Notes

PREFACE

1 CIA’s senior ranks were reshuffled in 1995. When John Deutsch moved from Deputy Secretary of Defense to DCI, he brought with him Nora Slatkin as the Executive Director. Dave Cohen, previously Associate Deputy Director for Intelligence, became DDO and Dr. Ruth David from Sandia National Laboratories became DDS&T. George Tenet was appointed CIA Deputy Director in July 1995.

2 These components and functions are presented in detail in the unclassified OTS fiftieth anniversary booklet, “The Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Technical Service, 1951-2001” by Benjamin B. Fischer, 2001.

3 “Budget weenie” is not an authorized CIA occupational title. The more formal designations are budget analyst, financial officer, or resource manager.

4 All of these capabilities were critical to agent operations and covert action programs but all were strapped for resources until 1999. OTS power-sources scientists solicited support from other government agencies to save the battery program. Programs such as the effort to understand and counteract the use of “spy dust” by the Soviets to track CIA officers were closed. Consideration was given in 1994 to closing, due to cost, the OTS counterterrorism training and explosive test range. Other OTS programs, such as disguise, were reduced to survival status and development of new tracking systems was limited to a handful of projects. In 1997, the Executive Director intervened to increase OTS’s covcom budget but the first significant new resources in a decade did not come until a 1999 supplemental congressional appropriation funded CIA’s intensified counterterrorism efforts.

5 William Hood, Mole (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1952), 11-16.

6 Charles E. Lathrop, The Literary Spy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004), 279.

7 Richard Helms, A Look over My Shoulder—A Life in the Central Intelligence Agency (New York: Random House, 2003), vii.

Deciphered message from page xxv: All of the statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed are those of the authors and do not reflect the official positions or views of the CIA or any other U.S. Goverment [sic] agency. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or Agency endorsement of the authors’ views. This material has been reviewed by the CIA to prevent disclosure of classified information.

CHAPTER ONE

1 The Medal of Honor, often called the Congressional Medal of Honor, is the highest award for valor in action against an enemy force that can be bestowed on an individual serving in the U.S. Armed Forces.

2 Donovan was initially appointed as director of the OSS’s predecessor, the COI (Coordinator of Information) on July 11, 1941. COI’s name was changed to OSS on June 13, 1942. See: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/oss/art03.htm.

3 Stanley P. Lovell, Of Spies & Stratagems (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1963), 21.

4 Ibid., 17

5 Ibid.

6 Ibid, 21.

7 A little over a year later, FDR created the OSRD, which took over weapons research and created another group, Division 19, within the NDRC. Benjamin B. Fischer, The Journal of Intelligence History (Nuremberg, Germany, Vol. 2, Number 1, Summer 2002), 16.

8 Ibid., 21.

9 Ibid.

10 After accepting the position, Lovell wore two hats; he retained his position in the NDRC while heading R&D for OSS.

11 Fredric Boyce and Douglas Everett, SOE: The Scientific Secrets (Phoenix Mill, England: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2003), 5-6.

12 Joseph Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War (New York: Random House, 2001), 114.

13 Ibid., 187.

14 Anthony Cave Brown, Wild Bill Donovan: The Last Hero (New York: Times Books, 1982), 301.

15 Ibid.

16 Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Spy Book: The Encyclopedia of Espionage (New York: Random House, 1998), 408.

17 Corey Ford, Donovan of the OSS (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1970), 135-136.

18 Ibid.

19 Bradley F. Smith, The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 171.

20 Brown, Wild Bill Donovan, 236.

21 Ibid., 185.

22 Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000), 8.

23 Boyce and Everett, SOE, Appendix A.

24 Lovell, Of Spies & Stratagems, 22.

25 For an illustration and details see: H. Keith Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment: Spy Devices of WWII (New York: Sterling, 1991), 95.

26 Lovell, Of Spies & Stratagems, 42. For images and a description of the Firefly see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 85, and Donald B. McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen: The Secret Story of American Spy Weapons (Wickenburg, Arizona: Normount Technical Publications, 1975), 167-171.

27 For images and a description of the Limpet see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 58-59, and McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen, 229-232.

28 Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 97.

29 Ford, Donovan of the OSS, 170; William Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 114; Stuart Macrae, Winston Churchill’s Toyshop (New York: Walker and Company, 1972), 7-11.

30 For illustrations and details see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 67-68, and McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen, 183-186.

31 Ibid, Melton, 65-66, and McLean, 81-105.

32 For images and a description of the kit for disguising Explosive Coal, see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 70-71.

33 McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen, 137-142.

34 H. Keith Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book (New York: DK Publishing, 1996), 32; Ivan V. Hogg, The New Illustrated Encyclopedia of Firearms (Secaucus, New Jersey: Wellfleet Press, 1992), 220.

35 For images and a description of the Liberator see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 34-35.

36 Woolworth was a popular “five and dime” store during World War II.

37 Lovell, Of Spies & Stratagems, 40. In reference to the special pistol, Lovell recounted a colorful incident in which Donovan fired the weapon in the White House in the presence of President Roosevelt to demonstrate its flashless and silent characteristics. When Gary Powers was shot down in the U-2 aircraft over the USSR on May 1, 1960, he was armed with an OSS .22 caliber silenced pistol.

38 For images and a description of the Stinger see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 29.

39 For images and a description of the Matchbox Camera see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 103-104.

40 Joseph E. Persico, Piercing the Reich (New York: Viking, 1979), 26-31.

41 Ibid, 28.

42 Warner, The Office of Strategic Services, 33.

43 Lovell, Of Spies & Stratagems, 56-57. For images and a description of Who Me? see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 83. The Who Me? formula was a mineral oil solution that used as its active ingredients skatol (from baby diarrhea), n-butyric acid, n-valeric acid, and n-caproic acid. Also see: McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen, 177-178.

44 Jack Couffer, Bat Bomb: World War II’s Other Secret Weapon (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 1992), 4-7.

45 McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen, 62.

46 Couffer, Bat Bomb, 113-120.

47 McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen, 62.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid, 61-63.

50 Lovell, Of Spies & Stratagems, 84-85.

51 Ibid.

52 Brown, Wild Bill Donovan, 745.

53 David Bruce, Memo to General William Donovan, May 8, 1943. Declassified records of the OSS, MORI ID # 24190.

54 Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War, 337.

55 Lovell, Of Spies & Stratagems, 86. Lovell refers to this, or a similar project, as “Campbell.”

56 Center for the Study of Intelligence, Office of Strategic Services 60th Anniversary Special Edition (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, June 2002), XI.

57 Ibid., 11.

CHAPTER TWO

1 Ford, Donovan of the OSS, 302.

2 Ibid., 303.

3 Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, 1981), 282.

4 Ford, Donovan of the OSS, 314.

5 Donovan had hoped to retain OSS or a civilian intelligence service based on the OSS structure after the war. Indeed, he had submitted a proposal to President Roosevelt for such a service, presumably with the intention of heading it. Initially, Truman rejected the idea of a follow-on service, claiming that it would turn into an “American Gestapo.” One measure of the change of perception about the threat posed by the USSR in the immediate aftermath of WWII was the sudden shift in Truman’s thinking during 1946.

6 Ford, Donovan of the OSS, 312.

7 Ibid., 314.

8 Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War, 448

9 Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 273.

10 Ibid., 11.

11 Ibid.

12 OSO had responsibility for foreign intelligence collection, counterintelligence, covert action, and technical support. OPC had responsibility to conduct paramilitary and psychological operations.

13 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 13.

14 Ibid.

15 Benjamin B. Fischer, “The Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Technical Service, 1951-2001” (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2001), 13.

16 The name TSS was born from bureaucratic infighting. Components in the DDP that ran operations carried the designation “division.” Drum’s initial proposal for a technical “division” met with stern objection from the other division chiefs because this would imply an operational rather than a support role for technical services. “Staff” became the acceptable alternative. Fortunately for TSS, Drum’s first suggestion for a name, the Material Assistance and Development Office, was also rejected. Inevitably, the staff would have been called the “MAD” techs.

CHAPTER THREE

1 The message originated in Moscow. A CIA officer had first written the text in longhand, then, using a one-time pad, he converted the text into what appeared to be a series of random letters. These were given to the local communicator and the coded message was fed through an electronic encryption machine before being transmitted to Langley. Because the message was first enciphered by hand and then by machine, the term “superencipherment” encompassed the full process.

2 Ronald Kessler, Inside the CIA (New York: Pocket Books, 1992), 178.

3 See Robert Louis Benson and Michael Warner (editors), VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, 1996).

4 Jerold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1992), 348.

5 The operation ran from April 1961 until August 1962. For a concise description, see: Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 490-493.

6 Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, 92-93.

7 Ibid., 411.

8 Ibid., 340.

9 Ibid., 337.

10 Ibid., 262.

11 Ibid., 413.

12 Jacob had run a surveillance detection route (SDR) that made a circuitous route through Moscow culminating at a bookstore that he entered through one door and exited from another. Called “dry cleaning” at the time of the operation, the term has been replaced with the less colorful term SDR. Fifteen years later CIA officers were equipped with hidden earpieces to monitor the transmissions of KGB surveillance teams, but Jacob had no such advantage.

13 Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, 307.

14 Ibid., 394.

15 Ibid., 301.

16 Ibid., 365-366.

17 Viktor Suvorov, Aquarium: The Career and Defection of a Soviet Military Spy (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1985), 1-4.

18 Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, 377.

19 Ibid., 95, 351.

20 David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 90.

21 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Archive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books. 1999), 182.

22 Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, 159.

23 Ibid., 248.

24 Ibid., 280.

25 Ibid., 330.

26 Ibid., 29.

27 Ibid., 334.

CHAPTER FOUR

1 I Samuel 19:18-42 relates the story of how Jonathan, son of Israel’s King Saul, communicated covertly to David through shooting of arrows to specific locations.

2 Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, 320-321.

3 Ibid., 394.

4 Ibid., 184

5 The Model IIIs was an improvement over the original Minox, which had been made of stainless steel throughout World War II. This new, postwar version of the classic spy camera was light since it was made of aluminum and featured a better lens. The suffix “s” indicated that the camera could be used for synchronized flash, though in the world of espionage this feature was seldom employed.

6 The operational file on each staff member contained the available data that could be gleaned from previous assignments abroad and with information from the KGB’s network of Soviet nationals who regularly reported their suspicions to their contacts about their American colleagues. Information about the newly arriving diplomat’s age, marital status, hobbies, education, and official position created the KGB’s “profile of the individual.” It was only those activities that were “out of profile” that would result in special attention from the “watchers.” For example, a newly arrived midlevel employee seen having lunch regularly with more senior staff might draw interest. The Soviets working at the U.S. Embassy had been screened and approved by the KGB. Many spoke excellent English (sometimes without even a trace of an accent), and did the bulk of the actual work for the Embassy when dealing with other Soviets who wanted to apply for a travel visa or to emigrate to the United States. They also were “fixers” that enabled the Embassy to cut through the Byzantine Soviet bureaucracy, as well as cooks, drivers, cleaning staff, gardeners, and even building maintenance personnel. They were seen as so essential to the smooth running of the Embassy that they became ubiquitous. Too frequently their nationality was forgotten and they were treated as “friends and colleagues” by many of the American personnel stationed at the Embassy despite awareness that they reported regularly to the KGB. Even seemingly innocuous patterns of who sat next to each other in the cafeteria, or whose wives were chatting closely at official functions, were considered as they attempted to unmask officers.

7 The Second Directorate is responsible for internal security.

8 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 185.

9 Ibid.

10 At Soviet embassies throughout the world, the spouses and dependents of diplomatic and intelligence personnel filled the required administrative and support jobs.

11 Ronald Kessler, Moscow Station (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1989), 68, 106.

12 As a result of his exposure, the officer received thorough annual medical checkups in the following years. No physical harm from the radiation was ever identified.

13 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 192.

