CHAPTER TWO

Operations

This chapter focuses on the operational career of Bomber Command – the times when it was actively engaged on operations. The six years of almost continuous conflict from late 1939 to 1945 are of course the major period of interest but the Command also saw active employment during the 1950s, albeit on a very small scale in places such as Malaya and Egypt (Suez).

Bomber operations September 1939 to May 1945

In the few years that Bomber Command had to prepare for war from its formation in May 1936 its operational focus remained that of formation daylight attacks on key target systems – the WA (Western Air) list of targets. This ‘Planning for a war with Germany’ had been instituted in 1937 and in December Bomber Command was ordered to commence detailed planning for WA1 (German Air Force organisation and associated industries), WA4 (German Army concentrations and lines of communication) and WA5 (Manufacturing resources in the Ruhr, inland waterways and ports, and areas outside the Ruhr). The Command was meant to have its plans in place by April 1938, although the large amount of planning effort meant that this date was slipped. However, an internal Bomber Command appraisal stated that the only one of these that was realistically achievable was WA5 as both of the others were inappropriate for strategic bombing.

The concept of the war-winning bomber weapon remained the one with which the Command went to war. From the first operations in September 1939 to the end of the war in Europe in May 1945, Bomber Command fought a six year campaign. The Second World War part of this chapter divides the war into ‘campaigns’ as fought by the Command in those six years; some are appropriate in military terms in that they relate to a particular set of targets over a short period of time, whilst others fit less well into this formula. There are a number of ‘campaigns’ that do not fit into this chronological survey but are important in the overall appraisal of the Command’s war and include: the Maritime war, U-boat war, Minelaying and Leaflet campaign. The attacks on Italy are covered at the end of the Strategic Bombing Offensive account.

The Strategic Bombing Offensive – early battles

At the outbreak of war Bomber Command’s strength, on paper, was around 500 bombers, and despite the fact that some of these were light bombers with small bomb loads it was theoretically a potent force. The departure of the Battles of No. 1 Group to France with the AASF reduced the number of aircraft by 25 per cent but had less effect on the bomb lift. So with the Western Air Plans for destruction of the Ruhr the Groups were ready for action – but it was to be eight months before they were cleared to drop bombs on Germany.

On the first day of war the Command mounted a limited number of sorties: a Blenheim flew a reconnaissance of the north-west coast of Germany, with Wilhelmshaven and Heligoland as particular points of interest. The Naval Observer on the Blenheim reported that a portion of the German fleet was sighted leaving Wilhelmshaven. With the decision having been taken that attacks on land targets were, for the present, banned, ‘fleeting targets at sea’ were the main focus of attention. On the evening of 3 September a force of nine Wellingtons from Mildenhall and eighteen Hampdens, nine each from Scampton and Waddington, went in search of the German warships but found nothing. Overnight, ten Whitleys from Linton-on-Ouse dropped propaganda leaflets in Area 1(a) (the Ruhr) with 5.4 million leaflets being dispensed. Whitley K8969 of 58 Squadron had to force-land in a cabbage field at Dormans near the River Marne but Flying Officer O’Neill and his crew were unhurt. The following day, however, Bomber Command suffered its first operational casualties with the loss of two Wellingtons and five Blenheims (four from 107 Squadron) during attacks on shipping. The Operational Order for this raid stated that: The greatest care is to be taken not to injure the civilian population. The intention is to destroy the German fleet. There is no alternative target.’ At least two major warships, Admiral Scheer and Emden were in port at Wilhelmshaven and these were the main targets for the fifteen Blenheims; five of each type failed to find the target because of bad weather but the others made a low-level attack. The Blenheim attack was noted in the Bomber Command ORB: ‘An eyewitness account obtained from secret sources shows that the action by the Blenheims was a most gallant affair and accorded with the best traditions of the RAF.’ Gallantry and high losses were to remain a feature of the Blenheim and No. 2 Group for much of its time with Bomber Command. Fourteen Wellingtons went to Brunsbuttel and five aircraft again failed to find the target because of bad weather.

This remained the pattern of activity for the next few weeks, the Whitleys flying by night over Germany on leaflet-dropping and the other types trying to find and bomb German warships. The Bomber Command ORB for 29 September summarised one such attack: ‘Eleven Hampdens from Hemswell carried out a reconnaissance of the Heligoland Bight area with instructions to search for enemy surface craft and if found to attack. One formation of six aircraft returned complete having sighted two destroyers near Heligoland steaming east at 25–30 kts; the target was attacked and seven 500 lb bombs were dropped by the first three aircraft. The destroyer turned presenting broadside and the second flight did not attack. No results were observed except that large splashes were seen in the water near the destroyers. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was experienced and one aircraft was hit and one of the crew wounded. The other flight of five aircraft failed to return.’

Wellington Is of 9 Squadron; the tactical concept of daylight formation attacks with their defence provided by the cross-fire from the bombers’ guns proved to be a failure.

November was a quiet month, with the exception of the decision to cease lone Blenheim reconnaissance flights as losses were outweighing the benefits. The bombers were still a ‘force in waiting’ and the theories of strategic bombing remained largely untried. There were mixed opinions as to the wisdom of daylight attacks but no conclusive evidence either way. This changed in early December with two Wellington attacks that proved that daylight raids were too costly.

On 14 December twelve Wellingtons from 99 Squadron were sent to patrol the Elbe Estuary and the Frisian Islands to attack shipping. ‘At 1425 hours a force of one battleship, one cruiser, three destroyers and one submarine was sighted, but owing to low cloud no attack could be made. Fighter attacks were made by twenty enemy aircraft, Me 109s and Me 110s, two of which were definitely destroyed and two more were probably shot down. Heavy anti-aircraft fire was encountered when the enemy aircraft were clear of our formation. One Wellington was shot down, two collided and fell in flames, two are missing and one, on arriving at Newmarket, collapsed and three of the crew were killed.’ On 18 December No. 3 Group sent twenty-four Wellingtons from three squadrons to patrol the Schillig Roads and Wilhelmshaven to report upon any enemy naval forces. ‘In Wilhelmshaven a battleship, two cruisers and four destroyers were seen in the harbour and alongside. They were not therefore attacked. There was heavy anti-aircraft fire and some twenty-five Me 109s and Me 40s (sic) attacked – at least twelve of which were shot down. Twelve of our aircraft failed to return; of these two are known to have descended into the North Sea on the way home.’

The powered rear turret was one of the main defensive features of the Wellington and as part of a cone of fire from a formation of aircraft was meant to provide adequate protection against fighter attack.

When the loss rates in daylight raids were compared with those for the Whitleys on their night-time forays (four aircraft in 123 sorties and many of those over Germany) the message was clear – it was far safer to fly at night. What this simple conclusion failed to address was how to find the target and hit it. This problem was to vex the Command for the next three years.

In January 1940 the Wellingtons and Hampdens joined the nightly leaflet-dropping campaign, not because it was considered to be effective but as a way of giving crews valuable experience in night operations. This routine continued into spring 1940 and the only aggressive actions were those of No. 2 Group who maintained their low-level attacks, with shipping still being the favoured target.

On 16 March Sir Charles Portal had taken over as C-in-C Bomber Command, the appointment being seen by many as political in as much as Portal was seen as less likely to cause waves; when he later became Chief of the Air Staff he and Arthur Harris were frequently in disagreement. Within days of taking command he authorised an attack on a land target – the German seaplane base at Hornum as a reprisal for a German attack on Scapa Flow. A force of thirty Whitleys and twenty Hampdens dropped a mix of incendiaries, 250 lb and 500 lb bombs; although results were hard to determine it had been a significant operation for the Command.

On the night of 13/14 April the Hampdens opened a new campaign for Bomber Command by dropping mines in the sea lanes between Germany and the Norway and Denmark. The minelaying campaign (Gardening) is covered in a separate entry in this chapter. The dropping of mines in this particular location was connected with the Allied attempts to disrupt the German invasion of the two Scandinavian countries. The Germans had launched their assault in the early hours of 9 April and Bomber Command Blenheims and Hampdens were airborne on anti-shipping sorties that day, but with little success. On 11 April six Wellingtons of 115 Squadron attacked the airfield at Stavanger/Sola, Norway in the first planned attack on a mainland target in Europe. The attack was led by Squadron Leader du Boulay to ‘bomb runways, aircraft and aerodrome installations’, for which task the bombers carried 500 lb SAP bombs and the plan was to attack from 1,000 feet. The first section of three aircraft found and bombed the target with no problems but by the time the second trio arrived the defences were alert and none was able to bomb. Pilot Officer Barber’s aircraft was shot down by flak and the other two aircraft were damaged, one having to make a wheels-up landing back at base.

This mini offensive against Norway continued until early May and whilst the number of aircraft involved was small it did represent the bulk of Bomber Command’s operational effort. The main targets were airfields, with Stavanger being a favourite as it was being used by the Germans as a main base.

On the night of 1/2 May, 10 Squadron sent a small number of Whitleys to attack Stavanger; ‘Larry’ Donnelly included an account of this raid in his book The Whitley Boys: ‘As we were climbing away from Dishforth Bick, our skipper informed us that although we had taken off second with a bit of luck and extra boost we could get there first and surprise them. “We can be in and out before they realise what’s hit them.” The weather forecast was good for a change and he was determined to take full advantage of it…. There was no searchlight or flak activity so it looked as if Bick had achieved his aim of being first to target. Bick throttled back the engines and we commenced our glide from about 4,000 feet. During the descent the bomb doors were opened and the bomb-aimer commenced chanting his directions … “Left, Left, Steady” to get the target in his bombsight. He finally called “Bombs Gone” and the Whitley lurched as the bombs fell away. Bick wanged open the throttles and we roared across the airfield at low level going like the clappers. I had an uninterrupted view from the tail and saw the bombs bursting in the hangar and installations area. At the same time the defences opened up. Three searchlights came on attempting to pick us up and flak hosed after us. As we escaped out to sea unscathed and I was able to report that, as a result of our bombing, fires had started in the target area. The crews following us now had something to aim at, but we had also stirred up a hornets nest for them. Highly elated, we made our way home. For a change we felt that we really had achieved something.’

Hampden crews on return from an attack on Bergen; the Command flew a mini-campaign in April and early May against the German invasion of Scandinavia.

This limited bombing, combined with minelaying and anti-shipping sorties, attempted to delay the German advance but to no avail.

Strategic bombing – round one

May 1940 brought the lifting of the ban on attacking targets in Germany. To use an overused but appropriate phrase, the ‘gloves were off’ and Bomber Command was given clearance to employ its ‘war winning’ doctrine of attacks on German industry. The first such attack, by ninety-nine aircraft, took place on the night of 15 May on oil and rail targets in the Ruhr area; the aiming points were industrial sites at places such as Sterkrade and Castrop-Rauxel and eighty-one of the bombers reported attacking their designated targets, although in the light of later evidence of navigation errors and the problems of finding targets, especially in the perennially hazy Ruhr, this seems unlikely. One Wellington (115 Squadron) crashed in France, becoming the first RAF casualty of the strategic bombing offensive, Flight Lieutenant Pringle and his four crew being killed.

Before we get too absorbed in the Strategic Bombing Offensive, which pretty much occupies the rest of this operational history, mention must be made of the valiant but catastrophic employment of light bombers against the advancing German ground force, the Battles of No. 1 Group and the Blenheims of No. 2 Group playing the major part. The ‘strategic’ bombers were also involved, the Bomber Command directive being to ‘attack vital objectives, starting in the Ruhr, to cause maximum dislocation to lines of communication of the German advance through the Low Countries.’

For the deployed squadrons such as the Battles the task was to ‘delay and weaken in every way possible the advance of the German mechanized forces and try to relieve the pressure on the Allied armies sufficiently to enable them first to hold the enemy and then to mount an effective counter-attack.’ It was a forlorn expectation and over the next few weeks the British light bombers attacked lines of communication, mainly bridges over rivers, and German columns on the march. Seldom having air cover and with strong ground defences the bombers were shot out of the sky. On 12 May two crew of a 12 Squadron Battle were awarded the Victoria Cross, the first such awards to Bomber Command (and the only occasion on which two members of the same crew received this highest gallantry award.) Their aircraft was the only one of five to return. The VC citation read: ‘Flying Officer Garland was the pilot and Sergeant Gray the observer of the leading aircraft of a formation of five aircraft that attacked a bridge over the Albert Canal which had not been destroyed and was allowing the enemy to advance into Belgium. All the air crews of the squadron concerned volunteered for the operation and, after five crews had been selected by drawing lots, the attack was delivered at low altitude against this vital target. Orders were issued that this bridge was to be destroyed at all costs. As had been anticipated, (it was) heavily protected by enemy fighters. In spite of this the formation successfully delivered a dive-bombing attack from the lowest practicable altitude and British fighters in the vicinity reported that the target was obscured by the bombs bursting on it and in its vicinity. Only one aircraft returned from this mission out of the five concerned. The pilot of this aircraft reports that in addition to the extremely heavy anti-aircraft fire, through which our aircraft dived to attack the objective, they were also attacked by a large number of enemy fighters after they had released their bombs on the target. Much of the success of this vital operation must be attributed to the formation leader; Flying Officer Garland, and to the coolness and resource of Sergeant Gray, who navigated Flying Officer Garland’s aircraft under most difficult conditions in such a manner that the whole formation, was able successfully to attack the target in spite of subsequent heavy losses. Flying Officer Garland and Sergeant Gray unfortunately failed to return from the mission.’ (Flying Officer Donald Edward Garland and Sergeant Thomas Gray, 12 Squadron RAF, Battle P2204; awarded for action 12 May 1940, London Gazette, 11 June 1940.)

By 21 May the Germans had reached the sea at Le Touquet and although the campaign in the west continued into June, the Armistice with France being signed on 25 June, and included the Allied evacuation from Dunkirk, it was to all intents and purposes over and the next major campaign would be that fought over Britain itself. History has recorded the virtual annihilation of the Battle squadrons but the Blenheims also suffered very heavily in the May–June period, losing over 100 aircraft; the most tragic day being 17 May when 82 Squadron lost eleven out of twelve aircraft that attacked troops near Gembloux – with the twelfth badly damaged and crash-landed in England. Support for the land campaign by attacking communications targets remained important into early June, and there was an intensive period of support during the Dunkirk evacuation.

Battle of 218 Squadron as part of the AASF deployed to France.

The strategic bombers spread their attentions over a variety of targets in Germany in the latter part of May, farthest afield being Hamburg, which was attacked on 17/18 May by forty-eight Hampdens. Small scale raids to a variety of targets in the same night remained the pattern of operations, along with minelaying, for the next year or so, although gradually the concept of concentration of effort on a single target became more important. The entry of Italy into the war on 10 June 1940 gave Bomber Command another set of targets to attack, the first such missions being flown the following night; there was never a concentrated campaign by Bomber Command against Italy but industrial cities in the North of the country were frequent targets. The attacks on Italy have been covered in a separate section in this chapter.

Countering the invasion

With the Germans established in the Low Countries and France, the threat of invasion became the highest priority for British military planners. Whilst Fighter Command’s role in countering the German plans is well known, the role of other parts of the RAF, especially Bomber Command, has been largely overlooked but the bombing of invasion ports, military camps and airfields was a factor in the German decision to abandon Operation Sealion. A Bomber Command summary stated that: ‘The invasion ports face us in a crescent, centred on Calais, some of the World’s greatest cargo and passenger installations; in fact, if the enemy had built ports himself for the express purpose of invading this country, he could hardly have improved on their actual layout – Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Flushing, Bruges, Zeebrugee, Ostend, Antwerp, Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne, Dieppe, Le Havre and Cherbourg.’ These names would appear on a regular basis in the summary of bomber operations over the next few months.

By the latter part of May 1940 at least 3,000 barges were observed in these ports; enough to transport one million tons of supplies, plus shipping for a further four million tons. More were arriving every day as the German invasion plans progressed. The urgency of attacking this build-up led to an immediate and determined commitment by aircraft of No. 2 Group, the Blenheims bearing the brunt of this work, the main attacks taking place from early July. Even crews still in training were thrown into the battle, some planners seeing these targets as ‘nursery slopes’ as they were only a matter of minutes flying time away from England. They were, however, heavily defended by antiaircraft guns. The aircraft of No. 2 Group were also tasked against airfields such as Abbeville, Amiens and Merville; although airfield attacks were little more than nuisance raids at this stage of the campaign. The night bombers were tasked against ports and airfields from time to time but their main emphasis remained that of attacking built-up areas.

Flight Lieutenant R. A. B. Learoyd of 49 Squadron was awarded the Victoria Cross for a low-level attack by two Hampden units, 49 and 83 Squadrons, on the Dortmund-Ems canal on 12 August; this was another of the ‘significant’ targets identified by the experts in the July directive. Eleven Hampdens attacked this target near Munster; two were shot down by flak but the attack had achieved an element of surprise and the damage to the canal restricted barge traffic on this important waterway for a number of weeks. The VC citation read: ‘This officer, as first pilot of a Hampden aircraft, has repeatedly shown the highest conception of his duty and complete indifference to personal danger in making attacks at the lowest altitude objective on the Dortmund-Ems Canal. He had attacked this objective on a previous occasion and was well aware of the risks entailed. To achieve success it was necessary to approach from a direction well known to the enemy, through a lane of especially disposed anti-aircraft defences, and in the face of the most intense point blank fire from guns of all calibres. The reception of the preceding aircraft might well have deterred the stoutest heart, all being hit and two lost. Flight Lieutenant Learoyd nevertheless made his attack at 150 feet, his aircraft being repeatedly hit and large pieces of the main planes torn away. He was almost blinded by the glare of many searchlights at close range but pressed home this attack with the greatest resolution and skill. He subsequently brought his wrecked aircraft home and, as the landing flaps were inoperative and the undercarriage indicators out of action, waited for dawn in the vicinity of his aerodrome before landing, which he accomplished without causing injury to his crew or further damage to the aircraft. The high courage, skill and determination, which this officer has invariably displayed on many occasions in the face of the enemy, sets an example which is unsurpassed.’ Acting Flight Lieutenant Roderick Alastair Brook Learoyd, 49 Squadron, Hampden P4403. (Awarded for action 12 August 1940, London Gazette, 20 August 1940.) A second Hampden VC was awarded the following month, to Sergeant John Hannah of 83 Squadron during an attack on the invasion barges at Antwerp. His citation read: ‘On the night of 15 September 1940, Sergeant Hannah was the wireless operator/air gunner in an aircraft engaged in a successful attack on enemy barge concentrations at Antwerp. It was then subjected to intense anti-aircraft fire and received a direct hit from a projectile of an explosive and incendiary nature, which apparently burst inside the bomb compartment. A fire started which quickly enveloped the wireless operator’s and rear gunner’s cockpits, and as both the port and starboard petrol tanks had been pierced, there was grave risk of the fire spreading. Sergeant Hannah forced his way through the fire to obtain two extinguishers and discovered that the rear gunner had had to leave the aircraft. He could have acted likewise, through the bottom escape hatch or forward through the navigator’s hatch, but he remained and fought the fire for 10 minutes with the extinguishers, beating the flames with his log book when these were empty. During this time thousands of rounds of ammunition exploded in all directions and he was almost blinded by the intense heat and fumes, but had the presence of mind to obtain relief by turning on his oxygen supply. Air admitted through the large holes caused by the projectile made the bomb compartment an inferno and all the aluminium sheet metal on the floor of this airman’s cockpit was melted away, leaving only the cross bearers. Working under these conditions, which caused burns to his face and eyes Sergeant Hannah succeeded in extinguishing the fire. He then crawled forward, ascertained that the navigator had left the aircraft, and passed the latter’s log and maps to the pilot. This airman displayed courage, coolness and devotion to duty of the highest order and, by his action in remaining and successfully extinguishing the fire under conditions of the greatest danger and difficulty, enabled the pilot to bring the aircraft safely to its base.’ (Sergeant John Hannah, 83 Squadron, Hampden P1355. Awarded for action 15/16 September 1940, London Gazette, 1 October 1940.)

Sergeant John Hannah was awarded the VC for his actions on the night of 15 September 1940.

Distinguished Flying Medal (DFM) to Sgt J. R. Ramshaw of 9 Squadron, May 1940; Bomber Command aircrew were recipients of thousands of gallantry awards in the Second World War. The highest number of awards to any RAF Command indicated the intense nature of the Command’s six-year war.

Strategic offensive – round two

The strategic offensive had been continued throughout the anti-invasion period but it was intensified following the 24 August German attack on London, with Churchill ordering a raid on Berlin in retaliation. The ‘Big City’, as Bomber Command crews came to know Berlin, was attacked by over eighty bombers. Poor weather caused problems, especially in the target area but some bombs did fall on the Reich capital; Berlin was attacked twice more before the end of August and Goering’s boast that ‘no enemy plane will ever fly over the Reich’ was well-and-truly laid to rest; Hitler’s response was a speech declaring that: ‘When they declare they will increase the attacks on our cities, then we will raze their cities to the ground. We will stop the handiwork of these air pirates ….’ Although it would be another two years before the RAF’s bombers were capable of inflicting significant damage, the air war had entered a new phase.

On the night of 23/24 September the Command made a maximum effort attack on a single target for the first time; the target was Berlin and 129 bombers took part. Three aircraft were lost and results were poor, crews being unable to identify their targets because of a thick haze, made worse by the glare of searchlights. It was, however, a new tactic.

Sydney Munn joined 77 Squadron having trained as an Observer (the Flying ‘O’ brevet of the Observer was not replaced by the Navigator’s ‘N’ until 1942). ‘Our first operation together took place on 7 November 1940, the target being Wesseling which we failed to locate owing to complete cloud cover. As an alternative we attacked an active enemy airfield on the way home. This was clearly visible with blazing runway lights. That sortie lasted eight hours.’ The main target that night had been Essen, with sixty-three of the bombers trying to find the Krupps Works. ‘Our second sortie was a disaster, and lasted eleven and a half hours – until we ran out of fuel. It took place on 10 November, and the target was one of the most distant, at the extreme end of the Whitley’s range, and on the border of Czechoslovakia. We were briefed to bomb an aluminium plant at a place called Rhuland, and on the way home, as a guide to a second wave, we were, if possible, to drop a parachute flare over Dresden. We had a very strong tail wind component on the outbound flight, gale force in fact, and this gave us an exceptionally high groundspeed of over 195 mph. The Whitley V cruised at an Indicated Air Speed of between 125 and 130 mph, which meant that the wind velocity was in the order of 70 mph.

‘We seemed to be covering the ground in no time at all and soon found the target, clearly visible in moonlight. I recall that as we completed the bombing run there were greenish flames emanating from the subsequent fire, so someone must have been “on the ball” – whether we were responsible or not I did not know. Having enjoyed a tail wind outbound, I had calculated that the resultant head wind for the homeward flight would give us a ground speed of between 60 and 70 mph – if that! We were in for a long slog! As we approached Dresden the WOp/AG left the radio compartment to prepare to launch the parachute flare down the flare chute. All seemed quiet below, with no light ack-ack tracer to be seen. Suddenly we were hit by a heavy AA shell. Smoke filled the cockpit and the smell of cordite was intense. It was a direct hit on the radio compartment and all our radio equipment was completly wrecked. This meant that I was to get no assistance in the form of radio bearings on the way home, but thank goodness we were still airborne and the engines sounded fine.

‘I was now relying on map reading, and began to look out on the starboard side for a checkpoint. After a while I could see flak in the distance which I judged to be about 20 miles north of us, at Hanover and at 90 degrees to our heading. Whitley navigators could use the disc of the starboard propeller as an “on the beam” sighting device, and it confirmed my groundspeed estimate at about 70 mph. It was at this stage that the captain, who had been preoccupied with recent events, began to take an interest in the navigation process, and he challenged my identification of Hanover. He said that in his opinion it was Bremen! I politely pointed out that if this was the case, having enjoyed a tailwind outbound, it had conveniently swung round through 180 degrees and we were making about 200 mph on the way home – hardly a meteorological probability. An argument ensued during which, as a commissioned officer, he pulled rank on me as a humble sergeant and said, “As Captain of this aircraft, I order you to give me an alteration of course from south of Bremen and a revised ETA at the Yorkshire coast”. In deference to an experienced navigator I complied, but to protect myself I recorded in my log that it was done on “Captain’s orders”. At the same time it occurred to me that such an alteration of course from a “false” position would make our landfall on the English coast more likely to be in the Norfolk area and, furthermore, the captain’s ETA would surely prove to be over-optimistic in view of the gross error in ground speed. Map reading was now out of the question as we were flying above extensive stratus cloud, and dead reckoning navigation was all we had left to rely on.

