type took on an increasing number of roles, with the Light Night Strike Force (LNSF) adding a new dimension to the overall tactical plan by spreading the air raid warning and strain on the German air defence system.

At its peak strength in the latter part of 1944 and early 1945 the Command could field 3,200 heavy bombers and 400 light bombers, a daily bomb lift of 20,000 tons. It had indeed grown into a powerful and destructive weapon. Target priorities changed from time to time, depending on where the major effort was seen to be required, although Harris was often criticised for sticking with his area bombing to the exclusion of other targets – a broadly unfair assessment but one with some justification.

Between June and August 1944 Bomber Command dropped 180,000 tons of bombs; an indication of the diversion of effort from the main strategic offensive was that only 30,000 tons of this total was dropped on Germany.

The Mosquito played an important role in the Pathfinder Force for target-marking but its larger contribution to the overall campaign was with the Light Night Strike Force and as a night fighter.

Although command of the bomber force reverted to the Air Staff on 14 September, one of the first series of major operations was in support of the airborne landings in Holland as part of Operation Market Garden. The striking power of Bomber Command is aptly demonstrated by statistics for October 1944 – 17,000 operational sorties were flown, 13,000 of these to targets in Germany. Over 50,000 tons of bombs fell on German territory: in one twenty-four hour period the Command dropped more tonnage of bombs on Duisburg than the Germans dropped on London in the entire war. By summer 1944 No. 5 Group was operating as a virtually independent organisation. Harris summed this up in his post war diary: ‘No. 5 Group operated largely as an independent unit and developed its own techniques, including the original Master Bomber concept as well as offset Skymarking such as the “5 Group Newhaven”. This used offset techniques 1,000–2,000 yards from the aiming point, any error in the Red TIs being cancelled by yellows from the Master Bomber. Other techniques were developed, including “sector bombing” with each aircraft given a heading and overshoot heading. This gave a good bomb distribution but needed very accurate low-level marking.’ The latter was a technique for which the Group became well known and from April 1944 it had its own pathfinder element, three experienced Squadrons (83, 97, 627) having been transferred from No. 8 Group.

The scale of the support required for one Main Force operation is hard to envisage, so perhaps a few numbers might help put it into perspective. According to a Bomber Command study: ‘To prepare for an operation by 1,000 bombers the following material had to be provided: Over 2,000,000 gallons of petrol, 70,000 gallons of oil, and 5,000 gallons of coolant are put into the aircraft. Over 4,500 tons of bombs may be required and 10,000,000 rounds of ammunition for the guns. Some 30,000 bicycles, 3,500 bomb trolleys and 6,000 other vehicles are employed. 15,000,000 litres of oxygen are required, whilst 8,000 pints of coffee and 6,000 lb of food are placed in the aircraft.’

Winter 1944/45 saw Bomber Command ranging far and wide over Germany attacking cities but also continuing to focus on transportation and, to a lesser extent, oil targets. A number of special missions were flown, such as the various raids against the Tirpitzand the No. 5 Group attack on the Dortmund-Ems Canal (23/24 September) to the employment of earthquake bombs by 9 and 617 Squadrons. A new directive was given to Harris on 25 September stating that the first priority, subject to weather and tactical feasibility, was the oil campaign, with equal second priority to target types that included the rail and water transport system, tank production and depots, and motor vehicle production and depots. Direct support of land and naval forces was listed as an ‘ongoing commitment’ but bombing of important industrial areas was also included. Harris would continue to argue that attacking German cities affected all of these target types. October brought a specific directive that, as Operation Hurricane, called for an all-out air offensive by the RAF and USAAF against the Ruhr to demonstrate the Allies overwhelming air superiority and the destruction that could – and would – be wrought unless Germany surrendered. A series of heavy attacks was mounted against Cologne, Essen and Duisburg, with smaller, single raids to Dortmund, Saarbrucken, Stuttgart and Wilhelmshaven.