14 Fifteen years later, in 1970, after most of CIA had relocated to the Langley Headquarters, East and South Buildings were occupied by TSD. The tech found himself assigned to the office formerly occupied by the DCI. He removed one of the acoustic tiles above where he imagined the DCI’s desk might have sat. Hanging by a now unconnected wire was a single DD-4 microphone, apparently missed when the recording system was dismantled.

15 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 308.

16 Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, 61-62.

17 Throughout the late 1950s, several TSS engineers worked on or were assigned to the large technology programs such as the U-2, but the programs were neither managed nor owned by TSS.

18 Jeffrey T. Richelson, A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 25.

19 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 391.

20 Schecter and Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, 101.

21 Ibid.

22 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, 105. Compared to satellites and spy planes, agents were far less costly. During his time as an agent for the Americans in the 1950s, Colonel Pyotr Popov was paid an estimated $4,000 a year (approximately $25,000 adjusted for inflation) and provided intelligence on GRU and KGB operations in both Europe and the United States. A single satellite would pay the salaries of ten thousand agents like Popov.

23 In 1962, the formation of the Directorate of Research consolidated high-altitude reconnaissance and satellite programs along with CIA-sponsored research in the new directorate. However, TSD and its technical support to operations responsibility remained under the Directorate of Plans.

CHAPTER FIVE

1 Charles E. Lathrop, The Literary Spy (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2004) 339.

2 The TOO’s referred to this as “the tech culture.” Mention is also made by Grose, Gentleman Spy, 389.

3 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 155-156.

4 When used in reference to TSD and OTS, “research and development” or “R&D” means “applied research and development.” The term “development and engineering” is usually more descriptive of the type of work done by TSD and OTS. The TSD/OTS-sponsored R&D focused on technologies and development processes that would lead to production of a product, device, or capability that could be used in clandestine operations. TSD/OTS R&D programs aimed toward a two- to five-year payoff—the shorter the better.

5 Undated CIA brochure, “Directorate of Science & Technology: People and Intelligence in the Service of Freedom,” page 3. The CIA’s Directorate of Research, established in 1962, preceded the DS&T by one year.

6 TSD would be part of the operations directorate until 1973. In a CIA reorganization that year, TSD was moved to the Directorate of Science and Technology and renamed the Office of Technical Service (OTS).

7 Cambridge Dictionary of Science and Technology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 632.

8 Sergo A. Mikoyan, “Eroding the Soviet ‘Culture of Secrecy,’ Studies in Intelligence , No. 11, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001.

CHAPTER SIX

1 Benjamin Weiser, A Secret Life: The Polish Officer, His Covert Mission, and the Price He Paid to Save His Country (New York: Public Affairs, 2004). 221-223.

2 Within ten years, TSD had developed several electronic short-range agent communication (SRAC) devices from this idea.

3 An accommodation address is most commonly a street or post office box address not associated with an intelligence service or a government agency.

4 The process, while complex for the novice, was well-known within the photographic industry. “Stripping film,” was a commercial product. Intelligence services made direct contact prints on the emulsion as part of a covert microphotography process. “Bleaching” the completed emulsion was a step in standard microdot concealments that the KGB refined in the early years of the Cold War. If an agent had the necessary technical aptitude to perform the procedures, affixing “bleached” emulsion of varying sizes onto postcards became a common technique for covert communications.

5 The instructions provide an exemplar of the detail and complexity necessary to provide technical training to an agent through impersonal communications. The exemplar does not convey the precise methodology or actual text of the operational message.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1 In 1963, during McCone’s tenure as DCI, the Directorate of Research was renamed the Directorate of Science and Technology.

2 The DDP had been redesignated as the Directorate of Operations (DO) in 1973.

3 Despite the abrupt change, McMahon’s engaging personality, and leadership skill earned the lasting respect of OTS during his fourteen-month tenure as Director. McMahon served as Honorary Chairman of the OTS fiftieth anniversary committee in 2001. However, for many senior DO and OTS officers, Schlesinger’s separating TSD from the operations directorate was viewed as a historic mistake.

4 Colby was sworn in as DCI in September. He served the CIA in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. President Reagan later tapped a fourth OSS veteran, William Casey, as DCI in 1981.

5 Seymour Hersh, The New York Times, December 22, 1974. The mail-opening program’s crypt was HGLINGUAL.

6 OTS’s role in the CIA mail-opening program is described in chapter 15.

7 U.S. House of Representatives, Special Subcommittee on Intelligence of the Committee on Armed Services, 1974; U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 1975, 1976. U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the Subcommittee on Health and Scientific Research of the Committee on Human Resources, 1977; Rockefeller Commission Report to the President on CIA Activities within the U.S., 1975.

8 “Family jewels” was an ironic nod to Allen Dulles who used the term to refer to a personal notebook during WWII that contained the names of his most important agents.

9 For pictures and technical details of the “Dart Gun,” see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons & Equipment, 22.

10 Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, 431.

11 CCDs had also been among the technologies that allowed satellites to image targets and transmit the “pictures” back to earth in real time. The first of these satellites was the KH-11, launched in 1976. Before the KH-11, film capsules of photographs taken by satellite cameras were jettisoned from the satellite and parachuted to earth.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1 Milton Bearden and James Risen, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story of the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (New York: Random House, 2003), 37.

2 Various aids were improvised by the agent to assist in ensuring the proper distance between lens and document as well as centering the camera. Knitting needles and threads of the proper length could be used as reference points. While these could be used if the agent was assured of privacy while photographing, they could be alerting and the objective would be to provide the agent sufficient training and confidence to operate the camera without any other aids. Over time, with improved lens design, the focusing tolerance expanded.

3 In OTS jargon, the pen was known as an “active concealment” because the concealment functioned as the product it represented, in this case a writing instrument.

4 Comments by policy officials on intelligence are usually offered in informal exchanges with officers who present the information and passed to senior Agency managers. The fact that the feedback reached a working-level case officer, like Saxe, was unusual and indicative of the significance of the information.

5 The L-pill, concealed in a pen identical to the one that housed the agent’s subminiature camera, was passed to TRIGON during a single hourlong clandestine meeting with a CIA officer in Moscow in 1976. After TRIGON’s arrest and suicide, the KGB produced the concealment pen said to have contained the L-pill.

6 Richelson, Jeffrey T., A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 343.

7 Kalvar, a commercial product developed as an alternative to traditional microfilm, represented a commercial product that OTS could apply to reduced-image photography. The original company ceased operations in 1979 but other firms continued making the product. For operational use, Kalvar had the advantage that it could be handled and processed in normal room light and developed in boiling water without requiring special chemicals.

8 Wording is based on a translation of the purported note on display in the FSB museum in Moscow.

9 Igor Peretrukhin, Agent Code Name—TRIANON (Agenturnaya Klichka— TRIANON) (Moscow: Tsetrpoligraf, 2000), 217-218.

10 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 362.

CHAPTER NINE

1 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 10-11.

2 The original stump is on display inside the FSB museum in Moscow. A replica is displayed inside the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C.

3 The TOO approach to providing technical support to operations officers contrasted with the OSS model. In 1944, OSS printed a catalog of available spy gear that could be ordered as needed. Following World War II and prior to the TOO program, TSS and TSD operated primarily as a supply and on-call service. If sustained technical support was needed for an operation, a TSS officer would be sent on TDY for that specific purpose. TOO represented a different philosophy that said a properly cross-trained officer with technical aptitude could make an ongoing contribution to the full range of an office’s operations. The forward-deployed TOO could provide expertise in his principal technical area and working-level technical support from his cross-training in other areas. Further, he would have immediate and direct access to the experts in every OTS discipline when those were required. The TOO became integral to operational planning and execution in locations of their assignments.

4 The first SRR-100 models were approximately ³⁄4 × 2¹⁄2 × 3¹⁄2 inches. The key design dimension was thickness because the unit would likely be worn in a shirt pocket or the inside pocket of a man’s suit coat.

5 The basic technology to intercept surveillance transmissions was widely understood. Soviets stationed in the United States had once used Bearcat scanners purchased at the local Radio Shack to pick up FBI transmissions. Decades later, some KGB technicians would still exhibit a genuine fondness for the stores and merchandise, praising the reliability and quality of the products such as batteries, wires, and other parts they had been able to obtain.

6 Victor Sheymov, Tower of Secrets: A Real Life Spy Thriller (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1993).

7 Barry G. Royden, “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol 47:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003, 12.

CHAPTER TEN

1 Driven by the character of Q, Major Boothroyd, who was not in the Bond novels, but added to the movies, spy gadgets became an instant hit. Q’s equipment was impressive on the movie screen, often defying the laws of physics. A more realistic portrayal of spy gadgetry was seen in Mission: Impossible, where every device had to be based upon technology available at the time. For more information see: Danny Biederman, The Incredible World of SPY-FI (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 2004).

2 Case officers were not encouraged by the fact that a great many of the elements required in technical collection violated some of the basic tenets of denied area tradecraft. For instance, installation of a technical device could involve an officer remaining at the target site for extended periods of time. In virtually every other operational procedure in denied areas, dead drops, signals, brush passes, car tosses, and the expanding arsenal of SRAC technology was aimed at minimizing the time of the operational act. Technical operations, such as installing a tap or emplacing a sensor, could require longer times at the target site to attach, adjust, and test the system.

3 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 194.

4 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 508-510; Richelson, A Century of Spies, 422. Polyakov is also known under the FBI codename TOPHAT and CIA codename BOURBON.

5 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 509. A “brush pass” allows for an imperceptible exchange of a small “package” such as a message or film cassette, to take place between two people as they “brush” past each other in a public area. There is no outward sign of recognition between the parties involved.

6 Communications between agents and case officers divides into two general systems known as “agent send” and “agent receive.” Due to the difficulty of concealing spy gear, agents were limited in the type of covert communications (covcom) equipment they could possess. As a result, agents had fewer options in sending messages—secret writing, in limited cases microdots, and dead drops. Options for agent receive systems included those plus OWVL, microprinting, and “blind” newspaper placements. Satellites introduced the option of long-range electronic covcom and BUSTER introduced short-range electronic covcom options.

7 A “mole” is a serving intelligence officer who is secretly working for another intelligence service.

8 David Wise, Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Hanssen Betrayed America (New York: Random House, 2002), 20-24.

9 Ibid., 193.

10 Ibid., 193-194.

11 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 509.

12 Royden, “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” Studies in Intelligence, 47:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003, 5.

13 Ibid., 12.

14 Schecter and Debriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World, 5, 25, 28.

15 “Dangles” appear to be legitimate volunteers, but are actually being controlled by another intelligence service.

16 The prepared text was often in the form of a personal letter containing information designed to avoid attracting unwanted attention and scrutiny from Soviet postal censors. The content was written in another person’s handwriting so even if censorship detected secret writing, the handwriting would not incriminate the agent.

17 Soviet postal censors used the word “perlustration” for the examination of mail to detect secret writing and microdots. Soviet censors detected secret writing by swabbing across the item with a “cocktail” of chemical reagents designed to expose the hidden content. Examination of the item after it was received by OTS would detect traces of the swabbing. For CIA use, secret writing systems developed by OTS were tested against such “cocktails” before being approved for operational use.

18 Royden, “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” 10.

19 The location in which the car was parked, direction it was facing, and other simple variables could be used as the signal.

20 Personal meetings in a denied area are inherently dangerous for the agent and avoided if at all possible. Though the agent may be unknown to counterintelligence, the case officer is always subject to being surveilled and may unknowingly lead surveillance to the meeting. Dead drops are a form of “impersonal communication” in which the agent and handler are separated by time, but not space. Personal meetings do, however, provide the handler with the important advantage of assessing the agent’s mental state and verifying that operational instructions are understood.

21 Information has more value when the adversary does not realize that it has been “lost.” As such, secretly copying documents is almost always preferred to taking the original document.

22 The KGB and other intelligence services recommended Minox cameras for their agents. U.S. Navy Warrant Officer John Walker, a mole for the KGB, was trained in the use of a Minox Model-C camera for “doc copy” during a trip to Vienna in the late 1960s. His technical instructions are still valid: use B/W Plus-X Pan film (ASA 125), shutter speed at 1/100th, distance to document eighteen inches, and even illumination with a 75-100 watt bulb placed at a 45-degree angle to the document.

