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{1} MS # P-069, The Kreipe Diary, 22 July-2 November 1944 (General der Flieger Werner Kreipe). OKH, OKL, and OKW are the abbreviated versions, respectively, of Oberkommando des Heeres, the High Command of the German Army, Oberkommando der Luftwaffe, The Luftwaffe High Command, and Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, the Armed Forces High Command.

{2} The results of the numerous joint intelligence studies undertaken immediately after World War II on the relation between German production and the Allied air offensive are well summarized in the third volume of the official Air Forces series, Wesley Frank Craven and James Lea Cate eds., The Army Air Forces in World War II, vol. III, Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, January 1944 to May 1945 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951). See also MS # P-059, Tank Losses (Generalmajor Burkhart Mueller-Hillebrand); K. O. Sauer, Effects of Aerial Warfare on German Armament Production (T.I. 341, M.I.F. 3); United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Military Analysis Division, The Impact Of the Allied Air Effort On German Logistics (Washington, 1947).

{3} German ground force losses are discussed in more detail in H. M. Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1950), pp. 232. See also OKH, Gen. St. d. H/Organizations Abteilung (hereafter cited as OKH/Org. Abt.) KTB, 2 December 1944, which gives the revised personnel situation as of 1 November 1944.

{4} B. H. Klein in his Germany's Economic Preparations for War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959) advances the thesis that, contrary to Nazi propaganda, the Third Reich never went over to an all-out industrial and economic effort until the war was lost.

{5} For a detailed description of the Goebbels comb-out see the manuscript study prepared by Charles V. P. von Luttichau entitled The Ardennes Offensive, Germany's Situation in the Fall of 1944, Part II, The Economic Situation (1953). OCMH.

{6} Exact dating for the various phases of the Ardennes plan, as these evolved in Hitler's mind, now is impossible. Magna E. Bauer has attempted to develop a chronology in MS # R-9, The Idea for the German Ardennes Offensive, 1944. See also MSS # P-069 (Kreipe) and A-862 The Preparations for the German Offensive in the Ardennes, September to 16 December 1944 (Maj. Percy E. Schramm).

{7} The Wehrmachtführungsstab, or WFSt, was the Armed Forces Operations Staff.

{8} The so-called Hitler Conferences from which Hitler's earlier thinking is derived are found in whole or in fragments in Felix Gilbert, ed., Hitler Directs His War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1950).

{9} The background of the abortive Fifth Panzer Army attack is described in Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 190-95.

{10} The story of this operation is told in Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, ch. V, passim.

{11} MS # B-034, OKW War Diary, 1 April-18 December 1944: The West (Schramm).

{12} General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., Inc., 1952), app. 3.

{13} The precise reasons for the selection of Antwerp as the German objective are none too clear. The city represented the main supply base for British operations and it might be expected that the British public would react adversely to an Allied command responsible for the loss of an area so close to England which could be employed for V-2 attacks at short range. Later, at Nuremberg Rundstedt would say that the Meuse bridgeheads and Liège actually were the ultimate objectives. The Fifth Panzer Army commander, General der Panzertruppen Hasso-Eccard von Manteuffel gives his story in Seymour Freiden and William Richardson, eds., The Fatal Decisions (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1956), Part 6.

{14} The remaining records of the German High Command show clearly that Keitel no longer had a hand in the actual direction of the war or in strategic planning.

{15} The German term Oberbefehlshaber West, which may mean either the Commander in Chief West or his headquarters, has been rendered as OB WEST when it refers to the headquarters and as C-in-C West when it refers to the person.

{16} The relations between Rundstedt and Model are described by one of the latter's staff officers Thuisko von Metzch, in an unpublished report made for the Office of the Chief of Military History in 1952, Charles V. P. von Luttichau, Report on the Interview With Mr. Thuisko von Metzch [14-19 March 1952] on Operations of Army Group B and Its Role in the German Ardennes Offensive, 1944. Copy in OCMH.

{17} Rundstedt Testimony, Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg, 12 August 1946) vol. XXXI.

{18} Interv, Luttichau with Metzsch, 14-19 Mar 52.

{19} Ltr, Jodl to Westphal, 1 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 30-31.

{20} Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 3 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 47-50.

{21} Ibid.

{22} Ibid.

{23} Ltr, Westphal to Krebs, 6 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 67-70.

{24} OKW Operation Directive of 10 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 95-104.

{25} On the attacks made by the U.S. First and Third Armies in November 1944 see Charles B. MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1963) and Cole, The Lorraine Campaign.

{26} Ltr, Rundstedt to Jodl, 18 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. I, pp. 152-59.

{27} Msg, Jodl to Rundstedt, 22 Nov 44, OB WEST, KTB Anlage 50, vol. II, p. 12. (Quotation is from Hitler.)

{28} The numerous postponements of the German 1940 offensive in the west were, for the most part, the result of Hitler's injunction that the attack be made in good flying weather.

{29} The older military history of the Ardennes is narrated on a somewhat antiquarian basis in Revue Historique de l'Armée, 1955, IIe Année, Numéro 2. For the 1940 campaign see L. Menu, Lumière Sur Les Ruines, Paris, 1953; also M. Fouillien and J. Bouhon, Mai 1940: La Bataille de Belgique, Bruxells, n.d.

{30} The best of numerous terrain descriptions of the Ardennes was prepared by the German General Staff in 1940, especially for the offensive in the west. It is entitled Militärgeographischer überblick über Belgien und angrenzende Gebiete. See also the British official publication of 1918: A Manual of Belgium and the Adjoining Territories (ed. The Admiralty). The best analysis of German military thought on the problem presented by the Ardennes terrain is in a manuscript by Magna E. Bauer entitled Comparison Between the Planning for the German Ardennes Offensive in 1944 and for the Campaign in the West in 1940 (1951). OCMH.

{31} Bauer, Planning for German Ardennes Offensive 1944 . . . and 1940, app. 8.

{32} MS #B-038, 116th Panzer Division, Ardennes (Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg).

{33} Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 510-12.

{34} The detailed deception scenario is given by Maj. Percy Schramm, then historian at OKW headquarters, in MS #A-862.

{35} OB WEST KTB, 13 Dec 44.

{36} Forrest C. Pogue, The Supreme Command, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1954), p. 316.

{37} See MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 597-98.

{38} Ltr, Eisenhower to Marshall, 10 Jan 45, in SHAEF message file, Plans and Operations, folder 27.

{39} Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 361-72. This is the best treatment of the problem of personal responsibilities for the various Allied intelligence estimates.

{40} The intelligence sources bearing on the Allied failure to appreciate the coming German counteroffensive have been gathered by Royce L. Thompson in a study entitled American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive, 2 vols. (1949). MS in OCMH files.

{41} Royce L. Thompson has compiled a complete collection of excerpts from pertinent Air Force records bearing on the operations of the U.S. Army Air Forces during the Ardennes battle: Tactical Air Phase of the Ardennes Campaign, 2 vols. (1950). MS in OCMH files.

{42} Craven and Cate, eds., Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 675.

{43} Ibid., p. 681.

{44} The best study on German rail movements and explanation of pertinent German sources will be found in Charles V. P. von Luttichau's manuscript, German Rail Communications in the Ardennes Offensive, 1944-45 (1952), OCMH. See also the OB WEST KTB and Anlage for the supply build-up prior to the attack.

{45} Detailed troop movements have been worked out in Luttichau, Rail Communications, ch. VII, passim.

{46} The several postponements of the German D-day are described in ETHINT-20, Hitler's Conduct of the War (Rittmeister Dr. Wilhelm Scheidt).

{47} The timing at the end of the German concentration is given unit by unit in Luttichau's German Rail Communications and in his study entitled The Ardennes Offensive, Progressive Build-up and Operations, 9 December 1944. MS in OCMH files.

{48} For the Hitler speeches of 11 and 12 December 1944 see Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War, p. 157.

{49} On the German artillery preparations see MSS #B-311, Army Group B Artillery, Ardennes (General der Artillerie Karl Thoholte); B-347, Sixth SS Panzer Army Artillery (Generalleutnant Waffen-SS Walter Staudinger); B 759, Sixth Panzer Army, 15 December 1944-21 January 1945 (Staudinger).

{50} The very difficult task of evaluating and reconciling the various tank strengths given in individual (and fragmentary) German documents has been ably done in Charles V. P. von Luttichau's manuscript, Armor in the Ardennes Offensive (1952). OCMH. Cf., MS #P-059 (Mueller-Hillebrand) and the OB WEST KTB for 16 December 1944.

{51} See Luttichau's Armor in the Ardennes Offensive, Table II.

{52} These figures have been gleaned from various secondary sources and are estimates only. Joint Intelligence Survey, Some Weaknesses in German Strategy and Organization (1946).

{53} MS #P-031b.

{54} The general problem of artillery and ammunition is discussed by General Thoholte, the artillery representative of Army Group B, in MS #B-311 (Thoholte).

{55} A contemporary memorandum on the supply and POL status written by a Colonel Poleck is found in Schramm's Merkbuch under the date of 3 January 1945.

{56} The German Intelligence Estimate for 15 December 1944 is given in OB WEST KTB.

{57} MS #P-038, German Radio Intelligence (1950).

{58} This situation map may be found in Thompson's American Intelligence on the German Counteroffensive.

{59} Jodl, while a prisoner at Nuremberg, said that once the Antwerp line was reached the subsequent German operations would aim at "neutralizing" the Allied armies to the east.

{60} MS # A-924, Operations of Sixth Panzer Army, 1944-45 (SS Generalmajor Fritz Kraemer). Kraemer was chief of staff of Sixth Panzer Army.

{61} MSS # B-311 (Thoholte) and P-109a, Ardennes Follow Up-3d SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment (Oberstleutant Waffen-SS Guenther Wisliceny); see also ETHINT-21, Sixth Panzer Army in the Ardennes Offensive (Generalmajor (Waffen-SS) Fritz Kraemer) and ETHINT-61, Tank Maintenance, Ardennes (General der Panzertruppen Horst Stumpff).

