Chapter 2
Field Marshal Montgomery had been studying the problem of crossing the Rhine ever since the failure of Operation MARKET GARDEN the previous September. The river would have to be crossed at some stage and as early as October Eisenhower had encouraged staff from the First Canadian, the Second British and the Ninth US Armies to confer and plan the forthcoming operation.
Behind the front, engineers set to work designing and training with new river crossing equipment, looking for ways to adapt seagoing landing craft to river work. Naval Unit No 3 arrived in Ninth US Army’s area equipped with two types of craft; the Landing Craft Medium known as LCMs and the smaller Landing Craft (Vehicle and Personnel) or LCVP. Experiments on the River Maas in Holland showed that both were suitable for river crossings and the LCVP, a small craft capable of carrying either twenty-four men, four tons of supplies or a small vehicle, would be ideal for carrying the first waves across the river. The larger LCM, measuring over fifteen metres long, was able to carry one medium tank or sixty men. A harbour craft company equipped with ten-metre long Seamules also participated in the trials. When Montgomery put forward his first outline to Supreme Allied Headquarters (SHAEF) in November, one thing was certain, he would need a large number of amphibious craft to cross the Rhine in force. A survey showed that existing stocks fell short of the required number and Eisenhower petitioned suppliers in the States to step up production and eliminate the shortage of boats and bridging material.
The German offensive in December halted planning for several weeks, but once the crisis had passed experts from all three Army groups met at SHAEF Headquarters to hear Eisenhower outline his plans for the first time. 21 Army Group would lead the offensive on Germany, crossing the Rhine to the west and east of Wesel before driving deep in enemy held territory; the two remaining Army groups would cross the river at the first opportunity.
General William Simpson, or Texas Bill as he was known in his West Point days, Ninth US Army’s four star general. 111-SC-194191
As soon as Montgomery heard the news he began to formalise his planning and at the end of January General Moore, Ninth US Army’s Chief of Staff, attended a meeting at 21 Army Group Headquarters. He was astonished to find that his services would not be needed during the initial attack as Montgomery intended to allocate the whole of his front to General Miles Dempsey’s Second British Army; the Americans would provide a Corps of two infantry divisions to fight under the British. The unexpected proposal came as a shock; it suggested that US troops had been relegated to a subsidiary role in one of the most important campaigns of war.
The outline strategy appeared to have several flaws and as soon as Moore returned to Ninth Army Headquarters, General William Simpson took steps to revise the plan with General Dempsey. Simpson believed that if Second Army monopolised all of the crossings west and east of Wesel it would be difficult to pass Ninth Army’s mass of men and equipment through Second Army’s bridgehead when the attack developed. Dempsey agreed with Simpson, each Army needed to have its own sector, Second Army to the west and Ninth Army to the south-east of Wesel. Montgomery relented, agreeing with his subordinates’ suggestions and 21 Army Group’s new directive issued on 4 February assigned an eleven-mile stretch of the river south-east of Wesel to Ninth Army. At long last detailed planning could begin.
Despite the tensions between Montgomery and Simpson during the planning of Operation VARSITY, it is all smiles during a visit by General Omar Bradley. 111-SC-197799
Airborne troops were included in 21 Army Group’s plans for the first time on 9 March. The intention was to drop XVIII Airborne Corps to the north of Wesel, enlarging the bridgehead to a depth of six miles at a single stroke, while disrupting the German chances of counter-attacking. To begin with, 21 Army Group’s plan envisaged using three airborne divisions, but Montgomery decided to scale the airborne operation down to two divisions when a survey revealed a shortage in transport aircraft and suitable runways. He was not prepared to repeat the mistakes of Operation MARKET GARDEN, where valuable troops were tied up guarding the drop zones during the critical hours following the landing. By dropping all the airborne and glider troops together, General Matthew Ridgway’s men could concentrate on holding their perimeter while medium bombers dropped supplies on the landing grounds.
The plan was for 6th British Airborne Division to land in the north, taking the town of Hamminkeln, while 17th Airborne Division dropped to the south. The main objective was to establish an all round perimeter, seizing bridges over the Issel Stream on their eastern perimeter as well as Diersfordt Forest, an area of wooded high ground overlooking Second Army’s crossing site at Xanten to the west.