Only 6 per cent of the Command’s effort had been expended against oil targets in September 1944, although this was in part down to the poor wording of directives that allowed Harris to find reasons why he should not be deflected from his own avowed campaign against industrial cities. A new directive of 1 November once more gave oil as the top priority, with transportation targets being the only other option; once again there was ‘let-out clause’ that stated: ‘As far as operational conditions allow, area bombing attacks are to be directed so as to contribute maximum destruction of the petroleum industry and the dislocation of the target systems already indicated.’ Despite the seeming clarity of the overall directive, Bomber Command did not focus on individual oil targets, in part arguing that the winter weather made them less suitable, especially when reconnaissance was unable to determine the level of damage already sustained by such targets. The German fighter force was in dire straits due to shortage of pilots and restrictions caused by lack of fuel. However, a German report of 5 November was fairly upbeat: ‘As regards our night fighter force, the position is rather more favourable at present. Substantial reinforcements have been received from disbanded bomber and transport units, and striking power has greatly increased. Our total strength of about 1,800 aircraft enabled about 200 fighters to take to the air during each enemy attack. Night fighter crews have achieved considerable success. The present fuel shortage only permits the employment of night fighters for a few days each month. Our forces should carry out operations at full strength on certain days and times based on previous experience. A further solution would be to convert some night fighter units to Me262 as this would enable us to attack and inflict heavy losses on the Mosquito squadrons which are operating in ever-increasing strength over NW Europe.’ A number of 262s were converted to the night fighter role but the limited numbers and stage of the war made their contribution negligible.

Final months

With fewer aircrew needed as loss rates reduced and the end of the war in sight, there was a gradual reduction in Bomber Command’s training organisation from late 1944. After January 1945 this run-down affected other various elements and so this month can be considered the peak of Bomber Command in terms of its wartime size. The New Year opened with oil and transportation still the main priorities but a new offensive against certain German cities, especially when combined with the Russian advance into Germany, might prove decisive in causing a final collapse of Nazi control. The final months of the war saw the bombers ranging over Germany, flying an increasing number of daylight raids as the German defences finally began to collapse. The four cities considered suitable were Berlin, Chemnitz, Dresden and Leipzig. Berlin, however, was removed from the list following a Joint Intelligence Committee assessment of 25 January: ‘The devastation of Berlin, even if it was to coincide with the Russian advance, would be unlikely to break down the German will to continue the war.’ The remaining three cities were to be attacked under Operation Thunderclap.

The attack on Dresden, which took place on the 13/14 February, has been the subject of much debate and more than any other event in six years of war has been cited in some quarters as proof of the barbaric nature of the bomber war. The Thunderclap attacks were intended as joint missions, the USAAF attacking by day and Bomber Command by night; the USAAF was due to attack Dresden on 13 February but because of weather the attack was delayed until the following day. A force of 800 RAF bombers delivered a devastating attack that wrecked Dresden, along with its industry and communications (and it was a key transport node for the Eastern Front) – and caused at least 50,000 civilian casualties. The following night Chemnitz was attacked by 700 heavy bombers but the weather was not clear as it had been the previous night and bombing was scattered and ineffective. This city was attacked again on 5/6 March with a higher level of damage.

The German night fighters were not a totally spent force and in the period 20–22 February Bomber Command lost sixty-two aircraft, mainly to fighters. In a dramatic, but ultimately futile, mission the Luftwaffe mounted Operation Gisella on 4 March when 100 night fighters followed the bomber stream back to England to attack bases and aircraft when they thought they were safe – it is estimated that twenty RAF aircraft were shot down. March brought heavy attacks, often by over 1,000 bombers, on cities such as Cologne, Essen, Mannheim and Darmstadt. The Dortmund raid of 12 March involved a record 1,108 bombers. Propaganda Minister Goebbels made a number of despondent entries in his diary during March:

1 March:	The air war has now turned into a crazy orgy. We are totally defenceless against it. The Reich will be gradually turned into a complete desert.
12 March:	The morale of the German people, both at home and at the front, is sinking even lower. The air terror which rages uninterruptedly over German home territory makes people thoroughly despondent.
13 March:	When I call to mind that the amount of petrol available to the Luftwaffe has fallen from 193,000 tons to 8,000 tons, then I realise what can be expected of the Luftwaffe and what cannot. What use is the mass output of new fighters when we have not even the petrol or the crews to put them into action?