23 In 1938, the original “Riga” Minox camera could be concealed in a man’s closed fist. Postwar Minox models (II and III) were just as small, but often necessitated the use of a separate light meter which also had to be concealed. In 1958 Minox incorporated an internal light meter for the first time into the slightly larger Model-B. Though still a “pocketable” camera, the Minox “B” and later models would continue to add features and size. In 1981 Minox introduced its smallest and lightest camera series, the “EC,” but its fixed-focus lens (three feet to infinity) was unusable for document photography. Regardless of the Minox camera being used, they were not designed for covert use and the act of “doc copy” would be obvious to anyone observing the user.

24 Tolkachev was instructed to be home from 6:00 PM till 8:00 PM on the evening of the date that corresponded to the number of the month; 1 January, 2 February, 3 March, 4 April, etc., and “cover” (stand by to answer) his phone. The call would be disguised as a “wrong number” wherein the caller would ask for one of three names. Each name was linked to a prearranged dead drop site: OLGA, ANNA, or NINA. If the caller asker for VALERIY it would trigger a personal meeting at a prearranged location exactly one hour following the call. Each month, on a date that equaled the number of the month plus fifteen—21 June, 22 July, 23 August—Tolkachev was further instructed to be at a prearranged site at a specific time and wait for five minutes. If his regular handler did not meet him, he was provided with a “parole” (a recognition signal and password) to authenticate the identity of the person sent to meet him.

25 An additional advantage of using the unmodified commercially available Pentax ME camera was that it was not a piece of “tradecraft” equipment and there was a plausible explanation for him to have it in his apartment. Conversely, possession of a noncommercial subminiature “doc copy” camera was proof of espionage.

26 Tolkachev was also provided with parked-car signals (PCS) which would confirm receipt of a transmission by the direction in which his car was parked. The CIA also parked cars on routes frequented by Tolkachev in a similar prearranged PCS to signal to the agent.

27 Tolkachev used the updated OTS-provided demodulator to receive the ciphered message. At the predetermined time and date a ten-minute-long transmission would take place that could include both real and dummy messages. To keep the KGB guessing about the messages the airwaves were often filled with dummy messages; only the real agent would know the date, time, and frequency for the message intended for him. The newly developed demodulator was connected to the radio and captured the message as it was received. The agent could then later recall it and scroll it across the screen of the demodulator unit. The first three digits of the message contained an indicator that told Tolkachev if the following message was intended for him. If so, he could scroll out the reaming portion of the message, which could be as long as 400 five-letter groups. Tolkachev would then use his OTP to decipher the message. Tolkachev attempted to monitor the IOWL transmission, but was unable to do so because of the lack of privacy in his apartment. Shortwave transmissions usually took place at night when atmospheric conditions provided greater transmission ranges and clearer signals, but this also conflicted with the times his family was in the apartment. As a result, subsequent transmissions were moved to the daytime hours when Tolkachev could arrange to be home. Unfortunately his institute’s change in security regulations eliminated trips away from the office during working hours and in December of 1982 Tolkachev returned all of his IOWL equipment to his handler.

28 Royden, “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” 27.

29 Unbeknownst to Tolkachev, the plan was modeled after the CIA’s first successful exfiltration of an agent from the USSR three years earlier. Victor Sheymov, a Soviet communications security specialist, and his wife and young daughter were hidden in the back of a van and secretly transported from a site near Leningrad to freedom in May 1980. The daring escape story is told in Tower of Secrets by Victor Sheymov. Then, an almost identical exfiltration plan was used in the summer of 1985 by MI6 (British Intelligence) to rescue their agent, KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, from inside the USSR. (see: Gordievsky, Oleg, Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky ([London: Macmillan, 1985]).)

30 Royden, “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” 33.

31 Royden, “Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky,” 5.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

1 Pronounced “See Kay Taw,” this operational code name would have no meaning to anyone who had not been briefed on the activity. CK initials referred to the Soviet/East European Division that ran the operation.

2 Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), 239.

3 Ibid., 29.

4 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 28.

5 The specialized antennas and broad-spectrum radio monitors used from a listening post continuously searched the airwaves for three reasons: (1) to gain positive intelligence, (2) to monitor police and counterintelligence frequencies to identify levels of surveillance activity, and (3) to spot transmissions that might indicate the presence of hidden listening devices transmitting from within the Embassy. Once a signal of interest was spotted on the cathode ray display, every effort was made to locate and identify the source and purpose of the transmission. If the signal had intelligence value it would be tagged and recorded, otherwise the monitoring equipment ignored it and continued its search for new and unrecognized signals.

6 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 28.

7 Early satellites captured images on film that was jettisoned and recovered as it parachuted to earth. The film was then flown to a facility to be processed and analyzed. Depending on where the film was recovered, the process from satellite to analysis could take a week or longer. Real-time satellites, however, capture images digitally and then transmit them to ground stations where they are relayed back to intelligence headquarters for immediate analysis.

8 OTS designed a new type of “secure room” that improved the confidence of the CIA that their operational discussions were protected from KGB eavesdropping. The special room, including chairs and tables, was constructed entirely of clear plastic to expose any electronic listening devices, or “bugs.” In theory, it was comparable to the fictional “cone of silence” from the 1960s television show Get Smart.

9 Edward Lee Howard was one of the officers who trained on the mock-up site at “The Farm.”

10 Time in the manhole became an important consideration for every entry. Sufficient time had to be allocated to do the necessary work, but longer times meant greater risk.

11 See: Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 529. The threat of “tagging” was a genuine concern. The KGB’s infamously aggressive program code-named METKA, used a variety of covert tracking substances and techniques, the best-known was dubbed “spy dust.” Discovered in the early 1970s, the use of spy dust was made public in the mid-1980s by the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR. The chemical substance, when placed on door handles in cars or on other common objects, allowed the KGB to track those who touched the compound. When analyzed, the mysterious substance was found to be nitrophenyl pentadien (NPPD) and luminol.

12 The capabilities of the counterintelligence services in countries covered by SE Division (USSR, East Germany, and the other Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern Europe) posed increased risks for Agency operations. Case officers required additional training for that environment.

13 An SDR is a route of travel to the place where an operation will occur, including stops and varied modes of transportation and is selected to reveal surveillance to the case officer without him having to appear to be looking. The security of Moscow operations demanded that the case officer make an absolute determination that he was free of surveillance before conducting the clandestine act.

14 Choke points referred to locations where vehicles or pedestrians are required to merge as they move from one to another area such as the only bridge connecting two sections of a city across a river. Anyone going from one to the other section must cross the bridge. Surveillance teams establish positions at choke points knowing that their target will eventually be compelled to pass through.

15 A “near field” receiver used a specially detuned antenna to ignore any transmission other than those very close to the receiver.

16 KGB surveillance teams often communicated nonverbally using a series of clicks that were created by “keying their microphones” with the radio control unit carried in their pants or jacket pocket. With this technique they avoided possible detection that might happen if seen speaking into the microphone sewn under the lapel of their surveillance clothing.

17 According to a former member of the Seventh Directorate, surveillance teams were known as Naruzhnoye Nablyudeniye or the “NNs”. Two different team configurations were employed depending on the target. For routine surveillance the team consisted of six officers, a team leader, and three cars. For special targets and suspected CIA officers the team was increased to eight officers, a team leader, and three cars. The additional officers were added in case the target was seen in contact with an unknown individual whereby they would detach from the main team and continue to follow the unidentified suspect.

18 The Russian clothing constituted a “light disguise” that affected external changes in appearance such as style and color of clothing and shoes, hats, wigs, beards and moustaches, eyeglasses, walking canes and heel lifts that could be adopted quickly. Light disguises were primarily most effective at a distance.

19 Counterintelligence services are usually more interested in identifying the spy than the case officer. Arresting a foreign intelligence officer is less important to the KGB than the opportunity to identify a possible traitor.

20 The history of the Penkovsky case is detailed by Schecter and Deriabin in The Spy Who Saved the World.

21 Because one never knew what products might appear in the market from day to day, Soviet women carried an empty bag thinking “perhaps” scarce items would be available.

22 One Moscow chief would not allow officers to use surveillance receivers during their first months in-country. He wanted the officer’s observation and detection skills tested and proven lest the technology become a substitute for awareness and intuitive judgment.

23 During Operation GOLD (Berlin, 1955-56) the KGB had protected their underground communications lines by placing them inside airtight cables that had been pressurized with nitrogen gas. Any penetration of the cable would lower the pressure and alert the KGB communication technicians. To overcome this KGB safeguard, the CIA constructed a “tapping chamber” around an underground section of the cable that was pressurized before the cable was opened and the taps placed on the lines. Because the pressure inside the “tapping chamber” was the same as that inside the cable, the alarm did not sound.

24 H. Keith Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment: Spy Devices of the Cold War (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1993), 37. A standard 35mm camera loaded with Kodak high-speed-infrared 2481 film and utilizing a flash unit fitted with an infrared filter over the lens (Kodak Wratten gelatin filters nos. 87, 87C, 88A, or 89B) allowed photographs to be taken in complete darkness without betraying the use of the flash.

25 The remote interrogation allowed the CIA to transmit a signal to a transceiver built into CKTAW. It would then automatically reply with a signal indicating the operational status of the unit. The “tamper indicated” signal was sent if the CKTAW device had been tampered with, or compromised. If the CIA officer received this signal (or no signal) after the device was “interrogated,” the operation would be aborted.

26 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 29.

27 Ibid., 30.

28 During an interview with coauthor Keith Melton in 1997 in Moscow, Vitaly Yurchenko stated that his formal rank was that of a naval Commander, not Colonel.

29 Ronald Kessler, Escape from the CIA: How the CIA Won and Lost the Most Important KGB Spy Ever to Defect to the U.S. (New York: Pocket Books, 1991), 45.

30 Ibid., 47.

31 David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard, the CIA Agent Who Betrayed His Country’s Secrets and Escaped to Moscow (New York: Random House, 1988), 19.

32 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 83-84.

33 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 40.

34 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 83-85.

35 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 59.

36 Ibid., 59-60.

37 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 86.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 137.

41 Ibid., 138-139.

42 Kessler, Escape from the CIA, 184.

43 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 186-187.

44 Ibid.,188.

45 Ibid., 113.

46 Ibid., 192.

47 Though polygraph examinations are not admissible in court, the FBI uses them routinely as an investigation tool and a way for a suspect to “prove his innocence.” Howard, however, had a history of failing polygraph examinations and never considered submitting to the testing.

48 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 62.

49 Ibid., 199.

50 Ibid., 204.

51 Ibid., 204-205.

52 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 115.

53 Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, 213.

54 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 83-85.

55 Ibid., 84.

56 The CIA later learned that Howard had met Soviet intelligence officers during the fall of 1984 and again during the Spring of 1985. See: www.nacic.gov/pubs/misc/screen_backgrounds/spy_bios/edward_howard_bio.html.

57 In May 1985, Aldrich H. Ames, a CIA counterintelligence officer, began spying for the USSR and also revealed the CKTAW operation.

58 Nikolai Brusnitsyn, Openness and Espionage (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1990). Soviet officials gave copies of the article to members of the U.S. delegation the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in Geneva.

59 Ibid., 32.

60 Krassilnikov, The Phantoms of Tchaikovsky Street Prizraki c Ulitsy Chaykovskogo (The Phantoms of Tchaikovsky Street) (Moscow: GEYA Iterum, 1999).

61 Ibid., 179-187.

62 Ibid.

CHAPTER TWELVE

1 “What happens in the field stays in the field” was often repeated and applied, except when the stories were too good not to be retold at Headquarters. These stories became part of OTS’s culture and lore.

2 TDY is a government acronym for “temporary duty” and refers to assignments, usually less than 180 days, away from an employee’s home area.

3 “Tech hotels” were not exclusively the culture of OTS. Officers from the Office of Communications, who managed the Agency’s communications networks around the world, earned a similar reputation for knowing where to find cheap rooms.