{62} The records of the 99th Division, for the battle described in this chapter, are quite complete and detailed. Basic documents are: 99th Div AAR and G-3 Jnl; AAR's and Unit Jnls of the 393d, 394th, and 395th Inf Regts; 741st Tank Bn AAR; AAR's of 639th and 413th AAA Bns; 254th Engr Combat Bn AAR; 371st FA Bn AAR; and 799th Ord Co AAR. This operation was the subject of studies by participants while in Classes Nos. 1 and 2, Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Fort Benning, Ga. (see especially those of Majors Ben W. Legare, J. B. Kemp, and T. J. Gendron and Capt. Wesley J. Simmons). The then commander of the 99th Division has written the official division history; see Major General Walter E. Lauer, Battle Babies: The Story of the 99th Infantry Division in World War II (Baton Rouge: Military Press of Louisiana, Inc., 1951). American combat interviews are another useful source.

{63} The action in this sector has been covered by General Priess in MS # A-877, Commitment of the I SS Panzer Corps During the Ardennes Offensive, 16 December 1944-45 January 1945 (General der Waffen-SS Hermann Priess. Cf. MS # P-109d, Ardennes Follow Up (Oberst der Schutzpolizei F. W. Bock), and MS # B-577, I SS Panzer Corps, 15 October-16 December 1944 (Oberst der Waffen-SS Rudolf Lehman). These are fragments extant of III/SSPz Gr Regt 25, KTB Nr. 2. For the story of the 277th Volks Grenadier Division, see MS # B-273, 277th Volks Grenadier Division, November 1944-January 1945 (Generalmajor Wilhelm Viebig), and MS # B-465, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 16-28 December 1944 (Generalmajor Walter Denkert).

{64} Sergeant Dolenc was listed as MIA; he was awarded the DSC.

{65} Among his staff it was rumored that Model wished to save the historic latticed houses here.

{66} The account of the operations conducted by this corps is none too precise: MS # B-092, 326th Volks Grenadier Division, 16 December 1944-25 January 1945 (Generalmajor Erwin Kaschner), and MS # A-937, The Ardennes Offensive, December 1944 (General der Infanterie Otto Hitzfeld). The AAR's prepared by the 395th Infantry.

{67} The 1st Battalion of the 394th was accorded a Presidential Citation for its role in this battle.

{68} Colonel Hightower was awarded the DSC for his conduct of the defense.

{69} Pfc. R. D. Smith and Pfc. Angelo Cestoni were awarded the DSC for bravery in the fight by the 393d Infantry. It should be added that the forward observers of the 370th Field Artillery Battalion, which was supporting the infantrymen of the 393d, also distinguished themselves and two, 1st Lt. G. W. Jackman and 2d Lt. W. D. Markin, received the DSC, Lieutenant Markin posthumously.

{70} The action at this point devolved on Sgt. Vernon McGarity and his squad. For outstanding heroism McGarity was awarded the Medal of Honor.

{71} The gallant attempt by Pfc. Richard E. Cowan single-handedly to cover the Company I retreat was recognized by the award of the Medal of Honor.

{72} Lt. Col. Paul V. Tuttle, Jr., for his able handling of the withdrawal by the 3d Battalion, was awarded the DSC.

{73} For details of the Wahlerscheid attacks, see MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, pp. 606-10.

{74} The 2d Division attack and subsequent fighting withdrawal are very well covered in combat interviews. In this chapter the following after action reports and journals have been used: 2d Div; 9th, 23d, and 38th Infantry Regiments the 2d Div Hq Commandant, The 644th Tank Destroyer Bn. Army Ground Forces Report No. 559 (26 January 1945) is useful. The published materials, History of the Fifteenth Field Artillery Battalion in the European Theater of Operations and D plus 106 to V-E: The Story of the 2d Division (n.d. n.p.), are of little value.

{75} The 2d Division engineers had worked on this secondary road until it offered a fairly passable single track.

{76} General Robertson, however, maintained personal control of the battle and was in the thick of the fight. He received the DSC.

{77} For ease of description this engagement has been treated as a fight by the 1st Battalion; notice, however, that the 1st deployed alongside Company K. Pfc. William A. Soderman, of Company K, stopped three enemy tanks with bazooka rounds during the night of battle but was badly wounded by machine gun fire from the last tank he attacked. Soderman was awarded the Medal of Honor.

{78} The history of the fight against the 1st SS Panzer during the first few days of the advance was the subject of a special report, based on personal interviews in January 1945, by Capt. Franklin Ferriss (in OCMH). Coverage on the German side is good, notably MSS # A-924 (Kraemer), A-877 (Priess), and B-733, 12th Volks Grenadier Division, 1-29 December 1944 (Generalleutnant Gerhard Engel).

{79} The actions fought here by the 26th Infantry involved very heavy fighting by attached tanks and tank destroyers. See especially the AAR's of the 741st and 745th Tank Battalions; the 634th, 703d, and 801st Tank Destroyer Battalions. See also Capt. D. E. Rivette, "The Hot Corner at Dom Butgenbach," Infantry Journal (October, 1945), pp. 19-23.

{80} Here Sgt. James L. Bayliss manned his machine gun to cover his men although he had been under fire by a German tank. Finally he was killed by a tank-gun round. Bayliss was awarded the DSC.

{81} During the fighting in the twin villages on the 18th, 1st Lt. R. A. Parker destroyed or immobilized six enemy tanks with a rocket launcher. Parker was awarded the DSC.

{82} The 3d Battalion of the 395th Infantry was given a Presidential Citation for its fight at Höfen. Sgt. T. E. Piersall and Pfc. Richard Mills fought with such conspicuous courage as to receive the DSC.

{83} This was 2d Lt. S. D. Llewellyn, who later received the DSC for the defense of the observation post.

{84} The unit was awarded a Presidential Citation.

{85} This was Cpl. Henry F. Warner, one of the 57-mm. antitank gunners. He fought the German tanks for two days, often by himself, and destroyed three panzers, but finally was killed by a machine gun burst from one of the panzers he was stalking. Warner was awarded the Medal of Honor.

{86} Sgt. I. R. Schwartz received the DSC for gallantry in this action.

{87} Colonel Daniel himself received the DSC.

{88} During the German assault Sgt. Peter J. Dalessandro of Company E saved his company from complete rout by a last-ditch stand with grenades and an abandoned machine gun. When he could hold no longer, the sergeant called for a mortar barrage right on his own position. He was awarded the Medal of Honor.

{89} See below, pp. 579-80.

{90} This decision was made about noon on the 20th, probably by Model supported by Rundstedt, but this is not certain. OB WEST KTB, 20 Dec 44.

{91} The records and reports of the 106th Division and the 424th Infantry are intact although rather scanty in content. The records of the 422d and 423d were destroyed before the capture of these regiments, but the Historical Division, ETO, did interview a large number of officers and men from these regiments when they were released from German prisons. First Army conducted Inspector General investigations of the actions of the 106th Division, the 820th Tank Destroyer Battalion, the 106th Reconnaissance Troop, and the 14th Cavalry Group. Most of the records of the 14th Cavalry Group were destroyed but the commanding officer, Col. Mark Devine, provided the author with some personal papers. The VIII Corps after action report and G-2 and G-3 journals are very useful for the relations between corps and division. Participants in this battle made special reports for the Advanced Infantry Officers Course No. 1 (Maj. William P. Moon, Maj. J. C. Hollinger, and Capt. Alan W. Jones, Jr.) See also, the 275th Armored Field Artillery Battalion journal and S-2 report. Col. R. Ernest Dupuy has written a very good semi-official history entitled, St. Vith: Lion in the Way, the 106th Infantry Division in World War II (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1949). Dupuy's work has been heavily drawn on, but the reader will find several points at which Dupuy and the present account differ. The German manuscripts are very detailed and useful; see particularly MSS # B-026, Effects of Ardennes Offensive on Army Group G (SS Generaloberst Waffen-SS Paul Hauser); B-688 (incorporating B-734), 18th Volks Grenadier Division, 1 September 1944-45 January 1945 (Lt. Col. Dietrich Moll); A-924 (Kraemer); B-333, LXVI Corps, October-23 December 1944 (General der Artillerie Walter Lucht).

{92} These were the 770th, 965th, 333d, 771st, 559th, 561st, 578th, and 740th Field Artillery Battalions.

{93} It will be recalled that the 106th had noticed unusual vehicular noise. See above, p. 59.

{94} See also ch. XVII.

{95} These troops were armored infantry from the 1st SS Panzer Division whose commander finally had thrown them in to get the attack rolling.

{96} Three members of the 18th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron were awarded the DSC for gallantry in the battle at the villages: 1st Lt. A. L. Mills, S. Sgt. Woodrow W. Reeves, and Cpl. C. E. Statler.

{97} Withee was captured after his lone fight. He was given the DSC.

{98} Combat Interv with Middleton and Evans; also Ltr, Middleton to Theater Historian ETO, 30 Jul 45.

{99} This according to the FUSA Inspector General report.

{100} Probably this message referred to the Amelscheid "cut-off" through which Americans had been attempting to evade the enemy.

{101} Lt. Col. William Craig, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, died of wounds on this day.

{102} 1st Lt. R. H. Thompson personally destroyed two enemy machine guns and their crews in this series of actions; he then made a lone attack on an enemy assault gun and was seriously wounded. He received the DSC.

{103} Much effort has been made to trace this story through the numerous headquarters which were involved but there are great gaps in the journal files. Interviews with officers concerned have only compounded confusion, yielding bits and pieces of information which, lacking in written record, cannot be put together in sequence. Royce L. Thompson made an exhaustive search of the records and conducted a number of personal interviews with officers involved in staffing the 106th requests. See his Air Supply to Isolated Units; Ardennes Campaign. OCMH, 1951.