Allied ground forces crossed the Rhine at the end of March and the industrial cities of the Ruhr were overrun. Large-scale bombing of cities virtually ceased and the Command focused smaller raids on specific targets, the main exception being Berlin on 10/11 April in support of the Russian advance on the city. Only three more large-scale attacks were made by Bomber Command: on 18 April nearly 1,000 bombers attacked the fortified island of Heligoland in an accurate daylight attack with no bomber losses; on 22 April over 750 bombers attacked the port of Bremen in preparation for the assault on the city by British XXX Corps; and in the final major raid of the war, 375 Lancasters and Mosquitoes attacked Berchtesgaden, the aiming points being Hitler’s famed Berghof (Eagles’ Nest chalet) and the nearby SS barracks. Bomber Command’s final offensive operations of the war took place on 2/3 May, the target being Kiel in an attempt to prevent a supposed attempt by Nazi die-hards to flee Germany for Scandinavia. During this latter series of attacks two Halifaxes and one Mosquito were lost, Bomber Command’s last operational casualties of the Second World War.

Bomber Command had three more important operations to complete – all of a peaceful nature: Manna, Exodus and Dodge. The population of The Netherlands was suffering from food shortages in the latter weeks of the war and under an agreement with the local German forces Bomber Command flew low level mercy missions dropping supplies, under the appropriate code name Manna. The first drops took place on 28 April with a certain trepidation amongst the aircrew – would the ‘free flight’ be honoured by the Germans? Over the next two weeks, by which time the unconditional surrender of German forces had been made, the Command flew over 3,000 sorties and dropped 7,000 tons of food, an act that the people of Holland have never forgotten. Operation Exodusinvolved the repatriation of thousands of prisoners of war, mainly by Lancasters with a quick modification to allow them to carry twenty-five passengers. The first flight was made from Brussels on 4 May and by the end of May over 74,000 PoWs had been brought home. The final operation, Dodge, was similar in that it involved bringing home Allied personnel from Italy and the Mediterranean Theatre.

A Lancaster dropping supplies to Dutch civilians under Operation Manna in late April 1945.

It had been a long and bitter struggle – a six-year war. Bomber Command had grown from a relatively ineffective force which, despite the courage of its crews, was limited in its ability to find and destroy targets to a weapon of enormous power. With the end of the war, following the unconditional surrender of Japan, the massive firepower that Bomber Command had built up was no longer required and disbandment of units, which had already started in spring 1945, accelerated. Despite the belief in some quarters that now was the time to face up to the Russians, the Cold War was still a few years away. In the immediate post-war period the Command went through a major reorganisation with the disbandment of all operational Groups except No. 1 and No. 3 Groups and a major change-round of airfields. Most of the plans that had been laid for re-equipment and new weapons in the latter part of the war were now cancelled or postponed.

Bomber Command had fought for six years. From the small and ineffective beginnings of the night offensive in 1940 through a period when the entire bomber philosophy was called into question through lack, as some saw it, of tangible results, to an increase in capability but a rising and unsustainable loss rate, to a final period when the destructive power of the Command and the accuracy with which it could deliver attacks was greater than any pre-war bomber exponent could have dreamt. Thousands of aircrew died in combat or in training; countless acts of heroism and devotion to duty went unrecorded or unrewarded. Bomber Command’s war was a peoples’ war – to friend and foe alike; it is now recorded in stark statistics of tonnage of bombs dropped, aircraft lost, civilians killed, factories put out of action, and a mass of data, much of it debated and disputed. The Victoria Cross is the highest gallantry award in the British military and throughout the war a number of Bomber Command aircrew received this medal (the details of each award are included in the ‘Operations’ chapter); one award – that to Leonard Cheshire – in many ways encapsulates the bomber war and the contribution made by outstanding individuals, although even then it is mirror for the countless thousands of bomber aircrew and the support personnel. The VC is usually awarded for a single act of gallantry in which there is a high risk of death; the award to Leonard Cheshire was unique in that it was for his overall contribution. The citation read: ‘This officer began his operational career in June, 1940. Against strongly-defended targets he soon displayed the courage and determination of an exceptional leader. He was always ready to accept extra risks to ensure success. Defying the formidable Ruhr defences, he frequently released his bombs from below 2,000 feet. Over Cologne in November, 1940, a shell burst inside his aircraft, blowing out one side and starting a fire; undeterred, he went on to bomb his target. About this time, he carried out a number of convoy patrols in addition to his bombing missions.