4 See: U.S. Department of State web page: moscow.usembassy.gov/embassy/embassy.php?record_id=spaso.

5 Ibid.

6 The common listening devices of the time were phone taps or microphones hidden in ceilings and walls and hardwired to a manned listening post.

7 Sanche de Gramont, The Secret War: The Story of Espionage since World War II (New York: Putnam, 1962), 411. See also U.S. Department of State Web site: moscow.usembassy.gov/embassy.

8 George F. Keenan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (New York: Pantheon, 1967), 189.

9 At the time, audio operations that were hardwired were state-of-the-art. In most cases they required only that a microphone be planted, with wires leading away to a nearby listening post. In this way, the listeners were assured of secure lines and a steady power source from the post or the target building’s own power. The unit could be turned off and on at will. It was only later, when technology had developed sufficiently to provide small, reliable transmitters, that “wireless” audio operations came into being.

10 See: www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/01/interviews/beria/ for excerpts of an interview with Sergo Beria, the son of Lavrenty Beria (chief of the NKVD—the Soviet secret police) who participated in the eavesdropping operations at Tehran and Yalta.

11 Ibid.

12 Gary Kern, “How ‘Uncle Joe’ Bugged FDR,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 47:1, 2003, 19-31.

13 Peter Wright, Spycatcher (New York: Viking, 1987), 20.

14 Ibid.

15 Peter Wright, The Spycatcher’s Encyclopedia of Espionage (Port Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia, 1991), 238. and Spycatcher (New York: Dell, 1987), 26, 28-29.

16 See: Melton, Ultimate Spy (New York: DK, 2002), 104, for a diagram of “the Thing,” photos, and a description of its operation.

17 Wright, Spycatcher, 78-79.

18 Ibid.

19 Wright, The Spycatcher’s Encyclopedia of Espionage (Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: William Heinemann Australia, 1991), 212-213.

20 Albert Glinsky, Theremin: Ether Music and Espionage (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 273.

21 The developer, Soviet scientist Léon Sergeyevich Theremin, first caused the filament inside an incandescent light bulb to resonate as a microphone in 1943 before perfecting the eavesdropping device inside the carved wooden seal in 1945. In 1947 Theremin subsequently developed a system to eavesdrop on foreign embassies in Moscow using infrared light beams aimed at “points of architectural resonance” such as windowpanes. For this accomplishment he was awarded the Stalin Prize, 1st Class, the equivalent at the time to the Nobel and Pulitzer Prizes combined. For more on Theremin see: Glinsky, Theremin.

22 Glinsky, Theremin, 263-264.

23 “Finds” are systems, components, and devices made and used by a foreign (non-U. S.) intelligence service for clandestine operations and usually returned to the United States for examination and analysis. These include any spy gear such as communications, surveillance, and forgery equipment as well as special weapons and improvised explosives.

24 For examples of OSS equipment see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment.

25 Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 211-212.

26 “Contractors” is a generic term that describes private sector persons or companies that provide goods and services to the CIA, including OTS.

27 Audio would be a priority of OTS until 1966 when the audio program was moved to the Clandestine Information Technology Office (CITO). CITO existed until 2000 when most of its functions were absorbed by the Information Operations Center that drew staff from both the DS&T and the DO.

28 OTS development or procurement programs usually had a nondescriptive name that served two purposes. First, all of the program’s contracts and financial activities would carry the designation to assure controls, tracking, and audit functions could be performed. Secondly, the names offered a layer of security and compartmentation when programs were being discussed. EARWORT would mean nothing to one not briefed about the name and the activity. To ask, “What does EARWORT mean?” would convey that the individual had not been granted access to the program.

29 “Listening post” refers to the location, usually a safe house near the location under surveillance, where the covert audio feed is received, recorded and initially evaluated. Listening posts were commonly staffed by speakers of the targets’ native language and equipped with headphones, amplifiers, and recorders that would capture the audio of operational relevance. The best of the “transcribers” or “monitors” could also provide cultural and emotional interpretation of the conversations they heard.

30 All OTS audio operations required submission of a formal “survey” before the operation could commence. The survey included detailed information about the target, purpose, planned operational activities, equipment to be used, and anticipated risk level.

31 In the 1980s, many advertisements would no longer be “blind” and the CIA would be identified as the employer. For an example see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment; 45.

32 Despite the many engineering and scientific achievements of TSD and OTS, the “tinkerer” reputation followed the techs. In 1996, more than three decades after Scoville’s remark and twenty-three years after OTS had become an office in the Directorate of Science and Technology, the Deputy Director of Operations referred to OTS as “my blue-collar guys” at a DS&T senior staff meeting. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology, who was also present, offered no objection to the characterization.

33 Something that was “jerry-rigged” meant that it had been cobbled together quickly, usually from available parts; such solutions were often intended for use only in the short term.

34 Amtorg offices had long provided cover for Soviet intelligence officers. See: William R. Corson and Robert T. Crowley, The New KGB: The Engine of Soviet Power (New York: Quill, 1986), 296, and Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 186-187. When Robert Hanssen sought to sell secrets to the GRU in 1979-80 he did so through the NYC office of Amtorg. See David Wise, Spy: The Inside Story of How the FBI’s Robert Hanssen Betrayed America (New York: Random House, 2002), 21.

35 A “front” company is or appears to be a legitimate firm whose visible image has no association with an intelligence service. However, the company supports or serves some clandestine activities. Front companies are commonly used by every intelligence organization.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

1 See: www.militaryradio.com/spyradio/tsd.html for a picture of the early transmitters, named SRT for “surveillance radio transmitter.”

2 “Sweeping” an environment with detectors for indicators of electronic, RF, and magnetic signatures of microphones, recorders, and transmitters is done by specialists known as TSCM (technical systems countermeasures teams). By later adding a remote on/off switch operated at the listening post, the transmitter could be turned off when a TSCM team was about to search the room. Once the transmitter quit sending the signal, detection was much more difficult. Later, remote on/off would also be used as a means of putting the transmitter in “sleep mode” to save battery power. The longer the batteries operated the less frequently entries into the target would be necessary to replace them.

3 See: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 67.

4 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, 128.

5 For details and photos of “bugs” in the SRT series see Pete McCollum’s clandestine communications website: www.militaryradio.com/spyradio/tsd.html

6 Critical characteristics for radio frequency audio transmitters intended for covert use include (1) reliability, primarily a function of the device’s design, components, and power supply; (2) concealability, primarily a function of device size and configuration; and (3) detectability, primarily a function of the intended or unintended signals generated and the materials from which the device is constructed. The same three characteristics are critical for every other component of an audio surveillance system such as the microphones, wires, connectors, batteries, and recording devices. Finally, reliability, concealability, and detectability are standards by which the operational utility of the fully integrated and operating system is judged.

7 Mallory since evolved into the well-known Duracell Company.

8 In addition to powering surveillance devices, batteries were vital to other OTS espionage equipment for covert communications, tracking beacons and signaling devices. Any gadget with electronics required a power source and, in most instances, that meant some type of battery.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

1 Philip Agee, CIA Diary: Inside the Company (New York: Stonehill, 1975), cover and end flap. The case held a tracking beacon, not an audio device.

2 The continuing miniaturization of circuits followed “Moore’s Law,” an observation made in 1965 by Gordon Moore, cofounder of Intel. The “law” observed that the number of transistors per square inch on integrated circuits had doubled every year since the integrated circuit was invented, and Moore predicted that this trend would continue for the foreseeable future.

3 Richelson, The Wizards of Langley, presents an organizational history of ORD.

4 Richelson, The Wizards of Langley, 147.

5 See: www.thesmokinggun.com/archive/ciacats2.html for a redacted TSD memorandum about the Acoustic kitty project.

6 Both OTS and ORD experimented with other unconventional ideas using animals for intelligence collection. Ravens were tested as winged couriers to deposit audio devices on windowsills, though ambient noise made this idea impractical.

7 Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 62.

8 For another description of the Backscatter Gauge in use see: F. W. Rustmann, Jr., CIA, INC.: Espionage and the Craft of Business Intelligence (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002) 62.

9 Antonio J. Mendez in The Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA (New York: Morrow, 1999), provides an account of his career as an OTS operational disguise specialist.

10 George Gardner, Picks, Clicks, Flaps and Seals: A Monograph on Surreptitious Entry (unpublished monograph), 1944, 5. This rare manual was the primary “surreptitious entry” manual used by the OSS and later by TSD. “George Gardner” is most likely the nom de plume for Willis George, the senior OSS “entry expert” and postwar author of Surreptitious Entry: The Sensational Story of a Government Agent Who Picked Locks and Cracked Safes in the Service of His Country (New York: Appleton-Century, 1946).

11 Ibid., 5.

12 The lock-picking course included a “final” exam requiring the student to pick open sixty different locks in sixty minutes. “It was a tough course,” one tech noted, “I passed only because the generous instructor included several simple suitcase and luggage locks.”

13 Because a tech might not have an idea of the types of locks he would encounter inside a target, he would be forced to bring with him as many types of tools as possible, sometimes carried in a small black bag. The FBI historically referred to these as “black bag operations.”

14 Images and an operational description of the kit appear in: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 75.

15 After a “woods metal” (commercially sold as Cerebun) copy of the key had been made, it was placed in a key-cutting machine to copy the “key cuts” onto a stronger key blank. This key was then available to be used operationally. For images and a description of the kit see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 76.

16 For images and descriptions of TSD lock picking kits, see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons & Equipment, 73, and Melton, Ultimate Spy, 114-115.

17 Details of HTLINGUAL are presented in the U.S. Senate, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Final Report, Book III. 1976.

18 For a detailed description of the TSD “Flaps and Seals” course, see: Mendez, The Master of Disguise, 72-76.

19 Gardner, Picks, Clicks, Flaps and Seals, 93. The “dry” process involved separating the two sides of the glued flap with an ivory tool, and required more training and practice. The “steaming,” which softened the glue with steam to allow it to be opened, was easier, but more hazardous. There was always the possibility that the steam would affect the script, and if the envelope was tinted, the dye could run or change color.

20 Ibid.

21 See: U.S. Senate, Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Final Report, Book III.

22 Ibid.

23 This decision, the amount of time techs would be in the target facility, went to the heart of operational planning, affecting the activities of both the tech and the case officers. Sometimes this was moot due to the target. A vacant building may offer unrestricted time. An occupied office building usually dictated a “quick plant” job. In other examples, a three-hour installation in an apartment could be accomplished by a ruse that temporarily drew the occupants out for the evening. However, that would also likely mean the audio would be a single bug with no redundancy and left no margin for installation complications or errors. A multiday installation actually could become more complicated, requiring separate operations to assure vacancy of premises, sustained countersurveillance, and logistical supplies for the audio team. Advantages included a less pressured schedule, opportunity to emplace multiple bugs, time to test system performance, and margin to correct errors.

24 Using more than one microphone and recording each “channel” separately allowed the signals to be individually filtered and amplified to achieve a result comparable to turning one’s head to hear a sound or conversation coming from a different part of a noisy room. “Audio steering” was accomplished by increasing or decreasing the amplification of the differing sound channels to focus on specific conversations.

25 The efficiency of a device, component, or system in electronics and electrical engineering is defined as useful power output divided by the total electrical power consumed (a fractional expression).

26 The 1980 Moscow Olympics that were boycotted by the United States ended the operation. Late in the spring of 1980, the Soviet government ordered a general clean up of Moscow prior to the Olympics. The shacks were declared public eyesores and razed. The wood block and transmitter along with the table were buried in an unknown dumpsite.

27 Oleg Kalugin, The First Directorate: My 32 Years in Intelligence and Espionage (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 261.

28 Victor Cherkashin, Spy Handler: Memoir of a KGB Officer (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 194.

29 Based on interview with former KGB communications security officer living in the West.

30 Ibid.

31 By the 1990s, classical audio operations had become engulfed in a tidal wave of digital information technology.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

1 Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, 68.