{104} Dupuy (St. Vith: Lion in the Way, page 134f.), goes no further than the First Army headquarters to find a culprit, following in this the combat interview with Colonel Towne, 16 January 1945.

{105} First United States Army, Report of Operations, an. 2, G-4 Sec, p. 120f.

{106} Headquarters, IX Troop Carrier Command, Operation Repulse, Resupply by Air, Belgium, December 1944 (January 1945); 435th Troop Carrier Group Unit History, MS dated 1 January 1945.

{107} The Panzer Lehr Division carried the same organization as other German armored divisions. Its name reflected the division's original status as a tank training unit. The Führer Begleit Brigade originally had been a special escort battalion for Hitler. It was expanded for commitment in the Ardennes to three panzer grenadier battalions, a panzer regiment, an artillery battalion, an antiaircraft battalion, and lesser units.

{108} The memoirs of the leading personalities in the Fifth Panzer Army, as collected in the German manuscript histories are detailed and uninhibited. They square in a remarkable manner with the recital of events in the American records. See especially MSS # B-151a, sequel to B-151, Fifth Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); B-321, LVIII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive, 16 December 1944-11 January 1945 (General der Panzertruppen Walter Krueger); A-939, The Assignment of the XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes, 1944-45 (General der Panzertruppen Heinrich von Lüttwitz); B-040, 26th Volks Grenadier Division in the Ardennes Offensive (Generalmajor Heinz Kokott). See also MSS # A-955, Report on the Campaign in Northern France, the Rhineland, and the Ardennes (Oberst i. G. Hans-Jürgen Dingler); B-506, LVIII Panzer Corps Artillery, 1 November 1944-1 February 1945 (Generalmajor Gerhard Triepel); A-941, Panzer Lehr Division, 1 December 1944-26 January 1945 (Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein); A-942, Panzer Lehr Division, 15-22 December 1944 (Bayerlein).

{109} MSS # A-939 (Lüttwitz); A-940, XLVII Panzer Corps in the Ardennes Offensive (Lüttwitz); A-941 (Bayerlein); A-942 (Bayerlein). For the corps plans, see KTB: Christrose.

{110} Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, pp. 464-71.

{111} The official U.S. Army history describes this fighting by the 28th Infantry Division as "one of the most costly division actions in the whole of World War II." MacDonald, The Siegfried Line Campaign, p. 373.

{112} The American sources for the initial phase of the defense in this sector are unusually complete. The 28th Division after action report shows the lines of withdrawal and is supplemented in detail by the 28th Division G-3 journal and telephone file. The 109th Infantry after action report and journal are intact and useful. (See also The Old Gray Mare of the 109th Infantry Regiment (Augsburg, 1953.)) The 110 Infantry has not only a regimental after action report but one for each of its battalions; however the 110th journal is missing for the period prior to 24 December 1944. The 112th Infantry S-2 and S-3 journals have numerous overlays showing the action. Combat interviews provide good coverage for most of the major actions by the 28th Division. For the German sources see note 2, above. See also The Rise and Fall of the 2d Panzer Division (MS) edited by TUSA, 1 PW, May 1945; MS # P-032d (Generalmajor Hans Kokott).

{113} The road from Dasburg through Clerf is marked on the OB WEST operations map by a purple penciled line as far as Bastogne.

{114} An M16 half-track from the 44th Antiaircraft Artillery (Automatic Weapons) Battalion was responsible for the fact that this battery was still in position. Early that morning a German company had marched up to a crossroads where the half-track was standing, apparently intending to deploy for an attack against the battery. Seeing the vehicle, the enemy column paused. One of the crew thought fast and waved the Germans forward in friendly fashion. When the .50-caliber machine guns on the half-tracks ceased fire nearly one hundred German dead were counted.

{115} MS # A-940 (Lüttwitz). The 707th Tank Battalion has a detailed unit journal in narrative form.

{116} The 110th Infantry action here is described in History of the 110th Infantry of the 28th Division, United States Army, World War II, 1941-1945 (Atlanta, Ga.: Albert Love Enterprises, 1945).

{117} There is no official record of the losses taken by the 110th Infantry during this phase of the battle. Estimates furnished the author by members of the regimental staff set the figure at about 2,750 officers and men.

{118} Events of this day are very obscure. Late in the afternoon an American tank platoon came to the edge of the village but retired, the commander reported, when no Americans could be found. This withdrawal was hastened by bazooka fire which crippled two of the tanks. The troops barricaded in the houses later reported that they had seen no American tanks but had hit two German tanks with bazooka shots. See MS by Maj. I. D. Warden and 28th Div G-3 Jnl.

{119} See below, pp. 393-95.

{120} MSS # B-321 (Krueger); A-873, Commitment of the 116th Panzer Division in the Ardennes, 12-16 December 1944 (Generalmajor Siegfried von Waldenburg); A-874, Commitment of the 116th Panzer Division in the Ardennes, 1944-45 (Waldenburg); B-027, 560th Volks Grenadier Division, 15-29 December 1944, and 12th Volks Grenadier Division, 1-28 January 1945 (Generalmajor Rudolf Langhaeuser). The Germans sited their searchlights five to eight kilometers from the American main line of resistance.

{121} It is quite possible that the German tank activity here was discouraged during daylight by the sharp-shooting Private Rosenthal, manning his tank destroyer in the 424th Infantry sector. See above, ch. VII, p. 153.

{122} During the fighting on 16 December Pfc. W. S. Rush stayed in the line at an exposed point, hurling grenades and firing his rifle although he was badly wounded. Rush refused to leave his post and died there of his wounds. He was awarded the DSC.

{123} Cota was acting on orders from the VIII Corps commander who wished to deny the enemy the use of Highway N 26, the main paved road from the south into St. Vith.

{124} The Americans lost four tank destroyers and eight armored cars. It would appear they were surprised by the speed of the German advance; the enemy assault was being made by bicycle troops.

{125} The so-called Parachute Army had developed originally as a partisan and personal creation of Goering. As a result it was ridden with politics. The account of Heilmann's difficulties is in MS # B-023, 5th Parachute Division, 1 December-12 January 1945 (Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann).

{126} The American infantry gave high praise to the 687th for its part in this fight. Colonel Strickler later said of the gunners, "a magnificent job by some magnificent men." Recognized as outstanding even in this band was S/Sgt. William J. Bennett of Battery C, who was awarded the DSC.

{127} This gallant feat was recognized fully at the time by General Middleton and its importance later emphasized in the VIII Corps after action report for December 1944.

{128} ETHINT-51, OKW, Ardennes Offensive (Generaloberst Alfred Jodl).

{129} The chief German source for the Seventh Army operations is MS # A876, Ardennes Offensive of Seventh Army, 16 December 1944-25 January 1945 (General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger). The corps accounts are in MSS # B-030, LXXXV Corps, 1 December 1944-10 January 1945 (General der Infanterie Baptist Kniess) and B-081, LXXX Corps, 13 September 1944-23 March 1945, Part Two (General der Infanterie Dr. Franz Beyer). The individual divisions are covered in MSS # A-930, A-931, 212th Volks Grenadier Division-Ardennes, 16 December 1944-25 January 1945 (Generalleutnant Franz Sensfuss); B-023 (Heilmann); B-067, 352d Volks Grenadier Division, 16 December 1944-25 January 1945 (Generalmajor Erich Schmidt); B-073 212th Volks Grenadier Division, Ardennes (Generalleutnant Franz Sensfuss); and P-032f, Ardennes Project (Generalmajor Hugo Dempwolff). LIII Corps' KTB covers the first hours of action but ends with 17 December.

{130} During the advance by Company A, 2d Lt. Samuel Leo silenced two enemy machine guns with grenades and killed five Germans with his rifle. He was given the DSC. On this day Pvt. J. W. Jones made a lone attack upon a machine gun which was firing directly at him; he destroyed the weapon and its crew but then was cut down by a second machine gun. Jones was awarded the DSC.

{131} The 109th Infantry AAR says of this incident: "It is believed that if Company B had been more aggressive in their attack to Fouhren [Föhren], they could have relieved the pressure on Company E, permitting them to conduct a withdrawal."

{132} When the antitank company was forced to pull back to a new position, Capt. Paul P. Gaynor remained alone to cover the withdrawal. He killed eight Germans with his carbine, wounded several others, then made a dash under fire across open ground and rejoined his company. He was awarded the DSC.

{133} This story is given in Rapport sur L'activite de la Gendarmerie Grand-Ducale lors du bombardment et de L'evacuation de la ville de Diekirch, provided the author by the Luxembourg liaison officer at Headquarters, SHAPE.

{134} Companies A and C had no communications with the battalion. During the night of the 16th the two company commanders, Capt. John W. Schalles and Capt. Roger L. Shinn, each got a half-track loaded with rations and ammunition and ran it through to the rifle line.

{135} Pfc. T. J. Zimmerer, an aid man, stayed behind enemy lines for eleven days with a severely wounded soldier. He was awarded the DSC.