‘At the end of his first tour of operational duty in January, 1941, he immediately volunteered for a second. Again, he pressed home his attacks with the utmost gallantry. Berlin, Bremen, Cologne, Duisburg, Essen and Kiel were among the heavily-defended targets which he attacked. When he was posted for instructional duties in January, 1942, he undertook four more operational missions. He started a third operational tour in August, 1942, when he was given command of a squadron. He led the squadron with outstanding skill on a number of missions before being appointed in March, 1943, as a station commander. In October, 1943, he undertook a fourth operational tour, relinquishing the rank of Group Captain at his own request so that he could again take part in operations. He immediately set to work as the pioneer of a new method of marking enemy targets involving very low flying. In June 1944, when marking a target in the harbour at Le Havre in broad daylight and without cloud cover, he dived well below the range of the light batteries before releasing his marker bombs, and he came very near to being destroyed by the strong barrage which concentrated on him. During his fourth tour which ended in July 1944, Wing Commander Cheshire led his squadron personally on every occasion, always undertaking the most dangerous and difficult task of marking the target alone from a low level in the face of strong defences. Wing Commander Cheshire’s cold and calculated acceptance of risks is exemplified by his conduct in an attack on Munich in April 1944. This was an experimental attack to test out the new method of target marking at low level against a heavily-defended target situated deep in Reich territory. Munich was selected, at Wing Commander Cheshire’s request, because of the formidable nature of its light anti-aircraft and searchlight defences. He was obliged to follow, in bad weather, a direct route which took him over the defences of Augsburg and thereafter he was continuously under fire. As he reached the target, flares were being released by our high-flying aircraft. He was illuminated from above and below. All guns within range opened fire on him. Diving to 700 feet, he dropped his markers with great precision and began to climb away. So blinding were the searchlights that he almost lost control. He then flew over the city at 1,000 feet to assess the accuracy of his work and direct other aircraft. His own was badly hit by shell fragments but he continued to fly over the target area until he was satisfied that he had done all in his power to ensure success.

Lancasters at peace – aircraft from various squadrons lined-up at an airfield in Italy to take part in Operation Dodge, the repatriation of Allied personnel.

Two of Bomber Command’s Victoria Cross winners: Leonard Cheshire and Norman Jackson.

‘Eventually, when he set course for base, the task of disengaging himself from the defences proved even more hazardous than the approach. For a full twelve minutes after leaving the target area he was under withering fire but he came safely through. Wing Commander Cheshire has now completed a total of over 100 missions. In four years of fighting against the bitterest opposition he has maintained a record of outstanding personal achievement, placing himself invariably in the forefront of the battle. What he did in the Munich operation was typical of the careful planning, brilliant, execution and contempt for danger which has established for Wing Commander Cheshire a reputation second to none in Bomber Command.’ (Wing Commander Geoffrey Leonard Cheshire DSO DFC, 617 Squadron RAF.)

With the war in Europe over, Bomber Command was tasked to provide squadrons for Tiger Force, a major reinforcement for the war against Japan. Many Canadian squadrons went home to Canada to prepare for this new task whilst RAF squadrons went into a training routine. The dropping of the atom bombs in August 1945 ended the war before Tiger Force deployed.