2 Fischer, The Journal of Intelligence History, 2, Summer 2000, 16.

3 Amy Knight, Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993), 138.

4 Ibid.,136, and verified by author interview with former KGB officer.

5 Knight, Beria, 106.

6 Simon Sebag Montefiore, Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (New York. Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 503.

7 Knight, Beria, 136.

8 Interview with former Soviet security officer.

9 John Markoff, James Early obituary, The New York Times, January 19, 2004.

10 ARPA: The Advanced Research Projects Agency was founded in February of 1958 as a research branch of the Department of Defense. The name was changed to Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) in 1972. In 1993 the name was changed back to ARPA and then back to DARPA in 1996. The agency is credited with development of the Internet.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

1 Nathan Miller, Spying for America: The Hidden History of U.S. Intelligence (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 179.

2 Nathan Nielsen, “Our Men in Havana,” Studies in Intelligence, Vol 23:1, Central Intelligence Agency, 1988, 1.

3 “Pocket litter” includes all secondary and incidental items that individuals normally carry in wallets and purses. Some pieces of pocket litter, such as library cards, credit cards, and blood donation cards, while not constituting official identification papers, are expected to be consistent with passports, driver’s licenses or other government-issued identification documents. Pocket litter of a tourist/businessman might include business cards, club membership cards, laundry receipts and movie ticket stubs. This type of pocket litter created by TSD carried the alias name of the user consistent with the alias official identification documents.

4 Nielsen, “Our Men in Havana,” 3.

5 Hugh Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Da Capo Press, 1988), 1,219.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 1,257.

8 Nielsen, “Our Men in Havana,” 3.

9 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 495-496.

10 Walter E. Szuminski, Our Man in Havana: TDY Hell (unpublished monograph), 5. See also National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Web site: www.noaa.gov/.

11 Ibid., 3.

12 Walter E. Szuminski with Edward Mickolus, Temporary Duty Hell: Our Man in Cuba’s Jails (an unpublished monograph, 2001), 17.

13 Sound tradecraft required the team to exit the elevator at a different floor than the apartment they would enter to mislead anyone attempting to surveil their movements by watching elevator stops. In addition, all members of the team would have been alert for surveillance during their travel to and from the apartment building.

14 The SRT-3 was the CIA’s first all-transistor transmitter receiver. For information on the ST-2A, the predecessor of the SRT-3, see Peter McCollum’s web page: www.militaryradio.com/spyradio/tsd.html

15 “Clear” signals were not protected by masking or encryption. If intercepted, the signal could be monitored, understood, and traced.

16 “Sweep teams” in the 1960s located “bugs” using special radio receivers to identify the clandestine transmissions. By remotely switching the transmitter off at the first indication that the room might be “swept,” the post keeper eliminated the signal that would have betrayed the hidden eavesdropping device.

17 Szuminski, Our Man in Havana, 9.

18 Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom, 1,295.

19 Nielsen, “Our Men in Havana,” 2.

20 Prior to creation of the CIA in 1947, the FBI had responsibility for U.S. intelligence operations in Caribbean and Central and South America countries.

21 Thomas, Cuba or the Pursuit of Freedom, 1,460.

22 Ibid., 1,297.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., 847.

25 Cambridge World Gazetteer: A Geographical Dictionary (New York: Cambridge University Press), 157.

26 The New York Times, September 2, 1925.

27 Mary Bosworth (editor), Encyclopedia of Prisons and Correctional Facilities, Volume 2 (Thousand Oaks, California: Sage Publications, 2005), 663-665.

28 Illustrated London News, February 13, 1932.

29 Szuminski, Our Man in Havana: TDY in Hell, 36-38.

30 Grose, Gentleman Spy, 519.

31 Ibid.

32 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 163-164.

33 A mixture of gasoline or alcohol and soap that is poured into a bottle, tightly corked, with a cloth fuse wrapped around the outside. The cloth was ignited and the bottle thrown. Upon impact with the target, the bottle breaks and the gasoline ignites.

34 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 166.

35 Ibid., 167.

36 Craig R. Whitley, Spy Trade: The Darkest Secrets of the Cold War (New York: Times Books, 1994), 54-55; Brown, Wild Bill Donovan, 579.

37 Whitley, Spy Trade, 432. Also see: James B. Donovan, Strangers on a Bridge: The Case of Colonel Abel (New York: Atheneum, 1964).

38 Szuminski with Mickolus, Temporary Duty in Hell: Our Man in Cuba’s Jails, 86-87.

39 Christ’s recommendation enumerated hardships endured including months of no sunlight, a year without any correspondence from family, constant communist propaganda as well as living in filthy, disease-ridden conditions. Christ described the two officers’ emotional stability, focus on positive opportunities such as studying Spanish, teaching English, lecturing on capitalism and democracy, maintaining personal standards of cleanliness and decency and assisting fellow prisoners who were sick or mentally vulnerable. As a result both left Cuba “35-40 pounds lighter but without mental or emotional aberrations.”

40 The DIC recognizes Agency employees who, like the three techs, performed “a voluntary act or acts of exceptional heroism involving the acceptance of existing dangers with conspicuous fortitude and exemplary courage.” The CIA has recognized twenty-six employees with the Distinguished Intelligence Cross award as of August 2005.

41 Peter Weyden, Bay of Pigs: The Untold Story (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1979), 35.

42 Benson, a paratrooper in World War II, jumped with Marshal Tito partisans behind German lines into Yugoslavia and is credited with assisting in the evacuation of more than 200 downed allied airmen, political escapees, and partisans. He was awarded the Bronze Star for World War II service and then served with the CIA in China and Greece. On April 5, 1962, he received, posthumously, the CIA Intelligence Star for “a voluntary act of courage performed under hazardous conditions.”

43 Saxitoxin is a thousand times more deadly than a typical synthetic nerve gas such as sarin; a dose of 0.2 milligrams would be lethal for the average male. For more information on saxitoxin, see the article by Neil Edwards, School of Chemistry, Physics, and Environmental Science at the University of Sussex at Brighton: www.chm.bris.ac.uk/motm/stx/saxi.htm. The CIA’s remaining inventory of saxitoxin was provided to the National Institute of Health (NIH) in 1975 on the premise that it could be “extremely valuable for medical research on diseases of the nervous system and for our understanding of how the nervous system normally works.” See: Ritchie J. Murdoch, Ph.D., D.Sc., Yale Medicine, Fall 1975, and also at: www.med.yale.edu/external/pubs/ym_fw0001/archives.htm. A television documentary, The History Detectives, aired on June 27, 2005, stated that the needles were produced by Fort Detrick machinist Milton Frank.

44 Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, 120.

45 Ibid., 121.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 121-122.

49 U.S. Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders , An Interim Report, November 20, 1975, 80.

50 U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 71.

51 Ibid., 72.

52 Ibid., 72.

53 Ibid., 72.

54 David Atlee Phillips, The Night Watch (New York: Atheneum, 1977), 91.

55 Warren Hinkle and William Turner, The Fish Is Red: The Story of the Secret War Against Castro (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), 30-31, and U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 73.

56 David Wise and Thomas B. Ross, The Espionage Establishment (New York: Random House, 1970), 130.

57 U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Senate Report Number 94-465, November 20, 1975, 85.

58 Ibid., 85-86.

59 Ibid., 88-89.

60 “Silenced” pistols and rifles are never completely “silent.” The purpose of the “suppressor” is to reduce the sound when the weapon is fired and make it harder to pinpoint the direction of the shot. Pistols are relatively much easier to suppress than rifles.

61 U.S. Senate, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 90.

62 John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York. Touch-stone. 1987), 210-211, 336-345.

63 Lumumba was eventually ousted from his post in the Congolese government and taken into protective custody by United Nations guards; he escaped and was then captured and executed by his Congolese enemies. See: Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, 124.

64 Ranelagh, The Agency, 358.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

1 Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin, 1997), 214.

2 Ibid., 211

3 Civil Air Transport (CAT) was the successor to Claire Chennault’s Flying Tigers, and the predecessor to “Air America.” In June 2001 the CIA issued a Unit Citation Award in recognition of all who served with Civil Air Transport and its secret successor, Air America, which ended operations in 1976. See: www.air-america.org/newspaper_articles/france_honors_cat.shtml

4 Ranelagh, The Agency, 419.

5 Karnow, Vietnam, 212.

6 Helms, A Look Over My Shoulder, 310.

7 Ibid., 230.

8 Ranelagh, The Agency, 419. Ranelagh notes that covert CIA involvement in Vietnam began in 1954 when DCI Allen Dulles sent Colonel Edward Lansdale to Saigon with these objectives.

9 “Covert action” is an operation designed to influence governments, events, organizations, or persons in support of foreign policy in a manner that is not necessarily attributable to the sponsoring power; it may include political, economic, propaganda, or paramilitary activities.

10 John L. Plaster, SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars (Boulder, Colorado: Paladin Press, 2000), 17-18.

11 John L. Singlaub, Hazardous Duty (New York: Summit, 1991), 293.

12 The junk’s unexpected speed amazed the crew. Years later, the same OTS engineer raised eyebrows around Mobile, Alabama, when testing a new a high-speed, high-lift vessel in the harbor. People stopped their cars to watch the test craft outpace traffic on the adjacent highway.

13 For details and images of the Metascope see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 36-37.

14 For pictures and a description of an “Anti-disturbance device” see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 88.

15 Plaster, A Photo History of the Secret Wars, 217.

16 John L. Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977), 22-23.

17 For images and details of the RS-6 see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment , 47.

18 For images and details on Dust Powder (B-3) see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 99.

19 For images and details on Puppy Chow see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 115.

20 For images and details on the Document Copying Attaché Case see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 43.

21 These were an early version of lightweight, condensed, dehydrated, vacuum-packed foods used by backpackers and mountain climbers.

22 Plaster, SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars, 17-18, and Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 36.

23 Francis Gary Powers was piloting a CIA U-2 aircraft when downed over the USSR on May 1, 1960. His survival weapon was an OSS .22 caliber silenced Hi-Standard pistol.

24 See: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment, 34-35.

25 For images and a reproduction of its issue instruction sheet, see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 12-13.

26 For images and details on the Stinger see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 14-15.

27 For photos, history, and firing details of the MBA Gyrojet pistol see: www.smallarmsreview.com/pdf/Gyrojettest.PDF. An MBA Gyrojet Rocket Carbine was shown in the 1967 James Bond film You Only Live Twice.

28 Plaster, SOG: A Photo History of the Secret Wars, 161.

29 Plaster, SOG: The Secret Wars of America’s Commandos in Vietnam, 77. See also www.sfalx.com/moh/sisler_george_SF.html.

30 Concise Dictionary of World History (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company. 1983), 593.

31 During the Vietnam War, the CIA proprietary airline Air America flew a variety of missions in the Far East. These missions ranged from covert CIA operations to overt air transportation contracted by the Republic of Vietnam and various U.S. government agencies. At one time it was the largest airline in the world based on the number of aircraft it operated.

32 See: www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20050224/news_lz1n24france.html).

33 For an image and details of the Rubber Airplane see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 102.

34 William M. Leary, “Robert Fulton’s Skyhook and Operation Coldfeet,” Studies in Intelligence, 38:5 Central Intelligence Agency, 1994, 99-110. Also see: www.cia.gov/csi/studies/95unclass/Leary.html.

35 Ibid.

36 Interview, Jim Morris, Spring 2005.

37 James B. and Sybil B. Stockdale. In Love and War (New York: Bantam, 1985). 135.

38 Ibid., 136.

39 Ibid., 128. In 1966 POWs in North Vietnam were allowed to send and receive a single letter each month.

40 Ibid., 140.

41 Ibid., 144.

42 Ibid., 192.

43 Ibid., 194. The clear “decal-like thing” was a thin piece of photographic emulsion with reduced writing; it resembled the Kalvar process used a decade later.

44 Ibid., 193-194.

45 Ibid., 196-197.

46 Ibid., 199-200.

47 Ibid., 207-209.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid., 209-211.

50 Concise Dictionary of World History 553.

51 Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 192.

52 Ibid., 189.

53 Duane R. Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), 269-270.

54 Ibid., 263.

55 Ibid. The chain gun, whose fire could penetrate the armor of Soviet T-55 tanks, was developed by the Army for the Bradley fighting vehicle.