{136} The 9th Armored Division never fought as a complete division during the period covered by the present volume. As a result the 9th Armored after action report and files are of little value in tracing the action of one of its combat commands. For the series of events described in this section the main sources are the combat interviews; the 60th Armored Infantry Battalion AAR; the 9th Armored Engineer Battalion AAR, which tells the very detailed story, by companies; the CCA AAR and S-3 Jnl; the separate troop histories in the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron AAR; and the useful AAR of the 811th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

{137} Histories have been published for three of the units involved in the defense described in this section: Col. Gerden F. Johnson, History of the Twelfth Infantry Regiment in World War II (Boston: National Fourth (Ivy) Division Association, 1947); History of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment, Fifth Infantry Division (Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1946); and Lester M. Nichols, Impact, The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division (New York: Bradbury, Sales, O'Neill, 1954). The combat interviews are excellent for the 4th Division, less useful for the 10th Armored. The 4th Division AAR provides a good narrative but the division journals are scanty. Of the regiments only the 12th Infantry has much information in its AAR and unit journal. The AAR of the 70th Tank Battalion can be used to flesh out much of the story. For the participation of the 10th Armored troops, see the 10th Armored G-3 journal and the CCA AAR. An interesting account by a participant will be found in Maj. Glenn W. Zarger's manuscript, Defense of Little Switzerland, prepared for the Advanced Officers Class No. 1, Armored School, Fort Knox, Ky., 1 May 1948.

{138} 1st Sgt. Gervis Willis later was awarded the DSC for his conduct in the defense of Berdorf.

{139} General Barton says that he told the tank commander to inform Captain Dupuis that his order to hold in Echternach was revoked, but apparently this message was not delivered. Ltr, Gen Barton to author, 17 Nov 59.

{140} The records of Peiper's unit were destroyed just before his capture. In 1945, however, Peiper was interviewed by members of the ETO Historical Section. (See Ferriss, Rpt Based on Intervs in January 1945, passim.) Much of the tactical detail used herein comes from the 3,268-page trial transcript of the so-called Malmédy Case tried before the U.S. General Military Government Court in 1946. A good summary of the latter is found in a manuscript by Royce L. Thompson entitled The ETO Ardennes Campaign: Operations of the Combat Group Peiper, 16-26 December 1944 (1952), in OCMH files.

{141} Ch. VIII.

{142} The massacres perpetrated by Peiper's troops were the subject of a special Congressional investigation: 81st Cong., 1st sess., Report of the Subcommittee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Malmédy Massacre Investigation (dated 13 October 1949). Cf., Records of the War Crimes Branch, USFET, 1946. The postwar SS view of the Malmédy incident is given in Paul Hausser's Waffen-SS im Einsatz (Goettingen, 1953), pp. 242-57.

{143} Hitler's order to take no prisoners probably had wide circulation. Lt. Col. George Mabry, commander of the 2d Battalion, 8th Infantry, has stated that his unit captured a German colonel from the Seventh Army who had such an order. Ltr, Gen Barton to author, 17 Nov 59.

{144} Thus Fragmentary Order 27, issued by Headquarters, 328th Infantry, on 21 December for the attack scheduled the following day says: "No SS troops or paratroopers will be taken prisoners but will be shot on sight."

{145} Peiper later said that if the German infantry had made a penetration by 0700 on 16 December he could have reached the Meuse the same day.

{146} The ubiquitous 51st Engineer Combat Battalion will crop up at many points in this narrative. The battalion was awarded a Presidential Citation.

{147} The origins of this scheme are described by Manteuffel in Frieden and Richardson, eds., The Fatal Decisions, pp. 272-74. See also B. H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1951).

{148} The original Brandenburg Division seems to have been none too happy that Skorzeny's group was given the name of the Brandenburgers. H. Kriegsheim, Getarnt, Getauescht und doch Getreu: Die Division "Brandenburg" (Berlin, 1958), p. 305.

{149} The story of the Hohes Venn operation is given by its leader in MS # P-051, Airborne Operations: A German Appraisal (Generalmajor Hellmuth Reinhardt). Cf., the C.S.D.I.C. U.K. documents S.I.R. 1377 (n.d.) and G.R.G.G. 359 (c) 24 Sep 45.

{150} The reports of enemy paratroopers did result in numerous troop alerts in the American rear areas. For example, the 1102d, 1107th, and 1128th Engineer Groups were alerted. (VIII Corps, G-3 Jnl, 16 Dec 44.) The German soldiery, surprisingly, were told of Colonel von der Heydte's failure in an article entitled "Operation Mass Murder" which appeared in the Nachrichten Fur Die Truppe (the German equivalent of The Stars and Stripes) on 22 December 1944. This article, as the title implies, is extremely bitter over the lack of troop training and preparation.

{151} The subsequent story of these units is threaded together from the VIII Corps G-2 and G-3 journals; combat interviews with the VIII Corps staff and the 168th Engineer Battalion; the separate troop histories in the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron AAR; the 168th Engineer Combat Battalion AAR; and the journals of CCB, 9th Armored. (The AAR of the latter is worthless and the journals are very confused; they do, however, have many map overlays from which the action can be traced.)

{152} The history of the 7th Armored in the battle of St. Vith is better documented than any part of the Ardennes story, with the sole exception of the defense of Bastogne. All of the units organic to this command prepared AAR's, including the division trains and artillery. The unit journals, as is common in an armored division, are rather slim, although, in this case, fairly accurate. A quite complete and accurate account was prepared by one of the participants, Maj. Donald P. Boyer, Jr., in 1947 and was published as St. Vith: The 7th Armored Division in the Battle of the Bulge, 17-23 December 1944. (I have used Major Boyer's original typescript which is written in greater detail.) The combat interviews (particularly those compiled by Robert Merriam) are very informative.

{153} Colonel Matthews' body was discovered about a month later. Col. John L. Ryan, Jr., who had commanded CCR, became the 7th Armored chief of staff.

{154} This outfit was called Task Force Navaho, so named because its leader had worked his way through college selling Indian blankets.

{155} The German operations are discussed in MSS # B-333 (Lucht) and B-688 (Moll). See also ETHINT #21.

{156} 2d Lt. R. L. Westbrook commanded this platoon. Although severely wounded he led the survivors to safety, then went back to his platoon's position to search for stragglers. He was given the DSC.

{157} See above, pp. 204-05.

{158} Remer had come to Hitler's attention by his prompt actions designed to protect the Führer during the July Putsch.

{159} Manteuffel tells how he met Model on foot outside St. Vith and persuaded the latter to commit Remer's brigade so as to speed up the Sixth SS Panzer Army and thus shake the Fifth loose. Freiden and Richardson, eds., The Fatal Decisions, Part 6.

{160} Gilbreth was convinced that he must "freeze" the vehicles in place after he had talked to the Commander of the 58th Field Artillery Battalion who had witnessed such precipitate withdrawals during the North African campaign. Ltr, Col Joseph H. Gilbreth to author, 6 Sep 58.

{161} The total losses for December 1944 (which include those sustained later in the defense of Bastogne) are reported in the AAR as being about 800 killed and missing; the 2d Tank Battalion lost 45 medium tanks and 14 light tanks.

{162} Sgt. M. N. Shay was awarded the DSC for organizing a group of soldiers to man machine guns and defend the village. When the defenders attempted to break out, Sergeant Shay stayed behind to cover the withdrawal and there was killed.

{163} The German sources for the Longvilly fight are MSS # A-939 (Lüttwitz); A-942 (Bayerlein); and B-040 (Kokott).

{164} The useful records of the early and confused American reaction east of Bastogne are for the most part those compiled in the combat interviews, shortly after the event, with personnel of the 9th and 10th Armored Divisions. The journals of the 2d Tank Battalion, for example, were destroyed. Most units lost their records and then attempted to compile an AAR from memory. The interviews mentioned above have served as the basis for the description of the Longvilly action in three publications: The Armored School, Armor at Bastogne (1949); Marshall, Bastogne: The Story of the First Eight Days; and Nichols, Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division.

{165} Combat interviews; VIII Corps AAR and G-3 Jnl; XVIII Airborne Corps AAR and G-3 Jnl; 101st Airborne Div AAR and G-3 Jnl.

{166} The 705th Tank Destroyer Battalion AAR, 755th Armored Field Artillery Battalion Unit History, and 969th Field Artillery Battalion AAR are must reading for anyone attempting to reconstruct the Bastogne defense.

{167} The author has made an exhaustive (and exhausting) effort to read all the documents, journals, and reports belonging to each of the units mentioned-no matter how cursorily-in this chapter. Of course a great number of records were destroyed; this is particularly true of the artillery battalions. The journals of most of the engineer units are extant, but these vary greatly in value. Surprisingly, many of the ordnance and antiaircraft units provided records which helped considerably in unwinding the involved tactical situation in their particular area. Any reader wishing to delve further into the story should begin with the following records: the VIII Corps G-3 Journal and Artillery AAR; First U.S. Army, G-3 Journal; the 51st Engineer Combat Battalion S-3 Operations Journal (a model of what such a record should be); the very complete 158th Engineer Combat Battalion S-3 Journal; and the brief but graphic AAR of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion (whose records were destroyed).

{168} The 51st held its main position for five days and was given a Presidential Citation. The Canadian Forestry Company which worked with the 51st pays high tribute to the battalion and its commander. See No. 1 Coy, Canadian Forestry Corps, Report of Operations, 16-21 December 1944.

{169} When the first German assault hit the 158th, Pvt. Bernard Michin took on an enemy tank with a bazooka at a range of ten yards, was badly burned by the explosion but destroyed the tank. Unable to see because of his wounds he located an enemy machine gun by sound, threw a hand grenade, and wiped out the crew. He was awarded the DSC.

{170} The difficulties which beset the 2d Panzer are well described in MSS # A-939 (Lüttwitz) and B-456, 2d Panzer Division, 21-26 December 1944 (Oberstleutnant Ruediger Weiz) and also in the Third U.S. Army interrogation of Lauchert.

{171} The Panzer Lehr commander was well forward with his troops. For his recollections, which have proven to be excellent, see MSS # A-941 through A-943 (Bayerlein).

{172} In theory both Americans and Germans recognized the need for proper employment of their technically trained engineer troops. Model, for example, put out an order on 18 December positively forbidding the use of the German Pioneers as infantry. (LVIII Corps KTB, 18 Dec 44.) Doctrine and tactical exigencies, however, often proved contradictory during the Ardennes battle.