Dropping the airborne troops close to the river meant that the link up with the ground troops would occur before the Germans could bring the full weight of their reinforcements against the lightly armed paratroopers. It also meant that 17th Airborne Division could immediately count on artillery support from the opposite side of the river while it established a perimeter north of Wesel.
Airborne landings had always preceded the ground attack in previous operations, but on this occasion General Dempsey suggested a different approach. If the paratroopers landed in advance of the river crossings, Second Army’s artillery could not shell the area ahead of the river crossings and following experiences in Normandy, night landings had been ruled out as too dangerous. Dempsey’s answer was for XVIII Airborne Corps to land on the morning after the land assault, eight hours after the last crossing had started. It was a hazardous proposal in the short term, however, the long-term effects would be extremely beneficial. The link up with troops advancing from the Xanten bridgehead would occur at an early stage, creating a bridgehead six miles deep by the first day. It had to be tried.
As the planning forged ahead, Montgomery ordered the building of eight new temporary bridges across the Maas River, a potential bottleneck on his supply lines. The attack would require a massive amount of materials, estimated at 540 tonnes per day for each division, and Ninth US Army alone had twelve divisions. 21 Army Group could not afford to run short of supplies once Operation VARSITY had begun.
Surprise at Remagen
During the first week of March the Allies were chasing the retreating German Armies towards the Rhine and despite Hitler’s order to hold every inch of German soil, thousands of men were forced to retreat and seek safety beyond the Rhine. Engineers had ample time to prepare the bridges along the river for demolition and on several occasions American and British troops saw huge structures collapse in clouds of smoke and dust as they approached. In spite of the chaotic nature of the retreat, it appeared the German engineers were organised; that is until the afternoon of 7 March.
On First Army’s front 9th Armoured Division was pushing towards the Rhine hoping to trap parts of Fifteenth Army as it fell back in disorder between Bonn and Koblenz. On 7 March one of Combat Command B’s armoured task forces, based around 27th Armoured Infantry Battalion and elements of the 14th Tank Battalion, was closing on Remagen and although a huge rail bridge crossed the river in the town, few expected it to be standing by the time American troops arrived.
The rapid retreat had created confusion in the German command and plans to defend Remagen had failed to materialise, leaving only a few dozen men to protect the engineers as they prepared the Ludendorff Bridge for demolition. With no one to stop them, the American Task Force advanced through the town and as Company A’s commander, Lieutenant Karl Timmerman, gave the order to cross the railway bridge, on the opposite bank Hauptmann Friesenhahn threw the switch controlling the primary circuit. Nothing happened. Either shrapnel or sabotage had damaged the wiring but as the GIs prepared to cross, Friesenhahn fired the secondary charges. This time there was an explosion but only half the charges had detonated and although the bridge had been seriously damaged there was still a route across. In the confusion that followed Timmermann’s men ran over the bridge and fanned out on the far bank while the rest of the battalion followed. The news stunned everyone – the mighty Rhine had been breached by accident rather than design.
The surprise capture of the Ludendorff Bridge at Remagen sent shock waves through the Allied and German High Commands.
As US troops poured across the river, the German High Command struggled to recover from shock, sending reinforcements to try to eliminate the tiny bridgehead. Hitler was furious and reacted with typical vengeance, sacking Feldmarschall Gerd von Rundstedt and several other senior officers connected with the fiasco. He also approved the execution of four junior officers; a fifth officer held by the Americans was condemned to death in his absence. As the Germans looked for scapegoats, First US Army took steps to expand its bridgehead, sending every available man towards Remagen while engineers built pontoon bridges to relieve the bottleneck; the race to expand the hold on the east bank of the Rhine was on.
Von Rundstedt’s replacement, Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, set about trying to contain the Americans in the Westerwald, a series of wooded hills and ravines east of Remagen, while the Luftwaffe tried in vain to destroy the bridges. One reserve deployed against the Remagen bridgehead was the 11th Panzer Division, a significant move in more ways than one. The Panzer Division would have been ideally placed to counter-attack 21 Army Group’s planned bridgehead at Wesel; the capture of the bridge at Remagen had indirectly increased the Montgomery’s future chances of securing a bridgehead in the north.