56 The original Cigarette was designed by Don Aronow and named after a classic boat he once owned that was reputed to have been used by a “bootlegger” during Prohibition. Bootleggers used high-speed boats to smuggle shipments of whiskey from Canada into the northeastern United States. Even if the boats were spotted by the U.S. Coast Guard, the “rum runners” depended on the speed of their craft to outrun their pursuers. See: “How a Kid From Brooklyn Put Go-Fast Boats on the Map,” Power & Motor Yacht,July 2000.

57 Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 271-272.

58 Ibid., 274.

59 A copy of the text of the Goldwater letter can be found at homepage.ntl-world.com/jksonc/docs/US-mining-nicaragua-harbors.html

60 Clarridge, A Spy for All Seasons, 277.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

1 The country’s name changed from the Central African Republic to the Central African Empire in 1976 and back again in 1979.

2 Cambridge World Gazetteer: A Geographical Dictionary (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 122.

3 The New York Times, November 5, 1996.

4 The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 151.

5 The New York Times, June 13, 1987.

6 Interview with Dr. David A. Crown, 2005.

7 The Concise Columbia Encyclopedia, 151.

8 Crown interview.

9 Dr. David Crown holds a doctorate degree in criminology from University of California—Berkeley and had compiled a distinguished career before joining the CIA. During the 1950s, he served as a U.S. Counterintelligence Corps Special Agent with field experience in Europe and then as Assistant Director of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Identification Laboratory in San Francisco.

10 The Liberia Official Gazette, Vol. L, 2.

11 Crown interview.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid.

14 The New York Times, December 5, 1977.

15 The New York Times, June 13, 1987.

16 Cambridge World Gazetteer, 122.

17 The New York Times, January 13, 1987.

18 The New York Times, November 5, 1996.

19 Dr. Robert Managhan, “Trends in African Forgeries,” Studies in Intelligence, 19:1, 1975, 14.

20 Crown interview.

21 Ibid.

22 Ibid.

23 Managhan, “Trends in African Forgeries,” 14.

24 Crown interview.

25 The Liberia Official Gazette.

26 Helms, A Look over My Shoulder, 93.

27 Ibid., 95.

28 Ibid., 99. Rosters containing the names of the fabricators, known as “burn lists,” were circulated among the Allied intelligence services as a means of limiting the damage caused by the perpetrators and maintaining integrity of intelligence information. Fifty years later, similar mechanisms, called “watch lists,” were created to identify terrorists, while unverifiable, but seeming plausible “hoax” data manufactured by unknown sources permeated the Internet.

29 Ibid.,110.

30 Managhan, Trends in African Forgeries, 13.

31 Peter Deriabin, Watchdogs of Terror (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1972), 94.

32 James Ridgeway, Blood in the Face (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 1990), 30, 32.

33 Ibid., 32.

34 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 6.

35 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6.

36 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 65.

37 U.S. Senate, Hearing Before the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (June 2, 1961), 6.

38 Ibid., 22.

39 Ibid., 18.

40 Kalugin, The First Directorate, 137.

41 David A. Crown, “Political Forgeries in the Middle East,” Studies in Intelligence, 22:2, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 10.

42 Ibid.

43 Ibid., 9.

44 Managhan, Trends in African Forgeries, 14.

45 Ibid., 12.

46 Ibid., 11.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid., 211.

49 U.S. House of Representatives, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, House of Representatives, Ninety-Sixth Congress (February 19, 1980), 69.

50 The Journal of Intelligence History (1:1, 2001), 62.

51 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield, 238.

52 Ibid., 224.

53 Ibid.

54 David A. Spetrino, “Aids Disinformation,” Studies in Intelligence, 32:4, Central Intelligence Agency, 1988, 10.

55 Ibid., 11.

56 Ibid.

57 Ibid., 9.

58 Ibid., 12.

59 The Washington Post, January 25, 2005.

60 Ibid.

61 Markus Wolf, Man Without a Face (New York: Public Affairs, 1997), 289.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid., 290. Wolf writes, “We left [Sudan] in 1971 and never returned.”

64 Crown interview.

65 Soon after the assassinations, a variety of credible reports surfaced that linked the late PLO Chairman, Yassir Arafat, directly to the killings of Noel and Moore. However, the U.S. Department of Justice concluded in 1986 that it lacked the evidence to bring an indictment against Arafat and argued further that if such evidence existed the potential for compromise of national security information would likely preclude it from being disclosed. See: David A. Korn, Assassination in Khartoum (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1993), 245-247.

66 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W.W. Norton, 2004). “Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” Chapter 3, 1.

67 Ibid., 22.

68 Crown interview.

69 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” Chapter 3, 1.

70 “Redbook 1986” booklet published by OTS.

71 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, “Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel,” Chapter 3, 1.

72 Ibid.

73 Ibid., 12.

74 Ibid., 22.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

1 Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and the Arms of Mass Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 3-5.

2 Ibid., 11.

3 Concise Dictionary of World History, 336.

4 Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999), 6.

5 Ibid., 13.

6 Ammonium nitrate and diesel fuel combine to produce an explosive of the type used in the 1993 attack against the World Trade Center and again in April 1995 against the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City.

CHAPTER TWENTY

1 The importance and difficulty of selecting the “right” people for intelligence missions was one of the important lessons the CIA learned from OSS. The OSS recruitment experience was compiled and published by the OSS Assessment Staff in Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & Company, 1948).

2 Jerrold M. Post, “The Anatomy of Treason,” Studies in Intelligence, 19:2 Central Intelligence Agency, 1975, 37.

3 Ibid., 36.

4 OSS found this to be an immediate problem. Since recruiters for OSS were not allowed to name the organization for which the individual would be working and did not know in what capacity the recruit would be working, the “pitch” talked about “mysterious, exciting overseas assignments.” This attracted “the bored, the pathologically adventuresome, the neurotically inclined to danger, and psychopaths.” The latter have a particular ability to make good short-term impressions. Structured assessment attempted to identify and weed out those who would be a danger to themselves, others, and the mission. See: Donald W. MacKinnon, “The OSS Assessment Program,” Studies in Intelligence, 23:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 1979, 22-23.

5 David Wise, Nightmover: How Aldrich Ames Sold the CIA to the KGB for 4.6 million (New York: HarperCollins, 1995), 114.

6 Golytsin, a KGB major in the First Chief Directorate, defected in December 1961. Nosenko, a Soviet security officer, defected in 1964. Both had access to sensitive counterintelligence information about worldwide Soviet operations. They offered explosive and contradictory information particularly surrounding the KGB’s relationship with Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. See: Ranelagh, The Agency, 404-409, 563-568, and Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors, 151-158, 173-176, for detailed accounts of the two cases.

7 See: J. F. Winne and J. W. Gittinger, “An Introduction to the Personality Assessment System,” Journal of Clinical Psychology. Monograph Supplement No. 38, April 1973. The PAS as used by OTS was an adaptation of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale that had been developed by psychologist David Wechsler. Measurements along the PAS scale were designed to predict an individual’s behavior in various situations.

8 To OTS officers and many “old hands” in operations, Jeffrey Richelson’s work, The Wizards of Langley, on the history of the CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, incorrectly bestows the wizard title on engineers and scientists. Ask a case officer or a tech, “Who are the wizards?” and he or she will likely reply, “Those are the shrinks in OTS.”

9 In the mid-1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, requirements for graphological operational assessments decreased to the point that the service no longer required a full-time staff in OTS. Graphology has, nevertheless, been growing as a personnel service for U.S. companies for applicant screening and job interviews. See: “Deciphering the Handwriting on the Wall,” Washington Post, October 17, 2004.

10 James Van Stappen, “Graphological Assessment in Action,” Studies in Intelligence, 3:4, Central Intelligence Agency, 1959, 49-58.

11 Keith Laycock, “Handwriting Analysis as an Assessment Aid,” Studies in Intelligence (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1959) vol 3:3 (1959), 27.

12 E. A. Rundquist, “The Assessment of Graphology,” Studies in Intelligence, 3:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 1959, 45-51.

13 Former DDP and DCI Richard Helms in A Look over My Shoulder, 426, commented that the studies “proved a useful extension of the routine diplomatic and military reporting.” Former DDO and DCI William Colby in Honorable Men—My Life in the CIA(New York: Simon & Schuster, 1978), 335, cited “psychological advice on how to handle alien agents” as an important TSD capability. OTS deployed psychologists to field bases to support requirements at CIA offices throughout the world. At Headquarters OTS devoted one or more full-time operational psychologists to handle the caseloads in high demand operational components such as the Soviet and Far East Divisions and the Counterterrorism Center.

14 John Waller, “The Myth of the Rogue Elephant Interred,” Studies in Intelligence, 22:2 Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 6.

15 Allen Dulles, “Brain Warfare,” speech to the National Alumni Conference of the Graduate Council of Princeton University, Hot Springs, VA, April 10, 1953.

16 See: DCI Stansfield Turner’s 1977 testimony. The DCI grouped MKULTRA’s 149 subprojects into three categories: (1) Research into behavior modification, drug acquisition, and testing and clandestine administration of drugs; (2) financial and cover mechanisms for each of the subprojects; (3) subprojects, of which there were thirty-three, funded under the MKULTRA umbrella but unrelated to behavioral modification, drugs, or toxins. Polygraph research and control of animal activity were examples offered. The process to completely phase out all of the MKULTRA projects required several years.

17 Michael Edwards, “The Sphinx and the Spy: The Clandestine World of John Mulholland,” Genii: The Conjurorsí Magazine. April 2001, see: http://www. frankolsonproject.org/Articles/Mulholland.html

18 Ibid.

19 Letter to Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA document 4-29, April 20, 1953.

20 Ibid.

21 Edwards, “The Sphinx and the Spy.”

22 Mulholland letter to Sidney Gottlieb, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA document 19-2, November 11, 1953.

23 Memorandum for the Record, Project MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA document 34-46, October 1, 1954.

24 Edwards, “The Sphinx and the Spy.”

25 Memorandum for the Record, Project MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA document 34-46, October 1, 1954.

26 Memorandum for the Record, Definition of a Task under MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA document 34-39, August 25, 1955.

27 Memorandum for the Record, MKULTRA, Subproject 34, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA document 34-29, June 20, 1956.

28 Edwards, “The Sphinx and the Spy.”

29 Memorandum for the Record, Central Intelligence Agency, MKULTRA document 8312, March 26, 1959.

30 In 1962, Dr. Gottlieb, who had been Chief of R&D for TSD, was promoted to Deputy Chief/TSD under Seymour Russell. Richard Krueger replaced Dr. Gottlieb as Chief of R&D for TSD but was not initially briefed on any of the MKULTRA projects, which continued to report to Gottlieb. Following the IG report, however, Krueger was “read into the program” and developed a process for phasing out over three years all remaining projects. Three years were required to close down the projects through orderly steps that would not expose the covert relationships or compromise the security of the participating institutions and individuals as well as fulfill government contractual obligations to the parties.

31 Marks, The Search for the Manchurian Candidate, 219.

32 Waller, “The Myth of the Rogue Elephant Interred,” 6-7.

33 U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Foreign and Military Intelligence Final Report, Book 1. 94th Congress, 2nd Sess., April 26, 1976.

34 The new MKULTRA records were potentially explosive for two separate reasons. First, the fact that they had not been discovered when sought by the Church Committee investigation could have pointed to a CIA “cover-up.” Second, the additional records had the potential for containing significantly new information about MKULTRA experiments and operational plans. Despite the hundreds of thousands of words written about MKULTRA, most of the CIA’s documentation about the program was destroyed in 1972-1973 at the direction of DCI Richard Helms. As recounted to the author by a TSD officer who was involved with the destruction, Dr. Gottlieb returned to TSD headquarters in late 1972 or early 1973 and advised his senior staff that the Director has ordered all MKULTRA records destroyed. It was a verbal order; there would be no memo. There followed some discussion about the advisability of destroying all records, particularly the documentation of research procedures and scientific results. Gottlieb responded that the directive had been unambiguous—all the records were to be destroyed. In the following days, MKULTRA project and operational records held by TDS were systematically shredded. Subsequently, remaining documentary information about MKULTRA has been subject to numerous FOIA requests and released to the public with some redactions of information judged to require continued classification.