{173} Intervs with Middleton and Capt L. B. Clarke 19 Jan 45 and 20 Apr 45; Ltr, Middleton to Col. S. L. A. Marshall, 30 Jul 45.

{174} The general story of the command decisions on the first days of the battle will be found in Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1948); Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier's Story (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1951); and Conquer: The Story of the Ninth Army. The Sylvan Diary and the Gay Diary give details of the reactions at the First and Third Army headquarters, respectively. Details of troop movements are given in the First U.S. Army Report of Operations and the AAR's of the V and VIII Corps. A good analysis of troop strengths will be found in a British study by the Directorate of Tactical Investigation, War Office, entitled The German Counter Offensive in the Ardennes (n.d.).

{175} Hq SHAEF files: GCT 322-12/Ops(A), sub: SHAEF Reserve.

{176} Hq SHAEF files: O and E SHAEF G-3, 370.5-4, vol. 1, Flow of Divisions.

{177} The records kept by the 30th Division are in a very good state and are particularly valuable in that they include a telephone record, attached to the G-3 journal, of important conversations between the commander and his chief officers. Published works on the history of the division include Robert L. Hewitt, Workhorse of the Western Front (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1946); History of the 117th Infantry (Washington, 1946); and History of the 120th Infantry Regiment (Washington, 1947).

{178} The 30th Division G-3 journal for 19 December sums up this fight very simply: "We didn't have as many TD's as they had tanks." Cf., 823d Tank Destroyer Bn AAR, Dec 44.

{179} The German intelligence was unaware that the XVIII Airborne was in this area. Radio intercept, however, had warned that a combat command of the 3d Armored would move to the Werbomont sector very shortly. OB WEST: I.c. Tagesmeldung, Anlage I:2 (19 Dec 44).

{180} Since the 3d Armored Division was deployed with little connection between its combat commands and subordinate task forces, it is necessary to rely on the three combat commands' AAR's and journals. The separate task forces can be followed in the battalion S-3 journals. The semi-official history of the division, Spearhead in the West, 1941-45 (Frankfurt a/M, 1945), is very readable and informative. The story of Task Force Lovelady is related in A. E. Roberts, Five Stars to Victory (Birmingham, 1949). Both the 30th Division and the 3d Armored are fairly well represented in the collection of combat interviews. In addition, see Victory TD: The History of the 628th TD Bn.

{181} The engineers were not unaware of their important role and the commanding officer showed this in his greeting to Colonel Ekman: "I'll bet you guys are glad we're here." Combat Interv with Col William E. Ekman.

{182} The combat operations of these engineer battalions would have some effect on the German advance against the western wing of the XVIII Airborne Corps, but since they are integral to the VIII Corps defense they constitute part of that story. See above, Chapter XIII.

{183} It was unusual during World War II for the division trains to keep a special narrative journal, but the 7th Armored did keep one that has proven a gold mine for this section.

{184} The German sources for other units than Kampfgruppe Peiper include: MSS ETHINT-21 (Kraemer), and ETHINT-34, OKW, Ardennes Offensive (Maj. Herbert Bücks); MSS A-873 (Waldenburg); A-924 (Kraemer); A-955 (Dingler); B-027 (Langhaeuser); B-321 (Krueger); B-506 (Triepel).

{185} History of the 20th Infantry Regiment and H. R. Bergen, History of 99th Infantry Battalion (Oslo, n.d.); also 120th Inf AAR. The story of other detachments in the Malmédy fight is told in 12th Army Group, Special Forces, AAR, December 1944.

{186} 30th Div telephone journal, 21 Dec 44.

{187} The recital of the subsequent operations by the 82d Airborne Division comes from a variety of sources, mostly at regimental level, although some combat interviews cover battalions and companies: 325th Glider Inf AAR and Jnl; 517th Para Inf AAR; 504th AAR and S-3 Jnl, 505th S-2 and S-3 Per Rpts, 508th "The Belgian Campaign, Part I, 17-31 December"; 82d Abn Div, Commander's Rpt, G-2 and G-3 Jnls. Published sources are mostly of the pictorial public relations type but some are of use, notably: W. G. Lord, Combat Record of the 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Paris, 1948); History of the 508th Parachute Infantry (Washington, 1945); and Saga of the All American (Atlanta, 1946).

{188} During the confused ebb and flow of battle on 22 December, Sgt. John Bueno and Cpl. Adam F. Burko of the division engineer battalion (105th Engineer Combat Battalion) took part in a fierce and successful attempt to recapture an American aid station and evacuate the wounded. After the platoon leader was killed, these two men inspired their comrades, led in the fight, and were largely responsible for the rescue of the wounded. Both were awarded the DSC.

{189} The unfortunate and costly bombing raids on Malmédy were the result of tragic errors. This was acknowledged by the IX Bombardment Division but the Ninth Air Force and General Carl Spaatz at first refused to do so and referred to the "alleged" errors at Malmédy, a view corrected in Craven and Cate (eds.), Europe: ARGUMENT to V-E Day, p. 670. Royce L. Thompson has a quite complete study of these air strikes in his unpublished manuscript entitled Malmédy, Belgium, Mistaken Bombing, 23 and 25 December 1944 (1952), in OCMH files. Thompson's work is based on official Air Force records.

{190} A very complete and instructive analysis of the failure to resupply Task Force Hogan by air is in Thompson's MS, Air Supply to Isolated Units, pp. 34-63.

{191} The main actions of the 2d SS Panzer in this sector are developed as a part of Chapter XXIII.

{192} The final withdrawal from St. Vith into the lines of the XVIII Airborne Corps is described at length in the following chapter.

{193} The exchange between the commanders involved in the St. Vith defense will be found in the G-3 journals of the XVIII Corps, the 7th Armored Division, and the 106th Division. The military student will be interested in the delay between the dispatch of the various messages and their receipt. For the last phase of the battle see Boyer, St. Vith; CCB, 9th Armored, journal and AAR; the various battalion journals cited in Chapter XIX; and General Matthew B. Ridgway, Soldier: The Memoirs of Matthew B. Ridgway (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956).

{194} The detailed recital of the Führer Begleit actions, supported by documents and memorabilia, is given in Die Geschichte Des Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland (Bielefeld 1958), vol. 2, Teil VIII (hereafter cited as Panzerkorps G-D).

{195} The operations of the LXVI Corps around St. Vith are described in MSS #B-026 (Hauser); B-333 (Lucht); and B-688 (Moll). The midday and evening reports on OB WEST KTB are particularly useful.

{196} During the skirmish around Grufflange Cpl. Horace M. Thorne, Troop D of the 89th Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, led a patrol to scout out the enemy location. He killed the crew of an immobilized enemy tank, set up a light machine gun on the tank deck, and there conducted a fire fight in which he personally accounted for two machine gun crews. He was killed by rifle fire while trying to clear a stoppage on his weapon. Corporal Thorne was awarded the Medal of Honor.

{197} Montgomery's first source of information on the American situation and, subsequently, his best liaison agency with the American commanders was the British intelligence-communications organization known as Phantom. The Phantom officers were particularly welcome at Hodges' headquarters and Collins' VII Corps headquarters, a partial explanation of the close tie-in between Montgomery and these particular commands. See R. J. T. Hills, Phantom Was There (London: Edward Arnold & Co., 1951).

{198} The role played by Montgomery while in command on the north flank of the Ardennes is described in two of his books: Field Marshal Montgomery of Alamein, Normandy to the Baltic (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1948) and The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein (Cleveland, Ohio: The World Publishing Company, 1958). For the numerous visits to General Hodges see the Sylvan Diary.

{199} 1st Lt. George D. Lamm of the 508th Parachute Infantry led a series of charges to hold back the Germans while the bridge was being prepared for demolition; thereafter he braved the enemy fire to detonate the explosives himself. He was given the DSC.

{200} Ridgway was told that there were about one hundred usable tanks in the forces which came out of St. Vith. Cf. XXIII below, pp. 582-83.

{201} This last will be the subject of the next chapter.

{202} Daily notes kept by the Chief of the Air Staff, SHAEF, Air Marshal James M. Robb on the meetings held in the Supreme Commander's office SHAEF (Main), in OCMH files (hereafter cited as Robb Notes); SHAEF (Main) files: Montgomery to Eisenhower.

{203} Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 378-80 and n.; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, p. 355.

{204} Both the VII Corps and the 84th Division prepared AAR's and G-3 journals. The regiments of the 84th also have AAR's and unit journals. The semiofficial history of the latter division was prepared by a member of the division, Lt. Theodore Draper, The 84th Infantry Division in the Battle of Germany, November 1944-May 1945 (New York: The Viking Press, 1946). See also Cpl. Perry S. Wolff, A History of the 334th Infantry (Mannheim, Germany: Mannheimer Grossdruckerei, 1945). The tank battalion supporting the 84th also has published its combat record: Capt. E. Castagna, The History of the 771st Tank Battalion (Berkeley, Calif.; Lederer, Street & Zeus Co., Inc., 1946).

{205} OB WEST KTB, daily entries for this period.

{206} Sylvan Diary, appropriate daily entries.

{207} The sources for the history of the 2d Armored are about as informative and complete as is the case with the average armored division. The AAR's compiled by the combat commands contain the bulk of the story. The diary maintained by the division artillery commander, Col. Carl I. Hutton, has been made available to the author. Formal publications of value are: A History of the Second United States Armored Division, 1940-1946 (Atlanta: Albert Love Enterprises, 1946), and History, 67th Armored Regiment (Burnswick, Germany: Georg Westermann, 1945).

{208} The problems facing the Fifth Panzer Army commander are graphically presented in MSS ETHINT-45 and 46, and MSS #B-151, B-151a, all by Manteuffel. The story of the 116th Panzer Division is recounted by the division commander (Waldenburg) in MS #A-873. The best of the fragmentary personal accounts on the history of the 2d Panzer Division is that by Lt. Col. Ruediger Weiz in MS #B-456.