‘It was normal procedure for us to empty the auxiliary fuel tanks first, and to change over to main tanks when the engines cut out. This enabled the Navigator to calculate accurately the fuel consumption in gallons per hour. Between 60 and 70 gallons per hour was normal. However, it did not occur to me at the time that, since we were operating at extreme range, a major diversion caused by navigation error would make the fuel situation critical. Ten minutes before the questionable ETA at the coast my Skipper began the descent to below cloud, and the white horses showed us that we were indeed still over the sea. After 20 minutes I sensed that it was beginning to dawn on those up front that I had been correct in my original calculation, and ages later we crossed the coast near Yarmouth. An admission of error was immediately forthcoming, and I then gave the pilot a course to steer for base, but we now had a long way to go before reaching Topcliffe.

‘At about this time I could hear concern being expressed up front about how much fuel remained in our tanks. It was not long before panic began to set in, and I was told to fire a distress cartridge, using the Very pistol which was situated just above my head. I fired every cartridge we had; with no radio and no R/T it was our only hope. Then luck seemed to be coming our way, and just as both engines began to splutter the pilot called out that he could see a flare path being laid out for us. With undercarriage down we began a glide approach when the engines cut. Ahead could be seen three “gooseneck” flares in line. There was no question of waiting for more to be lit, and we touched down at the first one on what proved to be a very bumpy surface. Seconds later we left both wheels of our undercarriage in a ditch, went through a hedge, and skidded to a halt in a field of turnips. We were near to Barkston Heath airfield in Lincolnshire. The three gooseneck flares turned out to be marking the corner of a triangular cross-country exercise which had been carried out that night by pupil pilots from Cranwell. Within half an hour a rescue team found us and took us to Cranwell, where we had breakfast and waited for another Whitley to come down and collect us. It was then back to Topcliffe for debriefing and a post mortem!’ In the interest of crew harmony the Squadron Commander moved him to another crew. Navigation problems, inaccurate Met forecasts and shortage of fuel were frequent occurrences throughout the war, especially prior to the introduction of general aids such as Gee and caused the loss of many aircraft and crews.

The bombers operated on most nights in November and December but usually in small numbers; the one significant exception to this was Operation Abigail Rachel (16/17 December). This attack on Mannheim was planned to involve over 200 bombers, although only 134 actually took part it was still the largest attack to date. The attack was led by Wellingtons dropping incendiaries but despite good weather and ineffective opposition it was not a success, bombing being scattered and only light damage being caused.

The night bombers continued their attempts to find pinpoint targets, oil targets being the main focus of the directive for the first three months of 1941. However, results against targets such as Gelsenkirchen, Sterkrade and Homberg were generally poor. On 10 January the Blenheims opened a new campaign when six aircraft of 114 Squadron, escorted by seventy-two fighters, flew the first Circus operation. The target was an ammunition depot in the Foret de Guines, near Calais and although the bombers found the target, results were indeterminate. Of more importance was the fact that the Luftwaffe ignored the bait. This type of operations became the main role for No. 2 Group from spring onwards, although the Group also maintained its commitment to unescorted daylight (cloud cover whenever possible) missions as well as contributing to the night effort.

The Stirling flew its first mission on the night of 10/11 February, 7 Squadron contributing three aircraft to the forty-three bomber force. The ORB recorded the event: ‘The Squadron carried out its maiden operational trip, three aircraft successfully bombed the target area at Rotterdam, all returned safely.’ Each aircraft carried an 8,000 lb load (16 × 500 lb bombs) – almost double that of a Wellington. This was followed a few days later, 24 January, by the debut of the Manchester, with six aircraft of 207 Squadron taking part in an attack on a cruiser in Brest harbour. Led by Wing Commander N. C. Hyde the aircraft dropped seventy 500 lb SAP bombs but ‘insufficient field of vision for the bomb-aimer to see the bomb bursts’ meant that results were not observed. There was no appreciable opposition but one Manchester crashed at Waddington having suffered a hydraulic failure.

The Stirling had a bomb-load twice that of the Wellington but its unusual bomb-bay layout limited the types of weapon it could carry.

A few weeks later, 10 March, it was the turn of the Halifax, with 35 Squadron, led by Wing Commander Collings, sending six aircraft to Le Havre; The AOC had sent the Squadron a goodwill message: ‘Good wishes to No. 35 Squadron and the heavyweights on the opening of their Halifax operations tonight. I hope the full weight of the Squadron’s blows will soon be felt further afield.’ The ORB account for the Wing Commander’s aircraft stated: ‘Took off from Linton at time stated for target. The weather was excellent to the French coast, where 8/10 cloud was encountered. Le Havre was located first by searchlights and flak, and then seen through a good break in the cloud, the dock area being clearly visible. A level attack was delivered from 13,000 ft in one stick of twelve 500 lb SAP bombs. The bombs were seen to burst along the edge of the main docks. Only slight heavy flak and scattered searchlights were encountered.’ One aircraft was damaged by flak but returned safely on three engines; sadly one Halifax was intercepted and shot down by RAF fighters over Surrey, with only two of the crew parachuting to safety. In early March the Command was given targets connected with the U-boat industry as its priority. The primary list comprised aviation and marine targets:

Location	Target
Augsburg	diesel engine factory
Bordeaux	U-boat base, FW Condor base
Bremen	Deschimag and the Focke-Wulf assembly factory
Dessau	Ju 88 factory
Hamburg	Blohm & Voss, Howaldts
Kiel	Germania Werft, Deutsche Werke, Howaldtswerke dockyard
Lorient	U-boat base
Mannheim	diesel engine factory
St Nazaire	U-boat base
Stavanger	FW Condor base
Vegescak	Vulcan Werke

Wellington R1379 of 115 Squadron was shot down on 10 May 1941.

The first of the aircraft targets was attacked on 12/13 March when eighty-eight bombers targeted the Blohm & Voss works at Hamburg and eighty-six bombers went to the Focke-Wulf factory at Bremen; the maritime campaign is covered later in this chapter. As always the target list remained broader than that given in the directives and over the next few weeks a wide variety of targets was attacked.

The Command sent sixty-one Wellingtons and twenty-nine Whitleys to Essen on the night of 3/4 July 1941; Sydney Munns was the Navigator in a 77 Squadron Whitley: ‘We took off for Essen at 2300 hours. Of all the targets in the Ruhr Valley’s industrial complex of towns, Essen was the most daunting because it lies in the middle of all the others and, no matter from what direction you approached, you had first to run the gauntlet of the other defences before experiencing those at Essen itself – which were considerable. My log shows that a very accurate forecast of wind velocities made navigation easier, and we maintained accurate tracks right through to the target. The D/F station on the island of Texel was transmitting as usual, and I obtained some very accurate loop bearings that put us dead on track. We crossed over Texel on time at 0036 hours, and soon we were weaving through the searchlight belt. We reached the target area at 0130 amid dozens of waving searchlights and very intense flak. The heavy flak bursts were too close for comfort and actually shook the aircraft. I let the bombs go in one stick, and the rear-gunner reported many large fires and heavy explosions on the ground. Twenty minutes later my log records that we were still experiencing continuous flak and searchlights, but finally we escaped on a planned southerly route and set course for Nieuport on the Belgium coast. I did my usual check on the North Star to ensure we were on a westerly and not a “red on blue” heading, and the visibility was so clear that I decided to try my first astro-navigation sight (I had been practising with the sextant on the ground) and took a sight on Polaris, the altitude giving me a reasonably accurate check on our latitude. From Nieuport we set course for Orford Ness, and as we approached the English coast we heard “squeakers”: these were transmitted from our own barrage balloon sites on a special frequency to warn us of their proximity. These particular squeakers probably emanated from Norwich and we skirted round them, landing at base at 0535 hours.’

Four German cities were attacked on the first ‘back to Germany’ night (7/8 July) and the Munster raid brought a VC for Sergeant James Ward of 75 Squadron. His citation read: ‘On the night of 7 July 1941, Sergeant Ward was second pilot of a Wellington returning from an attack on Munster. When flying over the Zuider Zee at 13,000 feet, the aircraft was attacked from beneath by a Messerschmitt on which he secured hits with cannon shell and incendiary bullets. The rear gunner was wounded in the foot but delivered a burst of fire which sent the enemy fighter down, apparently out of control. Fire then broke out near the starboard engine and, fed by petrol from a split pipe, quickly gained an alarming hold and threatened to spread to the entire wing. The crew forced a hole in the fuselage and made strenuous efforts to reduce the fire with extinguishers and even the coffee in their vacuum flasks, but without success. They were then warned to be ready to abandon the aircraft. As a last resort, Sergeant Ward volunteered to make an attempt to smother the fire with an engine cover which happened to be in use as a cushion. At first he proposed to discard his parachute, to reduce wind resistance, but was finally persuaded to take it. A rope from the dinghy was tied to him, though this was of little help and might have become a danger had he been blown off the aircraft. With the help of the navigator, he then climbed through the narrow astro-hatch and put on his parachute. The bomber was flying at a reduced speed but the wind pressure must have been sufficient to render the operation one of extreme difficulty. Breaking the fabric to make hand and foot holds where necessary, and also taking advantage of existing holes in the fabric, Sergeant Ward succeeded in descending three feet to the wing, and proceeding another three feet to a position behind the engine, despite the slipstream from the airscrew, which nearly blew him off the wing. Lying in this precarious position, he smothered the fire in the wing fabric and tried to push the cover into the hole in the wing and on to the leaking pipe from which the fire came. As soon as he removed his hand, however, the terrific wind blew the cover out and when he tried again it was lost. Tired as he was, he was able with the navigator’s assistance, to make successfully the perilous journey back into the aircraft. There was now no danger of the fire spreading from the petrol pipe, as there was no fabric left nearby, and in due course it burnt itself out. When the aircraft was nearly home some petrol which had collected, in the wing blazed up furiously but died down quite suddenly. A safe landing was then made despite the damage sustained by the aircraft. The flight home had been made possible by the gallant action of Sergeant Ward in extinguishing the fire on the wing, in circumstances of the greatest difficulty and at the risk of his life.’ (Sergeant John A Ward; 75 Squadron RNZAF, Wellington L7818. Awarded for action 7/8 July 1941, London Gazette, 5 August 1941.)

Wellington of 301 Squadron being readied at Hemswell for another mission, July 1941.

The industrial cities of the Ruhr were a main target area for Bomber Command – but with little success until accurate bombing aids became available.

The extension of the bombing directive to include smaller towns had no immediate effect and the bombers were back to their usual haunts of Berlin, Cologne, Essen and Frankfurt for much of August. Other industrial centres were also hit and intelligence reports occasionally provided feedback on results; for example, the 8/9 September attack on Kassel was known to have caused severe damage to a factory making railway rolling stock.

Blenheims at low-level en route to attack the power station at Knapsack 12 August 1941; two power stations in the Cologne area were attacked, thirty-eight Blenheims going to Knapsack.

New Brandenburg, Berlin 2/3 September 1941.

Barrage balloons were a constant threat to all RAF aircraft and from time to time they scored an ‘own goal’. On 22 October, the target was Mannheim and Ken Wallis was flying Wellington R1459 of 103 Squadron from Elsham Wolds: ‘This was another night with appalling weather and as we struggled back over the North Sea the aircraft was icing up – we had already been hit by lightning on the way out. Navigation was difficult but we fixed our position when we were fired at by the guns at Harwich, it was well known that Harwich always fired at you. We then turned North towards the Humber, turning West for land when the Navigator reckoned it was about time. As we headed west I saw a beacon in the distance and thought it was Elsham Wolds – but by its position I knew we were close to the balloon barrage around Immingham and Grimsby. The next thing I knew we had hit a cable, the impact coming on the port wing about a foot from the fuselage. An impressive shower of sparks as the cable sawed into the wing was followed by a smell of petrol and we were fortunate that the aircraft didn’t catch fire. The port engine packed up and the undercarriage dropped. I headed towards the airfield hoping they would switch on the lights but apparently they thought we were Germans and kept themselves blacked out. In the dim glow of the Very lights that we fired I glimpsed a Wellington on the ground but we simply couldn’t get down on the airfield. I put the aircraft down in a ploughed field, subsequently discovering that we had narrowly missed a quarry face. If we had landed on the runway we would probably have caught fire so perhaps it is just as well they didn’t turn on the lights. Having climbed out of the aircraft we did a head count, and had one too many – the chap with the rifle was one of the guards, we were that close to the airfield.’ Inspecting the aircraft they discovered that the cable had cut over four feet into the wing. The balloon barrage personnel at Grimsby were delighted that the aircrew had survived and invited them to a party with the comment ‘it’s nice to have a live RAF crew’. Ken was recommended for an immediate award of a Distinguished Flying Cross but, ‘The paperwork obviously got lost somewhere and nothing happened.’

The main raids on the night of 10/11 October were to Essen (seventy-eight aircraft) and Cologne (sixty-nine aircraft) but smaller forces also attacked a number of other targets, including twenty-two Wellingtons to Bordeaux. Four aircraft from the latter were lost, two of those being from 218 Squadron. Sergeant Haley was 1st Pilot of Wellington R1511: ‘We took off from Marham at 2000 hours on 10 October to bomb oil tanks slightly North of Bordeaux. We reached our objective but shortly after we turned for home the starboard propeller fell off. I turned the aircraft towards the unoccupied zone and gave the order to bale out at approximately 0400 hours.’ He was the only one to evade the Germans, arriving in Gibraltar on 4 March 1942; one crewman was killed and the other four became PoWs.

Wellington R1459 after its ‘engagement’ by a friendly barrage balloon cable on 22 October; Ken Wallis managed to put the aircraft down in a field and all the crew escaped unhurt.

Pilot Officer Groyecki was airborne in Wellington R1705 of 300 Squadron on the evening of 7 November 1941, the target being Mannheim. This was one of seven Wellingtons lost from the fifty-three that attacked Mannheim. He was one of two of the crew who escaped, the others becoming prisoners and his debrief stated: ‘Our aircraft took-off from Hemswell about 1720 hours on 7 November to take part in an attack on Mannheim. After leaving the target we found we were short of petrol. The starboard wing tank was leaking and may have been hit by flak splinters. At about 0300, finding we could not get home, we baled out north of Lille. I was first out and came down near Quesnoy. The aircraft dived uncontrolled and came down probably south of Lille.’ The main target that night had been Berlin, with 169 bombers attacking the Reich capital; in poor weather only seventy-three claimed to have bombed the target. Losses on the Berlin raid were high at 12.4 per cent (twenty-one aircraft). Cologne was also attacked and the total Command effort for the night was 392 aircraft – the highest number yet despatched in a single night. The loss rate for this night led to a disagreement between Bomber Command and the Air Ministry and led to a conservation policy directive.

The maritime war was once more the focus for the latter weeks of 1941, although for the Blenheims a new task was started on 27/28 December when six aircraft attacked the night fighter airfield at Soesterberg in Holland as part of a new campaign to reduce the effectiveness of the German night defences. These intruder raids became a standard routine for No. 2 Group.

Pinpoint accuracy – and area devastation

Despite the new directive of early 1942 calling for attacks on a limited number of German cities, the first few weeks of the year saw little activity; indeed, the largest raid in January and February was by ninety-eight bombers to Mannheim on 14/15 February. This was largely due to the continued conservation policy plus a reassessment of the Command’s tactics. On the night of 3/4 March a modified version of the Shaker technique was used against a pinpoint target for the first time. The Renault factory at Billancourt, near Paris, was attacked by 235 aircraft; the three waves making a concentrated and accurate attack. The first wave, experienced crews flying Gee-equipped aircraft dropped flares, identified the target and then dropped 1,000 lb bombs. The second wave also dropped 1,000 lb bombs, whilst aircraft of the first wave continued to keep the target illuminated. The third wave carried 4,000 lb bombs as well as 1,000 lb bombs. Defences were light and the bombers flew at 6,000 ft to improve accuracy. Concentration over the target was excellent at 120 aircraft per hour (two per minute) and crews reported good results. For once this assessment was confirmed by post-attack reconnaissance the following day. At least 40 per cent of the factory area had been destroyed and it was estimated that at least 300 bombs had fallen within the factory area. Despite this accuracy, casualties amongst French civilians were heavy.

The same night saw four Lancasters of 44 Squadron laying mines on what was the operational debut of the Avro bomber; recorded in the ORB as: ‘It is noteworthy that this is the first occasion that Lancaster aircraft have operated and this squadron is the only one operational with this type.’ Each aircraft carried four mines, an early indication of the superior weapon load of the Lancaster. The first true Shaker attack was made against Essen on 8/9 March with 211 bombers heading for the Ruhr. The basic concept with Gee was for it to be used as a navigation aid to get the bombers in the ‘right area’ from which a visual acquisition of the target could be made – it was not a blind-bombing aid. Whilst the bombers could be pretty sure they were ‘in the area’ the usual ground haze prevented accurate identification of the target and bombing results were poor. Essen was attacked four more times in March with equally poor results and with mounting losses; the 26/27 March attack cost 10 per cent of the 115 bombers. There was one other successful Gee raid in March when 135 aircraft attacked Cologne, for the loss of a single Manchester. It was estimated that 50 per cent of bombs fell within 5 miles of the aiming point, causing extensive damage to housing and industry.

Harris next chose to try out a true incendiary raid and chose as his target a city that would be easy to find (coastal) and having large areas of wooden structures would be a good incendiary target. Lubeck was attacked on 28/29 March using the now standard Shaker technique. Of the 234 bombers despatched, 161 claimed accurate attacks in good weather and with minimal defences – and reports suggested that 62 per cent of the city was burnt out. The British press reported: ‘Over 200 aircraft of Bomber Command tonight launched a shattering raid on the Baltic port of Lubeck, a shipbuilding and industrial centre. Hundreds of tons of high explosive were dropped and about half of the built-up area has been destroyed by fire. The RAF has begun a round-the-clock offensive against German arms factories and German-controlled industries in France.’ The Lubeck raid was without doubt a success and it provided a nasty shock to the German population and the Nazi leadership; the latter decreed that historic towns in Britain would be flattened by the Luftwaffe. Despite some accurate and damaging attacks on British cities the strategic bomber war was now beyond German capabilities and bomber traffic became increasingly one way.

Lubeck, March 1942, a single raid destroyed large parts of the city.

One of the War’s most dramatic raids took place on 17 April 1942 when a small force of Lancasters flew deep into Germany – by day – to attack a pinpoint target at Augsburg. The MAN diesel-engine works was a major producer of U-boat engines but would require a low-level daylight attack as it was about the size of a football pitch. Led by Squadron Leader John Nettleton of 44 Squadron, the twelve Lancasters, six each from Waddington’s 44 and 96 Squadrons, took-off at 3.00 pm in order to arrive over the target at dusk, which would give them the cover of night for their return flight. Diversionary raids were mounted to cover the period when the Lancasters were entering enemy territory but enemy fighters returning from engaging one of these diversions picked up the second section of 44 Squadron and after a chase shot down all three aircraft. They then picked on the lead section, shooting down another Lancaster before breaking off because they were short of fuel. The two remaining bombers, followed by the still intact 97 Squadron, reached the target and made their attacks, one falling to flak and crashing after releasing its bombs. John Nettleton’s was the sole survivor of the 44 Squadron contingent. The second formation lost two aircraft to flak over the target. The target had been bombed but the cost had been high with the loss of seven Lancasters and eighty-five aircrew, only twelve of whom survived to become PoWs. John Nettleton was awarded the Victoria Cross, the citation reading: ‘Squadron Leader Nettleton was the leader of one of two formations of six Lancaster heavy bombers detailed to deliver a low-level attack in daylight on the diesel engine factory at Augsburg in Southern Germany on 17 April 1942. The enterprise was daring, the target of high military importance. To reach it and get back, some 1,000 miles had to be flown over hostile territory. Soon after crossing into enemy territory his formation was engaged by twenty-five to thirty fighters. A running fight ensued. His rear guns went out of action. One by one the aircraft of his formation were shot down until in the end only his own and one other remained. The fighters were shaken off but the target was still far distant. There was formidable resistance to be faced. With great spirit and almost defenceless, he held his two remaining aircraft on their perilous course and after a long and arduous flight, mostly at only 50 feet above the ground, he brought them to Augsburg. Here anti-aircraft fire of great intensity and accuracy was encountered. The two aircraft came low over the roof-tops. Though fired at from point blank range, they stayed the course to drop their bombs true on the target. The second aircraft, hit by flak, burst into flames and crash-landed. The leading aircraft, though riddled with holes, flew safely back to base, the only one of the six to return. Squadron Leader Nettleton, who has successfully undertaken many other hazardous operations, displayed unflinching determination as well as leadership and valour of the highest order.’ (Acting Squadron Leader John Bering Nettleton, 44 Squadron RAF, Lancaster R5508; awarded for action 17 April 1942, London Gazette, 28 April 1942.)

A week later the town of Rostock was subjected to four nights of attacks that caused a great deal of damage and led to Goebbels decrying the British Terror Raid (Terrorangriff). The Command attacked a number of cities in May but Harris was already planning a series of spectacular raids.

Thousand bombers

Ever since he took over Bomber Command in February 1942, Arthur Harris was determined to prove that his bomber force could be a decisive weapon if properly equipped and handled the right way. To prove his point and silence the detractors he planned to concentrate 1,000 bombers against a single target in a single night. On the night of 30/31 May 1942 the first of the Thousand Bomber raids took place, a total of 1,047 bombers attacking Cologne.

Wellington crew kit-up: fleece-lined jacket, flying rations and a thermos of soup or coffee, plus a parachute – all essential items of equipment.

On this raid just under 900 bombers reported attacking the target and although forty-one aircraft were lost this was ‘acceptable’ in percentage terms. The defences had been overwhelmed but there had been no shortage of targets for fighters and flak; of more significance was the fact that the civil defence (ARP) organisation had been overwhelmed. Damage to parts of Cologne, civil and industrial, was heavy; 411 people were killed and over the next few days a large part of the population left the city. This attack was considered a success and combined with the Singleton Report silenced most of the Command’s detractors. One Victoria Cross was won this night; the citation for Flying Officer Leslie Manser read: ‘Flying Officer Manser was captain and first pilot of a Manchester aircraft which took part in the mass raid on Cologne on the night of 30 May 1942. As the aircraft was approaching its objective it was caught by searchlights and subjected to intense and accurate anti-aircraft fire. Flying Officer Manser held on his dangerous course and bombed the target successfully from a height of 7,000 feet. Then he set course for base. The Manchester had been damaged and was still under heavy fire. Flying Officer Manser took violent evasive action, turning and descending to under 1,000 feet. It was of no avail. The searchlights and flak followed him until the outskirts of the city were passed. The aircraft was hit repeatedly and the rear gunner was wounded. The front cabin filled with smoke; the port engine was over-heating badly.

‘Pilot and crew could all have escaped safely by parachute. Nevertheless, Flying Officer Manser, disregarding the obvious hazards, persisted in his attempt to save aircraft and crew from falling into enemy hands. He took the aircraft up to 2,000 feet. Then the port engine burst into flames. It was ten minutes before the fire was mastered, but then the engine went out of action for good, part of one wing was burnt, and the air-speed of the aircraft became dangerously low. Despite all the efforts of pilot and crew, the Manchester began to lose height. At this critical moment, Flying Officer Manser once more disdained the alternative of parachuting to safety with his crew. Instead, with grim determination, he set a new course for the nearest base, accepting for himself the prospect of almost certain death in a firm resolve to carry on to the end. Soon, the aircraft became extremely difficult to handle and, when a crash was inevitable, Flying Officer Manser ordered the crew to bale out. A sergeant handed him a parachute but he waved it away, telling the non-commissioned officer to jump at once as he could only hold the aircraft steady for a few seconds more. While the crew were descending to safety they saw the aircraft, still carrying their gallant captain, plunge to earth and burst into flames.