Cold War

The end of the Second World War brought a massive rebuilding programme throughout Europe and for Britain it was a matter of urgency to return to a peacetime budget as soon as possible. For the military this meant disbandment of units as personnel on ‘wartime duration’ commitments hastened to return to civilian life – and find a job. Britain attempted to restore its pre-war Empire but the political map had changed, whilst at the same time cutting the military budget, including equipment, as quickly as possible. For Bomber Command this meant a ten-year period of making do with wartime equipment and facilities, not that there was any shortage of aircraft or bombs! In addition to its strategic bombing role from the UK the Command also had a commitment to provide firepower to other theatres to support the resident air assets and this was to become an increasingly important element during the 1950s and 1960s. The period from 1946 to around 1953 is very much one of restructuring and making do, doctrine and tactics remained unchanged although the new ‘enemy’ was communism and the new Soviet empire in Europe. The Cold War was pretty much in place as soon as the hot war had ended as allies of necessity became enemies of choice.

The striking power of Bomber Command was transformed in the 1950s with the introduction of nuclear weapons and the strategic deterrent became the focus of Bomber Command – and indeed overall British strategy. This was very much an arms race and as with all such arms races one of the main strategies was that of pre-emptive attack; NATO planners believed that the Warsaw Pact would attempt to deliver such an attack against NATO’s nuclear assets in an attempt to remove a major threat. The threat of such a preemptive attack increased with the introduction of ballistic missiles in the mid 1950s and whilst manned aircraft remained the most numerous and potent nuclear assets for another decade the force mix was starting to change. The best way of protecting aircraft on the ground was to disperse them – and ensure that they could be airborne and out of harm’s way as soon as possible. Bomber Command’s solution to this was to disperse its V-bombers in groups of four to a number of airfields from Scotland to Cornwall. With the ‘accepted wisdom’ being that the warning period might be as little as four minutes it was also vital that these dispersed aircraft could be airborne quickly. Each of the dispersal airfields was provided with massive Operational Readiness Platforms (ORPs) at the end of the main runway, each capable of taking four Vulcans or Victors. In times of tension the crews would be on standby and with aircraft having been modified so that all four engines could be started simultaneously, all four bombers could be in the air within two minutes. This reaction time was frequently rehearsed.

The standard organisation for a V-bomber squadron was two Flights, each with an equal number of aircraft; each aircraft had a crew of five – 1st Pilot, 2nd Pilot, Navigator Plotter, Navigator Radar and Signaller (Air Electronics Officer from 1957 onwards). Whilst the allocation of a crew to ‘its own’ aircraft was not always possible the use of an assigned crew chief and allocated groundcrew to each aircraft worked well.

In its anti-flash white paint this Valiant was part of the trio of nuclear-armed V-bombers with which Bomber Command ’fought’ the early years of the Cold War.

In October 1957 the Air Council agreed a new reinforcement plan for the Far East Air Force; this centred on developing Tengah, Singapore as a major base with a 9,000 ft all-weather runway suitable for V-bomber use. The intention was for Tengah to have two resident Canberra units and for an immediate reinforcement capability by two V-bomber squadrons. Squadrons spent most of their time on training exercise or detachments, the latter usually connected with demonstrating – and practising – the global nature of the Command’s capability. Participation in exercises, including annual competitions, was vital. The increasingly close relationship between Bomber Command and Strategic Air Command (SAC) was evidenced in 1957 with an invitation to RAF V-bomber crews to participate in the SAC Bombing Competition at Pinecastle. Four Valiants, and six crews, were nominated and under Operation Longshot training commenced in January, culminating in a trial bombing competition in June. The four Valiants had been modified by Vickers-Armstrongs with underwing fuel tanks and auto-pilot. Following the competition, held at Marham, a Valiant Competition Flight was formed for the final intensive work-up, flying routes simulating the profiles used in the SAC Competition, the 2,774 mile route included an 800 mile leg using only astro navigation and with three radar attacks. The three chosen Valiants left Wittering on 25 September and after a night stop at Goose Bay, landed at Pinecastle, Florida the following day.