{209} The most complete story of the siege of Bastogne is S. L. A. Marshall's Bastogne: The First Eight Days (Washington: The Infantry Journal Press, 1946). The then Colonel Marshall was on the scene, had complete access to the daily record entries, and was persona grata to the entire command, this happy circumstance resulting in the fine collection of combat interviews which formed the basis for this interesting and graphic account. It is worth noting that the authors of the official history of the 101st did not write a chapter on Bastogne but simply introduced an abridged version of Marshall's book. (The present author has borrowed extensively from Brigadier General Marshall, but the careful reader will notice quite different interpretations of the same actions based on the same source materials. Marshall, concerned with the heroic story of an encircled unit, focuses on that unit, in effect looking from Bastogne at the perimeter. The present author, engaged in presenting the over-all campaign, directs his attention from the periphery inward.) The G-3 journal of the 101st is rather cursory. The 501st Summary of Actions is reconstructed from memory since most of the regimental records were lost; the 502d AAR is slim; the 327th Narrative is terse but informative; the 506th AAR is the most complete and useful of any of the regimental reports. See also Scrapbook 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment (Munich, 1945).

{210} Middleton recalls that he directed McAuliffe to reinforce the 10th Armored roadblock on the Longvilly road. (Ltr, Middleton to Col. Marshall, 1 Jul 45.) The S-3 journal of CCB, 10th Armored Division, notes at 0740 on 19 December that Ewell's mission is to relieve "the surrounded groups" and assist CCB. The 101st AAR simply states that Ewell was ordered to attack to the east and "secure Bastogne." The story as given in the text is based on Ewell's recollections (in a conversation with the author on 22 July 1961) and squares with information given the author by Middleton and McAuliffe.

{211} On the earlier actions by the armored units see Chapter XXI and also the documents cited there. The CCB, 10th Armored, AAR and S-3 journal are among the most valuable of the documents describing the Bastogne operation. The personal recollections of the CCB commander have been incorporated in Nichol's Impact: The Battle Story of the Tenth Armored Division.

{212} Generals Kokott and Bayerlein were responsible for the initial investiture of Bastogne, and their accounts, basic for "the other side of the hill," can be found in eight manuscripts: ETHINT-44, B-040, and P-32d by Kokott; and A-941 through A-945 by Bayerlein.

{213} S. L. A. Marshall, who interviewed Bayerlein says that the Panzer Lehr commander momentarily lost his nerve on the 19th and failed to prod his troops forward personally. (Marshall, Bastogne, pp. 184-86.) Bayerlein admits to his great surprise when he encountered strong armored opposition east of Bastogne. MS # A-941 (Bayerlein).

{214} For bravery in this action Pfc. Gilbert Van Every was awarded the DSC.

{215} It is indicative of the confusion and lack of precise information then current that the 2d Battalion journal reports, as if in surprise, that no casualties were sustained during this move.

{216} Ezell's excursion is treated with the 4th Armored story in Chapter XXI. The news of Ezell's subsequent departure from Bastogne is reflected only in scant journal notations.

{217} The records of the badly fragmented armor absorbed in the lines of the 101st Airborne are so scanty as to give no really precise strength figures.

{218} In the vernacular of the time, SNAFU stood for: Situation Normal, All (Fouled) Up. Thus Team SNAFU was named in a typical soldier cock of the snoot at adverse fate and the sensibilities of higher command.

{219} General McAuliffe subsequently was given the DSC for the defense of the town.

{220} Both the German and American records for the Ardennes contain, from time to time, reports of "attacks" which in fact were never noticed by the alleged targets and which probably were no more than dutiful commotion in response to the promptings of higher authority.

{221} Team Yantis (1st Lt. Ray J. Yantis was sent back on the night of 22 December to find a way through the enemy and bring back badly needed artillery ammunition from Neufchâteau, The team was ambushed and shot up near Pinsamont and had to abandon its vehicles. Special AAR, Company C, 55th Armored Engineer Battalion.

{222} See above, Chapter XIV, pages 328-29, for the rest of the story of the 58th Armored Field Artillery.

{223} In a television interview early in 1960 General von Lüttwitz admitted that he was responsible for the ultimatum to the Bastogne garrison. This confirms a like statement made to Colonel Marshall in 1945 but later denied by Lüttwitz.

{224} A complete listing of the Bastogne airdrop missions, carrier losses, weather conditions, and similar information can be found in Thompson's MS, Air Supply to Isolated Units, pp. 64-135.

{225} The official records credit Pfc. N. A. Osterberg, a bazooka man of headquarters company, with driving back the German tanks that assaulted the 2d Battalion positions. Private Osterberg was wounded during the three-hour fight. He was awarded the DSC.

{226} He received a posthumous award of the DSC.

{227} All of the higher German field commanders appear to have been in a quandary at this stage as to Hitler's intention toward Bastogne. See Manteuffel's queries to his superiors as described in MS #B-151a, and ETHINT-46, Fifth Panzer Army, Mission of November 1944-January 1945. In a conference which the author held with Manteuffel and his chief of staff, Generalmajor Carl Gustav Wagener, in Karlsruhe on 10 June 1960 Wagener said that Hitler expressed no particular interest in Bastogne during the offensive phase, nor did he insist that his original orders to capture Bastogne be followed.

{228} The history of the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division is related by the commander of the detachments at Bastogne in MS # P-032c, Ardennes Project: Report on the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, 16 December 1944-2 February 1945 (Maucke).

{229} Colonel Chappuis later was awarded the DSC.

{230} The German sources of greatest use are: the OB WEST/IC-Tagesmeldungen for this period; MSS ETHINT-34 (Buecks); ETHINT-40, LXXXV Infantry Corps in the Ardennes Offensive (General der Infanterie Baptist Kniess); ETHINT-51 (Jodl); ETHINT-54, Seventh Army, Ardennes (Generalmajor Rudolf Freiherr von Gersdorff); MSS # A-876 (Brandenberger); A-930 and A-931 (Sensfuss); B-029, LIII Corps, 8 December 1944-21 January 1945 (General der Kavallerie Edwin Graf Rothkirch); B-030 (Kniess); B-067 (Schmidt); B-073 (Sensfuss); B-081 (Beyer); P-032f (Dempwolff).

{231} See Chapter X, passim, and the American records cited therein. 1st Lt. Edgar C. Heist, Company D, 70th Tank Battalion, so distinguished himself that he was awarded the DSC. He was killed on 22 December.

{232} See below, Chapter XXI, note 2, for documentary sources relating to Patton and the Third Army.

{233} The combat interviews with the XII Corps provide an enlightening account of the problems encountered in the Third Army ninety-degree wheel to the north. See also the XII Corps AAR and G-3 journal. The semiofficial history of the XII Corps is Lt. Col. George Dyer's XII Corps: Spearhead of Patton's Third Army (Baton Rouge: Military Press of Louisiana, n.d.), ch. 11, passim.

{234} The 5th Infantry Division, as one would expect of an old line outfit, maintained very good records. General Irwin also made his personal diary available to the author. All three of the infantry regiments published official accounts: History of the Second Infantry Regiment, History of the Tenth Infantry Regiment, History of the Eleventh Infantry Regiment (All Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1946). The journals maintained by each of the rifle battalions are particularly useful.

{235} Combat interview and General Irwin's diary. The move of the 10th Infantry seems to have gone according to plan only in its first stages. Lt. Col. Donald W. Thackeray, the division G-2, and Lt. Col. George K. Moody, assistant G-3, were told by the Third Army staff that the regiment would go into assembly area in the vicinity of Rammeldange but that the 10th Armored would provide guides and prepare billets at the bivouac point. Apparently the 10th Armored did not get the word, and the skeleton staff in Luxembourg made no plans for the reception of the 10th Infantry until an officer from the 5th Division literally stumbled upon the 10th Armored forward command post. As a result the incoming infantry were put on the road to Rammeldange but no billets were provided. See Ltr, Maj. Gen. William M. Breckenridge to OCMH, 30 Nov 60.

{236} The enemy pitched a couple of smoke grenades into a crowded cellar, causing quick spread of the rumor that gas warfare had begun.

{237} The Robb Notes are the source of the Supreme Commander's views.

{238} The operations of the Third Army in the Bastogne counterattack are the subject of a special journal prepared by the TUSA 3 staff (in the author's possession). In addition the TUSA chief of staff, General Gay, kept an official Third Army diary (referred to hereafter as Gay Diary), a copy of which was used by the author. The personal data on General Patton is interesting but adds little to the official records. See also George S. Patton, Jr., War As I Knew It (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1947) and Harry H. Semmes, Portrait of Patton (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955).

{239} III Corps AR; G-2 and G-3 Jnls.

{240} Ezell's adventure was carefully checked at the time and is the subject of a special series of combat interviews.

{241} Very detailed coverage of the 80th Division operation will be found in the combat interviews. The division records are less useful than the AAR's and journals of the three infantry regiments. See also, Capt. Roy T. McGrann, The 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Pittsburgh, Pa.; Geyer Printing Company, 1946).

{242} Colonel Bandy was awarded the DSC for courageous leadership in the fighting on this day.

{243} Lieutenant Hritsik was awarded the DSC.

{244} The combat interviews are fragmentary for the 26th Division and the historian must rely on the regimental records. The 26th Division AAR is fairly complete, but the account of the action is very terse. The only publications of value are S/Sgt. Jerome J. Theise, ed., History of the Three Hundred Twenty-Eight Infantry Regiment, From Reactivation, 12 February 1943, to VE Day, 9 May (Wels: Verlagsdruckerei, 1945); and The History of the 26th Yankee Division (Salem, 1955).

{245} The American cavalry was greatly outnumbered at Rambrouch and forced to withdraw. Sgt. Lawrence L. Hatfield, whose platoon covered the withdrawal, was given the DSC.