‘In pressing home his attack in the face of strong opposition, in striving, against heavy odds, to bring back his aircraft and crew and, finally, when in extreme peril, thinking only of the safety of his comrades, Flying Officer Manser displayed determination and valour of the highest order.’ (Flying Officer Leslie Thomas Manser, 50 Squadron, Manchester L7301; awarded for action 30/31 May 1942, London Gazette, 20 October 1942.)

Five Mosquitoes of 105 Squadron made that type’s operational debut with Bomber Command on 31 May, flying as single aircraft their task was to fly over Cologne for post-attack assessment – and also drop bombs to keep the defences on alert. The weather was too poor for photographs and one aircraft (W4064, Pilot Officer Kennard) failed to return.

Two nights later the second mass raid took place, Essen being attacked by 956 bombers. This Ruhr target proved as elusive as ever and identification was impossible because of industrial haze. The loss of 31 bombers for no appreciable result was not a good result. The final raid in this series did not take place until 25/26 June, when 1,067 bombers attacked Bremen using three aiming points; aircraft of No. 5 Group went for the Focke-Wulf factory, the 102 aircraft of Coastal Command attacked the docks area (the Deschimag shipyard) and the Main Force targeted the centre of the city. It appeared to be a reasonable attack, although German records suggested a small force of around 80 bombers! However, at a cost of 48 bombers it was the most expensive of the thousand-bomber raids.

The operational pace slackened after the effort of May and June and the bombers went to nearer targets in the short summer nights, although on 11 July a force of forty-four Lancasters flew a 1,500-mile round-trip to attack U-boat construction yards at Danzig. The outbound leg was in daylight and the bombers were routed over the sea towards Denmark where they split to make individual ‘cloud cover’ attacks on the target. The tactic was successful in that only two Lancasters were shot down, both by flak over the target. Major night raids were flown during the summer against Duisburg, Dusseldorf, Hamburg, Saarbrucken, Vegesack and Wilhelmshaven but loss rates were once more causing concern.

Lancasters of 83 Squadron taxi out for a thousand-bomber raid.

Flensburg was the target on the night of 18/19 August and for the first time the Main Force (of 118 aircraft) was led by a Pathfinder force of thirty-one aircraft. It was not an auspicious start as poor weather led to misidentification of the target, some bombers actually dropping their loads over Denmark. Cloud obscured the next attack, Frankfurt on 24/25 August and although the weather over Kassel three nights later was much better the attack was still poor. The fourth attack was more successful, the marking and bombing of Nuremberg on 28/29 August being accurate, although losses (twenty-three aircraft) to the small force of 159 bombers were very high, including 25 per cent of the Wellingtons. Of most significance on this raid was the first use of a specialist target-marker – Red Blob Fire.

For much of the rest of the year Italy was the focus of the Command’s attention although German cities and a number of special targets were also ‘visited’.

Attacks on targets in France had always raised the spectre of French casualties and whilst such casualties were generally seen as the ‘fortunes of war’, every effort was made to keep them to a minimum. It was for this reason that the important Schneider armament works at Le Creusot was attacked in daylight on 17 October. Lancasters of No. 5 Group were allocated the task and carried out low-level formation flying practice. The target was 300 miles inside France and it was certainly a risky target as previous daylight ventures had met with heavy losses. On the afternoon of 17 October, ninety-four Lancasters left their bases in England and led by Wing Commander L. C. Slee of 49 Squadron, set course to coast in between La Rochelle and St Nazaire. ‘At the height we were flying we disturbed the cattle in the fields and numbers of them stampeded. At one place we saw oxen bolt, dragging their plough after them. Many of the French peasants in the fields waved to us as we swept over.’ No fighters appeared and other than a few bird strikes the bombers had a clear run to the target. They climbed to bomb from between 2,500 and 7,500 ft and crews reported an accurate attack with only light flak. The 140 tons of bombs dropped were spread over the factory area but some also fell within the workers housing area. A small formation of Lancasters also attacked the nearby power station, one crashing into the buildings during its low-level attack. On the return flight a 207 Squadron aircraft was attacked by three Arado Ar196 seaplanes; two Ar196s were shot down but the Flight Engineer was killed by return fire.

Lancasters of 50 Squadron at Swinderby August 1942.

Flares, searchlights and flak over Dusseldorf in the early morning of 1 August 1942; 630 bombers, almost half of which were Wellingtons, dropped nearly 900 tons of bombs.

The Krupps Works at Essen was the target on the night of 16/17 September 1942; 369 bombers made the most successful attack on this important but elusive target. Losses were high at thirty-nine aircraft (10.6 per cent of the attackers).

One of the most spectacular special raids was that of 6 December against the Philips Works at Eindhoven, a target that had been slated for attack some months before. This raid was carried out by 93 Bostons, Mosquitoes and Venturas of No. 2 Group. The low-level attack in good weather caused serious damage to the Works and was considered a great success, although at the cost of fourteen aircraft. The Italian campaign came to an end in late December and the Command returned to Germany on the night of 20/21 December with an attack on Duisburg by 232 bombers.

Operationally, 1943 opened slowly with the main target in January being the U-boat facility at Lorient, which was attacked four times without much success. A few Main Force raids went to Germany, such as Dusseldorf on the night of the 27th, which included Oboe Mosquitoes using a ground-marking technique.

Battle of the Ruhr: March to July 1943

‘The intensity of effort expended against the Ruhr and Rhineland industrial area in the second quarter of 1943 is entirely without precedent in air warfare. The scope of it can best be gauged by comparison with the corresponding quarter of 1942:

Apr–Jun 1942	9,751 sorties	14,057 tons dropped.
Apr–Jun 1943	14,723 sorties	39,113 tons dropped.

‘The increase in sorties is less striking than that in bomb tonnage, because of the very different proportion which heavy bombers bear in the force as a whole in 1943. The average strength of heavies in the second quarter of 1942 was about 40 per cent of the total. In 1943, this figure has risen to about 70 per cent.’ These comments appeared in Bomber Command Quarterly Review No. 5, which went on to point out that loss rates had decreased from 3.5 to 2.0 aircraft per 100 tons of bombs dropped. This was a significant figure but meant little if the increased weight of bombs was not being delivered accurately. The Review, however, determined that accuracy had indeed improved: This is largely attributable to the efficiency of the new navigational aids which render our bombing to a great extent independent of weather conditions over the target, and to the evolution of the Pathfinder technique. We are thus able not only to hit objectives under weather conditions which would have previously made night bombing a fruitless task, but we are able to operate on nights when night fighters find it difficult to leave and return to their aerodromes, and are otherwise impeded by the weather conditions.’ The introduction to the Review’s summary of the Battle of the Ruhr concluded: ‘It has thus been true to say that 1943 has so far been the year of achievement for Bomber Command.’

To what extent was this positive picture justified? The Battle of the Ruhr was very much a test of what Harris believed to be the new potential of his Command and he was determined to prove that the important but previously hard to hit industrial heartland of the Reich was now vulnerable. What the Review did not mention was that during the complete period of the Battle of the Ruhr, which opened with the attack on Essen on 5/6 March and ended with the attack on Aachen on 13/14 July, the offensive had cost the Command almost 1,000 bombers. This four-month period was the first of the great trials of strength between the night bombers and the German defences; the bomber weapon had developed the potential to be a major factor – it was now time to see if it could achieve what its supporters claimed. On the evening of 5 March a force of eight Pathfinder Mosquitoes equipped with the Oboe navigation system led a Main Force of 434 bombers to the industrial city of Essen, most famed as home to the extensive Krupps Works. Three of the Mossies had to turn back with technical problems (as did over fifty of the Main Force aircraft) but the remainder used the Oboe beams to drop their markers on target and on time. The initial markers were backed-up by the next wave of Pathfinders and by the time the Main Force arrived the target area was well lit and easily distinguishable despite the inevitable ground haze that had effectively shielded Ruhr targets on previous occasions. The first wave of Halifaxes was followed by a wave made up of Stirlings and Wellingtons, and a final wave of Lancasters concluded an attack that had taken around 40 minutes. The principle of concentration of effort and time had the dual tactic of causing greater destruction on the ground (and preventing effective fire-fighting) and less time for the defences to engage the attackers. In what had become a standard tactic, two-thirds of the bomb load comprised incendiaries in order to cause extensive fires after HE bombs had destroyed walls and broken gas pipes, and a percentage of the HE bombs had long delay fuses. The attack cost fourteen aircraft (3.2 per cent) but had been a major success after a winter of little activity. It is estimated that 160 acres of Essen, including parts of the Krupps Works, were destroyed or heavily damaged. The destruction included over 3,000 houses – and de-housing ‘industrial workers’ was one of the avowed aims of this type of attack. Harris summarised the importance of the Essen attack: ‘Years of endeavour, of experiment, and of training in new methods have at last provided the weapons and the force capable of destroying the heart of the enemy’s armament industry.’ The bomber strategy expounded before the war, and incorporated in the WA Plans, now appeared to hold real promise. As the events of winter 1943 were to show, the situation was by no means this straightforward. Nevertheless, the promise of Essen led to a new offensive aimed at destroying the vital war industries of the Ruhr.

On the night of 11/12 March 1943 the target for the bombers was Stuttgart, the fourth night of attacks in the Battle of the Ruhr. Of the 314 aircraft, 109 were Halifaxes and of those six were lost. Four of these losses were from 405 Squadron, a particularly bad night for the Canadians operating out of Leeming. Halifax II BB250 was flown by Pilot Officer Dennison on his twenty-first operation and in the early hours of 12 March they were picked out by a German fighter. At 0100 they saw a red flare which the crew decided was a fighter flare … the Wireless Operator advised the Captain to start weaving as he had picked up a German conversation on the Tinsel frequency he was searching. The Pilot began weaving and the Bomb Aimer reported a searchlight astern of the aircraft. Five minutes later cannon tracer hit the aircraft and fire broke out between the Starboard Inner and the fuselage. It was not long before it was obvious that the Halifax was doomed and Captain ordered the crew to bale out. Pilot Officer Dennison’s debrief, he was one of five of the crew to evade capture, continued the story: ‘When the Pilot’s turn came to leave the machine was diving fast and he was pressed up against his Perspex canopy so he could not manoeuvre to get down onto the floor. He held on to the control column and managed to get his feet onto the dash. The elevators still seemed to be working as he was suddenly thrown to the floor and he then managed to crawl to the exit. He was hampered by either his oxygen tube or his intercom lead, which he had not been able to disconnect owing to his parachute having been put on over them. After getting through the hatch he was unable to get away from the aircraft and he accordingly pulled his ripcord and was jerked away when the aircraft was at a height of 5,000 to 6,000 feet. He sustained two broken ribs while in the aircraft.’ Of the three crew that did not manage to escape, two had been killed and one taken prisoner.

The overall losses had been eleven aircraft and the attack had not been a success as the marking had been inaccurate, perhaps in part because of the reported first use by the Germans of dummy Target Indicators (TIs). The main weight of the attack fell to the South-West of the city, although some suburb areas were hit. With Bomber Command becoming increasingly effective the Germans had been expending a great deal of effort on increasing both the physical defences of night fighters and anti-aircraft guns and the ‘spoof’ defences of decoy fires and, now, dummy Target Indicators.

Stirling III BK653 of 214 Squadron was shot down by fighters on the Mannheim raid of 16/17 April 1943; four of the crew managed to escape and return to England, three were taken prisoner and one, the Rear Gunner Sergeant E. Lee was killed. The aircraft, Captained by Flying Officer D James had taken off from Chedburgh at 2150 and two hours later was cruising at 9,000 ft in bright moonlight and good visibility just South of St Quentin. The debrief of the escapees gave details of the attack by three Bf 109s: ‘An Me 109 was seen approaching on the starboard beam at the same level as the Stirling at a range of 800 to 1,000 yards. The Stirling immediately began corkscrewing, starting with a diving turn to starboard and shortly afterwards the Rear Gunner reported a second Me 109 coming in to attack from astern. Almost at once a third Me 109 was seen attacking from the port beam and level. The first 109 opened fire and hit the wings of the Stirling, apparently with no serious effects but it seems probable that the turret hydraulics may have been damaged as the rear turret became unserviceable after a 2–3 second burst had been fired.

‘The Stirling jettisoned its bombs and continued its evasive action, picking up speed by diving, and at times reached a speed of 300 mph. The 109 on the starboard side opened fire at 800 yards and then came in very close, almost colliding with the Stirling. A stream of bullets passed through the window between the Pilot and the Navigator; the mid-upper turret was damaged and the centre section and rest position riddled. The intercom and all electrical services failed. The Mid-Upper Gunner fired all his ammunition in two or three long bursts.

‘All three 109s pressed home their attacks and fired many bursts of tracer and HE shells at the Stirling. It is thought by the crew that the enemy aircraft broke off the combat because they had fired all their ammunition. The Stirling set course for home.’

In this incredible – and one-sided combat – none of the crew had been injured but it was soon evident that the aircraft had been seriously damaged. The No. 5 and No. 6 starboard wing tanks had been holed and petrol was leaking out and there was a fire beyond the starboard outer engine with burning petrol coming from the trailing edge of the wing. Some 8 or 9 minutes later the Captain gave the order to abandon the aircraft.

Bomber Command had sent 271 aircraft to Mannheim, comprising 159 Wellingtons, 95 Stirlings and 17 Halifaxes. The target was effectively marked by the Pathfinders and bombing was reasonably concentrated causing extensive damage. The bombers lost eighteen of their number (6.6 per cent of their total) – nine Wellingtons, seven Stirlings and two Halifaxes, the majority of these falling to fighters. With clear conditions it was in ideal night for the single-engined fighters but the difficulty that the three Bf 109s had in bringing down the Stirling emphasised the problems faced by these fighter pilots who were not used to the size of an aircraft such as the Stirling, which presented problems of estimating range and of combat at night. The overall losses had been high – but not as high as for the other raid mounted that night. The Command despatched 327 bombers to attack Pilsen, the aiming point being the important Skoda armaments factory. Thirty-six of the 197 Lancasters and 130 Halifaxes (eighteen of each) were lost on this raid and despite bright moonlight the attack was poor as the target was misidentified.

Halifax HR663 of 102 Squadron was one of the aircraft that didn’t make it back, although the pilot, Squadron Leader Lashbrook DFC DFM (on his thirty-sixth operation) and three other members of the crew managed to evade capture (two crew were taken prisoner and the Rear Gunner, Flying Officer G Williams was killed). Debrief of the evaders summarised the fate of the aircraft: ‘After having bombed the target the aircraft flew into the Mannheim region at 9,000 feet and experienced very severe icing. After climbing to 14,000 feet the ice began to evaporate and as the height of the cloud tops became les the aircraft reduced height to 9,000 feet.

‘In the Ardennes region an aircraft was seen going down in flames on the starboard side – tracer was seen and it was assumed to be a fighter attack. Approximately 3 minutes later another aircraft was seen going down in flames on the port side. The Pilot told the Mid-Upper Gunner to keep a sharp lookout and almost immediately bullets hit the aircraft. The fighter was not seen but was apparently attacking from astern and below. All members of the crew said they were OK. The Pilot put the aircraft into a steep dive to port and at once saw there was a very fierce fire between the Port Inner engine and the fuselage. … After 3,000 feet loss of height the Pilot found that he could not pull the aircraft out of the dive as the controls were not working properly, nor could he throttle back the port engines as the throttle control rods were loose or severed. The Pilot gave the order to bale out. The Pilot left, he believes, last and as he was trying to leave, the aircraft went into a spin. Eventually he got free at less than 1,000 feet and made a heavy landing.’

With total losses for the night of fifty-four aircraft (8.8 per cent of the force) this was the highest number of losses in a single night to date, although fourteen of the aircraft managed to ditch in the sea on the way home and a number of aircrew were rescued.

Halifax JB873 of 78 Squadron was fitted with the mid-upper turret and the poorer performance of the aircraft with this turret was cited as a contributing factor to its loss on the Bochum attack of 13/14 May. The aircraft had departed Linton-on-Ouse at 2339 and was to be one of the three of the Squadron’s aircraft to fail to return that night. One of the crew, Sergeant R. Goddard, the Navigator, evaded capture and his account of the mission was recorded by the RAF interrogators. ‘The aircraft was slow on this trip, only 145 IAS, possibly because this was the first trip with the mid-upper turret. When 5–10 miles South of Cologne at 20,000 ft the revs on the Starboard engine dropped and it cut out. The Pilot feathered the propeller. It was not possible to maintain height on three engines and after a 5,000 ft height loss the bombs were jettisoned live. It was decided to make for the nearest point on the English coast by a route that missed enemy defences. Some time later a jar was felt in the aircraft and the Pilot said the Port Outer engine was on fire. The Pilot ordered the crew to prepare to abandon and pressed the Graviner switch. The fire went out and the Pilot said that there might not be a need to bale out. Two or three minutes later the engine caught fire again and the Pilot ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. From the Bomber Aimer’s position the fire appeared to be coming from around the engine and the flames, which were a reddish colour, were licking back to about half chord of the mainplane. The Navigator was first to abandon the aircraft, the Bomb Aimer and Wireless Operator were preparing to follow. At the time he (the Navigator) jumped the aircraft was at a height of 10,000 feet and was diving steeply but still just about under control. The fire was spreading fast towards the centre of the aircraft.’ The Pilot, Sergeant G. Dane, was one of the two crew to be killed, the others, with the exception of Sergeant Goddard, escaped the aircraft but were taken prisoner. Subsequent investigation has attributed this loss to a night fighter flown by Lieutenant Heinz Wolfgang Schnaufer of II/NJG1. One of the other 78 Squadron Halifaxes also fell to a night fighter experten, JB924 being credited to Hpt Helmut Lent of IV/NJG1.

The Bochum raid had involved 442 aircraft, 135 of which were Halifaxes; of the latter thirteen were shot down out of total loss for the raid of twenty-four bombers. The Command lost a further nine aircraft on the raid to Pilsen mounted by 167 aircraft.

On the night of 23/24 May 1943 Dortmund was attacked by a force of 826 aircraft: In cloudless conditions an exceptionally accurate ground marking attack was delivered, virtually devastating the town and causing severe industrial damage. Ground defences in the target area and night fighters on the return route put up a strong opposition and thirty-eight aircraft failed to return. German records agree that the attack was accurate and in addition to extensive damage to houses a large number of industrial premises were destroyed or damaged. Zero hour was timed for 0100 with the attack to take place between 0058 and 0200. As an aid to navigation eleven Oboe Mosquitoes dropped yellow TIs at a key turning point. They then went on to drop three red TIs in salvo on the aiming point, with thirty-three backers-up dropping green TIs on the centre of the reds. The first wave of 250 aircraft comprised the best crews from all Groups, with all remaining non Lancasters in the second wave and the Lancasters in the final wave, with PFF aircraft at the head of each wave.

Dams raid

The most famous Bomber Command attack of the Second World War took place in May 1943 under the codename Operation Chastise, and its participants, Wing Commander Guy Gibson and 617 Squadron earned themselves a place in the RAF’s operational annals. The concept of attacking dams believed to be critical to war industries had been part of the original Western Air Plans, although it was not until late 1942 that the subject was raised again. One of the many weapons being developed by Dr Barnes Wallis was a ‘bouncing bomb’ (mine) specifically designed for attacking the German dams and despite early official indifference to the idea he was at last successful in persuading the Air Staff to take the idea seriously. The other essential part of the plan was an aircraft capable of delivering the weapon and aircrew able to fly the accurate attack profile that would be required. The former was achieved by modifying the bomb doors of the Lancaster; the solution to the latter was the creation of a special squadron. As an experienced bomber pilot (174 missions) Guy Gibson had just completed a tour with 106 Squadron but was asked by AOC No. 5 Group to form a special squadron and undertake one more operation. With selected crews 617 Squadron formed and started training. By May the aircraft, the crews and, after initial problems, the ‘bouncing bomb’, were ready. Time was tight as the attack relied on the water level in the dams being correct. At 2130 on 16 May the first wave of Lancasters took-off from Scampton, followed by two further waves for a total of nineteen aircraft. The first wave, of nine aircraft, was led by Gibson and was destined for the Mohne Dam, with the Eder Dam as their second target; the second wave, of five aircraft, was destined for the Sorpe Dam and the third wave, of five aircraft, was an airborne reserve for attack on any of the three dams not breached by the first attackers.

One aircraft of the first wave was shot down on the outbound route but overall it was a fairly easy run. The Lancasters arrived over the Mohne Dam around midnight and Gibson made an accurate attack with his bomb. He was followed by Flight Lieutenant Hopgood but by this time the flak gunners were fully alert and the Lancaster was hit on the run in. The bomb was dropped late, missing the target, and the aircraft crashed, with only two survivors. The third Lancaster, flown by Flight Lieutenant Martin, ran in – with Gibson flying alongside to distract the flak gunners. Despite this the bomb went short. Squadron Leader Young was next in and this time both Gibson and Martin flew escort. The bomb was accurate and the dam was drenched in the plume of water; two good hits had been made but Barnes Wallis had predicted that three would be needed to cause fatal damage. It was an accurate prediction for when Flight Lieutenant Maltby’s mine hit the dam, the plume of water was followed by the collapse of the dam wall and a flood down the river valley. It must have been an amazing sight for the circling Lancasters. Gibson took the remaining bombed-up Lancasters on to the Eder Dam whilst the others returned home (Squadron Leader Young was shot down by coastal flak over Holland).

Modified Lancaster of 617 Squadron; the Lancaster bomb bay has the distinctive cut-out for the ‘bouncing bomb’.

The Eder Dam was breached after two ‘bouncing bombs’ had been accurately dropped.

There were no defences at this dam and the Lancasters could make their runs with no distractions other than the terrain. The first run, by Flight Lieutenant Shannon, was accurate and actually caused a small breach. The second bomb, dropped by Squadron Leader Maudslay, was dropped late and caused no damage to the target, although it did damage the Lancaster (this aircraft was shot down during the return flight). Pilot Officer Knight made a good run and after the plume had subsided the dam gave way. Two targets had been destroyed but at a cost of nearly 50 per cent of the attackers (four aircraft).

The second wave was not so lucky; two aircraft turned back with technical problems, two were shot down on the outbound route and only Flight Lieutenant McCarthy made it to the target. His bomb hit the dam but caused no appreciable damage. The third wave also lost two aircraft on the way to the target area, with a third returning to base with technical problems. Of the remaining two, Flight Sergeant Ken Brown attacked the Sorpe Dam and Flight Sergeant Townsend attacked the Ennepe Dam. No appreciable damage was caused. Overall it had been a highly successful raid despite the loss of eight aircraft (with fifty-three aircrew killed); two of the main targets had been destroyed and whilst the military value of the attack has been questioned there can be no doubt of the good effect on morale of the attack. It was heralded in the British press: Tonight, walls of water swept down the Ruhr and Eder valleys in Germany, destroying everything before them, after the RAF had attacked two dams. The raids, by specially fitted Lancaster bombers using new “bouncing bombs” were planned to cripple Germany’s vital industrial heartland.’

