CHAPTER FIVE:
The Black Prince returned with his prisoner to Bordeaux and negotiations began almost immediately for the king’s release. These negotiations formed the backdrop to Anglo-French relations for the next several years. King Jean was not, of course, the only prisoner taken captive at Poitiers, indeed the battle was extraordinary by late medieval standards for the number of prisoners taken.1 As opposed to Crécy, the soldiers received permission to take hostages, and the conditions of the battle made the capture of the great nobles in the king’s division comparatively easy. Some contemporaries complained that the French nobles had purchased their lives too cheaply and surrendered too soon, but in reality there was nothing to gain by continuing the fight and everything to lose. It is also too simplistic an explanation for the French defeat.
In 1352, partly in response to the establishment of the Order of the Garter, although a similar project had been in mind since 1344, Jean II founded the Company of Our Lady of the Noble House, commonly called the Company of the Star. It was a monarchical order of knighthood with a number of privileges and obligations, one of which was never to flee from battle. It is recorded that at the battle of Mauron in 1352, 89 members of the Company died because of their oath never to retreat. A number of the much-depleted Company were also at Poitiers (as indeed were many members of the much smaller Order of the Garter) including the king’s sons, Jean de Melun, Jean de Clermont, Charny, and Armagnac. Charny, the author of a number of chivalric manuals and treatises, some probably written for the Company of the Star, died at Poitiers, and it seems unlikely that these were men who would only retreat or surrender, especially in the presence of their king, unless there was no other option.2
It is impossible to be precise about the number of captives: chronicle accounts range in number between 1,000 and 3,000, and the most recent study suggests that a figure of about 2,000 is probable. The situation that this provided was novel, problematic, and offered a range of opportunities for Edward III and the Black Prince. Clearly a financial benefit could accrue from ransoming some of the exalted figures taken captive, and more particularly there were political advantages. For the majority of the 2,000, however, the financial gains were limited and the political advantages virtually non-existent, so most were released within weeks upon payment or the promise of payment to their captors. There were 17 individuals, however, who were considered to be of national importance, and after the return to Bordeaux the prince and his father purchased the rights to these prisoners from their captors. The total cost to the royal purse was around £65,000, £20,000 of which was pledged to the Black Prince. Surprisingly, the great majority of money due to Anglo-Gascon captors from the Crown was paid. The prince himself, however, received just over a third of the sum owed to him although he received much of the residual sum in grants made during the establishment of the principality of Aquitaine in 1362–3.
The final economic benefits to the English Crown are difficult to establish for many of these prisoners. Indeed, with the exception of King Jean, it is unlikely that after the outlay and expense of maintaining such noble figures in England and Bordeaux Edward made any real financial gains. His motivation in purchasing them was political and he hoped to acquire influence over them. He also managed to remove Jean II and a number of his leading councillors and nobles from positions of power leaving France without guidance or direction and, hopefully, willing to accept a peace treaty on English terms. In the event, although it weakened his position at Poitiers, Jean’s decision to dismiss Charles, the dauphin, from the field proved extremely significant. Without his steadying influence, the turmoil in the months after the battle might have been even greater and the experience of ruling in these troubled times provided an excellent training for one of the most of the most gifted and capable of French monarchs.
Jean was brought to England and treated as his status demanded. Froissart and the author of the Anonimalle Chronicle described the journey from Bordeaux to London (11 April – 24 May 1357) vividly. Edward III and various magnates entertained the captured king with various pageants, displays and diversions en route. King Jean entered London on a white courser and the prince followed him on a black hackney.3 The king then lodged in the duke of Lancaster’s Savoy palace.
The first concrete agreement between the sides was the First Treaty of London, concluded on 8 May 1358. Negotiations, encouraged by the papacy, continued after an initial truce had been established at Bordeaux on 23 March 1357. The treaty set Jean's ransom at four million gold écus (£666,666). In addition, it demanded the restoration of all English lands in Aquitaine and Ponthieu, and confirmation of Calais as English territory. Nothing was offered in return; it was a ransom agreement, not a peace treaty, and Jean’s willingness to concede was prompted by his fear for France and his own desire for freedom. However, by accepting a ransom, Edward III implied that he accepted Jean’s title as king of France. The first instalment of 600,000 écus, due to be paid prior to the king’s release, was, however not delivered by the agreed date of l November.
The second treaty, signed on 24 March 1359, was even more demanding. In return for Jean’s release and (on this occasion) Edward’s renunciation of his claim to the French throne, the English king demanded nothing less than the return of the lands of the Angevin Empire with the addition of Ponthieu, Boulogne, Guînes, and Calais in full sovereignty. The French were to pay three million écus by L August 1359, and a further million was to follow, to be guaranteed by various royal and noble hostages. The territorial demands were so great that Edward may have agreed to give up his claim to the throne, knowing that the treaty could never be accepted and its refusal would provide him with an excuse for a further invasion. Even if this did not give him the throne, it would put further pressure on the French to accept his terms for a major territorial settlement. The truce that had been agreed at Bordeaux was extended from 9 April to 24 June 1359.