{246} With the exception of those conducted with the 101st Airborne Division, the combat interviews with the 4th Armored Division are the most informative of all those bearing on the battle at Bastogne. The 4th Armored AAR and G-3 journal provide little exact or detailed information. The combat command AAR's and journals remedy this lack. Each battalion has either an AAR or unit journal. See also K. A. Koyen, The Fourth Armored Division (Munich, 1945); Lt. Col. D. M. Oden, 4th Armored Division-Relief of the 101st Airborne Division, Bastogne, Pamphlet Series, Command and General Staff College, 1947; History of the Ninety-Fourth Armored Field Artillery Battalion (n.d., n.p.); and The Armored School MS, Armor at Bastogne (May 1949).

{247} Patton, in his book, War As I Knew It (page 201), admits that his order for day and night attack by the armor was an error.

{248} The story of this fight at Chaumont is confused. As many as twenty-two "tanks" were reported by the Americans, and these are alleged to have swept in from west, north, and east. See combat interviews; CCB S-2 Jnl; and MS # B-023 (Heilmann).

{249} The history of the Führer Grenadier Brigade is included in Die Geschichte Des Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, II, pp. 735ff. For other German units facing the XII Corps see MSS # B-023 (Heilmann); B-067 (Schmidt); B-030 (Kniess); and the German Seventh Army B.T.O., Tätigkeitsbericht, 2. Halbjahr, 1944.

{250} Capt. Robert W. Smith, commanding Company K, was awarded the DSC for bravery and leadership displayed in the fight at Kehmen.

{251} Pfc. J. O. Bird, of Company G, 39th Infantry, was awarded the DSC for gallantry in the Ringel action. When his company was pinned down by an enemy machine gun, Private Bird went forward alone, under direct fire, and shot the crew; he accounted for fifteen Germans with his rifle.

{252} The Eschdorf fight is well covered in the combat interviews held shortly after the event. The orders and counterorders given Hamilton are found in the 26th Division G-3 journal and the 104th Infantry journal. The journal of the 104th records that Company F was driven out of Eschdorf (at 0835 on 25 December) and seems to have been interpreted as meaning that none of Hamilton's force was in the town. However, no part of the 1st Battalion, 104th Infantry, was committed in this fight until after the air strike on the afternoon of 25 December.

{253} There seems to have been some initial confusion as to the exact status of the troops already in that village, for in one of the rare changes made in an official periodic report that of the III Corps was amended to read that the 26th Division "relieved two companies of the 80th Division" in place of "liberated two companies of the 80th Division."

{254} The 26th Division fight on the far bank of the Sure is described in Chapter XXIV.

{255} The battles on 26 December elicited numerous deeds of heroism. DSC's were subsequently awarded to Capt. James H. Leach and 2d Lt. John A. Whitehill of the 4th Armored Division; Capt. Gabriel R. Martinez and Pfc. A. G. Means of the 318th Infantry; and 2d Lt. Frederick Rau of the 274th Armored Field Artillery Battalion.

{256} Montgomery, Normandy to the Baltic, p. 280ff; The Memoirs of Field Marshal Montgomery, p. 276. The latter touches on the Ardennes campaign only lightly.

{257} For a Belgian view of the German offensive, see Paul Levy, Les Heures Rouges des Ardennes (Bruxelles, 1946). It may be added that not a single act of sabotage at the Meuse crossings was reported during the entire Ardennes campaign. Headquarters Advance Section, G-3, History of Operations: December 1943-1 July 1945.

{258} The more general impact of the Ardennes on the American supply bases and logistical system is treated in Roland G. Ruppenthal, Logistical Support of the Armies, UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II (Washington, 1959), vol. II.

{259} On 23 December Montgomery ordered all demolition charges removed from the bridges in the British sector. SHAEF SGS 381/2 Germany, German Counter Offensive, vol. I.

{260} Manteuffel's recollections of this period are very vivid: see MS # B-151a.

{261} See Chapter XVIII for the earlier story of the 2d Panzer advance guard.

{262} General Collins had a detailed memorandum on these events prepared by his staff and later kindly provided a photostat copy to the author.

{263} The present chapter will be concerned only with the battles fought by those troops of the VII Corps which were west of Hotton on 25 December. The next chapter will deal with the remaining combat elements of Collins' corps as these played their part in the XVIII Airborne Corps' fight farther east.

{264} For the American sources used in this chapter see the bibliographical notes included in the footnotes to Chapter XVIII. There are a number of combat interviews covering the 2d Armored Division during this period. General Harmon's own story is told in an article entitled, "We Gambled in the Battle of the Bulge," The Saturday Evening Post (October 2, 1948).

{265} British participation is acknowledged in the CCB AAR, 25 December 1944. See also MS, 30 Corps, Operations during the German Attack in the Ardennes, December 1944-January 1945 in Hist Div ETOUSA files.

{266} CCB AAR, 26 Dec 44.

{267} The dramatic end of the hopes nourished for the 2d Panzer and Panzer Lehr find expression in very detailed recollections by Lauchert; Bayerlein, MSS # A-941, A-943, and A-944; and Lüttwitz, MSS # A-938 and A-940.

{268} CCR AAR, 27 Dec 44.

{269} 2d Armored still was in contact with the enemy on 28 December. Pvt. C. W. Dillingham was given the DSC for bravery in breaking through a defended roadblock with his tank; Pfc. F. S. Rose was given the DSC for crawling with a broken leg for one and a half miles through snow and cold to bring aid to his mortally wounded scout section leader after their jeep had hit a double Teller mine.

{270} Sources used in this section are the same as those cited in Chapter XVIII.

{271} Model's suicide, later in the war, permits interpretations by his superiors and subordinates which may or may not be in accord with the facts. Even so, the OB WEST KTB does provide a reasonable guide to Model's conduct of the Ardennes operation in these last days of the offensive. Also, the OB WEST/IC-Tagesmeldungen reveal what information on the Allied dispositions and intentions was available to Model. A further check is provided by a series of postwar interrogations involving Rundstedt and Jodl. For the former see CSDIC (U.K.) # GRGG 330, SRGG 1332 and SRGG 1334 (these interrogations date from July and August 1945). Jodl was interrogated by the USFET Historical Division before his execution: MS ETHINT-51 (Jodl). See also the testimony of Jodl's aide in MS ETHINT-34 (Buecks).

{272} The term "elements of the 3d Armored Division" is used advisedly for CCB was operating with the 30th Division in the La Gleize sector, while Task Force Doan (Lt. Col. Leander L. Doan) was with the 84th Division west of the Ourthe. For the preceding action of these elements, see Chapter XXII.

{273} See Msg, Montgomery to Eisenhower, 25 Dec 44, SHAEF Msg file. Montgomery appears to have been kept fully apprised of the Manhay fight by the Phantom service. See Hills, Phantom Was There. See also Sylvan Diary and XVIII Airborne Corps G-3 Jnl.

{274} Collins' decision is described in Chapter XXII.

{275} This failure is confirmed in the XVIII Airborne Corps Inspector General Report of Investigation, CCA, 7th Armored, Manhay, 24-25 December 1944, dated 6 January 1945.

{276} Sylvan Diary; XVIII Airborne G-3 Jnl, 25 Dec 44.

{277} Like nearly all green divisions the 75th Infantry Division failed to keep or transmit really complete and useful historical records during its first combat operations. The bulk of the detailed information on the regimental actions of this division comes from the 3d Armored units to which the formations of the 75th were attached and from the combat interviews with the former. For the 289th Infantry, however, there exists the written recollections of the regimental communications officer, Capt. Walter G. Runte's study in the Advanced Infantry Officers' Course, Class No. 1.

{278} CCB, S-3 Jnl and AAR. The 474th Squadron Operations report of 25 December 1944, says that the vehicles attacked were displaying orange panels. By this date, however, some German units were using the distinctive U.S. orange insignia. The IX TAC operations summary of 25 December notes that the 7th Armored had set the coordinate P-5388 as the "no-bomb" line; everything to the east, therefore, was fair game. McGeorge's assembly area was almost exactly on the coordinates given.

{279} At 1345 on the 25th, General Kean, First Army chief of staff, called the IX TAC and said that the first priority air mission for the entire First Army was the enemy penetration at the junction of the XVIII Airborne and VII Corps. IX TAC, A-2 Jnl.

{280} The early story of Hogan's task force is told in Chapter XV.

{281} Capt. David C. Clagett, Study for the Advanced Infantry Officers Course, Class 1.

{282} The price for the initial commitment of the two regiments from the 75th was relatively high. The total losses of CCA, 3d Armored, during the fighting from 22 to 31 December were 70 killed, 376 wounded, and 218 missing. Of this total the attached 289th Infantry alone lost 37 killed, 208 wounded, and 79 missing. 289th Inf AAR, Dec 44.

{283} The man who stopped the lead tank may have been T/Sgt. Stephen G. Andromidas of Company L (Ltr, Maj. C. W. Anderson to Maj. Gen. William F. Train, 13 Dec 60). It is also possible that these German tanks were checked by a tank destroyer of the 629th Tank Destroyer Battalion. Sgt. Oscar M. Mullins and Pfc. Edwin W. Metz were awarded the DSC (both posthumously) for stopping an attack of "fourteen" enemy tanks on this date.

{284} For this phase of the action, the most useful materials are W. G. Lord, History of the 508th Parachute Infantry (Washington, 1948); 82d Abn Div, Chronology, Dec 44; 82d Abn Div, The Story of the Bulge: The Division Commander's Report; and especially the combat interviews.

{285} The German account of this action will be found in MS # P-032E. The best American account is that given in Spearhead In the West. See also journals of the 289th Infantry and CCA, 3d Armored Division. The paratroopers took the main losses in this fight: 120 casualties.