The citation of the award of a VC for Guy Gibson, said: ‘This officer served as a night bomber pilot at the beginning of the war and quickly established a reputation as an outstanding operational pilot. In addition to taking the fullest possible share in all normal operations, he made single-handed attacks during his ‘rest’ nights on such highly defended objectives as the German battleship Tirpitz, then completing a refit in Wilhelmshaven. When his tour of operational duty was concluded, he asked for a further operational posting and went to a night-fighter unit instead of being posted for instructional duties. In the course of his second operational tour, he destroyed at least three enemy bombers and contributed much to the raising and development of new night-fighter formations. After a short period in a training unit, he again volunteered for operational duties and returned to night bombers. Both as an operational pilot and as leader of his squadron, he achieved outstandingly successful results and his personal courage knew no bounds. Berlin, Cologne, Danzig, Gdynia, Genoa, Le Creusot, Milan, Nuremberg and Stuttgart were among the targets he attacked by day and by night. On the conclusion of his third operational tour, Wing Commander Gibson pressed strongly to be allowed to remain on operations and he was selected to command a squadron then forming for special tasks. Under his inspiring leadership, this squadron has now executed one of the most devastating attacks of the war – the breaching of the Mohne and Eder dams. The task was fraught with danger and difficulty. Wing Commander Gibson personally made the initial attack on the Mohne dam. Descending to within a few feet of the water and taking the full brunt of the anti-aircraft defences, he delivered his attack with great accuracy. Afterwards he circled very low for 30 minutes, drawing the enemy fire on himself in order to leave as free a run as possible to the following aircraft which were attacking the dam in turn. Wing Commander Gibson then led the remainder of his force to the Eder dam where, with complete disregard for his own safety, he repeated his tactics and once more drew on himself the enemy fire so that the attack could be successfully developed. Wing Commander Gibson has completed over 170 sorties, involving more than 600 hours operational flying. Throughout his operational career, prolonged exceptionally at his own request, he has shown leadership, determination and valour of the highest order.’ (Acting Wing Commander Guy Penrose Gibson DSO DFC, 617 Squadron RAF, Lancaster ED932; awarded for action 16 May 1943, London Gazette, 28 May 1943.)

Another Bomber Command pilot was awarded the Victoria Cross for an action in May 1943, although it would be nearly three years before the award was announced. This raid had none of the glamour, or success, of the Dams Raid and was recorded in the diary of 487 Squadron in sad terms: ‘A very black day in the history of the Squadron … a better set of boys could not be met in 30 years, everybody is dazed by the news.’ On 3 May the Squadron sent eleven Venturas to attack a power station near Amsterdam. Unfortunately the formation was bounced by fighters; nine bombers were shot down and a tenth limped home to crash at Feltwell. The sole survivor, Squadron Leader Leonard Trent, pressed on to the target – but was shot down, only Trent and one other member of the crew surviving. The London Gazette again: ‘On the 3 May 1943, Squadron Leader Trent was detailed to lead a formation of Ventura aircraft in a daylight attack on the power station at Amsterdam. This operation was intended to encourage the Dutch workmen in their resistance to enemy pressure. The target was known to be heavily defended. The importance of bombing it, regardless of enemy fighters or anti-aircraft fire, was strongly impressed on the air crews taking part in the operation. Before taking off, Squadron Leader Trent told the deputy leader that he was going over the target, whatever happened. All went well until the Venturas and their fighter escort were nearing the Dutch coast. Then one bomber was hit and had to turn back. Suddenly, large numbers of enemy fighters appeared. Our escorting fighters were hotly engaged and lost touch with the bombing force. The Venturas closed up for mutual protection and commenced their run up to the target. Unfortunately, the fighters detailed to support them over the target had reached the area too early and had been recalled. Soon the bombers were attacked. They were at the mercy of fifteen to twenty Messerschmitts which dived on them incessantly. Within four minutes six Venturas were destroyed. Squadron Leader Trent continued on his course with the three remaining aircraft. In a short time two more Venturas went down in flames. Heedless of the murderous attacks and of the heavy anti-aircraft fire which was now encountered, Squadron Leader Trent completed an accurate bombing run and even shot down a Messerschmitt at point-blank range. Dropping his bombs in the target area, he turned away. The aircraft following him was shot down on reaching the target. Immediately afterwards his own aircraft was hit, went into a spin and broke up. Squadron Leader Trent and his navigator were thrown clear and became prisoners of war. The other two members of the crew perished. On this, his twenty-fourth sortie, Squadron Leader Trent showed outstanding leadership. Such was the trust placed in this gallant officer that the other pilots followed him unwaveringly. His cool, unflinching courage and devotion to duty in the face of overwhelming odds rank with the finest examples of these virtues.’ (Squadron Leader Leonard Henry Trent DFC, 487 Squadron RNZAF, Ventura AJ209; awarded for action 3 May 1943, London Gazette, 1 March 1946.)

It was unusual for a Mosquito to fall victim to the German defences, as evidenced by the low level of losses in the Summary of Operations table. On 14 June Mosquito IX LR501 of No. 1409 Met Flight was airborne out of Oakington for a ‘routine’ daylight reconnaissance over Germany – and just after midday became the first Mosquito IX lost on operations (LR501 had only flown 10 hours 45 minutes total time when it was lost). The crew were flying at 28,000 feet in clear skies and the Navigator, Pilot Officer R. Taylor (on his twenty-first op) was making an entry in his Navigation Log when he felt the impact of cannon shells on the aircraft and looking up he saw pieces flying off the tail unit. The intelligence report of his subsequent debrief stated that he ‘saw an Fw 190 below and shouted to the pilot; he then pulled up the collapsible bullet proof shield and started giving evasive directions to the Pilot. A second Focke Wulfe made an attack but no hits were apparent. The Mosquito corkscrewed and performed skid turns but the controls finally disabled and broke. One shell went through the fuselage and the Navigator was thrown forward; his left hand became full of blood and he received cuts to his eyes and neck. The Pilot told the Navigator to bale out as the aircraft went into a spin. The Navigator, who was of stout build, was jammed in the entrance and could not move. The Pilot then left the aircraft by the top escape hatch. The Navigator fumbled for his parachute and after some time got hold of one of the carrying handles and succeeded with the greatest difficulty in attaching the parachute to his harness. He does not really know how he left the aircraft but is convinced he came out through the nose of the machine and believes the Perspex must have been blown away. He landed in a wheat field after a 2 or 3 minute descent and saw the aircraft on fire three-quarters of a mile away. He saw the Pilot coming down by parachute.’ The pilot made a safe landing but was taken prisoner. The report concluded: ‘the greater part of the damage was done in the first attack. If warning had been given it is likely that the Mosquito would have been saved. It is recommended that Monica be fitted to all Met Reconnaissance aircraft and that consideration be given to fitting it to PRU aircraft.’ Whilst the loss rate for the Mosquito remained remarkably low, for other aircraft in the latter half of 1943 it was far too high.

Summer 1943 saw two particularly significant attacks by Bomber Command:

1.19/20 June, Schneider factory and Breuil Steelworks, Le Creusot.

2.20/21 June, Zeppelin Works, Friedrichshafen.

The Le Creusot attack was made from low-level at night and was one of the most successful of the war so far.

The attack on the Zeppelin Works, an important manufacturer of Wurzburg radars and not an airship manufacturer, was the first of its type in that the extreme range meant that the bombers would not return to England but would fly on to bases in North Africa. The sixty Lancasters on this Shuttle raid were mainly from No. 5 Group and the flight to Lake Constance and on to Africa was expected to take over 10 hours, much of this being over enemy territory. A small Pathfinder force dropped TIs and the Main Force made a timed run from a good visual point on the lake shore. In another first this was a ‘directed attack’ with Wing Commander G. L. Gomm controlling the bombing – a technique that was later formalised as the Master Bomber technique – although Gibson had effectively done the same thing on a smaller scale during the Dams Raid. The target was effectively bombed and no aircraft were lost. One crew described the scene in the target area: ‘We stayed over Lake Constance for 13 minutes and had an excellent view of the attack. There were approximately sixteen to twenty heavy flak guns and eighteen to twenty light flak guns, and twenty-five searchlights, within a radius of 6–8 miles of the target. Several aircraft were coned but not for any length of time. Heavy guns were firing both predictor-control and unseen. As the defences were heavier than expected, the Deputy Leader [Gomm had taken over from Group Captain Slee] gave the order for all aircraft to increase height by 5,000 feet, so that the attack was actually delivered from 10,000 to 15,000 feet.’

Damage to the Krupps Works, Essen, June 1943.

Three nights later, 23/24 June, 52 of the Shuttle Lancasters returned to England – bombing La Spezia on the return route. Despite the special attacks detailed above, the main focus of the Command in early summer 1943 remained the Battle of the Ruhr. In the last weeks of the battle targets included Cologne, Gelsenkirchen, Krefeld, Aachen and Wuppertal. However, with the nights becoming shorter and the loss rate increasing Harris finally drew this campaign to a halt and took stock of the results.

Friedrichshafen Zeppelin Works after the attack of 20/21 June 1943.

Cartoon of a 9 Squadron Lancaster lost on the 9/10 July Gelsenkirchen attack.

Battle of Hamburg: 24 July 1943 to 3 August 1943

The city of Hamburg had been on Bomber Command’s target list almost 100 times before this short but intense series of attacks in summer 1943, during which just over 3,000 sorties were made in four major night attacks. One of the reasons that Hamburg was chosen for destruction, under the codename Operation Gomorrah, was its role as a major shipbuilding port and especially its involvement with U-boat construction. Also, its location meant that it should be easy to locate using H2S. The Battle of Hamburg was intended as a two-pronged campaign with the bombers of the USAAF hitting the city by day thus giving no respite to the defenders and making any repair work even more difficult. In the event this proved to be unworkable as the effect, primarily the pall of smoke, caused by the first Bomber Command attacks meant that the Americans could not see their targets and blind bombing was not an option.

However, the more important innovation was the first use of Window in an attempt to reduce loss rates of bombers, and with a loss rate of only 1.5 per cent on this first attack the tactic certainly worked. Of the 791 bombers on the first night, 728 claim to have attacked the target and in a well concentrated raid of only 50 minutes dropped 2,284 tons of bombs, the aiming point being the centre of the city. The bombing was somewhat scattered but three nights later a more effective attack was made, with 729 bombers of the 787 despatched claiming to have bombed the target. The Pathfinders used H2S to mark the aiming point near the centre of the city and in good conditions the Main Force dropped 2,326 tons into the area in one of the most concentrated attacks of the war. It also proved devastating to the inhabitants of Hamburg with an estimated 40,000 dying in the firestorm that raged through the city. Following this raid almost two-thirds of the population, over 1,000,000 people, fled the city to escape future raids. This was one of the strategic aims of area bombing – to de-house workers and disrupt war industry.

The Bomber Command ORS analysed the Hamburg raids: ‘The very low casualties incurred on the first two raids were largely due to the temporary disorganisation of the German fighter defences by a new countermeasure which precluded the vectoring of controlled night fighters. The final attack was ruined by unexpected deterioration of weather conditions over the target. Eighty-seven aircraft is a high price in itself, but in comparison with the loss suffered by Germany in the almost complete annihilation of her second city, it can only be regarded as minute. The ‘Hafen’ with its imposing array of shipbuilding yards, docks, warehouses and administrative buildings was the basis of Hamburg’s contribution to German economic life.

‘The destruction of Hamburg by bombing was thus far the stiffest task yet undertaken in air warfare. It was not until 1 August that smoke from the conflagrations cleared sufficiently to make reconnaissance possible. The heavily damaged areas covered 6,200 acres out of the 8,380 acres which comprise Hamburg’s closely built-up residential area. All parts of the city and dock were shattered – all four main shipbuilding yards were hit, five floating docks were sunk or badly damaged, 150 industrial plants were destroyed or badly damaged, plus massive disruption of communications and power.’

Italy was the main focus of attention in August but the Command also mounted Operation Hydra, an attack on the research installation a Peenemunde on the Baltic coast. The Allies had been acquiring evidence that this was the site of advanced weapon research, especially rocket technology and by late June 1943 the War Cabinet had scheduled Peenemunde as a high priority target for Bomber Command. Harris requested a delay until the longer nights of late summer would make his aircraft less vulnerable and on the night of 17/18 August a force of 596 bombers converged on the target. The initial markers were slightly off the aiming points but the Master Bomber, Group Captain John Searby was able to call on the backer-up markers to re-mark the target and to pass bombing instructions to the Main Force. It was a clear moonlit night and the target was well and truly plastered, although the moonlight was also perfect for the night fighters. Fortunately they were late arriving and only caught the last wave. Bomber losses of forty were considered acceptable for the level of destruction on such a vital target.

Battle of Berlin: August 1943 to March 1944

Harris had already decided that his next major campaign would be against the ‘Big City’ and the Battle opened on the night of 23/24 August when 727 bombers, almost half of which were Lancasters, took part in a Master Bomber attack. The results were disappointing with scattered bombing, the markers having fallen on the southern part of the city. The defenders took a heavy toll with fifty-six aircraft (7.9 per cent loss rate) being lost, the highest number in a single raid so far; it was a particularly bad night for the Stirlings with sixteen of the 124 aircraft involved being lost.

The Battle of Berlin took place in a number of phases and lasted to March 1944, by which time the Command had mounted 9,099 sorties against the ‘Big City’, dropping 29,804 tons of bombs; overall losses were 501 aircraft. Bomber Command was able to reach and hit its targets, albeit with mixed results, but it was paying a high price.

The second attack of the introductory phase took place on the last night of August 1943 and once again the bombers failed to do much damage and suffered high casualties with the loss of 47 of the 622 aircraft, with the Stirlings once more having the highest losses relative to aircraft dispatched (17 of 106 aircraft). The next raid, 3/4 September, was an all Lancaster affair, along with four Mossies whose task was to drop spoof route flares in an attempt to decoy German fighters. Accuracy was again poor and with 7 per cent of the Lancasters failing to return, a high rate for the Lancaster, it proved what a tough nut Berlin was. Some damage had been caused and after the bombing of Hamburg the Germans were wary of concerted offensives against a single city and a partial evacuation of the city was ordered. However, Bomber Command was also taking stock of the results with a view that the high loss rates, particularly those of the Stirling and Halifax, for low levels of damage could not be justified. For the next few weeks the bombers turned to other targets but it was only a short respite for Berlin and Harris was determined to launch an all-out offensive against this heartland of Nazi power.

One of the ‘other’ targets attacked in this period was Dusseldorf. The raid of 3/4 November was notable for two reasons: the operational debut of G-H, which in part explained the accuracy of the attack, and the award of a Victoria Cross to Bill Reid. His citation read: ‘On the night of 3 November 1943, Flight Lieutenant Reid was pilot and captain of a Lancaster aircraft detailed to attack Dusseldorf. Shortly after crossing the Dutch coast, the pilot’s windscreen was shattered by fire from a Messerschmitt 110. Owing to a failure in the heating circuit, the rear gunner’s hands were too cold for him to open fire immediately or to operate his microphone and so give warning of danger; but after a brief delay he managed to return the Messerschmitt’s fire and it was driven off.

‘During the fight with the Messerschmitt, Flight Lieutenant Reid was wounded in the head, shoulders and hands. The elevator trimming tabs of the aircraft were damaged and it became difficult to control. The rear turret, too, was badly damaged and the communications system and compasses were put out of action. Flight Lieutenant Reid ascertained that his crew were unscathed and, saying nothing about his own injuries, he continued his mission. Soon afterwards, the Lancaster was attacked by a Focke Wulfe 190. This time, the enemy’s fire raked the bomber from stem to stern. The rear gunner replied with his only serviceable gun but the state of his turret made accurate aiming impossible. The navigator was killed and the wireless operator fatally injured. The midupper turret was hit and the oxygen system put out of action. Flight Lieutenant Reid was again wounded and the flight engineer, though hit in the forearm, supplied him with oxygen from a portable supply. Flight Lieutenant Reid refused to be turned from his objective and Dusseldorf was reached some 50 minutes later. He had memorised his course to the target and had continued in such a normal manner that the bomb-aimer, who was cut off by the failure of the communications system, knew nothing of his captain’s injuries or of the casualties to his comrades.

‘Photographs show that, when the bombs were released, the aircraft was right over the centre of the target. Steering by the pole star and the moon, Flight Lieutenant Reid then set course for home. He was growing weak from loss of blood. The emergency oxygen supply had given out. With the windscreen shattered, the cold was intense. He lapsed into semi-consciousness. The flight engineer, with some help from the bomb-aimer, kept the Lancaster in the air despite heavy anti-aircraft fire over the Dutch coast. The North Sea crossing was accomplished. An airfield was sighted. The captain revived, resumed control and made ready to land. Ground mist partially obscured the runway lights. The captain was also much bothered by blood from his head wound getting into his eyes. But he made a safe landing although one leg of the damaged undercarriage collapsed when the load came on. Wounded in two attacks, without oxygen, suffering severely from cold, his navigator dead, his wireless operator fatally wounded, his aircraft crippled and defenceless, Flight Lieutenant Reid showed superb courage and leadership in penetrating a further 200 miles into enemy territory, to attack one of the most strongly defended targets in Germany, every additional mile increasing the hazards of the long and perilous journey home. His tenacity and devotion to duty were beyond praise.’ (Acting Flight Lieutenant William Reid, 61 Squadron RAF, Lancaster LM360; awarded for action 3/4 November 1943, London Gazette, 14 December 1943.)

The initial raid in the first real phase of the Battle of Berlin took place on 18/19 November when 440 Lancasters attacked the ‘Big City’, with a second force attacking Ludwigshaven to split the night fighter force. A combination of poor weather and poor PFF marking led to a scattered raid, although this time losses were light. Four nights later the weather forecast was near perfect and the Command mounted a maximum effort raid against Berlin, 765 aircraft taking part. The outbound route was near direct, which meant an increased bomb load. However, the weather was worse than forecast but this was an advantage as it proved more of a problem for the defenders than the attackers and marking was accurate with Berlin being hit hard. The Stirlings suffered a high loss rate again (10 per cent) and Harris reluctantly ordered their withdrawal from this target. Indeed, this was very much a Lancaster battle as the Halifax too had to be withdrawn from the Battle as their loss rates increased. The Halifax squadrons took a greater part in the latter phases when more of the improved Mk III became available. Although the cloud cover over the target meant that the attackers could not determine the accuracy of the raid it was, according to German sources, one of the most successful attacks made on Berlin with extensive damage over a wide area.

The bombers returned the following night but back-to-back ops meant fewer aircraft were available and less than 400 Lancasters took part, although with accurate blind marking through cloud, combined with fires still burning from the previous raid, it was considered successful. Berlin had a few nights of respite before almost 700 bombers left England on the evening of 26 November; near Frankfurt the bomber stream split to divide the German fighter force with one force heading for Stuttgart and the other carrying on to Berlin. Over Berlin clear weather meant a reasonable concentration for the attack and although the Lancaster loss rate was 6 per cent the raid was a success. Unfortunately the weather in England had deteriorated with fog covering the area South of the Humber; bombers were diverted to airfields in Yorkshire but thirty Lancasters crashed or crash-landed, resulting in several crews being killed. A maximum effort raid was planned for 2/3 December but the Halifax squadrons were grounded by fog and only 458 bombers took part and some of those turned back over the North Sea having encountered severe icing. Bad weather and inaccurate forecast winds meant that the Main Force was scattered by the time it arrived over Berlin, where German fighters had gathered having had a reasonable warning of the approach of the bombers. Most of the forty bombers that failed to return were lost over and near the target; this was one of the few occasions when Lancaster loss rates neared 10 per cent. It was two weeks before Berlin was targeted again. With fog forecast for the areas in which German night fighter airfields were concentrated Harris ordered another attack on Berlin on 16/17 December. Unfortunately the fog didn’t ground all the fighters and combat was joined as soon as the bombers crossed the Dutch coast, and continued all the way to Berlin and back. Bad weather was a problem for the Lancasters on their return to England and once more a number of aircraft and crews were lost in the futile search for a safe place to land. For 97 Squadron it was a particularly bad night with seven aircraft lost; Arthur Tindall was a WOP/AG on the raid: ‘I can still recall the Met Officer saying that the weather would close in by the early hours of the following morning and he anticipated the raid being cancelled. In the event it wasn’t with disastrous results. Our squadron lost seven aircraft that night. We were airborne for 7 hours 45 minutes compared with usual Berlin raids of 6 to 6½ hours. The following morning our ground crew said we had less than 50 gallons of petrol. In other words we were very lucky to have made it.’ Arthur was also on the next Berlin raid, 23/24 December: ‘Another early take-off – 0020 to Berlin. On the return we were attacked eight times by fighters, all of our guns were frozen. We landed on three engines and one tyre had burst – unknown to us until touchdown. The aircraft was written off.’ The final raid in December was a maximum effort with the Halifax units joining in to send 712 bombers and with a longer outbound route, combined with poor weather, the German controllers failed to bring many fighters into contact with the bomber stream and only twenty bombers were lost. It was a relief to the planners that the loss rate had dropped but they could take little comfort from the course of the Battle of Berlin to date.

The Junkers factory in Leipzig showing heavy damage after the attack of 3/4 December 1943.

Harris continued the Battle into 1944 and Berlin was attacked six times in January twice early in the month and four times late in the month – with nearly three weeks respite in the middle. The two attacks in the first few days of January brought another increase in loss rates, both being around 7 per cent, and disappointing results as the bombing was poorly concentrated. The two attacks on consecutive nights were different in that most losses on 1/2 January were outside the area of Berlin whereas the following night the controllers had mad an early prediction that Berlin was the target and they had 40 minutes to collect fighters at appropriate beacons. One of the effects of this was that the first aircraft over the target – the Pathfinders – were hit hard, losing ten aircraft Bomber Command paused for a few weeks with very few operations of any type being flown; the ‘Big City’ was still the favoured target but Bomber Command assessment was that less than 25 per cent of the city had been destroyed, an underestimate if German records are taken into account, a disappointing result when lesser campaigns had resulted in destruction levels on other cities of 50–70 per cent.

When the briefing curtains were drawn back on 20 January crews groaned as they saw the tape leading once more to Berlin, although the direct route had been changed in favour of a more diverse approach. This was another maximum effort with 769 bombers, 264 of which were Halifaxes but it followed the same pattern as previous raids with fighters getting in amongst the bombers and with a cloud-covered Berlin proving hard to hit. It was not a promising return for the Halifax, with twenty-two of the 264 aircraft being lost. It was 102 Squadron’s ‘turn’ to suffer and the Pocklington-based squadron lost five of its sixteen Halifaxes over enemy territory plus another two that crashed in England (it lost a further four aircraft the following night).

The Halifaxes were once more taken off the Berlin roster for the next raid and it was 515 Lancasters and fifteen Mosquitoes that returned to the city on 27/28 January. The bombers had a reasonable run to the target and bombed on sky markers as the aiming point was cloud covered; fighter combats took place on the return route and overall losses remained at over 6 per cent. It was back to a maximum effort the next night and a route via Denmark to try and throw off the fighters. The tactic was only partly successful and when the bombers arrived over Berlin the fighters were waiting and most of the forty-six losses occurred in the vicinity of the target. It was however the most accurate raid for a while as cloud was broken and the Pathfinders were able to lay ground markers. The planning for both of these raids had included diversionary operations to divert German defensives as well as offensive support operations against night fighter airfields and with an increasing number of Serrate-equipped Mosquito night fighters flying with the bomber stream. Two nights later 534 bombers were en route for the final attack in January. The northern route via Denmark once more prevented combats until the Berlin area but several bombers were shot down in the target area. Cloud was thick over Berlin but bombing was reasonably effective.

Berlin, Siemens Electrical plant March 1944.

There were only two more attacks on the city during the Battle of Berlin: the first of these came after a respite due to the phase of the moon making bomber operations unwise; on 15/16 February nearly 900 bombers, the largest force yet to attack Berlin, left England for the northern route. With a near direct route home bomb loads were high and the total dropped this night was a record 2,642 tons. The German fighters were out in force and combats began over Southern Denmark; of the forty-three bombers that failed to return most fell to fighters. Despite cloud cover the city was hit hard and in general this was a successful raid. It was another month before Berlin was targeted again, the main reason being the new directive issued to Harris for attacks on the German aircraft industry. It could be argued that the February raid was the end of the Battle of Berlin but it is worth including the 24/25 March attack as after this Berlin was never again subjected to a Main Force attack – and the March raid was little short of a disaster for Bomber Command.

The raid of 24/25 March was a maximum effort with 811 bombers taking part; seventy-two (8.9 per cent) of these aircraft failed to return – the highest single loss to date. The main cause of the disaster was weather and in particular an inaccurate wind forecast with stronger than expected winds scattering the bombers. Whilst this made them less vulnerable to fighters it meant that they strayed over flak defences, including those of the Ruhr, and it is estimated that fifty of the losses were caused by flak. The strong winds also meant that marking was poor and bombing was not concentrated, although large parts of the city were damaged.