35 Center for the Study of Intelligence, “An Interview with Richard Helms,” Studies in Intelligence, 25:3, Central Intelligence Agency, 1981, 21.

36 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence and the Sub Committee on Human Resources, Project MKULTRA, The CIA’s Program of Research in Behavioral Modification. 95th Congress, 1st Sess., August 3, 1977.

37 See: Marks, The Search for the ‘Manchurian Candidate, for a detailed account of the CIA research into human behavior based on official documents declassified under the Freedom of Information Act and released after publication of the 1975 Rockefeller Commission and 1976 Church Committee reports.

38 Bart Barnes, “Obituary, Sidney Gottlieb,” Washington Post, March 11, 1999, B.05. The opening sentence of the obituary identifies Gottlieb as “the former chief of the Central Intelligence Agency’s technical services division who in the ’60s directed CIA mind-control experiments, including the administration of drugs and LSD to unwitting humans . . .” Not mentioned is that the experimentation cited was authorized, limited, and ended by the mid-’50s.

39 Ted Gup, “The Coldest Warrior,” The Washington Post Magazine, December 16, 2001.

40 Center for the Studies of Intelligence, “An Interview with Former General Counsel John S. Warner,” Studies in Intelligence, 22:2, Central Intelligence Agency, 1978, 49.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

1 Interview with Carl A. Strahle. Strahle was one of the printers in the London OSS document shop. See also Christof Mauch, The Shadow War Against Hitler (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 179ff, and Persico, Piercing the Reich, 23-26. Casey would become Director of Central Intelligence in 1981.

2 The “intelligence division,” “graphic arts reproduction division,” and the “furnishings and equipment division” each produced identity-related materials. The other three original TSS divisions were organized to support agent communications, audio surveillance, and research and development.

3 “Cover” refers to the assumed or created identity, occupation and background of an intelligence operative. An operative can be assigned an occupational cover in his true name or can be placed “under cover” in an alias identity. The “backstopping” of cover refers to all the personal and official documentation as well as confidential arrangements made with government or private organizations to verify the operative’s legitimacy.

4 Documenting the alias identities of officers and agents has remained a core mission of OTS throughout its history.

5 Strahle interview.

6 During disguise presentations, particularly for middle-aged audiences, OTS briefers had one assured laugh line. “Here in the OTS disguise shop we specialize in making you look older and fatter. If you want to look younger and thinner, we recommend you talk with the Office of Medical Service.” There was truth in the humor. No matter how tight the corset, body weight did not change. No matter the direction of push, flesh would not move more than an inch or two. Graying the hair of a thirty-five-year-old and adding a salt-and-pepper beard could make a twenty-year difference. Coloring jet-black the graying hair of a paunchy fifty-year-old produced little more than the appearance of a middle-aged guy unsuccessfully dealing with his midlife crisis.

7 For a more detailed treatment of “exfiltrations” and disguise, see: Mendez, The Master of Disguise.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

1 David Kahn, The Codebreakers (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 122.

2 Center for the Study of Intelligence, “Intelligence in the War of Independence” monograph (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, undated), 33.

3 Ibid.

4 Anthony Cave Brown (editor), The Secret War Report of the OSS (New York: Berkley, 1976), 76-77.

5 Ibid., 77.

6 Ibid.

7 McLean, The Plumber’s Kitchen, 11.

8 Ibid., 239-242.

9 For more on MIS-X see: Lloyd R. Shoemaker, The Escape Factory: The Story of MIS-X (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990).

10 David Crawford, Volunteers: The Betrayal of National Defense Secrets by Air Force Traitors (Washington, D.C.: Air Force Office of Special Investigations, 1988), 24.

11 See: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 113, for photographs of a concealment desk.

12 See: Melton, Ultimate Spy, 162, for photographs.

13 See: Melton, Ultimate Spy, 161, for photographs.

14 Mendez, The Master of Disguise, 224.

15 The concealment techs could prepare virtually any type of wild or domesticated animal as “host carcasses” for dead drops. The DO case officers, however, were squeamish and agreed to proceed only with pigeons and rats. Mendez, The Master of Disguise, 224-225, presents more examples.

16 An “exfiltration” is a clandestine operation to move an officer, defector, or agent across international borders without the knowledge of any hostile security service.

17 Mendez, The Master of Disguise, 140.

18 The al-Qaeda terrorist organization used a Trojan-horse concealment to assassinate Ahmed Shah Massoud, the leader of the Afghanistan’s anti-Taliban Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, on September 9, 2001. Two al-Qaeda operatives posing as journalists secured an audience with Massoud. One carried a video camera packed with explosives. During the “interview” the explosive was detonated and Massoud killed.

19 Rustmann, CIA, INC., 53-56.

20 Actor Desmond Llewelyn became Q beginning with From Russia with Love in 1963 and continued in the Bond movies until his accidental death in a car accident in 1999.

21 On occasion, senior CIA executives would visit the lab and be treated to a “show and tell” to demonstrate the value of concealments. During one such visit, a lab engineer proudly displayed a laptop computer that had been configured as an active concealment device for use by a Soviet agent. The electronics for the intelligence function had been masterfully integrated into the overall unit and even when the computer was disassembled, the fact that any modification had been made was not apparent or visible. The executive visitor asked, “How long did this take?” “Two hundred work days,” replied the tech. “How many did you make?” “Only this one.” “Well, if you made a hundred, you can be a lot more efficient,” came the response. The operational imperative for one-of-a-kind concealments for Soviet operations seemed lost to the visitor.

22 For images and a description of a concealment desk see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 113.

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

1 A target staying at a little-used hotel might be surveilled from OP’s setup temporarily to monitor the hotel’s entrances. Covert video cameras could be concealed in parked cars outside each hotel entrance and feed “live video” to the watcher team set up in an adjacent hotel. Conversely, a “long-term” stationary OP might be established for the purpose of photographing all individuals entering and leaving a radical mosque that is a known transit point for new recruits departing Europe for terrorist training in the Middle East.

2 There are two types of telephoto lenses, refractive and reflex mirror (catadioptric). Refractive lenses (as in a telescope) are usually much larger than “mirror” lenses which have a system of mirrors and lenses to fold up the optical path causing the light passing through the instrument to do so in a zigzag fashion and greatly reduce the physical size and length of the unit. The compactness of a mirror lens is often desirable for surveillance photography. “Fast” lenses have larger areas of glass to gather more light, but are more difficult to conceal. “Slow” lenses are easier to hide, but require longer exposure times to take acceptable images and are vulnerable to vibration. See: Raymond P. Siljander, Fundamentals of Physical Surveillance: A Guide for Uniformed and Plainclothes Personnel (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1977), 182.

3 Telephoto lenses amplify any vibrations present and require firm support of the lens and camera assembly. The longer the lens on the camera, however, the more difficult it is to use and the more likely is a loss of image quality. Inclement weather, dust, and haze can significantly degrade the quality of the image. See: Siljander, Fundamentals of Physical Surveillance, 195.

4 Each doubling of film speed represents a doubling in the film’s sensitivity to light. “Push processing” allows film to be exposed at higher than rated ASA levels and developed using special processes to artificially “push” the ASA sensitivity to match exposure levels. It is possible to “push process” a commercially available ASA 6400 film to ASA 12800, ASA 25600, or even higher and still take an acceptable photograph of a target to produce a positive identification.

5 A conventional strobe flash unit covered with a Kodak Wratten 87C filter emits light in the infrared spectrum at wavelengths from 750 to 900 millimicrons. For an example of clandestine infrared photography using this technique see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 37.

6 Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 71.

7 Pheromones, chemicals secreted by an animal, especially an insect, are used as aids for surveillance tracking.

8 A well-known “spy shop” in New York City in the 1980s advertised repackaged, commercial-grade products, using unsubstantiated claims of technical capability that bordered on the unbelievable, such as: “Tell if any phone call anywhere in the world is bugged or recorded using this all-in-one briefcase counterspy kit!” Even more amazing was its “graduated” concept of pricing that produced catalogs and pricelists in English, Spanish, and Arabic. The same equipment was in all catalogs, only the prices changed; the prices in Spanish were double those in the English, and the Arabic version was four times higher!

9 Contractors and employees who have successfully undergone background investigations are provided with varying levels of security clearances in order to be able to work with the CIA.

10 In 1827, Sir Charles Wheatstone coined the phrase “microphone.” See: inventors.about.com/od/mstartinventions/a/microphone.htm. When sound waves contact a microphone, they cause the thin flexible internal diaphragm to vibrate. These vibrations are converted into an electrical signal, which varies in voltage, amplitude and frequency in an analog of the original sound. See: http://www. edinformatics.com/inventions_inventors/microphone.htm.

11 For photographs and technical descriptions see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 65.

12 For photographs and information on the fine-wire kit see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 67, and Melton, Ultimate Spy, 102.

13 Richard Tomlinson, The Big Breach: From Top Secret to Maximum Security (Moscow: Narodny Variant Publishers, 2000), 104.

14 Ibid., 104-105.

15 Rustmann, CIA, INC., 54.

16 For a photograph of a disposable “quick plant” writing pen, see: Melton, Ultimate Spy, 103.

17 Rustmann, CIA, INC., 57.

18 Melton, Ultimate Spy, 96, 105.

19 Bob Woodward, Veil, 147.

20 A “wood block” is an audio eavesdropping device usually consisting of a microphone, transmitter, and batteries built inside a hollow section of wooden molding or part of a table support or chair leg. Such devices are intended to be quickly exchanged with their identical counterpart inside the target location.

21 For photographs of “wood blocks” inside modified furniture components see: Melton, Ultimate Spy, 105.

22 See: Melton, Ultimate Spy, 103.

23 Experience taught that the ideal book to be swapped was on the top shelf where it was harder for the target to reach and less likely to be read and examined.

24 Glinsky, Theremin, 273; see also: Melton, Ultimate Spy, 104, for photos of the Great Seal and diagrams of the resonator.

25 See: Associated Press article by Ted Bridis “CIA Gadget Museum Showcase Robot Fish, Pigeon Camera, Tiger Dropping Microphone” on www.mind-fully.org/Technology/2003/CIA-Museum26dec03.htm.

26 A “provocation” would be an act by the officer to elude surveillance such as getting on, and then immediately off a subway car, or speeding through an urban area to “lose” the trailing vehicle.

27 Floyd L. Paseman, A Spy’s Journey: A CIA Memoir (St. Paul, Minnesota: Zenith Press, 2004), 61.

28 Planar eyeglass lenses are noticeably thick, but do not provide any optical magnification. The contents of a portable disguise kit issued to a CIA officer going abroad can be seen in Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment, 105, and Melton, Ultimate Spy, 131.

29 The sculpted facial disguises were remarkably lifelike. OTS received assistance from Oscar-winning mask designer John Chambers (Planet of the Apes) to help create disguises for intelligence officers. See: by Michael E. Ruane, “Seeing is Deceiving,” Washington Post, February 15, 2000.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FOUR

1 An agent requires the ability to both receive and send covert communications. A shortwave radio with a one-time pad is an example of an “agent-receive” system. Secret writing carbons and accommodation addresses represent an “agent-send” system.

2 Steganography is defined as “covered writing” or the art of communicating in a way that masks the very existence of the communication. See: Eric Cole, Hiding in Plain Sight: Steganography and the Art of Covert Communication (Indianapolis, Indiana: Wiley Publishing, 2003) for a detailed description of the uses of steganography for clandestine communication. Cole is a former CIA officer who specialized in the development of secure communication systems.

3 Through the 1970s, personal meetings also became increasingly technology dependent. Electronic signaling and nonattributable telephone calls replaced chalk marks and lipstick smears to trigger clandestine meetings. Case officers wore earpieces to listen for surveillance transmissions to determine if they were being followed. Identity-altering clothing and accessories were among other technical tools applied to assure the security of “low tech” personal meetings.