{286} The 4th Armored attack toward Bastogne is described in Chapter XXI, pp. 523-32, 547-55.

{287} The earlier operations of the 26th Division on the right flank of the III Corps are discussed in Chapter XXI, pp. 540-47.

{288} The 35th Division had suffered heavily in the Lorraine battles (for which see Cole, The Lorraine Campaign, ch. XII, passim) and General Gay persuaded Patton not to throw the division into the Ardennes fight until other Third Army divisions in better condition had been committed. (The AAR's of the 35th Division in the early phases of the Ardennes are so abbreviated as to be practically useless. Fortunately the story is told in considerable detail in the combat interviews. The published histories of the division's activities are very good. See Miltonberger and Huston, 134th Infantry Regiment: Combat History of World War II (Washington, n.d.); Combat History of the 137th Infantry Regiment (Baton Rouge, 1946); and The 35th Infantry Division in World War II (Atlanta, n.d.).

{289} Cf. Chapter XIX.

{290} This controversy as to Allied strategy is well treated in Pogue, The Supreme Command, pp. 312-17. Montgomery's strategy has had a number of defenders, but in the main they have produced more heat than light. One of the ablest is Reginald William Thompson whose The Battle for the Rhineland (London: Hutchinson, 1958) advances the thesis that Montgomery's attitude throughout the Ardennes campaign was governed by the military principle of the "maintenance of the objective," that is, the retention of forces (British and Canadian) in a posture which would permit a rapid resumption of the battle for the Rhineland.

{291} Notes; Bradley, A Soldier's Story, p. 480; Hq 12th Army Group, Military Objectives, file 371.3, vol. IV.

{292} Sylvan Diary; Gay Diary; Robb Notes.

{293} Manteuffel argues that the American counterattack began prematurely; see Freidin and Richardson, eds., Fatal Decisions, p. 290.

{294} The German sources contributing most directly to this chapter are MSS # B-23, 5th Parachute Division, 1 December 1944-12 January 1945 (Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann); # B-041, 167th Volks Grenadier Division, 24 December 1944-February 1945, Corps Höcker, 2-10 March 1945 and 59th Infantry Division, 20 March-24 April 1945 (Generalleutnant Hans Höcker); # B-068, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, Ardennes (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-151, Fifth Panzer Army, Ardennes Offensive (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-151a, sequel to MS # B-151 (General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel); # B-235, Fifth Panzer Army, 2 November 1944-16 January 1945 (Generalmajor Carl Wagener); # B-465, 3d Panzer Grenadier Division, 16-28 December 1944 (Generalmajor Walter Denkert); # B-592, Führer Begleit Brigade, 16 December 1944-26 January 1945 (Generalmajor Otto Remer); # B-701, Army Group B, 15 October 1944-1945 (Col Guenther Reichhelm); # B-799, LXXXIX Corps, 24 January-8 March 1945 (Lt Col Kurt Reschke).

{295} The German estimate of the opposing forces and Allied reserves moving into the Ardennes may be traced in the daily Ic. Feindlagekarten attached to the OB WEST KTB.

{296} During this battle Sgt. T. J. Dawson, Company C, 19th Tank Battalion, was killed by a direct artillery hit while attempting to rescue the crew members from his burning tank. He was awarded the DSC posthumously.

{297} Remer's operations west of Bastogne are described by Remer and some of his officers in MS # B-592 (Remer) and Die Geschichte Des Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, vol. II.

{298} Since the 87th Division and the 11th Armored fought side by side during this operation, their journals and histories should be used together. The 87th Division AAR is of little value but those prepared by the regiments are quite detailed. See Also Historical and Pictorial Record of the 87th Infantry Division in World War II (Baton Rouge: Army and Navy Publishing Company, 1946). The records of the 11th Armored are surprisingly complete for an armored outfit in its first operations. See also Hal D. Steward, Thunderbolt (Washington: 11th Armored Division Association, 1948). The combat interviews are very comprehensive in coverage of the 11th Armored but have virtually nothing on the 87th Division.

{299} See MSS # A-932 (Gersdorff); B-041 (Höcker); and B-799 (Reschke).

{300} The battle fought by the 6th Armored Division east of Bastogne received very detailed treatment in the combat interviews. The journals of the division were collected after the war and published under the title, Combat Record of the Sixth Armored Division (Aschaffenburg, n.d.) General Grow has provided excerpts from his personal diary for the author's use.

{301} During the battle in the woods Sgt. George P. Rimmer of Company A led a series of combat patrols against the enemy with such daring and success as to merit the special commendation of his commander. He received the DSC.

{302} Sgt. H. L. Luther was awarded the DSC for personally killing or capturing the enemy occupants of three dugouts during the affray at Harlange.

{303} The reports on this period of battle as found in the division and regimental AAR's are very sparse, but the G-3 and S-3 journals are useful. The combat interviews give quite extensive coverage. See also the 735th Tank Battalion AAR, December 1944.

{304} Capts. John J. Christy and Leland R. Dunham, commanding the two rile companies in this fight and the subsequent recapture of Kaundorf, received the DSC. During the night of 27 December Pvt. R. L. Presser of Company K, 104th Infantry, swam the Sure River under fire carrying a wounded comrade from a patrol on the north bank. Presser was awarded the DSC.

{305} During this advance 2d Lt. G. F. Pennington of Company E knocked out an enemy armored car with a rocket although mortally wounded. He was awarded the DSC posthumously.

{306} Sgt. B. R. Eastburn of Company C, 104th Infantry, was leading a platoon in the attack which came under intense machine gun fire and could not move forward. Eastburn "borrowed" another platoon and wiped out the machine gun nests. He received the DSC. Pfc. S. E. Hull, a member of the same company, broke up a German tank attack when he crawled forward with a bazooka and, at thirty-five yards' range, destroyed the lead panzer. Hull put in another rocket which killed the second tank, and thus ended the attack. Hull was awarded the DSC.

{307} Although the 502d had no offensive mission, the paratroopers had been involved in continuous small-scale combat with the enemy in their sector. During one such affair on 29 December a division aid man, Pfc. Floyd P. Marquart, went forward under fire to help a paratrooper who had been struck in the throat by a shell fragment and was slowly suffocating. Marquart performed an emergency tracheotomy with his belt knife, then dragged the wounded man back to a place of safety. He was given the Silver Star.

{308} The immediate reason for pulling back from the exposed tip of the salient was the American pressure on Rochefort. The 329th Infantry forced an entry there on 29 December and, although the regiment failed to gain complete control of the town on this date, the enemy could not risk a further defense with his depleted forces.

{309} See description in MS # B-172, Army Group B Engineers, 1-25 January 1945 (Generalleutnant Richard Wirtz).

{310} The German order of battle for the period of 16 December-2 January was as follows: 1st SS, 2d SS, 9th SS, 12th SS Panzer Divisions; Panzer Lehr and 2d, 9th, 116th Panzer Divisions; 3d and 5th Parachute Divisions; 3d and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions; 9th, 12th, 18th, 26th, 62d, 79th, 167th, 212th, 246th, 272d, 276th, 277th, 326th, 340th, 352d, 560 Volks Grenadier Divisions; and the Führer-Grenadier and Führer Begleit Brigades. The American order of battle for the same period included: the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, and 11th Armored Divisions; the 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions; the 1st, 2d, 4th, 5th, 9th, 26th, 28th, 30th, 35th, 75th, 80th, 83d, 84th, 87th, 99th, and 106th Infantry Divisions.

{311} For the characteristics of this equipment, see H. A. Koch, Flak: Die Geschichte der Deutschen Flakartillerie (Bad Nauheim, Germany: PodzuhnVerlag, 1954).

{312} As an example see Vannevar Bush, Modern Arms and Free Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1949): "The proximity fuze may well have saved Liège," p. 31. The conclusions reached in the text above are based on the rigorous analysis in Royce L. Thompson's Employment of VT Fuzes in the Ardennes Campaign (1950). MS in OCMH files.

{313} Office of the Director of Intelligence, U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe, Allied Air Power and the Ardennes Offensive (n.d.).

{314} 2d Tactical Air Force Operational Research Section, Report 19, The Contribution of the Air Forces to the Stemming of the Enemy Thrust in the Ardennes, 16-26 December 1944 (September 1945).

{315} This section is based on the extensive research done by Charles V. P. von Luttichau in his manuscript German Rail Communications in the Ardennes Offensive 1944-1945, and Royce L. Thompson's equally careful and detailed study, Tactical Air Phase of the Ardennes Campaign. Neither of these manuscript studies has been published, but both should be of great interest to students of logistics.

{316} Adolf Galland, The First and The Last (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1960), p. 242.

{317} This reserve was only fifty of the normal ammunition trains; each had been divided in two for protection against air attack. On 13 December the ammunition on hand and in shipment for Army Group B totaled 15,099 tons, but 5,353 tons were allocated to the Fifteenth Army, which did not, as planned, take part in the offensive.

{318} For these plans, see the LXVII AK: KTB Anlagen, 12 Dec 44.

{319} Manteuffel in MS # B-151a, p. 160. It is significant that the OB WEST G-4, Colonel John, also picks this date as the turning point in the German offensive. See Headquarters 12th Army Group, Consolidated Interrogation Report 1, 12 June 1945.

{320} Contained in OB WEST: KTB, 26 Dec 44.

{321} OKH: Org. Abt. KTB; see also Schramm, Merkbuch.

{322} Heer In Fesseln, p. 283.

{323} MS # A-874 (Waldenburg).

{324} The USSR Information Bulletin, 12 May 1948, and Novoye Vremya, No. 18, 18 February 1948. The most recent of such Soviet claims is that made by Marshall Grechko in Pravda, 9 May 1960.

{325} In answers to a questionnaire submitted by the Historical Section, USFET, on 20 July 1945, which answers were signed by both Jodl and Keitel.

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