The Battle of Berlin was over; Harris’s prediction of 500 bomber losses was correct – and that was only RAF losses – but his hope that Berlin would be destroyed from end to end was not fulfilled, despite the fact that almost 30,000 tons of bombs had been dropped. Nevertheless, the effect on the extensive industrial, economic and administrative activities of the Reich capital was significant both in direct (destruction) and indirect (evacuation or personnel, resources spent on repairs, and so on) results.

Berlin 24/25 March 1944.

Lancaster LL704 of 115 Squadron, complete with German guard. The aircraft was shot down on the night of 30/31 March 1944 and was one of sixty-four bombers lost that night – the highest loss of the war.

The latter part of March brought an increase in the number of attacks on targets in France as the pre-invasion bombing campaign got into its stride, although the largest individual raids were still those against German cities; for example 863 bombers to Stuttgart on 15/16 March and 846 bombers to Frankfurt three nights later. The latter city was hit hard in this accurate attack despite the usual creepback in the latter stages of the attack. The city was targeted again on 22/23 March as part of the policy of hitting the same target in quick succession, adding to the destruction that essentially finished Frankfurt as a working city.

Whilst Main Force raids continued during this period there was an increasing number of smaller operations against specific, and often pinpoint, targets, with No. 5 Group increasingly operating as an independent force. In a typical night three or four targets might be attacked, in addition to the usual selection of minor operations such as intruder or minelaying. On the night of the Stuttgart raid (15/16 March) for example, two other targets were attacked: 140 bombers went to Amiens and a small force of Lancasters (twenty-two aircraft) attacked an aircraft-engine factory at Woippy. However, one of the most successful nights in this period was that of 10/11 March when No. 5 Group sent 102 Lancasters on moonlight raids to four factories in France; thirty-three went to Clermont-Ferrand – one failed to return. As the photographs of two of the targets (below) illustrate, the attacks were accurate and caused extensive damage. The attack on La Ricamerie was made by sixteen Lancasters of 617 Squadron. Both these photographs appeared in the Bomber Command Quarterly Review and were used to illustrate the accuracy that the Command was achieving.

The night of 30/31 March 1944 was one of the worst of the war for Bomber Command. A force of 795 bombers was sent to Nuremberg and ninety-five failed to return (sixty-four Lancasters and thirty-one Halifaxes). A further ten were written-off in landing accidents and fifty-nine were recorded as having significant damage. The loss rate of 12.1 per cent to the Lancasters and 16.8 per cent to the Halifaxes, and the loss of 535 aircrew, with 180 others wounded or taken prisoner, was a major blow for the Command and if it had been repeated then Bomber Command would have ceased functioning. Les Bartlett flew on the raid as a rear gunner with 50 Squadron from Skellingthorpe and his diary entry recorded the events. ‘At 2200 we taxied out and were first airborne. We crossed the enemy coast and it was eyes wide open. As we drew level with the south of the Ruhr valley, things began to happen. Enemy night fighters were all around us and, in no time at all, combats were taking place and aircraft were going down in flames on all sides. So serious was the situation that I remember looking at the other poor blighters going down and thinking to myself that it must be our turn next, just a question of time. A Lancaster appeared on our port beam converging, so we dropped 100 feet or so to let him cross. He was only about 200 yards or so away on our starboard beam when a string of cannon shells hit him and down he went.

Lancasters prepare to depart en route to Frankfurt 18 March 1944.

‘We altered course for Nuremberg, and I looked down at the area over which we had just passed. It looked like a battlefield. There were kites burning on the deck all over the place, bombs going off where they had been jettisoned by bombers damaged in combat, and fires from their incendiaries across the whole area. Such a picture of aerial disaster I had never seen before and hope never to see again.

The Michelin Works at Clermont-Ferrand; reconnaissance photograph showing the damage caused by the attack on the night of 10/11 March 1944.

‘On the way to the target the winds became changeable and we almost ran into the defences of Schweinfurt, but we altered course just in time. The defences of Nuremberg were nothing to speak of, a modest amount of heavy flak which did not prevent us doing our normal approach, and we were able to get the Target Indicators dropped by the Pathfinder Force in our bombsight to score hits with our 4,000 lb ‘Cookie’ and our 1,000 lb bombs. To reach the coast was a binding two-hour stooge. The varying winds were leading us a dance and we found ourselves approaching Calais instead of being 80 miles further south, so we had a slight detour to avoid their defences. Once near the enemy coast it was nose down for home at 300 kts. Even then we saw some poor blokes ‘buy it’ over the Channel. What a relief it was to be flying over Lincoln cathedral once more. Back in debriefing we heard the full story of the Squadron’s effort. It was the worst night for the Squadron.’

Another accurate pinpoint attack on 10/11 March 1944 destroyed the needle-bearing plant at La Ricamerie.

Pilot Officer Cyril Barton was awarded the Victoria Cross for his actions during this attack; his citation read: ‘On the night of 30 March 1944, Pilot Officer Barton was captain and pilot of a Halifax aircraft detailed to attack Nuremberg when, some 70 miles short of the target, the aircraft was attacked by a Junkers 88. The first burst of fire from the enemy made the intercommunication system useless. One engine was damaged when a Messerschmitt 210 joined the fight. The bomber’s machine guns were out of action and the gunners were unable to return the fire. The two fighters continued to attack the aircraft as it approached the target area and, in the confusion caused by the failure of the communications system at the height of the battle, a signal was misinterpreted and the navigator, air bomber and wireless operator left the aircraft by parachute. Pilot Officer Barton now faced a situation of dire peril. His aircraft was damaged, his navigational team had gone and he could not communicate with the remainder of the crew. If he continued his mission, he would be at the mercy of hostile fighters when silhouetted against the fires in the target area and if he survived, he would have to make a 4 hour journey home on three engines across heavily-defended territory Determined to press home his attack at all costs, he flew on and, reaching the target, released the bombs himself. As Pilot Officer Barton turned for home the propeller of the damaged engine, which was vibrating badly, flew off. It was also discovered that two of the petrol tanks had suffered damage and were leaking. Pilot Officer Barton held to his course and, without navigational aids and in spite of strong head winds, successfully avoided the most dangerous defence areas on his route. Eventually he crossed the English coast only 90 miles north of his base. By this time the petrol supply was nearly exhausted. Before a suitable landing place could be found, the port engines stopped. The aircraft was now too low to be abandoned successfully and Pilot Officer Barton therefore ordered the three remaining members of his crew to take up their crash stations. Then, with only one engine working, he made a gallant attempt to land clear of the houses over which he was flying. The aircraft finally crashed and Pilot Officer Barton lost his life, but his three comrades survived. Pilot Officer Barton had previously taken part in four attacks on Berlin and fourteen other operational missions. On one of these, two members of his crew were wounded during a determined effort to locate the target despite appalling weather conditions. In gallantly completing his last mission in the face of almost impossible odds, this officer displayed unsurpassed courage and devotion to duty.’ (Pilot Officer Cyril Joe Barton, 578 Squadron, Halifax LK797; awarded for action 30/31 March 1944, London Gazette, 27 June 1944.)

Bombing up a Mosquito of 692 Squadron with a 4,000 lb ‘Cookie’.

An ORS report agreed with the comments regarding the wind and suggested that most problems were caused by the bombers becoming scattered and flying over heavily defended areas, although most losses were to night fighters. It was estimated that eighty bombers had been shot down en route to the target and that very few bombs actually fell on Nuremberg. In many respects it was just as well that the main focus of the Command for the next few months would be support of the invasion – and by the time they returned in strength to Germany the overall war situation, and the capabilities of the Luftwaffe, had changed.

Although pre-invasion targets were the main priority from March 1944 the Command continued to attack targets in Germany, including yet another attack on Schweinfurt. This raid took place on the night of 26/27 April and was primarily a No. 5 Group affair by 206 Lancasters supported by eleven Mosquitoes, along with nine specialist Lancasters from No. 1 Group. The low-level marking that had been proving so successful was for once inaccurate and the attack was scattered. Once again the high-level winds were stronger than forecast and the delay en route meant that the German night fighter force was able to take a heavy toll of the attackers; twenty-one Lancasters (9.3 per cent) were lost. The Schweinfurt attack saw the award of a VC to Sergeant Norman Jackson, although this was not promulgated until after the war; his citation read: This airman was the flight engineer in a Lancaster detailed to attack Schweinfurt on the night of 26 April 1944. Bombs were dropped successfully and the aircraft was climbing out of the target area. Suddenly it was attacked by a fighter at about 20,000 feet. The captain took evading action at once, but the enemy secured many hits. A fire started near a petrol tank on the upper surface of the starboard wing, between the fuselage and the inner engine. Sergeant Jackson was thrown to the floor during the engagement. Wounds which he received from shell splinters in the right leg and shoulder were probably sustained at that time. Recovering himself, he remarked that he could deal with the fire on the wing and obtained his captain’s permission to try to put out the flames. Pushing a hand fire-extinguisher into the top of his life-saving jacket and clipping on his parachute pack, Sergeant Jackson jettisoned the escape hatch above the pilot’s head. He then started to climb out of the cockpit and back along the top of the fuselage to the starboard wing. Before he could leave the fuselage his parachute pack opened and the whole canopy and rigging lines spilled into the cockpit. Undeterred, Sergeant Jackson continued. The pilot, bomb aimer and navigator gathered the parachute together and held on to the rigging lines, paying them out as the airman crawled aft. Eventually he slipped and, falling from the fuselage to the starboard wing, grasped an air intake on the leading edge of the wing. He succeeded in clinging on but lost the extinguisher, which was blown away.

By this time, the fire had spread rapidly and Sergeant Jackson was injured. His face, hands and clothing were severely burnt. Unable to retain his hold, he was swept through the flames and over the trailing edge of the wing, dragging his parachute behind. When last seen it was only partly inflated and was burning in a number of places. Realising that the fire could not be controlled, the captain gave the order to abandon aircraft. Four of the remaining members of the crew landed safely. The captain and rear gunner have not been accounted for. Sergeant Jackson was unable to control his descent and landed heavily. He sustained a broken ankle, his right eye was closed through burns and his hands were useless. These injuries, together with the wounds received earlier, reduced him to a pitiable state. At daybreak he crawled to the nearest village, where he was taken prisoner. He bore the intense pain and discomfort of the journey to Dulag Luft with magnificent fortitude. After 10 months in hospital he made a good recovery, though his hands require further treatment and are only of limited use. This airman’s attempt to extinguish the fire and save the aircraft and crew from falling into enemy hands was an act of outstanding gallantry. To venture outside, when travelling at 200 miles an hour, at a great height and in intense cold, was an almost incredible feat. Had he succeeded in subduing the flames, there was little or no prospect of his regaining the cockpit. The spilling of his parachute and the risk of grave damage to its canopy reduced his chances of survival to a minimum. By his ready willingness to face these dangers he set an example of self sacrifice which will ever be remembered.’ (Sergeant Norman Cyril Jackson, 106 Squadron RAF, Lancaster ME669; awarded for action 26/27 April 1944, London Gazette, 26 October 1945.)

Normandy Campaign: April 1944 to August 1944

As highlighted in the overview chapter the employment of the heavy bombers of Bomber Command and the US 8th Air Force was crucial to the Allied pre-invasion strategy in order to prepare the battlefield. The major problems were that of ensuring a successful initial landing on the heavily fortified Atlantic Wall and, even more crucially, ensuring that once ashore the troops would not be pushed back into the sea. The heavy bombers were involved in both parts of this strategy. One of the main elements of this as far as Bomber Command was concerned was attacks on lines of communication, especially the railway network. The first of the series of attacks on key French rail centres took place on 6/7 March, the target being Trappes. The 261 Halifaxes and six Mosquitoes attacked in good weather and delivered an accurate attack that proved the viability of night attacks on this type of target. Over the next few weeks Bomber Command caused heavy damage to a number of rail yards and, whilst the Germans proved adept at repairing through lines, the overall effect of the attacks caused massive disruption to rail traffic, especially where follow-up attacks were made on key nodes such as Amiens.

The Aulnoye Railway Centre before the attack by Bomber Command on 27/28 April 1944.

The Aulnoye Railway Centre after Bomber Command had dropped 931 tons on the yard on 27/28 April 1944. The area depicted is approximately 1,000 yards by 600 yards. Notice the elimination of the main road across the top of the picture and the appearance of a rough winding track in its place: also the disappearance of the branch railway line, passing under the road, and the road junction (top right).

On the night of 3/4 May 1944 the Command suffered one of its most disastrous nights when forty-two bombers were lost on what should have been as ‘easy’ target in support of the forthcoming invasion. The target was the large military camp at Mailly-le-Camp and 362 bombers took part. The Bomber Command ORS report stated that the target was ‘attacked by Lancasters with devastating effect in bright moonlight. Extremely heavy and widespread damage was caused, but forty-two aircraft (11.6 per cent) were lost. The high losses were associated with the delay in the issuing of instructions by the Master Bomber due to communications difficulties; this resulted in aircraft concentrating over the datum point in ideal weather conditions for fighters.

The first intercepts occurred on the south-east leg beyond Compiegne, and at first the enemy lost more heavily than did the bombers, losing three, probably four, fighters before we turned south. Then the unfortunate delay before the Main Force received their instructions resulted in concentration of our aircraft over the datum point in bright moonlight, presenting fighters with great opportunities for wholesale interceptions. The attack lasted 19 minutes longer than had been planned and it was during this period that most of the losses occurred. At least twenty-five aircraft fell in combat and nine were lost to flak, mostly over the target.’ The 1,500 tons of bombs caused massive damage and destroyed large numbers of vehicles, including thirty-seven tanks.

30/31 May 1944; Bombs going down onto a coastal gun battery at Boulogne as part of the softening-up of enemy defences before the invasion.

Whilst rail targets remained the most important target category for Bomber Command’s support of the invasion preparations, other targets were also hit, some with no great expectation of results but considered important as part of the overall preparation. This included the fixed coastal gun batteries that dominated the approach routes and from April onwards, and particularly from late May, this type of target became a regular feature, with some key batteries such as that at Boulogne being attacked a number of times. Typical of these attacks was that of the night of 30/31 May when fifty Lancasters and four Mosquitoes attacked the batteries at Boulogne.

The lines of communication campaign remained crucial in the weeks after the invasion. The rail yards at Cambrai were the target on the night of 12/13 June and Pilot Officer Andrew Mynarski of 419 Squadron was awarded a posthumous VC for his action that night. His citation read: ‘Pilot Officer Mynarski was the mid-upper gunner of a Lancaster aircraft, detailed to attack a target at Cambrai in France, on the night of 12 June, 1944. The aircraft was attacked from below and astern by an enemy fighter and ultimately came down in flames.

‘As an immediate result of the attack, both port engines failed. Fire broke out between the mid-upper turret and the rear turret, as well as in the port wing. The flames soon became fierce and the captain ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft. Pilot Officer Mynarski left his turret and went towards the escape hatch. He then saw that the rear gunner was still in his turret and apparently unable to leave it. The turret was, in fact, immovable, since the hydraulic gear had been put out of action when the port engines failed, and the manual gear had been broken by the gunner in his attempts to escape. Without hesitation, Pilot Officer Mynarski made his way through the flames in an endeavour to reach the rear turret and release the gunner. Whilst so doing, his parachute and his clothing, up to the waist, were set on fire. All his efforts to move the turret and free the gunner were in vain. Eventually the rear gunner clearly indicated to him that there was nothing more he could do and that he should try to save his own life. Pilot Officer Mynarski reluctantly went back through the flames to the escape hatch. There, as a last gesture to the trapped gunner, he turned towards him, stood to attention in his flaming clothing and saluted, before he jumped out of the aircraft. Pilot Officer Mynarski’s descent was seen by French people on the ground. Both his parachute and clothing were on fire. He was found eventually by the French, but was so severely burnt that he died from his injuries. The rear gunner had a miraculous escape when the aircraft crashed. He subsequently testified that, had Pilot Officer Mynarski not attempted to save his comrade’s life, he could have left the aircraft in safety and would, doubtless, have escaped death. Pilot Officer Mynarski must have been fully aware that in trying to free the rear gunner he was almost certain to lose his own life. Despite this, with outstanding courage and complete disregard for his own safety, he went to the rescue. Willingly accepting the danger, Pilot Officer Mynarski lost his life by a most conspicuous act of heroism which called for valour of the highest order.’ (Pilot Officer Andrew Charles Mynarski, RCAF, 419 (RCAF) Squadron, Lancaster KB726; awarded for action 12/13 June 1944, London Gazette, 11 October 1946.)

Len Manning’s crew joined 57 Squadron at East Kirkby in Lincolnshire at the end of June 1944: ‘We did several training flights on Lancasters before our first op on the 15 July. This was a raid on the railway goods yards at Nevers in the south of France, which was spectacular but uneventful.’ On 18 July the crew was scheduled for the massed daylight bombing raid on the area around Caen … ‘We dropped our bombs and as we turned for home I had a Grandstand view from the rear turret, the whole area was covered in smoke and dust to about 5,000 feet. It was also an amazing sight to see so many planes in the sky at one time, something that we never saw during our usual night time activities. We took off for this raid at 4.00 am and on our return, straight after debriefing we were told that we were ‘On’ again that night. This was to prove to be our third and last op with 57 Squadron.

‘On the evening of 18 July, we took off for Revigny in northern France. After crossing the coast. We were coned by searchlights and during our evasive action we lost the protection of the ‘Bomber Stream’ and became vulnerable to attack by enemy fighters. Having lost the searchlights, we set a new course for the target. Shortly after this there was an enormous explosion in the port wing, we had been hit by cannon fire. Immediately flames were streaming past my turret, which had stopped working as the pumps for the turrets were operated by the port engine. I centralized the turret by hand and opened the door into the fuselage and climbed in. Fred Taylor our mid-upper gunner was already out of his turret and was clipping his chute onto his harness, he struggled to open the rear door, having done this he leapt into the night. By this time the fuselage was a mass of flame and molten metal, the aircraft was now in a steep dive. My chute, which was stowed on the port side had started to smoulder. I pulled it from the stowage and struggled to clip it onto my harness, this was difficult due, to the ‘G’ force. I managed to clip the chute onto one of the clips but the other was impossible. With every- thing burning, I thought ‘It’s now or never’ and leapt through the door into the night. As I fell, I pulled the rip-cord and hoped that it would open. And as you can see, it did!

‘I was hanging to one side, I felt something brush my face, it was the intercom cord which was attached to my helmet and had been whipped off when the chute opened and had become entangled in the silk shrouds. I grabbed the cord and hung on. This probably saved my life, as it helped to take my weight. My helmet should have been removed before I jumped. I looked up and saw that the chute was burning and hoped that I would get down before it fell apart. On the way down there was a terrific explosion, this was the Lancaster exploding as it hit the ground at Bassevelle, which is about 60 miles east of Paris.

Massed heavy bombers used in support of the ground offensive near Caen in an attempt to break the deadlock.

‘I hit the ground flat on my back, which winded me. My chute had started to burn – I quickly smothered the flames, bundled the chute and pushed it into a hedge and headed off into the darkness. I staggered on for about 8 miles before collapsing on the step of a farmhouse. The farmer must have heard me moaning, as the burns to my face and arms were giving me great pain. He took me in and with his wife put me to bed. The following day I was given civilian clothes to replace my burned uniform and boots. The Germans came looking for me at the farm but the farmer convinced them that I had not been seen. But in view of this, it was decided to move me on again. A member of the resistance, who’s codename was “Lulu” came for me and we travelled across country to avoid German patrols. At one stage my guide indicated that he was lost and would have to call at a house to ask the way! He handed me a Luger pistol, hid me in the hedge and told me to shoot if he ran into trouble. We eventually arrived at a small cafe in the village of La Tretois, which was owned by two elderly ladies, Louise Beaujard and her mother. Although they didn’t speak English they made me very welcome and I was given a room in their hotel across the courtyard.

‘I had the run of the orchard behind the hotel, but the cafe was out of bounds except at meal times. One morning some jubilant young resistance men arrived and told us that the Americans had arrived outside the village and were setting up a field hospital. The following day I went down and found an officer who said that he would take me to Paris the following day. That night there was a large party in the village to celebrate their liberation; all the good wines came out of hiding, for the wining and dining. My charred battle dress also appeared, having been darned and pressed. A good night was had by one and all!’

Only three of the crew escaped the Lancaster; the mid-upper gunner, Fred Taylor, was another escaper whilst the Navigator, Rusty Ruston, was taken prisoner. The aircraft had been shot down by Herbert Altner, a night fighter experten flying a Bf 110, who claimed five bombers in the space of 30 minutes. The attack on the railway junction at Revigny was made by a force of Lancasters from No. 5 Group – they were caught by fighters and lost twenty-four aircraft (a 22 per cent loss rate), with 619 Squadron losing five of its thirteen aircraft.

Operation Goodwood called on Bomber Command to bomb defensive positions around Caen to support the British 2nd Army break-out attempt. Two major raids, 7 and 18 July, attacked fortified villages; the first attack was by 450 bombers and although it turned some strongpoints into rubble it did not achieve any significant military advantage. The second attack, by twice as many aircraft, was more successful, although the Germans were able to retreat in good order. A third raid, 30 July by 700 bombers, attacked targets in the Normandy area to support American operations. Harris reckoned that a Main Force attack was the equivalent of a 4,000 gun barrage and this flying artillery was employed again in August with attacks on the 7/8th and 14th of the month. The first of these was by over 1,000 bombers and was remembered as an awesome sight by air and ground observers. The second was slightly smaller, 800 aircraft, and was in support of the 3rd Canadian Division attack on Falaise.

Crossbow and Noball

Tied in with the Normandy campaign was the offensive against the V-weapon sites and under the code names of Crossbow and Noball Bomber Command expended a large number of sorties against launch sites and storage facilities. This campaign also involved the USAAF’s 8th and 9th Air Forces as well as the Tactical Air Force and Air Defence of Great Britain (ADGB being a short-lived designation for Fighter Command.)

The V-weapon storage site at Trossy St Maximin was the target for a major attack on 4 August, during which Squadron Leader Ian Bazalgette acted as Master Bomber and for which he was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. His citation read: ‘On 4 August 1944, Squadron Leader Bazalgette was “master bomber” of a Pathfinder squadron detailed to mark an important target at Trossy St Maximin for the main bomber force. When nearing the target his Lancaster came under heavy anti-aircraft fire. Both starboard engines were put out of action and serious fires broke out in the fuselage and the starboard main-plane. The bomb aimer was badly wounded. As the deputy “master bomber” had already been shot down, the success of the attack depended on Squadron Leader Bazalgette and this he knew. Despite the appalling conditions in his burning aircraft, he pressed on gallantly to the target, marking and bombing it accurately. That the attack was successful was due to his magnificent effort. After the bombs had been dropped the Lancaster dived, practically out of control. By expert airmanship and great exertion Squadron Leader Bazalgette regained control. But the port inner engine then failed and the whole of the starboard main-plane became a mass of flames. Squadron Leader Bazalgette fought bravely to bring his aircraft and crew to safety. The mid-upper gunner was overcome by fumes. Squadron Leader Bazalgette then ordered those of his crew who were able to leave by parachute to do so. He remained at the controls and attempted the almost hopeless task of landing the crippled and blazing aircraft in a last effort to save the wounded bomb aimer and helpless air gunner. With superb skill, and taking great care to avoid a small French village nearby, he brought the aircraft down safely. Unfortunately, it then exploded and this gallant officer and his two comrades perished. His heroic sacrifice marked the climax of a long career of operations against the enemy. He always chose the more dangerous and exacting roles. His courage and devotion to duty were beyond praise.’ (Acting Squadron Leader Ian Willoughby Bazalgette, DFC, 635 Squadron RAF, Lancaster ND811; awarded for action 4 August 1944, London Gazette, 17 August 1945.)

No. 514 Squadron attack a V-weapon site in the Bois de Cassan, 3 August 1944. Bomber Command sent 1,114 aircraft to attack three V-weapon storage sites on this day.

Germany: the final offensive – August 1944 to May 1945

In the middle of August, Harris was given clearance to return to his major effort of the strategic campaign, although the bombers continued to provide assistance to the ground troops from time to time.