After the Germans had bombed, shelled and finally fired V2 rockets at Remagen, the Ludendorff Bridge toppled into the Rhine on 17 March. The collapse was not a direct result of enemy action but the culmination of heavy traffic, engineering works and near misses had seriously weakened the damaged structure. The loss of the bridge made little difference. Several pontoon bridges had already been built and they were more than capable of supplying First Army’s bridgehead. American troops had already seized the hills overlooking the river and Kretzhaus and Notscheid, key road junctions in the Westerwald, bringing the Germans’ chances of reaching the river to an end; it meant that First US Army could start to plan its drive deep into the heart of Germany.
The final plan
While all eyes had been focused on Remagen, Montgomery continued to plan Operation VARSITY. Securing a sizeable bridgehead on the east bank of the Rhine demanded a large-scale assault rivalling the size of Operation OVERLORD and Montgomery’s plan involved five separate operations starting with the first river crossing at 21:00 hours on 23 March and culminating with the airborne landings thirteen hours later.
Major General Leland Hobbs, 30th Division’s leader. 111-SC-205532
The attack would begin with Operation TURNSCREW on Second Army’s left flank and 51st (Highland) Division aimed to capture Rees and the high ground overlooking the crossing point before daylight. An hour later 1st British Commando Brigade would begin Operation WIDGEON, a crossing west to Wesel, while 200 bombers from RAF Bomber Command reduced the town to rubble with 1,100 tons of bombs.
The third stage of Operation VARSITY would start at 02:00 hours, with the rest of Second Army and Ninth Army crossing the Rhine in close succession either side of Wesel. In the centre of Second Army’s front 15th (Scottish) Division would launch Operation TORCHLIGHT, crossing the river at Xanten to the west of the town. Simultaneously, General John B Anderson would open Operation FLASHPOINT, sending the first of XVI Corps’ divisions across the river south of Wesel. 30th Division, led by Major General Leland S Hobbs, would push east to cut the Wesel – Dinslaken railway at the earliest opportunity as a prelude to an advance through Staatsforst Wesel, an area of wooded hills, south of the Lippe river. 79th Division would start to send troops over the river an hour later and Major General Ira Billy Wyche’s men would link up with 30th Division and seize Dinslaken, forming a protective flank along the Neue-Ernscher Canal on the southern flank of 21 Army Group’s front.
The individual stages of Operation VARSITY
Major General Ira Wyche (centre) escorts the British Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, across the Rhine on 25 March.
Major General William Miley discusses 17th Airborne Division’s plans with First Airborne Army’s Chief of Staff. 111-SC-203302
While the ground troops pushed east of the river, the final phase of the attack would begin at 10:00 hours on 24 March. XVIII Airborne Corps, with the 6th British Airborne Division and the 17th US Airborne Division, led by Major General William Bud Miley, would land between Hamminkeln and Wesel, seizing Diersfordt Forest and establishing a perimeter along the Issel Stream.
The rapid series of crossings would hopefully keep the Germans on the defensive and the final blow, the Airborne landings, would hopefully throw Army Group H into confusion. In the first twenty-four hours Field Marshal Montgomery was hoping for a bridgehead twelve miles wide, extending from Rees in the west to Dinslaken in the east, and stretching over six miles deep; large enough to hold off anything the Germans could throw at it. Montgomery later summed up the scale and importance of the operation:
My intention was to secure a bridgehead prior to developing operations to isolate the Ruhr and to thrust into the northern plains of Germany. In outline, my plan was to cross the Rhine on the front of two Armies between Rheinberg and Rees, using the Ninth American Army on the right and Second Army on the left. The principal initial object was the important communications centre of Wesel. I intended that the bridgehead should extend to the south sufficiently far to cover Wesel from enemy ground action, and to the north to include bridge sites at Emmerich: the depth of the bridgehead was to be made sufficient to provide room to form up major forces for the drive to the east and north-east.