Final training took place hand-in-hand with familiarisation with American procedures. In typical bomber aircrew fashion one of the main comments concerned food: ‘The sphere in which the RAF and SAC practice differed most noticeably was in the quality and quantity of flying rations. Five different USAF menus were available, ranging from ‘bite-size’ steak to fried chicken, complete with milk, fruit, chocolate, cigarettes, condiments and tooth pick; a far cry indeed from lukewarm tomato soup and cheese biscuits.’ As to the ground crew: ‘A taste for coffee and doughnuts was rapidly acquired by the groundcrew, who, thus fortified, were successfully taking on all comers at soccer.’ The competition – Operation Iron Horse – began on 30 October, by which time two Valiants (XD859 and XD860) had been chosen as the competition primaries. The Valiants on the ramp at Pinecastle were surrounded by sixty-six B-47s from various SAC units (the B-36 and B-52 competitors operated from Carswell, Texas). It was a detachment from No. 3 Group so the AOC, AVM K. Cross, accompanied by C-in-C Bomber Command, ACM Sir Harry Broadhurst, turned up on the opening day. The Valiant crews had to cope with various equipment problems, especially with the all important Navigation and Bombing System (NBS). Nevertheless the RAF Wing achieved a final placing of twenty-seventh out of forty-five. The SAC Bombing Competition would become a regular feature of the V-force calendar with many crews having fond memories of the social life if not always the flying.

By 1959 the Air Ministry was convinced the future was with ballistic missiles, Thor having entered service and plans being underway for a British system, Blue Streak. In this very confused period of strategy decisions were being taken that simply didn’t make sense; the air-launched Blue Steel Mk 1 had not yet entered service (it did so in 1963) but the future ground-based deterrent of Blue Streak was cancelled in 1960. When the Thor squadrons disbanded the AOC issued this message: ‘You in the Thor force have maintained a constant vigil day and night for almost four years. You have maintained a higher state of readiness in peace-time than has ever been achieved before in the history of the Armed Forces. I am well aware of the sacrifices, so willingly accepted, that this constant readiness has imposed on the officers and airmen of the force.’ It was an accolade designed to sweeten the pill of disbandment but it was also true, and this period of Bomber Command’s history deserves more recognition that it usually receives.

With no follow-on for the original Blue Steel and with Thor as only a temporary system, and the next generation of missiles planned as seaborne, a new nuclear weapon was required for the manned aircraft. The search for a weapon led to selection of the Douglas GAM-87A Skybolt stand-off missile that had been designed for SAC’s B-52s and B-58s. Political agreement on the acquisition was reached in March 1960 and plans were made to acquire missiles for the Vulcan B.2, with aircraft from airframes on the production line from No. 61 receiving the appropriate installation points and strengthening. The first Vulcan flight with a dummy Skybolt was made in November 1961 and with a British warhead under development the programme appeared to be on course as a Blue Steel replacement.

The Cold War reached one of its coldest periods with the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 and Bomber Command came to a high state of readiness at the height of the crisis, although the politicians refused to sanction deployment of the bombers to their UK dispersal airfields. At this time only 617 Squadron was operational with Blue Steel, and even then it was a limited capability, with the other squadrons still carrying free-fall weapons. In the event of the ‘scramble’ being given, crews would have headed for their pre-planned targets and those that managed to penetrate enemy defences – and remember that with the rest of NATO, and especially Strategic Air Command, in action the skies over Europe would have been crowded with aircraft – would have dropped their weapons and flown on to their sanctuary bases. Most of these bases were in places such as Turkey and RAF bases in the Mediterranean and Middle East, a return to the UK was often out of the question for either radius of action reasons or the expectation that the airfield would no longer be there. This was the period of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the philosophy being that neither side would gain from conflict therefore peace was the only option.

An RAF crew launch a Thor missile at Vandeburg Air Force Base; the American Thor missile system was part of a NATO nuclear missile shield but the planned British follow-on, Blue Streak was cancelled.