On the night of 25/26 August a force of 190 Lancasters and six Mosquitoes of No. 5 Group attacked Darmstadt in what was an unsuccessful attack due to the fact that the Master Bomber had to return early and his two deputies were shot down; target marking was poor and bombing was scattered. Bill Carmen was in one of the seven Lancasters lost that night – it was the thirty-third mission for this 83 Squadron crew and only two of them survived. ‘Our participation in this sortie was as part of the flare force, backing up the Bombing Leader and his deputy. Our route to the target was along the track of a raid up ahead of us heading for Russelheim [comprising 412 Lancasters], but falling short and attacking Darmstadt. All part of the cunning plans to confuse the enemy defences.

‘Just before we turned to line up on our approach to the target our air gunners had briefly caught a glimpse of a twin-engine night fighter but he moved away. I was busy with my radio equipment when without warning there was a tremendous explosion somewhere behind me in the rear of the aircraft. The bulkhead door just behind my right shoulder burst open and I looked back into a raging, menacing inferno of flames. We were carrying fifteen bundles of flares, each one constituting 1,000,000 candle-power. The intercom was dead and I knew I had no time to lose. I ripped off my helmet and oxygen mask, clipped my parachute pack onto the front of my harness and headed for the nose of the aircraft and the escape hatch in the floor of the bomb aimer’s compartment. My navigator was kneeling down on the floor groping for his parachute pack and he waved me forward. The noise from the screaming engines was deafening. I reached the skipper, who was still trying to regain control of the aircraft, and slapped his knee to let him know I was there. He pointed towards the front escape hatch. Our Flight Engineer and Bomb Aimer were crouched either side of the now open escape hatch and as far as I could see neither had his parachute on. Both of them indicated that I should jump.

‘I remember turning over and over; my parachute pack, attached to the harness clips, had pulled off my chest and was somewhere above my head. I had the presence of mind to pull on the harness webbing straps until my fingers found the chute release handle on the pack and pulled it.’ Bill Carmen landed in a forest and managed to evade capture for 30 hours before being spotted by a railway worker and arrested by the police. Bill was uncertain at the time if they had been hit by a fighter or by flak but the chances are that it was the former, and Hauptmann Tino Becker was credited with three Lancasters in the Darmstadt area that night.

Oil storage depot at Pauillac after the attack of 4 August 1944; 288 Lancasters attacked two oil sites in good weather and delivered accurate attacks.

Allen Clifford recalled the attack on Homberg 8 November 1944: ‘If ever there was a low point in anybody’s life this was it – to be woken at 0400 hours knowing that you were going to war. I crawled out of a warm bed into a frozen Nissen hut at Methwold, gathered up towel and soap and shivered miserably in the wintry gap between the hut and the ablutions blocks to splash water over my face – but no time to shave. The breakfast of bacon and egg, and a mug of hot sweet tea preceded the briefing. The red tape, which slithered disconcertingly across the map like a long trail of blood, led from Norfolk to a suburb of the huge German inland river port and industrial city of Duisberg. “It’s bloody Homberg again” we all thought.’

Darmstadt September 1944.

This attack on 8 November consisted of 136 Lancasters from No. 3 Group and only one aircraft was lost, a Lancaster of 218 Squadron. This was the twenty-first operation for Allen. The crew was skippered by an Australian, Flying Officer Les Hough, and having been dropped at dispersal they climbed aboard Lancaster HA-C. According to the briefing the weather would be clear as far as the German border and then the aircraft would enter a bank of cloud to the target area. It turned out to be the reverse. ‘Over France we flew into heavy cloud and the tail wind was much higher than predicted and we were ahead of ETA as we broke into clear sunshine near the Rhine. The bombers were scattered having split up because of the cloud and so we were a straggling group of aircraft rather than a neat formation. We were at the front at 18,000 ft so had no protection from window; one minute the sky was clear and the next it was full of bursting shells. The bomb doors were open on the long approach to the target when we were hit by a savage burst of flak. A fearsome clatter was followed by smoke swirling into the fuselage.’ When the smoke cleared there was a 4-foot hole by the rear door and the starboard inner engine was on fire. Despite the best efforts of Flight Engineer Jack Tales the fire could not be extinguished and he began pumping fuel from tanks near the fire across to those in the port wing. Les Hough had maintained course to the target and just after the bombs were released the starboard outer engine failed. There was a torrent of flames over the starboard wing as the Skipper turned west to try and make the Allied lines. We were now clawing our way against the wind and our ground speed dropped to 80 mph. The wing was burning fiercely and had begun to “flop” so Les ordered everyone out.’ The Engineer found the pilot’s parachute and clipped it on him before heading for the escape hatch. Allen exchanged waves with the grim-faced pilot, still at the controls, and dropped headfirst through the hatch. He was dragged out like a leaf by the slipstream, which whipped his helmet away. As he fell on his back another figure exited the aircraft. They were still in the area where flak was exploding and no-one had thought to explain the advantage of getting away as quickly as possible from this area. Indeed, the only ‘how to parachute’ drill had been a few landing rolls on a mat in the gym. As Allen pulled his ripcord 300 feet below the blazing Lancaster the starboard wing broke off and he watched the remains of his aircraft fall past and explode on the ground. He looked up again and saw the remaining Lancasters heading home. ‘Suddenly it was all quiet, you could hear the swishing of the wind and it seemed a very long way to the ground. I was being blown over Duisburg and at less than 3,000 feet I could hear the phhht phhht of rifle and machine gun bullets as people on the ground were firing at me. You don’t realise until you are near the ground how fast you are falling, and I shot past a big town-clock as all-clear sirens were wailing. My flying boots hit the roof of an old three-storey house and I went through to my waist and was jammed and unable to move. I saw a dozen men of the Volksturm in the garden shooting at me with rifles, bullets hitting the roof all around me. I undid my parachute harness, wriggled like mad and fell through into the attic’ He was picked up and roughly treated by a group of men. Fortunately he was rescued by a Luftwaffe Feldwebel who told him he would be ok if he avoided the SS; he was delivered to a police station and was soon joined by Stan Lee. That afternoon they were paraded by armed soldiers through Duisberg with people shouting ‘terrorflieger’ and throwing stones at them. They were put up against a wall and were about to be shot when a woman intervened and saved their lives. Others of the crew had not been so lucky. Three had died in the aircraft and at least one had been murdered by the SS. Allen and Stan ended up in Stalag Luft IIIA at Luckenwalde, near Potsdam.

Lancasters of 428 Squadron, Middleton St George November 1944.

Duisburg October 1944.

Oil targets featured a number of times in subsequent weeks, although German cities, especially those with major rail yards, were still very much on the list, including a number of daylight attacks. On 23 December the Command sent 153 aircraft, all from No. 3 Group, to attack rail yards at Trier in support of US Army operations, whilst a smaller force of twenty-seven Lancasters and three Mosquitoes from No. 8 Group attacked the rail yards of Gremberg at Cologne. The lead Lancaster was flown by Squadron Leader R. A. Palmer (a 109 Squadron pilot but flying with 582 Squadron) and despite the weather conditions being unfavourable he made an Oboe run that exposed the aircraft to Cologne’s heavy flak. He was awarded a posthumous VC for this attack, the citation reading: This officer has completed numerous bombing missions [this was his 110 th op]. Most of them involved deep penetration of heavily defended territory; many were low-level ‘marking’ operations against vital targets; all were executed with tenacity, high courage and great accuracy. He first went on operations in January 1941. He took part in the first thousand bomber raid against Cologne in 1942. He was one of the first pilots to drop a 4,000 lb bomb on the Reich. It was known that he could be relied on to press home his attack whatever the opposition and to bomb with great accuracy. He was always selected, therefore, to take part in special operations against vital targets. The finest example of his courage and determination was on 23 December 1944, when he led a formation of Lancasters to attack the marshalling yards at Cologne in daylight. He had the task of marking the target and his formation had been ordered to bomb as soon as the bombs had gone from his, the leading aircraft. The leader’s duties during the final bombing run were exacting and demanded coolness and resolution. To achieve accuracy he would have to fly at an exact height and air speed on a steady course, regardless of opposition. Some minutes before the target was reached, his aircraft came under heavy anti-aircraft fire, shells burst all around, two engines were set on fire and there were flames and smoke in the nose and in the bomb bay. Enemy fighters now attacked in force. Squadron Leader Palmer disdained the possibility of taking avoiding action. He knew that if he diverged the least bit from his course, he would be unable to utilise the special equipment to the best advantage. He was determined to complete the run and provide an accurate and easily seen aiming-point for the other bombers. He ignored the double risk of fire and explosion in his aircraft and kept on. With its engines developing unequal power, an immense effort was needed to keep the damaged aircraft on a straight course. Nevertheless, he made a perfect approach and his bombs hit the target. His aircraft was last seen spiralling to earth in flames. Such was the strength of the opposition that more than half of his formation failed to return. Squadron Leader Palmer was an outstanding pilot. He displayed conspicuous bravery. His record of prolonged and heroic endeavour is beyond praise.’ (Acting Squadron Leader Robert Anthony Maurice Palmer, DFC, 109 Squadron RAF, Lancaster PB371; awarded for action 23 December 1944, London Gazette, 23 March 1945.)

A daylight attack on the rail yards at Rheydt by 200 Lancasters and eleven Mosquitoes on 27 December 1944.

The campaign against rail and oil installations continued into early 1945, although the New Year opened with yet another special raid when No. 5 Group sent 102 Lancasters and two Mosquitoes to attack the Dortmund-Ems canal, a target that Bomber Command had visited a number of times since 1940. The canal was breached near Ladbergen and only two Lancasters were lost, although a number of others were damaged by flak. One of these was a 9 Squadron aircraft – and Flight Sergeant George Thompson’s gallant aid to injured comrades earned him a VC. His citation read: This airman was the wireless operator in a Lancaster aircraft which attacked the Dortmund-Ems Canal in daylight on the 1 January 1945. The bombs had just been released when a heavy shell hit the aircraft in front of the mid-upper turret. Fire broke out and dense smoke filled the fuselage. The nose of the aircraft was then hit and an inrush of air, clearing the smoke, revealed a scene of utter devastation. Most of the Perspex screen of the nose compartment had been shot away, gaping holes had been torn in the canopy above the pilot’s head, the inter-communication wiring was severed, and there was a large hole in the floor of the aircraft. Bedding and other equipment were badly damaged or alight; one engine was on fire.

‘Flight Sergeant Thompson saw that the gunner was unconscious in the blazing mid-upper turret. Without hesitation he went down the fuselage into the fire and the exploding ammunition. He pulled the gunner from his turret and, edging his way round the hole in the floor, carried him away from the flames. With his bare hands, he extinguished the gunner’s burning clothing. He himself sustained serious burns on his face, hands and legs. Flight Sergeant Thompson then noticed that the rear gun turret was also on fire. Despite his own severe injuries he moved painfully to the rear of the fuselage where he found the rear gunner with his clothing alight, overcome by flames and fumes. A second time Flight Sergeant Thompson braved the flames. With great difficulty he extricated the helpless gunner and carried him clear. Again, he used his bare hands, already burnt, to beat out flames on a comrade’s clothing.

‘Flight Sergeant Thompson, by now almost exhausted, felt that his duty was yet not done. He must report the fate of the crew to the captain. He made the perilous journey back through the burning fuselage, clinging to the sides with his burnt hands to get across the hole in the floor. The flow of cold air caused him intense pain and frost-bite developed. So pitiful was his condition that his captain failed to recognise him. Still, his only concern was for the two gunners he had left in the rear of the aircraft. He was given such attention as was possible until a crash-landing was made some 40 minutes later.

‘When the aircraft was hit, Flight Sergeant Thompson might have devoted his efforts to quelling the fire and so have contributed to his own safety. He preferred to go through the fire to succour his comrades. He knew that he would then be in no position to hear or heed any order which might be given to abandon aircraft. He hazarded his own life in order to save the lives of others. Young in years and experience, his actions were those of a veteran. Three weeks later Flight Sergeant Thompson died of his injuries. One of the gunners unfortunately also died, but the other owes his life to the superb gallantry of Flight Sergeant Thompson, whose signal courage and self-sacrifice will ever be an inspiration to the Service.’ (Flight Sergeant George Thompson, 9 Squadron RAF, Lancaster PD377; awarded for action 1 January 1945, London Gazette, 20 February 1945.)

H2S radar picture of attack on Zeitz oil facility 16117 January 1945.

Bomber Command was now ranging across Germany attacking a variety of targets, some in support of land operations as Allied forces closed in from west and east, and others in a more strategic sense. The most infamous of Bomber Command raids in the eyes of some post-war commentators was the attack on Dresden as part of Operation Thunderclap. On the night of 13/14 February the Command sent two waves of bombers, three hours apart, to attack Dresden. The first wave consisted of 244 Lancasters from No. 5 Group and although the accuracy of the attack was hampered by cloud the city was hit. The second wave comprised over 500 bombers and a further 1,800 tons of bombs were dropped in clear weather. Six Lancasters failed to return but Dresden was devastated and as the city’s population has been boosted by refugees there was heavy loss of life. The Bomber Command attack was followed the next day by 311 USAAF B-17s, adding to the destruction and confusion.

Bomber Command’s last Victoria Cross was won on the night of 23/24 February, the award going to Captain Edwin Swales of 582 Squadron, a South African operating as Master Bomber for the attack on Pforzheim. His citation read: ‘Captain Swales was “master bomber” of a force of aircraft which attacked Pforzheim on the night of 23 February 1945. As “master bomber” he had the task of locating the target area with precision and of giving aiming instructions to the main force of bombers following in his wake. Soon after he had reached the target area he was engaged by an enemy fighter and one of his engines was put out of action. His rear guns failed. His crippled aircraft was an easy prey to further attacks. Unperturbed, he carried on with his allotted task; clearly and precisely he issued aiming instructions to the Main Force. Meanwhile the enemy fighter closed the range and fired again. A second engine of Captain Swales’ aircraft was put out of action. Almost defenceless, he stayed over the target area issuing his aiming instructions until he was satisfied that the attack had achieved its purpose. It is now known that the attack was one of the most concentrated and successful of the war.

‘Captain Swales did not, however, regard his mission as completed. His aircraft was damaged. Its speed had been so much reduced that it could only with difficulty be kept in the air. The blind-flying instruments were no longer working. Determined at all costs to prevent his aircraft and crew from falling into enemy hands, he set course for home. After an hour he flew into thin-layered cloud. He kept his course by skilful flying between the layers, but later heavy cloud and turbulent air conditions were met. The aircraft, by now over friendly territory, became more and more difficult to control; it was losing height steadily. Realising that the situation was desperate Captain Swales ordered his crew to bale out. Time was very short and it required all his exertions to keep the aircraft steady while each of his crew moved in turn to the escape hatch and parachuted to safety. Hardly had the last crew-member jumped when the aircraft plunged to earth. Captain Swales was found dead at the controls. Intrepid in the attack, courageous in the face of danger, he did his duty to the last, giving his life that his comrades might live.’ (Captain Edwin Swales, DFC, SAAF, 582 Squadron RAF, Lancaster PB538. Awarded for action 23 February 1945, London Gazette, 24 April 1945.) The attack had been made by 367 Lancasters and thirteen Mosquitoes, with ten Lancasters being lost (plus two others that crash-landed in France).

During March and April the mix of target types continued, with Main Force raids comprising anything from 300 to 1,100 bombers. Cities that had previously only received light damage were now devastated by Bomber Command’s accurate delivery of heavy bomb loads. The final Main Force operations against Germany took place by day on 25 April 1945, the targets being Wangerooge and Berchtesgaden. The attack on Wangarooge was made by 482 bombers, over 300 of which were Halifaxes, for the loss of seven aircraft (six of these in mid-air collisions). The aim of the attack was to destroy coastal gun batteries that controlled the approaches to the ports of Bremen and Wilhelmshaven and to prepare the way for a possible amphibious assault. The attack was made in good weather and was a success, although as usual with established fortified gun emplacements direct damage was fairly light. The attack on Berchtesgaden was highly popular with the crews that took part as it struck at Hitler’s famous Eagles Nest chalet – and the associated SS barracks. The 359 Lancasters and sixteen Mosquitoes made an accurate attack and the bomb load included the last operational drop of the Tallboy.

One of the last major bombing targets Heligoland, 18 April 1945.

The Command’s final operational bombing mission took place on 2/3 May after a break without ops of almost a week. This was an all Mosquito affair against Kiel to destroy shipping in the harbour. A total of 126 Mosquitoes attacked in two waves, with a further fifty-three Mosquitoes flying support, primarily airfield intruder, in the Kiel area. Only one Mosquito, from 169 Squadron, was lost. The only heavies airborne were eighty-nine aircraft from No. 100 Group flying Radio Countermeasures (RCM) support and tragically two of these were lost, probably in a mid-air collision. These three aircraft, from which only three of the Halifax crewmen survived, were the last operational losses suffered by Bomber Command.

A force of forty-six Lancasters (twelve from No. 3 Group, thirty-four from No. 6 Group) were airborne on the evening of 3 May to drop mines in the Kattegat, Laeso Rende and Aalborg areas as part of the campaign aimed at preventing Nazi die-hards escaping. However, the mission was cancelled and the bombers were recalled shortly after take-off: thus ended the last offensive sortie that Bomber Command despatched in the Second World War. This brought to a close nearly six years of war for Bomber Command.

Operations Exodus, Manna and Dodge

By the time these final operational mission were being flown, Bomber Command had turned most of its effort to more peaceful pursuits under Operations Exodus and Manna. Operation Exodus, the repatriation of British PoWs from Europe, commenced on 26 April and in the period to 7 May Lancasters flew 469 sorties bringing home 75,000 personnel. On 29 April the Command flew the first of almost 3,000 sorties under Operation Manna to air-drop food to the starving Dutch population in that area of the country still occupied by the Germans. The final Manna sortie on 7 May involved 561 aircraft comprising 299 Lancasters of No. 1 Group, 217 Lancasters of No. 3 Group and twenty-seven Lancasters plus eighteen Mosquitoes from No. 8 Group. The main food drops took place at Kralingsche Plas (Rotterdam), Valkenburg airfield, Ypenburg airfield, the racecourse at the Hague and Gouda. The final part of this trio of humanitarian operations, Dodge, involved flying British personnel from Italy.

Before looking at Bomber Command’s post-1945 operations, there are a number of specific Second World War ‘campaigns’ to review.

THE MARITIME WAR

Although in September 1939 the Command’s first operational bombing missions were flown against German warships this was not from any strategic desire to attack these targets but was down to political constraints that prevented attacks on ‘real’ strategic targets such as German industry. These early anti-shipping operations by the medium bombers, and the light bombers of No. 2 Group, were covered above. However, as the maritime war progressed, and with the German capital ships and U-boats creating havoc in Britain’s vital sea lanes, maritime targets became far more important and Bomber Command expended a great deal of effort against such targets. There were three aspects to this:

1.Attacks on U-boat facilities.

2.Attacks on capital ships in harbour.

3.Attacks on industry associated with U-boat construction.

Of the capital ships there were three that appeared frequently in Bomber Command records: Gniesenau, Scharnhorst, and Tirpitz, and the Command expended a great deal of effort in trying to destroy these warships. Attacks on docks and maritime cities, such as Kiel and Hamburg, and other maritime installations, combined with the minelaying campaign, were aimed at German military and commercial shipping and without doubt had a major effect on the enemy’s capability. The anti-shipping campaign involved the medium and heavy bombers as well as the light bombers of No. 2 Group; the latter flew thousands of anti-shipping sorties, with the Blenheims continuing to shoulder the bulk of this work. On 28 April 1941 Blenheims of 101 Squadron, with fighter escort, flew the first Channel Stop, an attempt to close the English Channel to daylight German shipping. With the Germans employing flak ships and providing fighter escort this coastal shipping was by no means an easy target. However, the focus here will be on the three ships mentioned by name.

Salmon and Gluckstein

The warships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, often referred to as ‘Salmon’ and ‘Gluckstein’ by RAF crews, were high on the target list whenever they appeared in Brest, the major naval base in France for the German capital ships. On one Atlantic foray they had sunk twenty-two Allied ships and when Bomber Command’s main priority was switched to the maritime war in March 1941 these two ships were attacked a number of times in the following weeks.

After the 4/5 April attack on Brest, the Gneisenau was moved out of her dry dock because of the threat posed by unexploded bombs – and whilst in clear water she was damaged by a torpedo attack by Coastal Command Beauforts. Back in dry dock she was hit by at least four bombs on the night of 10/11 April. Brest was ‘visited’ a number of times day and night over the next few months and although the current range of bombs was not capable of destroying these armoured vessels they caused damage to the ships, the dock facilities and the capability of the repair teams. The arrival of the cruiser Prinz Eugen in Brest in late May added even more interest in attacking this port.

Halifax over Brest docks; this naval target – home to major German warships – was a frequent target in the Command’s contribution to the maritime war.

One final daylight raid is worthy of mention. Bremen harbour was attacked on 4 July by 112 Blenheims of 105 Squadron led by Wing Commander Hughie Edwards and despite the lack of cloud cover the bombers pressed home their attack in the face of heavy flak, with four aircraft being shot down. For his tenacious leadership of this raid Hugh Edwards was awarded the VC, his citation reading: ‘Wing Commander Edwards, although handicapped by a physical disability resulting from a flying accident, has repeatedly displayed gallantry of the highest order in pressing home bombing attacks from very low heights against strongly defended objectives. On 4 July 1941, he led an important attack on the Port of Bremen, one of the most heavily defended towns in Germany. This attack had to be made in daylight and there were no clouds to afford concealment. During the approach to the German coast several enemy ships were sighted and Wing Commander Edwards knew that his aircraft would be reported and that the defences would be in a state of readiness. Undaunted by this misfortune he brought his formation 50 miles overland to the target, flying at a height of little more than 50 feet, passing under high-tension cables, carrying away telegraph wires and finally passing through a formidable balloon barrage. On reaching Bremen he was met with a hail of fire, all his aircraft being hit and four of them being destroyed. Nevertheless he made a most successful attack, and then with the greatest skill and coolness withdrew the surviving aircraft without further loss. Throughout the execution of this operation which he had planned personally with knowledge of the risks entailed, Wing Commander Edwards displayed the highest possible standard of gallantry and determination.’ (Acting Wing Commander Hugh Idwal Edwards, 105 Squadron, Blenheim V6028. Awarded for action 4 July 1941, London Gazette, 22 July 1941.)

With the termination of the main four-month anti-naval effort in early July 1941 the bombers returned their focus on Germany. The net effect of the attacks, including twenty-four major raids on Brest, was one of negating, for a period of time, the operational capability of these major German naval assets. It was not quite the end because a special raid was called on 23/24 July when Scharnhorst moved from Brest to La Pallice; a raid by thirty Whitleys overnight was followed by a fighter-escorted daytime attack on Brest, La Pallice and Cherbourg. Brest was targeted by 100 bombers, including the operational debut of the Boeing B-17 Fortress with Bomber Command, three aircraft of 90 Squadron taking part. The attack was reasonably accurate and the defences caused little damage. It was a different story at La Pallice where the unescorted Halifaxes of 35 and 76 Squadrons lost five of their number to fighters and had to face heavy flak over the target. Despite this, the bombers scored five direct hits and Scharnhorst had to return to the dry dock in Brest.

A final burst of activity occurred in December with an Air Ministry signal of 10 December instructing Bomber Command to give ‘highest priority to the destruction of enemy capital ships’ with a ‘suggestion’ for a series of daylight attacks on Brest. This target was attacked a number of times in December, the largest raid being 121 bombers on 17/18th of the month.

Daylight attack by Venturas on a whaling ship in Cherbourg docks, 15 April 1943.

Before closing the story for 1941 it is worth highlighting the statistics from a report into the anti-shipping activities of No. 2 Group. In the period March to October 1941 the Group had flown 2,320 such sorties, during which it lost 126 aircraft. As with all statistics the picture is somewhat skewed as on only 30 per cent of occasions were targets found, which meant an actual loss rate of 18 per cent, with a further 7 per cent seriously damaged. Of those losses it was estimated that 51 per cent were caused by anti-aircraft fire from the ships, 18 per cent to enemy aircraft, 5 per cent from colliding with ships, and 25 per cent to unknown causes. Of the 456 ships attacked it was estimated that seventy-two had been sunk and a further sixty-five seriously damaged. As with every other aspect of Bomber Command’s activities at this time, one of the main problems was lack of effective weapons – the 250 lb GP and SAP bombs were simply inadequate.