4 “Unnatural acts” appear out-of-the-ordinary or suspicious when observed and serve as a “flag” to alert counterintelligence. For example, making a large chalk X on a telephone pole or repeatedly looking over one’s shoulder while walking down a street are uncharacteristic actions and could prompt further attention from security or law enforcement officials.

5 Crawford, Volunteers, 26.

6 Ibid., 27.

7 Weiser, A Secret Life, 74.

8 Ibid.

9 For visual examples of sophisticated criminal “brush passes” see the 1973 movie Harry in Your Pocket.

10 Weiser, A Secret Life, 81.

11 Ibid., 75.

12 Crawford, Volunteers, 27.

13 Victor Suvorov, Inside Soviet Military Intelligence (New York: Macmillan, 1984), 119.

14 Crawford, Volunteers, 28.

15 British intelligence (MI6) refers to them as “dead letter boxes” (DLBs).

16 CIA officer Aldrich Ames, a mole for the KGB and Russian Intelligence Service (SVR), sharply complained to his handler about the size of the dead drop site (code name PIPE) they had selected for his use along a horse path in Maryland’s Wheaton Regional Park. Ames communicated that he needed more money and estimated that the size of the drainpipe used for the dead drop would accommodate up to $100,000. See: Wise, Nightmover, 220.

17 Weiser, A Secret Life, 58.

18 Before the FBI arrested Ames on February 21, 1994, they attempted to lure a SVR officer into a trap by leaving a horizontal chalk mark on the side of a U.S. Postal Service mailbox located at the corner of R Street and 37th Street in Washington, D.C. Unbeknownst to the FBI, however, the SVR had changed the location of the signal site. The horizontal mark left by the FBI meant nothing and the SVR didn’t respond. See: Wise, Nightmover, 272-273.

19 Crawford, Volunteers, 30. The most famous instance of a botched signal occurred on May 19, 1985, when KGB spy John Walker was participating in a complicatedsignal and drop sequence in rural Montgomery County, Maryland. The KGB officer arrived in the general area and left a soda can at the base of a stop sign to signal his presence. Walker left a second can at the base of another stop sign as a signal to the KGB. Walker saw the can left by the KGB officer and proceeded to leave his secret documents at the base of a telephone pole some distance away. Unbeknownst to the KGB, the FBI had Walker under surveillance and made the mistake of removing the signal can he left at the stop sign. When the KGB officer could not see Walker’s can to confirm that he was in the area, he followed his instructions and aborted the operation. After leaving the secret documents, Walker proceeded to a second drop location where the KGB was to have left money for him. He found nothing and when he returned to retrieve the documents, they were gone as well. Walker was arrested early the next morning at the Ramada Hotel in nearby Rockville, Maryland, and the KGB officer departed the country for the Soviet Union the following day. See: Jack Kneece, Family Treason, The Walker Spy Case(New York: Stein and Day, 1986), 109-123.

20 Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, 573, describes secret writing. Spy Book attributes to Ovid in “Art of Love” counsel that one’s missive “can escape curious eyes when written in new milk [then] touch it with [charcoal] dust and you will read.”

21 Joseph B. Smith, Portrait of a Cold Warrior: Second Thoughts of a Top CIA Agent (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1976), 130-131.

22 Ibid., 131.

23 Accommodation addresses differed from dead drops in that once a letter was dropped in a mailbox both the agent and the handler lost control of the message. An effective AA would have a constant stream of business or personal correspondence, letters, and postcards going and coming. In some countries, a post office box or a “letter-drop” provided an adequately safe and convenient type of accommodation address. A message can be communicated through an AA without SW if the type, style, or color of a postcard is, in itself, the signal. For example, a recruited agent who has just returned from a posting abroad could signal to the CIA his willingness to begin his clandestine work by mailing a specific type of postcard to an innocuous AA. For the most sensitive agents, AAs were used only once.

24 Weiser, A Secret Life, 23.

25 During World War I German agents traveling to the United States impregnated articles of clothing with their secret inks. To recover the ink, a scarf or a shoelace would be soaked in distilled water.

26 Tomlinson, The Big Breach, 82-83.

27 Ibid., 65.

28 Ibid., 65-66.

29 Ibid., 127. The chemical formulation for the reagent was not specified by Tomlinson.

30 See: Melton, Ultimate Spy, 150.

31 A microdot communication to an agent would normally carry several identical dots buried in different locations. One longtime microdot user explained, “Three dots to an agent was the minimum. The first he wouldn’t find. He would find the next but would drop it or a gust of wind from an open window would blow it away. Hopefully he would find and read the third one.”

32 The original “bullet” lens was invented by Charles Stanhope in London in the late 1700s. This small magnifying lens (the “Stanhope”) was used originally in the textile industry to count the number of cotton fibers in a field, and was further refined by Henry Coddington in 1830. The Stanhope lens was used well into the 1800s and later saw popular use in the making of “peeps” for viewing tiny “girlie pictures” that were sold at carnivals and sideshows, and even for a miniature version of “The Lord’s Prayer.”

33 Ibid.

34 The original magazine is displayed inside Moscow’s FSB Counterintelligence Museum.

35 Wise, Nightmover, 259-260. The message continued to describe each signal site and dead drop to be used in Moscow. Signal site ZVONOK was accessed by boarding a number 10 trolley bus traveling toward Krymsky Most. The agent was to get off at the fifth stop and locate a specific phone booth where he would make his mark, a 10 cm Cyrillic “R” on the building wall to the left of the phone booth and drainpipe. The mark was to be made waist high using black crayon or red lipstick so that it could be easily read from a passing vehicle. The CIA would acknowledge receipt of Vasilyev’s signal by parking a car with the license plate number D-004 opposite the Lenin Central Museum.

36 Ibid.

37 Cellulose base film, both cellulose nitrate and cellulose acetate, was the primary choice for creating “soft films.”

38 Xidex Corporation acquired Kalvar Corporation in March of 1979 and three months later closed the New Orleans plant and fired the production personnel. See: www.keypointconsulting.com/downloads/pub_Event_Studies.pdf .

39 To produce “soft film” a frame of Kalvar was placed between two pieces of glass together with a developed negative containing the message for the agent (emulsions sides together). The glass plate was exposed to a 500 watt lamp for 40 to 50 seconds and then held with tweezers and dipped into boiling water for two seconds. As it cooled, the emulsion was carefully peeled away from the backing and allowed to dry. The resulting image on “soft film” was ready to be camouflaged and passed to the agent.

40 Weiser, A Secret Life, 66.

41 Tomlinson, The Big Breach, 66.

42 Messages were created by adding the random series of numbers (the “keys”) on the designated page of the OTP to the plaintext message. The person receiving the ciphered message subtracts the random numbers (found on his matching copy of the OTP) to recover the original message.

43 It needed to be a good-quality shortwave receiver capable of single sideband reception.

44 These are often referred to outside the CIA as “numbers stations” or “counting stations.” For more information on “spy numbers stations” and an opportunity to listen-in on sample transmissions, go to: www.spynumbers.com/enigma.html

45 A 150 five-number message would contain 750 numbers. It was possible, but less common, for transmissions to also be sent using phonetic language where letters were “spoken” (alpha, bravo, charlie, delta, foxtrot, etc.). Most messages were usually fixed at a length of 150 five-number groups, but could be longer. If the message was shorter than 150 groups, additional numbers would be added as “pads or “filler” at the end.

46 “Time-sensitive” information reported events or circumstances of immediate significance. If not received by the intelligence service quickly, the reporting rapidly lost its value.

47 Weiser, A Secret Life, 215, 229.

48 Ibid., 229-230.

49 “Bent-pipe” refers to the satellite’s limited role in receiving and relaying the signal without any processing. In essence, the signal from the agent bounced off the satellite to the ground receiving station.

50 The Russian Federal Service (FSB) museum in Moscow displays an attaché case, labeled as the BIRDBOOK system, which is filled with electronics and has a transmitting antenna built into the lid.

CHAPTER TWENTY-FIVE

1 Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, 522-523.

2 Ibid.

3 R. James Woolsey, in testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 1993, just before his installation as DCI. The colorful metaphor provided a “sound-bite” justification for his view that substantial intelligence resources were still needed in the post-Cold War era.

4 A term applied to the period where movement of information became faster than physical movement, more narrowly applying to the 1980s onward. The Information Age also heralded the era when information was a scarce resource and its capture and distribution generated competitive advantage. Microsoft became one of the largest companies in the world based on its influence in creating the underlying mechanics to facilitate information distribution.

5 James Gosler, “The Digital Dimension,” from Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber (editors) (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2005), 96.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 Weiser, A Secret Life, 158.

9 Gosler, “The Digital Dimension,” 100.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid., 101.

12 Ibid.

13 Construction of the Internet began in 1969 with the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) by academic researchers under the sponsorship of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). Two decades later, the Internet became publicly accessible with a worldwide system of interconnected computer networks. The “Net” connected thousands of smaller commercial, academic, domestic, and government networks, creating an interlinked “World Wide Web” that provided varied information and services including online chat, electronic mail, and instant messaging.

14 Walker was arrested on May 20, 1985, shortly after leaving secret documents for the KGB at a dead drop location in rural Montgomery County, Maryland. The warrant authorizing the search of the Ames residence was made possible by the discovery in their household trash of a yellow Post-it note referencing a covert meeting with the Russian Intelligence Service to be held in Bogotá, Columbia.

15 Decision Support Systems, Inc., Secure Communications Operational Tradecraft; “How Not To Be Seen,” January 11, 2002, website: www.metatempo.com/SecureCommo.PDF.

16 For even greater protection, the agent may choose to superencipher the message using an OTP first, and then enciphering it again using a “strong and proven” encryption program such as PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). See: web.mit.edu/network/pgp.html. Such protection, properly employed, would be slow and cumbersome to use, but would result in an “unbreakable message.”

17 “Malware” (malicious software) includes programs for data encryption, digital steganography, password “cracking,” and “hacking.” Possession of such software, while not illegal, may become a basis for suspicion if detected during an examination of the agent’s computer and hard drive.

18 The first electromechanical encryption machine was developed and patented by Edward Hebern in 1918.

19 A free version of PGP can be downloaded from www.pgpi.org/. Advanced commercial versions of PGP are available from www.pgp.com/.

20 FBI Affidavit for the Arrest of Ana Belen Montes; September 2001, pg. 8. The complete affidavit can be downloaded at www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressre101/092101.pdf.

21 Robert Hanssen 2001 Arrest Affidavit No. 86-87. Hanssen’s technique was so effective that the KGB was unable to locate the message on the diskette. A month later, on March 28, 1988, he sent a letter to them with the simple instruction “Use 40 TRACK MODE.” See: www.cicentre.com/Documents/DOC_Hanssen_Affidavit.htm.

22 Cole, Hiding in Plain Sight, 5.

23 Ibid.

24 Hundreds of stego programs are commercially available over the Internet and allow data to be hidden in a variety of file formats using familiar graphic interfaces found on the Windows operating systems.

25 Dead drops are still in use and difficult to detect when used only once. FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen was arrested on February 18, 2001, after loading a dead drop with information for the SVR at Foxstone Park in Vienna, Virginia.

26 See: www.callingcards.com/ for pricing and coverage of international phone cards.

27 The assumption is made that retail outlets that sell phone cards near foreign embassies and missions are likely to be under surveillance and stocked with special phone cards that allow all calls to be monitored and traced.

28 Robert Hanssen 2001 Arrest Affidavit, No. 131.

29 Tomlinson, The Big Breach, 66-67.

30 See news articles: news.scotsman.com/international.cfm?id=115032006; www.dlmag.com/news/12/01-24-2006/418-britain-russia-and-a-spyrock.html.

31 FBI Affidavit for the Arrest of Ana Belen Montes; September 2001, pg. 11.

32 Gosler, “The Digital Dimension,” 110.

EPILOGUE

1 Lovell, Of Spies and Stratagems, 40-41.