Setbacks with the Skybolt missile and the pro-ballistic missile lobby in the US, led to Skybolt being cancelled by the Americans in December 1962 – and left the British with no new weapon. It would have been an interesting period if Skybolt had joined the RAF inventory as new tactics were being considered, including keeping aircraft on airborne alert in the same way that SAC did. There was even a new Vulcan, the B.3 in the pipeline (on paper) capable of carrying up to six Skybolts. Sadly, this remained a paper exercise. With the Thor missile system becoming defunct by mid 1963 the British nuclear deterrent still firmly resided with the RAF’s bombers despite the fact that the strategic scenario had changed. The previous tactic of high-level penetration of Soviet airspace to deliver nuclear weapons was no longer valid by the early 1960s, a fact aptly demonstrated by the Russian shoot-down with a SAM-2 of a high-flying U-2 spy plane. The increased capability of the defences led the RAF to adopt the tactic of low-level attack for both its nuclear and conventional missions. The Vulcans managed the switch with few problems but it was very much a stop-gap and the time of the large unarmed bombers was reaching its end, although both Bomber Command and SAC would attempt to delay the inevitable.

The 1960s was a decade of appalling political indecision in terms of military capability and Bomber Command was badly affected. If the cancellation of the various weapon upgrades for the V-bombers was a drawback the subsequent decisions on future aircraft programmes was disastrous.

Strategic bombing remained the rationale for Bomber Command with the capability of inflicting ‘unacceptable damage’ (nuclear attack) on the enemy as the core strategy. Despite the problems outlined above the RAF was looking forward to its new aircraft, a replacement for the Canberra and the Vulcan, and one that promised to introduce a new level of capability. The BAC TSR.2 had its origins in the March 1957 GOR.339 for a tactical strike/reconnaissance aircraft for service entry by 1964 to replace, primarily, the Canberra. Its core design was the ability to deliver a nuclear weapon of Red Beard type (hence ‘strike’ as this term was applied to nuclear and not conventional operations), day and night from low-level and with a radius of action of 1,000 nm. Nine aerospace companies submitted bids, one of which was, ironically, Blackburn with a variant on their NA.39; ironic because the NA.39 became the Buccaneer for the Royal Navy and some years later the RAF was to acquire the ‘Bucc’ as its ‘new’ tactical strike aircraft. The politics, civil and military, behind the GOR.339 saga are legendary but despite being fascinating are outside of the scope of this book. Suffice it to say that the decision was taken to proceed with the revolutionary design of the TSR.2 and its systems. The winning design was developed by the newly-created British Aerospace Corporation but a threat to the whole programme was never far away as the Minister of Defence was soon querying the high cost of the aircraft, which was being estimated at £1.7 million per aircraft. This was wrapped up in questions as to capability requirements and the Air Ministry and Admiralty were asked to study the tactical roles of aircraft in both limited and global war. Limited war was used to refer to conventional operations, and later to limited tactical nuclear use, whereas global war was the old MAD idea of an all-out nuclear exchange. Bomber Command was still very much at the cutting edge of these strategies.

The TSR.2 was intended as a deep-penetration nuclear bomber and it incorporated a number of new features – but it fell victim to the mid 1960s defence cuts.

The Labour Government of 1965 had made clear its intention of making cuts in defence expenditure and inevitably its axe fell on one of the most expensive programmes then underway. In the Budget speech of April 1965 the announcement was made that the TSR.2 programme was being cancelled on cost grounds. This was a devastating blow both to the British aerospace industry and to Bomber Command. The TSR.2 was the type around which future capability had been based and the Command had expected to acquire around 150 aircraft. To soften the blow the Government announced it had agreed an option with the US to acquire the F-111A, the cost per aircraft being half that of the TSR.2. This would have been an excellent alternative as far as the RAF was concerned but the axe fell again before the ink was dry on the deal. Bomber Command was left with no alternative but to carry on with the aircraft it had, whilst searching for new bombers that could meet the changing operational scenario. Nuclear weapons remained at the heart of the bombing strategy but the doctrine was changing whereby aircraft would carry tactical nuclear bombs, the strategic delivery moving to ballistic-missile submarines.

The 1960s saw a continuation of the run down of the strength of Bomber Command and by the latter part of the decade this had reached the point whereby only one operational Group was under the Command’s control. This was illogical and the decision was taken to combine Bomber Command and Fighter Command to form Strike Command: this took effect on 1 May 1968. The role of the bomber element, No. 1 Group, remained unchanged – as did the equipment in the short term – but the change of name brings this overview of RAF Bomber Command to an end.