Camouflaged ships at Dunkirk under attack by twelve Bostons on 23 June 1942.

Brest had become such a hot spot for the warships that in February 1942 the Germans decided to move them to safer havens in Germany; the Channel Dash, as it became known was a risky venture and once it was learnt that the warships were loose – and in theory vulnerable – the RAF and Fleet Air Arm mounted an intensive search. Bomber Command was part of this, flying 242 sorties, none of which scored any hits. This also brought the operational debut of one of No. 2 Group’s new aircraft, the Bostons of 88 Squadron. It was an embarrassing period for the RAF in that the only damage caused to the warships was by mines, both Gneisenau and Scharnhorst hitting mines that were believed to have been laid by Hampdens of No. 5 Group. All the major vessels reached port safely.

Tirpitz

There was one German capital ship that occupied a great amount of Bomber Command effort, primarily because of Churchill’s determination to see it destroyed – the Tirpitz. John Morrison was a W/Op Air Gunner with 35 Squadron during the series of raids on the Tirpitz in April 1942. The crew of Halifax TL-G (W1053) took-off from Kinloss at 2021 on 27 April destined for Faettenfjord as part of a force of thirty-one Halifaxes and twelve Lancasters. By the time they reached the target area the ship’s smoke screen was in full force and an accurate attack was impossible: the crew dropped their load of mines in the general area. They landed back at Kinloss at 0455 and after debrief and breakfast retired to bed as the crew was on the roster for a repeat attack. Halifax W1053 left Kinloss at 2035 was part of a force of thirty-one Halifaxes and twelve Lancasters. Two of the Squadron’s aircraft failed to return, as did two other Halifaxes and a Lancaster. John Morrison recalled what happened. The outbound journey was uneventful and as we flew up Trondheim fjord Johnny Roe descended to 150 feet and before long it looked like we were entering hell. The aircraft was in the smoke screen and was being fired at by every gun in the area; the noise of the bullets and shrapnel hitting the aircraft was unbelievable and there were flashes of light and tracer in all directions. Reg Williams [the Navigator] shouted that the Tirpitz had swung round through 90 degrees and Johnny said we were going round again. However, the aircraft was hit badly and he told us to take up crash positions, at which point Reg went and jettisoned the mines.’ Halifax W1048 of 35 Squadron is now on show at the RAF Museum having been recovered in 1973 from Lake Hammer Vand (Hoklingen); Pilot Officer Macintyre’s (sic)subsequent debrief noted: ‘While over Trondheim at about 300 feet we were hit by light flak and set on fire. We crash-landed on Lake Hammer Vand at 0050. We left the aircraft burning furiously and later I heard that it sank through the ice in the morning.’ The crew escaped the crash and all managed to evade capture with the exception of Sergeant Stevens who had broken his leg and was taken prisoner. Wing Commander Don Bennett (later to be commander of the Pathfinder Force) was also shot down and managed to escape. The second attack, the following day, was equally without result, although hits were claimed, and cost another two Halifaxes.

In July a Russian submarine damaged the warship and put it in dry dock for six months, after which she was damaged again by a Royal Navy midget submarine.

The next air attacks were naval affairs in April, July and August 1944 – but all with no appreciable result. By this time Bomber Command had very large bombs and two special squadrons to drop them.

Aircrew discuss bomb plots following the final attack on the Tirpitz.

In early September 1944 it was rumoured that Tirpitz was about to leave its anchorage in Kaa Fjord, Norway and Operation Paravane was mounted in yet another attempt to destroy the ship. The attack was to be made by 9 and 617 Squadrons using Tallboybombs; which meant that they had to deploy to Yagodnik in Russia in order to have sufficient range. A detachment of thirty-eight Lancasters was led to Russia by OC 617 Squadron, Wing Commander ‘Willie’ Tait. The flight to Russia was fraught with problems because of poor weather and six Lancasters crashed; Flying Officer Ross, ‘Selected a long stretch of wooden road void of telegraph poles’ on which to land but had to abort his approach and put the aircraft down in nearby marshy land – with all crew surviving the crash. At 0630 on 15 September a force of twenty-eight Lancasters left Yagodnik at low level; twenty-one were armed with Tallboys and seven with Johnny Walker mines. There was no significant opposition and weather over the target was good – until the very effective smokescreen was put into action; seventeen Tallboys and all the mines were dropped but results were not observed. All the aircraft returned to Yagodnik and flew back to England a few days later. Subsequent reconnaissance showed that Tirpitz was damaged but still afloat. Further raids were planned but the Germans had already decided that damage was too severe to make the ship operationally seaworthy. Tirpitz was moved to Trondheim Fjord to be used as a floating gun battery; a move that brought it into the range of bombers from Scotland.

‘Willie’ Tait led forty Lancasters from 9 and 617 Squadrons out of Lossiemouth on 29 October but when they arrived the target was obscured by cloud; most of the Tallboys were dropped blind but with no result. On 12 November it was a different story and Tait’s thirty-one bombers found clear skies and having achieved complete surprise there was no opposition and no smokescreen. Bombing was accurate with a number of direct hits and near misses; at 0927 the battleship rolled over and sank. There was immediate debate, which has continued ever since, as which of the two squadrons delivered the crucial blows to Tirpitz; 617 Squadron claiming that with their SABS bombsight they were more accurate – as an ex 9 Squadron Navigator (Tornado period) this author refuses to accept this assertion!

Anti-shipping operations continued to the end of the war; indeed in the last few weeks of the war ships became prime targets with Allied fears that hard-core Nazis would try to escape to Norway.

U-boats

Whilst the capital ships might have made headlines it was the U-boat war that was far more important in strategic terms. German submarines had been operating in the sea lanes since the first days of the war but by mid 1940 they were proving increasingly effective and Bomber Command was asked to join in the battle against this threat. The first specific attack was made on the night of 2/3 September when thirty-nine Hampdens attacked the submarine base at Lorient. A new directive of 21 September had instructed the Command to allocate three squadrons for this campaign, with attacks on U-boat bases, crew training and rest centres, and manufacturing centres, including construction yards and component manufacturers.

U-boat pens at Brest under attack 15 April 1943; target photo by 21 Squadron.

For the remainder of the war Bomber Command played a direct part in countering this most effective of German threats, with attacks on U-boat construction facilities and component factories, including special attacks such as that against the MAN engine works at Augsburg, and U-boat bases, especially those in France. The minelaying campaign and, in Harris’s view, the general strategic offensive, also contributed to the overall campaign against the U-boats. The effect of attacks increased in the latter part of the war as accuracy improved and weapons became more effective, although the massive concrete U-boat pens were not seriously affected until the advent of the super-heavy bombs such as Grand Slam.

Minelaying (Gardening)

‘It is not unusual for the mine-laying aircraft to fly round and round for a considerable time in order to make quite sure that the mine is laid exactly in the correct place. It calls for great skill and resolution. Moreover, the crew does not have the satisfaction of seeing even the partial results of their work. There is no coloured explosion, no burgeoning of fire to report on their return home. At best all they see is a splash on the surface of a darkened and inhospitable sea.’ With these words, a Bomber Command report of 1941 summarised the minelaying role. I have covered this role in some detail as it is one of the most oft-ignored, yet vital contributions made by Bomber Command.

It had long been realised that two of the most effective weapons against shipping – merchant and military – were the torpedo and the mine; the latter being of particular value if it could be laid in sufficient quantity and with an element of secrecy. Air delivery was an obvious option and enabled the sea-mining campaign to be extended in range. However, the Admiralty, who held responsibility for naval warfare of this nature, did not place an order for air-dropped mines until July 1939 – and then only for thirty mines as a trial. These trials were completed in March the following year and production of the 1,500 lb (680 kg) A (for airborne) Mk 1 mine commenced.

On the night of 13/14 April 1940, a number of Hampdens flew to the Danish coast to lay the first mines in what was to develop into a major Bomber Command offensive. This campaign has remained one of the least recognised aspects of the Bomber Command story; yet, it occupied a huge slice of the overall Command effort – especially in the critical period of 1942–1943. As with so much of military history, the main reason that this campaign has been ‘sidelined’ is that it lacks ‘glamour’. It was lonely, it was dangerous, but it was rarely spectacular.

Minelaying, or Gardening as it was called involved the aircraft laying a mine (planting a vegetable) in a specific location. All of these locations were given suitable agricultural names (flowers and vegetables) in line with the general terminology implied by Gardening, although some areas were, for no particular reason given the names of sea-creatures. Amongst the most frequented areas were: Eglantine (the approach to Heligoland), Nectarines (Frisian Islands), Artichokes (Lorient) and Forget-Me-Not (Kiel Canal). There were just under 130 code names in total and some target areas were given more than one. Likewise, the mines themselves were often referred to by a suitable code-name rather than the somewhat more boring technical description such as a 1,000 lb AI Mk V. Without knowing the relevant codes for mine and area the recorded details in Operations Record Books (ORBs) appear very cryptic.

Bomber Command involvement in minelaying stemmed from a meeting held at the Air Ministry in early April 1940 at which representatives from Bomber Command, Coastal Command, and the Admiralty examined ways in which to execute the requirements of Western Air Plan 15 (WA15). Arthur Harris, as AOC of No. 5 Group, was confident that his crews would have no major problen in accurately dropping mines. It was his aircraft that would have to carry out this task, the Hampden being the only Bomber Command type at that time capable of carrying the existing generation of mines. The initial plan was for each Station with No. 5 Group to cover specific targets for the first series of drops, as follows:

Hemswell (61 and 144 Squadrons) – sixty mines to Kiel and Warnemunde.

Waddington (44 and 50 Squadrons) – sixty mines to Elbe and Swinemunde.

Scampton (49 and 83 Squadrons) – forty-two mines to Neustadt, Travemunde and Swinemunde.

The plan called for three sorties by each Station, of twenty aircraft per sortie, to be flown over a seven-day period on moonlit nights. It was a new role but crews were given no specific training; parameters were set as delivery height of 400–1,000 feet (122 to 305 m), speed below 200 mph (322 km/h), and the drop was to be carried out away from ships, lighthouses or likely places of observation – secrecy being the aim of the game.

In the event, the target areas were changed to reflect the operational requirements, hence the early missions went to Danish and Norwegian waters in an attempt to disrupt the German invasion of Scandinavia. The fifteen Hampdens (from all of the nominated units except 83 Squadron) which took part in the first operation of the night of 13/14 April 1940, laid their mines in Danish and southern Norwegian waters – one aircraft was lost (L4605 of 50 Squadron, Flight Lieutenant Cosgrove and crew). On the following night, twenty-eight Hampdens went out minelaying, with the loss of two aircraft.

During the following four weeks (up to 9/10 May) the Hampdens were minelaying on ten nights – a further 218 sorties, for the loss of four more aircraft. It had been an intensive period and lessons were quickly learnt and applied. Post-war research reveals it was also a successful start; at least three vessels (Nyborg, Odin and Christian IX) were damaged in the Great Belt, between Denmark and Sweden, in the latter part of April.

Each aircraft could carry only a single 1,500 lb (680 kg) A Mk I mine. As with so many other aspects of Bomber Command’s operations in the first half of the war, the major problem was one of navigation – how to get to the target area and then plant the vegetable in exactly the right spot. Navigation relied on Deduced Reckoning (DR) and whatever fixes, astro or visual, were available; the actual drop was usually carried out by timed run from a visual fixpoint in the area of the target. This was one of the most dangerous periods of the operation as it was quite likely that the area where the landfall was made would be defended, or at the very least that the aircraft would be spotted and reported upon.

The converse of this was that defended areas were often an aid to navigation! The Germans realised the dangers from an effective mining campaign and so the coastal defences were strengthened on land and sea. A number of old warships were converted into flak ships, with a formidable array of weapons – a ‘typical’ arrangement being five 105 mm, four 20 mm and one 30 mm, plus one or more searchlights. Later in the war, gun-laying radars were added to the ships to make them even more effective. New light flak positions sprang up in all the known mining areas and RDF (radar) stations were established to give early warning and fighter control.

After the early burst of activity in conjunction with the Norwegian campaign the minelaying impetus decreased. However, it remained a regular element of the Bomber Command task; with, on average, three Hampden squadrons on stand-by for minelaying duties (they were tasked on normal bomber ops as well).

At first the Command was given five general areas for its minelaying operations, part of a coordinated campaign being run by the Admiralty through Coastal Command; the areas being Norwegian waters, Danish waters, the Baltic, Kiel Canal and the Elbe estuary, and the Bay of Biscay. As the campaign progressed, and especially following the 1942 offer, by the new commander of Bomber Command – Arthur Harris, to drop 1,000 mines a month, the areas were extended so that in effect Bomber Command was gardening from the extreme north of Norway right down to the Spanish border. The overall mining campaign was under the control of the Admiralty Directorate of Minelaying Operations; within the constraints of the broad directives it issued, the Air Ministry and Bomber Command had considerable flexibility regarding the actual targets and percentage of effort in a given period.

In consultation with naval advisers, and with consideration of the prevailing strategic situation (i.e. U-boat waters became a key target area during the intensive periods of anti-U-boat ops), operations were planned and the Groups were notified of their required effort. The planning procedure then followed that of a normal bombing mission. This ‘political’ aspect of the minelaying campaign is an important factor towards understanding the position of Bomber Command (and Harris in particular), and the pleas of the Admiralty for a diversion of resources away from the Strategic Bombing Offensive and into more critical areas such as the battle against the U-boats. The Bomber Command answer was the classic one given by all supporters of strategic air power – that it is better to destroy the target system (in this case the U-boats) at its place of origin, the centres of production, than it is to try to hunt them down later; hence the strategic bombing of construction yards and component factories. One important aspect of the overall strategy was the minelaying campaign in areas used by the U-boats for training (the Baltic) and transit (Bay of Biscay). These two operational areas saw a large percentage of the total minelaying effort – and the highest percentage of losses amongst the minelaying aircraft. Two periods that saw particular attention being paid to the U-boat areas were November 1942, in connection with Operation Torch, the landings in North Africa; and June 1944, in connection with Operation Overlord, the landings in Normandy. One senior German naval officer was to comment, ‘without training in the Baltic, and safe escort through coastal waters and the routes to and from the operation area in mid-ocean, there can be no U-boat war.’

In June 1943 Bomber Command summarised the general purposes of the large-scale minelaying campaign as:

1.To cause serious embarrassment and dislocation to the enemy’s vital seaborne traffic, especially in regard to raw materials for the Ruhr and military supplies for the Russian Front or for the Norwegian theatre of operations.

2.To assist the Battle of the Atlantic by interrupting the passages of U-boats leaving or entering the French West Coast bases, and by rendering the U-boat training areas unsafe.

3.To interfere with the arrivals and departures of blockade runners, armed merchant raiders, iron ore ships and sundry traffic using the Gironde River and other Atlantic ports.

4.To force the enemy to maintain numbers of experienced personnel and much valuable material for the purpose of sweeping his widely-spread harbours and channels.

The Hampdens of 5 Group had shouldered the task and achieved reasonable results at an acceptably low loss rate; however, being able to carry only one mine meant that the overall impact of the Hampden campaign was limited. With the decision that all medium and heavy bombers should be equipped for carrying out minelaying tasks, the scene was set for a rapid expansion of capability. When the Wellingtons joined in the campaign they doubled the capability as they could carry two mines; likewise, the overall Bomber Command capability was increased by the decision to employ training units on the mine-laying task. It now became a routine element for the various OTUs – with mixed feelings from those involved. To some it was seen as an ‘easy’ introduction to planning and executing an operational mission; to others, it was a risk taken by a partly-trained crew before they were ready.

When the warships Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Prinz Eugen broke out of Brest and made the so-called Channel Dash to the safety of ports in Germany the RAF was caught off guard. After months of trying to destroy these important vessels at Brest, the opportunity of catching them in open waters was lost. The only consolation for the RAF was that the two battle cruisers (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) hit mines that had almost certainly been laid a few days earlier by aircraft from 5 Group. Although both ships were damaged they still managed to reach port before any effective air attacks could be mounted. (Hampdens and Manchesters had been flying day and night sorties laying mines during the previous ten days.)

Heavy bombers, such as the Manchester and Halifax, were equipped to carry four mines, the redoubtable Lancaster could take six, as could the Stirling. Even the Mosquito was given the capability of carrying two mines, albeit over a much shorter range.

Stirlings joined in the minelaying campaign on the night of 23/24 March 1942, with three aircraft (N3669, N3674 and R9303) from 15 Squadron laying mines off Lorient. For the Lancaster, minelaying was to be the type’s first operational outing – L7549 of 44 Squadron, pilot W/O Crum, dropping four mines in the Heligoland area on 3 March 1942. The sortie was recorded thus in the Operations Record Book:

TASK GARDENING ROSEMARY. Vegetables (2 Assembly 22, 1 Ordinary and 1 PDM No. 2) dropped in allotted position. Height 600 ft. Time 2046 hrs. Heading 288 at 180 mph. Visibility bright moonlight. Slight haze. Pinpoint on Trischen from which a careful timed run was made. Uneventful. Surprising lack of flak. Crew cooperated well.

It was important to record details of the accurate laying of the mines as this information would be sought in the debrief by the naval armaments officer (who had also been at the briefing), in order that he could transfer the details to an Admiralty Chart.

The employment of the heavy bomber force was essential as in February 1942, Harris had made an offer to the Admiralty to lay an average of 1,000 mines a month – a ten-fold increase! However, he did stress that this was not to have a detrimental effect on the main bomber offensive. What it gave Harris was a political lever to use on the Admiralty, and Churchill, whenever the cry went up for Bomber Command to help out in the naval war.

The Air Staff agreed the commitment on 25 March 1942, and the policy was implemented. During 1942 the minelaying effort absorbed some 14.7 per cent of the total Bomber Command operational effort, with 4,743 sorties, during which 9,574 mines were laid (1941 figures had been 1,250 sorties and 1,055 mines). There had also been an increase in the loss rate, up from 1 per cent to nearly 4 per cent, although with marked variation depending upon the operational area – Kiel had the lowest rate and the Weser estuary the highest. Throughout 1942 and 1943 the squadrons sent crews to find nominated stretches of water in which to place their cargo. It was certainly looked on by most crews as a bit of light relief after the hazards of ‘Happy Valley’ (the Ruhr) or Berlin. Ken Pincott was with 15 Squadron: These were looked on as an easy operation because most often the main attack that night would be against a mainland target by the bomber force. Apart from a little flak and occasional fighter, the odds of survival were much higher.’

Tom Wingham was operating with 102 Squadron on the night of 28 April 1943 in Halifax JB894/X: ‘Kattegat, two 1,500 lb mines. Good visibility although 7/10 cloud base 2,000 feet. Mines laid as ordered from 1,500 feet heading 156 at 176 TAS, after timed run. Avoided flak ships but saw some light flak. Easy run. Surprised to hear later of the heavy losses suffered that night.’

No less than 207 aircraft had been tasked with minelaying that night, 167 reported successful missions (a total of 593 mines), but twenty-two aircraft were lost (seven Lancasters, seven Stirlings, six Wellingtons and two Hampdens) – at over 10 per cent, by far the most costly night of minelaying recorded by the Command. This large-scale effort broke the previous sortie record, set only the night before, of 160 sorties.

Not all minelaying sorties were straightforward, Harry Hull was air gunner in a Halifax of 10 Squadron: ‘We were briefed for a minelaying trip and, full of confidence that there could not be many more, set off, but barely half an hour from base I felt a thump, thump, thump from under the aircraft which just did not sound normal. The skipper sent the bomb aimer down to inspect the bomb bay for the vibration. Upon opening the inspection hatch he found a mine had broken free from one of the holding straps and was swinging backwards and forwards with the movement of the aircraft. After waiting for the end of the radio silence period we contacted base and they gave us a jettison area – they certainly did not want an unexploded mine rolling down the runway when we landed!’

On rare occasions aircraft witnessed the results of the minelaying effort; the Bomber Command Quarterly Review carried this account from a 305 Squadron Wellington. ‘At about 2100 on 16 February 1943, this aircraft was laying mines in the Bay of Biscay. The night was extremely clear, there was bright moonlight and the sea was calm. The aircraft was making a run-up at a height of 500 feet when she saw a U-boat crash-dive ahead.

‘It took her less than a minute to reach the position and she had just passed over it when there was a violent explosion which shook her considerably. The bomb aimer and rear gunner both saw a big column of spray and the latter saw what he took to be the tail of the U-boat standing almost vertically out of the water. It disappeared after a short while and nothing more was seen. Mines had also been laid on previous sorties in this area.’

It was not only the estuary and open sea areas that were attacked with mines, the campaign also targeted inland waterways and canals. A very successful example of this was the raid by twenty-two Mosquitoes of No. 8 Group against the Kiel Canal on the night of 12/13 May 1944. All but two of the aircraft made attacks on the target and the canal was closed for seven days. One Mosquito was lost.

The mines themselves were robust and reliable devices, fitted with a drogue parachute to slow them down for water entry. Prior to 1943 all delivery was low level, usually 600-800 feet (180–240 m); the main requirement being accurate delivery and the need to reduce entry shock. Improvements in mine technology and delivery systems meant that by March 1943 aircraft were cleared to drop their mines from 3,000 feet (920 m), an improvement but still not ideal as it still required the aircraft to loiter at heights where light flak was effective. However, later in the year, the Stirlings carried out trials dropping mines from 12,000 feet (3,658 m) and before long the cleared height was up to 15,000 feet (4,572 m). This became the standard technique.

The task of accurate navigation was aided by the use of the radio nav aid Gee, although the accuracy and reliability decreased close to the enemy coastline because of jamming. However, trials were later carried out using the H2S radar system, including its employment by one aircraft acting as a ‘minelaying pathfinder’ for other aircraft. Eventually mines were being laid blind from 15,000 ft using the H2S information.

Loading mines into a Stirling, March 1944.

This tactical change was highlighted in a Bomber Command report of March 1944. ‘Since the beginning of the year, a new technique which enables mines to be dropped accurately from high altitudes has been developed and put into operation. In conjunction with H2S and the Mark XIV bombsight, it is now possible for mines to be laid successfully over heavily defended areas either visually or through 10/10ths cloud. Kiel Bay, the Belts, the Heligoland Bight, the Sound, the Kattegat, Oslo Harbour, the Rade de Brest, and the Gironde, have all been mined by the new method. The exercising areas and swept channels in the vicinity of Kiel alone have received 1,111 mines.’

At around the same time, Bomber Command received a most welcome testimony from the First Sea Lord: The extensive and deep penetration into enemy waters made on the night of 9/10 April is typical of the skill and determination shown by the aircraft that take part in minelaying operations. The work of the minelaying aircraft of Bomber Command during the past four years has paid rich dividends. Shipping losses have been inflicted on the enemy and the sea traffic has been impeded and delayed to an extent which has seriously dislocated their general communications. I should be grateful if you would convey to those concerned the Navy’s appreciation of their fine work.’ (103 Lancasters of No. 1 Group and No. 5 Group laid mines in the Baltic off Danzig, Gdynia and Pillau – for the loss of nine aircraft.)

Throughout the war improvements were made in the mines, including the use of acoustic mines from September 1942. A variety of mines of between 1,000 lb (454 kg) and 2,000 lb (907 kg) were used during the campaign. The primary weapons were:

1.1,500 lb (680 kg) A Mk I with about 750 lb (340 kg) High Explosive. Modifications led to others, up to Mk IV. Acoustic or combination mine.

2.1,000 lb A Mk V with about 650 lb (295 kg) HE. Magnetic mine.

3.2,000 lb A Mk VI, more HE and greater sophistication of fusing.

4.1,000 lb A Mk VII with greater sophistication all round.