The French failure to comply with the first treaty was based less on unwillingness than on the inability to raise the necessary revenue. By 1359, the dauphin had restored control. The threat posed by the Jacquerie, the mercenary companies, and Charles ‘the Bad’ of Navarre had been reduced, and the French council was now in a position to resist a potential English invasion. Jean and his advisers, who were held captive in England and may have believed that the invasion force that Edward III was recruiting would destroy or capture France, did not know this. In May the French Estates General refused to implement the treaty and both sides prepared for war.
The Reims campaign of 1359–60 involved one of the largest single forces gathered by the English in the Hundred Years War. The army marched from Calais to Reims, the coronation city of France, which Edward intended to take by force if necessary and there have himself crowned – he brought a crown with him in his baggage train for that express reason. The siege failed. The people of Reims were not as friendly as Edward had hoped, and they had had plenty of time to prepare defences and lay in stores that proved more than adequate. By contrast, the English found the siege extremely difficult. Food was difficult to find and forage for the horses almost impossible. It seems to have been this that drove the king finally to lift the siege and look elsewhere for his victory. First he rode to Burgundy and by means of a hefty financial inducement managed to secure the support of some of the local nobility. Next he rode to Paris.
The battle of Poitiers had galvanised the building of fortifications within France, indeed the English victory at Poitiers, to a degree prevented a successful siege of Reims since the town’s defences were greatly improved in the years between 1356 and 1359. Castles, churches and manor houses were all fortified in those intervening years. In many cases these were official fortifications, but they also provided sanctuary for those whose living was dependent on war. ‘These fortifications were the centres of ‘borrowed’ lordships which provided for their occupants in the long intervals between the grander military adventures ... The professional soldiers who occupied them were ... freebooters...because they made a living out of soldiering without depending on the wages paid to them by their sovereign.’4 Such men proved a great nuisance for the Valois monarchy in the early 1360s.
In Paris, the dauphin, Charles, was a very different man from his father and grandfather. He was not drawn out as Philip had been in 1346, or Jean ten years later. He waited and watched as the English battered themselves against the walls in one of the bleakest winters in memory. Finally, on 13 April, which became known at Black Monday, a truce was agreed at Brétigny.
The treaty of Brétigny of 8 May 1360 marked the end of what we might call the first period of the Hundred Years War. Formal hostilities were brought to a conclusion through a settlement involving the transfer of a captured king and the renunciation of the English claim for the French throne in return for nearly a third of the kingdom of France and a sizeable cash incentive – at least in theory. More properly the treaty of Brétigny should be known as the treaty of Brétigny-Calais for it was at the coastal town that the final clauses of the settlement were to be signed and the agreement completed. For some reason or reasons, they were not.
At Brétigny, Edward III agreed to renounce his French title: at Calais, on 24 October 1360, this was delayed. The agreement stipulated that Aquitaine, Poitou, Ponthieu, Guînes, Calais and its march were to be handed over to the English in full sovereignty, and Jean II would be returned for the kingly sum of three million écus. Edward would renounce his claim to the French throne as well as to Normandy, Anjou and Maine. These were essentially the same conditions as in the first treaty of London although the ransom was somewhat reduced. However, by the time of the signing of the treaty at Calais, not all the promised territories were in Edward’s hands. In order to guarantee their transfer it appears that Edward had the so-called renunciation clauses removed and placed in a separate document which envisaged that the handover of lands would happen by 1 November 1361 at the latest. The renunciations would then be made orally and ratified in writing by 30 November. In the interim, the king of France would refrain from exercising his sovereignty in the territories in question and Edward would refrain from using his French title. The mutual renunciations were never performed.5
Whether this was deliberate policy on one side or both in order to provide a loophole to resume hostilities is unclear, although it does seem unlikely. In a sense the capture of King Jean at Poitiers created as much of a problem as it provided an opportunity. After Edward failed to capture Reims, Jean was useful only as a ransom prisoner – if he was to be ransomed as a king then Edward had to accept his kingship. From 24 October 1360, Edward III refrained from using the French title, although, perhaps significantly, he continued to use the fleur de lys as part of his coat of arms. It appears that both Jean and Edward saw the treaty as tenable and they thought it marked both an end to England’s claim to the throne and of French sovereignty in England’s continental possessions.
If Edward III truly believed he could have become king of France then the treaty of 1360 may be judged a failure. If he had fought the war primarily to secure full sovereignty over his continental possessions then it was a triumph. Different interpretations continue and abound. In many ways students of the period have been somewhat dogmatic in their interpretation of the war in general and particularly the treaty of Brétigny-Calais. Few have taken account of the fact that motivations change, opportunities develop, and conditions evolve. There does not seem to have been enough acceptance of such a simple interpretation. For Edward, the throne of France and his claim to it may have been nothing more than a simple bargaining chip in 1337. After Crécy, after Poitiers, after the depredations to France caused by the English chevauchée policy and by the Black Death; after the revolt of the Jacquerie and turmoil in Paris caused by Etienne Marcel; and given the financial implications of the king’s ransom and the need for town and coastal defences, the throne may have seemed much more attainable.