In the period 1 February 1942 to 8 May 1945, Bomber Command flew 16,240 mining sorties, dropping a total of 45,428 mines (statistics do vary between sources). Statistics as to the losses of enemy shipping are hard to determine, and often show great variance. One Bomber Command analysis (post-war) claimed 491 ships sunk and 410 damaged – an average of one ship per 50 mines dropped. The total effort by the Command from April 1940 onwards was 47,152 mines, for a loss of 467 aircraft.

There was always a degree of argument as to what effect this campaign had, and thus if the effort expended was worth the result. Whilst the actual sinkings do not always look particularly impressive it is essential to remember other equally important factors. A great quantity of shipping was damaged and this had a direct impact on the construction yards – effort, including resources and manpower, had to be expended in repairing these vessels.

In order to reduce the danger, the Germans conducted an intensive mine-sweeping programme, again involving resources and manpower that could have been employed elsewhere. Every ship sunk or damaged caused disruption in the communications of military and civil, often industrial, material. Losses, or the threat of losses, eventually became so severe that neutral countries, the most important being Sweden with the supply of raw materials such as iron ore, were reluctant to ship goods to Germany. Any one of these elements was important, taken together they are very significant. Harris summed it up, ‘… could put a large part of the German navy on the work of mine sweeping, and many workers on to the repair of ships.’

Operation Thunderbolt, the RAF’s post-war analysis of Bomber Command’s efforts, had this to say: The main contribution which the strategic air forces made in the conduct of sea warfare was in the minelaying campaign. During the war Bomber Command laid 47,000 mines, which were responsible for sinking or damaging over 900 enemy ships. The Command was in fact responsible for over 30 per cent of sinkings inflicted on enemy merchant shipping in north-western waters.’

The inevitable conclusion must be that the gardening carried out by Bomber Command between 1940 and 1945 deserves to be recognised as an important facet of the air power story of the Second World War.

Stirling crew de-briefing after a minelaying operation, 17 March 1944, a night when three Stirlings were out gardening.

Propaganda leaflets (Nickelling)

Although in the early months of the war aircraft flew pure leaflet-dropping missions as soon as the Strategic Bombing commenced in May 1940 it was more usual for leaflets to be dropped as part of a bombing mission.

On the first night of war ten Whitleys from Linton-on-Ouse dropped propaganda leaflets in Area 1(a) (the Ruhr) with 5.4 million leaflets being dispensed. By the end of the war the Command had dropped billions of leaflets over Germany and Occupied Europe, greatly assisting the enemy, the cynics said, by providing them with good quality toilet paper! The first method was that of stuffing leaflets down the flare chute of the aircraft, not an easy task in the confines of the Whitley when the crew had to unwrap the bundles of leaflets to ensure that they would disperse in the slipstream of the aircraft and float to earth. The leaflets were in bundles of 1,500, in packs containing twelve bundles and the task was to slit open the packs and drop them down the chute attached to the training flare opening. A normal load was 1,200–1,800 lb of leaflets. Automatic systems were subsequently developed whereby leaflets were containerised and could be carried in the bomb bay.

Many of the propaganda leaflets were aimed at Occupied Europe and were in the appropriate language, with French and Dutch being the two most common.

If the recipient pulled on the tag (Ziehen) the picture changed to a sinking U-boat and a drowning sailor.

Wellington bomb bay with containers of leaflets being attached to the bomb beam, May 1944.

Sydney Munns’s 77 Squadron Whitley was typical with its ‘mixed load’ on the night of 14 November 1940: ‘On this particular raid on Berlin, apart from HE bombs and incendiaries we carried leaflets to drop over the target – what we called the “newspaper delivery” – and also over Holland we dropped hundreds of bags of tea, sealed in strong canvas, which we delivered “courtesy” of the RAF. The tea came from the Dutch East Indies, and this we called the “grocery run”. I cannot remember whether on this occasion we dropped forged ration books, but sometimes we did so – anything to upset the economy!’ Nearly five years later Bomber Command would have a serious purpose with its food drops over Holland as it took much-needed supplies to the Dutch people under Operation Manna.

In December 1940 the Air Ministry was urging Bomber Command to drop more leaflets as the improvement in material deserved greater effort. However, with the launch of the bombing offensive the leaflet campaign was seen as secondary. The same complaint was made again in March 1941 and that leaflets were becoming obsolete before they were dropped and were having to be pulped. The following month the Command was told that the Prime Minister would like to see as many leaflets dropped as possible! March 1941 saw another propaganda food drop to Holland; a gift of 4,000 lb of tea had been made by the Dutch in Batavia and this was dropped in ⅔ oz bags over Holland with a label saying ‘Holland will rise again, Greetings from the Free Netherlands Indies. Keep a good heart.’ According to a Dutch naval attaché the reaction from the people was that it would be better to bomb the Germans!

The psychological warfare experts were forever designing new messages to drop on the enemy in an effort to destabilise the morale of the German people and make them lose confidence in the Nazi regime. Favourite topics included depicting the Nazi leadership as the wreckers of Europe, including Germany, and as caricature figures; from mid-1942 when the war began to turn against Germany it was common for leaflets to run headlines of Allied victories and the progress of the war.

The leaflet campaign continued to the end of the war but it tends to be ignored in the RAF records after it was no longer a specific mission but was combined with a normal bombing mission, although the training units continued to fly nickel sorties into 1944.

THE OFFENSIVE AGAINST ITALY

Italy joined the war on 10 June 1940 and Bomber Command made an immediate response by launching 36 Whitleys to attack the Turin area on the night of 11/12 April. Having refuelled in the Channel Islands the aircraft proceeded on their long flight to Italy only to encounter bad weather that made twenty-three of them turn back before crossing the Alps. Nine aircraft claimed to have bombed Turin, where the lights were on until the bombs began to fall, and two claimed to have bombed Genoa. A Whitley of 77 Squadron crashed near Le Mans with the loss of its crew, the first Bomber Command losses in action against Italy.

The blurred nature of this night-target photo of Genoa docks was caused by the low level attack by this 49 Squadron crew on 718 November 1942.

Haddock Force Wellingtons from Salon attacked Genoa on the night of 15/16 June but only one of the eight aircraft claimed to have reached the target. Genoa and Milan were attacked the following night and Italy was left alone for a while as other priorities required attention.

Autumn 1942 brought a concerted series of attacks against the industrial centres of Northern Italy. This new offensive was launched with a raid on Genoa on 22/23 October. Italy remained a high priority for the rest of year, with November being a particularly busy month.

The Turin raid of 28/29 November saw another Bomber Command VC awarded: ‘Flight Sergeant Middleton was captain and first pilot of a Stirling aircraft detailed to attack the Fiat Works at Turin one night in November, 1942. Great difficulty was experienced in climbing to 12,000 feet to cross the Alps, which led to excessive consumption of fuel. So dark was the night that the mountain peaks were almost invisible. During the crossing Flight Sergeant Middleton had to decide whether to proceed or turn back, there being barely sufficient fuel for the return journey. Flares were sighted ahead and he continued the mission and even dived to 2,000 feet to identify the target, despite the difficulty of regaining height. Three flights were made over Turin at this low altitude before the target was identified. The aircraft was then subjected to fire from light antiaircraft guns. A large hole appeared in the port main plane which made it difficult to maintain lateral control. A shell then burst in the cockpit, shattering the windscreen and wounding both pilots. A piece of shell splinter tore into the side of Flight Sergeant Middleton’s face, destroying his right eye and exposing the bone over the eye. He was probably wounded also in the body or legs. The second pilot received wounds in the head and both legs which bled profusely. The wireless operator was also wounded in the leg.

Lancaster s of 9 Squadron were part of the force that bombed Genoa on 22123 October 1942; mission certificate for Squadron Leader Fry and crew.

Turin 20/21 November 1942 from a 49 Squadron aircraft.

‘Flight Sergeant Middleton became unconscious and the aircraft dived to 800 feet before control was regained by the second pilot, who took the aircraft up to 1,500 feet and released the bombs. There was still light flak, some very intense, and the aircraft was hit many times. The three gunners replied continuously until the rear turret was put out of action. Flight Sergeant Middleton had now recovered consciousness and, when clear of the target, ordered the second pilot back to receive first aid. Before this was completed the latter insisted on returning to the cockpit, as the captain could see very little and could only speak with loss of blood and great pain. Course was set for base and the crew now faced an Alpine crossing and a homeward flight in a damaged aircraft, with insufficient fuel. The possibilities of abandoning the aircraft or landing in Northern France were discussed but Flight Sergeant Middleton expressed the intention of trying to make the English coast, so that his crew could leave the aircraft by parachute. Owing to his wounds and diminishing strength, he knew that, by then, he would have little or no chance of saving himself. After four hours, the French coast was reached and here the aircraft, flying at 6,000 feet, was once more engaged and hit by intense light anti-aircraft fire. Flight Sergeant Middleton was still at the controls and mustered sufficient strength to take evasive action.

‘After crossing the Channel there was only sufficient fuel for 6 minutes flying. Flight Sergeant Middleton ordered the crew to abandon the aircraft while he flew parallel with the coast for a few miles, after which he intended to head out to sea. Five of the crew left the aircraft safely, while two remained to assist Flight Sergeant Middleton. The aircraft crashed in the sea and the bodies of the front gunner and flight engineer were recovered the following day. Their gallant captain was apparently unable to leave the aircraft and his body has not been traced.

‘Flight Sergeant Middleton was determined to attack the target regardless of the consequences and not to allow his crew to fall into enemy hands. While all the crew displayed heroism of a high order, the urge to do so came from Flight Sergeant Middleton, whose fortitude and strength of will made possible the completion of the mission. His devotion to duty in the face of overwhelming odds is unsurpassed in the annals of the Royal Air Force.’ (Flight Sergeant Rawdon Hume Middleton, No. 149 Squadron; awarded for action 28 November 1942, London Gazette, 13 January 1943.)

Turin was the target for the night of 8/9 December 1942 and according to the ORS report (Night Raid Report No. 216) ‘89 per cent of the force despatched report having reached the target, where weak defences and clear skies enabled pilots to bomb with deliberation. Serious damage was caused to industry, municipal and residential property at a very low cost to our forces.’ The attack involved 133 aircraft from No. 5 Group but 10 per cent of the force turned back early with technical problems. The attack was led by a Pathfinder force that accurately marked the target from 2 minutes before Zero Hour (2100) to 18 minutes after Zero Hour. The initial wave of Pathfinders comprised ten aircraft as ‘finders’ dropping a long stick of flares at 8-second intervals across the target area so that the aiming point could be identified. The ‘illuminators’ then released flares in an arc east and south of the city centre, this illumination being maintained until Zero+18. The Main Force was thus able to bomb in near ideal conditions. The ORS Report stated that ‘the heavy gun defences appear to have been increased, but there was no improvement in accuracy. The light guns were also more numerous than before and were fairly accurate at times. They appeared to be firing barrage. Night fighter activity on the route to Turin was negligible.’ The attackers dropped 121 tons of HE and 151 tons of incendiaries, with forty-six bombers carrying a full load of 4 lb incendiaries whilst most of the rest carried a mixed load of HE and incendiaries. Only one Lancaster was lost on this raid – targets in Italy were invariably thought of as ‘soft’ because of weak defences and low loss rates.

Although Italy remained on the target list there were few major attacks until late summer 1943 when a concerted series of attacks was part of Allied pressure designed to persuade the Italian Government to sign an Armistice (and in due course to change sides). Genoa, Milan and Turin were attacked a number of times; Flight Sergeant Arthur Aaron was awarded the VC for his actions on the Turin raid of 12/13 August, his citation read: ‘On the night of 12 August 1943, Flight Sergeant Aaron was captain and pilot of a Stirling aircraft detailed to attack Turin. When approaching to attack, the bomber received devastating bursts of fire from an enemy fighter. Three engines were hit, the windscreen shattered, the front and rear turrets put out of action and the elevator control damaged, causing the aircraft to become unstable and difficult to control. The navigator was killed and other members of the crew were wounded.

‘A bullet struck Flight Sergeant Aaron in the face, breaking his jaw and tearing away part of his face. He was also wounded in the lung and his right arm was rendered useless. As he fell forward over the control column, the aircraft dived several thousand feet. Control was regained by the flight engineer at 3,000 feet. Unable to speak, Flight Sergeant Aaron urged the bomb aimer by signs to take over the controls. Course was then set southwards in an endeavour to fly the crippled bomber, with one engine out of action, to Sicily or North Africa. Flight Sergeant Aaron was assisted to the rear of the aircraft and treated with morphine. After resting for some time he rallied and, mindful of his responsibility as captain of the aircraft, insisted on returning to the pilot’s cockpit, where he was lifted into his seat and had his feet placed on the rudder-bar.

‘Twice he made determined attempts to take control and hold the aircraft to its course but his weakness was evident and with difficulty he was persuaded to desist. Though in great pain and suffering from exhaustion he continued to help by writing directions with his left hand. Five hours after leaving the target the petrol began to run low, but soon afterwards the flare path at Bone airfield was sighted. Flight Sergeant Aaron summoned his failing strength to direct the bomb aimer in the hazardous task of landing the damaged aircraft in the darkness with undercarriage retracted. Four attempts were made under his direction; at the fifth Flight Sergeant Aaron was so near to collapsing that he had to be restrained by the crew and the landing was completed by the bomb aimer.

‘Nine hours after landing, Flight Sergeant Aaron died from exhaustion. Had he been content, when grievously wounded, to lie still and conserve his failing strength, he would probably have recovered, but he saw it as his duty to exert himself to the utmost, if necessary with his last breath, to ensure that his aircraft and crew did not fall into enemy hands. In appalling conditions he showed the greatest qualities of courage, determination and leadership and, though wounded and dying, he set an example of devotion to duty which has seldom been equalled and never surpassed.’ (Acting Flight Sergeant Arthur Louis Aaron DFM, 218 Squadron, Stirling EF452; awarded for action 13 August 1943, London Gazette, 3 November 1943.)

The Italians changed sides in September but the Germans maintained a tight grip on Italy to the end of the war, the Allies having to fight hard for every mile – but this was not Bomber Command’s war.

BOMBER OPERATIONS 1946–1968

There can be no doubt of Bomber Command’s intense operational activity during the Second World War – but what about the 20 years following the war? For most of that period the Command’s main concern was the Cold War and, from the mid–1950s, its role in the nuclear deterrence of NATO against the Warsaw Pact. This general situation is covered in the overview history of Bomber Command but there were periods in the 1950s when the Command, or parts of it, was back in combat. As part of the global nature of British commitments, and the post-war problem of anti-colonialism, the British military became involved in a number of conflicts. Of these conflicts two involved small-scale Bomber Command detachments – the Malayan Emergency (1948–1960) and the Mau Mau campaign in Kenya (1952–1956), whilst the third was on a large scale but short duration, Suez 1956.

Malayan Emergency (1948–1956)

A State of Emergency had been declared in Malaya on 16 June 1948 as communist guerrillas attempted to seize control of the country. It was not until March 1950, under Operation Musgrave, that Bomber Command became involved in supporting the RAF units based in the Far East Air Force (FEAF). The first bomber detachment was by eight Lincolns of 57 Squadron, which deployed from the UK to Tengah, Singapore, being joined in June by an RAAF Lincoln detachment. The overall British strategy was to cutoff the communists from their sources of supply and to destroy the active terrorist bands in the jungle. It was with the latter that the Bomber Command detachments became involved.

The Lincolns were replaced from February 1955 by detachments of Canberras, under Operation Mileage, as Bomber Command retained its commitment to the Malayan Emergency to the end of the operational period of the conflict in 1956, although it did not officially end until July 1960. Air strength was at its height in the mid 1950s but Bomber Command’s commitment was normally restricted to six or eight aircraft from a single squadron, the units deploying in rotation from the Binbrook Wing. The first Canberra unit, 101 Squadron was in theatre from February to June 1955 and in that period flew thirty missions, the majority by three or four aircraft, with a standard weapon load of six 1,000 lb bombs. The Canberra rotation continued to August 1956:

Lincoln of 100 Squadron over Malaya.

Canberras bomb jungle targets.

101 Squadron	Feb–Jun 1955
617 Squadron	Jun–Oct 1955
12 Squadron	Oct 1955–Mar 1956
9 Squadron	Mar–Jun 1956
101 Squadron	Jun–Aug 1956

Crews from 101 Squadron had been training for Operation Mileage since January, the focus being on low level navigation and bombing. Departing Binbrook on 7 February they arrived at Changi on 11 February. After a few days local flying and bombing on China Rock range the detachment flew a simulated attack a week later. The first operational flight took place on 23 February when Squadron Leader Robertson led three Canberras to attack a terrorist camp. Over the next few weeks the detachment was kept busy with day and night attacks in ‘static’, i.e. known, targets. Initially the Canberras flew similar tactics to those developed by the Lincolns but two main techniques soon became standard: Auster Mark and Datum Point. Pinpoint targets were usually attacked by a vie of three aircraft to ensure a good distribution of bombs over the target area, the six bombs (1,000 lb or 500 lb) being dropped in sequenced pairs or a single stick of six. Having been given the target map reference this was plotted on a one million scale map and a circle of 10 minutes flight time (at 200 kts groundspeed) drawn around it. The area was then examined for the best run-in taking into account such factors as terrain and navigation features (always tricky in the jungle). The formation would set up for the pre-briefed run and check in with the Auster Mark aircraft. At the 10-minute point the formation leader would call ‘bombing in 10’. The bombers would navigate visually from the run-in point and call every one minute down to ‘bombing in 90 seconds’, at which point the Auster would drop his marker flare on the target and call ‘target marked’. The Datum Point technique involved a timed run from a distinctive Initial Point and as it was less accurate was used for ‘area attack’. Various other techniques, some of which used ground radar, were also employed from time to time.

The break of deployment in mid 1956 was caused by the Suez Crisis but also coincided with a reduction in terrorist activity. Canberras were back in action in 1958 but with the resident FEAF bomber unit, 45 Squadron, being employed. Whilst the Bomber Command detachments had played a role in the overall Malayan Emergency campaign it is only right to state that the work of FEAF units, from Hornets and Venoms to Dakotas and Pembrokes, and even Dragonfly helicopters developing the role of Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), was far more significant in the overall air and land campaign.

Mau Mau (1952–1956)

The Mau Mau uprising in Kenya was a vicious ‘post Colonial’ struggle and trouble had been brewing since the late 1940s, the heartland of the rebels being the Kikuyu tribe. Although a State of Emergency was not declared until October 1952, Bomber Command had sent aircraft to Eastleigh, the main airfield at Nairobi, since March 1947 (Lancasters of 82 Squadron). However, it was not until the main offensive against the terrorists, from 1953 and particularly in 1955, that the Lincolns of Bomber Command flew offensive operations in support of ground forces, the main operational area being the Aberdare region. The combined air and ground assault soon broke the back of the rebellion and by mid 1956 the crisis was over.

Suez (1956)

The British presence in Egypt had been under pressure since the end of the Second World War and by the early 1950s the main military presence had been confined to the Canal Zone, including a number of RAF Stations. Under an Anglo-Egyptian agreement the British finally withdraw in June 1956 but the following month the Egyptian leader, Nasser, nationalised the Suez Canal. This action was used by Britain and France as a rationale for intervention, although this was masked in the excuse of protecting the Canal from an Israeli-Egyptian conflict. As far as our Bomber Command story is concerned the British air plan, Operation Musketeer, involved a major deployment of Canberras to Malta and Cyprus, and of Valiants to Malta. The main strategic air campaign had two elements:

1.Neutralise the Egyptian Air Force (which on paper was quite potent).

2.A psychological warfare campaign to disrupt the Egyptian economy, morale and armed forces.

Both of these strategic aims would have been instantly recognisable to air planners of 1942! Indeed, the tactics employed would also have been recognisable. The primary role of the Air Task Force, under Air Marshal Barnett, was the neutralisation phase and the main targets for the bombers were Egyptian airfields. Bombing was planned as selective in order to avoid civilian casualties or excessive material damage and so the second element of the bombing campaign was abandoned and the bomber effort was concentrated on military installations. In terms of technique it was back to the old Pathfinder concept with marker Canberras dropping Target Indicators for the Main Force.

In August 1956 six Bomber Command Canberra squadrons – 9, 12, 15, 101, 109 and 139, the latter two as marker units, had been ordered to restrict training and prepare for deployment to the Middle East. This was a surprise for one of the Binbrook units, 101 Squadron, as it had only recently sent a detachment to Malaya. Binbrook was a hive of activity as aircraft and personnel prepared; the former having extra equipment fitted and the latter having inoculations. It was a similar story for the two marker squadrons at Hemswell, although they also flew visual aiming sorties as there would be no radio aids (Gee-H) where they were going. Other Bomber Squadrons were tasked with ferrying bombs out to Malta as this would be the main base for the longer-range B.6 Canberras and stocks of 1,000 lb bombs at that base were low. The overall work-up concluded with a Command Exercise on 28 August when the ‘target’ was marked by Valiants dropping green proximity markers, which were then ‘centred’ with red TIs for the Main Force to bomb on. The exercise went well and the marker Canberras were amongst the first to deploy, a joint 109/139 detachment moving to Malta towards the end of September although the latter was later concentred with 109 Squadron as 139 Squadron became part of the Cyprus force. At Binbrook, 101 Squadron was ordered to, ‘Deploy to Luqa as the vanguard of any air action which might be required in connection with the Suez crisis.’ The Squadron duly moved to Luqa, being joined on 22 September by 12 Squadron, the latter moving to Hal Far. Strength at Malta was subsequently boosted by the arrival of 9 Squadron on 30 October. The main Canberra force was based at Nicosia, Cyprus under Group Captain Key and comprised seven squadrons: 10, 15, 18, 27, 44, 61 and 139). All aircraft were painted with recognition stripes on wings and fuselage just like those used for D-Day but this time being yellow and black for most aircraft rather than white and black. On 30 October the BBC broadcast a warning to Egyptian civilians to keep away from military targets as these were now under threat of bombing.

Cairo West, 5 November 1956.

The Canberras and Valiants went into action on the night of 30 October, the targets being Almaza, Kabrit, Abu Sueir, Inchas and Cairo West airfields. Most of the bombers were recalled en route as there was uncertainty as to the clearance to bomb certain targets, in part generated by worry over causing American casualties – it was though they were evacuating from one of the Cairo airfields.

One of the main targets for the following night was Almaza airfield and 139 Squadron was tasked with marking the target. The standard technique of Marker 1 and Marker 2 (each with eight 4.5 inch flares and two 1,000 lb TIs) and Flare 1 and Flare 2 (each with twelve 4.5 inch flares) was used. Taking off at 1715 the aircraft flew out at 30,000 feet aiming for a distinctive bend on the Nile and from there to the IP for a timed run and descent to 8,000 feet and final run to the target. With the target identified in the light of the flares the TIs were dropped on the east and west hardstands of the airfield. As soon as the flares ignited the ground defences opened fire with continuous but ineffective anti-aircraft fire. Mike Heather was a Navigator on this mission: ‘Strict R/T silence was maintained during start-up, taxi and take-off. We got airborne in WT369 at 1715 and set course. We crossed the Egyptian coast as it was getting dark and when we arrived over Cairo all the lights were still on. We had little difficulty in finding Almaza but in spite of this we went through the full procedure of dropping flares over the target and then into a shallow dive to place the TIs. The Egyptian AA gunners seemed to shoot at the flares rather than us so marking the target was easy, although by the time we had finished all the lights had been turned off.’

By 6 November the military campaign was progressing well, including airborne and seaborne landings, but the political situation was a mess and under American pressure a cease-fire was brought into force at 1700 GMT. The Bomber Command detachments had flown their final sorties the day before. Operations had lasted less than a week but it was Bomber Command’s largest operational involvement since the end of the Second World War. The Canberras had flown seventy-two operational sorties from Malta and 206 from Cyprus, with the Valiants from Malta flying a further forty-nine sorties. The Canberras dropped 1,439 bombs, the standard Canberra load being four 1,000 lb bombs from Malta and six 1,000 lb bombs from Cyprus. It had not been a great success and the Bomber Command report stated that visual bombing standards were low because of lack of practice following prolonged grounding for aircraft modifications and a concentration of effort on flypasts and VIP visits! By December all but one squadron had returned to the UK.